Fishing opportunities for 2018 under the Common Fisheries Policy

Transcription

1 12 th August 2017 Ref. Ares(2017) /08/2017 Response to DGMare Consultation on Fishing opportunities for 2018 under the Common Fisheries Policy Evaluation of the reform My response will focus on coherence between the objectives of the reformed CFP and the new management to develop in consequence thereof. The setting of fishing opportunities for 2018 must be seen in context with the requirement of full catch accountability, with the regulations that restrict fishermens methods in catching the fish and with the sea basin characteristics that define the playing ground for fishermens efforts to harvest in a selective and economical way. Fish stocks are in general improving and an increased number of fish stocks can be harvested at MSY. This is a result of reduced fishing effort hence reduced fishing mortality obtained over the past 8 years. It does not accrue to the reformed CFP. The reformed CFP may in effect be a threath to the progress obtained if TAC/quota top-ups are not based on catch accountability. The situation following the reform is as follows: The first of the big 3 CFP objectives, namely that all catches count on quotas, must be accurately documented and landed is not compiied with, not controlled and not sanctioned against fishers or Member States according to the Control Regulation art 33 and ICES (July 2017) assess that 40-45% unwanted catches of plaice and cod in the North Sea will take place on top of the landed fish. Discards are not under control they may fall or increase depending on price relations, recruitment to stocks and prescriptive regulations. The consequence is that catch figures and advice are uncertain, the MSY objective difficult to manage, quality of advice suffers. Also negative

2 externality costs from high discarders are paid by low discarders. If TAC s are not aligned with fishing mortality the logic consequence of ICES s advice is to leave Catch-TAC/Quotas and go back to Landing-TAC/Quotas where expected discards are deducted prior to the TAC setting. I do not recommend that this deroute is allowed. The choke species problem adds to the difficulties in obtaining catch accountability. A hierarchy of solutions from proper TAC settings to national quota allocation can be applied. Incommensurable rules, such as the Landing Obligation combined with the ban on selling undersized fish for consumption, force fishermen to discard fish. Commissions and MS last-haul inspection has demonstrated this convincingly. Conclusion: We have a fundamental CFP failure, catches are not counted and landed as they should be, we do not have a firm basis for setting TAC s, and adverse fishing practises are rewarded. The second of the 3, namely MSY has been improving due to reduced effort. However current policy to top-up TAC s while discards continue is not viable. And the MSY implementation is not handled properly. The Basic Regulation stipulates a Precautionary Approach, which is vital for protection but fails to communicate that MSY is an economic concept which entails that adaptive measures should take account of industry adaptability and choke species issues. It is a great step that ICES has defined MSY ranges to take account of these issues. Unfortunately not all interest groups influencing the CFP have understood the nature of this and they are stuck with the understanding that MSY is a means of protecting stocks irrespective of industry consequences. MSY and sustainability is in effect about optimal long-term utilisation (Brundtland) - not protection per se. Conclusion: Many stocks are not in critical situation, but the span between interest groups understanding of MSY leads to unsurmountable differences in opinion with regard to sensible TAC settings. The third big CFP objective is results based management. Or free choice of gear - in a blunt expression. This is not a specified objective of the CFP, merely a policy statement first expressed by the Danish Minister in her communication to the Council in October 2008, and at numerous occasions by the Commissioner, ministers and industry. 2

3 Results based management (incentive based management or management by output) is a main tool to obtain compliance with the Landing Obligation and to ensure a level playing field for economic use of the resources. Indeed prescriptive gear regulations are a direct cause to discards. Not going into detail here let me just refer to three papers: ICES Advice 2009, Book 8: The Baltic cod fishery would seem a candidate fishery to move to a target based system, allowing fishermen to adjust their gear or fishing pattern to meet appropriate management targets set for the fishery. This would remove the need for the large scale and frequent changes to the current technical measures regulations, which have occurred over the last decade in the Baltic cod fishery and caused many of the current problems. Ref. Ares(2014) /10/2014 The Commissions discussion paper: where the Catch Metric approach is discussed as an alternative to prescriptive regulations. I too have produced a paper on this issue. DiscardLess paper on free choice of gear Results based management can take place where the fishery is sufficently documented. In most cases this means by Remote Electronic Monitoring, but many small fisheries fishing with passive gear and insignificant discard levels can establish accountability without having full REM. In context with this consultation on TAC for 2018 let me point to the need for incentive based exemptions from the Landing Obligation rather than new prescriptive management governing conditions. Conclusion: Decisive incentive based drivers for the CFP implementation has not been brought into play. The conceptual nature of results based management is hardly understood neither is its potential in making the reformed CFP lift the ground and eventually become a world-best management. Conclusion and proposal TAC s must be set in respect of ICES MSY ranges taking into account choke issues in mixed fisheries and fisheries with large recruiting yearclasses. TAC s must be adhered to. It is the responsibility of Member States and the Commission must as guardian of the Treaty see to this. Full catch accountability must be established through accurate documentation as 3

