Accident Report. Para 1 & Lightning One Collision on Lake Wakatipu on 14 July 2004

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Transcription:

Accident Report Para 1 & Lightning One Collision on Lake Wakatipu on 14 July 2004

REPORT NO.: 04 3511 VESSEL NAME: PARA 1 & LIGHTNING ONE Casualty Details: Date of Casualty: 14 July 2004 Time of Casualty: Casualty Type: Casualty Location: Investigator: 1720 hours New Zealand Standard Time (NZST) Collision Lake Wakatipu Domonic Venz 2

REPORT NO.: 04 3511 VESSEL NAME: PARA 1 & LIGHTNING ONE Vessel Details: Vessel Name: Para 1 Lightning One Vessel Category: Passenger Passenger Certified Operating Limit: Enclosed Enclosed Overall Length (m): 8.5 11 Flag: New Zealand New Zealand Owner s Name: Parabungy Ltd Parabungy Ltd SSM Company: Survey Nelson Survey Nelson 3

SUMMARY On the evening of 14 July 2004, two para-bungy vessels were returning to their base in Queenstown Bay, Lake Wakatipu. As they both approached the 5 knot zone, one vessel slowed to 5 knots and continued into the 5-knot speed area. The second vessel did a sharp turn to port and then straightened up while still coming off the plane. As the vessel slowed, its bow struck the stern of the first vessel doing damage to both vessels. All passengers were checked with no injuries sustained. The second vessel had damaged the outboard motors while attempting evasive manoeuvres astern and was towed to the wharf by the first vessel. 4

KEY EVENTS 1.1 On Wednesday 14 July 2004 para-bungy and para-flight operations were underway on Lake Wakatipu. 1.2 During the afternoon, two vessels, Para 1 and Lightning One, departed their base wharf in Queenstown Bay and went out to the Sunshine Bay area for para-bungy operations. 1.3 Two para-bungy jumps were successfully completed before the jumpmaster onboard Para 1 called a halt to operations due to the increased wind strength. 1.4 At approximately 1710 hours New Zealand Standard Time (NZST), both vessels headed back towards Queenstown Bay to disembark their passengers at the base wharf. 1.5 Both vessels departed at the same time but upon arrival in Queenstown Bay, Para 1 was ahead and to port of Lightning One. 1.6 Para 1 slowed at the 5-knot marker and slowly proceeded to enter the 5-knot zone. The Skipper of Lightning One made a turn to port and crossed the wake of Para 1 and then turned to starboard to straighten up the vessel. Immediately after returning to a straight course, he saw Para 1 ahead. He put both main engines full astern, at which point, both engines stalled (See Appendix I chart of Queenstown Bay). 1.7 At 1720 hours, the bow of Lightning One struck the stern of Para 1 damaging both vessels. Passengers on both vessels were checked for injuries with none found. 1.8 The Skipper of Lightning One then attempted to start both main engines but could only get the starboard engine started. He then idled into the wharf using the starboard engine and discharged the passengers. 1.9 Both vessels were assessed for damage. Lightning One was removed from the water for engine repairs as was Para 1 for repairs to the aluminium launch platform at the stern of the vessel (See Appendix II Damage to Para 1 and IIA - Damage to Lightning One). 5

