REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE LOSS OF THE MFV "MAGGIE B" ON 29th MARCH 2006

Transcription

1 Leeson Lane, Dublin 2. Telephone: Fax: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE LOSS OF THE MFV "MAGGIE B" ON 29th MARCH 2006 The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25 th March, 2003 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000 The copyright in the enclosed report remains with the Marine Casualty Investigation Board by virtue of section 35(5) of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, No person may produce, reproduce or transmit in any form or by any means this report or any part thereof without the express permission of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board. This report may be freely used for educational purposes. REPORT No. MCIB/122 1

2 2 Report MCIB/122 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board 9th April 2009.

3 CONTENTS PAGE FOREWORD 5 1. SYNOPSIS 6 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION 7 3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT THE INCIDENT EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS LIST OF APPENDICES LIST OFCORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE LOSS OF THE MFV "MAGGIE B" ON 29TH MARCH

4 4

5 FOREWORD FOREWORD Following the sinking of the MFV "Maggie B" and the resultant tragic loss of life, the MCIB conducted an investigation into the incident. Following the investigation a draft report was issued to any adversely affected party, each of whom had the opportunity to make a comment on any point in the findings. These comments were examined by the MCIB and the report amended as necessary. Whilst the draft report was being prepared for final printing, a decision was taken to raise the MFV "Maggie B". As a result of this decision, the MCIB postponed the publication of the report so that the MCIB Investigators could examine the wreck to ascertain if any new evidence had emerged which would shed further light on the cause of the sinking. These findings are publicised in the attached Supplementary Report. 5

6 SYNOPSIS 1. SYNOPSIS 1.1 The Motor Fishing Vessel MFV "Maggie B", with three people on board, departed from Kilmore Quay, Co. Wexford on Tuesday 28th March 2006 at between hrs. and hrs. local time to commence a fishing trip which took place South of Hook Head, approximately four hours steaming time away from Kilmore Quay. 1.2 The vessel completed four to five trawling tows of about 3 1 / 2-4 hours duration each. Fishing continued until the late evening of Wednesday 29th March The Fish Hold bilge level alarm had been sounding regularly during the voyage and the Skipper had been starting the bilge pump when the alarm sounded. At approximately hrs. another alarm sounded. This alarm sounded for approximately 10 minutes before the Skipper and the surviving crew member went to the engine room to investigate. On inspection of the engine room it was found to be flooded approximately half way up the main engine. The fish hold was also reported to be flooded. 1.4 The vessel appeared to be sinking by the stern and rolled to Starboard. The vessel did not right itself and capsized. 1.5 One crewman survived the sinking, the Skipper and another crewman are still missing. 6

7 FACTUAL INFORMATION 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION 2.1 Vessel details: Official Number: Port of Registry: Wexford Fishing No. WD 113 Owner: Year of build: Year of lengthening: Construction: Overall Length: Registered Length: Breadth: Depth: Gross Tonnage: Registered Tonnage: Engine: The vessel is recorded as being registered to Declan Bates of Kilmore Quay. It is understood that Walsh Brothers Fishing Ltd. Ballyhimicken, Garryvoe, Co. Cork had purchased the vessel from Mr. Bates and were in the process of reregistering ownership in their name at the time of the incident (Yard: Van der Pol, Holland) 1995 (Yard: Appledore Shipbuilders, Devon,UK) Steel metres metres 5.18 metres 3.33 metres 41 tons 12 tons Cummins NT 855M 172 Kw Fuel remaining on board: Approximately 3000 Litres Gas Oil. Hydraulic Oil on board: Engine Lubricating Oil: RFD SOLAS Fish on board: Not Known Not Known 6 person inflatable liferaft with A pack. Approximately 6 boxes of fish and over 90 empty boxes were stored in the Fish Hold. No ice was taken on board for the trip 7

8 FACTUAL INFORMATION Cont. 2.2 Crew: Skipper: Crewman: Crewman: Mr. Glynn Cott Mr. Jan Sankowski Mr. Krzysztof Pawtowski The Fishing Vessels (Certification of Deck Officers and Engineer Officers)(Amendment) Regulations, 2000 (S.I 192 0f 2000) does not require a qualified Deck Officer for a vessel of less than 17 metres. The Fishing Vessel (Basic Safety Training) Regulations 2001 (S.I.587 of 2001) require that crew members on board an Irish registered fishing vessel undertake basic safety training as set out in the Regulation. It is unclear if Mr. Cott and Mr. Sankowski had undertaken such training or a recognised equivalent. Mr. Pawtowski has stated that he completed safety training courses in Poland. However, it is unclear if these would be a recognised equivalent standard. His certificates for the courses were lost with the vessel. The MCIB have checked with the BIM Training Colleges and have found that there is no record of Mr. Cott undertaking training at their training centres. 2.3 Sea Fish Licence: The safety requirements for licensing of sea-fishing boats were revised in the Maritime Safety Act The following is the relevant text from this Act. "8(A) (a) It is a condition of a sea-fishing boat licence that the licensee shall ensure that the licensed boat complies with requirements specified by or under the Merchant Shipping Acts 1894 to (b) Where by or under the Merchant Shipping Acts 1894 to 2005 a survey is required to be carried out of a sea-fishing boat for the purpose of establishing whether or not such boat complies with the requirements specified by or under those Acts, the licensing authority shall not grant or renew a sea-fishing boat licence in respect of the boat unless the licensing authority is satisfied that the boat complies with such requirements. (c) Where a code of practice published by the Minister relating to the safety and seaworthiness of sea-fishing boats of a class to which paragraph (b) does not apply requires a survey to be carried out of a sea-fishing boat of such class for the purpose of establishing whether or not such boat complies with the requirements specified in the code of practice, the licensing authority shall not grant a sea-fishing boat licence in respect of the boat unless a declaration of compliance with the code of practice has been provided to the licensing authority". 8

