SUMMARY TABLE EXTERNAL PRESSURE ON SHARED STOCKS UNDERMINES REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT GOALS...6

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1 Appendix 2.2: Risk Assessment Tables Table of Contents SUMMARY TABLE EXTERNAL PRESSURE ON SHARED STOCKS UNDERMINES REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT GOALS OVERFISHING OF YFT/BET IN SOUTH EAST ASIA UNDERMINES THE SUSTAINABILITY OF REGIONAL STOCKS Yellowfin Bigeye INADEQUATE CATCH AND EFFORT MONITORING AND REPORTING OF DOMESTIC SOUTH EAST ASIAN FLEETS UNDERMINES DATA INTEGRITY AND STOCK ASSESSMENTS OVERFISHING OF BET IN THE EPO UNDERMINES THE SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF WCPO STOCKS UNLICENSED/UNAUTHORISED FISHING WITHIN THE FFA REGION UNDERMINES REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES UNLICENSED/UNAUTHORISED FISHING IN THE WESTERN WCPO BY SMALL SCALE SOUTH EAST ASIAN VESSELS UNLICENSED/UNAUTHORISED FISHING BY VESSELS ARISING FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN Purse Seine Longline UNLICENSED/UNAUTHORISED FISHING BY VESSELS ARISING FROM THE EASTERN PACIFIC OCEAN Purse seine Longline UNAUTHORISED/UNLICENSED FISHING BY NEW VESSELS IN THE PS FISHERY UNLICENSED FISHING BY VESSELS ON THE FFA REGIONAL REGISTER Purse Seine Longline UNLICENSED FISHING BY HIGH SEAS VESSELS IN FFA MEMBER EEZS Purse Seine Longline EXCESS CAPACITY AND /OR EFFORT IN LICENSED FLEETS UNDERMINES REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT GOALS EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE LL FLEET COMPROMISES ACHIEVEMENT OF BET/YFT SUSTAINABILITY OBJECTIVES EXCESS EFFORT IN THE PS FLEET COMPROMISES ACHIEVEMENT OF BET/YFT SUSTAINABILITY OBJECTIVES EFFORT SHIFT FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN UNDERMINES ACHIEVEMENT OF REGIONAL MANAGEMENT GOALS...32 Page 1

2 3.3.1 Purse Seine Longline EFFORTS SHIFTS FROM THE EASTERN PACIFIC OCEAN UNDERMINE REGIONAL MANAGEMENT GOALS Purse Seine Longline INCREASES IN LL CATCH AMONGST THE 2000T NATIONS UNDERMINES BET/YFT FISHING MORTALITY CONTROL OBJECTIVES CAPACITY CAPS IN THE SOUTHERN ALBACORE FISHERY ARE EXCEEDED CAPACITY AND CATCH CAPS IN THE SWORDFISH FISHERY ARE EXCEEDED CAPACITY CAPS IN THE STRIPED MARLIN FLEET ARE EXCEEDED EFFORT CREEP IN THE PS FISHERY EFFORT CREEP IN THE LL FISHERY UNDERMINES EFFORTS TO CONTROL FISHING MORTALITY UNREGULATED USE OF FADS OUTSIDE CLOSURE PERIODS NON-COMPLIANCE BY LICENSED VESSELS AND FLAG STATES UNDERMINES REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT GOALS FISHING IN HIGH SEAS POCKETS Purse Seine Longline CATCH DISCARDING AMONGST THE PS FLEET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH VMS PROVISIONS Purse Seine Longline USE OF NON-PRESCRIBED FISHING GEAR AND/OR METHODS OTHER THAN THOSE SPECIFIED BY LICENCE Purse seine Longline FISHING INSIDE CLOSED WATERS Purse seine Longline FALSIFICATION/MISUSE OF LICENCE DOCUMENTS Purse seine Longline FISHING ON FADS DURING CLOSURE PERIODS VESSELS EXCEED DAYS UNDER VDS MISREPORTING OF TARGET SPECIES...59 Page 2

3 4.9.1 Purse Seine Longline MISREPORTING OF BYCATCH SPECIES Purse Seine Longline MISREPORTING SET TYPE IN PS FISHERY MISREPORTING CATCH POSITION Purse seine Longline FAILURE TO SUBMIT TIMELY AND ACCURATE LOGSHEETS FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROMPT ENTRY/EXIT/WEEKLY REPORTS Purse seine Longline INADEQUATE REPORTING TO THE WCPFC BY FLAG STATES INADEQUATE MONITORING AND CONTROL OF THE POST-HARVEST SUPPLY CHAIN UNDERMINES REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT GOALS ILLEGAL TRANSHIPPING Purse seine Longline BUNKERING (RE-FUELLING) AT SEA Purse seine Longline LANDING OF CATCH IN FOREIGN PORTS DOES NOT ALLOW ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY FOR PORT INSPECTIONS/CATCH VALIDATION Purse seine Longline FISHERIES IN THE FFA REGION UNDERMINE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF BYCATCH SPECIES AND WIDER ECOSYSTEM FAILURE TO ADOPT APPROPRIATE MITIGATION TECHNIQUES ON LL VESSELS UNDERMINES SEA TURTLE CONSERVATION OBJECTIVES FAILURE TO ADOPT APPROPRIATE MITIGATION TECHNIQUES ON LL VESSELS UNDERMINES SEABIRD CONSERVATION OBJECTIVES HIGH BYCATCH RATES AND/OR ILLEGAL TARGETING UNDERMINES SUSTAINABILITY OF WCPO SHARK POPULATIONS Purse seine Longline...92 Page 3

4 Summary Table Strategic Risk Risk Risk # Sector Likelihood Consequence Risk Rating Adequacy of Residual Existing MCS Risk External pressure on Overfishing of YFT/BET in South East Asia undermines YFT Almost certain Major Severe Weak Severe common stocks the sustainability of regional stocks BET Major High Weak High undermines regional fisheries management goals Inadequate catch and effort monitoring and reporting of south east Asian fleets undermines data integrity and stock assessments 1.2 YFT/BET Almost Certain High Weak High Overfishing of BET in the EPO undermines sustainable management of WCPO stocks 1.3 BET Unlikely Strong Low Unlicensed/unauthoris ed fishing within the FFA region Excess capacity or effort in licensed fleets undermines regional fisheries management goals Non-compliance by licensed vessels and flag states undermines regional fisheries management goals Unlicensed fishing in the western WCPO by small scale 2.1 Western WCPO Almost Certain High High south east Asian vessels Unlicensed/unauthorised fishing by vessels arising from PS Unlikely Minor Low Weak Low the Indian Ocean LL Unlikely Insignificant Low Weak Low Unlicensed/unauthorised fishing by vessels arising from PS Likely High Weak High the Eastern Pacific Ocean LL Weak Unregulated fishing by new PS vessels 2.4 PS Unlikely Major Weak Unlicensed fishing by vessels on the FFA Register PS Rare Low Very Strong Low LL Likely High High Unlicensed fishing by high seas vessels in FFA member PS Rare Minor Low Strong Low EEZs LL Likely Major High Weak High Excess capacity in the LL fleet 3.1 LL Likely Major High High Excess effort in the PS fishery BET Almost Certain Serious Severe Severe YFT Major High Severe Effort shift from the Indian Ocean PS Likely High Strong LL Unlikely Effort shift from the eastern Pacific Ocean PS Likely High Strong LL Minor Increasing LL catch amongst the 2000t nations 3.5 LL Unlikely Capacity caps in the Sth Albacore fishery are breached 3.6 LL Unlikely Minor Low Low Capacity and catch caps in the swordfish fishery are Spain exceeded Aust/NZ Rare Low Low Capacity caps in the striped marlin fishery are breached 3.8 LL Unlikely Weak Effort creep in the PS fishery 3.9 PS Almost certain High Weak High Effort creep in the LL fishery 3.10 LL Unlikely Minor Low Weak low Unregulated use of FADs outside closure periods 3.11 PS Major High Very Strong Fishing in high seas pockets PS Likely High Very Strong Low LL Likely Minor Catch discarding in the PS fleet 4.2 PS Strong Low Non-compliance with VMS provisions PS Rare Major Very Strong Low LL Major High High Use of non-prescribed gear PS Insignificant Low Strong Low LL Page 4

5 Strategic Risk Risk Risk # Sector Likelihood Consequence Risk Rating Adequacy of Residual Existing MCS Risk Fishing inside closed waters PS Rare Low Very Strong Low LL Falsification/misuse of licence documents PS Rare Major Strong Low LL Unlikely Major Fishing on FADs during closure periods 4.7 PS Likely High Strong Vessels exceed days under VDS 4.8 PS Rare Low Low Misreporting of target species PS Almost certain Serious Severe Strong High LL Likely Serious Severe Weak Severe Misreporting of bycatch species PS Almost certain Minor High Strong LL Almost certain High Weak High (higher for sharks) Misreporting set type in the PS fishery 4.11 PS Unlikely Major Very Strong Low Misreporting catch position PS Unlikely Very strong Low LL Non-or delayed logbook submission 4.13 PS & LL Likely Major High Weak High Failure to provide prompt entry/exit/weekly reports PS Unlikely Very Strong Low LL Inadequate reporting by flag states 4.15 WCPFC CCMs Major High Weak High (but variable) Illegal transhipping PS Major High Strong DW Freezer Vessels Likely Major High Weak High Fresh product Major High Weak High vessels Bunkering (refuelling) at sea PS Minor (highest for shark) Low Low Inadequate monitoring and control of the postharvest supply chain undermines regional fisheries management goals Fisheries in the FFA region undermine the sustainability of bycatch species and the wider ecosystem Landing of catch in foreign ports Failure to adopt appropriate mitigation techniques on LL vessels undermines sea turtle conservation objectives Failure to adopt appropriate mitigation techniques on LL vessels undermines seabird conservation objectives LL (DW) Likely (highest for shark) High High LL (Domestic) Unlikely (highest for shark) PS Unlikely Minor Low Strong Low LL Likely High High Tropical Shallow LL Weak Tropical Deep LL Unlikely Weak Temperate LL Rare Minor Low Weak Low LL (N of 30S) Rare Low Strong in AUS/NZ Low (but hotspots exist) (sp. dependent) Weak Elsewhere LL (S of 30S) Likely Minor High Weak High PS Unlikely Minor Low Strong Low High bycatch rates and/or illegal targeting may lead to overfishing of shark populations LL Likely Major High Weak High Page 5

6 1. External pressure on shared stocks undermines regional fisheries management goals 1.1 Overfishing of YFT/BET in South East Asia undermines the sustainability of regional stocks Risk Description: Stocks of many oceanic fish species important to FFA members are shared with coastal states outside the FFA region. There is a risk that overfishing of YFT and BET by domestic fleets in south east Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam) will undermine regional agreements towards ensuring the sustainability of YFT and BET stocks. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC Convention objectives; Regional Tuna Management and Development Strategy; CMM Yellowfin Almost certain Domestic tuna catches in ID/PH (using a variety of gears including pole and line, handline, ringnet, small scale purse seine, gillnet) are dominated by YFT (Figure 1.1). Catches in these fisheries have grown significantly in the past decade are now thought to represent approximately 25-30% of the total YFT catch in the WCPO 1. The latest stock assessment notes that if stock-wide over-fishing criteria were applied at the level of our model regions, we would conclude that region 3 is fully exploited and the remaining regions are under-exploited. 2 The assessment further notes that the attribution of depletion to various fisheries or groups of fisheries indicates that the Philippines/Indonesian domestic fisheries and associated purse-seine fishery have the highest impact, particularly in region 3... and that these fisheries are also contributing significantly to the fishery impact in all other regions. 3 1 Langley, A., S. Harley, S. Hoyle, N. Davies, J. Hampton and P. Kleiber. Stock assessment of yellowfin tuna in the western and central Pacific Ocean. WCPFC 5 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. WCPFC-SC5-2005/SA- WP Ibid, Langley et al (2009) 3 Ibid, Langley et al (2009) Page 6

7 Figure 1.1: Distribution and cumulative catches of YFT between in the Pacific Ocean by gear type; longline (blue), purse seine (green), pole and line (grey) and other (orange). (Source: Langley et al, ) Consequence Major The latest stock assessment indicates that the domestic fisheries of ID/PH have the largest impact of any fishery sector on reduction in spawning biomass of YFT across the WCPO (see Figure 1.2). Total biomass of YFT in region 3 has been reduced to about 35% of the unexploited level, compared to approximately 60% for the total WCPO biomass 5.The assessment also notes that overfishing in ID/PH is also likely to be reducing the number of fish available in adjacent areas. Langley et al (2009) conclude that in region 4, the purse seine fishery is responsible for most of the impact, while the Philippines/Indonesian fisheries accounts for about 25% of the impact due to the direct movement of fish from region 3 to region 4. Similarly, while the direct fishery impacts are moderately low in regions 1, 2 and 5, the high impacts on the stock in region 3 are reducing the movement of fish to these adjacent regions. 6 (a) (b) Figure 1.2: Estimates in reduction in spawning biomass due to fishing in (a) Region 3 and (b) in the entire WCPO, attributed by fishery. (Source: Langley et al, ) 4 Ibid, Langley et al (2009) 5 Ibid, Langley (2009) 6 Ibid, Langley et al (2007) 7 Ibid, Langley et al (2009) Page 7

8 Socio-economic circumstances in PH/ID; Overcapacity in PH/ID fleets; ENSO events Domestic catch and effort data collection systems in PH/ID; reporting to WCPFC. Weak Systems to collect and analyse catch and effort information in ID and PH have historically been weak. Dedicated efforts have been made in recent times to improve understanding of catches in PH, although considerable scope for improvement remains. Information on ID catches remains poor. Severe Additional MCS measures recommended: FFA members need to support efforts through the WCPFC to gather better data on ID/PH/VT catches in order to inform better management decisions. Existing domestic institutional capacity and regulatory arrangements require review and strengthening to support fuller participation in (and implementation of) relevant WCPFC initiatives Bigeye Severe Catches of BET in PH/ID have expanded since the 1970 s, with a particular expansion since the turn of the century. The latest stock assessment indicates that, current levels of catch are not sustainable even at the recent [high] levels of recruitment estimated for the last decade, and that overfishing is occurring in the bigeye tuna stock 8. Notwithstanding that, the contribution of PH/ID fisheries to reduction in total and spawning biomass in WCPO BET stocks is less than that for YFT. Major The BET 2009 stock assessment indicates the ID/PH fishery, together with the LL fishery, are the dominant fishery-related impacts on BET stock in Region 3 (Figure 1.3). The PH/ID fishery has now overtaken the PS associated fishery as the second largest impact on WCPO BET stocks as a whole (behind the LL fishery) (Figure 2.3). The 2008 assessment noted depletion is particularly pronounced in Region 3 where base case scenarios indicate BET biomass is approximately 20% of unfished levels. 9 An important change in the 2009 assessment from the previous assessment was an increased reliance of other regions on recruitment from region Harley, S., S. Hoyle, A. Langley, A., J. Hampton and P. Kleiber. Stock assessment of bigeye tuna in the western and central Pacific Ocean. WCPFC 5 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. WCPFC-SC5-2009/SA- WP-4 9 Langley, A., Hampton, J., Kleiber, P. & Hoyle, S. (2008). Stock Assessment of Bigeye Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, including an Analysis of Management Options. WCPFC 4 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 134pp. 10 Ibid, Harley et al (2009) Page 8

9 (a) (b) Figure 1.3: Estimates of reduction in spawning biomass in (a) Region 3 (which includes the ID/PH fishery) and (b) the whole WCPO attributed to the various sectors harvesting BET. The LL fishery continues to make the largest contribution to the reduction in biomass, however impact of the IN/PH fisheries has increased markedly since the 1970s and has now overtaken the PS associated fishery as the second greatest region-wide impact on BET stocks. (Source: Harley et al, ) Socio-economic disadvantage in PH/ID; Overcapacity in PH/ID fleets; ENSO events Domestic catch and effort data collection systems in PH/ID; Reporting to the WCPFC Weak Systems to collect and analyse catch and effort information in ID and PH have historically been weak. Dedicated efforts have been made in recent times to improve understanding of catches in PH, although considerable scope for improvement remains. Information on ID catches remains poor. High Additional MCS measures recommended: As per YFT High 11 Ibid, Harley et al (2009) Page 9

10 1.2 Inadequate catch and effort monitoring and reporting of domestic south east Asian fleets undermines data integrity and stock assessments Risk Description: Significant gaps exist in the catch and effort information associated with domestic south east Asian (ID, PH and VT) fleets harvesting stocks shared with FFA members. There is a risk that data gaps will undermine the integrity of regional resource assessments. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. CMM 08-01) Almost certain Uncertainties associated with domestic tuna catches in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam are widely recognised as a key issue for the management of WCPO stocks. The WCPFC supported a dedicated project the Indonesia and Philippines Data Collection Project (IPDCP) to address data gaps. This was supported by voluntary contributions from WCPFC members in the period 2003 to Both the YFT and BET stock assessments identify domestic catch, effort and size information from PH/ID fleets as key areas of uncertainty. In the latest YFT assessment, Langley et al (2007) note A significant component of the increase in juvenile fishing mortality is attributable to the Philippines and Indonesian surface fisheries, which have the weakest catch, effort and size data. There has been recent progress made in the acquisition of a large amount of historical length frequency data from the Philippines and these data were incorporated in the assessment. However, there is an ongoing need to improve estimates of recent and historical catch from these fisheries and maintain the current fishery monitoring programme within the Philippines. While the various analyses have shown that the current stock status is relatively insensitive to the assumed level of catch from the Indonesian fishery, yield estimates from the fishery vary in accordance with the level of assumed Indonesian catch. Therefore, improved estimates of historical and current catch from these fisheries are important in the determination of the underlying productivity of the stock. 12 A range of sensitivity analyses are performed in the YFT/BET assessments to gauge the impact of uncertainties associated with PH/ID catches. Analyses in the 2007 YFT assessment indicated that the F current /F MSY and B current /B MSY reference points are relatively insensitive to large differences in the assumed historical and recent levels of catch from the Indonesian fishery. 13 In the 2008 BET assessment, differences in estimates for MSY of 7,280t (55,760t to 63,040t) were generated by assuming catches of 50% and 150% of probable recent and historic catches in PH/ID. Capacity and capability of domestic systems to collect necessary catch, effort and size data. High The WCPFC Secretariat recently received funding approval from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for a medium-size project, the West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management Project (WPEA), to continue IPDCP-related initiatives (expanded to include a rage of institutional issues) for 3 years starting in The objectives of the WPEA include (1) to collect and compile data that can be used to reduce the uncertainty of the assessments of tuna stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, (2) to improve the monitoring of tuna fisheries in the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam to strengthen their capacity to monitor their fleets targeting tuna in the WCPO and (3) review policy and institutional issues as a means to identify capacity building needs to strengthen each country s participation in the WCPO particularly in relation to the implementation of conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission. The GEF will contribute US$1 million to the WPEA over 3 years with US$2 million co-financing secured from a range of bilateral and multilateral donors including the US NMFS, 12 Ibid, Langley et al (2009) 13 Ibid, Langley et al (2007) Page 10

11 the Government of Japan and AusAID. The WCPFC s 2009 budget contribution is US$115,000 with provisional funding of US$75,000 proposed for The WCPFC Secretariat anticipates a long term requirement for support by the Commission to this region. Weak Significant improvements in data collection have been made in recent years, particularly in PH. Achievements in 2007/8 in PH included: the implementation of logsheet data collection and provision for the purse-seine, ringnet and handline gears; the establishment of cannery receipt data collection; agreement on tuna catch estimates for the purse-seine, ringnet and large-fish gears developed during an annual review meeting attended by agencies responsible for data collection and the fishing industry; and recovery of historical data from that has yet to be encoded. Planned activities for 2009 include: expansion of port sampling into other landing centres for gears offloading tuna; compilation of historical cannery receipt data; improving the coverage of logsheet data through capacity building with the fishing industry; further collaboration by BFAR/NFRDI with BAS to improve reporting and catch estimates. Progress on IPDCP activities are less well developed in Indonesia (partly because the initial focus of the Project was the Philippines). High Additional MCS measures recommended: FFA members need to support efforts through the WCPFC to gather better data on ID/PH/VT catches in order to inform better management decisions. Existing domestic institutional capacity and regulatory arrangements require review and strengthening to support fuller participation in (and implementation of) relevant WCPFC initiatives. 1.3 Overfishing of BET in the EPO undermines the sustainable management of WCPO stocks Risk Description: Evidence exists of at least some level of connectedness between BET stocks from the EPO and WCPO. There is a risk that overfishing of BET in the EPO will undermine efforts towards sustainable management in the WCPO. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. CMM 08-01) Unlikely Page 11

12 Recent stock assessments show there is a very high probability that BET is being overfished in the EPO. Spawning biomass at the beginning of 2009 was close to historic low levels (Figure 1.4), while recent catches have been 19% higher than MSY levels 14. The majority of recent reductions in spawning biomass have been attributed to the floating object PS fishery. The important issue is whether the EPO and WCPO BET populations form a single stock, or whether they are functionally distinct. The extent of mixing amongst BET populations in the WCPO and EPO is unclear. DNA analysis has shown little evidence of population sub-division in the Pacific Ocean 15, indicating a degree of mixing between populations, however most tagging studies show relatively little movement from release sites. Archival tagging research in the EPO indicated little large scale movement of BET. Stocks assessments for the WCPO and EPO are done separately 16. Figure 1.4: Projected spawning biomass ratio of BET in the EPO. Projections beyond 2009 are based on current levels of fishing mortality. (Source: Aires-da-Silva, A & Maunder, M. [2009] page 56) The consequences for the sustainability of BET populations if EPO and WCPO populations operated as a single stock would be at least moderate. Management measures to control BET fishing mortality by IATTC. Studies to determine the level of connectedness between EPO and WCPO BET populations; Logbooks and other information to determine BET population status in the EPO. Strong A range of genetic and tagging studies have been undertaken to assess the stock structure of BET across the Pacific. Credible stock assessments of BET in the EPO are performed regularly. 14 Aires-da-Silva, A & Maunder, M. (2009) STATUS OF BIGEYE TUNA IN THE EASTERN PACIFIC OCEAN IN 2008 AND OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE. IATTC 10 th Stock Assessment Review Meeting. 89pp. (accessed at 15 Grewe, P.M., and Hampton, J An assessment of bigeye (Thunnus obesus) population structure in the Pacific Ocean based on mitochondrial DNA and DNA microsatellite analysis. SOEST 98-05, JIMAR Contribution Schaefer, K.M., and Fuller, D.W Movements, behavior, and habitat selection of bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) in the eastern equatorial Pacific, ascertained through archival tags. Fish. Bull. 100: Page 12

