s E c RE T / / NOFORN I I 20320214 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY' CUBA APO AE 09360 14February 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue' Miami, FL 33172. JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment l. ) 3. (S/NF) Personal Information: o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Fahed al-fouzan o Aliases and Current/True Name: Fahd Muhammad Abdallah al-fawzan. Fahad Fowzan al-fowzan Barood. al-barud o Place of Birth: Riyadh. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 26 SePtember 1983 o Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000218DP (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 6 January 2006. b. (S771gD Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaida who probably served as a recruiter and fundraiser. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan with $15,000 USO foito*ing the 11 September 2001 attacks. In2002, the Saudi Interior Ministry designatedetainee ur u high-priority detainee. Detainee resided in al-qaida guesthouses and safe houses and possibiy attended an al-qaida-affiliated training camp. Detainee CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20320214 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320214
S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20320214 associated with known al-qaida members and was part of a unit in Tora Bora, Afghanistan (AF). Detainee's name appeared on numerous al-qaida associate documents. o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A LOW threat from a detention perspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. c. (S/NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ) next to the footnote.) o (S/A{F) Detainee is probably associated with Khalid Sulayman Jaydh al-hubayshi's, ISN US9SA-000155DP (SA-155) twin brother, Yasir Sulayman al-hubayshi al-jihani. o (S/A{F) Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-jadani, US9SA-000230DP (SA-230), stated detainee is providing a cover story. o (S/A{F) Detainee is probably a recruiter and fundraiser for al-qaida through al- Haramayn; therefore, detainee's intelligence value was increased from LOW to MEDIUM for this year's assessment. 4. (S/ND Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee quit school at the beginning of middle school. After dropping out of school, detainee found employment at a dessert shop where he worked for over a year before it closed. Detainee then gained employment at a laundromat, where detainee worked with five other individuals.' b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: Just prior to 11 September 200I,2 detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK), via Balrain (BA) and the United Arab Emirates (AE), with $15,000 USD to purchase laundry machines for his business. While en route, d^etainee spent two days in Bahrain, where detainee heard of the events of 1 I September 2001.' Afathal ' o0ozt8 30209-ApR-2002,000218 30203-AUG-2002 2 Analyst Note: In TD-314127540-02, the Saudi Interior Ministry reported that detainee left Saudi Arabia on l0 September 2001, confirming detainee's departure date. ' 00021830203-AUG-2002 2 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20320214
S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20320214 SI-IBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Khan, a friend and fellow employee, met detainee in Karachi, where the pair stayed for a week and a half to two weeks shopping for laundering equipment.* c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee claimed he was unable to locate the equipment they desired, so Khan convinced detainee to travel to Afghanistan to purchase inexpensive leather goods. The pair traveled to Kandahar, AF, via Quetta, PK, where they were met by an Afghani named Muhabit Shiy who took them to his home in the Wazir Akhtar Khan District of Kabul, AF.' The goup remained in Kabul for ten days to two weeks while shoppin_g for leather goods. The group then traveled to Khowst, AF, where they stayed for one week.o During this time, the coalition bombing began and detainee reportedly expressed a desire to leave Afghanistan.' Detainee's traveling partners told him the Pakistani Army would be harsh to Arabs and thus took detainee to Jalalabad, AF. Once in Jalalabad, the group hid in a pump house waiting for the bombing to cease. After approximately ten days to fourteen days, detainee insisted on leaving. Detainee stated Muhabit Shiy found a guide (I'lFt) who charged $1,000 USD to take detainee to Pakistan.s 5. (S/NF) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) The guide advised detainee to allow the guide to carry detainee's papers, passport, and money; detainee complied. Upon arrival at the Pakistani border, the guide fled with detainee's belongings. Detainee was advised to report to the nearest Pakistani police station, where detainee was summarily taken into custody.e However, it is assesse detainee fled Afghanistan with a group of al-qaida and Taliban fighters led by Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) appointed military commander in Tora Bora, Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-falchi aka (Ibn al-shaykh al-libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212). The group crossed the Afghani- Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region, reaching a small Pakistani village around 14 December 2001. The group felt safe in the hands of their Pakistani host (NFI) who - 000218 MFR 06-MAR-2002; Analyst Note: Detainee stated that he wanted to purchase laundry machines in Pakistan, because they were locally made and brand new. The machines were also less expensive than the ones in Saudi Arabia. Detainee said it would be cheaper for him to purchase the machines in Pakistan and have them shipped to Saudi Arabia than to buy the machines in Saudi Arabia. Detainee claimed to have saved approximately -$5,000 in Saudi Riyals by pwchasing the machines in Pakistan. ) Analyst Note: The Wazir Akhtar Khan district, also known as Ahbar Khan, was a former diplomatic district known to have been conholled by the Taliban and al-qaida and used for quarters and training. o Analyst Note: The above account is the one given by the detainee most frequently. In 000218 302 03-AUG-2002, detainee reversed the two names, claiming that Shah was his business parbrer who lived in Pakistan, and that Khan was the Afghan friend. In that account, Shah stayed in Kabul only a short time, and returned to Peshawar rather than continuins on to Jalalabad. 