The Day of Infamy. Political Background. Pearl Harbour. Planning and preparation.

Transcription

1 The Day of Infamy Political Background Japan as a nation was poor in terms of its natural resources. It required these to maintain its role as one of the World s major players. In 1931 in an attempt to expand its capabilities it invaded and conquered Manchuria, a part of China. In 1937 it continued a long and unsuccessful campaign to take the rest of China. In 1940 The Japanese Government allied themselves with the Axis countries and continued their expansion occupying Indochina. It was through these actions that the seeds of War with the United States of America were sown. The U.S.A. had important economic interests in South East Asia and these Japanese moves caused great concern. An embargo on American shipments to Japan of oil and other raw materials was imposed, U.S. military power in the Pacific was strengthened and military aid to China was increased. In its turn Japan viewed the withdrawal of raw materials, especially that of oil, as a major threat to its interests. This could only be addressed by the further expansion into countries with these resources in South East Asia ultimately effecting U.S. interests and almost certainly leading to war. Pearl Harbour As a Naval Base, Pearl Harbour had been under development as a major base for many years. In its favour it had dry docks capable of holding the largest Battleships, industrial facilities for their repair and maintenance, numerous berthing, mooring and docking locations. In the centre of the harbour was Ford Island where there was a large Naval Air Station for combat, land-based aircraft and short and long range patrol seaplanes. Southeast of Ford Island was a Submarine base established as far back as Nearby was a large expanse of Oil storage tanks, a Naval Hospital and numerous other facilities. On the negative side, while there was the room, Pearl Harbour still did not have enough support facilities to maintain the size of the Pacific fleet that had been suddenly sent to reinforce the region. Its area was limited preventing fast dispersal of the fleet and its opening to the sea was through a single, vulnerable, narrow channel. There were not enough services to keep the fleet in a fighting state and the sudden influx of Naval personnel had stretched the available housing and recreational facilities to breaking point. As these men spilled into nearby Honolulu, relations became tense with the local inhabitants who resented their overbearing arrival. As such the newly arrived fleet was less secure than it might otherwise be, its battle readiness was below standard and the morale of its sailors, far from the comforts of family and home was diminished. Planning and preparation. The fly in the ointment for Japan s required expansion was always going to be the American Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbour and as such it had to be addressed. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander of the Japanese Fleet devised the plan to attack the American fleet in harbour. The key elements of his plan were the need for

2 meticulous preparation, surprise and the use of aircraft carriers and their planes on an unprecedented scale. The element of preparation started in the spring of 1941 when navy pilots began practising level, dive and torpedo bombing. This practice immediately identified problem areas. Using targets with the same thickness as the U.S. Battleship s deck armour it was discovered that the usual 800kg bombs would not penetrate when dropped from 8,500 feet but with too little time to design and test a new purpose built bomb an improvised solution was found by welding tail fins onto 16 inch naval gun shells. These bombs now needed a new rack to carry them and ensure that they would swing clear of the propeller arc. With these changes in place the bombing problem was solved. There were also problems with torpedo bombing. The harbour was particularly shallow for the use of standard torpedoes having an average depth of 40 feet. When a torpedo was delivered by standard means it would sink to between 60 and 75 feet prior to rising to its running depth. This would obviously mean that torpedoes would embed themselves deeply into the muddy bottom before ever reaching their intended targets. The solution came from the British. They had come against the same problem when planning their attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto. A Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin was immediately dispatched to Taranto to investigate and discovered the ingeniously simple solution: large wooden fins attached to the torpedoes to aid buoyancy. With little time before the intended attack only 30 new torpedoes could be ready for practice by October with a further 150 not scheduled for delivery until the 30 th November. The Fleet however was due to set sail ten days prior to that date. A major part of the attack plan now seemed at risk. The man in charge of delivering the torpedoes at the Mitsubishi factory in Nagasaki ignored his company s overtime ban but even so could only still deliver the required new torpedoes 24 hours after the battle fleet had sailed. The carrier Kaga had remained behind to take delivery and steamed quickly to rejoin the task force on its way to Pearl Harbour. It is worth noting that in devising his plan, Yamamoto was aware of the possible use of anti-torpedo nets. His solution was to use Kate torpedo bombers as suicide attackers to destroy the nets and allow those behind to complete their attacks. As it happened there were no nets. Admiral Kimmel, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet had requested them but the Navy had turned him down. Their reason for refusing being one of expense. After the attack, at his court marshal, one of the charges placed against Kimmel was his failure to have torpedo nets in place! The attack. Much to the opposition of the Japanese aviators, the first Japanese forces to reach Pearl Harbour were five midget submarines launched from larger subs lying off shore. The larger submarines were to perform reconnaissance duties prior to the attack and to engage U.S. vessels leaving Pearl in search of the Japanese Fleet after it. The midget subs were to penetrate the harbour defences, lie in wait on the bottom until the air attack started, launch their pair of torpedoes and sneak away under cover of the ensuing chaos. The danger was that the submarines would be discovered attempting to enter through the harbour defences and so loose the element of surprise. Yamamoto s reason for using the submarines was his fear was that the air attack alone might not be adequate.

