European Gas Pipeline Incident data Group EGIG Dick van den Brand Co-ordinator (external) safety Gasunie, the Netherlands Projectmanager EGIG IGU, AMSTERDAM June 6th, 2006 1
Contents of this presentation What is EGIG? EGIG: input EGIG: output Analyses EGIG figures Conclusions 2
What is EGIG? 3
12 operators organize incident statistics European operators of gas transmission pipeline systems Belgium Czech republic Denmark Germany Finland France Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Switzerland UK Covering and exposure 122.000 km 1970 2004 2,8 milion km. yr Report > Every 3 years > 6th report is placed on the internet (WWW.EGIG.nl) 4
Objectives of EGIG To communicate about the safety performance Provide a reliable and realistic picture of incident frequencies Basis for statistical use To analyse the causes of incidents To improve safety performance 5
3.000.000 2.500.000 2.000.000 1.500.000 1.000.000 500.000 0 Evolution of the exposure 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year [-] 6 Exposure [km.yr]
EGIG: The input 7
Defined System and defined incidents System Transport of gas > Steel transmission pipelines >15 bar > Outside the fences of installations > Onshore Incidents Incidents with unintentional release 8
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Annual number of incidents 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 7 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 9 9 9 0 1 2 3 2 0 0 4 Year [-] N u m b e r o f in c id e n ts [-]
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 10 Public Patrol Contractor Unknow n D istribution com panies Com pany staff Landow ner O ther Client O n line inspection Detection of incidents Type of detection Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture Percentage of incidents [% ]
The EGIG parameters System Incidents Diameter Pressure Year of construction Type of coating Cover Grade of material Wall thickness How detected Leaksize Cause of incident Ignition Consequences A free text 11
EGIG: The output 12
The EGIG figures output Failure frequencies, distributions and/or probabilities Calculated from total exposure and 5 year moving average to observe trends and also to observe the distribution of incidents and leaksize per cause. Calculated from partial exposure to observe influence of design parameters on the causes and consequences of incidents. 13
General Incident failure frequencies Period [year] Number of Incidents [-] System Exposure [km.year] Failure frequency [per km.year] 1970-2004 1123 2.770.000 0,00041 1970-2001 1061 2.410.000 0,00044 2000-2004 100 570.000 0,00017 2004 23 122.000 0,00019 14
Evolution of the primary failure frequencies 1 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 15 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Frequency per 1000 km yr Year [-] Entire period Last 5 years
Estimated probabilities per leak size Size of leak Pinhole or crack Hole Rupture < = 16 Rupture > 16 ignition probability 0,03 0,02 0.09 0,30 16
Using these figures for risk analysis Decisions on future developments depend on historical statistical data EGIG statistics are used together with other parameters which are based on poor or even no knowledge Ignition probability, Probability of being exposed, effect-consequence relations Etc Not everything (measure or situation) can be quantified Used as an additional method in certain countries: Shall give different national demands Misused for far-reaching decisionmaking: because QRA has significant limitations. 17
Pipelines compared to other transportmodes A pipeline is safer (per ton.km) if: ca 5000 tankcars ca 2000 railroad tankcars ca 1000 inland waterway vessels are needed to transport a flammable gas A pipeline: safest transportmode for continuous mass transport of gas 18
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Analysis EGIG figures 20
Relation cause-size of leak Frequency per 1,000.km.yr 0,25 0,2 0,15 0,1 0,05 0 External Interference! Construction defect./ Material failure Corrosion Ground movement Hot-tap made by error Other and Unknown Cause Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 21
Primary failure frequencies per cause (5-years moving average) 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 22 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year [-] Construction/material Corrosion External interference Ground movement Hot-tap by error Other/unknown Frequency per1,000.km yr
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External interference: diameter class and size of leak Fre q u e n cy p e r 1,0 0 0.km yr 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 0-4 5-10 12-16 18-22 24-28 30-34 36-40 42-46 48+ Diameter class [inches] Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 24
External interference: Depth of cover class and size of leak Frequency per 1,0 0 0.km.yr 0,2 0,18 0,16 0,14 0,12 0,1 0,08 0,06 0,04 0,02 0 80-100 100+ Cover class [cm] Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 25
External interference: wall thickness class and size of leak Frequency per 1,000.km.yr 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 0-5 5-10 10-15 Wall thickness class [mm] Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 26
Construction: Year of construction and size of leak Frequency per 1,000.km yr 0,25 0,2 0,15 0,1 0,05 0 <1954 1954-1963 1964-1973 1974-1983 >1984 Year of construction Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 27
Corrosion: year of construction and size of leak Fre q u e n cy p e r 1,0 0 0.km.yr 0,3 0,25 0,2 0,15 0,1 0,05 0 <1954 1954-1963 1964-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 Year of construction Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 28
Corrosion: Coating and size of leak 0,12 Frequency per 1,000.km.yr 0,1 0,08 0,06 0,04 0,02 0 Unknown Coaltar Bitumen Polyeth Epoxy Other Type of coating Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 29
Corrosion: wall thickness class and size of leak Frequency per 1,000.km.yr 0,14 0,12 0,1 0,08 0,06 0,04 0,02 0 0-5 5-10 10-15 Wall thickness class [mm] Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture 30
Analysis of these figures External interference 75% of serious incidents And 90% of these incidents: <10mm wall th. <28 diam. Ground movement 10 % of serious incidents And 90% of these incidents: <10mm wall th. <1975 Construction 10% of all incidents And 90% of these incidents: <1983 Corrosion 1 % of serious incidents And 90% of these incidents: <1974 31
Conclusions & Recommendations 32
Conclusions and recommendations Pipelines: a safe transportmode most recent overall incident frequency 0,00017 [per km. year] the failure frequency seems to stabilize. A safe alternative in the case of mass transport Integrity 10-20% of all serious incidents international standards, primarily a responsibility of the operator pipelines must be treated as transport External interference > 75 % of all serious incidents We have still a job to improve. As traffic safety also a responsibility of authorities 33
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Questions? 35