DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

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1 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE April2007 MEMORANDTIM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami. FL33172 SUBJECT: Recom.mendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Al-Khadr A al-yafi o Aliases and Current/True Name: Al-Khadr Abdullah Muhammed al-yafi" Abu Musa. Musa al-lujdi. Gharib o Place of Birth: Lawdar" Yemen (YM) o Date of Birth: 1970 o Crtrzenship: Yemen o Intemment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously assessedetainee as Continued Detention under DOD Control (CD) with Transfer Language on 31 March b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an Islamic extremist and a veteran jihadist who admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan (AF) for jihad. Detainee was identified as being on the front lines of Kabul, AF, at an al-qaida supported guesthouse, and at Tora Bora, AF. Detainee is reportedly an al-qaida facilitator who trained at multiple camps in Afghanistan, and is possibly a Usama Bin Laden (UBL) bodyguard. IADDITIONAL CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C RE T / / NOFORN / I

2 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.I JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A LOW threat from a detention perspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. c. (S/NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by F next to the footnote.) o Detainee was possibly an al-qaida facilitator and"/or a UBL bodyguard 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicatedo on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee's formal education ended after the fourth grade. Detainee was conscripted into the Yemeni military in 1985 when he was 17 years old, and served from in the infantry. Detainee was trained to use the Kalashnikov assault rifle, handguns and various other weapons that he could not recall. After the military, detainee worked on his parents' land as a shepherd. He also took odd jobs in construction, security, and small trades dealing in sheep and vegetables for approximately 10 years. Detainee traveled twice to Saudi Arabia, performing both the Hajj (major pilgrimage) and the Umrah (minor pilgrimage;.' The first trip to Saudi Arabia was in 1994, for approximately 1-2 months. The second trip to Saudi Arabia was in 1998 for approximately 2 weeks.' b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee studied for six months at the Dimaj Institute in Sadah, YM, under deceased Shaykh Muqbil al-wadi, who encouraged detainee to travel to Afghanistan to teach the basics of religion and Arabic language.' Abd al-malik al- ' DEC-2002 tiir ' to-:i+/soo13-01, Analyst Note: In this account, detainee claimed he traveled to Afghanistan in May of This is inconsistent with other accorurts he has given, and he may have been trying to downplay his associations with Arab fighters in Afghanistan. It is assessed that detainee actually traveled to Afghanistan in He later also denied ever attending the Dimaj Institute or studying under Shaykh Muqbil al-wadi. See IIR Shaykh al-wadi is aka Shaykh Muqbil. A variant of Dimaj is Dumaj. The Dimaj Institute is also known as Dar al- Hadith or Jamia Shavkh al-muqbil. 1 L S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

3 s E c RE T / / NOFORT\ I I STIBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Pakistani, who was approximately years old, handled detainee's recruitment and travel. Detainee met al-pakistani at a speech given by Shaykh Muqbil al-wadi.a c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: Detainee was in Afghanistan for approximately two years teaching the Koran alongside Abd al-malik al-pakistani. Detainee did missionary work in Karachi, Pakistan (PK), at various mosques before proceeding to Quetta, PK, and Kandahar, AF. Detainee worked as a missionary in Kandahar until his departure for Khowst, AF, in early December 2001.s Detainee denied meeting any Taliban members, attending any training camps, or carrying any weapons while in Afghanistan." 5. (U) Capture Information: a. (S//\fF) Detainee joined a group of 31 Arabs in Khowst. Three guides took them to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Parachinar, PK. Detainee claimed he gave his passport to a guide. Once in Pakistan, the guide told detainee that he was going to get a vehicle and food, but did not retum, leaving detainee without his passport. Pakistani authorities arrested detainee in Parachinar on 15 December 2001 and transferred him to US custodv at the Kandahar Detention Facility on26 December b. (S) Property Held: None c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 16 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: There were no reasons for transfer documented in detainee's file. 6. (S/NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee admitted to his role as a jihadist traveling to Afghanistan during only one interview. In all other accounts, he has resolutely maintained his cover story despite evidence to the contrary. Detainee continues to maintain his Koran-teaching cover story. Majid M Abdu Ahmed, ISN US9YM DP (YM-041), revealed that the Koran-teaching cover story was false.o Mohammed Y A1 Zayley, US9SA (SA-055), stated that after detainee and his group were captured a Pakistani prison warden instructed them that when interrogated by US forces they should say they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran or for religious studies.' " TD-3r t to-lt+/soot:-ot u DEC-2002, l4-arjg-2002 t to-3 t , TD -3 4 r r, TD-3 14/ t oooo r-ArJG-2002 n IIR o7o4 02, IIR o78o oz t ) S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I