9 Cont. FACTUAL INFORMATION The length overall of the MFV "Maggie B" was metres. Therefore, it was not covered by either paragraph (b) or (c) and there is no statutory survey regime or regulations for vessels in the 15 to 24m category. However, for vessels between 15m length overall and 24m registered length, it is understood that the Licensing Authority has continued a practice in place prior to the 2005 Act to require provision of a vessel condition survey report by a private marine surveyor for vessels in that category confirming that the vessel is in a safe and seaworthy condition before a licence is issued in respect of the vessel. It is not necessary for such a survey report to be received before issue of a licence offer but it would be required before issue of the licence. In the case of the MFV "Maggie B" the owners did submit a survey report. The Deputy Registrar General of Fishing boats wrote an offer of Licence letter on 29th March 2006 to Walsh Brothers Fishing Limited. This letter listed a number of conditions which would require compliance with before a licence would be issued. That letter also stated, "I am to point out that this licence offer does not confer the right to fish. You may not engage in any fishing activities until a formal licence has issued and the vessel is properly registered in your name, at a Port within the State, as required under Part IV of the Merchant Act, 1894". 9

10 EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT 3.1 This fishing vessel was originally built in 1989 and registered on the British Flag as "Gilsea" BM118 RSS number B It was built as an under 10 Metre trawler and during the period it operated in this category it was involved in an incident in 1993 in which it capsized. The UK Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB) did not carry out a formal investigation into the incident but in a brief report concluded that the accident was caused by a trawl door snagging on the bottom causing the vessel to veer across the snagged trawl warp whilst still maintaining a relatively high forward speed (a manoeuvre known as "girting"). There are four other incidents recorded on the UK authorities database relating to the vessel, which are not related to the vessels design or to its stability. 3.2 In 1995 the vessel was lengthened to its present overall length of Metres and converted for beam trawling. Due to its new length the vessel would be subject to compliance with the UK Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Rules. It would not have been required to comply with these rules at its original length. It was assessed by the UK authorities and deemed to be in compliance. The vessel was purchased in Milford Haven by its first Irish owner in From February 2003 to May 2005 the vessel was laid up in Kilmore Quay while work was carried out to the vessel. It was then operated out of Kilmore Quay until it was sold to the present owner in March/April When operating out of Kilmore Quay the trawling beams were removed as the vessel was used for herring fishing. 3.4 The Marine Survey Office carried out an initial safety equipment inspection in October 2003 and this was finalised in September 2005 at Kilmore Quay. When the vessel was inspected in September 2005 the vessels safety equipment was found to be in compliance with statutory requirements. 3.5 When the vessel was purchased by its present owners it was intended that it would be converted back to beam trawling and to accomplish this it was fitted with the original beams and a new A frame, forward. A net drum was removed from the aft gantry with this gantry being left in place. A fish hopper system was fitted. 3.6 A survey to establish the condition of the vessel prior to purchase was undertaken on behalf of Walsh Brothers by a private marine surveyor in February There appears to have been a considerable amount of shifting/adding and removing ballast from the vessel at the time that the modifications were taking place. The ballast consisted of steel railway track joiners and bags of lead. It could not be ascertained whether there was an increase or a decrease in the amount of ballast on board compared with what would originally have been in the vessel.

11 Cont. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT 3.8 The deck was modified aft of the Fish Hold hatch to allow the fitting of a hopper system. 3.9 The flush deck hatch at the aft end of the main deck was removed to allow adding and removal of ballast. From witness statements taken, it appears that this hatch may not have been correctly secured. It has not been possible to verify if it was sealed with a gasket or sealant The vessel was prepared to go to sea by the Skipper and Crew for a number of weeks prior to the incident. The Skipper decided to carry out an initial fishing trip on the 28th March The witness, Mr. Krzysztof Pawtowski stated that before the fishing trip began and whilst in port, the Steering Gear compartment bilge level alarm would sound every day. The crew would then start the bilge pump for a period and the alarm would stop. He also recalled that twice during the period of preparing the vessel, the Fish Hold bilge level alarm sounded and was similarly pumped out The weather at the time of departure was Wind: Westerly force 2 to 3. Weather: Scattered showers and patchy drizzle Visibility Moderate in showers otherwise good Sea state: Moderate 3.13 The weather at the time of the incident was Wind: South backing Southeast force 6 to 7 with gusts up to 37 knots Weather: Widespread rain heavy at times Visibility: Moderate to poor Sea state: Moderate to rough 3.14 The vessel departed from Kilmore Quay, Co. Wexford on Tuesday 28th March 2006 at between hrs. and hrs. local time to commence a fishing trip, which took place after steaming approximately four hours from Kilmore Quay During the period the vessel was steaming at sea, the surviving crewmember Mr. Pawtowski recalled that the bilge level alarm for the Fish Hold was sounding regularly and he recalled that it sounded three times when he was in the wheelhouse. Each time the alarm sounded, the Skipper Mr. Cott started the bilge pump and pumped out the bilge. Nobody went to check the Fish Hold compartment because it seems that the sounding of bilge level alarms was a regular occurrence both in port and at sea Mr. Cott had instructed that when the bilge alarm sounded that the Fish Hold bilge pump should be started and then switched off when the bilge was pumped out The gear was shot and towed for periods of 3 to 3 1 / 2 hours and then hauled each time. 11

