Mis thinking globalisation: The case for WTO 2.0 Richard Baldwin Graduate Institute, Geneva & University of Oxford 26 September 2012, WTO Forum
Mis thinking globalisation Conventional view: Globalisation = no trade to free trade, slowly. But pervasive sense that today s globalisation is different
Conventional view: Globalisation trade costs (1870 1980) 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1870 Global trade costs 1939 15 15 14 14 13 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1889 1914 1921 1950 1980 13 12 12 11 11 1.1 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 10 Source: David, Meissner, and Novy (2011) Source: Gravity model based estimates of trade costs (Jacks, Meissner, Novy 2011).
Conventional view (1870 1980): Globalisation all about trade costs 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1870 1939 Global trade flow (right scale in logs) 15 15 14 14 13 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1889 1914 1921 1950 1980 13 12 12 11 11 1.1 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 10 Source: David, Meissner, and Novy (2011) Source: Gravity model based estimates of trade costs (Jacks, Meissner, Novy 2011).
1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 Then something changed Trade kept growing 15 1870 15 14 14 1939 13 1921 1950 Despite flat trade costs 13 12 12 11 1914 1980 11 10 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Source: David, Meissner, and Novy (2011)
Globalisation impact changed 1991, 52% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008 G7 exports 1990, 65% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 G7 manufacturing 1950, 55% 1988, 67% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008 G7 GDP 1990 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.2 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 logs World manufacturing
Global manufacturing shares 1990, 65% G7, 47% 4% 17% China + Korea 3% 5% five risers RoW 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Korea India Turkey Indonesia Poland Thailand 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 World manufacturing share Korea India Turkey Indonesia Poland Thailand US China Japan Germany Korea Italy UK France 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 $ bill 2005
The tight geographical clustering of manufactures export swings Change in national export manufacturing share, 1980s to 2007-08 (percentage points) Philippines Mexico China Malaysia Thailand Sri Lanka Turkey Morocco Bangladesh Tunisia Poland Pakistan Hungary US Romania Netherlands Denmark UK India France Spain Greece 59% 46% 44% 42% 40% 35% 29% 28% 23% 22% 20% 18% 17% 10% 9% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 1% Italy Portugal Switzerland Korea Canada Germany Sweden Austria Japan Hong Kong -1% -1% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -4% -5% -6%
Trade changed Vertical specialisation index 60% Index of intra-industry trade 5 Asia 50% US- EU25 4 4 40% 3 30% Intra- Asean 3 G7 20% 10% 1986 Japan- Asean 2 2 1990 US- China 1 LatAm 1 0% 0 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Reimporting/reexporting takeoff 1995 2008 US Mexico Canada Argentina China Indonesia S.Africa Korea Russia Brazil UK India Sweden Italy Switz Austria Germany France NL Norway Spain Japan Australia Poland US Mexico Canada Argentina China Indonesia S.Africa Korea Russia Brazil UK India Sweden Italy Switz Austria Germany France NL Norway Spain Japan Australia Poland US Canada Mexico US, 1995 Reexports Reimports -70% -35% 0% 35% 70% US, 2008 Reexports Reimports -70% -35% 0% 35% 70% US Mexico Canada Argentina China Indonesia S.Africa Korea Russia Brazil UK India Sweden Italy Switz Austria Germany France NL Norway Spain Japan Australia Poland US Mexico Canada Argentina China Indonesia S.Africa Korea Russia Brazil UK India Sweden Italy Switz Austria Germany France NL Norway Spain Japan Australia Poland Canada, 1995 Reexports Reimports -70% -35% 0% 35% 70% Canada, 2008 Reexports Reimports -70% -35% 0% 35% 70% US Mexico Canada Argentina China Indonesia S.Africa Korea Russia Brazil UK India Sweden Italy Switz Austria Germany France NL Norway Spain Japan Australia Poland US Mexico Canada Argentina China Indonesia S.Africa Korea Russia Brazil UK India Sweden Italy Switz Austria Germany France NL Norway Spain Japan Australia Poland Mexico, 1995 Reexports Reimports -70% -35% 0% 35% 70% Mexico, 2008 Reexports Reimports -70% -35% 0% 35% 70%
Chinese reimport/reexport Argentina Indonesia Russia S.Africa Brazil Australia China, 1995 China, 2008 1995 2008 Argentina Indonesia Russia S.Africa Brazil Australia Korea India Japan Mexico Germany Norway Sweden Switz Italy Canada Austria France US UK NL Poland Spain Reexports Reimports -10% 0% 10% 20% Korea India Japan Mexico Germany Norway Sweden Switz Italy Canada Austria France US UK NL Poland Spain Reexports Reimports -10% 0% 10% 20%
Global supply chain trade, 2009 Source: Baldwin and Lopez Gonzales (2012).
