IAEA Training in Level 2 PSA MODULE 8: Coupling Source Terms to Probabilistic Event Analysis (CET end-state binning)

Similar documents
Level 2 PSA for the VVER 440/213 Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant

COMPUTING SOURCE TERMS WITH DYNAMIC CONTAINMENT EVENT TREES

Accident Management Strategies for Mark I and Mark III BWRs

REGULATORY OBSERVATION

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS for protecting people and the environment

Nuclear safety Lecture 4. The accident of the TMI-2 (1979)

Classical Event Tree Analysis and Dynamic Event Tree Analysis for High Pressure Core Melt Accidents in a German PWR

DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Safety Analysis: Event Classification

DESIGN OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Comparison of the partner s approaches for physical phenomena assessment in level 2 PSA

Identification and Screening of Scenarios for LOPA. Ken First Dow Chemical Company Midland, MI

IEM on Severe Accident Management in the light of the accident at the Fukushima Daïchi NPP

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER F: CONTAINMENT AND SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS 7. CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (EVU [CHRS])

Containment Isolation system analysis and its contribution to level 2 PSA results in Doel 3 unit

How to reinforce the defence-indepth in NPP by taking into account natural hazards?

Integrated Coping Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events

ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EPR AT DUKOVANY NPP

INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN CASE STUDY OF RAPID BLOW DOWN ON OFFSHORE PLATFORM

Safety and efficiency go hand in hand at MVM Paks NPP

Workshop Information IAEA Workshop

Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG)

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER I: AUXILIARY SYSTEMS. A high-capacity EBA system [CSVS] [main purge]

Loss of Normal Feedwater Analysis by RELAP5/MOD3.3 in Support to Human Reliability Analysis

Considerations for the Practical Application of the Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Design

Review and Assessment of Engineering Factors

An Improved Modeling Method for ISLOCA for RI-ISI and Other Risk Informed Applications

Severe Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants

Recent Research on Hazards PSA

SAFETY APPROACHES. The practical elimination approach of accident situations for water-cooled nuclear power reactors

Enhancing NPP Safety through an Effective Dependability Management

CONTENTS OF THE PCSR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Simulation of Experiment on Aerosol Behaviour at Severe Accident Conditions in the LACE Experimental Facility with the ASTEC CPA Code

Gas Sampling in the DST

Evaluation of the fraction of Unit-3 vent gas that flowed into Unit-4 reactor building

FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY OVERVIEW VOLUME 2: DESIGN AND SAFETY CHAPTER P: REFERENCE OPERATING CONDITION STUDIES (PCC)

TEPCO s Safety Assurance Philosophy on Nuclear Power Generation Plants

ASVAD THE SIMPLE ANSWER TO A SERIOUS PROBLEM. Automatic Safety Valve for Accumulator Depressurization. (p.p.)

DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION IN 1F1

The «practical elimination» approach for pressurized water reactors

APPENDIX B AN EXAMPLE RISK CALCULATION

The Nitrogen Threat. The simple answer to a serious problem. 1. Why nitrogen is a risky threat to our reactors? 2. Current strategies to deal with it.

Event tree analysis. Prof. Enrico Zio. Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia. Prof. Enrico Zio

NKS PODRIS project. Importance of inspection reliability assumptions on piping failure probability estimates

HYDROSTATIC LEAK TEST PROCEDURE

Safety Classification of Structures, Systems and Components in Nuclear Power Plants

Engineering & Projects Organization

Improving Accuracy of Frequency Estimation of Major Vapor Cloud Explosions for Evaluating Control Room Location through Quantitative Risk Assessment

Complementarity between Safety and Physical Protection in the Protection against Acts of Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities

DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE DG-1074

CLASS DH - PNEUMATIC TESTING - GREATER THAN 1 BAR (15 PSIG)

Correlation of Equipment Failures in Seismic PRAs

HTR Systems and Components

Verification and validation of computer codes Exercise

V.H. Sanchez Espinoza and I. Gómez-García-Toraño

1. Preface Important Safety Notes Brief Product Information Product Working Principle Installation Guidelines...

SAFETY SEMINAR Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - August 3-7, Authors: Francisco Carlos da Costa Barros Edson Romano Marins