12 EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT Cont Fishing continued throughout the day of 29th March and the weather was deteriorating during the day Before the last hauling of the fishing gear Mr. Pawtowski recalls the bilge level alarm sounding and Mr. Cott went to start the pump. Normally the alarm stops once the bilge level falls sufficiently, however, in this case it continued to sound. Mr. Cott was then seen removing what the witness described as a fuse at an electrical panel which stopped the alarm sounding. The fuse was later seen to be back in place and no alarm was then sounding. 12

13 THE INCIDENT 4. THE INCIDENT 4.1 At approximately hrs. Mr. Pawtowski who was in the Mess Room recalled hearing an alarm, which he described as different to that which he had heard before but assumed that it was a bilge alarm. He stated that this alarm sounded continuously for approximately 15 minutes until the end. After approximately 10 minutes Mr. Cott and Mr. Pawtowski went to the Engine Room door and looked down and saw that the space was flooded. Water was up to the height of the engine flywheel as it was spraying water upwards as it turned. Mr. Cott was then seen running to the wheelhouse. The crewmember that remains missing, Mr. Sankowski, reported to Mr. Pawtowski that the Fish Hold was also flooded. 4.2 The main engine at this time was still running and the fishing gear was still down. 4.3 The last time Mr. Cott was seen by Mr. Pawtowski was on the Starboard side of the vessel on the Main Deck. Mr. Pawtowski stated that Mr. Cott had come out to the Main Deck via the external steps from the wheelhouse deck. This would indicate that Mr. Cott was on the Main Deck level as the vessel was sinking. 4.4 A Mayday call was received by MRCC at hrs. This call was made by the Skipper, Mr. Glynn Cott. 4.5 In a very short space of time the vessel started to roll to Starboard and continued until it capsized. 4.6 The vessel sank and is lying at the bottom, heeled over on its Starboard side, in position N W South of Hook Head. 13

14 EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT 5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT 5.1. The vessels Emergency Position Indication Radio Beacon (EPIRB) was activated which gave the position of the vessel. 5.2 After the vessel capsized the crewmembers, Mr. Pawtowski and Mr. Sankowski were in the water. Mr. Pawtowski did not see Mr. Cott again since he saw him on the Starboard side of the Main Deck. 5.3 Mr. Pawtowski and Mr. Sankowski saw that the vessel s inflatable liferaft was floating in the water un-inflated still in its canister and decided to swim over to it. Mr. Pawtowski believed that Mr. Sankowski was swimming behind him towards the liferaft but when he arrived at it there was no sign of him and he did not see him again. 5.4 Mr. Pawtowski reported that none of the three persons on board were wearing lifejackets, as there was not enough time to put them on. 5.5 Mr. Pawtowski pulled out the liferaft painter and inflated the raft, however, it inflated upside down and he was unable to right it. He also reported that the liferaft appeared to be not fully inflated. This may have contributed to him being unable to right the liferaft to its normal position in the water. 5.6 Mr. Pawtowski estimates that he was in the water for about half an hour before being rescued by the Dunmore East Lifeboat which brought him to Dunmore East. He was then transferred to Waterford Regional Hospital where he recovered. 5.7 On the 4th April 2006 two divers undertook to dive on the wreck on behalf of the owners (Walsh Brothers). That dive did not find the missing men or provide any evidence which would give information that would explain how water entered the vessel. 5.8 Between the 21st May and 26th May 2006, Irish Naval Service divers operating from the Irish Lights vessel "Granuaile" carried out an investigation of the wreck. That investigation consisted of searches using a ROV (remotely operated vehicle) fitted with a video camera and a number of manned dives carried out by the Diving Section. The search did not locate the missing men and the video evidence examined by MCIB did not give any apparent reason as to the cause of the loss of the vessel. 5.9 Extensive searches were carried out by the Coast Guard both at sea and on the shore line for 21 days using helicopters, Lifeboats, Irish Naval Service vessels, Air Corps fixed wing Casa aircraft, local fishing vessels, Coast Guard shore units and members of the public. Some items that had floated off the vessel were found but to date, Mr. Cott and Mr. Sankowski remain missing. 14

