Compare and Contrast:

Transcription

1 Compare and Contrast: A look at four national situations from the perspective of a Fisheries Advisor with as much emphasis as possible on the nature of Participants entitlements in the Fisheries Ross Shotton Marine Resources Service Fisheries Department FAO, Rome, Italy

2

3

4 Gulf of Arden Socotra SAUDI ARABIA OMAN 52 E 54 E 6 N 44 E REPUBLIC OF YEMEN 48 E 50 E 42 E 4 N Arabian Sea 2 N DJIBOUTI SOMALIA 0 N INIDAN OCEAN

5

6

7

8 _ Reported Landings Mauritius Qatar Tonnes 20,000 5,000 0,000 5, Tonnes 2,000 0,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2, Timor-Leste Yemen ,000 Tonnes Tonnes 20,000 60,

9 Fisheries Management Functions Social- Economic Research & Analysis Socio-Economic Analysis Operational Plans Strategic Plans Strategic Policy Planning Fishery Operational Planning Ecosystem & Nat. Sci. Analysis Resource Research & Analysis Stock Assessments & Forecasts Enforcement Plans Fishing Entitlements Monitoring Req ts Catch & Effort Monitoring Enforce t Reporting Enforcement

10 Mauritius Qatar Timor Leste Yemen Score B+ D C F Monitoring of Catch Comment Data ok, function working acceptably No data collection available data suffer from bias of unknown direction that will change through out the year depending on the demand for imports and exports With independence, collapse of data collection activity. No funds for data collection, no staff for data collection outside of capital; no indication of any future funds. No reliable data available for period of Indonesian occupation. Collapse of data collection following the civil war (though the Fisheries Centre was undamaged) and no resumption collection. No funding for travel to ports. No funding for data entry. Management system has adjusted to lack of active data collection and relies on voluntary returns from auctions and wholesalers. Where landing tax is imposed, probably 50% of catch is unrecorded for the Red Sea and 30% for the Gulf of Aden.

11 Mauritiu s Monitoring of Effort and/or Fleet Capacity Score Comment B+ Sufficient for usable CPUE analysis; no provision for change in fishing power Qatar D Vessel licences only. No record of number of traps of gill nets that are used. Data on trips are recorded in ledgers by the Coast Guard but not analyzed. Timor Leste Yemen D F Fishing effort not recorded; information on numbers of fishermen available only through 999 national census. No licensing of the extremely active small scale sector, neither fishermen or boats.

12 Mauritius Qatar Timor Leste Yemen Score B+ B- F D MCS & Compliance Comment Well-staffed MCS system. Banks catch < TAC - no compliance issue. Hiring of low-paid expatriate fishermen from Madagascar legalized. Landings of foreign fleet monitored - more detail needed. Artisanal estuary fishery ok.. Coastguard monitors departures but at-sea transfers of catch. Monofilament gillnets better but still problem. Irregular patrols control fishing in MPAs. Low price for undersized fish deters landings. Geographical isolation & high costs keeps coastal fishing at low level. Suspect Indonesian IUU fishing in the southern waters (hundreds of boats?) and Australia trap & line boats 5 boats. Collusion between the Navy and foreign fishermen - canceling of foreign licences has stopped this. Regulated marketing of lobsters through SOEs creates massive smuggling. Illegal entanglement nets used for lobsters. >500 inspectors, but no arrests etc.

13 sk Mauritius Qatar Timor Leste Yemen Resource Research & Analysis / Socio-economic Research & Analysis Score E/D F/F E/E E/D Comment Size frequencies of Banks catch measured at port - no area records provided by vessels so stock identity unknown. Periodic data collection relating to incomes and related data as country is small and politicians are sensitive to voters. No regular collection of, e.g. costs & earnings data. No resource research or analysis. Fishermen are expatriates, usually from India. No Socio-economic research. No resource research or analysis. No Socio-economic research. No resource research or analysis. No Socio-economic research. Unions active in fisheries issues now self-representing.

