EU PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPPING SEMINAR 21 JANUARY 2009 BRUSSELS PRACTICAL SELF DEFENCE MEASURES SUCCESSFUL LESSONS LEARNT TO DATE

EU PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPPING SEMINAR 21 JANUARY 2009 BRUSSELS PRACTICAL SELF DEFENCE MEASURES SUCCESSFUL LESSONS LEARNT TO DATE

INTRODUCTION Aim To outline practical defensive measures (and actions to take if Outline captured), to combat piracy in the GOA/HOA region General Situation Prior to transit During Transit If attacked If Captured

BIMCO THE WORLDS LARGEST SHIPPING ORGANISATION Over 2500 in 123 countries Over 950 Owners operating a fleet of over 650,000,000 DWT (Ship-owners, managers and operators) 1,300 Shipbrokers and agents 50 P&I Clubs and National Associations 86 Others with interests in shipping, e.g. classification societies, maritime law firms, ports, financial institutions

What is BIMCO An Owner/Members Association Practical Service Organization Information Support Documentation Education & Networking Security & International Affairs Industry advocate International has NGO status in many fora (IMO, WCO, ISO, etc.) Round Table of Shipping Associations (Intertanko, Intercargo, ICS). Regional (EU) National (US: CG, CBP, MARAD UK:SITPRO)

The GOA AND HOA Why we are here! A Commercial Strategic Choke Point

SETTING THE SCENE AN INDUSTRY CRISIS Clear huge amounts of information and intelligence in dealing with piracy is being lost and unrecorded for many different reasons. Evident some hijackings and many ransom negotiation difficulties could be avoided if this were in the public domain with better communications and handled sensibly and only released in a controlled manner on a need to know basis. One of the main problems is the paranoia over intelligence that military, public service and commercial organisations have. Applaud EU initiative Looking to a paradigm change in method stakeholders address the issues involved

PARADIGM CHANGE NOT FOUND SUFFICIENTLY ROBUST SOLUTIONS TRADIONAL APPROACHES UNLIKELY TO WORK SOMALIA! REQUIRMENT FOR FULL AND EXPLICIT EXCHANGES OF VIEWS BETWEEN ALL STAKEHOLDERS HANDLING AND COMMUNICATION OF NECESSARY INFORMATION AND INTEL INDUSTRY IS PLANNING TO AVOID MORE ON THIS NAVIES ARE HELPING DETER AND DELAY BUT... HOW DO WE REDUCE: ATTRACTIVENESS OF PIRACY? AMOUNTS OF RANSOM PAID? THE NUMBERS OF SHIPS HELD? WAY AHEAD BIMCO WORKSHOP - AN ATTEMPT TO START THIS PROCESS LAST FRIDAY WILL DRAW ON IT IN MY PRESENTATION

STATUS QUO - INDUSTRY VIEW Piracy is likely to continue into the future. The benefits to pirates still outweigh the costs. There has been no significant positive change in the situation ashore. Naval forces have had increasing success but are limited by RoE s, jurisdiction and the number of assets deployed. EUNAVFOR still has much to do especially C3 Notwithstanding UNSCR 1851, and the contact group set up always more to be done Pirates are increasingly violent and confident likely to be more so. The industry must take steps to prepare and defend itself it cannot put its own safety in entirely in the hands of naval forces.

WHAT IS THE ACTUAL RISK? SPEED + FREEBOARD + ROUTING

Common Denominators of Vessels Liable to Attack Generally agreed as: Low speed Low freeboard Inadequate planning and procedures Low visible alert state or measures Slow response times

TOTAL ATTACKS 2008

REDUCING THE RISK Route planning (done as a matter of course) Weather Company guidelines / policy Physical protection Doors/hatches Lighting Speed Heighten ISPS State Ship s security stretched because of advances in technology and modern manning practices

REDUCING THE RISK Specialist knowledge Enhanced situational awareness Clear understanding of own vessel s capabilities and vulnerabilities Well briefed, prepared and practised team at all levels Management CSO Master / SSO Crew

REDUCING THE RISK REGIONAL Nature of threat (i.e. Numbers, locations, means etc) Detailed route planning factoring in security issues in addition to weather understand the interface Liaison and contacts with local forces / military authorities