15 CONCLUSIONS 6. CONCLUSIONS 6.1 At the time the vessel was lengthened in 1995 an approved stability book was produced for it. In the weeks prior to the incident this vessel had been modified by the Skipper and Crew. There does not appear to be any evidence to show that stability calculations were carried out to assess the vessel s stability taking into account the modifications and changes in weight which took place. 6.2 There appears to have been an on-going problem with bilge level alarms sounding on a regular basis. It has not been established where water entered the Engine Room and Fish Hold. 6.3 A crack on the hull situated on the Port side forward had been identified by a private surveyor employed by the owner at the time of the vessel s purchase. That surveyor was of the opinion that the crack did not pose any danger to the hull of the vessel and recommended that a repair could be carried out the next time it was dry-docked or slipped. The videotape evidence gathered by Naval divers did not show that any crack, which might have been in this area, had spread causing a catastrophic hull failure allowing water ingress. 6.4 Tests carried out on the inflatable liferaft showed that it was capable of inflating and that the components of the liferaft were capable of working. The liferaft had been serviced by an approved servicing station but it was found that the CO2 inflation cylinder was overdue for pressure testing. The cylinder and its connecting hose and fittings were sent to a specialist company to carry out full pressure and leakage tests on them and these tests showed that there were no faults in the cylinder or its connections. There is no way of establishing if the cylinder had been filled with the correct amount of inflation gas when it was last serviced. 6.5 A stability investigation to understand the stability profile of the vessel prior to the sinking was carried out by the MCIB. From that investigation it appears that the vessel would have complied with the enhanced stability criteria for beam trawlers. 15

16 RECOMMENDATIONS 7. RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 It is recommended that legislation for the construction, stability and safety of Fishing Vessels between metres be implemented as soon as possible. 7.2 The MCIB notes that the Merchant Shipping (Safety of Fishing Vessels) (15-24 metres) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 640 of 2007) was signed by Minister of Transport on 17th September It is recommended that a Marine Notice be issued to Owners and Skippers of fishing vessels pointing out the dangers of making structural alterations or modifications to fishing methods or equipment without a qualified Naval Architect carrying out an assessment of the effects upon the vessels stability. 7.4 It is recommended to Skippers and Crew of vessels that when an alarm is actuated on board their vessels that they satisfy themselves as to the cause of the alarm and assess the implications for the safety of the vessel. 16

17 APPENDICES 8. LIST OF APPENDICES PAGE 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March Munster CO2 pressure test report on liferaft inflation gas cylinder Hosetech report of examination and tests on connecting hose and fittings Liferaft servicing record MCIB stability assessment Condition and value survey report by Promara 52 17

18 APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

19 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

20 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

21 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

22 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

23 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

24 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

25 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

26 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

27 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

28 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

29 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

30 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

31 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

32 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

33 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

34 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

35 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

36 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

37 Cont. APPENDIX 8.1 Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

38 APPENDIX 8.1 Cont. Appendix 8.1 Met Eireann weather report 28th March 29th March

39 APPENDIX 8.2 Appendix 8.2 Munster CO 2 pressure test report on liferaft inflation gas cylinder. 39

40 APPENDIX 8.3 Appendix 8.3 Hosetech report of examination and tests on connecting hose and fittings. 40

41 Cont. APPENDIX 8.3 Appendix 8.3 Hosetech report of examination and tests on connecting hose and fittings. 41

42 APPENDIX 8.3 Cont. Appendix 8.3 Hosetech report of examination and tests on connecting hose and fittings. 42

43 APPENDIX 8.4 Appendix 8.4 Liferaft servicing record 43

44 APPENDIX 8.5 Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 44

45 Cont. APPENDIX 8.5 Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 45

46 APPENDIX 8.5 Cont. Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 46

47 Cont. APPENDIX 8.5 Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 47

48 APPENDIX 8.5 Cont. Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 48

49 Cont. APPENDIX 8.5 Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 49

50 APPENDIX 8.5 Cont. Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 50

51 Cont. APPENDIX 8.5 Appendix 8.5 MCIB stability assessment. 51

52 APPENDIX 8.6 Appendix 8.6 Condition and value survey report by Promara. 52

53 Cont. APPENDIX 8.6 Appendix 8.6 Condition and value survey report by Promara. 53

54 APPENDIX 8.6 Cont. Appendix 8.6 Condition and value survey report by Promara. 54

55 Cont. APPENDIX 8.6 Appendix 8.6 Condition and value survey report by Promara. 55

56 APPENDIX 8.6 Cont. Appendix 8.6 Condition and value survey report by Promara. 56

57 CORRESPONDENCE 9. LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED PAGE 9.1 The Cott Family 58 MCIB Response Mrs. Anne Corrigan 64 MCIB Response Ms. Elaine Hayes 65 MCIB Response Ms. Danuta Sankowska 70 MCIB Response Ballycotton Marine Services Ltd. 78 MCIB Response Commissioners of Irish Lights 81 MCIB Response Promara 82 MCIB Response 83 57

