To: Donna Darm, Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service

Transcription

1 Memorandum To: Donna Darm, Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service From: Jonathan Scordino, Makah Tribal Marine Mammal Biologist Date: November 15, 2007 Subject: Report on concerns raised at September 11, 2007 meeting on unauthorized whale hunt On September 19, 2007, representatives of the Makah Tribe met with NOAA Fisheries to discuss the implications of the unauthorized whale hunt that occurred on September 8, 2007, on NOAA s National Environmental Policy Act review of the Tribe s February 11, 2005 request for a waiver of the Marine Mammal Protection Act take moratorium. NOAA Fisheries alerted the Tribe that the September 8, 2007, hunt raised two concerns that the Tribe needed to address in a detailed report: (1) the relative effectiveness of the hunting methods used on September 8 th hunt in relation to those methods proposed by the Tribe in its waiver request; and (2) whether the hunt affected the behavior of other whales in the area of the hunt. This report is my biological evaluation of those two issues based on the best information currently available. A detailed report was supplied to NOAA Fisheries on September 11, 2007 describing the wounds the hunted whale had received and the whale s behaviors before it died. In summary, on September 8, 2007, a gray whale was fatally harpooned and shot in the Strait of Juan de Fuca by five Makah Tribal members. Four harpoons were embedded in the whale and 16 bullet wounds were observed. In violation of the Tribe s Gray Whale Management Plan, these individuals did not obtain a permit from the Makah Tribal Council authorizing these hunting activities. Nor did these individuals use the Tribe s approved hunting methods. Issue 1 Review of Hunting Methods. The precise cause of death for the gray whale hunted on September 8 th cannot be definitively determined because the tissue damage caused by the harpoons and bullet wounds received during the hunt cannot be directly observed. The whale was allowed to sink in deep water and the carcass was not recovered; no necropsy could be performed. This report is the product of my professional judgment based on several hours of first 1

2 hand observations of the whale before it died in the evening of September 8, 2007, and well as upon my subsequent review of photographs of the whale taken by myself and others on that day. These observations are discussed in my previous report of September 11, Copies of my photographs have been previously provided to NMFS Enforcement and the Department of Justice. Photos have also been supplied to Cascadia Research to determine if the whale can be uniquely identified as a member of the Pacific Coast Feeding Aggregation of gray whales. It should be understood that if the hunters had been supplied with sufficient ammunition, not lost the primary rifle, and if hunt had been allowed to progress unimpeded by the Coast Guard, the whale would surely have died much sooner. According to BM3 Ryan T. Wolfe, the Coast Guard departed USCG station Neah Bay at 10:44 AM and spotted the whale hunt soon after. On the scene the hunters reported to Coast Guard that they needed to return to Neah Bay to get more ammunition to finish off the whale since it was suffering and they were out of bullets (MK3 Kozakiewicz; SN Patrick L. O Brien). The Boarding Officer informed them that was not going to happen (MK3 Kozakiewicz). After detaining the five hunters, the Coast Guard established a 500 yard no entry perimeter around the whale preventing Tribal authorities from euthanizing the injured whale. Tribal authorities started the process to gain permission to euthanize the whale at 11:20 AM. Permission to euthanize the whale was not formally received from NOAA until after the whale had died. 1 The hunters lack of ammunition and the speed in which the Coast Guard responded to the incident and their subsequent no-entry zone helps explain the long recorded time to death for the whale. What is still unanswered is why the observed 16 bullet holes (15 to the head and one to the body) and 4 harpoons did not kill the whale more quickly. The whale killed on September 8 th took between 8.5 and 9.5 hours to die. 2 Killing a large whale with a rifle requires training, marksmanship, and the right equipment. None of the five hunters involved in the unauthorized hunt had participated in any previous hunts as a gunner. Additionally, none of the hunters had received training on where to aim a rifle shot to humanely kill a whale. The accepted methods by the International Whaling Commission for humanely killing a gray whale is to shoot the whale in central nervous system with a large caliber rifle or use a darting gun (harpoon equipped with a exploding grenade head) aimed at the whale s thorax (International Whaling Commission 2006). Rifle shots are specifically aimed at the brain stem to ensure an instantaneous loss of consciousness and humane death. Correctly aiming a shot from a high caliber rifle at the central nervous system of a whale is essential if the whale is to be quickly and humanely dispatched. 1 2 The Makah Tribal Council received a call from NOAA Fisheries at around 5:00 PM authorizing the euthanasia of the injured whale. Concerns over legal ramifications led the Council to request a formal authorization in writing through . The formal authorization was not received until 7:15 PM. Based on reports from the United States Coast Guard, the whale had been harpooned and was being shot between 9:40 AM and 10:45 AM. The official radio log reports that shots were fired at 10:26 AM. The whale s death was officially recorded at 7:08 PM. Therefore, the time to death was between 8.5 and 9.5 hours. 2