7 Analyst Note: The Coalition bombing campaign commenced on 7 October 2001. " ooo2t8 MFR 06-MAR-2002 n 000zrs MFR 06-MAR-2002,000218 rnrrral screening 03-JAN-2002, S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I 20320214
S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I 20320214 STIBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for convinced them to surrender their weapons. The host then gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them on 20 December 2001. During the transit to prison, one of the prisoners attacked a guard leading to a struggle in which six Pakistani guards were killed and some of the prisoners escaped.l0 Pakistani officials transferred detainee from Kohat, PK, to thekandahar Detention Facility where detainee was placed in US custody on 2 January 2002." b. (S) Property Held: Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were in detainee's possession at time of capture: o Cassette tapes (NFI) c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 13 February 2002 d. (S//ND Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Low-level operations involving the theft or confiscation of passports in order to trap people in Afghanistan to IIR 7 739339602, Withdrawal from Tora Bora (DAB analysis paper, JDIMS) " TD-314/00845-02 + S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20320214
S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20320214 6. (S/NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account is assessed to be an elaborate cover story with a limited timeline. Detainee has not provided information on his prior travel and extended stay in Afghanistan in 1,999. Yaiations of detainee's name and alias as well as his phone number appear on numerous al-qaida associated documents; however, detainee provided no explanation as to why his name appeared on these documents. When confronted with inconsistencies detainee gave in separate interviews, detainee refused to answer further questions.l2 Detainee provides different reasons on why he traveled to Afghanistan in late September 2001. Detainee's claim, that he traveled to Afghanistan to shop for leather goods or to collect money and food for the poor, is assessed as highly disingenuous. Detainee's decision to give his money, passport, and papers to an unidentified Pakistani guide was either an act of extraordinary naivet6 or a complete fabrication. Detainee reported turning himself to Pakistani Police; however, this is a consistent cover story with fighters escaping from the Tora Bora region.13 Detainee has refused to take a polygraph.la 7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S/NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al- Qaida who probably served as a recruiter and fundraiser. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan with $15,000 USD shortly after 11 September 2001, probably to support Arabs attempting to flee Afghanistan. Detainee probably fought at Tora Bora against US and coalition forces. Detainee is probably affiliated with senior members of the Taliban and known members of al-qaida. Detainee's name was found on multiple al-qaida associate documents. A Saudi govertrment delegation identified detainee as a high-priority detainee in2002. o (S/A{F) Detainee is assessed to be an al-qaida member and probably a recruiter and fundraiser for al-qaida. Detainee possibly has close ties to a Taliban commander. o (S/AfD According to a foreign government service, a reliable source identified an individual with a variation of detainee's name and alias Fahd Fauzan al-fauzan aka (Barud), as a member of al-qaida.ls o (C) A variation of detainee's name, Fahd al-fuzan, and his cell phone number were listed among al-qaida papers on interrogations, letters, catalogues, and training " ooo2l8 MFR 03-AUG-2002 t'withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis " 000218 MFR 03-AUG-2002.000i1srR 05-DEC-2003 ts ro4ur27689-02 5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320214
s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20320214 notes recovered in aruid of al-qaida operative Abu Hafs' home in Kandahar.16 (Analyst Note: It is unclear from the translation of the documents in what context detainee's name and phone number was used.) o (S/n{F) P_etainee claimed an individual named Muhabit Shiy met him in Afghanistan." Detainee also claimed he met a business partner in Pakistan named Muhabat Shah.rR. (S//Nf; A former Taliban Commander in the Lowgar Province of Afghanistan was named Muhabat Shah.le (Analyst Noie: Lowgar Province is in eastern Afghanistan, immediately south of the Kabul Province and just to the northwest of Khowst and west of Jalalabad. Detainee's trip from Kabul to Khowst would have taken him through the Lowgar Province. It is possible the individual detainee who met in Afghanistan was the former Taliban