58 58 CORRESPONDENCE

59 CORRESPONDENCE 59

60 60 CORRESPONDENCE

61 CORRESPONDENCE MCIB RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE COTT FAMILY, RECEIVED ON 31st JANUARY The first recorded Mayday call was shown in the MRCC SITREP made available to the MCIB. This has been verified by MRCC as being correct and is considered by the Investigator to show the start time of the incident. That document shows that a Mayday call was received from "Maggie B" at hours (Local time), which was the time that the incident became known to the rescue services. The call was acknowledged by MRCC who requested the caller to identify the name of the vessel calling. The normal Mayday call procedures appear not to have been followed insofar as the caller did not state the name of the vessel, or its position. In a continuation of that Mayday call and conversation with MRCC, the position of the vessel was then given by the caller, who reported that it was sinking at hours. This all took place in the space of two minutes and the MCIB does not consider the report of the vessel sinking to be a second Mayday call but that it was an update of the situation. The SITREP also states that UKMCC advised that they received a COSPAS SARSAT alert from E17530 ("Maggie B") at hours (Local time). The MCIB has a copy of the General Arrangement drawing, which shows the lay out of internal spaces in the vessel, but it does not show any detail of alarm panel location. Mr. Patowski was interviewed again at a later date following the interview which took place at Waterford Regional Hospital. It must be appreciated that a statement taken immediately after such a shocking experience may not provide every detail of the incident. It is always necessary to obtain a statement as early as possible after an incident in order to assemble the general sequence of events that have taken place. However it is only after some time that a person may begin to remember other details of an incident, hence the reason for taking a further statement. In the signed statement given by Mr. Noel O Regan on the 2nd May 2006 he described the bilge system and stated that each compartment was fitted with individual electric pumps. In addition it was also possible to pump the bilges using the engine driven bilge pump. He also stated that each compartment was fitted with a bilge level alarm, which was tested in the presence of Mr. O Regan and Mr. Declan Bates, the previous owner. Mr. O Regan has advised that to the best of his recollection the bilge alarm sensor in the Fish hold was situated between the forward bulkhead and the position where the propeller shaft passed through the hull. This would place the sensor slightly forward of the longitudinal centre of the space. 61

62 CORRESPONDENCE The vessel was purchased by Mr. Declan Bates in 2003 and brought to Kilmore Quay where an MSO (Marine Survey Office) surveyor carried out a Safety Equipment survey in October A written list of deficiencies to rectify before a follow up inspection was issued to the owner at that survey. In July 2004 the owner contacted the MSO to advise that the vessel was ready for re-inspection. The vessel was inspected again and some further items were identified which required attention and another deficiency list was issued to the owner. In October 2004 a further inspection was carried out by MSO and the surveyor was unable to complete the inspection until repair work on the main deck was completed. In September 2005 a final inspection took place and the vessel was declared to be in compliance with current legislation for a vessel of this type and size. It is the Board s understanding from an interview with Mr. Andrew Walsh that he and his business partners knew very little about the technical aspects of fishing vessels and basically provided the funds necessary for any modifications, which took place under the supervision of Mr. Cott. The Board does not attribute any particular significance to Mr. O Regan s comment regarding the lengthening of the vessel in He has also advised the investigator that his comment does not have any technical relevance. An MCA approved stability information book was produced for the vessel in In the original report provided by Mr. Noel O Regan of Promara Ltd. and dated 15th March 2006, the report identified a crack on the starboard side of the vessel. The Investigator subsequently received a letter from Mr. O Regan stating that there was an error in his report and that the crack was actually on the port side and not the starboard side as shown in the report. That report was attached to all documents relevant to the investigation. This was the reason for close inspection of the port side. In a signed statement given by Mr. Anthony Walsh on the 7th April 2006 he stated that the Promara surveyor Mr. Noel O Regan was of the opinion that the crack did not compromise the integrity of the hull and its water tightness. He also stated that Mr. O Regan indicated that a repair could be completed sometime around August 2006 when the vessel would be slipped for its annual re-fit. Mr. O Regan s report recommended a type of repair which should be carried out to the crack. The Investigator clearly shows the fact that the recommended repair was not carried out and also includes the explanation given by Mr. Walsh for the repair work being deferred until the vessel was going to be slipped in August In a signed statement given by Mr. Noel O Regan on the 2nd May 2006 he stated 62

63 CORRESPONDENCE that he surveyed the "Maggie B" at Kilmore Quay on two occasions and was satisfied that the vessel was in a seaworthy condition and a good investment for the owners. Mr. O Regan also advised the Investigator that he was not concerned about the hull crack as it was small and was situated in way of a small tank and above the waterline. As stated in the report, the video evidence did not show that any crack, which might have been in this area, had spread causing a catastrophic hull failure allowing water ingress. There is nothing preventing anyone from applying for a fishing licence by completing an application form and submitting it to the Department of Transport. The fact is that a licence will not be issued until all requirements are met. In this case no licence was issued for that reason. The Sea Fishing Boat Licence Application form was received on 8th March In a letter dated 29th March 2006 signed by the Deputy Registrar General of Fishing Boats and addressed to Mr. Anthony Walsh it stated in addition to other points that, the vessel condition survey report submitted by Mr. Walsh with his application did not specifically confirm that the vessel was in a safe and seaworthy condition. The letter also stated that the report was being returned to Mr. Walsh. 63