3 In my professional judgment, there are two reasons why the 15 rifle shots to the head did not kill the whale more quickly. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. The first reason is that the gunners on the hunt were not trained to humanely kill a gray whale. Dr. Al Ingling trained the Tribe s gunners for the hunts in the late 1990s on where to shoot the whale to hit the brainstem and what range the rifle was most effective. Glenn Johnson was the only tribal member approved to be the gunner for gray whale hunts (Ingling pers. comm. 2007). Glenn Johnson was not among the crew on the September 8, 2007 hunt. The untrained gunners on the September 8, 2007 hunt fired shots that were not correctly aimed to hit the central nervous system of the whale. The shots were all grouped with high precision suggesting the hunters had good marksmanship; however the shots were not located correctly so as to destroy the whale s central nervous system, and more precisely stated, they were inaccurately aimed to hit the whale s brain stem. Based on illustrations published by Norwegian veterinarians, the brain of a minke whale is located in the median plane between the eye and the dorsal surface (Figure 1). On a horizontal line the caudal portion of the brain incorporating the brain stem lies as far behind the eye as the blowhole is in front of the eye (Knudsen et al. 1999). Assuming a gray whale s brain is located in the same position of the head as a minke whale s brain, it appears that all of the shots fired by the Makah hunters were too far rostral and dorsal to enter the central nervous system. Figures 2 and 3 depict the location of the whale s brain juxtaposed against the location of the bullet holes. More than likely the bullets impacted parts of the skull that did not encase the brain. However, without documenting the trajectory of any of these bullets I cannot determine exactly what internal structures were damaged. Lack of training may also have resulted in the hunters firing from too close of range. An accurately aimed shot at extremely close range may not impact the internal location that the hunter expects. At extremely close range projectiles from high caliber rifles are often unstable (Ingling 1999). An unstable bullet will follow the path of least resistance and is less likely to penetrate the cranium of a whale than a shot with a stable bullet (Ingling 1999). Based on second hand accounts, it appears that some or all of the shots were fired at extremely close range. The second possible reason for the lengthy time to death was that the wrong combination of gun and ammunition was used. In order to deliver a bullet that can enter the cranium of a whale and destroy the brain stem a large caliber rifle is needed (Ingling 1997). A rifle that delivers a large bullet at high velocity has the greatest potential to quickly and humanely kill a whale (Ingling 1997). According to tests performed in 1999 (Table 1 and Table 2), the Tribe determined that a rifle of.50 caliber or higher has demonstrated an overwhelming ability to damage the central nervous system sufficiently to instantaneously kill a whale (Ingling 1999). The type of bullet is also very important. Soft tip or hollow point bullets are designed to crack when they hit tissue and expand causing maximum tissue damage (North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission 2001). A round that expands on impact is ineffective as 3

