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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN Sara Willman & Jasmin Dhaliwal Risk Management Professionals, Inc. (949) 282-0123 (877) 532-0806

RISK MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS Key Services Process Safety & Risk Management Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) What-If? Studies Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) Studies Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Safeguard Protection Analysis (SPA) Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment & Verification Process Safety Management (PSM) Risk Management Program (RMP) California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program Nevada Chemical Accident Prevention Program (CAPP) Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) Inherently Safer Technology (IST), Hierarchy of Hazard Control Analysis (HCA), Safer Technology & Alternatives Analysis (STAA) Safety & Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) Damage Mechanism Review (DMR) Safety Case Key Services (cont.) ERP Development & Emergency Preparedness Training (NIMS-Compatible) Risk-Graph and Bow-tie Analysis QRA Services FTA & ETA Background Services to Process Industries, Utilities, & Government Since 1995 International w/us Focus Qualifications Extensive Experience Two Decades of Risk-Based Applications Engineering, Safety, Security, and Emergency Response Backgrounds Locations HQ: Irvine, CA Houston Norfolk Walnut Creek Contact info@rmpcorp.com U.S. (877) 532-0806

SUMMARY Overview Intensification Substitution Moderation Simplification Examples of Inherently Safer Design implementation Incorporating Inherently Safer Design into HAZOP studies

INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN Avoid hazards instead of controlling them Low level of danger even if something goes wrong

INTENSIFICATION Minimization Decrease inventory of hazardous substances Benefits Reduce number of process operations Fewer startups/shutdowns Containment of explosion overpressures Downsides High pressures and temperatures Increase process complexity

INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLES Storage Use hazardous chemicals as soon as they are produced or delivered Store fewer vessels as full as possible, instead of storing many partially filled vessels

INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLES Distillation Prioritize low inventory Combine multiple columns into one Utilize other methods of separation Reduce residence times

SUBSTITUTION Use safer materials in place of hazardous ones Safer nonreactive agents Materials that require lower temperatures and pressures Safer refrigerants or heat transfer fluids Downsides Economics Efficiency

SUBSTITUTION EXAMPLES Use soap and water for cleaning Less toxic solvents Cyclohexene vs. benzene Ductile materials instead of brittle Dry powder and UV rays/electron-beam radiation for coatings instead of toxic solvents

SUBSTITUTION EXAMPLES Ethylene oxide manufacture Catalyst tubes cooled by heat transfer oils Kerosene boiled under pressure Flixborough explosion caused by ignition of boiling hydrocarbons under pressure Water used in newly developed plants

MODERATION Attenuation Using hazardous materials under the least hazardous conditions Store chemicals as refrigerated liquids at atmospheric pressure instead of under pressure at ambient temperature Store toxics in diluted solutions

MODERATION EXAMPLES Phenol production High risk of runaway reactions Water dump tank in place as safety system Increase in reaction volume could decrease temperature Storage and transport Dilute solutions Less hazardous solution Chlorine as sodium hypochlorite

SIMPLIFICATION Decrease process complexity Benefits Plant contains less equipment Provides fewer opportunities for human error Typically cheaper than complex processes Need less complex protective equipment

SIMPLIFICATION EXAMPLES Ways to simplify Stronger equipment can replace relief systems Resistant materials of construction can replace protective instruments Relocate equipment Avoid moving parts Examples Equipment strong enough to withstand high pressures Materials that can withstand high or low temperatures

OTHER ISD METHODS Limitation of Effects Avoiding the domino effect Making incorrect assembly impossible Making status clear Tolerance of misuse Ease of control Computer control Instructions and other procedures Life-cycle friendliness Passive safety

PHILOSOPHY OF ISD ISD is a way of thinking Not every ISD method will be viable for every type of operation Safety culture Benefits, downsides, and trade-offs Mitigate severity of consequences should an accident occur

ISD IN HAZOPS HAZOPs identify hazards and mitigate hazards through safeguards ISD eliminates or reduces hazards rather managing or controlling them Methods of incorporating ISD in HAZOPs: ISD Checklists Consider ISD alternatives to replace safeguards