64 CORRESPONDENCE MCIB RESPONSE The MCIB notes the contents of this letter. 64

65 CORRESPONDENCE 65

66 66 CORRESPONDENCE

67 CORRESPONDENCE 67

68 CORRESPONDENCE MCIB RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MS. ELAINE HAYES, RECEIVED ON 31st JANUARY Ms. Hayes stated that Mr. Glynn Cott did not make the decision to sail the vessel. As the Skipper, it would be Mr. Cott s decision to sail or not to sail. The Investigator states from an interview with Mr. Anthony Walsh that he and his business partners knew very little about the technical aspects of fishing vessels and basically provided the funds necessary for any modification, which took place under the supervision of Mr. Cott. The owners may or may not have advised Mr. Cott that a licence was in the post but the Board has no information of this. In a signed statement given by Mr. Declan Bates (previous owner) on 29th May 2006 he stated that whilst he had offered his advice to the Skipper he felt that the Skipper was happier to do things his own way so he (Mr. Bates) had little involvement in the re-rigging project. Many of the points raised in Ms. Hayes letter are similar to those revised by the Cott Family letter and have been answered by the MCIB in their reply to that letter. The MCIB wishes to re- iterate that it is satisfied that it has established the reason for the sinking of the "Maggie B". The subject of divers, helicopters etc. is not a matter for the MCIB and should be directed to the relevant authorities. The function of the MCIB is to find the facts not faults of any incident and to make recommendations to prevent any incidents recurring. The MCIB did not consider the raising of the "Maggie B" to be required to complete its investigation as the cause of the incident was clearly a stability issue. In relation to Ms. Hayes point about there being "so many guesses, estimates and assumptions in this stability investigation that in my opinion it renders meaningless". The MCIB does not agree that the amount of assumptions made render the analysis meaningless. The assumed loading condition may not be an exact replication of the condition at the time of the incident but it provides sufficient information for the Board to establish that when the vessel was intact, i.e. not flooding or filled with floodwater, it should have had sufficient stability not to capsize and it also allows the Board to gauge a point at which the flooding of the vessel would have reduced the stability such that the loss of the vessel was inevitable. 68

69 CORRESPONDENCE Additionally, the Board has no choice but to make such assumptions in this case as the only witness did not know how much fuel and fresh water was on board, did not know the precise make up of the fishing gear (weights, lengths of wires etc.) and did not have a precise recollection about other deadweight items on board. It may also be worth noting that once the vessel sank any evidence in relation to the precise make up of the loading condition is lost as the tanks will become compromised with sea water and other equipment may be washed away. As found in the supplementary report "Revised Stability Investigation" the primary cause of the capsize of the "Maggie B" was lack of stability. The "Revised Stability Investigation" confirms the MCIB s original opinion that the cause of the incident was due to lack of stability. 69

70 70 CORRESPONDENCE

71 CORRESPONDENCE 71

72 72 CORRESPONDENCE

73 CORRESPONDENCE 73

74 74 CORRESPONDENCE

75 CORRESPONDENCE 75

76 76 CORRESPONDENCE

77 CORRESPONDENCE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MS. DANUTA SANKOWSKA RECEIVED ON THE 30th JANUARY The misspelling of Mr. Sankowski s name in the report was a typographical error, which has been corrected. Other documents on file have the correct spelling. When making enquiries regarding qualifications, the Investigator contacted BIM who were unable to find any record of qualifications for Mr. Glynn Cott. The Investigator was unable to establish, through the owners whether Mr. Sankowski had any qualifications. It was believed that any documents he may have held would have been lost with the vessel. Witness statements are not attached with MCIB reports as they are made in confidence. 77

78 78 CORRESPONDENCE

79 CORRESPONDENCE 79

80 CORRESPONDENCE MCIB RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM BALLYCOTTON MARINE SERVICES LTD., RECEIVED ON 18TH JANUARY Witness statements are never published as they are made in confidence. 2. Please see response to Ms. Elaine Hayes. 3. The cause of the sinking is illustrated in the stability calculations included in this report. 4. On reading the MCIB Draft Report Mr. Connolly who acts for the Cott Family contacted the Investigator to inform him that he believed that there was an error in the draft report. He correctly pointed out that in Section 6.3 the report stated that a crack had been identified on the Port side whereas the Promara report had stated that the crack was on the Starboard side. The Investigator advised Mr. Connolly that the error was in fact in the Promara report and that the author of the report Mr. Noel O Regan had written to the Investigator and admitted that there was an error. On receipt of Mr. O Regan s correction the report was written to include the reference to the crack as being on the Port side. Following the telephone conversation between Mr. Connolly and the Investigator he was fully aware of the error in the Promara report and the reason why the MCIB Draft Report differed from it. He was aware of this before he sought clarification about it from the MCIB. The MCIB did not consider the raising of the "Maggie B" to be required to complete its investigation, as the cause of the incident was clearly a stability issue. The MCIB also wishes to advise that the primary recommendation of this investigation is that regulations be enacted for the construction, stability and safety of fishing vessels between metres as soon as possible. Lifting the vessel will not change this essential recommendation. It is clear to the MCIB that a safety regime is necessary for vessels in this size sector of the fleet as there is a safety regulatory scheme for fishing vessels under 15 metres and over 24 metres. This gap in the regulatory framework is clearly seen in regard to the trends in recent fishing vessel tragedies. The MCIB notes that the Merchants Shipping (Safety of Fishing Vessels) (15 24 Metres) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 640 of 2007) was signed by the Minister for Transport on 17 September

81 CORRESPONDENCE MCIB RESPONSE The MCIB notes the contents of this letter. 81

82 82 CORRESPONDENCE

83 CORRESPONDENCE MCIB RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PROMARA, RECEIVED ON 3rd JANUARY Mr. O Regan s report recommended a repair should be carried out but it did not specify that it should be carried out before the vessel sailed as suggested in his letter to the MCIB dated 22nd December In a signed statement given by Mr. Anthony Walsh on the 7th April 2006 he stated that Promara surveyor Mr. Noel O Regan was of the opinion that the crack did not compromise the integrity of the hull and its water tightness. He also stated that Mr. O Regan indicated that a repair could be completed sometime around August 2006 when the vessel would be slipped for its annual re-fit. In a signed statement given by Mr. Noel O Regan on the 2nd May 2006 he stated that he surveyed the "Maggie B" at Kilmore Quay on two occasions and was satisfied that the vessel was in a seaworthy condition and a good investment for the owners. Mr. O Regan also verbally advised the Investigator that he was not concerned about the hull crack as it was small and was situated in way of a small tank and above the waterline 83