4 there is a lot of tissue between the skin and the cranium of a whale. Pointed tip full metal jacket bullets are also ineffective at killing whales as they are reported to easily splinter, ricochet or capsize against bone (North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission 2001). Round tip, full metal jacket bullets have been shown to travel efficiently through flesh and to penetrate bone; round tip full metal jackets are the suggested bullet by the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission and the International Whaling Commission to humanely dispatch a whale (North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission 2001; International Whaling Commission 2006). The Makah Tribe s Gray Whale Management Plan requires the use of a.50 caliber or larger rifle with round tip full metal jacket or monolithic solid type bullets as the primary weapon to quickly dispatch a whale after harpooning. During the hunt the.577 caliber rifle purchased by the tribe for hunting gray whales fell into the water after having been accidentally discharged (statement by Keith Johnson). After the loss of the.577 caliber rifle, the hunters only had a Weatherby.460 Magnum and a shotgun available to dispatch the whale. The.460 Weathersby has 74% the energy as the.577 and in tests penetrated water (a flesh equivalent) only 39% the distance achieved by the.577 (Ingling 1999). The.460 Weatherby was purchased by the Makah Whaling Commission to allow hunters to practice shooting large caliber rifles, but the rifle was not approved for use in whale hunts. The Whaling Commission had blunt tipped full metal jacket rounds for the.460 but did not supply these rounds to the hunters. The hunters supplied their own rounds and it is unclear if the bullets they used had rounded tip full metal jackets that would most efficiently penetrate the skull of the whale or if they used more economical rounds that are more suitable for target shooting. Norwegian whale researchers have noted that bullets are available in many different qualities and that it is often the case that cheaper ones are of lesser quality (North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission 2001). Therefore, the choice of bullets and the unexpected use of the.460 may have resulted in the large number of shots needed to dispatch the whale. It is possible that these two factors incorrect location of the shots and improper ammunition worked together to render the hunting methods ineffectual in quickly and humanely killing the whale. From my observations I do not believe any of the shots to the whale s head directly caused the death of the whale. However, the bullets probably knocked the whale unconscious. I observed the whale on the water between 3:06 PM and the whale s death at 7:08 PM. During the first three and a half hours of observation I only observed the whale use its tail to swim on two or three occasions. The whale only used its pectoral flippers to swim in what was an attempt to keep its head above water. The whale s tail was generally sunk deep in the water with only the top of the whale s head and its blowhole at the surface. The whale moved in a slow counterclockwise circular pattern with no apparent recognition of where it was. On multiple occasions the whale pushed its head against the 16-foot skiff that was attached to the whale via a harpoon line and showed no reaction to the tactile stimuli. At 6:40 PM the behavior of the whale changed drastically. The whale started to swim in straight lines, perform dives, and use its tail in locomotion. Preliminarily, I interpreted the uncoordinated swimming behavior as a result of the injuries the whale had received from the harpoons. However, on reflection of my 4