13 Low 2. Unlicensed/unauthorised fishing within the FFA region undermines regional fisheries management objectives 2.1 Unlicensed/unauthorised fishing in the western WCPO by small scale south east Asian vessels Risk Description: Considerable overcapacity exists in many south east Asian domestic fleets (e.g. Philippines, Indonesia). There is a risk that overcapacity and declining catch rates in south east Asian fisheries will result in unauthorized fishing in the FFA area of interest. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: CMM 08-01; National licencing frameworks; WCPFC Convention Almost certain Considerable overcapacity exists in the Indonesian and Philippines domestic fleets. Palma and Tsamenyi indicate there are approx. 150,370 registered fishing vessels in the Sulawesi Sea alone, ranging from large industrial fishing vessels (4%) to small artisanal vessels. 17 Indonesia estimate approx. 112,259 were registered in eastern Indonesia in 2001 (5,233 PS; 2,745 LL; 1,951 PL; 51,940 Drift Gillnet; 50,390 Troll). 18 Regular incursions are reported by surface patrols and industry in both PNG and Palau by pump boats (Figure 2.1) handlining for YFT/BET and small group seiners taking SKJ, YFT and BET. Consultations in PNG indicated large numbers of Indonesian outrigger and other small scale vessels fishing illegally on anchored FADs in the Bismarck Sea. They also noted reports of Filipino group seiners working illegally in archipelagic waters in northern PNG, and that these vessels are organised and operating as fleets. Anecdotal reports suggest these vessels then tranship on the high seas. Concerns were also expressed about the possibility of licensed support vessels (as part of group seine operations) either fishing illegally or supporting both legal and illegal operations. Consultations indicate likelihood of unauthorized incursions will be highest in the north west and south west of PNG EEZ (and archipelagic waters) as well as southern Palau EEZs as well as HSP1. Anecdotal information suggests the banning of foreign vessels in Indonesian waters has pushed some vessels into the western WCPO. 17 Palma, M.A. & Tsamenyi, M. (2008). Case Study on the Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the Sulawesi Sea. APEC Fisheries Working Group. 62pp 18 Indonesia Annual Report (Part 1). WCPFC 4 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 8pp. Page 13

14 Figure 2.1: Indonesian pumpboat. (Photo courtesy Palau Marine Law Enforcement Division, Ministry of Justice) The key consequence of unauthorized fishing in the western WCPO is likely to be undermining local licencing arrangements in PNG and Palau, as well as impacts on coastal communities. Impacts may also be felt by licensed fishing operators where illegal fishing pressure on anchored FADs is intense. Biologically, the consequences of the unauthorised fishing in FFA member EEZs are likely to be comparatively minor. While the numbers of vessels reported to fish illegally is high, the capacity of most vessels is comparatively low. Handline catches in the western WCPO are dominated by YFT, which are more resilient than BET. Moreover, while the unauthorised nature of the activity is of concern, it s worth noting that if the vessels weren t fishing in FFA member EEZs, they would likely be fishing in the ID/PH EEZs (i.e. the overall level of effort may not have changed significantly, however the distribution of effort has changed although note that catch rates in the PNG/Palau EEZs may be higher than ID/PH EEZs given localised depletion). Nevertheless, unauthorised catches will undermine achievement of fishing mortality reduction objectives for BET. High Overcapacity and overfishing in PH/ID domestic fisheries; domestic management measures in East Asian states (e.g. banning of foreign flagged vessels from fishing in ID waters may have increased the likelihood of foreign fleets fishing in western WCPO waters); fuel price Aerial surveillance, at sea patrols sightings, observer sightings reports Current levels of aerial surveillance and at sea patrols are moderate in the western part of the WCPO where unauthorised vessels are likely to operate. No MTUs are fitted to smaller south east Asian vessels. There is no observer program operating on PH vessels, except those operating in the PNG EEZ. Anecdotal evidence from PNG interviewees suggested patrol vessels are reluctant to apprehend small vessels and typically confiscate the gear only. High Additional MCS measures recommended: Cooperative MCS arrangements between PNG/Palau and ID/PH such as information sharing, joint operations and personnel exchange Liaison through the RPOA-IUU process with countries who have had similar experiences (e.g. Australia in its northern waters) Maritime boundary delimitation where unresolved Page 14

15 2.2 Unlicensed/unauthorised fishing by vessels arising from the Indian Ocean Risk Description: There is a risk that overcapacity, declining catch rates, management failure and other local circumstances (e.g. piracy) in the Indian Ocean will result in the movement of unregulated vessels into the WCPO. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. national fisheries legislation; WCPFC Convention; VDS) Purse Seine Unlikely The key fleets likely to shift from the IO to the WCPO are those associated with the EU (Spain, France), as well as vessels beneficially owned by European based companies but flagged to other countries (e.g. Seychelles). The likelihood of unregulated fishing will be largely dependent on two factors: catch rates and management measures in the Indian Ocean and the availability of legitimate fishing days in the WCPO. In the short term at least displacement from key fishing grounds off Somalia (Figure 2.2) as a result of piracy is also likely to be a key driver of migration away from the Indian Ocean. Latest advice from the IOTC Scientific Committee indicates that the (YFT) stock is very close to an overfished state, or already overfished, and the fishing pressure in recent years has exceeded the optimal level 19 and that catches should not exceed the average catch for the period (i.e. 330,000 t) and fishing effort does (should) exceed the level exerted in If catch rates continue to decline and effort is capped or reduced, considerable commercial pressure may exist to find alternative fishing grounds. 19 IOTC. Report of the Eleventh Session of the Scientific Committee. Victoria, Seychelles, 1-5 December, IOTC-2008-SC-R[E]. 166 pp. 20 IOTC. Report of the Eleventh Session of the Scientific Committee. Victoria, Seychelles, 1-5 December, IOTC-2008-SC-R[E]. 166 pp. Page 15

16 Figure 2.2: Location of PS catches of yellowfin tuna in the small (0-3kg), medium (3-10kg) and large (above 10kg) size categories in the Indian Ocean from (Source: IOTC, 2008) The availability of legitimate fishing days will be dependent on the future management of the PNA and possible HS VDSs, as well as the opportunities for reflagging to PICs and CCMs with available high seas history. If VDS days are tightly controlled and reflagging opportunities are few, the likelihood of unregulated fishing will increase to at least moderate. Available evidence suggests IOTC vessels are already seeking alternative fishing grounds. Anecdotal reports indicate that approximately Spanish and French vessels have moved from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean during 2009, while another large Spanish-owned previously Seychlles flagged vessel (Pacific Star more than 4000GRT) has recently reflagged to Kiribati to operate in the WCPO. Consequence Minor Apart from the challenge to national and regional licencing arrangements, the key consequence associated with vessel movement into the WCPO is likely to be increased fishing mortality of BET stocks. Many of the vessels capable of transferring into the WCPO are high capacity vessels, using the latest technology and setting more or less exclusively on FADs. The biological consequences will be higher if vessels operate in the central and eastern WCPO where a higher proportion of BET are taken. The full consequence of vessel movement will depend on the numbers of unregulated vessels. Risk rating Low Key drivers Catch rates in Indian Ocean, stock status and management controls on YFT; vessel displacement as a result of piracy in key fishing grounds off Somalia; availability of legitimate fishing days in the WCPO Aerial surveillance, at sea patrols, VMS Weak Current levels of aerial surveillance and at sea patrols are moderate in the western part of the WCPO where unauthorised vessels are likely to transit. No VMS information sharing arrangements exists between the WCPFC and IOTC. Low Page 16

17 2.2.2 Longline Likelihood Unlikely There appears to be less pressure on the LL fleet in the IO to migrate to the WCPO than the PS fleet. LL in the IO tend to target BET, the stock status of which is healthier than YFT. Latest scientific advice for BET from the IOTC SC indicated that Stock size and fishing pressure in 2004 were within acceptable limits and in 2008, preliminary assessment results based on tagging data suggest a high probability that the stock is not in an overfished state. 21 Nevertheless, catch rates have gradually declined since 1980 and some commercial pressure may exist to find alternative fishing grounds. Major increasing fleets are Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan, with very little capacity to transfer to the WCPO. Insignificant The key consequence associated with vessel movement into the WCPO is likely to be the impact on achievement of the BET catch reduction targets. Based on the factors surrounding likelihood, we expect few LL vessels will seek to move from the IO to the WCPO to fish unregulated. As a result, we expect the consequence to be insignificant. Low Catch rates of BET and (to a lesser extent) YFT in the Indian Ocean; management measures on BET/YFT; availability of legitimate fishing opportunities in the WCPO Aerial surveillance, at sea patrols, VMS Weak Current levels of aerial surveillance and at sea patrols are low-moderate in the western part of the WCPO where unauthorised vessels are likely to transit. No VMS information sharing arrangements exists between the WCPFC and IOTC. Low 2.3 Unlicensed/unauthorised fishing by vessels arising from the Eastern Pacific Ocean Risk Description: There is a risk that overcapacity, declining catch rates, management failure and other local circumstances in the Eastern Pacific Ocean will result in unregulated fishing in the WCPO (i.e. without an appropriate bi-lateral access agreement or licence through an FFA member, or without appropriate authorisation to fish on the high seas) by EPO-based vessels. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. WCPFC Convention; national fisheries legislation) Purse seine Likely A number of factors suggest there is a likelihood that EPO PS vessels may seek to fish in the WCPO without appropriate authorisation in the coming years. Catches of one key target species 21 IOTC. Report of the Eleventh Session of the Scientific Committee. Victoria, Seychelles, 1-5 December, IOTC-2008-SC-R[E]. 166 pp. Page 17

18 YFT have declined substantially in the EPO since 2002, while overall capacity has continued to increase (Figure 2.3). Unilateral PS closures amongst IATTC coastal states have resulted in temporary spare capacity. Seasonal closures agreed at IATTC80 (of 59 days in 2009; 62 days in 2010 and 73 days on 2011) 22 will also result in temporary spare capacity and increase the likelihood of unauthorised PS fishing in the WCPO if requirements to remain in port are not complied with. Figure 2.3: Purse seine fishing capacity and yellowfin tuna catch during (Data source: A number of prosecutions have been made in recent years of EPO-based PS vessels fishing illegally in FFA member EEZs. The Cook Islands has prosecuted two vessels one flagged to Ecuador, one to Venezuela for illegally fishing in their EEZ in recent years and French Polynesia has prosecuted one Venezuelan vessel. At WCPFC 5 in Busan, the US also indicated that it had evidence of unlicensed fishing by an Ecuador flagged vessel in US territory. Numerous additional anecdotal reports were received during in country interviewees of suspected illegal fishing by Latin American flagged PS vessels west of 150 o W. This evidence is supported, at least circumstantially, by the distribution of reported effort in the EPO which occurs right to the boundary with the WCPO (Figure 2.4). The likelihood of unauthorised fishing by purse seine vessels from the EPO is considered to be greatest in the eastern equatorial part of the WCPO Source: IATTC (2009) The Fishery for tunas and billfishes in the Eastern Pacific Ocean in WCPFC-SC5-2009/GN-WP-02. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, La Jolla, USA. Page 18

19 Figure 2.4: Annual distributions of the purse-seine catches of skipjack, by set type, The sizes of the circles are proportional to the amounts of skipjack caught in those 5 by 5 areas 23. The key consequence associated with vessel movement into the WCPO is likely to be increased mortality of BET stocks, particularly given illegal activity is likely to be concentrated in the eastern and central WCPO where higher proportions of BET are taken in the catch. Many of the vessels capable of transferring into the WCPO are high capacity vessels, using the latest technology and setting more or less exclusively on FADs. Anecdotal evidence suggests catch rates of SKJ in recent years have been sufficient to satisfy the economics of smaller vessels, but may be insufficient for larger vessels. Consequently, larger vessels are more likely to seek alternative grounds in the WCPO in search of higher catch rates. The full consequence of unauthorized fishing will depend on the numbers of vessels fishing illegally. If vessels are fishing regularly, the consequences could be major. High Catch rates of YFT and SKJ in the EPO; Compliance with agreed IATTC PS closures; impact of any market based measures to avoid transactions in EPO BET; IATTC reductions in PS fishing capacity if adopted; ENSO related shifts in tuna abundance Aerial surveillance, at sea patrols, VMS (on legitimate vessels) Weak IATTC does not have a central VMS system and no VMS information sharing exists between FFA members and IATTC and its members. Levels of aerial surveillance are comparatively high in the Cook Is EEZ, but very low in the Kiribati EEZ. Levels in the adjacent high seas areas are unknown though probably quite low. At sea patrols in the Line Islands of Kiribati and adjacent HS areas are very low. Sea days in the Cook Islands are higher, however coverage declines with increasing distance away from patrol boat base. Remain in port provisions for PS vessels during IATTC closures will assist in reducing risk of spare capacity migrating into WCPO. No cross-endorsement of WCPFC/IATTC observer programmes exists. High Page 19

20 Additional MCS measures recommended: Encourage the establishment of a centralised VMS at IATTC, including a data sharing agreement to support monitoring of vessel movements across the EPO/WCPO boundary Cross endorsement of WCPFC/IATTC observer programmes accompanied by a programme to build a reciprocal understanding of the observer requirements of each organisation Targeted aerial surveillance based on analysis of key drivers and local intelligence Investigate use of satellite imagery to better target aerial and surface surveillance Longline Likelihood The likelihood of LL vessels seeking to migrate from the EPO to the WCPO is likely to be a function of catch rates and IATTC management measures on BET. While the latest scientific advice indicates that BET spawning biomass was at record low levels in early 2009, recent spikes in recruitment are expected to result in increased longline catches for the next few years 24. Moreover, while IATTC has recently capped catches of BET in for all four distant water LL fleets (CN, JP, KR and TW), catches in the most recent year for which full data is available (2007) are below the proposed targets (Table 2.1) and there appears little immediate reason for EPO vessels to migrate to the WCPO (unless catch rates drop below commercially viable levels). Table 2.1: Comparison of 2007 BET catches versus IATTC catch reduction targets for distant water LL fleets agreed at IATTC80, June (Data source: IATTC 2009 BET Limit IATTC 2010 BET Limit 2007 Catch % Reduction needed in 2009 % Reduction needed in 2010 China % -8% Japan % -116% Korea % -113% Taiwan % -25% Nevertheless, given the porous boundary between the EPO and WCPO and the fact that significant catches of target species are taken immediately adjacent to the boundary (Figure 2.5), the likelihood of some level of unauthorised fishing remains at least moderate. This level may increase with seasonal changes in the distribution of BET across the EPO/WCPO boundary and long term catch rates of BET in either ocean basin. It is also worth noting that effort levels amongst DWFNs in the EPO LL fishery have decreased significantly over the past decade (see Figure 4.3) 24 page 66 Page 20

21 Figure 2.5: Distribution of longline effort in the WCPO and eastern EPO during (Green=distant water fleets; red=foreign offshore fleets; blue=domestic fleets) (Source: Williams and Terawasi, 2008) 25 Consequence The key impact of unregulated fishing by EPO LL vessels is likely to be to BET stocks. Given the porous boundary between the EPO and WCPO, effort is likely to be concentrated into the east of the WCPO where proportions of BET in the catch are highest. Risk rating Stock status and management controls on BET by IATTC; temporal changes in population distribution of BET across the EPO/WCPO boundary. Aerial surveillance, at sea patrols, VMS (on legitimate vessels) Weak IATTC does not have a central VMS system and no VMS information sharing exists between FFA members and IATTC and its members. Levels of aerial surveillance are comparatively high in the Cook Is EEZ, but very low in the Kiribati EEZ. Levels in the adjacent high seas areas are unknown though probably quite low. At sea patrols in the Line Islands of Kiribati and adjacent HS areas are very low. Sea days in the Cook Islands are higher, however coverage declines with increasing distance away from patrol boat base. No cross-endorsement of WCPFC/IATTC observer programmes exists. Additional MCS measures recommended: As per PS 25 Williams, P. & Terawasi, P. (2008) Overview of tuna fisheries in the western and central Pacific Ocean, including economic conditions WCPFC 4 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. WCFPFC-SC4-2008/GN WP-1 Page 21

22 2.4 Unauthorised/unlicensed fishing by new vessels in the PS fishery Risk Description: Despite increasing restrictions on fishing access across most ocean basins, new PS vessels continue to be built by some flag states. Access in the WCPO PS fishery is limited through the PNA VDS scheme, as well as effective flag state caps on high seas effort under CMM There is a risk that new PS vessels unable to be accommodated under legitimate access arrangements may seek to fish unlicensed or unauthorised in the FFA region. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC Convention; PNA VDS; future HS VDS Unlikely Significant scope for movement of unregulated vessels into the WCPO exists, both from existing fleets and as a result of planned increases in the capacity of many PS fleets. The key factor influencing the likelihood of unregulated fishing is the future management of the VDS and in particular the availability of fishing days. New PS vessels require significant capital investment (in the order of US$10-$15m) and considerable pressure will likely be brought to bear on the PNA and its members to accommodate increased capacity either through increased allocations of fishing days, increased use of archipelagic waters or reflagging to PNA members. If tight controls are exerted on the number of days available under the VDS, considerable commercial incentive will exist for PS vessels without allocations to fish without authorisation. Based on the current structure of PS fleets, there is a higher likelihood unregulated activity will arise from fleets flagged to existing CCMs, rather than non-members. Major A range of potentially major consequences will result from unregulated fishing. These include undermining the legitimate access arrangements in place through WCPFC Convention (for the high seas) and FFA members (national waters), eroding the market value of a fishing day for PNA members, impacting catches and catch rates for authorised vessels and undermining conservation and management measures aimed at reducing fishing mortality BET and YFT. Given the nature of the activity, unregulated fishing will also require significant resourcing for MCS arrangements amongst FFA members. Many new vessels seeking to fish without authorisation are likely to be high capacity, use the latest technology and set more or less exclusively on FADs. The biological impact of unregulated PS activity is likely to be highest in the central and eastern Pacific where higher proportions of juvenile BET are recorded in PS catches. The economic consequences of unregulated activity is likely to be highest in the western WCPO if it undermines the integrity of the PNA VDS scheme and devalues the market value of legitimate fishing days. Increasing capacity in global PS fleet; availability of legitimate days under PNA VDS/future HS VDS; willingness of PICs to accommodate vessels under domestic arrangements (e.g. by reflagging or the acquisition of new vessels) Aerial surveillance, surface patrols Weak Vessels unlicensed in FFA waters and unauthorised on the high seas would not have VMS. No global register of fishing vessels exists. Aerial and surface surveillance in many areas across the FFA region is low. Additional MCS measures recommended: Encourage the establishment of a global register of fishing vessels Information and intelligence sharing between RFMOs Page 22

23 2.5 Unlicensed fishing by vessels on the FFA Regional Register Risk Description: As at 24 March, 2009, a total of 1065 vessels were registered in good standing on the FFA Regional Register, including 707 LL vessels, 210 PS vessels, 30 P&L vessels, 90 fish carriers, 24 bunker vessels and four motherships. Of the catching vessels, most vessels are not registered in all FFA member EEZs. There is a risk that some vessels may seek to fish in FFA member EEZs without an appropriate licence/access agreement. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Domestic fisheries legislation; National Tuna Management Plans Purse Seine Rare The overall likelihood of PS vessels on the FFA Register fishing without an appropriate authorisation appears to be low. The total number of vessels is comparatively small, and vessel positions are monitored very closely under VDS arrangements. Anecdotal evidence suggests that compliance with VMS arrangements is good, with only about 7-10 vessels manually reporting at any one time. Observer reports between indicate that only 3% of trips on UST vessels and 8% of trips on FSMA vessels included instances where the vessel fished in areas not covered by their licence or agreement. Given the blanket nature of this GEN-3 offence category (which includes fishing in closed areas around islands and in archipelagic waters), the incidence of fishing in an EEZ or HS area without authorisation is likely to be lower than this. It is not clear however, whether the presence of an observer on the vessel provided a deterrent to fishing in EEZs not covered by their licence/agreement. Many interviewees in country considered the risk of unauthorised fishing by PS vessels on the FFA register low, although some concern was expressed by Tokelau about possible incursions into its northern waters from vessels not complying with VMS requirements. Although there appear to be significant shortcomings with the FFA VAP database (most notably through lack of specificity in offence reporting categories and lack of contributions by FFA members) the number of illegal fishing offences reported is considerably lower in the PS fishery than the LL fishery (Figure 2.6). The proportion of PS illegal fishing offences as a percentage of the total number of illegal fishing offences also appear to have decreased over time (Figure 2.6). Page 23

24 (a) (b) Figure 2.6: Incidents of illegal fishing reported in the FFA Violations and Prosecutions Database (a) between 1979 and 2005 and (b) between 200- and The possibility of unlicensed fishing may increase if vessels are unable to find observers consistent with the requirements of the PNA3IA/CMM The key consequence of unauthorised fishing by PS vessels on the FFA Register appears to be the challenge it poses to legitimate access frameworks, undermining national and Commissionagreed conservation and management measures and possible losses of legitimate licence revenue for FFA members. While the occurrence of unauthorised fishing may be infrequent, it represents a significant challenge to both national and WCPFC access frameworks. Assuming no overall increase in fishing effort (i.e. effort that would have been expended in one EEZ is expended in another or on the HS), the biological consequences of unauthorised fishing are likely to be low, unless the shift is effort is sufficient to change the catch composition (e.g. to the central/eastern Pacific with higher catch rates of juvenile BET). Low Perceived chances of detection/prosecution; severity of sanction; availability of observers FFA VMS; Observers; aerial surveillance; at sea patrols Very Strong All PS vessels on the FFA Register and licensed in PNA countries are polled hourly under the VDS scheme. While only limited VMS data sharing arrangements exist amongst FFA members, the introduction of 100% observer coverage from 2010 for all vessels fishing beyond national jurisdiction in the WCPFC Convention Area will likely be a significant deterrent to non-compliance. Low Page 24

25 2.5.2 Longline Likely The inherent likelihood of unlicensed fishing associated with the LL fleet is likely to be higher due to the number of vessels involved. LL vessels are polled less frequently and have lower rates of observer coverage than PS vessels. The large majority of FFA members interviewed reported or suspected some level of unlicensed fishing in their EEZ, many expressing specific concern with LL vessels although in many cases (a) little hard evidence was provided and (b) it was not known whether these were vessels on the FFA register. The VAP database shows higher levels of prosecution amongst the LL fleet for illegal fishing than the PS fleet (Figure 2.6). A number of consequences arise from unlicensed fishing by LL vessels on the FFA Register including challenging legitimate access frameworks, possible losses of legitimate licence revenue for FFA members, loss of future allocation if catches are reported in a different EEZ and undermining the integrity of scientific data if catches are unreported. Assuming no overall increase in fishing effort (i.e. effort that would have been expended in one EEZ is expended in another or on the HS), the biological consequences of unauthorised fishing are likely to be low, unless the shift is effort is sufficient to change the catch composition (e.g. to the central/eastern Pacific with higher catch rates of BET). High Perceived chances of detection/prosecution; severity of sanctions; spatial changes in the distribution of stocks FFA VMS; aerial surveillance; at sea patrols; observers All vessels in good standing must be reporting normally and automatically to the FFA VMS. However, limitations in VMS data sharing arrangements and the in country monitoring of vessels means that VMS is not being used to its optimum potential. Observer coverage rates are very low, particularly for distant water LL vessels. Aerial and surface surveillance coverage is variable. High Additional MCS measures recommended: Port-to-port VMS monitoring; enhanced VMS data sharing between FFA members, including the use of alerts on the entry and exit of unauthorised vessels from EEZs; improved rates of aerial surveillance in high risk areas; satellite imagery in remote areas to detect possible illegal activity enhanced use of the WCPFC IUU blacklist where satisfactory outcome has not been achieved through normal enforcement processes; strong domestic sanctions exploration of remote monitoring techniques - e.g. drum monitors, cameras to detect when vessels are fishing Page 25