84

85 Leeson Lane, Dublin 2. Telephone: Fax: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE LOSS OF THE MFV "MAGGIE B" ON 29th MARCH 2006 The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25 th March, 2003 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000 The copyright in the enclosed report remains with the Marine Casualty Investigation Board by virtue of section 35(5) of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, No person may produce, reproduce or transmit in any form or by any means this report or any part thereof without the express permission of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board. This report may be freely used for educational purposes. REPORT No. MCIB/122 85

86

87 CONTENTS PAGE 1. SYNOPSIS CONCLUSIONS LIST OF APPENDICES LIST OFCORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

88 SYNOPSIS 1. SYNOPSIS Following the raising and re-floating of this fishing vessel it was towed to Arklow where MCIB investigators attended and carried out an inclining test to establish its stability at the time of the incident. In preparation for the test, all spaces were cleaned of any mud and water. During cleaning and preparation, any items removed from the vessel to allow cleaning to take place and which were on board at the time of the sinking were weighed to allow the weight and position to be recorded for inclusion in the stability calculations. The inclining test was conducted at the Port of Arklow on 12th February A trawl beam, which was recovered during the re-floating operation, was identified as the Starboard beam. The Port side beam remains on the sea bed. During the salvaging operation an attempt was made to recover the Port trawl beam. However, this attempt failed in spite of a substantial force being applied in order to lift the beam and its attached components. It is not known if the un-recovered trawl beam became snagged at the time of the casualty or at a later date. Samples of recovered parts of the Port and Starboard trawl beam wire ropes were sent to a laboratory, The Test House (Cambridge) Ltd. for examination to establish if the wires had been cut during the salvage operation or if they had failed due to excess force being applied. The result of the examination shows that the wires were cut and had not failed. See attached Test House report. The beam trawling arrangement was fitted with a safety system which includes quick release Stenhouse Slips. These are used to release the pulley blocks fitted at the outer extremes of the trawl derricks should one or other of the trawl beams become fouled on the sea bed. Once operated, it has the effect of greatly reducing the heeling lever that results when a trawl beam becomes fouled. Neither of these Stenhouse Slips had been operated. MCIB arranged for the vessel to be lifted out of the water by crane and placed on the dock at the Port of Arklow. The hull was inspected externally and no significant damage was found which could be attributed to causing the vessel to sink or to affect the result of the inclining test. Despite some deformation at the bow the watertight integrity of the hull below the water has not been compromised. The damage in way of the ballast tank shown in the photographs below was largely the result of the vessels impact with the bottom and compression damage indicating that the tank was probably empty when the vessel capsized. 88

89 SYNOPSIS The Starboard bilge keel is bent inboard. As the vessel lay to starboard when on the seabed it is unsafe to attribute this damage to anything other than the interaction between the vessel and the seabed. A tyre was found lodged between the propeller and hull in the bottom of the nozzle. As there is no evidence of gouging to the tyre, damage to the propeller blades or the nozzle coating, it is believed the tyre drifted into the nozzle shortly after the vessel capsized. At this time the propeller would have been able to turn freely in the current. The lack of hydraulic pressure in the gearbox disengages the drive clutch. Note the steering nozzle is set to about 10 degrees to starboard. This indicates that the port beam placed a heavier towing load on the vessel than the starboard beam. This would have turned the boat across the Starboard trawl in the event of the load coming off the port side. The blue rope seen in this picture was used by salvors to ensure the tyre was not lost during the salvage operation. The lack of damage to the tyre indicates that it drifted into the nozzle after the engine failed. The gearbox used on this vessel allowed current to turn the propeller after power was lost. The Keel cooling system is intact. It was largely protected by the keel and starboard bilge keel when the vessel lay on the bottom. However, there is some bending and denting of the tubes most probably the result of some interaction with the seabed. 89

90 CONCLUSIONS 2. CONCLUSIONS From the evidence collected during the investigation it is not possible to be definite as to the cause of sinking except to say that there were a number of factors, which have been outlined in the revised stability investigation, that could have contributed to the sinking. There is no single outstanding factor that alone would cause the casualty to occur. Therefore, it must be assumed that a combination of factors mentioned in the stability report led to the vessel sinking. 90

91 APPENDICES 3. LIST OF APPENDICES PAGE 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation Laboratory Report Photographs (7)

92 APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 92

93 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 93

94 APPENDIX 3.1 Cont. Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 94

95 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 95

96 APPENDIX 3.1 Cont. Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 96

97 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 97

98 APPENDIX 3.1 Cont. Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 98

99 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 99

100 APPENDIX 3.1 Cont. Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 100

101 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 101

102 APPENDIX 3.1 Cont. Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 102

103 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 103

104 APPENDIX 3.1 Cont. Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 104

105 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 105

106 APPENDIX 3.1 Cont. Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 106

107 Cont. APPENDIX 3.1 Appendix 3.1 Revised Stability Investigation. 107

108 APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. 108

109 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. 109

110 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. 110

111 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. 111

112 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. 112

113 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. 113

114 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. 114

115 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / $6+; 1/+6; 6/634/7+ 4 /7/8Г7 3;2+76/-/ :/.+2../28 0 /. 838 / +, / "34/-63777/ #./ / / Г46/4+6/ /8 / 3./ /62 115