4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I JTF-GTMO.CDR SI-IBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo 7. (U) Detainee Threat: b. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and its allies. c. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an Islamic extremist and a veteran jihadist who admitted to a joint US-Yemeni interview team that he traveled to Afghanistan for jihad. Detainee was on the Kabul front lines, at al-qaida affiliated safe houses, and at Tora Bora. Detainee reportedly trained at Derunta and Khaldan Training Camps and was an al-qaida facilitator. o (S/A{F) During a joint US-Yemeni custodial interview, detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to fight jihad, and was in Afghanistan for approximately two years prior to his capture.lo o (S/A{F) Detainee was identified as being in Afghanistan for over a three-year period before and after 11 September 2001 by others in US and foreign custody. Detainee was seen on the Kabul front lines, at al-qaida affiliated guesthouses, and at Tora Bora. o (S/A{F) Detainee participated in hostilities on the Kabul front lines and in Tora Bora.. (S/A{F) Abdu Ali al-hajj Sharqawi, ISN PK9YM DP (YM-1457), a well known al-qaida facilitator who facilitated the travel of many jihadists into and out of Afghanistan, remarked that detainee was a Yemeni who was at the Kabul front lines.". (S/,Am; Muhammad Mani Ahmad al-shal Lan al-qahtani, ISN US9SA DP (5,4'-063), identified detainee as a fighter he saw in Tora Bora.l2. (S/AVF; Pakistan's ISID listed Abdallah al-igazar as one of forty-eight Yemenis captured as they were escaping from Afghanistan. It is assessed Abdallah al-i{.j;razar is a variant of detainee's name.''. (S/A{F) Abd a\-razzaq Abdallah Ibrahim al-sharikh ISN, US9SA DP (5,4.-067), identified detainee as being in Tora Bora.ra o (S/AfF) Detainee transited multiple al-qaida affiliated guesthouses while in Afghanistan. 'o TD3ur " IIR 6034 oo59 05 t' SIR I4-APR-2003, Analyst Note: 5, is assessed to be an intended "206 Hijacker" in the 11.^ September 2001 attacks, who failed to gain entry into the US '' TD-314/ to > sir 28-ocr S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

5 s E c RE T / / NOFORN I I s SLIBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo. (S/AIF) Mohammed Hashim, ISN US9AF DP (AF-850), stated he saw detainee in early 2000 at the Arab compound in Kandahar. ''. (S/AVf; Abu Faraj al-libi aka (Mustafa Faraj Muhammad Mas'ud al-jadid al- Uzaybl),ISN US9LY DP (LY-10017), a high level al-qaida leader who was detained in early May 2005, recognized detainee as a Yemeni he saw at the Kabul guesthouse in approximately T999 or 2000.'o. (S/A{F) Mamdouh Ibrahim Ahmed Habib, ISN US9AS-00066lDP (A5-661, transferred), reported detaine.e was one of the individuals he saw at the Abu Harnza guesthouse in Kabul." (Analyst Note: Abu Hamza guesthouse is assessed to be the Abu Hamza al-qa'iti guesthouse, a known al-qaida guesthouse.)18 o (S/AfF) Detainee's name was found on a document recovered during raids on suspected al-qaida safe houses in Pakistan. Detainee was listed as Al-Khodr Abdullah al-yafe'i aka (Musa al- last name illegible), who had a Yemeni passport and an ID card. The safety deposit box number associated with detainee was 'e lanalyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within Al- Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts or safety deposit boxes were storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets, until completion of training or other activity.) o (S/A{F) Detainee was recognizedby al-qaida members who claimed to have known him by his alias while in Afghanistan. Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah Salih al- Hanashi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-078), stated detainee identified himself to YM-078 as Gharib, from Abyan, Yemen.2o (Analyst Note: An independent corroborating account is available in the SCI supplement.) o (S/A{F) Detainee has been identified as an al-qaida facilitator who trained at multiple camps in Afghanistan, and possibly identified as a UBL bodyguard. o (S/NF) 5,4'-067 stated that Fahd Umar Abd al-majid al-umari al-sharii ISN US9SA DP (SA-215), told him (5A-067) that detainee was an al-qaida facilitator with whom SA-215 had trained at Derunta and Khaldan Training Camps.2l o (S/AIF) 5, reported that detainee could be one of UBL's bodyguards.22 " IIR n65 03, JuN-2003 'u TD-3]4/q " IIR r8 Analyst Note: Variants of al-qa'iti include al-kyate, Alkuaiti, al-gayedi, al-qu'aidi, al-qoaiti, and al-giati tn td 3 4 r oz, AFGp g 0552i 30 -IUL-2002 to TD-3r4r29r52-02 " > sir 28-ocr-2006 tt > oooo6z sir 28-ocr s E c RE T // NOFORN I I