26 2.6 Unlicensed fishing by high seas vessels in FFA member EEZs. Risk Description: In the FFA region legitimate vessels may fall into two broad types: vessels licensed through FFA member countries and/or vessels authorised by WCFPFC CCMs to fish on the high seas. There is a risk that vessels authorised to fish on the high seas only will operate illegally in FFA members waters. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: FFA member national licensing frameworks, national tuna management plans Purse Seine Rare Currently only three PS vessels operating in the WCPFC area are reporting through the WCPFC VMS, and not the FFA VMS. This number may rise as more vessels register with the Commission, however the number is likely to remain comparatively low. Most PS vessels operating in the region are licensed in at least one FFA member EEZ. Minor The potential catches associated with unauthorised high seas PS vessels appear to be low, however illegal fishing represents a major challenge to legitimate fisheries management arrangements. Anything more than very occasional incursions would likely undermine the integrity of the VDS and impact the market value of a fishing day. Low Perceived chances of detection and prosecution; level of domestic sanctions VMS; Aerial and at sea patrols; FFA Regional Register; WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels, WCPFC high seas boarding and inspection scheme Strong 100% observer coverage on PS vessels should provide a level of deterrence to non-compliant behaviour. In the absence of 100% observer coverage, MCS arrangements would be either weak or moderate. Significant impediments currently exist in VMS data sharing between the FFA and WCPFC systems. Vessels reporting directly to the WCPFC VMS are unable to be seen in FFA member EEZs, creating significant opportunities for non-compliance. Levels of aerial surveillance/at sea patrols may be insufficient to deter non-compliance. Low Longline Likelihood Likely The WCPFC VMS commenced operation on 1 April, Based on a rough 75/25 split in historical in zone and high seas catch taken from the region, it was assumed that the number of vessels operating in each zone was roughly proportional. However, based on current uptake it is expected that approximately 2,300 vessels will be reporting directly to the WCPFC VMS system by the end of the first year (see Table 2.2 for vessel numbers as at 5/6/09), the bulk of which are LL vessels. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests somewhere in the order of 4,000 fishing vessels are likely to be currently operating in the Convention Area (A. Carlot, pers comm.). Notwithstanding the fact that a proportion of these vessels will be working in the northern Page 26

27 region, the numbers of active vessels likely to be fishing adjacent to FFA member EEZs is significantly higher than expected, increasing the inherent likelihood of unauthorised incursions into FFA member EEZs. Table 2.2: WCPFC authorised vessels reporting directly to the Commission VMS, as at 5 June 2009 WCPFC expect around 2,300 vessels will be reporting directly to the Commission VMS by the end of its first year of operation. (Source: WCPFC) Vessel Type China Chinese Taipei Korea Spain USA Vanuatu Total Fish Carrier 1 1 Longline Multipurpose Vessel 1 1 Purse Seine 3 3 Support Vessel 1 1 Troll 1 1 Total Major Illegal fishing represents a serious challenge to the fisheries management frameworks of FFA members. Catches taken in zone are likely to be either unreported or reported as being taken on the high seas, potentially impacting on legitimate licence revenue and future catch or effort allocations. The direct biological impact is likely to be low if overall levels of effort do not increase (i.e. effort has simply shifted from the high seas to an in zone area). Information to support regional resource assessments may be compromised if significant amounts of illegal catches go unreported. Management scenarios involving in zone Vs high seas catches are likely to be compromised if catches taken in zone are reported as being taken on the high seas. High Perceived chances of being detected (levels of aerial and surface patrols); prosecution record of coastal state; VMS arrangements VMS; Aerial and at sea patrols; FFA Regional Register; WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels Weak Significant impediments currently exist in VMS data sharing between the FFA and WCPFC systems. Vessels reporting directly to the WCPFC VMS are unable to be seen in FFA member EEZs, creating significant opportunities for non-compliance. Levels of aerial surveillance/at sea patrols may be insufficient to deter non-compliance. Very low levels of observer coverage exist. High Page 27

28 Additional MCS measures recommended: Reciprocal information sharing arrangements between WCPFC and FFA to allow visibility of high seas vessels in FFA members EEZs 100nm buffer zone extending VMS visibility outside EEZs to support improved MCS responses Industry based reporting Closure of high seas pockets Aerial and surface capability to respond to suspicious activity, monitor gear stowed and secured etc Very strong domestic sanctions; use of WCPFC IUU blacklist where satisfactory result not achieved through normal processes Exploration of remote monitoring techniques - e.g. drum monitors, cameras to detect when vessels are fishing 3. Excess capacity and /or effort in licensed fleets undermines regional fisheries management goals 3.1 Excess capacity in the LL fleet compromises achievement of BET/YFT sustainability objectives Risk Description: WCPFC CMM introduces a requirement for fleets flagged to JP, KR, TW and CN (and the US in 2009 only) to reduce catches by 10% annually for the years There is a risk that, in the absence of commensurate reductions in fishing capacity and effort, catch reductions will not be achieved and increasing incentive will exist to under-report catches. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC CMM Likely Experience in other jurisdictions suggests that catch reduction targets will not be met in the absence of commensurate capacity and/or effort reductions in affected fleets (e.g. EU hake). 26 Table 3.1: Catch reductions required of fleets harvesting more than 2000t (except the US) in 2004 under CMM 08-01, based on 2007 catches. CCM or 2004 Catch CMM Target 2007 Catch % Reduction China 9,314 6,520 7,821 17% Indonesia* 8,413 5,889 10,197 42% Japan 28,100 19,670 26,876 27% Korea 21,449 15,014 10,054-49% Taiwan 15,854 11,098 14,760 25% 26 Page 28

29 Table 3.1 shows that, based on recent catches, reductions will be most difficult to achieve for Indonesia (42%), followed by Japan (27%) and Taiwan (25%). Both the Japanese and Taiwanese Governments have announced plans to scrap both large and small scale LL vessels in response to catch reductions in the WCPFC and ICAAT areas. The OPRT website ( reported Japan had approved the decommissioning of 87 LL vessels (64 large scale, 23 small scale) in March 2009, while Taiwan announced in 2008 a compensation scheme to reduce its LL fleet (with a prime focus on albacore vessels and a secondary focus on YFT and BET vessels). Taiwan also reportedly scrapped 183 large scale LL vessels between , according to the OPRT. The impact of the latest schemes on fleet capacity in the WCPO is unknown. *We have assumed for the purpose of this risk that Indonesia, as a developing State with the majority of catch taken in archipelagic waters, is exempt from the BET catch reductions. Major In the absence of significant capacity reduction, catches are likely to remain significantly above target levels. Continued fishing at or near current levels will have a detrimental impact on stocks of BET; the impact on YFT will be less severe (J. Hampton, pres. comm.). High Capacity levels in fleets required to achieve 30% BET catch by 2011; effort shifts from other ocean basins WCPFC Record; CCM reporting to the Commission; logbooks; observers The WCPFC Record and FFA Regional Register are strong measures and well enforced. Significant weaknesses exist however in reporting arrangements and observer coverage. Operational logsheet coverage amongst the fleets required to reduce BET catch by 30% are particularly low (JP 26% between ; KR- 26%; CN - 31%; TW distant water 14%). Coverage of observer data is extremely low at between 0-2%. Coverage is particularly low on the Japanese LL fleet, with many national observer programmes not placing an observer on Japanese vessels in up to 15 years (e.g in the case of Palau). A sanction regime for non-compliance with WCPFC CMMs has not yet been developed. High Additional MCS measures recommended: Although not strictly MCS, the key measures required to achieve compliance are capacity and/or effort reduction measures amongst key fleets. This is unlikely to be achieved in at least some fleets. In the absence of capacity reduction, key MCS responses include improved monitoring of key fleets (observers, unloading) and reduced opportunity for leakage of BET/YFT through the supply chain (CDS, transhipment verification). 3.2 Excess effort in the PS fleet compromises achievement of BET/YFT sustainability objectives Risk Description: Available effort in the WCPO PS fishery is governed by a complex array of access agreements and exemptions (e.g. PNA VDS, US Treaty, HS effort limits under CMM 08-01, archipelagic waters exemptions, etc). There is a risk that the level of fishing undertaken under each of these agreements, when taken collectively, will be in excess of that required to achieve regional sustainability goals on at least some species, including BET and YFT. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. WCPFC CMM 08-01) BET - Almost certain Page 29

30 Recent modelling by SPC indicates that the number of days available, conservatively, under the various access agreements and excluded waters is approximately 52,304 (not including the domestic PS fisheries of PH and ID) 27. Actual levels of effort in the fishery (including searching time) have continued to increase since the 1970 s with the provisional 2008 effort levels of close to 60,000 days the highest on record (Figure 3.1). Current levels (across all sectors PS and LL) of effort are more than twice that resulting in MSY for BET 28. CMM was agreed in 2008 with the objective of reducing BET mortality by 30% from the average level from Based on the number of fishing days available under the various access arrangements, SPC modelling shows that CMM will not achieve its objective. Rather, unless additional controls are implemented, it appears likely that levels of fishing mortality in 2018, even under the most optimistic scenario modelled by SPC, will remain at least 1.7 times that which will result in MSY. Recent modelling also shows that small reductions in bigeye tuna fishing mortality resulting from the longline catch limits and purse seine FAD closure under CMM are more than offset by likely increases in fishing mortality resulting from higher purse seine effort and catchability 29. Moreover, even if even if longline and purse seine objectives were achieved, the overall objectives of the measure would not be achieved because the measure does not include any provisions for the domestic fisheries of Indonesia and the Philippines, which comprise an important source of fishing mortality on juvenile (1-3yr old) bigeye tuna. Figure 3.1: Purse seine catch and estimated fishing effort (days fishing and searching) in the Western and Central Pacific Convention Area (Source: Williams and Terawasi, 2009) 30 YFT Current levels of fishing mortality on YFT (including LL catches) appear to be slightly below that required to produce MSY. 31 Based on the number of days available to the PS fleet (and including LL related mortality), SPC projections suggest fishing mortality will remain at, or slightly below, that required to result in MSY. BET - Serious The biological consequences of continued high levels of purse seine effort on BET stocks are likely to be serious. SPC modelling shows that (when all sources of fishing mortality are included) spawning biomass of BET in 2008 was likely to be below that required to produce MSY 32. Moreover, based on PS (and LL) effort available under CMM 08-01, SPC project spawning biomass will continue to fall to well below that required to produce MSY in 2018 even under the most optimistic scenario (Figure 3.2). Under the most pessimistic scenario, spawning biomass will fall to approximately 30% of that required to produce MSY. While the closure of HSP 1 and 2 under CMM will result in a small reduction in bigeye fishing mortality if that effort is 27 Hampton, J. and Harley, S. (2009) Assessment of the Potential Implications of Application of CMM for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna. WCPFC-SC5-2009/GN-WP Ibid, Hampton and Harley (2009) 29 Ibid, Hampton and Harley (2009). 30 Williams, P. and P. Terawasi (2009) Overview of tuna fisheries in the western and central Pacific Ocean, including economic conditions SPC and FFA. WCPFC-SC5-2009/GN WP-1 31 Ibid, Hampton and Harley (2009) 32 Ibid, Hampton and Harley (2009) Page 30

31 removed from the fishery, if such effort is simply transferred to other high seas areas, primarily to the east (where the catchability of bigeye is estimated to be higher), the net effect will be an increase in bigeye fishing mortality compared to no closure of the HSPs 33. The impact of high levels of PS effort on BET is likely to be magnified with higher rates of FAD usage. Figure 3.2: Estimates of BET spawning biomass compared to spawning biomass required to produce MSY under a range of projection and recruitment scenarios. (Source: Hampton and Harley, 2009) 34 YFT - Major The economic consequences associated with overfishing of YFT would be higher than BET for FFA members, although the biological consequences on YFT from current levels of effort are likely to be lower. SPC modelling on a range of projection scenarios (including both PS and LL related mortality) indicates that whilst YFT spawning biomass is predicted to decrease by 2018, it should remain at or in excess of levels required to maintain MSY (although only marginally in some cases) 35. The impact on YFT stocks may increase if greater than expected levels of effort occur in areas exempt from CMM 08-01, including the archipelagic waters of FFA members and PH/ID. BET - Severe YFT- High 33 Ibid, Hampton and Harley (2009) 34 Ibid, Hampton and Harley (2009) 35 Ibid, Hampton and Harley (2009) Page 31

32 Total amount of allowable fishing effort under the various bilateral, sub-regional and regional fisheries access arrangements; amount of effort in Archipelagic waters; increases in operational efficiency by fishing on FADs; and overall levels of effort in the purse seine fishery. Control measures governing effort (e.g. PNA VDS; UST; CMM 08-01, etc); VMS records of fishing activity; CCM reporting to the WCPFC; logsheets; 100% observer coverage in the purse seine fishery from WCPFC Indonesia and Philippines Data Collection Project to establish better monitoring programmes for catches of highly migratory species in the Philippines and Pacific Ocean waters of Indonesia. Arrangements for monitoring fishing effort across most fleets are strong. Observer coverage across fleets subject to 100% coverage requirements should assist in providing for robust independent reporting of catch, effort and set type. The key weaknesses in current MCS arrangements are in control measures surrounding available effort in the fishery which, collectively, appear to allow more effort than is required to produce MSY in BET stocks. Weaknesses also exist in data collection and control associated with ID and PH domestic fisheries. BET - Severe YFT - High Additional MCS measures recommended: Strong arrangements to monitor catch and effort are already in place across most sectors (except PH/ID). Actions required to address risks are largely fisheries managementrelated. Support for initiatives to strengthen relevant institutions and improve monitoring and data collection in domestic ID/PH fisheries. 3.3 Effort shift from the Indian Ocean undermines achievement of regional management goals Risk Description: There is a risk that overcapacity, declining catch rates, management failure and other local circumstances (e.g. piracy) in the Indian Ocean will result in the movement of vessels into the WCPO either on the high seas, or through bilateral access arrangements with FFA members or reflagging to FFA members. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: CMM Purse Seine Likely A number of factors suggest a likelihood that PS vessels currently operating in the IO will seek to fish in the WCPO in the coming years. Catch rates of the key target species YFT have Page 32

33 declined significantly over the period (albeit from record high catches). Latest advice from the IOTC Scientific Committee indicates that the stock is very close to an overfished state, or already overfished, and the fishing pressure in recent years has exceeded the optimal level 36 and that catches should not exceed the average catch for the period (i.e. 330,000 t) and fishing effort does (should) exceed the level exerted in Even in the absence of management measures capping YFT catch or effort by IOTC, should catch rates continue to fall it is likely that commercial pressures may provide an incentive to transfer effort into the WCPO. Anecdotal evidence indicated that relocation of PS vessels to other ocean basins is already happening with Spanish/French vessels relocating to the Atlantic Ocean and the 4000GRT Pacific Star recently relocating to the WCPO. Moreover, the impact of piracy off the coast of Somalia, one of the key YFT fishing grounds in the IO (Figure 3.2), may result in IO vessels seeking to fish in the WCPO. The key consequence associated with vessel movement into the WCPO is likely to be increased mortality of BET stocks. Given the existing effort controls under the VDS and HS allocations this is only likely to manifest where new vessels are included under domestic arrangement allowing for an overall increase in effort and capacity. Many of the vessels capable of transferring into the WCPO (mostly EU vessels) are high capacity vessels, using the latest technology and setting more or less exclusively on FADs. The risk will be higher if vessels operate in the central and eastern WCPO where a higher proportion of BET are taken. The full consequence of vessel movement will depend on the numbers either reflagged or fishing legitimately on the high seas. Significant scope for movement exists between oceans with approximately 40 EC flagged vessels (23 Spanish; 17 French) operating recently in the Indian Ocean. Catch rates in Indian Ocean, stock status and management controls on YFT, piracy in key fishing grounds off Somalia High FFA Regional Register; WCPFC Record; flag state controls over HS fishing days; VDS; VMS; Log sheets; CCM reporting to the WCPFC Strong Strong MCS measures are in place to monitor the movement of legitimate vessels between ocean basins (e.g. VMS). Vessels wishing to fish in zone (within a PNA member) will need to be accommodated under the VDS without exceeding a Party s PAE. Vessels fishing in the high seas must come under the HS effort caps included in CMM While strong measures exist to ensure vessel days are not exceeded under the PNA VDS, the effectiveness of flag state controls over high seas effort caps have not been tested. Additional MCS measures recommended: Robust process to monitor CCM compliance with CMMs (e.g. high seas effort/capacity caps) Longline Likelihood Unlikely There appears to be less pressure on the LL fleet in the IO to migrate to the WCPO than the PS fleet. LL in the IO tend to target BET, the stock status of which is healthier than YFT. Latest scientific advice for BET from the IOTC SC indicated that Stock size and fishing pressure in 2004 were within acceptable limits. It also indicated that while catch rates have gradually declined since 1980, in 2008, preliminary assessment results based on tagging data suggest a high probability that the stock is not in an overfished state. 38 The key consequence associated with vessel movement into the WCPO is likely to be the impact on achievement of the BET catch reduction targets. Of the fleets required to reduce BET 36 IOTC. Report of the Eleventh Session of the Scientific Committee. Victoria, Seychelles, 1-5 December, IOTC-2008-SC-R[E]. 166 pp. 37 IOTC. Report of the Eleventh Session of the Scientific Committee. Victoria, Seychelles, 1-5 December, IOTC-2008-SC-R[E]. 166 pp. 38 IOTC. Report of the Eleventh Session of the Scientific Committee. Victoria, Seychelles, 1-5 December, IOTC-2008-SC-R[E]. 166 pp. Page 33

34 catch by 30% under CMM 08-01, TW and JP have significant LL fleets in the IO. Catch rates of BET; stock status and IOTC management controls on BET FFA Regional Register; WCPFC Record; VMS; Log sheets; CCM reporting to the WCPFC; Strong measures are in place to monitor the movement of legitimate vessels between ocean basins (e.g. VMS). While new measures are in place under CMM to limit the total capacity of each CCM s fleet for bigeye and yellowfin, as well as reduce BET fishing mortality, the ability of flag states to ensure compliance with these provisions is yet to be tested. Additional MCS measures recommended: Robust process to monitor CCM compliance with CMMs (e.g. high seas effort/capacity caps) 3.4 Efforts shifts from the Eastern Pacific Ocean undermine regional management goals Risk Description: There is a risk that overcapacity, declining catch rates, management failure and other local circumstances in the Eastern Pacific Ocean will result in the movement of vessels into the WCPO either on the high seas, or through bilateral access arrangements with FFA members or reflagging to FFA members. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: CMM Purse Seine Likely A number of factors suggest a likelihood that EPO PS vessels may seek to fish in the WCPO in the coming years. Although relatively stable for the last 2 years, overall capacity in the EPO has steadily increased over the past decade while catch rates of at least one key species - YFT have declined in recent years 39 (Figure 3.3). Moreover, scientific advice indicates that BET is both overfished and subject to overfishing. Current effort levels are approximately 20% higher than that required to produce MSY. IATTC staff have recommended significant reductions in capacity from its current 228,246m3 to around 158,000m3 (approx. 31%) though no agreement on this measure has yet been reached. A number of vessels have already sought bilateral access to FFA members EEZs (e.g. seven Ecuadorian flagged and two El Salvador flagged vessels operating on a 12-month waiver in KI, NR and TV), while a number of IATTC members have sought CNM status in the WCPFC. At present there appears to be little cross-authorisation of PS vessels between the IATTC and WCPFC, apart from 5 US flagged and 3 Spanish flagged vessels (and the Latin American vessels 39 IATTC (2007) THE FISHERY FOR TUNAS AND BILLFISHES IN THE EASTERN PACIFIC OCEAN IN 2006, IATTDOCUMENT IATTC-75-06C, 2007 Page 34

35 allowed to operate under temporary arrangements above). As a result, IATTC vessels wishing to work legally in the WCPO will need to either reflag and come under the HS effort controls of existing WCPFC members, or seek a bilateral arrangement with an FFA member. The impact of accommodating new vessels into the WCPO will be largely dependent on whether they are accommodated under existing VDS and HS effort controls, or under arrangements (e.g. reflagging to a PIC, domestic charter) that allow for an overall increase in fishing effort. If the arrangement allows an overall increase in fishing effort, the key biological consequence is likely to be higher mortality on BET stocks, particularly if effort is focused in the central and eastern WCPO. Many of the vessels capable of transferring into the WCPO are high capacity vessels, using the latest technology and setting more or less exclusively on FADs. The full consequence of vessels movement will depend on the numbers either reflagged or fishing legitimately on the high seas. Even if effort transferred was accommodated under existing VDS allocations, increased mortality of BET may still arise: effort is likely to be concentrated in the central and eastern WCPO which exhibit higher catch rates of BET. High Catch rates of YFT and SKJ in the EPO; IATTC management controls on BET including seasonal closures; impact of possible market based measures to avoid transactions in EPO BET; unilateral tuna conservation measures taken by IATTC members, including PS closures 40 ; IATTC reductions in PS fishing capacity Regional Register; WCPFC Record; National Licencing arrangements; Logbooks; VMS Strong Strong MCS measures are in place to monitor the movement of legitimate vessels between ocean basins (e.g. VMS). Vessels wishing to fish in zone (within a PNA member) will need to be accommodated under the VDS. Vessels fishing in the high seas must come under the HS effort caps included in CMM While strong measures exist to ensure vessel days are not exceeded under the PNA VDS, the effectiveness of flag state controls over high seas effort caps have not been tested. Additional MCS measures recommended: Robust process to monitor CCM compliance with CMMs (e.g. high seas effort/capacity caps) Longline Likelihood The likelihood of LL vessels seeking to migrate from the EPO to the WCPO is likely to be a function of catch rates and IATTC management measures on BET. While the latest scientific advice indicates that BET spawning biomass was at record low levels in early 2009, recent spikes in recruitment are expected to result in increased longline catches for the next few years 41. Similarly, while agreement to new catch limits was reached at IATTC80 catches for all fleets in the most recent year for which full data is available (2007) are below the proposed targets (Table 2.1) and hence there appears little immediate reason for EPO vessels to migrate to the WCPO. It is also worth noting that effort levels amongst DWFNs in the EPO LL fishery have decreased significantly over the past decade (Figure 3.3) (see appendix A) 41 page 66 Page 35