PRIOR TO TRANSIT PLANNING (1) Establish and follow company extant crisis management procedures adopting IMO and other industry recommended practices. Financial risk of transiting the GOA should be addressed by owners, managers and charterers from the outset CSOs should ensure a specific transit plan and contingency plan for the high risk passage is written and exercised. Brief and discuss with the Master and SSO Be aware of the particular sea areas and ports affected by piracy and armed robbery Carry out crew training prior to passage ensure trainers have practical experience Trainers should reassure and encourage crews to be proactive. Ensure the piracy contingency plan is available and conduct a drill prior to arrival in the area. Review plan if necessary and brief all personnel on their duties. Ensure all crew are familiar with the Alarm system and sounds. Prepare an emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers and pre-prepared messages, which should be ready at hand or permanently displayed near the communications panel. [e.g tel. nos. of MSCHOA, IMB, PRC, CSO.] Master should thoroughly brief his crew on his expectations.

PRIOR TO TRANSIT PLANNING (2) Report to UKMTO before entering the area (operations departments to register passage prior to transit with Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (http://www.mschoa.org). Follow transit course and speed advice/instructions of UKMTO/MSCHOA for best protection. Wherever practicable, vessels transiting to ports outside of East Africa should consider navigating to the east of Madagascar or (for guidance) maintain a distance of more than 600 nautical miles from the coastline. Plans to use the UKMTO transit corridor which lies within the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA). Make every effort to plan transit periods of highest risk area for night passage. No successful attacks have occurred at night If considering additional private security it is not advised to use armed guards as there are serious risks involved Additional unarmed security crews however will reduce risk to crew and enhance watch keeping numbers. Passive devices such as LRAD are also considered useful.

Reducing the Risk Vessel Specific Identify and address key weak points (low speed, freeboard, access control etc) Vessel audits no 2 vessels are the same! Specific equipment (LRAD, Citadel, fire hoses, foam etc, anti-access devices and systems Evasive manoeuvres Speed Detailed procedures Trained operators and security personnel Communications and coordination internally and externally

Reducing the Risk Crew Drills and procedures especially damage control and fire fighting Confidence and familiarity Physical preparedness supplies etc Psychological preparedness Profiling

PRIOR TO TRANSIT DEFENSIVE MEASURES (1) Vessels should comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all times; navigation lights should not be turned off at night. Follow the guidance given by Flag State Authority (e.g. for UK vessels Marine Guidance Notice 298). Proceed at or near full speed. Critical machinery should be fully operational and any maintenance completed before entering the area. Keeping in mind the minimum manning levels ensure that ship routines are adjusted sufficiently in advance to ensure a well rested and well briefed crew on watch and ensure sufficient watchkeeping is planned. Minimise external communications (radios, handsets and AIS information) to essential safety and security related communication and SOLAS information only during transit of high risk areas. Endeavour to have operational/running redundant auxiliary machinery, including where applicable generators and steering motors. Increase lookouts / bridge manning. Man the Engine Room. Secure and control access to bridge, engine room, steering gear room, and crew quarters. In case of emergency warships can be contacted on VHF Ch. 16. [Backup CH08].

PRIOR TO TRANSIT DEFENSIVE MEASURES (2) Ensure all ladders are stowed or up on deck If a comparatively low freeboard extend the width of the gunwales to prevent grappling hooks sticking Have gollocks/machetes placed along gunwales available for cutting grappling hooks Prepare citadel and lock down procedures No work should occur outside the accommodation unless essential. Fire pumps should be set running and hoses pressurized with water spray discharged overboard in highest risk quarters. Consider razor wire/physical barriers around stern / lowest points of access, commensurate with crew safety and escape. Consider the use of passive defence equipment such as LRAD

DURING TRANSIT - IMPLEMENTATION & COMMUNICATIONS Ensure vessels use the MSPA designated corridor and although attacks occur few are successful if inside designated routes. Be aware that virtually all attacks occur in daylight Maintain best possible speed through the high risk area. No successful attacks have occurred on vessels passaging at 15 knots or more Keep photographs of pirate mother ships on bridge. Report immediately if sighted. Report all sightings of suspect mother ships to the IMB PRC. Tel: +603 2031 0014 / +603 2078 5763 and MSCHOA. The Master should try and make as early an assessment of a threat as possible. As soon as the master feels that a threat is developing he should immediately Call the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) and the 24 hour manned Piracy Reporting Centre. Emergency contact details located on the Contact Us page within the Registered User area. Keep a good lookout for suspicious craft, especially from astern. [Most attacks to date have occurred from the port quarter.] Use light, alarm bells and crew activity to alert suspected pirates that they have been detected. Whilst measures should be taken to prevent Pirates boarding, the safety of crew and passengers is paramount. Provide maximum available deck lighting consistent with safe navigation.