6 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I s SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo o (S/A{F) Shaykh Muqbil al-wadi recruited detainee in Yemen for jihad. o (S/AIF) Beginning in the early 1980s, al-wadi played a direct role in spreading the influence of Wahabism in Yemen, and was responsible for the jihadist movement in the Sadaa, YM, area.23 (Analyst note: Shaykh al-wadi was the founder of the al- Salafiah (Salafist) movement in Yemen and operated a number of reform-oriented institutions and organizations including the Dimaj Institute. The Dimaj Institute is a suspected terrorist training facility, which recruits and indoctrinates Muslim radicals.) o (S/AIF) Four other individuals captured with detainee were also influenced by Shaykh Moqbil al-wadi: Uthman H Al Rahim, ISN US9YM DP (YM-027),24 Mohammed A al-ansi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-029),25 Maiid M Abdu Ahmed, ISN US9YM DP (YM-041),26 and Ali A Al Rahizi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-04s).' ' d. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile toward the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 16 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 28 January 2007, when he was found in possession of contraband, including a sheet of paper tom in half with foreign language written on the front and back. Detainee has a total of two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on27 May 2003, when he spit on and threw water and bodily fluids on guards while participating in a mass disturbance. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include threatening guards, assault, damage to government property, inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, possession of food, and possession of both non-weapon and weapon type contraband. On 3 June 2004 several rocks were found in the detainee's cell. In 2006 detainee had a total of five Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and one so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: ^. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 6 June b. (S//ND Placement and Access: Detainee spent two to three years in Afghanistan and was identified as beins on the front lines near Kabul and Tora Bora. Detainee was also " DEC-2002, U-UCR Damaj Institute, TD -314 I l, FBIS GMP I-FEB-2001: Analvst Note: A variant of al-wadi is al-wad'a t'iir " oooo29 sir ol-apr-2002 tu IIR TD-3r4t tt oooo I9-MAY s E c RE T //NOFORN I I

7 s E c RE T // NOFORN I I s SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo identified as residing at a guesthouse and an Arab compound in Kandahar, and training at both Khaldan and Derunta. Detainee is a committed veteran jihadist, and was possibly an al- Qaida facilitator or UBL bodyguard. c. (S/NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee should be able to provide limited information on Taliban and al-qaida commanders that were stationed at the Kabul front lines and Tora Bora. Detainee should be able to identify recruiters that operated from the Dimaj Institute in Yemen. Detainee has named some associates but has provided very little insight to their identities or activities. The information detainee can provide would probably incriminate himself and other JTF-GTMO detainees, but it would be dated and not strategically or tactically critical. If corroborating information can be found that confirms his role as an al-qaida facilitator or UBL bodyguard, this would raise detainee's intelligence value. d. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Personalities, training, and recruiting practices at the Dimaj Institute o Individuals in detainee's group that fled from Tora Bora 9, (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 2 November 2004, and he remains an enemv combatant. S, JR. ' Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminologlt. s E c R E T // NOFORN I I s