4 stated in the CFP article 15 and through setting aside quota buffers to account for catches by fisheries not covered by REM. Exemptions from the Landing Obligation allowing for discards of high survivors must be simple and fishermen obliged to count part of the discards against quotas in order to incentivise selectice methods. For North Sea plaice, which is a strong stock a quota count of discarded plaice should be moderate in order to incentivise inclusion of the present massive, not recorded discards in the regular quota accounting system. Undersized fish from species where large size gives high price should be allowed to sell for consumption. Free choice of gear must be given to REM fisheries. Gear regulations related to habitat impact could not be given free at this stage. Given the political difficulties in bringing the new management on the market in a horizontal regulation it is necessary to use a phasing-in approach for selected stocks on a voluntary basis: I suggest Cod and Plaice in the Baltic, Skagerrak and North Sea. Perhaps Nephrops in the North Sea. Let me add that Member States footdragging in bringing effective national management about is detrimental to the CFP implementation. If full catch accountability is included in the 2018 TAC/Quota Member States will be incentivised to work for the reform. Unfortunately there is a misconception about quota transferability and concentration of rights. Transferable Fishing Concessions may produce lower discards, increased wealth and sustained coastal fishery if properly designed. It is important to separate the discussion on TFC design and TFC policy to progress and to understand that a market based approach may well benefit less competive fisheries as is the situation in the big economy where often 50 % of income is redistributed. Quota transferability - at least as an in-year opportunity will alleviate the choke problem. The reform entails that biological advice must change. MSY requirement and severe choke issues forbid a system based on year-old data and extended advice processes. New technologies allow for real-time data sampling and the development in processing power and datamining techniques allows for new thinking. I advice the Commission to evaluate the feasibility of a dataming based biological advice as a way to real-time advice on how fish stocks can be managed. 4

5 This is also what the SCAR-Fish has recommended: An advisory process delivering continuous advice based on real time computation of data. The Strategic Working Group on Fisheries and Aquaculture in its report to Member States and the Commission, November The model for 2018 TAC s Let me give a concrete illustration on how to include my proposal in the TAC/quota regulation for The approach is comparable to the model Fully Documented Fisheries included in the yearly TAC/quota proposals from In the model TAC/quotas are set as catch levels (F aligned with the TAC - or full top-up). The part of the TAC/quotas that equals the calculated discard is reserved in an accountability pool. Cod in greater North Sea The TAC would be tonnes (ICES MSY approach - incl. Norway) with footnote 1), 2), 3) to the TAC and each MS quota. Footnotes to the TAC/Quota table: 1) Of which tonnes is reserved for the accountability pool. The reservation may be released on basis of Member State measures to ensure full catch accountability as outlined in article x 2) Vessels participating in trials on fully documented fisheries (FDF) are exempted from the provision in the Technical Regulation articles x-y 3)Vessels participating in trials on fully documented fisheries are exempted from Regulation 1380/2013 article (the use of catches of species below mcrs shall be restricted to purposes other than direct human consumption) Plaice in the North Sea Same footnotes as for cod but with an added footnote taking account of palice being a high survivor 4) Vessels participating in trials on fully documented fisheries may release unwanted catches. Such catches count against quotas with a weight of 40%. 5

6 Note: This footnote makes detailed regulation on survivability management superfluous. The figure does not have to be aligned with exact survival. As long as the stock is above SSBpa, deviations will not be serious for stock survival only for distribution of economic externality effect between fleets. In the event that survival is lower than expected size composition in landings will differ accordingly and ICES will advice on lower TAC s. Council may then reduce the TAC or increase fishermens counting of discards against their quota holding. Article x Reservation for accountability pools Vessels participating in trials on fully documented fisheries may access a proportionate share of the reservation without deductions. Other vessels may access the reservation on basis of scientific statistical documentation of discards from the type of gear used. Note: MS decide on their own how to access the accountability pool. They can choose to do nothing, to use an REM solution or to single out certain fisheries with low discards. REM is voluntary. Accountability is not. The model entails that small scale fisheries (gill netters) with low discard can access the accountability pool without REM (CCTV solutions). Mogens Schou Partner, Aquamind Copenhagen, Denmark 6