36 Figure 3.3: EPO longline effort (on all species) from , by 000s of hook set. (Data source: page 45) The likelihood of vessel migration may change if threatened market action (e.g. by ISSF) against EPO-caught BET (in response to perceived management failure) begins to bite. Consequences Minor The key impact of effort transfer from the EPO will be on the achievement of catch reduction targets under CMM Of the fleets required to reduce BET catch by 30%, CN, JP, KR and TW all have significant fleets operating in the EPO. Japan and Taiwan have scrapped LL vessels in response to RFMO catch reduction measures. Stock status and management controls on BET by IATTC, including agreed catch reduction targets for CN, JP, KR and TW 42 ; impact of any future market based measures to avoid transactions in EPO BET Regional Register; WCPFC Record; National licencing arrangements; Logbooks Strong measures are in place to monitor the movement of legitimate vessels between ocean basins (e.g. VMS). While new measures are in place under CMM to limit the total capacity of each CCM s fleet for bigeye and yellowfin, as well as reduce BET fishing mortality, the ability of flag states to ensure compliance with these provisions is yet to be tested. Additional MCS measures recommended: Robust process to monitor CCM compliance with CMMs (e.g. high seas effort/capacity caps) 42 Page 36

37 3.5 Increases in LL catch amongst the 2000t nations undermines BET/YFT fishing mortality control objectives Risk Description: CMM introduces a measure requiring that nations that harvested less than 2000t of BET in 2004 to ensure their catch does not exceed 2000t in each of 2009, 2010 and There is a risk that expansion of catch within the 2000t limit will undermine fishing mortality reduction and capping objectives on BET and YFT respectively. Note also that the 2000t limit does not apply to small island developing states. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: CMM Unlikely Table 3.2 shows that considerable potential for expansion of current catches exists under the 2000t limit. Nevertheless, the current economics of LL fishing, the historical catch records of most nations and the absence of a dedicated LL fleet in many CCMs suggests the likelihood of significant expansion in BET catches is unlikely. Even if it was assumed that those countries with a history of longlining for BET (e.g. catches of BET in 2007 greater than 500t) were to increase catches to the 2000t limit, the additional catch would be in the order of an extra 4689t. However, this appears unlikely. Of the five countries with catches in 2007 greater than 500t, Australia has recently adopted strict effort limits in its Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery and Fiji s catch has halved between 2004 and There is some likelihood that FSM, the Philippines and Vanuatu may increase catches, offsetting some of the proposed reduction in the 30% fleets. Based on the current economics of the LL fleet and the state of development of SIDs LL fleets, there is little likelihood that the exemption to SIDs from this measure will result in significant expansions in effort in the short term. Table 3.2: Possible expansions in catches allowed under CMM for fleets catching less than 2000t in Fleets with catches in 2007 higher than 500t are highlighted in yellow. CCM 2004 Catch 2007 Catch Possible catch Increase on 2004 Increase on 2007 American Samoa Australia Belize Cook Islands EC Fiji French Polyn New Caled FSM Kiribati Page 37

38 RMI Nauru NZ Niue Palau PNG Philippines Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga USA Vanuatu Total If the three fleets with the highest likelihood of increasing catches (FSM, Philippines, Vanuatu), expanded catches to the 2000t limit additional catch would be in the order of 2105t. This would offset approximately 18% of the catch reduction scheduled to be achieved through the 30% reduction in catches by CN, JP, KR and TW. The impact would be less severe on YFT. Expansion of domestic fleets; reflagging of foreign vessels to PICs; economic circumstances surrounding LL profitability Logbooks, CCM reporting to the WCPFC Catch reporting in Philippines is weak, but improving. Reporting by PICs to WCPFC is likely to be adequate to detect changes in overall catches where they are reported accurately in logbooks. Additional MCS measures recommended: Robust process to monitor CCM compliance with CMMs 3.6 Capacity caps in the Southern Albacore fishery are exceeded Risk Description: CMM requires that each CCM (except for SIDs) ensure that the number of its vessels actively targeting South Pacific Albacore in the CA south of 20 o S does not increase above 2005 levels or recent historical ( ) levels. There is a risk that insufficient flag state control will result in increases in the number of vessels targeting albacore. Page 38

39 Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC-CMM Unlikely The key drivers influencing the ALB fishery suggest the likelihood of this CMM being breached is low. The economics of the LL fishery continues to be marginal in light of relatively high fuel prices and overall effort amongst key fleets continues to decline. Both Japan and Taiwan have announced LL capacity reduction measures in response to tighter management controls in the WCPFC and other fisheries. At least one major fleet the Taiwanese DW fleet has switched to increased targeting of BET in recent years (J. Hampton pers. comm.). Moreover, the impending closure of the Chicken of the Sea cannery in American Samoa may increase expenses in the supply chain. Nevertheless, we note that monitoring compliance with this provision will be difficult. Numerous countries, including key DWFNs (e.g. Japan, Taiwan, China and Korea) have yet to provide the Commission with information on the maximum number of vessels authorised to target ALB south of 20 o S. Minor The current (2005) stock assessment for South Pacific albacore concluded that there are no sustainability concerns regarding the overall stock and substantially higher yields could be taken from the fishery (Langley 2006) 43. However, at a local scale, very high levels of fishing effort appear to be capable of causing localised depletion of albacore tuna. This is principally an issue for domestic longline fleets where fishing effort is concentrated in a relatively small area, largely due to operational constraints of the fleet. 44 Increases in capacity of distant water fleets may increase competition with domestic fleets and exacerbate the prospect of localised depletion however, based on the economics and other developments surrounding the fishery, the prospect of this occurring appears unlikely. Low Economic circumstances surrounding the ALB LL fishery; possible increases in supply chain costs associated with closure of the Chicken of the Sea cannery in American Samoa; possible displacement associated with management measures on northern albacore stocks; possible future preferential market demand for ALB based on sustainability criteria CCM controls on fleet capacity; CCM Reports to WCPFC in accordance with CMM 05-02; operational logsheet information; port sampling and inspections, VMS There have been difficulties in monitoring CMM with the data provided to the WCPFC Secretariat at this point. Information specifically listing the number of vessels fishing for South Pacific albacore south of 20 S per year has been provided by some CCMs (Australia, Belize, New Caledonia and New Zealand), but not others. 45 It is not known whether key CCMs have introduced specific controls to limit expansion of their vessels targeting albacore. VMS position information should provide evidence of albacore targeting. Coverage of operational logsheet information amongst key distant water fishing nations (e.g. Taiwan) is low. The absence of a robust process to monitor compliance with CMMs and an associated sanction regime is a key weakness. Low 43 Langley,A.D. (2006) The South Pacific albacore fishery: a summary of the status of the stock and fishery management issues of relevance to Pacific Island countries and territories. Technical Report 37. Noumea,New Caledonia: Secretariat of the Pacific Community 44 Ibid, Langley et al (2006) 45 WCPFC Secretariat (2008) REVIEW OF CCMs IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND COMPLIANCE WITH, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES. WCPFC5-2008/18 Page 39

40 3.7 Capacity and catch caps in the swordfish fishery are exceeded Risk Description: Stock assessments for swordfish (SWO) in the south western Pacific indicate that overfishing is not occurring at current effort levels and the stock is not in an overfished state. Nevertheless, as a result of uncertainty in the assessment and as a precautionary measure to prevent increases in fishing mortality, WCPFC agreed (CMM 08-05) to limit the number of fishing vessels flagged to each CCM fishing for swordfish (SWO) to the number in any one year between , and (for 2009) to limit the catches of SWO in the Convention Area south of 20 o S for each CCM to the amount caught in any one year between There is a risk that insufficient flag state control will allow the agreed capacity and catch caps in the SWO fishery to be exceeded. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC-CMM Spain - Australia/NZ - Rare Over 95% of the SWO catch in 2007 was taken by three flags - Spain, Australia and New Zealand although data from some countries have not been received (e.g. Japan, Taiwan). In recent years, the most significant growth has occurred in the Spanish fleet who have grown from zero catch in 2003 to 4,190t in Catch caps for both Australia (2,387t) and New Zealand (1,027t) are significantly higher than recent catches (1,110t and 392t in 2007 respectively) and both appear at little risk of breaching the caps. The highest risk appears to be the Spanish fleet who need to reduce catches by 1,086t (26%) based on 2007 catch figures. Anecdotal evidence suggests that capacity caps (i.e. limits on the number of vessels operating) are unlikely to be breached. The biological and economic consequences of capacity and fishing mortality increases on SWO stocks both appear to be moderate. While the current stock assessment indicates overfishing is not occurring, declining catch rates and fish sizes in core areas of the fishery since 1997 have raised concerns about the biological and economic sustainability of the fishery 46. SWO represents a development opportunity for domestic fleets and some nations (e.g. Tonga and Fiji) have already expressed concern about the impacts of increasing DW catches on domestic development. Possible association of Spanish vessels with PICs to continue current levels of effort; SWO price; perceived success of ES fleet may attract interest from other fleets CCM reporting to WCPFC; Flag state controls on number of vessels and catch; logbooks; observer coverage. Spain - Aust/NZ - Low Reporting by some key fleets (e.g. Australia, NZ, EU) is strong, however others have yet to provide necessary data with which to gauge compliance 47. Moreover, the absence of real time data makes monitoring to ensure caps are not breached difficult. The level of observer coverage on Australian and NZ fleets appears adequate to independently validate catch and effort reporting. The absence of a robust process to monitor compliance with CMMs and an associated sanction regime is a key weakness. Concerns were also expressed in country about the 46 Kolody,D.,N. Davies,and R. Campbell. (2006) South-West Pacific Swordfish stock status summary from multiple approaches. WCPFC 2 nd Regular Session of the Scientific Committee, WCPFC-SC2 SA-WP-7. 21pp 47 WCPFC Secretariat (2008) REVIEW OF CCMs IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND COMPLIANCE WITH, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES. WCPFC5-2008/18 Page 40

41 inability to independently validate catches of EU based vessels when unloading at bonded ports in the French Pacific territories. Additional MCS measures recommended: Robust process to monitor CCM compliance with CMMs Develop regime of sanctions for non-compliance Ensure submission of operational catch and effort data to WCPFC Port monitoring of Spanish vessels in Papeete, French Polynesia and Noumea, New Caledonia. Spain - Aust/NZ - Low 3.8 Capacity caps in the striped marlin fleet are exceeded Risk Description: CMM places an obligation on CCMs to limit the number of fishing vessels fishing for striped marlin (MLS) in the Convention Area south of 15 o S, to the number in any one year between the period in order to prevent further increases in fishing mortality of MLS stocks. There is a risk that insufficient flag state control will allow for increases in the number of vessels fishing for striped marlin. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: CMM Unlikely Considerable uncertainty exists in monitoring compliance with this measure. It is not clear whether the intent of the measure is to limit the number of vessels to those who targeted striped marlin during , or those who recorded any catch. Given MLS are usually taken as a commercially important byproduct, rather than a target species, it is unlikely many captains would nominate MLS as a target species. As a result the chances of increases in the number of vessels nominating MLS as a target species could be considered low. However, this may not reflect whether the measure is achieving its intended objective i.e. to prevent increases in fishing mortality of MLS. Moreover, many DW nations taking MLS as a byproduct have yet to provide the WCPFC with information to monitor compliance with this CMM. These include China, Spain and Japan. Based on a general trend towards effort reduction in the LL fishery, there is some reason to believe the likelihood of this measure being breached is low. The biological consequences of increased fishing mortality in MLS stocks is likely to be at least moderate, however the economic impact to Pacific Island economic is likely to be insignificant to minor. While the first stock assessment of MLS in 2006 provided no indication that current exploitation rates are having a deleterious impact on the productivity of the stock (Langley et al 2006) 48, several of the plausible model scenarios indicated that current levels of fishing effort may be at or exceed F MSY. On that basis, Langley et al (2006) recommended no further increase in fishing mortality (effort), particularly in Coral Sea and Tasman Sea areas where MLS show high catchability. Given striped marlin is typically taken as a byproduct, catches will likely follow effort trends in other fisheries. 48 Langley,A.,B. Molony,D. Bromhead,K. Yokawa,and B Wise. (2006) Stock assessment of striped marlin (Tetrapturus audax) in the southwest Pacific Ocean. WCPFC-SC2-2006/SA WP-6. 62pp Page 41

42 CCM flag state controls on taking MLS; CCM reporting to WCPFC; operational catch and effort data; port sampling; at sea boarding and inspection. Weak The Secretariat has received information from Australia, Cook Islands, Korea, New Caledonia, Chinese Taipei and the U.S on the respective numbers of vessels. Vanuatu has provided monthly longline catches (mt) of striped marlin taken south of 15 S for the period but not the number of vessels involved. 49 Other nations have recorded catch history of MLS but have yet to provide the WCPFC with relevant information on the number of vessels including China, Spain, Fiji, Japan, New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Tonga. Observer coverage, particularly of many DW LL fleets, is very low. Operational level catch and effort data coverage of DW LL fleets is low. No formal process of monitoring CCM compliance with CMMs exists. No regime of sanctions for non-compliance exists. Additional MCS measures recommended: Ensure CCM provision of information relevant to the measure (including robust process to monitor compliance with CMMs); Ensure submission operational catch and effort data to detect trends in targeting behaviour and CPUE; Improved observer coverage to provide independent validation of catch and effort reporting and MLS catch rates. 3.9 Effort creep in the PS fishery Risk Description: Technological and other improvements in fishing over time will increase the effectiveness of a given unit of fishing effort. This is referred to as effort creep. There is a risk that effort creep in the PS fishery will undermine the effort control objectives of the Vessel Days Scheme as well as the fishing mortality control objectives of other measures such as CMM Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: VDS; WCPFC-CMM Almost Certain The Palau Arrangement (VDS Scheme) recognises the need to account for effort creep in para 2.6 (ii)(a, b), and notes it will be a function of the annual meeting of the Parties to receive a briefing "on current catch and effort levels and any observed or potential increase in average effective fishing effort for each fishing day since the introduction of the VDS". Gillett and Lewis (2003) reported an increase in carrying capacity of PS fisheries on the FFA Regional Register of approximately 67% between 1988 and Anecdotal evidence suggests considerable improvements in the effectiveness of PS effort over time through the use of helicopters, FAD fishing, remote monitoring of FADs, gear improvements, etc. Harley et al (2009) reported significant increases in the catchability of BET over time in the PS fishery 51, leading Hampton and Harley (2009) to conclude that a unit of purse seine effort in 2008 results in considerably more fishing mortality than it did in In the Atlantic, ICCAT assumes that efficiency improvements result in a catch increase for the purse seine fishery of 2.5-3% each year (D Wright, pers. comm.). The current VDS structure deals with capacity increases by differential debiting of days fished, based on vessel length (vessels less than 50m are debited 0.5 days for 49 WCPFC Secretariat (2008) REVIEW OF CCMs IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND COMPLIANCE WITH, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES. WCPFC5-2008/18 50 Gillett, R. and Lewis, A. (2003) A Survey of Purse Seine Fishing Capacity in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 1988 to Gillett, Preston and Associates. 51 Harley, S, Hoyle, S., Langley, A., Hampton, J. & Kleiber, P. (2009) Stock assessment of bigeye tuna in the western and central Pacific Ocean. WCPFC 5 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee WCPFC-SC5-2009/SA-WP-4 52 Hampton, J. & Harley, S. (2009) Assessment of the potential implications of application of CMM08-01 for bigeye and yellowfin tuna. WCPFC 5 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee WCPFC-SC5-2009/GN- WP-17 Page 42

43 each day fished; vessels 50-80m are debited 1 day for each day fished; vessels over 80m are debited 1.5 days for each day fished). This provides some control over fishing effort, however scope for significant effective effort increases remain in at least two areas: (a) increases in the size of vessels within each category (i.e. a new 79m vessel will be debited the same amount of days as an old 51m vessel) and (b) technology advances for the same size class of vessel. The key risks associated with effort creep in the PS fishery appear to be in (a) increased catches of BET and YFT (particularly where effort creep is associated with increased FAD usage), and (b) undermining the economic value of a fishing day. Catch of BET by PS vessels in PNA EEZs was 20,767t in An increase in effective effort of 10% over 3yrs, could be expected to deliver an increased catch of 2067t, meaning an effective reduction of 36% would need to be achieved to meet BET mortality reduction targets. It is not clear whether the proposed measures (HSP closures, 3 month FAD closures and catch retention provisions) will achieve the target. High Technological advances in fishing technology (eg. development of improved FAD technology); increases in skipper experience; increases in fishing capacity within the three VDS vessel size classes. Vessel based reporting during registration; FFA Regional Register. Weak While the VDS contemplates the need to account for effort creep, no specific program exists to support estimates of effort creep amongst the PNA PS fleet (e.g. Annual surveys of fishing vessel characteristics and fishing technology) High Additional MCS measures recommended: Program to estimate levels of effort creep on an ongoing basis. An opportunity exists under the 100% observer requirements to independently record the characteristics of vessels (e.g. type of gear used) and fishing operations (e.g. use of helicopters, types of FADs, etc) to support regular estimates of effort creep. Additional information could be collected where necessary during pre-fishing inspections Effort creep in the LL fishery undermines efforts to control fishing mortality Risk Description: CMM introduces a range of measures with the overall objective of reducing fishing mortality on BET by 30% by 2011 and preventing any future increases in mortality of YFT stocks. Moreover, the PNA countries are currently discussing the possible introduction of a LL VDS. There is a risk that effort creep in the LL fishery will undermine both the fishing mortality control objectives of CMM and the effort control objectives of the proposed LL VDS. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: CMM 08-01; possible future LL VDS Unlikely A range of technological, operational and other improvements over the past decade are likely to have increased the effectiveness of a unit of LL fishing effort. Technological improvements have included web-based access to sea surface temperature and other satellite data. Notwithstanding that, anecdotal information suggests the level of effort creep operating in the LL fishery is likely to be considerably less than the PS fishery. Page 43

44 Minor The immediate consequence of effort creep in the LL fishery appears to be the potential to undermine fishing mortality reduction objectives for BET under CMM Catch reductions of 30% are required by four fleets (JP, TW, KR and CN) by Catch reduction targets will be hardest to achieve for JP and TW based on recent catch figures. Effort creep of a few percent over the three year period will effectively increase the difficultly in meeting catch reduction targets. The longer term consequence of effort creep is its potential to undermine effort control objectives under any future LL VDS. The possible impact of effort creep will depend on the design of the scheme and should be taken into account in its design. Low Technological improvements in LL gear technology; access to better web-based intelligence; increases in skipper experience. Vessel based reporting during registration; FFA Regional Register. No specific program exists to support estimates of effort creep amongst the LL fleet (e.g. Annual surveys of fishing vessel characteristics and fishing technology) Weak Low 3.11 Unregulated use of FADs outside closure periods Risk Description: Catch rates of juvenile BET and YFT are higher in sets associated with FADs and other floating objects than in unassociated sets. There is a risk that increased use of FADs outside the closure periods will undermine objectives to achieve a 30% reduction in BET fishing mortality and a cap on YFT fishing mortality. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: CMM08-01; PNA 3IA Few regulations currently exist in the region on the use of FADs, outside the 3-month FAD closures recently adopted under the PNA 3IA and CMM Catch rates have been significantly higher in recent years on drifting FADs than on unassociated schools (Figure 3.4). Commercial incentives exist for increasing FAD use given FAD fishing is typically more fuel efficient than setting on free swimming schools. Nevertheless, overall rates of drifting FAD sets have declined steadily since the late 1990 s (Figure 3.5). Of the major fleets, rates of FAD sets are highest in the US fleet. FAD usage is also high amongst Philippines vessels based in PNG. Most vessels looking to move into WCPO waters from the EPO and IOTC are likely to have a high level of FAD usage (J Hampton, pers. comm.). Most new technology for PS fishing involves the use of FADs. Page 44

45 Figure 3.4: Skipjack CPUE in the WCPO by set type between (LOG=log sets; dfad=drifting FAD sets; afad=anchored FAD sets; SCH=free school sets) (Source: SPC) Figure 3.5: Changes in proportion of set type across the major fleets during (Green=other; red=drifting FAD; yellow=log; blue=unassociated) Major Higher catches of juvenile BET and YFT are taken in association with FADs. Associated sets in the PS fishery are identified as the 2 nd and 3 rd largest contributors to the reduction in YFT and BET stock biomass respectively in the WCPO (Figure 2.2; 2.3). LL catch rates continue to be negatively affected by the impact of increased PS catches if juvenile BET/YFT. High Increasing fuel prices (FAD sets are more fuel efficient than unassociated sets); improved FAD technology; movement of vessels with higher FAD usage from other ocean basins Logsheets (including set type reporting); Observers (to provide independent information on FAD usage) Very Strong 100% observer coverage should provide very good information on levels of FAD usage. Nevertheless, the actual risk to fish stocks will be dependent on management action to address risks arising from increasing FAD usage, if required. Additional MCS measures recommended: None. The information upon which to base management measures in relation to FAD usage should be available through 100% observer coverage. Page 45

46 4. Non-compliance by licensed vessels and flag states undermines regional fisheries management goals 4.1 Fishing in high seas pockets Risk Description: The PNA 3IA closes two areas of high seas enclosed by the Parties (HSP 1 and 2) to all forms of fishing. The closures are to be implemented through foreign fishing agreements and licensing requirements of the Parties. WCPFC CMM closes HSP 1 and 2 to purse seine fishing. There is a risk that vessels will fish in the high seas pockets in breach of these conditions. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: PNA 3IA; CMM Purse Seine Likely Fishing effort (in days fished) in HSP 1 varied between 1% to 9% of the total effort in the area comprising the PNA member EEZs and the two HSPs between HSP 2 was relatively more important during the same period, with fishing effort varying between 8% to 17% of total effort. Moreover, catch rates of SKJ in HSP 2 were consistently above the average catch rates across the PNA-HSP region during the period. Both of these factors make HSP 2 slightly more likely to attract fishing in breach of the 3IA/CMM closures. This is likely to be particularly the case during El Nino years where catches and effort shift eastwards. SPC-OFP modelling shows the HSP closures are an important conservation measure for BET reducing overfishing by approx. 10.7%, assuming that effort previously undertaken on the high seas is not simply displaced into EEZs. Combined catches of BET in the two HSPs in 2007 was 5207t (with over 95% coming from HSP2). A 10% transgression rate in the HSPs would result in an additional 521t of BET catch. The consequences of illegal fishing in HSPs will be higher if vessels are fishing a full allocation of fishing days in EEZs then working on the high seas. High ENSO-related increases in target species abundance in HSPs VMS; 100% observer coverage; aerial and surface patrols Very Strong The adequacy of MCS is rated very strong based on the assumption of effective monitoring of VMS and achieving 100% coverage rates of observers. Current rates of at sea and aerial patrols are unlikely to serve as an effective deterrent to non-compliance. Low Longline Likely Page 46