Commander.) o (S/A{F) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), identified detainee as Fahd al-fouzan, an individual who helped raise money for al-qaida and the Taliban in Saudi Arabia. YM-252 further stated detainee also helped recruit fighters to travel to Afghanistan.2o I (S/A{F) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan with $15,000 USD. (Analyst Note: It is assessed that detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a significant amount of money in order to facilitate Arabs fleeing Afghanistan in anticipation of the US and coalition campai gn. ) o (S/A{F) Senior al-qaida operative Zayn al-4+bidin Muhammad Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016 (GZ-10016), photo-identified detainee and stated detainee was close to the individual known as the "Filipino." Abu Zubaydah identified the "Filipino" as Khalid al-hubayshi.2l lanalyst Note: Khalid al-hubayshi is assessed to be Khalid Sulayman Jaydh al-hubayshi (SA-155, transfened).) ' (S/A{F) Detainee probably associated with SA-155's twin brother, Yasir Sulayman al-hubayshi al-jihani, who taught the use of remote control devices and explosives to small groups of Arabs while he lived in Kabul during the summer of 200r.22 o (S/A{F) Detainee is assessed to have participated in armed hostilities in Tora Bora against US and Coalition forces. 'u AFGp-2002-800078. IIR 7 739328402 rt ooo2r8 MFR 06-MAR-2002 tt 00021830203-AUG-2002; Analyst Note: In 000218 SIR 03-APR-2006, detainee stated Muhabat Shah was enrployed by detainee's father in Saudi Arabia. Muhabat Shah later owned his own grocery store in Pakistan. te TD-3r4r38585-04 'o ooo252 FM4o o5-jan-2005 ".to-3t4/2q346-02 22 >to-3r+/38306-03 6 s E c RE T // NOFORI{ I 20320214
s E c R E T // NOFORN I 20320214 o (S/A{F) br a group of photos held by a US intelligence agency, there is a photo of two men captioned,'otaloot al-jaddawi and Barood Fahd al-fawran.""' Taloot al- Jaddawi is a known alias for Hamud Dakhil Hamud Said al-jadani, ISN US9SA- 000230DP (SA-230). (Analyst Note: It is assessed, based on name variation and alias variation, that the other individual in this picture is detainee.). (S/Am; SA-230, who was turned over to US custody withdetainee, claimed detainee is lying to interrogators about detainee's cover story." o (S/AfD YM-252 identified detainee as a member of al-sulami's unit in Tora Bora.25 (Analyst Note: Al-Sulami is assessed to be Yahya Samil Suwaymil al- Ulayani al-sulami, ISN US9SA-000066DP (5A-066).) ' (U//FOUO) S4-066 reportedly was part of a special operations training group at al-faruq and led a group of ten to fifteen individuals in Tora Bora.'o (Analyst Note: This supports detainee's presence in the region of Tora Bora.) o (S/A{F) Detainee was captured with a group of individuals including Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-fakhri aka (Ibn al-shaykh ut-i,iui;, ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212).27 LY-212 was a senior al-qaida trainer, most notably in charge of the Khaldan training cilmp. The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region, reaching a small Pakistani village around 14 December 2001. The group felt safe in the hands of their Pakistani host (l.tfd who convinced them to surrender their weapons. The host then gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them on 20 December 2001. During the transit to prison, one of the prisoners attacked a guard leading to a struggle in which six Pakistani guards were killed and some of the prisoners escaped.2s (Analyst Note: It is unknown exactly what the relationship between detainee andly-212 is; however, the significance of LY-2I2's stand against the authorities cannot be overlooked.)2e o (C) A variation of detainee's name, Fahad Fowzan al-fowzan, and aka (Barood), was published in a79-page document on the al-neda Internet site on 20 July 2002. The document contained information regarding the capture of eighty-four Taliban and al-qaida fighters who crossed the border in the Nangarhar?rovince, AI, after US and coalition strikes following the 11 September 2001 attacks.30 o (S/A{F) A variation of detainee's alias Barud was on a recovered document associated with the Islamic Observation Center (IOC) in London, England (uk) that t' AFGp-2002-604008 to > ooo2t8 sir 24-APR-2006 " ooozszfm4o 1o-FEB-2005 'u 000252 FM40 l8-ocr-2004,iir 6034172703 2t IIR 7 i39 339602 2t IIR 7 739339602, Withdrawal from Tora Bora (DAB analysis paper, JDIMS) 'n TD4Ar526o9-05 'oiir7 739339602 7 s E c RE T // NOFORI\ I I 20320214
S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320214 listed the names of seventy-six primarily Ar*9 individuals fighting alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance (NA).'' ' (S/A{F) The director of the IOC allegedly provided documents (NFI) for al- Qaida members who assassinated NA leader Ahmed Massoud in September 2001.32 o (S/A{F) Detainee's name is noted on a letter listing sixty-eight Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan, who were reported as probable al-qaida members. Coalition personnel recovered the letter along with materials linked to al-qaida. A typed version of a nearly identical letter was found on a computer hard drive recovered during a raid on a suspected al-qaida safe house in Islamabad, PK." (Analyst Note: This document is assessed to be a partial list of the names of fighters captured fleeing from Tora Bora.) o (S/A{F) Variations of detainee's aliases appear in documents and media recovered from guesthouses and safe houses associated with al-qaida, which suggests detainee was present at those locations. o (S/n\fD Detainee is identified on documents listing the names and