Compare total vs supply chain trade I2P '09 UK Germany France Itlay NL Belgium Austria Poland Czech Denmark Spain Portugal Finland Greece Ireland Turkey Sweden Brazil Russia India Indonesia Australia Taipei China Japan Korea US Mexico Canada RoW UK 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% Germany 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 2% France 0% 1% Itlay 1% NL 1% 0% 0% Belgium 0% Austria Poland Czech Denmark 0% Spain 0% Portugal Finland Greece Ireland 0% Turkey 0% Sweden 0% Brazil 0% Russia 1% India 0% Indonesia 0% Australia 1% 0% Taipei 1% 0% China 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 4% Japan 1% 0% 0% 2% Korea 1% 1% US 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 4% Mexico 1% Canada 2% RoW 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 4% 2% 1% 3% Supply chain trade 2009 total gbr deu fra ita nld bel aut pol cze dnk esp prt fin grc irl tur swe bra rus ind idn aus twn chn jpn kor usa mex can RoW UK 1% 0% 0% 1% Germany 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% France 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% Itlay 1% 1% 0% NL 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% Belgium 0% 1% 1% 1% Austria 1% Poland 0% Czech 0% Denmark Spain 0% 0% 0% Portugal Finland Greece Ireland 0% 0% Turkey Sweden Brazil 0% Russia 0% India 0% Indonesia Australia 1% 0% Taipei China 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% ## 0% 0% 2% 1% 4% 0% 0% Japan 0% 2% 1% 1% Korea 1% 0% 1% US 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 2% 2% Mexico 2% Canada 3% RoW Total trade Source: Baldwin and Lopez Gonzales (2012).
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 International trade politics changed Developing nations seek out liberalisation of policies that foster supply chain industrialisation. Unilateralism on tariffs, Take off in BITs, FDI, and soaring deep RTAs provisions Applied tariffs, simple mean, all goods (%) Middle East & North Africa Sub- Sahara n Africa South Asia East Asia & Pacific 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 250 200 150 100 50 0 New BITs signed 1988 FDI 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Number of deep provisions in new RTAs 1986 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Trade governance changed Supply chain trade needed new disciplines. More interconnected policy; trade investmentservices IP nexus Deep N S RTAs around outsourcing HQ economies partly filled the gap. US, Japan and Germany (EU). Mega Regionals & mega bilats start to harmonise the bilateral rules. TPP, TAP (EU US), EU Canada, Japan EU, Canada Japan (old Quad + offshoring partners). ISA?
WTO did not change
Looking forward Harmonised rules on supply chain trade likely to be written by 2020; Most likely negotiated in mega regionals & mega bilats; WTO unlikely to be involved (DDA stuck). So what is the future of the WTO?
Three premises For traditional trade, WTO is in excellent health. Status quo is comfortable for WTO members whose trade is booming. On current trajectory, status quo will be destroyed by 2020; mega regionals & mega bilats will have transformed world trade governance.
The WTO s future: ERGO A) Stay on the 20 th century side track; Allow fragmentation of global trade governance & exclusion of some major WTO members. B) Seek to multilateralise the new supply chaintrade disciplines.
Case for WTO 2.0 In future status quo, firms from 3 of the world s 4 manufacturing giants (US, China, Japan, and Germany) will have been involved in negotiating the harmonised supply chain rules. The 3 will have to be convinced that multilateralisation will improve things.
Key questions: Structure of WTO 2.0 What structure (number of members, S&D, etc.)? Which issues? Economic logic of S&D Primarily import substitution industrialisation (ISI). Secondarily vulnerable groups.
Structure of WTO 2.0 Production unbundling destroyed ISI, so much weaker economic rational for S&D for supplychain rules. Logic for vulnerable groups unaffected. ERGO: Need WTO 2.0 WTO 1.0 keeps S&D, WTO 2.0 doesn t.
S&D in WTO 2.0: Politics US, inter alia, likely to demand elimination of special and differential treatment for all major supply chain players as a price for multilateralising supply chain trade rules. This cannot happen in WTO 1.0, so need WTO 2.0 (maybe World Supply Chain Organisation??)
Universal membership WTO 1.0 logic: free market most efficient non discrimination with universal members is natural implication. Supply chain trade is more highly concentrated and not a free market outcome. Logic of universality is weaker. Politics suggests membership only for those heavily engaged in supply chain trade.
Which issues covered in WTO 2.0?