47 Annual reports to the WCPFC ( 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 ) show high levels of fishing activity by DW fleets adjacent to the boundaries of the HSPs (Eg. DW LL effort in FSM and Palau). Aggregated catch data held by SPC 61 shows a dominant history of Taiwanese fishing in HSP1 (>90% of recorded catches) and Japanese in HSP2, however poor operational catch and effort data coverage from a number of key DW fleets for HS catches 62 leaves a significant degree of uncertainty in historic activity and catch levels from these areas. Total catches of BET from HSP1 in ranged from 1,310t 2,468t, averaging 1,948t (2.3% of av. total BET LL catch in WCPO, 1.4% for all gears). Total catches of YFT in ranged from 3,000t - 4,504t, averaging 3,670t (4.8% of av. total YFT LL catch in WCPO, 1% for all gears). In HSP2, total catches of BET in ranged from 541t 1,635t, averaging 960t (1.1% of av. total BET LL catch in WCPO, 1% for all gears). Total catches of YFT ranged from 955t 2,603t, averaging 1,566t (2% of av. total YFT LL catch in WCPO, 0.4% for all gears). Aggregated Longline catch data from HSP1 indicates China, Taiwan and Japan are the only CCMs/fleets operating in this area. Aggregated Longline catch data from HSP2 indicates a number of fleets have historically operated in this area including Vanuatu, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, FSM, Fiji, China, Cook Is., Solomon Is (no longer active) and NZ. Minor Fishing in breach of licence condition closing the hjgh seas pockets represents a challenge to management frameworks, and may require considerable MCS resources to monitor compliance. The direct biological impacts of breaches are likely to be low if overall levels of effort do not increase (i.e. effort that would have previously been applied in PNA EEZs is applied in HSPs). Indirect impacts on the certainty of resource assessments may occur if catches are not reported. Some loss of PIC income may occur if catches that would have otherwise been taken in EEZs are taken on the high seas and not reported. Likewise, unreported catches may also impact any future catch or effort allocation to PICs. ENSO-related increases in target species abundance in HSPs; perceived chances of being apprehended/prosecuted. VMS, Aerial surveillance, Observers, logsheets, port inspections (of logsheets). LL vessels subject to the 3IA closures are monitored through the FFA VMS system, however visibility of vessels in the HSPs is limited only to FFA members is limited to countries that have implemented port-to-port monitoring (PNG only at this stage). Historical aerial and surface patrol coverage very limited in HS waters. Observer coverage on DW LL vessels is generally very low. Unlike the PS fishery where the HSP closures have been mirrored by the WCPFC, HS LL vessels may continue to legitimately fish in the HSPs unless they are closed by the Commission at WCPFC6. This is likely to complicate the compliance environment for the LL fishery. 53 Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Papua New Guinea. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Palau. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP-7 56 Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Solomon Islands. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Republic of Marshall Islands. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Kiribati. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP-14 (Rev) 59 Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Tuvalu. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP Annual Report Part 1, Information on Fisheries, Research, and Statistics Fiji. WCPFC-SC4-AR PART 1/WP-8 61 Aggregate catch data for WCPO (as at 9 March 2009) provided by SPC Oceanic Fisheries Program in May SPC-OFP (2008) Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. WCPFC-SC4-2008/ST IP-2 Page 47

48 Additional MCS measures recommended: Implement port to port VMS monitoring in all PNA members through licence conditions, including optimised use of automated alerts upon vessel entry/exit; Strong, harmonised penalties for non-compliance amongst PNA members Explore use of remote monitoring technology (e.g drum monitors, cameras) to detect fishing activity Targeted aerial and surface surveillance to respond to suspicious activity (e.g. check gear is stowed and secured, etc) 4.2 Catch discarding amongst the PS fleet Risk Description: The PNA 3IA and CMM introduce catch retention provisions for the PS fishery, except under a limited range of circumstances. The purpose of the provisions is to encourage the development of technology to reduce the catch of juvenile BET and YFT in sets associated with floating objects. There is a risk that catch discarding in the PS fishery will undermine the effectiveness of the catch retention provisions and erode incentives to develop technology to reduce juvenile catches. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: PNA 3IA; CMM Approximately 5% of the PS catch between 1995 and 2007 has been discarded 63, although the frequency and proportion of discarding is highly dependent on key drivers including prices for small fish and availability of product. Typically, very small fish are discarded as being uneconomic and difficult to handle for canneries, however they will be accepted when supply of larger fish is short. On average, about 41,806t, 5,553 and 1,100t of SKJ, YFT and BET are discarded in the PS fishery annually, excluding the domestic fisheries of PH and ID 64. Discarded fish are typically very small and have a higher natural mortality rate than larger fish. As a result the biological consequences are unlikely to be particularly severe. The proportion of discards has been able to be quantified through the use of observers, and are considered sufficiently small to not include in stock assessments (J. Hampton, pers. comm.) Nevertheless, the continued practice of discarding undermines the incentive to reduce catches of juvenile BET and YFT. Price for small fish; supply of product to canneries (smaller fish will be accepted when supply of larger fish is weak) 100% observer coverage; Logbooks Strong 100% observer coverage is likely to resolve most problems associated with catch discarding. Low Additional MCS measures recommended: 100% observer coverage in all domestic vessels 63 SPC OFP (2008). Estimates of Annual Catches in the WCPFC Statistical Area. 4 th Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 38pp. 64 Ibid, OFP (2008) Page 48

49 4.3 Non-compliance with VMS provisions Risk Description: Monitoring of vessel position through MTUs is a fundamental cornerstone of the MCS regime operating in the Pacific at regional, sub-regional and national levels. In the purse seine fishery VMS is the key monitoring tool underpinning the PNA Vessel Days Scheme. It will also be critical to any HS VDS that might be introduced by the WCPFC. There is a risk that non-compliance with VMS automatic reporting requirements will undermine the VDS (in the purse seine fishery) and facilitate other forms of non-compliance (in both the purse seine and longline fisheries e.g. fishing in an area not covered by the vessel s licence or access agreements). Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. PNA VDS; possible future HS VDS; National fisheries legislation and licence conditions; WCPFC-CMM ; future LL VDS) Purse Seine Rare Anecdotal evidence from FFA indicates that, at any one time, only between 7-10 PS vessels are reporting manually due to faulty VMS Units (M. Ferris, pers. comm.). The overwhelming majority of cases involving loss of VMS signals appear to be unintentional and due to installation problems or interference from other systems operating from the vessel. Intentional tampering with units does not appear to be widespread (M. Ferris, pers. comm.). Current arrangements under the VDS, where vessels in the fishery are automatically assumed to be fishing unless VMS evidence can prove otherwise, create a strong incentive to ensure MTUs are operating normally. Technical manipulation of the system to transmit misleading position data is also thought to be very technically advanced and beyond the majority of operators in the pacific at present 65. Major Widespread non-compliance with VMS provisions would significantly undermine the VDS, which calculates and apportions fishing days based on VMS data. Non-compliance may also facilitate other forms of illegal activity (e.g. illegal transhipping; fishing in closed areas, etc). If catches taken illegally go unreported, they may have significant biological and economic impacts for FFA members. Current arrangements under the VDS provide an incentive to ensure the MTU is reporting automatically and normally. FFA Type Approval Specifications and testing/certification requirements for VMS units; Regional Register of Fishing Vessels/Vessels on Good Standing list/hmtcs; Alarm systems onboard vessel to notify of a fault and on FFA VMS; National VMS Officers monitoring compliance at the country level. In the event of an MTU failure, vessels must manually report their position to relevant national fisheries authorities at least once every 8 hours until VMS signal is restored. Very Strong The FFA updated its specifications for the type approval of units used with the FFA Vessel Monitoring System on 1 May The new specifications harmonise with other type approval specifications in use around the world and provide a more rigorous approach to type approval than had previously been the case. Provisions are included for physical installation and security standards which must provide robust protection against wilful attempts to compromise the physical security of the housing and units must be tamper-evident, ie. evidence of attempts to 65 Personal Communication with FFA VMS Consultant 15 June FFA. (2009) The Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) Type Approval Specifications, Page 49

50 compromise the physical housing should be detectable on inspection (eg. Nitrogen filled under + ve pressure ). Software must be locked-down at all times and it must not be reasonably possible for the VMS functions of the unit to be altered via the terminal of the E-MTU (Enhanced Mobile Transmitting Unit, with two-way and forms capabilities) or by attaching a computer or terminal to an MTU 67. In addition, the FFA specifications also apply to the Mobile Communications Service Provider (MCSP) to ensure the integrity and timeliness of the data transmitted to FFA from fishing vessels 68. VMS MTU/EMTU type approval tests and certification must be passed each year 69. If faults are encountered with a vessel s VMS signal, communication is initiated with the vessel by its licence state, to request it to manually report positions every 4 hrs and/or direct the vessel to port to have the MTU/EMTU inspected and re-certified 70. Comprehensive monitoring of PS VMS operability and position reporting is undertaken as part of VDS function at FFA. National VMS Officers in each country monitor vessel signals (twice a day on average) in their jurisdiction, check for faulty signals and contact vessel or agent if lose signal to require manual reporting and/or vessel to transit directly to port to have VMS unit inspected 71. Low Longline Advice from the FFA VMS section indicates that most problems associated with the loss of signals or other VMS Mobile Transmitting Unit (MTU) faults are unintentional and generally due to installation problems, dirty or inconsistent mains power supplies on vessels (particularly aging vessels) or interference from other electronic systems operating from the vessel (not recognised during installation) and intentional tampering with units is not widespread 72. Vessels replacing MTU terminals without advising FFA to update the VMS database with their new DNID (electronic identification number) is another cause of "MTUs not operating". Notwithstanding that, information on current patterns of VMS reporting amongst the LL fleet shows significantly higher numbers of non-compliant vessels in the LL fishery than the PS fishery. In June : - Approximately 70 80% of vessels ( vessels) were reporting normally to the FFA VMS (14%) vessels provided inconsistent VMS reports i.e. did not report every day or reported less than every 4hrs on some days during the month. In some cases this may be due to vessels newly registered on FFA s Vessels in Good Standing List and/or vessels experiencing technical faults as noted above. It is possible that some of these cases may be the result of vessels turning off their MTU vessels did not provide any automatic VMS position reports. In some cases this may be due to vessels fishing in other ocean regions (eg. EPO), changing their login, going into dry-dock and turning off MTUs or operating on a new/replacement unit which has not yet been configured into the FFA VMS (may still be monitored by flag state). Further investigation would be required to more accurately consider the likelihood that some vessels have intentionally switched off their MTU. Major 67 Ibid, FFA (2009) 68 Ibid, FFA (2009) 69 Personal Communication with FFA VMS Consultant 15 June Advice from Fisheries VMS Officers during in-country consultations, Mar-April In-country consultations, March to April Personal Communication with FFA VMS Consultant and FFA VMS officers Summary VMS MTU report frequency data for longliners on the FFA Good Standing list supplied by FFA for June Page 50

51 Given the importance of VMS as a tool to monitor compliance with a range of regional, sub-regional and national management measures, widespread non compliance would represent a significant challenge. The consequences of non-compliance will further increase if a LL VDS is adopted. Significant concern was expressed by some stakeholders during in country visits about the prospect of LL vessels switching off MTUs to facilitate illegal behaviour. In particular, concern was expressed at the potential for vessels to switch off MTUs as they changed jurisdictions e.g. high seas to FFA member EEZ or one EEZ to another to facilitate unauthorised fishing. For example, officials in the Solomon Islands expressed concern that vessels were switching off MTUs as they entered HSP2, and either transhipping illegally and/or returning to fish unmonitored in the Solomons EEZ. Installation and other technical problems with MTUs; facilitation of illegal activity High FFA Type Approval Specifications and testing/certification requirements for VMS units; Regional Register of Fishing Vessels/Vessels on Good Standing list/hmtcs; Alarm systems onboard some vessels to notify masters of a fault. When an MTU is switched off an alarm and position report is automatically generated on the FFA VMS FFA VMS officers may then follow-up with relevant national authorities who have not yet requested automatic forwarding of power failure alerts. In the event of an MTU failure, vessels must manually report their position to relevant national fisheries authorities at least once every 8 hours until VMS signal is restored. Updating of type approval standards as per PS. National VMS Officers in each country monitor vessel signals (twice a day on average) in their jurisdiction to check for faulty signals and contact vessel or agent if a signal is lost and advise the vessel to report positions manually and/or to transit directly to port to have VMS unit inspected and repaired 74. The longline fleet is not currently monitored by FFA (as they do for the purse seine fleet to administer the VDS). If there is a requirement for a vessel to report positions manually due to a system fault, such position reports are sent directly to relevant National Authorities 75. Alerts of varying types are available to FFA members however they are not in widespread use due to historical problems experienced with earlier systems (e.g. lack of resources to cross-check each alert). A new alternative system is currently being setup to allow VMS officers to access alert reports online, although this system will still be reliant on capacity in country to regularly cross-check reports. Unlike the PS fleet which will be subject to 100% observer coverage (and hence independent information on vessel activity will be available in the event of MTU malfunction), observer coverage on the LL fleet is very low. High Additional MCS measures recommended: Implement port-to-port monitoring Onerous manual reporting requirements for non-compliance (e.g. report hourly and return to port within 24hrs; will encourage carrying of spares) Very strong sanctions where deliberate non-compliance is proven Include incentives for compliance in any future LL VDS (e.g. automatically lose a day if MTU not functioning) Consideration should be given to the VMS resourcing needs associated with any future LL VDS (e.g. there may be a need for a dedicated staff member at FFA/RMCC to monitor LL compliance with VMS provisions). This person may also operate in support of national VMS officers. 74 In-country consultations, March to April Personal Communication with FFA VMS Manager, Page 51

52 4.4 Use of non-prescribed fishing gear and/or methods other than those specified by licence. Risk Description: The types of fishing gear and methods able to be used by a vessel are specified on the fishing permit/licence. There is a risk that vessels may use gear other than that specified on the licence/permit. Most commonly this involves methods to target sharks (eg. attaching a hookline to buoys in the LL fishery), though may also include use of a handline to catch fish and squid for onboard consumption, sale at local markets and/or transhipment for sale at foreign markets to supplement crew incomes. This risk is closely linked to the risk of vessels targeting species other than tuna and tuna-like species as prescribed on fishing permits whereby vessels generally employ alternative fishing methods (including different gears or gear configurations) to target different species, such as sharks and reef fish. Factors contributing to the likelihood, consequences and key drivers for both of these risks may therefore be interrelated. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. FFA Member licence conditions; National Tuna Management Plans) Purse seine Due to the nature of the gear and vessel configuration, purse seiners are less able to use non-prescribed fishing gear(s) at any large scale. Handlining by purse seine crews for species other than tuna (eg. squid) appears to be quite common (25 cases reported by observers on PS vessels since 2005), however this activity is only thought to occur at a very small scale across this sector. It is worth noting that alternative gears are currently being developed to reduce the bycatch of juvenile YFT and BET by purse seine vessels fishing on floating objects (e.g. through the use of escape holes and other alternative systems) 76. Should the use of such gear become a requirement in future, the likelihood of non-compliance should be factored into assessments. Insignificant The consequences of handlining are likely to be insignificant. Risk Rating Low Supplementation of crew income. 100% observer coverage. Licence conditions. Boarding and Inspection in-port and at sea. Strong 100% observer coverage should provide very good information on usage rates of non-prescribed gear. Given the relatively benign nature of the most common offence (i.e. handlining) it is 76 Nelson, P. (2004) Reducing juvenile Bigeye tuna mortality in FAD sets. SCTB17 Working Paper FTWG-7g. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission La Jolla, California. Page 52

53 questionable whether the presence of an observer will provide a deterrent. Low Longline Use of non-compliant gear was reported by observers on 17 of 153 trips through GEN-3 forms. Of these, 10 were onboard Chinese vessels and 7 were onboard FFA member LLs (3 Fiji, 1 FSM, 1 KIR, 1 PNG & 1 Tonga). For those breaches where detailed observer comments were available, the most common infringement was vessels deploying a hookline (snood) attached to a buoy to target sharks. These are most likely attached to the vessel whilst drifting during mainline soak times. Vessels targeting reef-associated species, particularly if setting lines on the bottom (in shallower water [<50m]), may carry alternative gear onboard, such as smaller longlines with shorter snoods and smaller hooks and a mainline more resilient to abrasion on reefs. Vessels would generally need to be of sufficient size to have additional storage for alternative gears such as bottom longlines that would generally be rigged up and stacked in boxes or baskets before departing. Other non-permitted gears employed may include rods with electric reels and/or winches to work droplines targeting deeper reef fish (in m) on seamounts or drop-offs. If the use of alternative methods to target sharks is widespread, the impact on shark populations may be significant, particularly if the activity is intense. Current information on the scale of alternative gear usage is poor due to very low rates of observer coverage on LL vessels. The impact on non-shark species is likely to be less serious. Supplementation of crew income; shark fin prices Licence conditions. Boarding and Inspection in-port and at sea. Fishery observers (for monitoring purposes only). Existing rates of boarding and inspection may not provide a significant level of deterrence to non-compliance; observer coverage in the LL sector is very low. Additional MCS measures recommended: Pre-fishing inspections of all vessels, including checking gear on board the vessel Education of fishing masters to ensure high awareness of permitted gear configurations Enhanced rates of at sea boarding and inspection based on local intelligence Page 53

54 4.5 Fishing inside closed waters Risk Description: Domestic legislation and/or licence conditions of most, if not all, FFA members contain closed waters provisions. Most frequently these are spatial closures around islands (e.g. 12nm), though may also include closures to internal waters and territorial seas to minimise competition between commercial and artisanal/community fishers, closures to other areas such as archipelagic waters where they are off-limits to certain fleets and closures for marine parks (e.g. PIPA in KI). There is a risk that vessels licensed in the relevant EEZ will fish inside closed waters in breach of licence conditions. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. National fisheries and environment legislations, national tuna management plans, national marine parks legislation) Purse seine Rare Fishing in closed waters by purse seine vessels was not frequently reported as a compliance problem by interviewees in country. This fits with GEN-3 form data showing that fishing in areas not covered by a licence or agreement is reported on less than 10% of trips across all fleets (Figure 6.1). Notwithstanding that, some FFA members noted sightings of FADs inside closed waters (e.g. Tokelau). Highest risk areas are likely to be archipelagic waters adjacent to productive fishing grounds in PNG and Solomon Islands, as well as remote protected areas such the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA). Some anecdotal evidence suggests that awareness of closed water provisions is limited amongst some fleets. A number of consequences may result from fishing in closed waters, depending on the nature of the area and objectives for the closure. Principally, increased competition may decrease availability of fisheries resources for community/artisinal fishers who supply the majority of the protein on local markets and whose range is often limited to the immediate area around islands. In extreme circumstances, intense illegal fishing may impact food security of local communities. Given the high catching capacity of PS vessels, conflict with local vessels may be high. There is likely to be little biological impact on highly migratory species if the overall level of effort remains the same (i.e. fishing that would have occurred on open areas occurs in closed waters). Local impacts on site attached species may occur if the level of activity is intense. Low Perceived chances of detection/prosecution; ENSO related movements of fish inside archipelagic waters VMS; Aerial and surface patrols; observer coverage Very Strong 100% observer coverage on PS vessels should provide a level of deterrent to fishing inside closed waters. VMS hourly polling associated with the VDS provides very good position reporting. Low Longline Page 54

55 Nine of the 15 PIC FFA members identified fishing inside closed waters as a key IUU activity in their waters during in country consultations. Kiribati, Tuvalu and Tokelau in particular rated the likelihood of illegal fishing in closed waters very highly. The most commonly reported offence was LL vessels targeting sharks within 12nm closures around islands (and in particular smaller LL vessels able to readily switch between targeting tuna and sharks). Particular concern was also expressed about provincially licensed foreign vessels (mainly Shark LLs) that are not on the FFA Register and/or VMS. Many countries reported fishing in closed waters occurred more frequently in remote areas (e.g. SE SOLs, between SOLs and SE PNG, nth of VAN, parts of Fiji, KIR - Phoenix and Line Islands (western 2 EEZs), central FSM) with much of the intelligence coming from community reports of breaches. Anecdotal reports received in country are slightly at odds with available GEN-3 data showing that fishing in areas not covered by a licence or agreement was reported on less than 5% of trips (see Figure 6.2). Given the low observer coverage rate and the possibility that the presence of an observer on board provided a deterrent to non-compliance, the actual rate of occurrence may be higher than this. Biologically the impact is likely to be minor on highly migratory species, however could be significant on vulnerable species (e.g. sharks) if the activity was prolonged or intense (J. Hampton, pers. comm.). The impact on other species likely to be taken e.g. Sailfish, wahoo, dogtooth tuna and deepwater reeffish such as ruby snapper is unknown. Perceived chances of detection/prosecution; price of shark fin (particularly during periods of high demand e.g. Chinese New Year) ; profitability of LL operations VMS; Aerial and surface patrols; observer coverage VMS polling provides good position reporting, though is frequently not used to its full potential in country (see Project 2 results). Levels of observer coverage are very low on most fleets. Current rates of aerial surveillance and at sea patrols are unlikely to deter non-compliance, particularly in remote areas. Additional MCS measures recommended: Exploration of longarm techniques such as implementing no-go areas (where being polled by VMS inside the area would automatically constitute an offence) around selected closed areas (e.g. around isolated communities and/or reefs) Implementation of community and industry based reporting Exploration of remote monitoring techniques (e.g. drum monitors, cameras) to detect fishing activity Targeted aerial and surface surveillance based on local intelligence 4.6 Falsification/misuse of licence documents Risk Description: Controlling the number of legitimate fishing vessels through national and regional (e.g. WCPFC Record) licencing/access arrangements is a fundamental cornerstone of regional efforts to sustainably manage fisheries and to regulate use of in zone and high seas areas. There is a risk that falsification or misuse of vessels documents including multiple vessels with the same or similar names operating on the one licence will facilitate an increase in the number of vessels operating in the fishery and undermine legitimate access frameworks. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. national fisheries legislation; national tuna management plans; CMM ; CMM ) Page 55

56 4.6.1 Purse seine Rare The comparatively small number, close monitoring and easy identification of PS vessels makes the risk of falsifying vessel documents rare. Major The falsification/misuse of documents to allow for an increased number of vessels is a direct challenge to national/regional licencing frameworks. Widespread falsification of vessels documents would significantly undermine the value of legitimate access rights, result in lost government revenue and undermine national and regional conservation and management measures. Multiple vessels operating on the same licence also deprives FFA members of licence fees for legitimate access and other revenue (such as fees for regional register) important to support the FFA MCS Program and regional MCS operations. Level of fees for legitimate access; perceived risk of being detected/prosecuted; level of fines Regional Vessel Register and Unique Vessel Identifiers (UVIs); HMTCs for licences, incl. FAO Vessel Marking Reqmts; VMS, Aerial and surface surveillance; boarding and inspections. 100% observer coverage in the PS fleet from 1 January 2010 together with close monitoring under the VDS will likely mitigate opportunities for licence falsification. Strong Low Longline Unlikely A number of FFA members expressed concern about licence duplication/falsification during in country visits. For example, interviewees in PNG expressed concern about multiple Philippine vessels operating on same licence, as well as difficulties in differentiating between vessels under the same access agreement with similar names. Many of the vessels in the latter category reportedly carried copies of licences, as opposed to the originals, indicating single licences may be used to cover multiple vessels. Notwithstanding that, information on licence falsification is very poor and the extent of non-compliance remains uncertain. Major The falsification/misuse of documents to allow for an increased number of vessels is a direct challenge to national/regional licencing frameworks. Widespread falsification of vessels documents would significantly undermine the value of legitimate access rights, result in lost government revenue and undermine national and regional conservation and management measures. Multiple vessels operating on the same licence also deprives FFA members of licence fees for legitimate access and other revenue (such as fees for regional register) important to support the FFA MCS Program and regional MCS operations. Level of fees for legitimate access; perceived risk of being detected/prosecuted; strength of sanctions FFA Regional Register; WCPFC Record; HMTCs for licences, incl. FAO Vessel Marking Reqmts; VMS, Aerial and surface surveillance, boarding and inspections. Page 56