ISD CHECKLISTS Stimulate thinking of ISD Promote out of the box thinking Considers possibilities and then determines feasibility Checklists should be reviewed periodically

Guide Word Intensify/Minimize Checklist Question Is the storage of all hazardous gases, liquids and solids ISD CHECKLISTS minimized? Can equipment sets be combined to reduce overall system volume? Can pipeline inventories be reduced by feeding hazardous materials as a gas instead of a liquid? Are just-in-time deliveries used when dealing with hazardous materials? Are all hazardous materials removed or properly disposed of when they are no longer needed or not needed in the next X days? Are attempts made to completely eliminate raw materials, process intermediates, or by-products? Can process conditions be changed to reduce production of hazardous wastes or by-products?

Guide Word Substitute Checklist Question Is it possible to substitute less hazardous raw materials? Is it possible to eliminate hazardous raw materials, process intermediates or by-products by using an alternative process or chemistry? Is it possible to use utilities with lower hazards? Is it possible to substitute less hazardous final product solvents? Moderate Can potential releases be reduced via lower temperatures or pressures, or elimination of equipment? Is it possible to make reaction conditions less severe by using a catalyst or a by using a better catalyst? Is it possible to dilute hazardous raw materials? Are all hazardous gases, liquids and solids stored as far away as possible?

Guide Word Simplify Checklist Question Are equipment and procedures designed such that they cannot be operated incorrectly or carried out incorrectly? Are machine controls located to prevent unintentional activation while allowing easy access for stopping the machine? Are all manuals, guides, and instructional materials clear and easy to understand, especially those that are used in an emergency situation? Can equipment be eliminated or arranged to simplify material handling? Can DCS modules be simplified?

Original Image Source: AcuTech http://www.nj.gov/dep/enforcement/tcpa/downloads/ist_workshop_sample_worksheets

ISD ALTERNATIVES TO REPLACE SAFEGUARDS Original Image Source: https://www.worksafebc.com/en/health-safety/create-manage/managing-risk/controlling-risks

Original Image Source: AcuTech http://www.nj.gov/dep/enforcement/tcpa/downloads/ist_workshop_sample_worksheets

INCORPORATING ISD AT THE OVERALL PROCESS LEVEL VS. NODE LEVEL Overall Process Level ISD opportunities are limited Stimulating ISD considerations is a challenge Node Level Smaller, more important details are revealed Stimulating ISD considerations is easier

CALARP PROGRAM 4 19 CCR Section 2762.13: Hierarchy of Hazard Control Analysis (HCA) HCA is required for/when: PHA scenarios that identify the potential for a major incident Management of Change (MOC) occurs Incident occurs Design/Review of new processes HCA uses the information provided by PHA/MOC/Incident and documents all inherent safety measures and safeguards related to the process safety hazard identified Recommendations to eliminate hazards using first and second order inherent safety measures are developed

REFERENCES Kletz, T. A., & Amyotte, P. (2010). Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design. Boca Raton, Fla: CRC. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Review Board (CSB). (2012). Inherently Safer: The Future of Risk Reduction. Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology, Council, N. R., & Division on Earth and Life Studies. (2012). The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience. National Academies Press. Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2008). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures: Third Edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

March 27, 2018 UPCOMING WEBINARS / CONFERENCES Webinar Safeguard Protection Analysis (SPA) for CalARP Program 4 Presented by Steve Maher, CSP PE and John Johnson April 10, 2018 Webinar The Importance of P&IDs and Labeling Presented by Max Oppedahl Mar 18-21, 2018 Exhibitor Presentation by Stephanie Smith, PE 2018 IIAR National Conference and Expo Apr 22-26, 2018 Exhibitor 14 th Global Congress on Process Safety

QUESTIONS? Sara Willman Jasmin Dhaliwal Sara.Willman@RMPCorp.com Jasmin.Dhaliwal@RMPCorp.com Risk Management Professionals, Inc. (949) 282-0123 (877) 532-0806