14 Mauritius Qatar Timor Leste Yemen Score D+ E NA E Provision of Management Advice No annual management plans. TACs for the Banks fishery following 5-year 0% reduction in TAC - catch never reaches declining TAC. Management ad hoc crisis driven. Frequent staff turnover limits corporate memory & commitment to department and longer term change. Policy & Planning Unit active on an ad hoc basis. No regular OP process. Exports prohibited when domestic prices rise. Licences capped in 2004 but 50 of 550 dhows not fishing not profitably. Management decisions without consultation with Fisheries Department. No regular OP process. No planning. Comment Major decisions taken independently to Fisheries Department by Minister. No regular fishery management process.

15 Mauritius offshore Mauritius estuarine Fishing Rights (i.e. Access Rights). Comment Limited licensing and restrictions of vessel replacement; low profitability => no pressure from new entrants. St Brandon Bank managed under exclusive access agreement; Saya de Malha fishing bank - high seas fishery. TACs now transferable to encourage fleet reduction and increase catch rates/profitability. Small decline in fleet size insufficient to allow restructuring. Banks fishermen must register to qualify for training grants and other government supports. Miserable working conditions deter young fishermen; turn to Madagascar for low cost crews. Government assistance to enter estuarine fisheries => resources now overfished. No restrictions on entry for social reasons but low incomes deter further entrants. Licences non-transferable among individual fisherman

16 Qatar Timor Leste Yemen Fishing Rights (i.e. Access Rights). Comment Licensing limited to dhows. Capping of licensing and tradability has created licence value of $ Only 70% of fleet fishing. Number of traps/dhow limited to 300 no consideration of licensing traps yet. Owners must negotiate with Government to get green card for Indian fishermen. No restriction on entry into coastal fishery. Lack of capital and expertise has prevented participation in offshore fishery. Decisions on foreign entry ad hoc (none so far permitted). Indonesian tradition Constitution permits fishing everywhere; but strong clan traditions Common property without traditional management practices. Cancelling of licensing agreements with foreign (Chinese and Egyptian) participants has mitigated conservation problems

17 Community Capacity to Negotiate Wishes - The Fishermen - Country Comment Mauritius Qatar Strong tradition of unions and community organizations. Fishermen's NGOs organize small-scale fishermen and promote their welfare; tradition of religious charities active in fishermen s affairs. Significant tradition of expectations of handouts from the Government, e.g. bad-weather allowance. No co-sharing of responsibilities. Indian fishermen have severely limited rights (common throughout the Persian Gulf countries). Deportation a threat. But, owners need good fishermen so bargaining is not completely one-sided.

18 Country Yemen Timor Leste Community Capacity to Negotiate Wishes - The Fishermen - Comment Open entry. Widespread auctions & growing competition for fish restricts ability of companies to manipulate prices. Government relies on taxes/above-normal profits from state companies to pay privileged and non-productive employees. SOEs challenged by traders as sources of credit, etc. Ministry support for unions counters power of Sana a elites Tradition of devolved consultation and local area organization not lost during independence; fishermen s leaders respected. Government struggling to address issues and requirements for community management as little past tradition. At lower levels, this tradition surprisingly healthy and will provide a foundation for growth

19

20 Synthesis? The distance from general precepts to operational implementation is inevitably enormous these examples are the norm Attempts at generalizing may be dangerous the devil is in the detail None of the countries comes close to being in a position to address community empowerment in the sense of my examples during my opening presentation, But, all have the structures on which community empowering can be built and from which community management structures could evolve

21 Comparisons? Simple comparisons will ignore the differing underlying causes for similar outcomes: social factors legal traditions biology of the resource commercial fisheries environment political history But Common elements exist the issue is in the navigation around the issues

22 Scoring operational management: Mauritius Qatar Timor Leste Yemen Score (400) Licensing of vessels Enforcement & Compliance (MCS) Collection of catch data Collection of effort data 5 8 Resource assessment Provision of harvesting advice Operational planning 3 0 5

23 Scoring community empowerment: Task Mauritius Qatar Timor Leste Yemen Transferability of entitlement 8 / Community involvement in management policy Community empowerment - formal 3 / informal Community involvement in information collection 0 0

24