57 The Regional Vessel Register and associated vessel identification and marking requirements operate as effective sources against which to validate aerial and surface patrol contacts. Coverage rates of aerial and surface surveillance are generally low in many EEZs. A number of foreign fleets don't make landfall in a number of FFA member countries and are thus less frequently boarded and inspected and for the most part, operating outside the direct oversight of MCS Officers in country. Additional MCS measures recommended: Work through WCPFC to encourage progress on global register of fishing vessels Incorporate Unique Vessel Identifiers into Regional Register Mandatory annual pre-fishing inspections Improved rates of (dockside and at sea) boarding and inspection amongst higher risk fleets based on local intelligence Very strong penalties for non-compliance (including failure to produce original licence documents) 4.7 Fishing on FADs during closure periods Risk Description: The PNA 3IA introduces a prohibition to fishing on floating objects, and to deploying and servicing FADs, for a three month period (1 July 30 September) from 2010 onwards in PNA member waters. CMM mirrors the FAD closure in high seas waters between 20 o N and 20 o S. The objective of the FAD prohibition is to contribute to 30% reduction in BET fishing mortality and to cap YFT fishing mortality. There is a risk that PS vessels will fish on floating objects in breach of these conditions. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: PNA 3IA; CMM Likely In the absence of 100% observer coverage the likelihood of FAD fishing during the proposed closure period is high. FAD fishing is frequently more fuel efficient than setting on free swimming schools and high fuel prices would provide considerable incentive for non-compliance. All five major PS fleets record some level of fishing on floating objects; overall rates of associated sets are highest in the US fleet (approx. 70% in 2007)and lowest in the Korean fleet (25% in 2007) 77. Anecdotal evidence also suggests rates of FAD usage are high in the Philippines fleet operating in PNG waters and in the Latin American and Spanish vessels. SPC modelling shows the proposed FAD closures will result in the biggest single reduction in overfishing of BET (15.8%) of all measures modelled in association with the development of CMM08-01, apart from the 30% reduction of LL catch 78. If 25% of the fleet (i.e. domestic, single EEZ vessels see below) are able to fish on FADs, the effectiveness of the measure will reduce by 25%. High 77 Ibid, Williams & Terawasi (2008) 78 OFP (2008b) Evaluation of Potential Bigeye Tuna Management Measures. 5 th Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2pp (accessed at IP13%20[Evaluation%20of%20Potential%20BET%20Management%20Measures].pdf) Page 57

58 Fuel prices (FAD fishing is more fuel efficient than unassociated sets); perceived risk of detection/prosecution; level of fines; adequacy of domestic legislation implementing closures Observers Strong The introduction of 100% observer coverage from 1 July 2010 for all foreign fleets under the PNA 3IA and for all vessels operating on the high seas, on the high seas and at least one coastal state EEZ and two or more coastal states under CMM should provide a considerable deterrent to non-compliance, as well as good information on non-compliance where it occurs. Adequacy for these fleets would have been rated very strong but for potential operational difficulties in monitoring compliance with FAD provisions most FAD sets commence in the predawn hours where monitoring proximity to FADs will be difficult. Some difficulties may also arise in monitoring proximity to submerged and semi-submerged objects. For domestic vessels, the gap in 100% observer coverage that remain in one EEZ only represents a potential weakness in the MCS regime. Additional MCS measures recommended: 100% observer coverage on all domestic PS vessels. Strong sanctions for in zone breaches of the floating object prohibition 4.8 Vessels exceed days under VDS Risk Description: Para 4.1 of the Palau Arrangement requires all Parties to ensure the number of days by PS vessels in their waters does not exceed the Party's PAE. There is a risk that inadequate coastal state control or other weaknesses will result in the overall level of days exceeding the TAE. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: The PNA s Vessel Days Scheme (VDS) Rare Days are currently recorded through the VMS, with PS vessels reporting hourly. Level of compliance with VMS provisions is very high. A number of arrangements mitigate the likelihood of a Party's PAE being exceeded: (a) a Party may transfer to the current Management Year up to 100% of any unused PAE from another Management Year within the same Management Period; (b) Parties may also transfer days between themselves. Given the interannual variability in SKJ distribution and catch (driven by ENSO fluctuations), there appears a reasonable likelihood that, should a party exceed its PAE, days would be available from an external party. Similarly, where a Party's PAE is exhausted for the year, PS vessels may choose to fish in other Party's EEZs (subject to being licensed). The key risk associated with a Party exceeding its PAE appears to be to the integrity of the VDS system, and in particular the potential value of fishing rights. Low Ability to secure additional days either through moving between years in a management period, or through transfer from another Party. Page 58

59 VMS; sanctions for exceeding days; provisions for trading of days between PNA members; arrangements to transfer days between years in a management period PS vessels are polled hourly through VMS. Level of compliance with the VMS provisions is high. Penalties apply under the Palau Arrangement where a Party's PAE is exceeded: where the amount of excess days is less than 100, the same amount of days is deducted from the Party's PAE for the following year; where the amount is greater than 100 days, 120% of the amount of days is deducted from the party's PAE for the following year. This is likely to serve as an effective deterrent. Adequacy of MCS would have been rated strong but for the fact that several PNA members have yet to include measures in domestic legislation to effectively enforce effort caps. Low 4.9 Misreporting of target species Risk Description: Fishers are required to report catch and effort statistics as a condition of fishing access. Logbook catch and effort data is a fundamental cornerstone of MCS regimes operating at all levels in the region and is used for a range of purposes including calculating access fees as well as supporting stock assessments. There is a risk that vessels will under-report target species and/or misreport target species on log sheets. For the purposes of this assessment, over-reporting of catch (e.g. to increase future catch or effort allocations based on catch) is also considered under this risk. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. national conditions of licence access; National tuna management plans; WCPFC catch and effort reporting requirements; CMM 08-01) Purse Seine Almost Certain The likelihood of misreporting and/or under-reporting of target species by PS vessels was rated either 'medium' or 'high' by all members of the PNA during in country consultations (except Palau where little PS activity has occurred in recent years). The most frequently reported types of misreporting and/or under reporting included: under-reporting all target species catches in logsheets, misreporting juvenile YFT as BET (both deliberately and as a result of identification challenges), misreporting juvenile BET/YFT as skipjack (i.e. simply recording the entire catch as skipjack). Several countries (e.g. PNG) noted that DWFNs frequently produced different sets of catch figures during access fee negotiations than those reported in logsheets or in export figures. Many countries noted that observer reports of catches frequently differed (with observer reports always higher) from catches reported by vessels in logsheets. An analysis of observer records from the PS fleet between shows that (apart from not recording bycatch species and breaching MARPOL), misreporting of target species and not reporting target species in logsheets were the two most frequent violations reported (Figure 4.1). Page 59

60 Figure 4.1: Violations and incidents reported on Form Gen-3 by observers in the PS fishery during Data for UST and FSMA trips were supplied by FFA. Data for national observer program trips was supplied by SPC. Serious The most direct consequences of misreporting are twofold: loss of government revenue (in the form of access fees, transhipping fees, export taxes, etc) and a reduction in the integrity of management data. The total amount of funds received by the region through PS access arrangements is not known, however even a misreporting rate of 10% is likely to result in millions of dollars in lost income to the region (where access fees are proportional to catch). Kiribati reportedly receives approximately US$30m annually in access fees. Assuming a directly proportional relationship between catches and access fees, 10% under-reporting of target species may cost Kiribati A$3m annually. The major consequences of under-reporting for management data are for stock assessments of BET and YFT. Severe Reduction in cost where access fees are proportional to catch; avoidance of local fees and charges (e.g. transhipping charges, export taxes); unintended identification problems between BET/YFT; price of small YFT/BET Page 60

61 Log sheets; port sampling; observers; boarding and inspection; prosecutions Strong 100% observer coverage should provide (a) a significant deterrent to non-compliance and (b) together with unbiased sampling techniques (e.g. spill samples), accurate independent validation of catch and effort reporting. Coverage of PS unloadings was high in the mid-1990's following the ban on transhipment at sea, however has significantly declined since and was around 10% in Given the seriousness of this risk, further MCS actions should be considered to better monitor catches through the supply chain (e.g. transhipment verification increasingly important with closure of canneries in Pago Pago; cross-verification with cannery receipts). High Additional MCS measures recommended: Education on requirement to accurately report all catch and effort 100% observer coverage on all domestic vessels Transhipment verification, including 100% observer coverage on carrier vessels Improved unloading coverage in key ports (71% of product unloaded in 5 key ports Pohnpei 30%, Majuro 14%, Rabaul 12%, Honiara 8% and Tarawa 7% adding next 3 ports Yaizu (7%), Wewak 3% and Pago Pago 3% brings total to 84%) Integrated information management to cross check catch logs with observer reports, transhipment records, unloading records etc. This will identify vessels and fleets for further investigation/action. Administrative penalties for minor non-compliance; strong sanctions for major non-compliance Longline Likely Most FFA members who licence LL's in their EEZ identified misreporting of target species by LL's as a key IUU concern rating it either 'medium' or 'high' likelihood. The most frequently reported offences were under-reporting catches in logbooks and non-reporting of juvenile BET/YFT. Many consultees believed under-reporting was 'standard practice' amongst foreign LL fleets. GEN-3 observer reports show not reporting catches of commercial species occurred on almost 40% of observed trips (Figure 4.2). Some consultees amongst regional institutions thought that in the absence of increased observer coverage and a comprehensive catch documentation scheme, misreporting would become more frequent as BET becomes more regulated. Particular concern was expressed about the scope for misreporting amongst DWFN fleets who don t unload in PICs and are not subject to regular port inspections. Page 61

62 (a) Page 62

63 (b) Figure 4.2: (a) Violations and incidents reported on Form Gen-3 by observers from national observer programs on LL vessels during and (b) numbers of trips by vessel flag observed under national observer programs during Data was supplied by SPC. Serious Adequately assessing compliance with the BET mortality reduction targets under CMM requires accurate catch data across all CMMs, although particularly across the fleets required to reduce catch by 30% over the next three years (China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan). The consequences of significant levels of misreporting are likely to significantly impede achieving the objective of 30% reduction in BET mortality. Widespread under-reporting may also impact the integrity of regional stock assessments, particularly amongst fleets whose data are central to assessments (Japan DW fleet for YFT/BET; Taiwanese DW fleet for ALB). Under-reporting of target species also has significant economic implications for FFA members including loss of legitimate access fees (where access is proportional to catch), loss of other government revenue (e.g. transhipment charges, export fees, etc) and loss of any future catch or effort allocation under the WCPFC. Severe The incentive to misreport BET will increase as the fishery becomes more regulated. Failure to reduce fishing effort and capacity commensurate with the 30% reductions will increase incentives to misreport. Incentives also exist to under-report to avoid local fees and charges. Misreporting in the LL fleet would go hand in hand with illegal transhipping. Log sheets; port sampling; observers; boarding and inspection; prosecutions Weak Page 63

64 Submission of logsheets to national fisheries agencies is variable across the region (see section 4.13). Coverage of operational logsheet data available to SPC is variable, with rates of coverage high amongst FFA members and very low amongst key DWFNs required to reduce catch by 30% under CMM (Figure 4.3a). Likewise, coverage of observer data across the region on LL vessels is generally very low, particularly amongst DWFN fleets required to reduce catches under CMM (Figure 4.3b). Coverage of DWFN fleets amongst national observer programs is very low, with only two trips each on Japanese and Korean flagged vessels recorded in national observer program reports to SPC in the period (Figure 4.2b). Some national observer programmes reportedly not placing an observer on Japanese vessels in up to 15 years (in the case of Palau). No validation of catches is undertaken in the post harvest supply chain. Very little, if any, validation is undertaken of catches transhipped on the high seas. (a) (b) Figure 4.3: Coverage of (a) logsheet and (b) observer data available to SPC for LL fleets operating in the WCPO for the years during Severe Additional MCS measures recommended: Catch documentation scheme (CDS) Transhipment verification, including 100% observer coverage on all carrier vessels Improved rates of unloading coverage in key ports, including cooperation with officials in foreign port states to inspect/monitor catches taken in the FFA area Improved rates of observer coverage Exploration of remote monitoring techniques to validate catch for vessels that don t regularly come into FFA ports Increased priority in country on ensuring timely and accurate logsheet submission (e.g. administrative and other sanctions upon failure to submit logsheets within mandatory deadlines; linking licence renewal to logbook submission) encouragement of all CCMs to comply with requirements to submit operational level catch and effort data to the WCPFC Increased rates of at sea boarding and inspection, particularly amongst higher risk fleets (based on local regional/analysis e.g. in short term may be those fleets required to reduce BET catch by 30% under CMM 08-01) Integrated information management to cross check catch logs with observer reports, transhipment records, unloading records etc. This will identify vessels and fleets for further investigation/action. Page 64

65 Exploration of EMTUs to support more timely submission of catch and effort information Co-operation with foreign ports to monitor unloading; improved unloading coverage of key ports within FFA area Strong in zone sanctions for under-reporting 4.10 Misreporting of bycatch species Risk Description: Fishers are required to report catch and effort statistics as a condition of fishing access. Logbook catch and effort data is a fundamental cornerstone of MCS regimes operating at all levels in the region and is used for a range of purposes including calculating access fees as well as supporting stock assessments. There is a risk that vessels will misreport (including under-reporting and non-reporting) non-target species. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. national licence access conditions, national tuna management plans, WCPFC catch and effort reporting requirements) Purse Seine Almost Certain Five of eight PNA members rated the likelihood of mis-reporting of bycatch as either 'medium' or 'high'. Several countries said bycatch was rarely recorded unless an observer was present. Others (e.g. Solomon Is) reported there is an almost constant discrepancy between observer reports and catch logs for bycatch. Some industry members interviewed during in country consultations that bycatch was not recorded in log books unless it was of 'significant quantity'. These reports accord with observer reports from UST/FSMA vessels in which failure to report bycatch was the single most prevalent offence reported. Many interviewees for this study noted that bycatch was frequently sold on local markets and the proceeds used to supplement crew incomes (e.g. in Solomons). Bycatch is largely an issue for FAD sets; little bycatch is taken in association with free school sets. Minor The key consequence of a failure to report bycatch is an absence of quality management data. The consequences of misreporting will depend on the species. For sharks the impact could be major; for fin fish species the impact is likely to be minor (J. Hampton pers. comm.). For sharks, bycatch is only an issue on FAD sets. For most species the impact of current rates of mortality associated with the PS fishery is unclear given the absence of data. A preliminary PSA (Kirby, SC2) rated a number of shark species (black tip reef, bronze whaler, bigeye thresher, silvertip shark, long finned mako, grey reef shark) as the highest risk species. Overall catches of these species are less than in the LL fishery. Page 65

66 Figure 4.4: Composition of species groups in the catch of PS vessels in the WCPFC area during (Source: IP1%20Annual%20Catch%20Estimates.pdf; page 14). Absence of effective enforcement of bycatch reporting requirements; avoidance of local fees and charges; supplementation of crew income High Log sheets; unloading monitoring; observers; boarding and inspection; prosecutions Strong MCS arrangements have historically been weak: logsheet reporting has been poor, and little priority appears to have been placed on enforcing bycatch reporting requirements in many countries. These arrangements should improve significantly with the requirement for 100% observer coverage. This requirement should be supported by additional measures to encourage compliance with bycatch reporting requirements. Additional MCS measures recommended: Education of fishing masters to ensure awareness of requirement to accurately record bycatch Increased priority to enforcing bycatch reporting requirements in country (e.g. administrative sanctions for minor non-compliance) Integrated information management to cross check catch logs with observer reports, transhipment records, unloading records etc identify vessels/fleets for follow up Longline Almost Certain Twelve of 15 countries interviewed identified non-reporting of bycatch as a key compliance concern. Many countries reported that crew sold bycatch on local markets and/or traded shark Page 66

67 fins to supplement income. Primary species affected include sharks (comprised approx 70% of average non-target catch (t) fm of which blue shark averaged 48.5%) and pelagic finfish such including dolphinfish (3.7%), escolars (4.5%) and opah/moonfish (4.6%) 79. GEN-3 data shows that (apart from breaching MARPOL regulations) not reporting bycatch is the single most common breach reported by observers (69% of trips) (Figure 5.2). Logsheet reporting of sharks is generally very poor. Molony (2005) notes that approximately 335,000 sharks were recorded from approximately 1.6 million longline sets (CPUE of 0.2 sharks per longline set) between 1990 and By contrast, approximately 290,000 sharks were reported by observers from approximately 21,000 longline sets (approximate CPUE of 14.2 sharks per set) for the same period. 80 Where reported, sharks are typically not reported to species level. The consequences of misreporting are likely to be highest for sharks. Sharks and rays represent the non-target species grouping most frequently captured in the LL fishery (Figure 4.5). Based on the available data, stock assessments for important shark species in the WCPO have not been able to be performed. Molony (2008) notes that for key shark species stock status is uncertain. A preliminary PSA (Kirby, SC2) rated a number of shark species (black tip reef, bronze whaler, bigeye thresher, silvertip shark, long finned mako, grey reef shark) as the highest risk species. The consequences of misreporting in the LL fishery is higher than PS because the absence of observer coverage means there is little independent information to correct data. Samoa and Vanuatu noted this issue to be very serious and of particular concern due to broader ecosystem impacts and monitoring of bycatch species being sold into local food markets. Figure 4.5: Composition of species groups in the catch of longliners in the WCPFC area during (Source: IP1%20Annual%20Catch%20Estimates.pdf; page 14) Supplementation of crew income; little perceived risk in detection/prosecution High (highest for sharks) 79 Table 21, SPC, Estimates of Annual Catches in the WCPFC Statistical Area, WCPFC-SC4-2008/ST-IP Molony, B. W. 2005a. Estimates of the mortality of non-target species with an initial focus on seabirds, turtles and sharks. Working Paper EB WP-1. 1st meeting of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Noumea, New Caledonia 8 19th August, Page 67

68 Log sheets; port inspections; At sea boarding and inspection; observers Weak Observer coverage of the LL fleet particularly DW fleets is very low. Levels of port inspections in the FFA region amongst DW fleets is also very low. Little attention has been paid to pursuing prosecutions for non-compliance with bycatch reporting provisions. Where reported, bycatch is frequently not reported to species level. Additional MCS measures recommended: Education of fishing masters to ensure awareness of requirement to accurately record bycatch Greater attention to enforcing compliance with bycatch reporting requirements amongst FFA members (e.g. administrative penalties for non-compliance) Stronger sanctions for not reporting SSIs Stronger sanctions for repeated non-compliance Integrated information management to cross check catch logs with observer reports and unloading records Improved observer coverage rates to build up information on typical bycatch harvest rates and compositions Improved rates of boarding and inspection, particularly amongst vessels/fleets with history of non-compliance Exploration of remote monitoring technologies (e.g. cameras) to independently verify bycatch rates on vessels considered too small or unsafe to deploy observers High (highest for sharks) 4.11 Misreporting set type in PS fishery Risk Description: Species compositions in purse seine sets vary considerably depending on the nature of the set type i.e. unassociated or associated with floating objects. Given the increasing focus on the impact of juvenile catches of BET and YFT in associated sets, there is a risk that PS set type will be misreported. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: In zone and WCPFC catch and effort reporting frameworks Unlikely Some interviewees suggested there was a likelihood that associated sets in the PS fishery may be misreported as unassociated in response to increasing controversy about the impact of juvenile BET and YFT catches made in association with floating objects. Misreporting set type is not an offence category on GEN-3 forms, so no independent data is available. We have categorised the likelihood here as unlikely, however note that information to support the assessment is poor. Misreporting of FAD sets will go hand in hand with illegal FAD fishing during closures if occurring. Major The consequence of misreporting set type for resource assessments is major, particularly for BET. Set type is a key input into the stock assessment for BET and associated sets misreported as unassociated would significantly underestimate the amount of BET taken (J. Hampton, pers. comm.). Moreover, set type is a major factor influencing catch rates of bycatch species 81. Molony (2005) reports that CPUEs for mammals, sharks and turtles are all higher in sets associated with floating objects. 81 Molony, B. W. 2005a. Estimates of the mortality of non-target species with an initial focus on seabirds, turtles and sharks. Working Paper EB WP-1. 1st meeting of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Noumea, New Caledonia 8 19th August, Page 68

69 Controversy surrounding catches of juvenile BET/YFT in floating object sets; FAD fishing bans 100% observer coverage Very Strong 100% observer coverage should provide adequate deterrence to non-compliance, and if not, will provide an independent picture of set type misreporting to allow adjustments in stock assessments. Enforcement action should be taken where repeated misreporting occurs. Low 4.12 Misreporting catch position Risk Description: Reports of catch position are a key component of catch and effort reporting. Catch position information is used in stock assessments, in modelling management scenarios between FFA member and high seas waters and in determining access fees. There is a risk that misreporting of catch position will undermine the integrity of management information and result in the loss of government revenue for FFA members. Breaches may include reporting catches on the high seas while fishing in an EEZ, accumulating the catches of a number of sets into a single position, or reporting position in one FFA EEZ while fishing in another. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: In zone and WCPFC catch and effort reporting requirements Purse seine Unlikely Observers reported instances of misreporting of catch position on less than 10% of trips on the PS fleet between (see Figure 6.1). Higher levels of monitoring associated with the VDS are likely to encourage good compliance with position reporting requirements. A number of consequences may arise from position misreporting including undermining the integrity of management information and loss of government revenue. Reporting catches taken in zone as being taken on the hjgh seas can alter the outcomes of high seas VS in zone management planning scenarios. Position misreporting will have little consequence for regional stock assessments unless the magnitude of the misreport is sufficient to place the catch in a different sub-region. The key short term economic impact of position mis-reporting is loss of legitimate access fees in FFA countries where fees are proportional to catch. The key longer term impact for FFA members, particularly where catches taken in zone are reported as being taken on the high seas, may be a loss of allocation under any future WCPFC management arrangement. Reducing access fees in future bilateral access negotiations. VMS, logsheets, observers Very Strong Page 69

