TURFs in marine fisheries: the experience of co-management of the Chilean artisanal benthic fisheries Miriam Fernandez and many more
Outline of the presentation TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS IN FISHERY THE EXPERIMENT THAT STARTED TURFs IN CHILE: 30 YEARS AGO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TURFS: HOW THEY WORK, BENEFITS AND PROBLEMS CHALLENGES AHEAD
Common property resources the use of access is both free and open to a set of users or potential users characterizes most marine fisheries throughout the world for several centuries individual fisherman has no incentives to restrain his catch in the interest of future returns, because anything he leaves in the sea for tomorrow can be taken by others today.
A territorial use right in fisheries can remove the condition of common property, assigning exclusive rights of a fraction of the fishery to a group of fishers Common property resources Territorial use rights in fishery
Territorial use rights in fishery Provide relative rights on the resources Can relate to the surface, bottom or the entire water column It is size-specific, not resource-specific, so it covers only a fraction of the distribution of the stock The size can vary depending on the resource/use Boundaries are clear The territory should be protected by the lays and institutions of the country Length of the tenure, the rights (transferable?) and conditions (taxes?) need to be defined
Territorial use rights in Chilean fisheries A territory for artisanal fisheries Middle-scale fleet (18 m) Small-scale fleet Special territories for benthic species
BENTHIC FISHERIES TARGETS ON SEVERAL SPECIES: SUBTIDAL AND INTERTIDAL
The loco fishery: the transit from common property to TURFs Catch trends of the loco fishery 30000 25000 Landing (tons) 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982
LAS CRUCES EXPERIMENTAL HUMAN EXCLUSION AREA MARINE CONCESION: 5 HA, ONLY 1 KM OF COASTLINE. December 1982
The loco fishery: the transit from common property to TURFs Catch trends of the loco fishery 30000 25000 Landing (tons) 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 EXPERIMENT OF HUMAN EXCLUSION IN LAS CRUCES
PATTERNS OF ABUNDANCE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE INSIDE (HUMAN EXCLUDED) OUTSIDE (EXPLOITATION) 10000 Number of locos / 500 m Of coastline 7500 5000 2500 0 1982 1985 1990 1982 1985 1990 Castilla et al. 1986
AFTER 1982, LOCO CATCH DECREASES SHARPLY 30000 25000 LOCO ABUNDANCE LANDING (Tons) 20000 15000 10000 VEDA DE LOCO 5000 0 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 EXPERIMENT STARTS IN LAS CRUCES RECOVERY INSIDE EXCLUSION
Population of exploited benthic resouces recovered in the short term (two years) after exploitation was reduced Two simultaneous study cases, showed similar results: Juan Carlos Castilla in central Chile Carlos Moreno in southern Chile Results promoted the idea of scaling up the experiment: first trial creating management areas (TURFs)
SCALING UP THREE EXPERIMENTAL MANAGEMENT AREAS ECIM Las Cruces 5 ha. A 1981 1988-1991 Caleta Quintay 52 ha. N N 50 m 100 m Caleta El Quisco 57 ha. C Caleta Las Cruces 84 ha. N D 100 m N 100 m
EXPERIMENTAL Management Areas: 1989-1995 The experiment is applied to three Caletas (Coves) in Central Chile: Las Cruces, El Quisco and Quintay Fishers association were assigned a portion of the sea bottom to experiment a new management strategy Size of protected area increased 10 times At that time (1990), fisher s associations were reorganizing (end of Pinochet era) so the social structure also facilitated this new management regimen that depends very much on leaders and cooperation
EXPERIMENTAL MANAGEMENT AREAS: 1989-1991 Comparison between TURFs and Open access: recovery Loco CPUE (individuals per trip/boat) Sea urchin Stone crab Fernández and Castilla (1998) Ecological Applications
NEW FISHERIES ACT (1991) DEFINES TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS: MANAGEMENT AREAS LEY GENERAL DE PESCA Y ACUICULTURA Artículo 48.- En la franja costera de cinco millas marinas a que se refiere el artículo anterior, como en las aguas terrestres e interiores, además de las facultades generales de administración de los recursos hidro-biológicos mencionados en el párrafo 1º del título II, podrán establecerse, por decreto supremo del Ministerio, previos informes técnicos de la Subsecretaría y del Consejo Zonal de Pesca respectivo, las siguientes medidas o prohibiciones 122-123 : a) Vedas extractivas por especie en un área determinada. b) Determinación de reservas marinas. c) Medidas para la instalación de colectores u otras formas de captación de semillas en bancos naturales de recursos hidro-biológicos, quedando igualmente prohibido efectuar actividades pesqueras extractivas en contravención a ellas. d) Un régimen denominado "Áreas de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos", al que podrán optar las organizaciones de pescadores artesanales legalmente constituidas 124.
