Markets for Sports. Robert M. Coen. Professor Emeritus of Economics. Northwestern Alumnae Continuing Education. January 26, 2017

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Markets for Sports Robert M. Coen Professor Emeritus of Economics Northwestern Alumnae Continuing Education January 26, 2017

William Hurlburt, 1832-1882 Founded National Baseball League, 1876 Ban Johnson, 1864-1931 Founded American Baseball League, 1901

Exemplary Competitive Market Many small consumers and producers Competition holds price and profits down, output up Producers desire to monopolize Restrict output, raise price, make high profits Attempts to monopolize thwarted by competition

What s Different About Sports Markets? Competition (sporting) is basis of profitability Nurture competitors, don t destroy them Product is not just the game Exciting competition requires economic collusion a league Establish rules of game and fair play Assure competitive balance Organize crowd-pleasing championships Limit entry to keep prices up, depress wages Negotiate media coverage The legal firm is the team; the economic firm is the league The league is a natural monopoly

Market served most cheaply by one firm One firm potentially lowest price for consumers Larger firm can drive out smaller Examples Natural Monopoly Railroads Telephone service (in old days) Electric and gas utilities How to control monopoly power? Regulate Interstate Commerce Commission (1887) Federal Communications Commission (1934) Illinois Commerce Commission

Un-natural Monopoly Producers collude (cartel or trust) to eliminate competition Examples Standard Oil (1911) American Tobacco (1911) AT&T (1982) How to prevent un-natural monopolization? Prosecute Sherman Act, 1890 Clayton Act, 1914

Is Professional Sport a Natural Monopoly? Many teams can be sustained in a league, but only as cartel Scale economies arise from championship and media outputs Can many leagues be sustained in a market? Probably not Early professional leagues highly unstable U.S. baseball and football are examples

National League History Preceded by National Association of Professional Baseball Players Poor scheduling, unstable membership, dominant team 1876 Businessman William Hurlburt forms National League League faces savage competition -- price cutting, wage increases 1882 American Association 1890 Players League 1901 American League National League prevails 1903 National and American Leagues form Major League Baseball 1914-15 Federal League comes and goes

Initial Teams of National League, 1876 Chicago White Stockings (now Chicago Cubs) Philadelphia Athletics (expelled after 1876) Boston Red Stockings (now Atlanta Braves) Hartford Dark Blues (folded after 1877) Mutual of New York (expelled after 1876) St. Louis Brown Stockings (folded after 1877) Cincinnati Red Stockings (expelled after 1880) Louisville Grays (folded after 1877, players banned for gambling)

National Football League History 1920 National Football League formed 1940-42 American Football League comes and goes 1946-49 All-American Football Conference comes and goes AAFC included Cleveland Browns, SF 49ers, Baltimore Colts 1960 American Football League formed 1967 First Super Bowl played 1970 NFL and AFL merge, form NFC and AFC

Sports Cartel Practices Roster limits Reserve clause Salary caps Draft priority Revenue sharing Promotion and relegation Seek public subsidies

Reserve Clause 1879 NL owners adopt reserve clause Players cannot change teams without permission Like slavery -- restricts freedom, holds down wages 1922 Baltimore, of defunct Federal League, sues MLB for monopoly Supremes rule that MLB not subject to antitrust Why? Not interstate commerce!! 1951 Congressional hearings find support for reserve clause Justification: Needed for competitive balance 1953 Supremes asked to rule specifically on reserve clause Reaffirm antitrust exemption cite Congressional inaction 1972 Players Union backs Curt Flood challenge Supremes again reaffirm exemption 1976 Free agency finally won through collective bargaining

Did Reserve Clause Achieve Competitive Balance? Shouldn t in theory Didn t in fact Revenue stream generated by player is property Under reserve clause, club owns property Under free agency, player owns property Property will migrate to wherever it is most valued Invariant to who owns it Baltimore and Boston dynasties in 1890's Dominance of three NYC teams in 20th c. Supremacy of Cardinals 1920-1950 Poor performance of Cubs, Red Sox, Indians

Salary Caps NBA union accepts in 1984-85 Limits player budgets to 53% of average revenue Benefits owners, penalizes big stars 1995, M. Jordan and P. Ewing seek to decertify union Caps not effective -- too many exemptions, bonuses NFL player budgets limited to 63% of average revenue MLB has no caps, but luxury tax on excessive player budgets

What s Happened to Salaries? Prior to 1976, MLB salaries far below estimates of worth to clubs After 1976 (with free agency), salaries rapidly rise toward worth Free agency established three tiers Rookies, no power 4-6 yrs., eligible for arbitration >6, free agency Salaries closer to worth as players move to higher tiers Average MLB salaries exploded after 1980 $140K in 1953 (today s $) $2.5M today up 18X Players share of revenue up from 20% to 60% If pie had remained same, average pay would be up just 3X Growth of pie main source of average salary growth

Draft Priority Pioneered by NFL Sole right awarded to negotiate with new player Worst team gets first pick In 1978, courts held to be unreasonable restraint of trade Adverse court judgment led owners to bargain with union Success in maintaining competitive balance Revenue Sharing In NFL, 40 % of gate goes to visiting team Sharing of broadcast and merchandise income Art Modell: "We're 26 Republicans who vote Socialist!"

Different business model of English soccer leagues Football (soccer) Association (1863) dominated by amateurs 1888, first pro league Promotion and Relegation Designed by amateurs, not business people Goal is not profit maximization Limits on profits and their use Desire to maximize number of teams In England, four tiers Teams move among tiers depending on record Promotion/relegation Strong incentives for team play and investment Growing TV revenue threatens amateur influence

Monopoly and Technical Innovation Does monopoly retard innovation? -- AT&T example Technical advances in delivery of games, expansion of market Revolution in economic-statistical analysis in sports Bill James and Society for American Baseball Research See Michael Lewis, Moneyball Story of GM Billy Beane and Oakland As Beane uses SABRmetrics to build winning team on small budget Might innovation destroy some sports? Golf: Improvements in clubs and balls allow longer hits Courses must expand in size, making game more expensive See Harry Brown, Golf Ball

Future of Sports Markets If natural monopolies, should they be regulated? Attempts to apply Sherman Act misguided Should there be joint ownership of league? Make legal firm and economic firm the same Focus profit maximization on league, rather than club Joint ownership of facilities Greater revenue sharing of all receipts Should entry and mobility be made easier? Tiered leagues; promotion and relegation Should sports leagues be non-profit? Greater use of revenue for amateur sports and recreation Promote other social goals

END