70 100% observer coverage and hourly VMS polling under VDS arrangements are likely to provide an effective deterrent to non-compliance and accurate source of independent validation against misreporting catch. Low Longline Eight of 15 countries interviewed (RMI, Fiji, KIR, Nauru, Tok, Sols, Tuv & Van) reported position misreporting as a key compliance concern. The probability of non-compliance is likely to be greater for fleets operating under agreements where access fees are proportional to catch. Likelihood is increased adjacent to high seas waters. While GEN-3 data in the LL fishery showed instances of misreporting catch position were reported on less than 5% of trips on LL vessels (Figure 6.2), some caution should be exercised in interpreting this data given most trips would have occurred within a single zone. A number of consequences may arise from position misreporting including undermining the integrity of management information and loss of government revenue. Accumulating catches from multiple lines as taken from a single line, or from multiple sets as having been taken from a set, have the potential to confound CPUE data, while reporting catches taken in zone as being taken on the hjgh seas can alter the outcomes of high seas VS in zone management planning scenarios. Position misreporting will have little consequence for regional stock assessments unless the magnitude of the misreport is sufficient to place the catch in a different sub-region. The key short term economic impact of position mis-reporting is loss of legitimate access fees in FFA countries where fees are proportional to catch. The key longer term impact for FFA members, particularly where catches taken in zone are reported as being taken on the high seas, is loss of allocation under any future WCPFC management arrangement. Reducing access fees in future bilateral access negotiations. VMS, logsheets, observers VMS polling of the LL fleet provides independent validation of position information, however it remains difficult to prove where catches were taken. Observer coverage remains low, particularly amongst the DW fleets. Additional MCS measures recommended: Integrated information management to cross-validate logsheet position reports with other information sources such as VMS, entry/exit reports, observer position reports Strong sanctions for non-compliance 4.13 Failure to submit timely and accurate logsheets Risk Description: Under national licence and other access conditions all vessels are required to submit logsheets detailing operational level catch and effort statistics. Under the HMTCs vessels must submit catch estimates to national authorities within 14 days of trip completion and final logsheets within 45 days of trip completion. There is a risk that vessels will not submit logsheets within the required timeframe or format. Page 70

71 Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: National fisheries legislation; national tuna management Plans; licence/access conditions Likely During in-country consultations, most member countries reported significant gaps and delays in the provision of logsheets, particularly in the LL sector. Logsheet data coverage was reportedly less than 50% for some locally based foreign fleets operating from FFA member countries (e.g. FSM, KI, Vanuatu). This was particularly the case for countries where LL vessels work from ports in neighbouring countries and generally don t come ashore, making it more difficult for authorities to collect logsheets upon completion of each fishing trip. For example, Solomon Islands officials noted difficulties in obtaining copies of logsheets from vessels returning to port in Fiji, where Fijian authorities collect logsheets and send them directly to SPC in Noumea. PNG authorities noted delays in receiving logsheets often occur for foreign vessels requiring logsheet data to be translated before it can be entered and cross-checked. PNG also noted that the low educational qualifications of many vessel masters contributed to the lack of timely and accurate logsheet submission with many lacking an understanding of how to properly complete logsheets. Major The provision of timely and accurate logsheet information is a fundamental cornerstone of an effective MCS regime and is critical to accurate scientific assessments and management decision making. Catch and effort data from the JP DW LL sector underpins stock assessments of BET and YFT, while data from the TW DW LL fleet underpins ALB assessments. Failure to submit logsheet data leads to greater uncertainties in stock assessments and impedes compliance activities, such as cross-checking logsheets with entry and exit reports, reported catch positions and VMS tracks. Vessels returning to foreign ports; poor literacy rates amongst some fishing masters; failure to place a high priority on timely and accurate submission of logsheet information High Licence/access conditions; sanctions for non-compliance Weak A number of impediments appear to exist in enforcing the requirement for timely and accurate logsheet reporting, including some countries placing a low priority on the collection of logsheet information and vessels returning to foreign ports without cooperative arrangements in place to collect and distribute logsheets. Additional MCS measures recommended: High Education of fishing masters/companies/agents on the need for timely and accurate logsheet submission Higher priority needs to be placed on the collection of timely and accurate logsheet information, including appropriate sanctions (e.g. administrative sanctions for minor breaches; stronger sanctions for major breaches) Link licence renewal to logsheet submission Consideration of EMTUs to facilitate near real time submission of data Improve coordination between FFA members to ensure logsheets are collected and provided to coastal states in which vessels have fished Page 71

72 Port-to-port VMS monitoring to allow MCS officers in the coastal state to track vessels to the port of unloading and contact relevant authorities or agents to ensure logsheets are promptly sent in Failure to provide prompt entry/exit/weekly reports Risk Description: Vessels within the FFA area of interest moving between different jurisdictions are required to provide entry and exit reports. General information to be provided includes: RA licence number, date/time, Int Call Sign, position, total catch onboard by weight of species and/or catch taken in zone, number of fishing days (over last week), intended action, port name and ETA/ETD and catch unloaded by sp (for port entry/dep reports) 82. FSMA vessels are also required to provide reports with position and catch onboard (a) at least 24hrs before ETA/ETD to/from port, (b) every Wednesday (weekly), (c) at time of entry/exit to/from an EEZ and (d) at time of entry/exit to/from a closed area (eg. 12nm territorial zone). Other jurisdictions may have additional specific reporting requirements (e.g. reporting at least 24hrs prior to refuelling in KI). The reports required provide a range of information important in monitoring compliance with fisheries management frameworks and are an integral part of national and regional MCS regimes. There is a risk that failure of vessels to provide the required reports will undermine regional MCS efforts. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. national licence conditions of access, FSM Arrangement) Purse seine Unlikely Larger PS vessels are likely to have then human and technical resources to prepare and send reports easily. Given the relatively close monitoring of position reporting under VDS arrangements, instances of non-compliance should be readily detected. GEN-3 observer reports confirm relatively high levels of compliance with entry/exit reporting requirements with only 4% and 6% of trips on UST and FSMA vessels including instances of non-compliance respectively. The key consequence of reporting non-compliance is reduced effectiveness of national and regional MCS arrangements. Reporting failure results in reduced opportunity for validation/crosschecking of key MCS related information such as catch on board, catch composition, position, intended actions and the like (Nauru has successfully prosecuted a number of vessels for underreporting in logbooks as a result of cross-checking entry/exit reports). VMS, observers, aerial and surface surveillance Very Strong 100% observer coverage in the PS fleet from 2010 will likely provide a significant deterrent to non-compliance as well as detect any instances of non-compliance. The close monitoring of PS 82 Ibid Page 72

73 vessel movement associated with the VDS means few undetected instances of vessels moving between jurisdictions should occur. Low Longline The rate of non-compliance is expected to be higher amongst smaller LL vessels with less technologically advanced communication systems (ie. or telex to send reports to relevant authorities). The costs associated with sending s via satellite may be a disproportionate cost to smaller vessels. A general lack of clarity and/or understanding of requirements for reporting in different areas/jurisdictions and language translation issues (evident in relation to other operational data 83 ) may also contribute to reporting non-compliance. This is slightly at odds with GEN-3 observer reports which show non-compliance with provisions to notify countries when crossing EEZ boundaries on only 3% of trips (Figure 6.2). Caution should be exercised in interpreting this result however given the majority of trips would have occurred within a single EEZ. Delays in providing entry/exit reports may also result in reduced revenue coming into some countries under relevant bilateral access agreements and may result in inaccurate recording of active fishing days. The key consequence of reporting non-compliance is reduced effectiveness of national and regional MCS arrangements. Reporting failure results in reduced opportunity for validation/crosschecking of key MCS related information such as catch on board, catch composition, position, intended actions and the like (Nauru has successfully prosecuted a number of vessels for underreporting in logbooks as a result of cross-checking entry/exit reports). Delays in providing entry/exit reports may also result in reduced revenue coming into some countries as per relevant bilateral access agreements and may result in inaccurate recording of active fishing days. VMS, observers, aerial and surface surveillance VMS provides a strong independent source of vessel tracking, however it is often not used optimally in country. Other forms of independent validation of position e.g. observer are weak in the LL sector. Additional MCS measures recommended: Implement Port to Port VMS monitoring; enhance VMS data sharing arrangements with neighbouring countries to improve visibility of legitimate vessels; administrative sanctions for non-compliance; integrated data management system to cross-verify entry/exit reports with other independent information (e.g. VMS position, observer reports, logsheets); improved education amongst fleets with particularly high levels of non-compliance. 83 WCPFC Secretariat (2008) Consultancy Report: Causes of Data Gaps. WCPFC5-2008/IP05 Page 73

74 4.15 Inadequate reporting to the WCPFC by flag states Risk Description: Cooperating Commission Members (CCMs) have a range of reporting obligations to the WCPFC including the provision of operational catch and effort data, as well as specific reporting requirements in relation to CMMs. There is a risk that CCMs will fail to comply with their reporting obligations. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC requirements on the submission of scientific data; Various CMMs [e.g. CMM (BET/YFT), CMM (SWO), CMM (MLS), CMM (Sthn ALB)] but variable Reporting obligations to the WCPFC broadly fall into two categories: information required pursuant to agreed CMMs and scientific information. On information required pursuant to CMMs, WCPFC5 noted TCC4 had serious concerns that many CCMs had not met their reporting obligations with respect to various measures, and had urged CCMs to bring their reporting up to date in advance of WCPFC5 (in Dec 2008) 84. Tables 1-3 in the information paper (WCPFC IP06(Rev.1)) presented by the WCPFC Secretariat to WCPFC5 clearly demonstrate a significant number of CCMs are still not complying with reporting obligations to the Commission on a range of important requirements. Considerable gaps also exist in the submission of scientific data, particularly operational catch and effort data, to the WCPFC. A recent independent investigation into the causes of gaps in data provided to WCPFC 85 found that 26 out of 38 entities (68%) are collecting some operational data, but not providing it to the Commission (or have yet to do so). Forms of non-compliance with scientific data requirements include complete lack of provision of certain data (eg. operational catch and effort data for many DWFN longliners), provision of data in different forms or units to those specified, provision of incomplete data and/or delays in the provision of data to the WCPFC and Scientific Provider (SPC-OFP). This lack of compliance with data reporting requirements has resulted in a number of serious gaps in the scientific data provided to the Commission 86. The level of operational catch and effort data is better for the PS fishery (where the only real coverage gap is the JP fleet) than the LL. Coverage in the LL fishery is relatively good for FFA members, however very poor for DWFN fleets (Figure 4.6). 84 WCPFC Secretariat (2008) Compliance Information Requested by TCC4. WCPFC IP06 (Rev.1) 85 WCPFC Secretariat (2008) Consultancy Report: Causes of Data Gaps. WCPFC5-2008/IP05 86 SPC-OFP (2008) Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. WCPFC-SC4-2008/ST IP-2 Page 74

75 Figure 4.6: Average coverage of operational catch and effort data by flag state in the WCPO LL fishery between (Data source: SPC) Major Failure of CCMs to comply with WCPFC reporting requirements does not allow for complete implementation and/or proper monitoring of compliance with CMMs and will limit the ability of scientists and scientific providers to provide the best possible scientific advice (incl Stock Assessment advice) to the WCPFC and FFA Members. Such consequences are fundamental to the effective operation of the Commission and its subsequent ability to provide an effective means of managing migratory tuna stocks throughout the WCPO to ensure their long-term sustainability. Improved levels of operational catch and effort data would allow SPC to better standardise out factors such as the influence of CPUE on assessment results (J. Hampton, pers comm.) High Indicative reasons indentified by the FishServe (FINNZ) consultancy 87 for non provision of data were: Misunderstanding of what data is required and how data is to be provided for example, the Commission requires aggregate data to be provided where operational catch data isn t captured in respect of 100% of fishing activity. The requirement necessitates both the provision of aggregate data as well as the operational data that is available. This isn t written clearly in the Commission s requirements; Translation of English language requirements by some members may cause further lack of clarity; Lack of Resources to either collect data from the source or to provide collected data to the Commission; Collecting data but not the specific types required by the Commission; Domestic legal constraints i.e. privacy laws; Other agreements i.e. all data being collected and stored, however authorisation not given to release data so collected and stored by SPC to the Commission; and Potential lack of recognition among key officials of the importance of data for stock assessment or other fisheries management tasks. 87 WCPFC Secretariat (2008) Consultancy Report: Causes of Data Gaps. WCPFC5-2008/IP05 Page 75

76 WCPFC requirements for CCMs to submit scientific information as well as other information to support monitoring compliance with CMMs. Weak The failure of many CCMs to supply operational level catch effort information as well as information to support compliance monitoring with CMMs is well known (e.g. data coverage is published on the SPC-OFP website). Current MCS measures have to date proven relatively ineffective in encouraging CCMs to comply with relevant requirements, although recent evidence suggests that compliance with CMM reporting requirements is improving. TCC4 noted that failure to provide information constitutes a failure to comply with the measure in question and recommended to WCPFC5 that the Commission may wish to consider remedial action, including sanctions, for failure to comply 88. A process has been initiated within the WCPFC (lead by Australia) to develop a formal scheme to monitor and enforce compliance with conservation and management measures. High Additional MCS measures recommended: Process to monitor CCM compliance with WCPFC CMMs Development of a WCPFC regime of sanctions for non-compliance with reporting requirements FFA members should continue to lobby for the full submission of operational catch and effort data to the WCPFC, including the removal of domestic legal impediments in some countries to data provision. 5. Inadequate monitoring and control of the post-harvest supply chain undermines regional fisheries management goals 5.1 Illegal transhipping Risk Description: Transhipment is the process of unloading any or all of the fish onboard a fishing vessel to another vessel either at sea or in port. A number of provisions in domestic legislation and under the WCPFC Convention govern where, and to which vessels, product can be transhipped and under what circumstances. There is a risk that vessels will tranship product in contravention of relevant national laws and/or the WCPF Convention, including transhipping outside designated transhipping ports or areas and receiving product taken in contravention of relevant national and regional fisheries management frameworks. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. Article 29 of Part VII of the WCPF Convention for the Regulation of Transhipment; National licence conditions; 2 nd Implementing arrangement of the Palau Agreement which prohibits at-sea transhipment by purse seine vessels operating within the PNA group; the FSM arrangement, which specifies designated Transhipping ports within the jurisdictions of the PNA, and applicable national provisions and regulations prohibiting transhipment at sea). 88 WCPFC-TCC4 (2008) Summary Report. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 2 7 October Page 76

77 5.1.1 Purse seine A number of incentives exist for illegal transhipment including savings on fuel costs and government port and transhipping charges, maximising time on fishing grounds, as well as the ability to avoid compliance checks and launder IUU catches. Purse seine transhipment is a relatively self-contained process with little or no dependence on shore based services. GEN-3 observer reports from UST and FSMA vessels between indicated illegal transhipping occurred on 5% and 7% of trips respectively, although it is unclear whether the presence of an observer on board the vessel artificially reduced these figures. Reports of considerable illegal transhipping (and bunkering) activity in the western high seas pockets has been received through the PNG observer program (Figure 5.1). Considerable incentives also exist for illegal transhipping in the eastern WCPO where few ports exist and the cost savings involved in avoiding steaming to port are relatively high. Figure 5.1: Observer reports of transhipping (38% of reported incidents) and bunkering (62% of reported incidents) activity in the western high seas pockets by PNG licensed fishing vessels during (Source: FFA, WP 12, High Seas Pockets Closures. Sub-regional workshops on the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Data provided by Mr. David Karis of PNG NFA VMS). Of the 210 purse seine vessels currently reporting through the FFA VMS (as at March 2009), the Japanese distant water and US Treaty vessels generally don t tranship to carriers, instead returning to home ports in Japan and/or American Samoa at present (although this may change if the canneries in Pago Pago stop receiving product). This leaves approximately 140 vessels operating within the FFA region who tranship their catches. Two categories of refrigerated carriers serve purse seiners in the WCPO: 1) Those that remain in the trade for several years or more and make regular voyages to and from transhipment ports and major processing ports such as Bangkok, and 2) vessels which are engaged for shorter periods of time to add capacity during periods of peak demand and/or to transport cargo to nontraditional markets 89. Anecdotally, this second category of vessels could be considered higher risk of non-compliant transhipping due to factors including less experience, understanding or regard for operational requirements and regulations in the region, transporting cargo to non-traditional markets with less awareness of WCPO management frameworks and a desire to maximise earnings in short period of time. 89 McCoy, M. (2007) Regulation of Transhipment by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission: Issues and Considerations for FFA Member Countries. Gillett, Preston and Associates Inc. FFA Report #2007/26. Page 77

78 Violations and Prosecutions Database: 15 Cases related to illegal transhipping were recorded in the FFA Violations and Prosecutions Database (VAP) from 1993 to December of these involved illegal transhipping activities on the high seas. 3 of the most recent cases recorded in the VAP ( ) involved vessels transhipping without a valid licence. Major Given the high catch volumes involved, illegal PS transhipment represents a significant potential challenge to the integrity of management frameworks operating in the region. Illegal transhipping goes hand in hand with under-reporting, the most direct consequences of which are losses in legitimate government revenue and undermining of management data (see misreporting of target species in the PS fishery above). The biological consequences of laundering IUU catches through illegal transhipment is likely to be higher in the central and eastern WCPO where higher proportions of BET are taken. Illegal transhipping also represents an immediate loss of revenue to FFA member states. McCoy (2007) estimates each transhipment in port by a PS vessel contributes between US$3,000- $6,000 to the host country 90. In addition, illegal transhipping represents a significant lost opportunity cost for compliance activities. The prohibition on at-sea transhipment and requirement for purse seine vessels (with the exception of Philippine vessels operating in PNG) to tranship in port provides for cost-effective MCS opportunities and facilitates the deployment of observers onboard purse seiners. High Increase in fishing time (maintaining rate of return on capital investment for owners 91 ); fuel savings (particularly whereby designated transhipping ports are further away from fishing areas) avoiding access and transhipment fees in port (for example, the Solomon Islands Port Authority charges quarterly duty, and an environmental charge, anchoring charges, pilotage charges for vessels >40m, and transhipment fees per tonne of fish transhipped 92, 93 ). avoiding compliance inspections/checks in port Transhipment vessels also often provide other services to the high seas fishing fleets, such as bringing food, water, new crews, and spare fishing gear and engine parts 94. Vessels may avoid national duty taxes on such goods by transhipping at sea and, in relation to the exchange of crew, may avoid national immigration laws with the associated permits/visas and fees. VMS on carriers and catching vessels, Aerial-surface surveillance, observer coverage on fishing vessels, logsheet and transhipment reporting forms, transhipment reporting requirements. Strong The requirement for 100% observer coverage on the PS fleet from 2010 will likely provide a significant deterrent to illegal transhipment, however there is currently no observer coverage of transhipment vessels. Hourly polling of VMS under the VDS provides very good position information. Current levels of aerial and surface surveillance may not provide a high level deterrent, particularly in high seas areas. Absence of VMS visibility of FFA licensed vessels on the high seas a major limitation. Additional MCS measures recommended: Transhipment verification (including 100% observer coverage of authorised carriers, prior notice of transhipment to allow for MCS opportunities, post-transhipment declarations) 90 Ibid, McCoy (2007) 91 P231, FFA Trade Study 92 Supplement to the Solomon Islands Gazette (20 July 2007) Ports Act (Cap.161), The Levy of Rates and Dues (Ports of Honiara and Noro) Rules 2006, S.I. No Meeting with Solomon Islands Port Authority, 19 February Gianni, M. And Simpson, W. (2005) Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing How flags of convenience provide cover for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Page 78

79 Standardised inspection/port state measures across region to ensure IUU not displaced to areas of weak MCS (requires development of regional Standard Operating Procedures [SOPs]) CDS (depending on whether the scope of the scheme includes PS product) Cross-endorsement of observers between RFMOs; Port-to-port monitoring 100% observer coverage on all domestic vessels Improved rates of aerial surveillance in high risk areas based on local intelligence/analysis Satellite coverage of remote areas Strong sanctions for non-compliance Engagement with brokerage firms on the nature and patterns of vessel transhipment. Engagement with non-ccm port states (e.g. Thailand, Ecuador) to cooperate with transhipment verification measures, report unloading etc Longline DW Freezer vessels - Likely A number of incentives exist for distant water freezer vessels to engage in illegal transhipping, particularly in the central and eastern parts of the WCPO. For TW, KR and CN vessels working in the central and eastern parts of the WCPO, few port facilities exist and transhipping allows vessels to both remain on fishing grounds longer as well as save fuel in steaming to port. CMM also provides an incentive to launder catches, particularly in the central and eastern WCPO, to avoid BET catch reduction targets. The incentive is likely to be greatest for the JP and TW fleets who require the largest reductions based on recent catches. CMM also provides an incentive to illegally tranship shark fin to avoid compliance with fin: carcass ratios. Illegal transhipping also supports under-reporting of target species which, in turn, reduces access fees where fees are proportional to catch. Fresh Product vessels The likelihood of fresh product vessels illegally transhipping will vary by sector and location. For fresh fish vessels using ice, the likelihood of transhipment of fresh tuna at sea is expected to be low as most vessels have limited ice carrying capacity and fish quality is also likely to suffer during unpacking and re-packing of fish in and out of holding tanks 95. Vessels using refrigerated seawater systems may more readily tranship catches at sea and continue fishing. The likelihood of both RSW and Ice-fresh longliners transhipping shark and shark fin at sea may be higher than tuna products. Particular concern has been expressed about vessels operating out of Palau transhipping to adjacent ports (e.g. Davao, General Santos) in the Philippines. One well-informed interviewee in Palau estimated 30% of LL catches are illegally unloaded in the Philippines, in contravention of a domestic law requiring all product taken in the Palau EEZ to be landed locally. Considerable incentives exist for LL vessels to land product in the Philippines including reportedly cheaper fuel and provisions, good supplies of inexpensive bait, and avoiding export taxes in Palau of $0.35/kg. Incentives also exist to tranship shark products into the Philippines in contravention of Palau s law banning prohibition of shark products. For vessels based in Guam and licensed to fish in FFA member EEZs illegal transhipment may be a measure to avoid US authorities who will confiscate large quantities of shark fins not landed with carcasses (McCoy 2007) Ibid, McCoy (2007) Page 79