3 The fears of the Japanese aviators were very nearly realised. The destroyer USS Ward raised the first alarm at 06:30 after observing the conning tower of a midget submarine following in the wake of USS Antares, a stores ship entering the harbour. Ward sounded General Quarters and attacked firing two shots from seventy-five yards hitting with the second shot. For good measure she also dropped a pattern of depth charges sinking the sub in 1,200 feet of water. Thus it was that America fired the first shots in anger that fateful day. Only minutes later, a PBY patrol aircraft from Ford Island reported depth charging a submarine one mile off the harbour entrance. Unfortunately, all these reports did was to fuel a long-winded and confused discussion about their meaning. The land based naval officers onshore involved in the discussions did not even bother to inform the Army of the sightings. So it was that the Japanese on the whole maintained the element of surprise. Meanwhile the Japanese Fleet comprising of two Battleships, three Cruisers, nine Destroyers, eight fuel tankers, 27 submarines and six Japanese carriers struggled to maintain their stations in heavy swelling seas. Normally in such conditions, the attack would have been cancelled, but the die was cast and from 06:00 gradually the first wave of 183 bombers (high level, torpedo and dive) and fighters formed up and headed south. The second wave of 167 aircraft formed up similarly to the first, minus torpedo bombers. In all 350 aircraft had been launched successfully. At 0700 one of the six SCR 270 mobile radar stations on the Island of Oahu picked up a swarm of aircraft some 132 miles dues north. But in December 1941, the use of radar was little understood by the Americans. There were few experienced operators and the hard-to-use sets were only turned on for a few hours each day. The radar contact, although not its size, was duly reported but a flight of 11 B17 bombers was expected from that direction and at that approximate time. The report went to Kermit Tyler, the junior duty officer. He had started on what was only his second shift in that role at 04:00 that quiet Sunday morning. He knew about the bombers and dismissed the report with the words Don t worry about it! So it was that a further mistake was added to the growing list, leaving just 45 minutes of peace remaining. At 07:40, Mitsuo Fuchida s first wave swept over the northern tip of Oahu. Fuchida had been responsible for pilot training and had been closely involved in the overall battle plan. The horizontal bombers continued on their course at 9,840 ft, the divebombers climbed to 13,120 ft and the torpedo bombers began their gradual decent, which would bring them into the harbour at deck level. The intention was for the torpedo bombers to attack first before the explosions, splashes and smoke of the others bombers attacks could obscure their view, but it was now the turn of the Japanese to falter. Fuchida s attack flare was not seen by one segment of the fighter cover and a second flare fired caused the dive bombers to begin their attack thinking that surprise had not been achieved. An intricate attack plan was beginning to unravel! US airfields at Ford Island, Hickham, Wheeler, Kaneohe, Bellows and Ewa were all attacked by fighters and bombers with the intention of preventing US retaliation by destroying as many aircraft as possible, while the torpedo planes split into two pincer flights attacking the harbour from the north and south east sides. The efforts of the raids on the American airfields was made easier for the Japanese by the grouping together of aircraft on the ground in an attempt to make sabotage more difficult. The degree of surprise achieved by the Japanese is probably best demonstrated by the words of Lee Soucy, Pharmacist s Mate 2 nd Class on board the USS Utah: even after I saw a huge fireball and cloud of black smoke rise from the