KEY CONDITIONS 2.1 Vessel Details 2.1.1 Lightning One is a restricted passenger ship of aluminium construction with inflatable bags built in 1994. She has an overall length of 11 metres and a maximum breadth, excluding the bags, of 2.3 metres. Two 200 hp Yamaha four-stroke outboards power the vessel (See Appendix III - Photograph of vessel). 2.1.2 The vessel had a valid Safe Ship Management (SSM) Certificate with Survey Nelson Ltd. She was fit to ply enclosed limits, Lake Wakatipu, with 2 crew and 22 passengers. 2.1.3 The Skipper, aged 23 of Queenstown, holds a Local Launch Operator (LLO) Certificate, endorsed for Para 1, Lightning One and Thunder One. He obtained this in March 2004. 2.1.4 Para 1 is a restricted passenger ship of aluminium construction built in 1986. She has an overall length of 8.5 metres and a breadth of 3.25 metres. The vessel is powered by two 200 hp Yamaha outboards (See Appendix IV- Photograph of vessel). 2.1.5 The vessel had a valid SSM certificate with Survey Nelson Ltd. She was fit to ply enclosed limits Lake Wakatipu with 2 crew and 12 passengers. 2.1.6 The Skipper holds an Inshore Launch Masters (ILM) Certificate and a Marine Engineers Class 6 (MEC6) Certificate, both obtained in August 2000. 2.1.7 Para 1 is a launch and recovery vessel for para flights. This where a parachute type apparatus is towed behind the vessel and is winched off the stern deck of the vessel. 2.1.8 Lightning One is a recovery vessel. This recovers jumpers after they have completed a bungy jump from the parachute apparatus towed by Para 1 or Thunder 1. 2.1.9 Parabungy New Zealand Limited of Queenstown owns both vessels. 2.2 Weather Conditions 2.2.1 The jumpmaster on board Para 1 had overseen two successful para bungy jumps that afternoon. At around 1700 hours, he halted operations due to the increased wind in the jump area. The condition at the time of cessation was northwest 18 knots and overcast. 2.2.2 Conditions upon their return to Queenstown Bay, were calmer due to the relative shelter of the area. 2.3 Mechanical Details 2.3.1 When the Skipper of Lightning 1 put both engines full astern the vessel was still travelling ahead at about 15 knots. The throttles were in the process of being returned to the idle position but were still at about ¼ revolutions. 2.3.2 Both engines stalled when they were put full astern. One engine could be restarted after the collision and the other could not due to a bent conrod. 6

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS N.B. These are not listed in order of importance. 3.1 The high-speed turn of Lightning One while approaching the 5-knot zone. 3.2 During the turn the Skipper lost visibility over the long bow of Lightning One. 3.3 The Skipper of Lightning One not ascertaining whether there was enough room for such a highspeed manoeuvre. 3.4 Both engines stalled when put full astern and were unable to arrest the forward movement of the vessel. 3.5 The failure of the Skipper of Lightning 1 to maintain a proper Lookout as required under Maritime Rule part 22.5 Look-Out Every vessel must at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions, so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and risk of collision. 3.6 He also failed under Maritime Rule part 22.6 Safe Speed Every vessel must at all times proceed at a safe speed so that proper effective action to avoid a collision can be taken and the vessel can be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. CAUSE Human Factor Failure to comply with regulations Drugs & Alcohol Overloading Failure to obtain ships position or course Fatigue Physiological Improper watchkeeping or lookout Lack of knowledge Ship Handling Misconduct/Negligence Error of judgement Other... Environmental Factor Adverse weather Debris Ice Navigation hazard Adverse current Submerged object Lightning Other... Technical Factor Structural failure Wear & tear Steering failure Mechanical failure Improper welding Inadequate firefighting/lifesaving Electrical failure Inadequate maintenance Insufficient fuel Corrosion Inadequate stability Other... 4.1 While making a made a turn to port and then back to starboard, the Skipper of Lightning One lost visibility over the bow and collided with the stern of the almost stationary Para 1. 7

OPINONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Opinions 5.1.1 The Skipper of Lightning One has been removed from operational duties and has been confined to work on the wharf and front line sales. 5.1.2 He is to undergo in house company retraining. Parabungy New Zealand Ltd has issued him with a formal letter of warning. 6.1 Recommendations 6.1.1 That the Skipper of Lightning One be censured for his failings under Maritime Rule parts 22.5 Lookout and 22.6 Safe Speed. 8

Appendix I 9

Appendix II & II(a) 10

Appendix III 11

Appendix IV 12