80 Major The consequences of illegal transhipping in the LL fleet are potentially major, and include most notably undermining the effectiveness of fishing mortality reduction objectives under CMM 08-01, loss of legitimate access fees for FFA members, laundering of shark fins leading to higher than reported mortalities on shark populations, and undermining the integrity of key catch and effort data for stocks assessments. The DW freezer vessels of JP, KR and TW have been responsible for 56% of the total BET catch in the WCPO during (although that percentage has dropped to just over 40% in recent years). Each of these fleets is required to reduce catches by 30% by 2011 under CMM Widespread illegal transhipping amongst the sector accompanied by under-reporting of catches would seriously compromise the achievement of fishing mortality reduction objectives. Moreover, under-reporting of catches may have implications for regional stock assessments which are underpinned by DW LL data. Also some concern that transhipment at sea enables circumvention of per trip licences, ie. using the same licence for an extended trip. The key consequences of illegal transhipping are largely the same as for DW freezer vessels. Fresh product vessels accounted for about 57% of BET catches in 2007, with the largest catches taken by JP, ID, CN and TW all of whom (except ID) are required to reduce catches under CMM DW Freezer vessels - High Fresh Product Vessels High Incentives to under-report catches/illegally tranship where access fees are proportional to reported catches; economic incentives to stay on fishing grounds longer and avoid costs associated with steaming to port (continued high fuel prices will heighten this incentive); avoidance of government charges related to transhipping; avoidance of catch reduction measures under CMM 08-01; closure of canneries in American Samoa may increase levels of legal and illegal transhipping. Existing MCS Measures: VMS; Aerial-Surface Surveillance; observer coverage; logsheets and transhipment reporting forms; Flag state responsibilities Weak Observer coverage across the LL fleet is very low; aerial and surface surveillance is likely to be insufficient to detect or deter illegal transhipping; surface surveillance capacity is very low for high seas areas; coverage of unloading data has declined since the 1990 s. VMS effectiveness is impeded by lack of port to port coverage; few port state controls in key ports (e.g. Philippines) Residual Risk DW Freezer vessels - High Fresh Product Vessels High Additional Recommended MCS measures/actions: Transhipment verification (including 100% observer coverage of authorised carriers, prior notice of transhipment to allow for MCS opportunities, post-transhipment declarations) Standardised inspection/port state measures across region to ensure IUU not displaced to areas of weak MCS (requires development of regional Standard Operating Procedures [SOPs]) CDS to track product through the supply chain Cross-endorsement of observers between RFMOs Port-to-port monitoring Improved rates of aerial surveillance in high risk areas based on local intelligence/analysis Satellite coverage of remote areas 96 Ibid, McCoy (2007) Page 80

81 Strong sanctions for non-compliance Engagement with brokerage firms on the nature and patterns of vessel transhipment. Co-operation between FFA members and non-ffa port states (e.g. Davao, Philippines; Pago Pago, American Samoa) to resolve local issues and/or better monitor catches taken in FFA waters Consideration should also be given to the costs/benefits of banning LL transhipment on the high seas (including economic impacts on LL operations, practicality of requiring transhipment in port particularly in the east where few ports exist, implications of current IATTC measures which allow transhipment at sea and don t limit this to fish caught in the IATTC area) 5.2 Bunkering (re-fuelling) at sea. Risk Description: Specialised refuelling and resupply ( bunker ) vessels are an important element of the current infrastructure that allows fishing vessels, both legitimate and IUU, to operate at sea for long periods of time. A number of large global companies specialise in the provision of at-sea services supporting the operations of distant water fishing fleets 97. As at 29 July 2009, 23 Bunker vessels were listed on the WCPFC Temporary Register of Fish Carriers and Bunkers Bunker vessels were listed in Good Standing on the FFA Vessel Register at 24 March While few prohibitions currently exist within the region on refuelling at sea, the operation of bunker vessels may facilitate a number of forms of illegal activity. These include (a) allowing vessels engaged in illegal activity to remain at sea longer and avoid compliance opportunities available when vessels come into port, (b) illegally trading in cigarettes and other goods to avoid customs duties and other charges, (c) exchange of crews to avoid immigration or other requirements and (d) laundering of shark fin and other easily tradable products in breach of fisheries regulations. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various (e.g. CMM 08-06) Purse seine GEN-3 data from the PS fishery indicates a relatively high rate of bunkering at sea, with bunkering or not report bunkering to national authorities reported on approx. 30% of trips. Bunkering activities observed by PNG Observers (and reported on Form Gen-3) in High Seas Pockets (HSPs) 1 and 2 from indicate a large number of vessels are currently bunkering at sea, particularly on high seas waters as shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1: Table 5.1: Bunkering events by PS vessels in high seas pockets during reported by the PNG national observer program. Year Total Average/ 97 Gianni, M. and Simpson, W. (2005) The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: how flags of convenience provide cover for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, International Transport Workers Federation, and WWF International FFA (2009) FFA Vessel Registration (MCS12/WP.19). MCS WG Meeting. Honiara, 2-8 April Page 81

82 year Bunkering Source: PNG observer data, PNG NFA 100 Four cases have been recorded to date in the FFA Violations and Prosecutions database for illegal bunkering (2 Belize, 1 Pananama and 1 Singaporean Vessel). Whilst most of the risk associated with the illegal sale of shark fin to bunker vessels is associated with longliners, purse seiners have also been reported for selling fins to bunker vessels 101. Many bunkering companies advertise integrated services including crew repatriation, reefer services and fish trading. Minor (highest for shark fin) Available information suggests the primary area of non-compliance associated with bunkering at sea is the illegal trade in shark fins. Many shark species have comparatively vulnerable life histories, and undetected finning, leading to higher than observed levels of mortality is a key risk in the sustainable management of shark populations. The consequences are likely to be higher in the LL fishery which takes far higher numbers of sharks than the PS fishery. Within the LL fishery, the risks may be highest in the distant water LL fleet which refuels at sea more frequently than domestically based vessels. The FFA has also received reports that some bunker vessels, licensed in the region to supply fuel to fishing vessels inside the EEZ, are also selling various personal items to fishing vessel crews. The types of items reportedly being sold are electronic equipment, alcohol, cigarettes, etc. Besides selling the above items, vessels may also be trading contraband goods such as drugs. Indications are that these items are usually sold from a shipping container mounted close to the superstructure of the bunker vessel 102. Low Operational efficiency; avoidance of in port compliance measures; ease of trading/storage of shark fin. FFA Regional Register; WCPFC Record; WCPFC Temporary Register of non-ccm carriers and bunkers; in port and at sea boarding and inspections. For bunker vessels on the WCPFC Temporary Register, difficulties exist in imposing compliance obligations on vessels flagged to non-ccms. Rates of boarding and inspections on bunker vessels across the region appear to be variable. Rates of inspection for products such as shark fin in port states outside the FFA region are unknown. In relation to shark fin, some ambiguity exists in the current wording of CMM which requires only that trunks to be held on catching vessels until the first point of unloading. In theory, this allows fishing vessels to unload fins to bunker or transhipment vessels and then discard carcasses. Unless the bunker vessel is breaching a domestic regulation in relation to shark fins, little scope may exist under CMM to police illegal sales of shark fins at the level of the bunker vessel. Low 100 Ibid, FFA (2009) WP 12, High Seas Pockets Closures. Sub-regional workshops on the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 101 Ibid, FFA (2009) High Seas Pockets Closures. 102 Ibd, FFA (2009) High Seas Pockets Closures. Page 82

83 5.2.2 Longline Distant Water - Likely Domestic Unlikely Rates of bunkering at sea are likely to differ between sectors in the LL fishery. Rates are likely to be highest amongst DW vessels that rarely come into FFA member ports. GEN-3 data from national observer programs on mostly domestically based vessels indicates low rates of bunkering (Figure 5.2). Some bunker vessels are suspected of involvement in the purchase of large amounts of shark fins in the region, particularly those servicing the large longline fleets. 103 In November 2008, US authorities boarded a bunker vessel and confirmed illegal transhipments of a considerable amount of shark fins from a Korean longliner in Kiribati waters. 104 (highest for shark fin) Available information suggests the primary area of non-compliance associated with bunkering at sea is the illegal trade in shark fins. Many shark species have comparatively vulnerable life histories, and undetected finning, leading to higher than observed levels of mortality, is a key risk in the sustainable management of shark populations. The consequences are likely to be higher in the LL fishery which takes far higher numbers of sharks than the PS fishery. Within the LL fishery, the risks may be highest in the distant water LL fleet which refuels at sea more frequently than domestically based vessels. The FFA has also received reports that some bunker vessels, licensed in the region to supply fuel to fishing vessels inside the EEZ, are also selling various personal items to fishing vessel crews. The types of items reportedly being sold are electronic equipment, alcohol, cigarettes, etc. Besides selling the above items, vessels may also be trading contraband goods such as drugs. 105 Distant water - High Domestic - Operational efficiency; avoidance of in port compliance measures; ease of trading/storage of shark fin. FFA Regional Register; WCPFC Record; WCPFC Temporary Register of non-ccm carriers and bunkers; in port and at sea boarding and inspections. As per PS Resdiual Additional MCS measures recommended: Improved rates of boarding and inspection of bunker vessels Port-to-port monitoring to allow for cooperation with the ports of return in inspecting vessels operating in the WCPO Consideration of the role that formal charter arrangements might play in addressing the issue of WCPFC control over non-ccm flag states. Improved observer coverage on bunker vessels Distant water - High Domestic Ibid, FFA (2009) High Seas Pockets Closures. 104 Ibid, FFA (2009) High Seas Pockets Closures 105 Ibd, FFA (2009) High Seas Pockets Closures. Page 83

84 5.3 Landing of catch in foreign ports does not allow adequate opportunity for port inspections/catch validation Risk Description: Vessels working in FFA members waters often unload in foreign port states, both FFA and non-ffa members. There is a risk that inadequate cooperation, lack of familiarity with relevant national and WCPFC fisheries management frameworks and/or lack of authority to enforce these provisions results in weaknesses in MCS arrangements. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: Various Purse seine Unlikely Port of return data for the PS fleet indicates that approximately 80% of vessels unload in FFA member ports (see Figure 5.2). 106 The majority of catch is landed in PNA member ports, all of which could reasonably be assumed to have a thorough understanding of PNA and WCPFC PS requirements. Ports of unload outside the FFA membership during included Yaizu, Makurazaki, Shimizu, Yamagawa (Japan), Kaosiung (Taiwan), Busan & Masan (Korea), General Santos, Manila, Zamboanga and other (Philippines), Bangkok (Thailand), Pago Pago and Guam (USA), and various ports in Indonesia Data sourced from Table 11, Lawson (2008) Factors Affecting the Use of Species Composition Data Collected by Observers and Port Samplers from Purse Seiners in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. WCPFC SC4 2008/ST WP Ibid, Lawson (2008) Page 84

85 Figure 5.2: Ports of return in the purse seine fishery during , by number of trips. (Total number of trips returns = 1949) Minor Given the vast majority of PS catch is unloaded in PNA member ports, the consequences are expected to be low. Low Legislative requirements to land catch domestically (e.g. Japan); Supply contracts with non-ffa member ports; historical links with non-ffa member ports 100% observer coverage; supply of operational catch and effort data to the WCPFC; port inspections at foreign ports Strong 100% observer coverage will provide detailed information on the ports of unload and some basis for independently validating vessel logsheet data. The supply of operational catch and effort information in the PS fleet is comparatively high. Low Longline Likely A number of LL vessels working in the FFA area regularly unload at foreign port states. These include the distant water fleets (which may tranship at sea, land catch domestically e.g. Japan or land in a non-ffa member port in the region e.g. the TW fleet unloading in Pago Pago), fleets based in non-ffa member countries (e.g. vessels based in Guam and fishing in FSM) as well as fleets based in FFA member ports and fishing in different coastal states (e.g. Fiji-based vessels fishing in Solomon Islands EEZ). Significant concern was expressed during in country consultations about weaknesses in MCS arrangements in relation to these vessels. For example, FSM expressed concern about a lack of information on the activities of (mostly Taiwanese) vessels fishing in their waters and landing catch in Guam. The Solomon Islands noted difficulties in securing the logsheets of vessels Page 85

86 working in their waters but unloading in Fiji, where local Fiji authorities send the logsheets directly to SPC. Concerns were also expressed about the lack of MCS opportunities on distant water LL vessels who rarely come into port in the FFA area (see 5.11 above). Additional concerns were expressed about the absence of MCS opportunities associated with bonded ports in the French Pacific (Papeete and Noumea). Anecdotal reports were received suggesting high levels of shark catch (e.g. 70% shark and 30% swordfish in unloads) and the possible use of wire trace by some LL vessels, although no independent information has been received to verify these reports. The key consequences associated with landing catch at foreign ports are the absence of information on the activities of fishing vessels provided to the coastal state and the absence of compliance opportunities where no information sharing and cooperative enforcement arrangements exist. High Legislative requirements to land catch domestically (e.g. Japan); vessels domestically based in foreign ports (e.g. Fiji-based vessels fishing in other FFA members waters); Supply contracts with non-ffa member ports; historical links with non-ffa member ports Co-operative information and sharing and enforcement arrangements; Observers; supply of operational catch and effort data to the WCPFC (which includes port of unload); boarding and inspections Few formal cooperative arrangements appear to exist within the region in relation to information sharing and enforcement between coastal and port states. A number of FFA member MCS officers volunteered that officials in some member countries should work together more closely to ensure compliance of vessels 108 fishing in one member s waters and returning to port in another. Port inspections of foreign vessels in FFA member ports pre-dominantly only inspect vessels against the local port states requirements unless a specific request is received from a neighbouring country where a vessel had been fishing. Notwithstanding that, some informal arrangements exist and reportedly work quite effectively (e.g. between Cook Islands and Pago Pago). Very large gaps exist in the operational logsheet data provided to WCPFC by distant water fleets including Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China for fishing activities outside FFA member EEZs 109. Observer coverage of LL vessels is low. Some distant water fishing nations do deploy observers on vessels fishing within the FFA member region from foreign ports 110 however individual observer trip reports are generally not shared with FFA members. Rates of boarding and inspection at sea are variable across FFA member countries. High Additional MCS measures recommended: Port to Port VMS monitoring to track vessels to the relevant port state. Establishment of cooperative information and sharing and compliance agreements with key port states (including assessing opportunities for cooperation under the UN Agreement on Port State Measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing currently under development e.g. there may be merit in requiring as a 108 Fiji Response as part of follow-up country consultations. 109 SPC-OFP (2008) Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. WCPFC-SC4-2008/ST IP Hsiang-Wen Huang, Kuo-Nan Chung, Ju-Ping Dai, and Chih-Hao Shiao (2007) Overview of Taiwanese Observer Program for Large Scale Tuna Longline Fisheries in Pacific Ocean From WCPFC-SC4-2008/EB-WP-6. Page 86

87 condition of access that vessels unload only at ports nominated by Parties to the Agreement) Establishment of a 24hr contact point within the FFA/RMCC to assist foreign ports in communicating with relevant coastal States to support information flow and follow-up of suspected breaches. 6. Fisheries in the FFA region undermine the sustainability of bycatch species and wider ecosystem 6.1 Failure to adopt appropriate mitigation techniques on LL vessels undermines sea turtle conservation objectives Risk Description: Sea turtles are occasionally taken on LL gear while targeting tuna. WCPFC CMM introduces a number of measures in the LL fishery to mitigate the capture of sea turtles and improve survival rates for those incidentally taken. There is a risk that inadequate adoption of the required measures will undermine objectives to reduce sea turtle mortality associated with WCPO LL fisheries. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC CMM Tropical Shallow - A range of different catch rates have been identified for tropical shallow and deep water set LL's. A review of observer and logbook data by SPC (2001) showed that shallow-set night longline gear is roughly ten times more likely to have turtle bycatch encounters than deep-set gear Notwithstanding, Molony ( SC1) only reported differences in catch rates of between for the tropical shallow Pacific LL fishery and for the tropical deep LL fishery 113. Total mean reported catches were higher in the tropical shallow fishery (7190 +/- 15,517 from ) than the tropical deep fishery (1031 +/ from ), however mortality was higher in the deep fishery probably because turtles were unable to surface after hooking. Mortality rates were less than 26% in all years, with total annual mortalities estimated between 500 and 3,000 turtles per year. Tropical Deep - Unlikely Total mean reported catches were higher in the tropical shallow fishery (7190 +/- 15,517 from ) than the tropical deep fishery (1031 +/ from ). Temperate - Rare Molony (2005) estimated the number of turtles captured in the temperate albacore fishery was very low (annual mean of 169 +/- 2273). Tropical Shallow Anonymous, (2001) Draft - A review of marine turtle by -catch in the western and central Pacific Ocean tuna fisheries. A report prepared for the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). SPC-OFP. 112 Ito, R.Y. and W.A. Machado Annual report of the Hawaii-based longline fishery for Adm. Report H-01-07, NOAA/National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries Science Center, Honolulu Laboratory, Honolulu, HI. 113 Molony, B. (2005) Estimates of the mortality of non-target species with an initial focus on seabirds, turtles and sharks. SC1- EB-WP-1. SPC - Oceanic Fisheries Programme. Page 87

88 Kirby and Hobday (2007- SC3) rated the risk of all turtles in both the shallow and deep fisheries at "medium" in an updated productivity-susceptibility analysis, except leatherback turtles which were rated "low" risk. Of the six species taken in Pacific LL fisheries, two (Hawkesbill and leatherback) are listed by the IUCN as 'critically endangered', two (green and loggerhead) are listed as 'endangered', one (olive ridley) is listed as 'vulnerable', and one (flatback) is listed as 'data deficient' Tropical Deep - While deep set gear is less likely to capture turtles, Molony (2005) reported higher rates of mortality, probably because captured turtles are unable to return to the surface to breathe. Kirby and Hobday (2007- SC3) rated the risk of all turtles in both the shallow and deep fisheries at "medium" in an updated productivity-susceptibility analysis, except leatherback turtles which were rated "low" risk. Of the six species taken in Pacific LL fisheries, two (Hawkesbill and leatherback) are listed by the IUCN as 'critically endangered', two (green and loggerhead) are listed as 'endangered', one (olive ridley) is listed as 'vulnerable', and one (flatback) is listed as 'data deficient' Temperate - Minor Molony (2005) estimated relatively low levels of mortality associated with the temperate albacore fishery (annual mean of 33+/- 1086). Tropical Shallow - Tropical Deep - Temperate - Low Uptake of mitigation measures to reduce bycatch rates and subsequent mortality; levels of LL effort Observer coverage; Log book records; annual reports to the WCPFC Weak Existing observer coverage rates in the tropical LL fisheries is very low. Reporting rates of SSI interactions are very low compared to observer reports. Tropical Shallow - Tropical Deep - Temperate - Low Additional MCS measures recommended: Education of fishing masters on bycatch mitigation techniques Pre-fishing boarding and inspections to verify appropriate bycatch mitigation devices are on board Meeting agreed 5% coverage of the LL fleet by 2012 will provide additional data on interactions with turtles, however may still not provide adequate coverage to generate useful information given the rarity of interactions. The Regional Strategy should take account of any MCS-related outcomes from detailed ecological risk assessment work is currently being carried out by SPC. Implementation of the high priority MCS related measures under the FFA Action Plan for Sea Turtle Bycatch Mitigation. Page 88

89 6.2 Failure to adopt appropriate mitigation techniques on LL vessels undermines seabird conservation objectives Risk Description: Incidental capture of seabirds in LL fisheries is an issue of global concern. WCPFC CMM introduces a number of measures to reduce incidental capture of seabirds including a requirement that all vessels working south of 30 o S must adopt two suggested mitigation techniques including one principal measure (Side setting with a bird curtain and weighted branch lines, Night setting with minimum deck lighting, Tori line, Weighted branch lines). There is a risk that non-compliance with CMM or bycatch of seabirds north of 30 S will undermine seabird conservation objectives. Fisheries Management Frameworks Impacted: WCPFC-CMM N of 30 S Rare (with isolated hotspots) S of 30 S - Likely The only FFA members with waters south of 30 o S are Australia and New Zealand, although some Vanuatu flagged vessels operate in the area. Australia has a comprehensive Threat Abatement Plan for the capture of seabirds in domestic LL fisheries. Black (2008) notes that in recent years the estimated incidental catch of seabirds in the Australian ETBF has been reduced dramatically from an estimated 2,000 birds in 2002 to less than 100 birds in 2005 due to implementation of effective mitigation strategies 114. In New Zealand, recent incidents of high albatross bycatch (50 albatrosses, mostly Antipodean albatrosses, Diomedea antipodensis, from a single vessel fishing for swordfish near the Kermedec Islands in November 2006 and 12 Chatham albatrosses, Thalassarche eremita, caught by a single bottom longline ling vessel in September 2007) have prompted the New Zealand government to strengthen regulations on seabird bycatch mitigation. However observer coverage in these fisheries remains sporadic and at an inadequate level to accurately estimate seabird bycatch. Of the fisheries north of 30 o S Molony (2005) 115 concluded "the interaction of the industrialised fleets with birds between 15ºN and 31ºS were extremely low and too low to generate reliable estimates of catches and mortalities" and further that "in conclusion, the risk of industrialised fishing to the sustainability of bird populations in the region of the WCPFC examined is very low". Notwithstanding that, some concern exists about the impact of LL interactions with small populations of endemic tropical seabirds that are unlikely to be able to sustain even low levels of fishing induced mortality. More recent and focused analysis by Kirby et al (2009) 116 into seabird-longline interactions across the WCPO suggests that the areas with the highest likelihood of species-level population effects occur in the Tasman Sea, east of New Zealand but also around Fiji (in particular close to the island of Gau) and at the equator at 165 W. This study also identified significant areas of medium risk throughout the central pacific FFA member region to approximately 20 S as shown in Figure 6.1 below. 114 Black, A. (2008). Seabird Bycatch Rates in WCPFC Longline Fisheries. Birdlife International. WCPF 4 th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. SC4-EB-WP8 115 Molony, B. (2005) Estimates of the mortality of non-target species with an initial focus on seabirds, turtles and sharks. SPC-OFP. WCPFC-SC1-2005/EB-WP Kirby, D.S., Waugh, S. and Filippi, D. (2009) Spatial risk indicators for seabird interactions with longline fisheries in the western and central Pacific. WCPFC-SC5-2009/EB-WP-06 Page 89

90 Figure 6.1: Areas of likely species-level effects of fishing on seabirds in the WCPFC Convention Area (expressed as probability). Highest risk areas - pink, Medium-high - orange; Medium green; Medium-low pale blue; Low dark blue; Negligible risk White. (Source: Kirby et al [2009] 117 ) (but species dependent) Waugh (2006, see WCPFC SC 2) found that 55 species of albatross and petrel that occurred south of 20 o S and were potentially vulnerable to fisheries bycatch 118. These included species with IUCN classification of Critically Endangered (6), Endangered (7), Vulnerable (26) and Near Threatened (7) for both albatrosses and petrels. The remainder were classified by the IUCN as Least Concern ( Whilst hotspots exist within the FFA member region north of 30 S, where high levels of fishing activity overlap with distributions of some Critically Endangered species (eg. Fiji Petrel) with extremely small global populations, small petrels, particularly from the Gadfly petrel family have only rarely been reported in fishing bycatch and it is possible that some species and associated areas attributed medium to high risk by Kirby et al. (2009) may in fact be very low risk 119. Further independent data from observers on longliners would provide greater certainty on the risks associated with these seabird species. Levels of adoption of bycatch mitigation measures; levels of effort below 30 o S N of 30 S Low S of 30 S - High 117 D.S. Kirby, S. Waugh and D. Filippi (2009) Spatial risk indicators for seabird interactions with longline fisheries in the western and central Pacific. WCPFC-SC5-2009/EB-WP Waugh, S. (2006) Towards a seabird mortality risk assessment: distribution of seabirds in the WCPFC Convention Area and potential overlap with fisheries. WCPF 2 nd Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. SC2-EB-WP4 119 Ibid, Kirby et al. (2009) Page 90