4 hangars on Ford Island and heard explosions, it did not occur to me that these were enemy planes. Sixteen torpedo bombers approached the harbour from the northwest while twentyfour swept in over Hickham Field from the Southeast. There was bitter disappointment at the absence of the American Carriers although some pilots mistook USS Utah for a carrier. She was in fact an old battleship, which had her main guns removed and the deck covered in heavy timbers as protection from the dummy bombs used on her as a target ship. She was hit in quick succession by two torpedoes and began immediately listing to port. The remaining torpedo planes flew over Ford Island to attack the ships moored against the quayside of the Navy yard. Battleship Row At 08:00 as the first torpedoes struck home, honour guards were performing their regular ceremony of raising their ensigns at the sterns of virtually all ships. This was no less the case on Battleship Row, where six battleships were moored side by side. These formed the next highest priority target for the torpedo bombers after the absent carriers. The first torpedo hit the West Virginia, the second struck Oklahoma, each being struck several further times. West Virginia was only prevented from capsizing by the speedy counter flooding ordered by its mortally wounded Captain, Mervyn Bennion. After several more torpedo strikes, Oklahoma began to heel over to port and was only stopped from turning full circle by the jamming of her masts into the muddy bottom. Arizona was somewhat protected from torpedo strike by the repair ship Vestal, moored along side her in the usual berth of the California. Arizona was instead targeted by high-level Kate bombers carrying the modified 1,760 pound battleship shell bomb. Four bombs found their mark with the last hitting at 08:10 beside turret number 2, forward. Penetrating deep into the forward magazine, fifty tons of gunpowder exploded in a massive fireball killing 1,177 officers and men. Settling on an even keel, smoke from her burning oil continued to dominate the skyline for hours afterwards. Just 337 members of her crew escaped what is still the worst ship disaster in American History. Covered by the ships moored alongside, Maryland and Tennessee suffered relatively minor damage. The Flagship of the Pacific Battle Fleet, California, had moved her moorings from alongside the Arizona to close to the aviation tanker fuel quay to the southern end of Battleship Row. Her watertight integrity was severely compromised by the preparations made for scheduled maintenance work, with doors, hatches and portholes wide open. When two torpedoes plunged into her hull, her sinking was merely a foregone conclusion. As with the Maryland, it was only the fast thinking actions of a few men organising counter flooding that prevented her complete capsizing. The Nevada was the only Battleship that made up enough steam to enable her to make a run for the open sea. Damaged by a single torpedo hit she was then targeted by twenty-three dive-bombers of which at least five scored direct hits. Realising that she could not now make the open sea, and determined not to block the narrow channel she was deliberately run aground at Hospital Point. The first wave lasted only half an hour with at least four separate torpedo attack runs. The second wave found their attack less easy. Thick smoke from the first round of attacks obscured many of their targets and by now air defences were manned and prepared. 20 Japanese planes were shot down, but still many further ships were damaged and sunk. Fighting continued to rage over the harbour until 0945 when finally the attackers returned to the fleet. Fuchida begged for a third wave to attack and finish the US Navy, but he was overruled by the cautious and relatively