5 observations, I believe the drastic change of behavior at 6:40 PM was result of the whale returning to consciousness. I have only twice before seen a whale display the uncoordinated surface swimming behavior I observed on the September 8 th whale. In 1999, I observed a whaling protest boat strike a gray whale coming to the surface to breathe. The boat was traveling at high speeds and lifted on a small wave to come down full force on the head of the whale. Like the September 8 th whale, this whale stayed on the surface and slowly swam in an uncoordinated pattern. The vessel-stuck whale started swimming again after about 30 to 60 minutes of surface swimming behavior. My second observation of this type of behavior was again in 1999 from video footage taken from helicopters during the successful hunt on May 17, The first shot that hit the whale during the May 17 hunt stunned the whale and it temporally laid still at the surface. Later analysis showed that the third shot had hit a ridge of bone on the dorsal rear section of skull. The blast caused radiating fractures and likely caused momentary unconsciousness of the whale since the impact created an extensive skull fracture (Gosho 1999). It is my judgment that the behavior of these two whales in 1999 showing patterns of unconsciousness is consistent with my observations of the behavior of the whale on September 8 th. Large plumes of blood were observed leaving the side of the whale by Coast Guard and by observers on board my vessel at irregular intervals. Review of the photographs of the bullet wounds to the head also showed that they were bleeding. It is my professional judgment that the combination of bullet wounds to the head and the harpoons and bullet wounds in the thorax and abdomen region of the whale caused internal bleeding that ultimately led to the death of the whale on September 8, The blood likely only escaped the thorax and abdomen of the whale during brief periods of movement. If the whale had not been knocked unconscious from the bullet wounds to the head, I believe the whale would have swum more actively and bled to death more quickly. Issue 2 Effects on Whale Behavior and Distribution. The second issue of concern for NOAA Fisheries was the impact of the hunt on the behavior of other whales within the vicinity of the hunt. Two sources of information were analyzed to determine if the hunt affected behavior of other gray whales in the vicinity of the hunt. First, a gray whale photo identification survey was conducted three days after the hunt around the location of the hunt. The survey effort and observations while the hunt took place were analyzed to determine if there was a short term behavioral response to the hunt by whales in the local area. Second, sightings of whales during gray whale photo identification surveys between 2004 and 2007 were analyzed to determine if a change in whale distribution occurred. This analysis was purely observational and did not lend itself well to statistical tests of significance. The Makah Tribe has employed a marine mammal biologist to conduct gray whale photo identification surveys in the Strait of Juan de Fuca during summer and fall months since These surveys are used to determine the number of whales utilizing the Makah Usual and Accustomed (U&A) grounds, the turnover of new whales utilizing the U&A, 5

6 and to supply data to a regional effort to determine the population size and biology of gray whales that feed south of the Bering Sea during summer months. Tribal surveys in the Strait of Juan de Fuca are conducted from a 22-foot vessel that runs a near shore survey line from Cape Flattery in the west to Sekiu in the east. The vessel is run at 15 miles per hour while the operator and observers scan for whales. When a whale is observed the team records the position of the whale from the on-vessel GPS, the time of sighting, the number of whales observed, the depth at which the whale(s) is observed, and climatic variables that may affect survey effort. Then the team approaches the whale and takes photographs of the left and right flank of the whale for purposes of identification. The photos are later analyzed by Cascadia Research of Olympia, Washington to identify the individual observed. The Tribe performs a minimum of one survey a month during the summer and tries to perform more surveys as resources allow. In 2004 and 2005 only one survey of the Strait of Juan de Fuca took place in August and September. In 2006 there were two days of effort in August and four days in September. In 2007, there were four days of effort in August and three days in September. Based on video collected by an eyewitness and my knowledge of the area I determined that the whale was harpooned on September 8, 2007, just east of Sail Rock. This area was surveyed on September 11, During the survey, two whales were seen within one kilometer of where the September 8 th whale was harpooned. The behavior of the whales was similar to whales seen during surveys during previous months. The whales continued their normal feeding behaviors and showed no escape behavior or agitation when approached by the vessel for photographs. On September 8 th, Tribal members heard news of the hunt and watched as the Coast Guard apprehended the five hunters. They observed from a hill just southeast of Sail Rock. I have spoken to a few of the people who watched the events after the hunt. Some of them reported seeing other whales spouting in the area as the Coast Guard enforced the 500 yard no entry zone around the injured whale. They reported that the other whales in the area seemed unaffected by the hunt that had recently transpired. The whales also showed no reaction to the Coast Guard and Makah fishing boats in the area. Based on the anecdotal reports received from September 8 th and the survey effort on September 11 th, I do not believe that the whales exhibited any significant behavioral response to the September 8 th whale hunt. The second phase of this analysis was to determine if a long term change in whale distribution occurred. GIS software was used to plot the sightings of whales during research surveys (Figures 4 and 5). I then selected all gray whale sightings within a 5 km radius of the estimated location using a buffer application in Arc Map to count sightings within August and September of each year. Tabulated sightings were then divided by the days of effort in each month to standardize effort in each sampling period (Table 3). I found that in each of the years more whales were sighted in September than in August. In 2007, notwithstanding the hunt on September 8 th, more whales continued to be observed in September than in August. The ratio of sightings in September to August was slightly less than in prior years. However, the data is not sufficiently robust to 6