116 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / "/-3:/6/.$6+; 7+ 4 /Г7 3;2+76/-/ :/.+2.; 8 8 // /6/78838 / 0 / / 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/Г7 3; 218 /634// /6/

117 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / "/-3:/6/.$6+; 7+ 4 /Г7 3;2+76/-/ :/.+2.; 8 8 // /6/78838 / 0 / / 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/Г7 3; 218 /634// /6/

118 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / 368#./' /Г7 3;2+76/-/ :/.+2.; 8 8 // /6/78838 / 0 /.7 / / 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/Г7 3; 218 /634// /6/

119 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / 368#./ / /Г7 3;2+76/-/ :/.+2.; 8 8 // /6/78+88 / 0 196/7 3;/6 / / 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/Г7 3; 218 /634// /6/

120 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / #8+6,3+6.#./' /Г7 3;2+76/-/ :/.+2.; 8 8 // /6/ /0 196/7 3;/6/.1/ 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/Г7 3; 218 /634// /6/

121 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / #8+6,3+6.#./ / /Г7 3;2+76/-/ :/.+2.; 8 8 // /6/ /0 196/7 3;/ / 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/Г7 3; 218 /634// /6/

122 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / "/-3:/6/.$6+; 7+ 4 /7 3; 21 / Г 2. :.9+ ; 6/ /43 /6-36/ 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/ 122

123 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / "/-3:/6/.$6+; 7+ 4 /7 3; 21 / Г 2. :.9+ ; 6/ /43 /6-36/ 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/ 123

124 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / 368#./; /Г7 3; 21 / Г 2. :.9+ ; 6/ /43 /6-36/ 196/ 7+,3:/+2.: /;/ /6/28-+ /6++21 /837 3;+86+27:/67/0+8 19/ /; 6/ / +663;/. 124

125 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / / /Г7 3; / /; 6/ / ; 6//, / 8/. 6/ +8 :/ - /+216/ /7960+-/ 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/ 125

126 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / 368#./ / /Г7 3; 21 / Г 2. :.9+ ; 6/ /43 /6-36/ 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/ 126

127 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / #8+6,3+6.#./' /Г7 3; 21 / Г 2. :.9+ ; 6/ /43 /6-36/ 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/ 127

128 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / #8+6,3+6.#./ / /Г7 3; 21 / Г 2. :.9+ ; 6/ /43 /6-36/ 196/ /8+ 30+,3:/ 128

129 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / / / 196/ 7+,3:/ 129

130 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / 368#./' /Г7 3; / :/67/0+8 19/ / / :.9+ ; 6/7 196/ 368#./ / /Г7 3; 217 8/ :/67/0+8 19/ / / :.9+ ; 6/7 130

131 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / # Г7 3; ; 6/7/, :/67/ /7 #8+6,3+6.#./ / / 196/ # Г7 3; 21- /+6/:./2-/30 / / 232/308 /; 6/7 7 3; / 131

132 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / # Г7 3; 21.//4 1 8/ 4/6+896/7-+ /+88 /,6/ /308 / ; 6/7 3; / 196/ # Г7 3; :/67/; 6/ / +663;/. /, /28 / / ' #./7+ 4 / 132

133 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / # Г7 3; 21./ /+2..//4 7-+ /. 2./8/6 2+8/ 2+896/308 /; 6/ /7960+-/ / /-+4896/.+8 74/- /2/8- / # / #8+6,3+6. / /7 3; 21 / / 133

134 APPENDIX 3.2 Cont. Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / /-+4896/.+8 74/- /2/8- / #./' /Г7 3; 21 / / 196/ /-+4896/.+8 74/- /2/8- / #./' /Г7 3; 21.// / /.; 6//2. 134

135 Cont. APPENDIX 3.2 Appendix 3.2 Laboratory Report. /28 Г //732 +2/Г9, 2 3,6/0/6/2-/ $ & 196/# // / /-+4896/.+8 74/- /2/8- / #./ / /Г7 3; 21+6/ +8 :/ 7 + 3; 794/6 437/.32; +8; ,/+2 /+6 / / /7 8/ 196/ /-+4896/.+8 74/- /2/8- / #8+6,3+6. / /Г7 3; // / /4+8/ /77 135

136 APPENDIX 3.3 Appendix 3.3 Photo 1 showing hull exterior. Appendix 3.3 Photo 2 showing steering nozzle and propeller. 136

137 Cont. APPENDIX 3.3 Appendix 3.3 Photo 3 showing bent bilge keel on starboard side. Appendix 3.3 Photo 4 showing keel cooler. 137

138 APPENDIX 3.3 Cont. Appendix 3.3 Photo 5 showing keel cooler. Appendix 3.3 Photo 6 showing keel cooler. 138

139 Cont. APPENDIX 3.3 Appendix 3.3 Photo 7 showing tyre in steering nozzle 139