March 11, Agenda Item I.3.c US-Canada Albacore Treaty: Recommendations for Future Negotiations

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1 Agenda Item I.3.c Supplemental Public Comment 3 (Includes Graphs) March 2013 AMERICAN ALBACORE FISHING ASSOCIATION Bonita Road, #311 Bonita, California Tel: (619) Fax: (619) Toll Free (866) March 11, 2013 Mr. Dan Wolford, Chair 7700 NE Ambassador Place, Suite 101 Portland, OR Re: Agenda Item I.3.c US-Canada Albacore Treaty: Recommendations for Future Negotiations Dear Mr. Chairman and Council members: The American Albacore Fishing Association would like to express its sincere gratitude to this Council for its recognition of US fishermen s concerns and the need to protect US albacore fishermen from a foreign fleet operating in the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This chart depicts Canada s albacore fishery from The chart reflects Canada s fishery data submitted to the ISC and used in the North Pacific albacore stock assessments. The treaty was enacted in At that time, Canada s albacore fishery consisted of several dozen Canadian vessels and annual landings of some 200 metric tons of albacore. 1 As you 1 Turning The Tide: A New Policy for Canada s Pacific Fisheries, Peter H. Pearse, Commissioner, The Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy (Sept. 1982) p AAFA Ltr. PFMC re. Treaty Letter.doc

2 Re: Recommendations on US-Canada Albacore Treaty can see in this chart, up until the mid-90s, Canadian effort under the treaty was relatively stable. In the mid 1990 s, Canada s fleet aggressively expanded its fishery, including its effort in the US EEZ. Many Canadian salmon trollers were encouraged to convert over to fishing albacore in the US EEZ. With its government s assistance, the Canadian fleet was transformed into a larger, more aggressive, and highly competitive fleet. In 1998, US fishermen were able to get the attention of the State Department. With the growing inequity of the treaty and crowding on the grounds, the US entered into negotiations with Canada in order to reduce Canadian fishing effort in US waters. The resulting 2002 treaty amendment sought to reduce Canadian effort back to the pre-1998 average level of fishing. 2 That pre-1998 average is shown on this chart by the black dashed line. It is worth noting that between 1992 and the 2002 treaty amendment, the Canadian fishery had already increased over 580%. 3 The treaty amendment was approved by Congress and signed by the President in In presenting the treaty amendment before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the State Department explained that this significant reduction in Canada s fishing effort was necessary to protect US fishermen. There was no mention of protecting other economic interests or other fishery relations. The reduction of Canada s effort to the pre-1998 average level was necessary to protect US fishermen. US fishermen are still seeking that protection. The reduction in Canadian effort that was necessary in the 1990s was never achieved. The treaty was amended, but the goals were not achieved. Congress has not reviewed the performance of the treaty amendment, but it is evident it was not successful at achieving its goals. In the decade that followed the amendment, Canada s fleet continued to increase operations in the US EEZ and continued to have significant negative impacts on US fishermen. Since the treaty s fishing regime expired in 2011, US fishermen have not been idle. AAFA submitted to the State Department a framework proposal for developing future treaty options. No response or encouragement was received. Nonetheless, fishermen sought to obtain information that could facilitate progress. Unfortunately, requests to National Marine Fisheries Service were unproductive, despite a lengthy and costly process under the Freedom of Information Act. Even the most basic requests, such as for the annual Canadian vessel lists, required under the treaty, were denied. AAFA commends the State Department for requesting that Canada produce its fleet s effort characterization data. That request was made in May 2012 but the data has not been provided. The absence of data production by both parties has made it difficult to develop fact-based proposals that would achieve the required goals and provide the necessary certainty to protect US fishermen and restore the US albacore fishery. 2 Statement of David A. Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries, US Department of State, made before the Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the Committee on Resources, US House of Representatives, 108 th Congress, 2 nd Session. 3 The Overall State of Canada s Fishery in 2002, Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Dec. 2003)

3 Re: Recommendations on US-Canada Albacore Treaty It is important that the Council recognizes that the Data Working Group and the Economic Working Group were not created or tasked with evaluating the effectiveness of the required effort reduction. That important distinction was made very clear. It is worth noting that, in the absence of the Canadian fleet, the US fleet had a most surprising 2012 season. Surprising because, as the 110 Canadian treaty vessels were barred from US waters, we saw US participation rebound with over 170 more US vessels. Even more surprising was how these US vessels fished without all the crowding, interference and aggression that characterized fishing under the treaty. The US catch also rebounded, despite a challenging season and a soft market. In fact, the US fleet more than made up for the landings of Canadian vessels. All of the catch was landed at US ports and sold through US buyers. With the expiration of the treaty s last fishing regime, US fishermen have been afforded a glimpse of what they had hoped the treaty amendment would have provided a decade ago. During the 2012 season, US fishermen experienced first hand the amount of effort reduction necessary to ensure that a foreign fleet does not harm US fishermen. Most every US fishermen is convinced that keeping Canadian vessels out of the US EEZ is essential for the future of this fishery. After so many years of struggling under an oppressive treaty regime, there is little if any tolerance for keeping the treaty. Letters are arriving from ports, even including authorized treaty ports, offloading facilities, fuel companies, trucking companies, albacore processors and buyers, recreational charter fleets, and a broad range of businesses, expressing their support for US albacore fishermen and their opposition to negotiations of a future fishing regime. In summary, we strongly believe the treaty amendment has not been effectively implemented, monitored, or enforced, and the treaty has considerable negative impacts on US fishermen

4 Re: Recommendations on US-Canada Albacore Treaty There is a pressing need to protect US albacore fishermen and protect this important US fishery. Sound policies at the foundation of the Magnuson Act direct that foreign fishing should be removed from US waters. We ask the Council to recommend the State Department not proceed with negotiations for any future fishing regime. We thank you for your support of US albacore fishermen and this historic fishery. Sincerely, Chip Bissell American Albacore Fishing Association - 4 -

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