5 inexperienced Chuichi Nagumo, Commander of the 1 st air fleet who argued that the attack had achieved its objectives and that it was pointless to risk further loss. More of that later One of the few ships that attempted to escape the harbour was the light cruiser St. Louis. As she emerged from the harbour entrance, lookouts were horrified to see two torpedo tracks running straight towards her. Unable to manoeuvre in the narrow channel there was nothing they could do other than wait for the explosions. Instead the two 18 inch torpedoes hit a small coral reef, exploding harmlessly. The lookouts then spotted a midget submarine 1,000 yards to the southwest and several salvoes were fired at it with the ship s starboard 5-inch guns. The Submarine disappeared and so in the same way as the attack had begun it ended with a US warship firing at a Japanese midget submarine. After the Battle The scene left behind by the Japanese was one of devastation. In an attack which had lasted a less than two hours they had sunk or severely damaged eight Battleships, three Cruisers, three Destroyers and eight other ships. 280 US aircraft had been destroyed or damaged, numerous buildings and hangars left burning and 3,500 people had become casualties with 2,403 fatalities. Of those killed, one third had been onboard the Arizona when she had exploded in a ball of flame. In contrast the Japanese lost a total of five midget submarines and 29 aircraft resulting in 64 fatalities. The attack had been a stunning success and had fully achieved its aim of neutralising the US Navy allowing for unopposed Japanese expansion in the short term at least. In hindsight, this apparent success was rather more a great failure. It turned the mood of US isolationism into a desire for revenge, forcing the US into a war she had desperately been trying to avoid. The main prize of the US carriers was not present during the attack. The issue of the third wave was where the ultimate long-term success of the operation was decided. Much discussion has since revolved around the third wave. Its planned targets were to be the repair facilities of the naval yard, the power station and the huge oil storage farm. The only aircraft available to perform the attack would have been those from the first wave that were undamaged enough to be refuelled and rearmed or quickly repaired. Their pilots would have required de-briefing from the first wave attack and re-briefing regarding their new targets. All this, under the threat of discovery by U.S. forces. Had this attack taken place as successfully as the previous two, the ability of the U.S. to mount a counter-offensive in the Pacific would have been significantly delayed. It is worthy of note that such an attack would likely to have been suicidal, if not because of the prepared defences, then because logistically speaking it would have had to expose the already tired pilots of the third wave to a night time return landing on the Japanese carriers, even if they could have been found. It should also be noted that while the Pacific Fleet would have been seriously effected by such an additional attack, it is quite likely that with its industrial power behind it, America would have still quickly overcome the obstacle.

6 Ultimately most of the ships sunk at Pearl were soon repaired and restored to the fleet. The Nevada assisted with the bombardment of Iwo Jima and sailed as part of the Allied invasion fleet off Normandy, California, Tennessee and West Virginia fought in the Philippines. Utah and Arizona remain in Pearl Harbour as a testament to that fateful day, with the Arizona being preserved as a memorial to all those who lost their lives on that day. More recently the battleship Missouri has been moored next to the Arizona as it was on her decks that the Japanese instrument of surrender was signed just four years later. Thus symbolically at least, WWII begins and ends at Pearl Harbour. The Key Players Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet and Walter C. Short, Commander of the Army forces, were both found guilty of dereliction of duty. They protested their innocence until their deaths, repeatedly claimed that they were deliberately denied vital information that prevented their being alerted to a surprise attack, which was supposedly available in Washington. Since then their families have continued to demand that both men be re-instated with full rank to provide some form of posthumous vindication but the most recent inquiry took place in 1995 rejected these demands declaring: As Commanders, they were accountable. Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, who had dismissed the radar reports of aircraft finally retired disappointingly at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He always blamed his slow rise through the ranks on his fatefully dismissive words that day. In April 1943 Yamamoto was shot down and killed during an inspection tour of the Solomon Islands. After the crippling loss of four Japanese aircraft carriers at the battle of Midway, Nagumo was transferred to command a small naval flotilla in the Marianas. He committed suicide in July 1944, after having organised the defence of Saipan. Ironically Fuchida survived the war eventually converted to Christianity. He travelled widely in Canada and America, eventually becoming a US citizen in 1966 and subsequently dying there in After all the theories, ideas and discussions have faded into the distance it is probably worth realising that whatever form the attack took, with whatever targets damaged or destroyed and by however many waves, there could only be one ultimate result; the destruction of the Imperial Japanese forces. This had even been predicted by the author of the plan, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto with his words immediately after the Pearl Harbour attack: We have awakened a sleeping giant and instilled in him a terrible resolve. The Game We will be running the game as a demonstration game at Salute, certainly for this year anyway. Hopefully as you will appreciate, it takes quite some time to research the topic thoroughly let alone source and prepare all the ships and ground plans even before starting to build the scenery, so there has been no chance to work up a set of playable participation rules. However, to quote all optimists there s always next year!

7 At the time of going to press we have all the ships painted, Ford Island is virtually complete and two of the three static 1/48 th Japanese Aircraft for the static display are finished ready for photographing. After Christmas construction of the surrounding port installations and landscaping can begin in earnest. We are hoping to demonstrate the scale of the target rich environment set out before the Japanese, showing all the ships in their anchorages and to put into context the events of that infamous day! David Barnes South London Warlords