aliases of suspected al-qaida members and the contents of their trust accounts. One such list was recovered during September 2002 raids on a suspected al-qaida safe house in Karachi.3a (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's presence within al-qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordinating travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts were storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders that guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.) o (S/A{F) The Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations aka (Mabahith), designated detainee as high priority detainee. o (S/A{F) In2002, the Saudi lnterior Ministry designated detainee as being high priority and a member of the al-haramayn Charitable Institutei). Detainee was ranked sixth in a list of thirty-seven high priority detainees held at JTF-GTMO.36 " TD-314109853-02; Analyst Note: The IOC is a London based human rights group that monitors the developments ^^ of cases involving fundamentalists worldwide. The IOC has probable ties to extremist,, organizations. AL-MUHAJIRON- ASSESSMENT I 8.MAY-2OO5.DOC 33 IIR 7 739326802,TD-3r4n3r74-03,AFGp-2002-602073 'o rd3r4r40693-02 35 Analyst Note: Al-Hararnayn is an IICT Tier I terrorist support entity (TSE). Tier I TSEs have demonstated sustained and active support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests; or provide witting o-perational supporto Tier 1 terrorist groups. " TD-314127540-02; Analyst Note: Detainee stated that although he wanted to work for al-haramayn, he was only eighteen at the time so he was unable to receive employment. For more information, see 000218 SIR 03-APR- 2006. 8 s E c RE T / / NOFORTI I I 20320214
s E c R E T // NOFORN I 20320214 o (S/AIF) The Saudi government also reported detainee was identified by other detainees in the al-hayer 'Isam al-mas'ari as one of a^group of individuals who joined the "military camp Abu Nasir" in Afghanistan.'' o (S/A{F) The Saudi Ministry of Interior reported detainee traveled to Afghanistan for ten months in 1999. Detainee's passport was issued on 17 May 1998, suggesting foreign travel occurred long before 2001.'o (Analyst Note: It is possible detainee traveled to Afghanistan during this time frame to participate in training.) c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile toward guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 29 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 12 January 2007, when detainee was found in possession of contraband, including pita bread wrappers, elastic bands, and blank sheets of paper. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include assault, attempted assault, failure to follow instructions, failure to follow camp rules, damage to government property, inciting and participating in mass disturbances, and possession of food and nonweapon tlpe contraband. Detainee has a total of two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 4 January 2004, when detainee threw urine on two guards. In2006, detainee had five Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and one report so far in 2007. 8. (S/A{F) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 5 December 2006. b. (S//l[F) Placement and Access: Detainee was in Afghanistan in 1999 for ten months at the age of sixteen. Detainee was employed by al-haramayn. Detainee was reportedly an al-qaida recruiter and fundraiser, which would have probably provided him access to senior al-qaida members. Detainee had possible personal relationships with some members of al-qaida's leadership, as evidenced by detainee's photograph with Tora Bora commander SA-230. Detainee's name appears on numerous al-qaida-associated documents recovered during the 2002 raid in Karachi, indicating a presence in an al- Qaida guesthouse or training camp.. Detainee is assessed to have fought at Tora Bora in late 200I prior to being captured with senior al-qaida member LY-212. "' TD-314127540-02; Analyst Note: There is no further information regarding the individuals who identified detainee or the military camp Abu Nasir. It is probable that the military camp Abu Nasir is a reference to a military unit in Afghanistan led by an individual by the name of Abu Nasir. tt TD-3r4r21540-02 9 s E c R E T /i NOFORN I I 20320214
S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320214 Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-00021SDP (S) c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee probably has detailed information regarding al-haramayn's financial and logistical support to al-qaida and other terrorist groups. Given detainee's high-priority status as designated by the Saudi govemment, it is probable that detainee has information on criminal or terrorist activities prior to his travel to Afghanistan. Detainee probably has specific information regarding al-qaida and Taliban personnel in various guesthouses and safe houses. Detainee remains unexploited with respect to detainee's presence in Afghanistan in 1999, and further interrogations may uncover further associations between detainee and al-qaida elements. d. (S/ND Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Al-Haramayn and al-qaida cooperation o Al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses and safe houses in Kabul o Recruiting and fundraising procedures o Al-Qaida combat operations, tactics, and procedures in Tora Bora. Al-Qaida and Taliban egress routes from Afghanistan 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 19 October 2004, and he remains an enemv combatant. Commanding - Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminologt. 10 s E c RE T / / NOFORI\ I I 20320214