7 determine if statistically significant changes in the whale counts occurred in the vicinity of the September 8 th whale hunt. In summary, observations from surveys on September 11 th and anecdotal observations on the day of the hunt suggest that there is not a significant response of fear or avoidance by whales in the vicinity of whale hunting. Analysis of yearly changes in distributions between August and September around the hunt site suggests that the removal of an individual does not lead to noticeable changes in the number of whales utilizing a site. However, the results of this latter analysis were not statistically significant. Literature Cited: Gosho, M. E Report of the NMFS observer monitoring the Makah gray whale spring hunt in NOAA Fisheries Unpublished Report. Ingling, A. L The development of techniques incorporating traditional elements to enable the Makah to harvest the gray whale in an efficacious, safe, and humane manner. Report to the International Whaling Commission IWC/49/HK4. Ingling, A. L Ballistic testing of large-caliber rifles for the Makah Tribal gray whale subsistence hunt. Report to the International Whaling Commission IWC/51/HK International Whaling Commission Report of the workshop on whale killing methods and associated welfare issues. Report for International Whaling Commission IWC/58/Rep 7 International Whaling Commission Report of the Workshop on Whale Killing Methods and Associated Welfare Issues. Report for the International Whaling Commission IWC/55/Rep5 Knudsen, S.K, H. J. Hedvig, and E. O. Oen The position of the brain in the minke whale in relation to external features. Report to International Whaling Commission IWC/51/WK13 North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission Report from the workshop on marine mammals: weapons, ammunition and ballistics. Comfort Home Hotel Atlantic, Sandefjord, Norway November Oen, E. O Research to improve hunting and killing methods for minke whales in Norway. Report for International Whaling Commission IWC/58/WKM&AWI 25 7

8 Figure 1: Adapted from Oen (2006) this figure shows the location of the brain inside a minke whale s head. Viewed laterally the brain is situated in the median plane between the eye and the dorsal surface. When projected on a horizontal line the caudal part of the brain (A), lies as far behind the eye (B), as the blowhole (C) lies in front of the eye. Figure 2: This figure shows where the brain of the whale is located in relation to where the shots hit on the outside of the right side of the whale as marked by an x. 8

9 Figure 3: Location of shots marked with an x in relation to the location of the brain as seen from the left side of the whale. 9

10 Figure 4: Distribution of gray whales sighted during Makah Fisheries Management gray whale surveys in 2004 and During 2004 and 2005 there was one day of effort during each month. 10

11 Figure 5: Distribution of gray whales sighted during Makah Fisheries Management gray whale surveys in 2006 and There were two days of survey effort in August and four days of effort in September in There were four days of survey effort in August and three days of effort in September in

12 Table 1: Cartridge specifications of ammunition and rifles tested by Ingling (1997). Cartridge Caliber Length Weight Velocity Energy in. mm. in. mm. gr. gm. ft/sec m/sec ft-lbs joules * BMG * BMG BMG ** *Spitzer **Woodleigh Table 2: Bullet penetration into water during Ingling s 1999 ballistics study. Rifle Cartridge Penetration in. cm. Flesh Equiv. in. cm Spitzer Round Mono Round Mono LAR Spitzer SA Round Mono SA Woodleigh Round Mono

13 Table 3: Average counts of gray whale sightings in August and September photoidentification surveys within five kilometers of the site of illegal gray whale hunt on September 8, Aug Sept Ratio (Sept/Aug)