THE TURFs ARE INSTITUTIONALIZED Portions of the sea bottom can be assigned to fisher s unions Size of the TURF is defined by fishers (based on potential areas) Request to access to a the MA: Target resources need to be defined Initial assessment conducted by fishers (subsidy to hire professional help) Annual assessment required to propose a quota and to maintain the area Based on the assessment, a quota is requested Quota needs to be approved by the fisheries administration Internal rules clearly defines (survillance, penalties, etc). Taxes are charged and there are costs associated to survillance (prevent large areas) The law regulates access of fishers to MAs, but does not restrict this group of fishers managing a MA to fish outside, in the open acces areas The most heavily exploited resources can only been fished in MA (e.g., locos) IMPORTANT: fishers can also fish outside management areas
1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Total areal ( thousands ha) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 TURFs: the implementation phase Total area: 300.000 ha 20º 30.0º 40.0º 50.0º 55º Number of MA
Do MA work?
PROTECTION (SURVILLANCE) VARIES AMONG MA DENSITY (nº ind / 200m 2 ) 250 200 150 100 50 0 120 80 40 PROTECTED OPEN ACCESS 0 LAS CRUCES MPA MA GOOD ENFORCEMENT MA POOR ENFORCEMENT
The value of MA also for exploited fish species 35 30 25 20 Area Protegida Area abierta PROTECTED OPEN ACCESS DENSITY (nº ind / 200m 2 ) 15 10 5 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 LAS CRUCES Pingüipes chilensis Graus nigra MPA MA GOOD ENFORCEMENT MA BAD ENFORCEMENT
Secondary consequences: marine conservation Conservation of biodiversity TOTAL BENTHIC 60 RICHNESS Number of species 50 40 a 30 20 10 Total richness Total Richness (algae, fish, invertebrates) (algae + fish + invertebrates) c b 0 Open access Open access Management Areas (MAs) No take MPA Low enforcement High enforcement Low enforcement High enforcement No-take Seeding: more and large mothers Gelcich et al 2013. Cons Biol
The good side Sustainable stocks are maintained inside the MA: beyond benthic species Higher income Improved the organization and empowered local communities Motivation to learn about the resources and consequences of exploitation Changes in fishermen behavior
EXPERIMENT: SOCIAL RESPONSE Fishermen tendency to overharvest Open access areas Regulations (quotas) SOCIAL PERCEPTION Not organized fishers Overharvest Low performance unions High performance unions OPEN ACCESS AREAS PROTECTED AREAS Round Gelcich et el. 2014 Gelcich et al. Ecol. Soc. 2013
The dark side Large fractions of the coast assigned to MA drives effort displacement
EFFORT DISPLACEMENT ON OPEN ACCESS PERCENTA OF EFFORT IN OPEN ACCESS 100 80 60 40 20 0 100 80 60 40 20 0 Totoralillo Caleta Hornos 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 100 80 60 40 20 0 100 80 60 40 20 0 PERCENTAGE OF FISHING GROUNDS IN MA
LIMPET: CPUE DECREASES IN OPEN ACCESS AFTER MA WERE PLACED 0 5 10 20 30 Isla Pájaros 0 5 10 15 20 Isla Dama 0 5 10 15 La Peña 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
The dark side Large fractions of the coast assigned to MA drives to effort displacement Thus, much of the contrast we see between open access and MA it is not only because the good care fishers pay to MA, but also to: different approaches of fishers to resources between open access areas and MA poor enforcement in open access lack of integrated management
Lessons learned It may not work for all species: our case is on sedentary species (crabs?) The optimal size of MA needs to be studied (too small does not provide enough resources, too large become too expensive) Regional Integrated Management: The optimal rate between MA and Open Access needs to be addressed Protocols for stock assessments need to be defined and enforced Similar management and enforcement efforts need to be assigned to all regimes
Mussels Outside Barnacles Outside Mussels Inside Barnacles Inside 100 Mean cover % 80 60 40 20 0 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005