DURING TRANSIT DEFENSIVE MEASURES SPEED If your maximum speed is more than 18 knots, don't slow down for a Group Transit, just push on through. 1. If your maximum speed is 16 knots, consider joining a 14 knot Group Transit and keep those 2 knots in reserve for when your next door neighbour comes under attack so you can get out of there more quickly etc, so that you can definitely keep up when the weather's bad or your machinery is not operating efficiently or when the hull is fouled, or simply to enable you to increase speed and conduct a 'narrow weave' when the pirates try to attack you.

ON ATTACK IMMEDIATE ACTION (1) Follow contingency plan. Activate Emergency Communication Plan / Call in order of priority The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Dubai. The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) The International Maritime Bureau. Activate the ship security alert system, which will alert your Company Security Officer and flag state consider tying in to ships LRIT if active. If the Master has opted to turn off the Automatic Identification System (AIS) during transit of the piracy area, this should be turned on in the event that the vessel comes under pirate attack. Sound emergency alarm and make a PA announcement Pirate attack. as per the Ship s emergency plan which should be specified and all crew made aware of prior to entering the area of high risk. Make Mayday call on VHF Ch 16 [and backup Ch 8, which is monitored by military vessels]. Send a distress message via the DSC (Digital Selective Calling) system and Inmarsat-C as applicable. Muster all crew in a safe area inside the accommodation ideally away from external bulkheads and portholes.

ON ATTACK IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (2) Pirates have great difficulty boarding a vessel that is: i. Passaging over 14 knots ii. Manoeuvering sharply Prevent skiffs closing on the ship by altering course and increasing speed where possible Carry out small zigzag manoeuvre, not more than 7-10 degrees rate of turn to maintain speed. Avoid creating a lee for the pirates; if possible increase their exposure to the wind / waves. Use the bow wave and stern wash to make it difficult for small attack craft to approach and fire upon the vessel. As pirates close alongside manoeuvre violently and attempt to create wash Man the hoses and turn on if not done so already using them has been found to deter attacks however risky this is, it is better to being boarded and held hostage. Maximise vessel speed. [Evidence to date from failed attacks is that the pirates will give up if unable to board within 30-45 minutes.]

IF CAPTURED Offer no resistance otherwise this could lead to unnecessary violence and harm to crew. Before pirates gain access to bridge inform the Maritime Security Centre and if time permits the company. If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated, then the main engine should be stopped, all way taken off if possible and the vessel navigated clear of other vessels. Remain calm and co-operate fully with the pirates. Ensure all crew, other than bridge team, stay together in one location. If in a locked down citadel ensure internal protection/cover is available if pirates attempt to force entry and keep clear of entry point/doors and portholes/windows do not resist entry.

NEGOTIATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR OWNERS Ship Owners Response Consultant Law Enforcement Cargo Owners Hull P&I Clubs Hostage Crews Governments Naval / Military Forces Ransom Delivery Team Banks Media - Local Host Government CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM Media - International Vessel Insurers Other Pirate gangs Families Community Leaders Lawyers Crew / Colleagues

THE NEGOTIATION CYCLE Establish Facts Initial contact (demand) Negotiation dialogue Notification CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM Agreement Crew Vessel Cargo Recovery Ransom delivery

HOW TO ASSIST EUNAVFOR Request from EUNAVFOR Feedback from the merchant shipping community. So far, getting very little, except for complaints, or alternatively strong support for efforts. Hoping for comments on the validity of: self protection measures, suspicious sightings, routine sightings of fishing activity, new ideas, general views.

EUNAVFOR (cont) Key is knowing where the most vulnerable ships are in the first place. This is why shipping companies need to register their ships movements on MSC HOA website Need to identify the most vulnerable Ships masters need to send their positions to UKMTO on a regular basis so they track them once they are in the area of interest. Use of AIS in the Gulf of Aden, POLESTAR and LRIT in the Somali basin, all helps them know where vessels are.

Q&A