2009/FWG/WKSP/007 Effective Collaboration Between Scientists, Managers and Policy Makers Submitted by: World Bank Workshop on Implementing Ecosystem Approaches to Fisheries in the Context of the Broader Marine Environment Vancouver, Canada 28-29 May 2009
Effective collaboration between scientists, managers and policy makers Lidvard Grønnevet NORWAY AS EXAMPLE Positive development EBFM and EBM partly implemented General Principles / Lessons Learned
Fishing Industry in Norway. Fundamental changes over the last decades Resource depletion Unprofitable Subsidized Sustainable resources. Main fish stocks fully productive. Profitable. Both public and private sector. No subsidies * (* except.) WHY? The rest of this presentation The negative example of the two most important fish stocks: Northeast Arctic cod Norwegian spring spawning herring
HOW? Evolution not Revolution EFFECTIVE Collaboration between scientists, managers, policy makers and stakeholders 50 % of the problems in the world results from people using the same words with different meaning. The other 50 % come from people using different words with the same meaning. Kaplan 1997 (from Hersoug 2005; Closing the Commons )
Transitions: 1956 Saltwater Fisheries Act 1983 New Salt Water Fisheries Act In force from August 1, 1984 2007 Marine Resources Act In force from January 1, 2009
Fisheries agencies and institutions Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs The Fishery and Aquaculture Industry Research Fund NIFES 1 Institute of Marine Research National Coastal Administration Directorate of Fisheries Norwegian Food Safety Authority 2 National Veterinary Institute 3 The Guarantee Fund for Fishermen 5 district offices 7 regional offices 8 regional offices Innovation Norway 63 district offices The Research Council of Norway Fiskeriforskning 1 The National Institute of Nutrition and Seafood Research 2 Affiliated institution 3 Affiliated institution The Norwegian Seafood Export Council SECORA AS Institute of Marine Research
Institute of Marine Research
Internal organisation chart of The Royal Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs Minister State Secretary Political Adviser Secretary General Communication Unit Administration Unit Department of Aquaculture, Seafood and Markets Department of Coastal Affairs Department of Research and Innovation Department of Marine Resources and Environment The Regulatory Chain
Number of boats/fishers 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 Development in the Fishery Sector 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1000 Tonnes 0 YEAR Number of Fishers Number of Fishing Boats Volume of Catch The number of vessels by length groups. 1980 2008.
Volume and Value of Fisheries and Aquaculture 3500 14000 3000 12000 2500 10000 1000 Tonnes 2000 1500 8000 6000 Million NOK 1000 4000 500 2000 0 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year Volume Fisheries Volume Aquaculture Value Fisheries Value Aquaculture Spawning stock biomass of all main pelagic species. 1985 2007
Spawning stock biomass of Barents Sea capelin, Northeast Atlantic mackerel, Norwegian spring spawning herring, North Sea herring and blue whiting.1985 2008. Catch (tonnes) of all pelagic species. 1985 2008.
Value of catch (in 2008 values) of all pelagic species. 1985 2008.1000 NOK.
Spawning stock biomass of all main groundfish species. 1985 2007. Spawning stock biomass of Northeast Arctic cod, Northeast Arctic haddock,northeast Arctic saithe and Northeast Arctic Greenland halibut north of 62º N. 1985 2008.
Catch (tonnes) of all groundfish species (incl. crustaceans). 1985 2008. Value of catch of all groundfish species (incl. crustaceans) 1985 2008. 1000 NOK. (in 2008 values).
Deflated fish price index 1945 2006 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1945=100 First-hand sales value adjusted to the consumer price index Estimated total operating revenues and costs (nominal value). Vessels 8 metres and above. (operating whole year) 1980 2007.
Estimated total operating margin (percent) = (operating result/operating revenues) * 100. Vessels 8 metres and above. (operating whole year) 1980 2007. Effects; Remuneration to Fishers 180 160 140 120 100-80 60 40 20 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 Based on index wage, average prices, total catch and number of fishermen 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Required catch (kg) to obtain average wage Catch (kg) per fisherman
45 % 40 % 35 % 30 % 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 % 5 % 0 % Subsidies; Percentage of Catch Value 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Governmental support (nominal value) to the fishing fleet. 1980 2008. For the period 1980-2004 governmental support is due to the agreement between Norwegian Fisherman`s Association and the Ministry of Fisheries.
Norwegian spring spawning herring Norwegian spring spawning herring
The population of Norwegian spring spawning Atlantic herring rose dramatically in parallel with the temperature but...the rapid decline and collapse by the end of the 1960s was due to a combination of poor environmental conditions and over fishing. Herring SSB (10 6 tons) Temperature ( C) Herring Temperatures Toresen and Østvedt, 2000 Northeast Arctic cod
Northeast Arctic cod
Capelin in the Barents Sea Development of the total stock (dark + light area) and spawning stock (dark area) of capelin in the Barents Sea measured during autumn. Recruitment is measured as billions of one-year-olds during autumn. Impacts of the environment on the fish stock Capelin is an important part of the diet for many predators, including cod, harp seals, minke whales, humpback whales, and haddock. Capelin is the main prey item for cod. Growth, maturation, and cannibalism of cod are all affected by the capelin abundance. The estimated annual consumption of capelin by cod has varied between 0.2 and 3.0 million t over the period 1984 2007. Young herring consume capelin larvae, and this predation pressure is thought to be one of the reasons for the poor year classes of capelin in the periods 1984 1986, in 1992 1994, and in 2001 2005. The abundance of herring in the Barents Sea is expected to be at a low level in 2009. Low capelin abundance has also in some periods had a negative impact on harp seal and seabird populations. However, these effects were much stronger during the first capelin collapse (caused by the 1983 year class of herring) than during the two later collapses. After spawning, dead capelin may also be of importance as food for haddock and other benthic feeders. ICES 2008 Barents Sea capelin
Management Objectives (1980) Conservation of resources Maintain settlement and activity along the coast Secure employment Diversified fleet structure and ownership Conflicting goals Challenges - Reform Process Drivers Structural problems Huge overcapacity and operating losses Large subsidies Depleted resources herring / cod crises Initiatives from the pelagic fleet Public debate
Management Objectives (present) Sustainability and conservation Profitability and efficiency Maintain settlement and activity along the coast Diversified fleet structure and ownership Conflicting goals Key Policy and Reform Components Stability and predictability; long-term allocation TACs, limited access, and individual vessel quotas Reduction/elimination of the subsidies Involvement of stakeholders Knowledge-based and gradual approach
Results Sustainable harvest Fewer vessels, fewer fishermen Improved profitability Quota utilization Diversified fleet structure Geographical concentration Lessons Learned Fewer vessels and fishers are inevitable Subsidies delay required reform General economic growth can smooth the path Stakeholder involvement is crucial Incremental process reduces opposition Timing, pace and sequencing are essential Clear distribution of benefits and integrated compensation secure support
Overall Compliance with The Code of Conduct Bar chart showing status of compliance of the 53 top fishing countries with the FAO (UN) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF). Error bars are derived from Monte Carlo runs of the MDS ordination technique on the upper and lower score limits for each question and country (see Annex 5). Broken lines: green denotes good compliance rating; red denotes fail rating. Oil interest statement (Teknisk Ukeblad, April 09): Marine / Fisheries biologists are saboteurs. Background: MRI s advice to not open important spawning grounds for oil activites.
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