Which issues covered in WTO 2.0? Revealed preference evidence from US RTAs (share with given provision) Visa and Asylum Terrorism Taxation Statistics US LE frq Social Matters SME US AC frq Research and Technology Regional Cooperation Public Administration Political Dialogue Nuclear Safety Movement of Capital Money Laundering Mining Labour Market Regulation IPR Investment Innovation Policies Information Society Industrial Cooperation Illicit Drugs Illegal Immigration Human Rights Health Financial Assistance Environmental Laws Energy Education and Training Economic Policy Dialogue Data Protection Cultural Cooperation Consumer Protection Competition Policy Civil Protection Audio Visual Approximation of Anti-Corruption Agriculture TRIPs TRIMs TBT STE State Aid SPS Public Procurement GATS FTA Industrial FTA Agriculture Export Taxes CVM Customs AD 0% 80% Legally enforceable Legally enforceable Provision not in WTO 1.0 (maybe in WTO 2.0) Provision in WTO 1.0 but deeper commitments in the RTAs Source: WTO database on RTA provisions
Ditto for US, Japan, EU & RoW US Japan 80% 80% US AC frq 80% US LE frq Jpn AC frq Jpn LE frq 0% 0% AD Customs CVM Export Taxes FTA Agriculture FTA Industrial GATS Public Procurement SPS State Aid STE TBT TRIMs TRIPs Agriculture Anti-Corruption Approximation of Audio Visual Civil Protection Competition Policy Consumer Protection Cultural Cooperation Data Protection Economic Policy Education and Training Energy Environmental Laws Financial Assistance Health Human Rights Illegal Immigration Illicit Drugs Industrial Cooperation Information Society Innovation Policies Investment IPR Labour Market Mining Money Laundering Movement of Capital Nuclear Safety Political Dialogue Public Administration Regional Cooperation Research and SME Social Matters Statistics Taxation Terrorism Visa and Asylum AD Customs CVM Export Taxes FTA Agriculture FTA Industrial GATS Public Procurement SPS State Aid STE TBT TRIMs TRIPs Agriculture Anti-Corruption Approximation of Audio Visual Civil Protection Competition Policy Consumer Protection Cultural Cooperation Data Protection Economic Policy Education and Training Energy Environmental Laws Financial Assistance Health Human Rights Illegal Immigration Illicit Drugs Industrial Cooperation Information Society Innovation Policies Investment IPR Labour Market Mining Money Laundering Movement of Capital Nuclear Safety Political Dialogue Public Administration Regional Cooperation Research and SME Social Matters Statistics Taxation Terrorism Visa and Asylum EU All others 80% EU AC frq EU LE frq 80% RoW AC frq RoW LE frq 0% 0% AD Customs CVM Export Taxes FTA Agriculture FTA Industrial GATS Public Procurement SPS State Aid STE TBT TRIMs TRIPs Agriculture Anti-Corruption Approximation of Audio Visual Civil Protection Competition Policy Consumer Protection Cultural Cooperation Data Protection Economic Policy Education and Training Energy Environmental Laws Financial Assistance Health Human Rights Illegal Immigration Illicit Drugs Industrial Cooperation Information Society Innovation Policies Investment IPR Labour Market Mining Money Laundering Movement of Capital Nuclear Safety Political Dialogue Public Administration Regional Cooperation Research and SME Social Matters Statistics Taxation Terrorism Visa and Asylum AD Customs CVM Export Taxes FTA Agriculture FTA Industrial GATS Public Procurement SPS State Aid STE TBT TRIMs TRIPs Agriculture Anti-Corruption Approximation of Audio Visual Civil Protection Competition Policy Consumer Protection Cultural Cooperation Data Protection Economic Policy Education and Training Energy Environmental Laws Financial Assistance Health Human Rights Illegal Immigration Illicit Drugs Industrial Cooperation Information Society Innovation Policies Investment IPR Labour Market Mining Money Laundering Movement of Capital Nuclear Safety Political Dialogue Public Administration Regional Cooperation Research and SME Social Matters Statistics Taxation Terrorism Visa and Asylum
Only beyond WTO measures Visa Movement of capital IPR Investment Competition policy Visa and Asylum Terrorism Taxation Statistics Social Matters SME Research and Technology Regional Cooperation Public Administration Political Dialogue Nuclear Safety Movement of Capital Money Laundering Mining Labour Market Regulation IPR Investment Innovation Policies Information Society Industrial Cooperation Illicit Drugs Illegal Immigration Human Rights Health Financial Assistance Environmental Laws Energy Education and Training Economic Policy Dialogue Data Protection Cultural Cooperation Consumer Protection Competition Policy Civil Protection Audio Visual Approximation of Legislation Anti-Corruption Agriculture RoW legally enforceable EU legally enforceable Japan legally enforceable US legally enforceable 0% 50% 100%
At least 2/3 rd of US & Japan RTAs have legally binding provisions Tariffs to zero, Beyond TRIPs, Beyond AD, Beyond CVM, Beyond Customs, GATS, TRIMs, Investment, Movement of Capital,
Don t have the answers! Time to start thinking ahead on trade Global trade governance is at turning point. Status quo likely to evaporate by 2020. Need global thinking on what comes next. Voice of all nations needs to be added to the conversation among manufacturing giants. Design issues need research. Content issues need research.
Thanks for listening My paper WTO 2.0 will be soon posted on http://www.voxeu.org/