Preliminary Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for CH HCSB TBM

Pneumatic Conveying Principles BSH&E SEMINAR

Assessing Combinations of Hazards in a Probabilistic Safety Analysis

HIGH WIND PRA DEVELOPMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM IMPLEMENTATION Artur Mironenko and Nicholas Lovelace

Risks Associated with Caissons on Ageing Offshore Facilities

-. 30ýv. Entergy ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT I IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTAL. 05/01101 Supplement Volume 2 of 2. (Sections 3.7 and 3.

Improvements in the Reliability, Costs and Processing of WLP/RDL Circuits

6.6 Relief Devices. Introduction

Introduction. Seafood HACCP Alliance Training Course 8-1

NUBIKI Nuclear Safety Research Institute, Budapest, Hungary

DK46 - DK800 Supplementary instructions

A comparative study of FLEX strategies to cope with Extended Station Blackout (SBO)

August 31, CFR CFR ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

Instrumentation systems of BWR

VERTICAL CONCEPTUAL SITE MODELS FOR MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITES

RULES OF THE OIL AND GAS PROGRAM DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES CHAPTER DRILLING WELLS TABLE OF CONTENTS

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT OF COLD CHANNEL PIPELINE RUPTURE SIZE FOR WWER 440/270 REACTOR

Inspection Credit for PWSCC Mitigation via Peening Surface Stress Improvement

New Findings for the Application of Systems for Explosion- Isolation with Explosion Venting

Advanced LOPA Topics

LOW PRESSURE EFFUSION OF GASES revised by Igor Bolotin 03/05/12

Leaks from Unit-3 PCV and steam release in a large amount

DISTRIBUTION LIST. Preliminary Safety Report Chapter 19 Internal Hazards UK HPR1000 GDA. GNS Executive. GNS all staff. GNS and BRB all staff CGN EDF

OBJECTIVE 6: FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING - AMBIENT RADIATION MONITORING

Mounting and operating instructions EB 2530 EN. Self-operated Pressure Regulator. Pressure Reducing Valve Type M 44-2

Gas Accumulation Potential & Leak Detection when Converting to Gas

Ing. JOZEF BALÁŽ Ph.D. and Ing MILAN CVAN CSc

XA TEPSS RELATED PANDA TESTS (ESBWR)

EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES - CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS AREAS (ZONING) AND SELECTION OF EQUIPMENT

USE OF THE EXCEEDANCE CURVE APPROACH IN OCCUPIED BUILDING RISK ASSESSMENT

Abstract. 1 Introduction

Dynamic Context Quantification for Design Basis Accidents List Extension and Timely Severe Accident Management

Installation Operation Maintenance. Bermad Level Control Valve with Modulating Horizontal Float Pilot valve One Way Flow IOM.

Advanced Imaging Techniques for Structural Health Monitoring

Ranking of safety issues for

PURE SUBSTANCE. Nitrogen and gaseous air are pure substances.

RESPIRATOR PERFORMANCE TERMINOLOGY

GAS SYSTErv' At~t~ULUS OBJECTIVES: Approval Issue. <=> Page 3. <=> Pages 3-4. <=> Page 4. <=> Page 5. <=> Pages 6 7. <=> Pages 7-8.

Designing to proposed API WHB tube failure document

The ongoing experimental programs at IRSN on

~ A Behavioral Response Study in 2007 &2008 (BRS 07/08) was conducted in the Bahamas to

The Relationship Between Automation Complexity and Operator Error

Transcription:

IAEA Training in Level 2 PSA MODULE 8: Coupling Source Terms to Probabilistic Event Analysis (CET end-state binning)

The Problem A probabilistic treatment of severe accident progression leads to numerous possible pathways that an accident might proceed in time For a given PDS, the CET expands into many branches, each representing a distinct accident progression It is simply impractical to calculate a source term for each pathway through the CET. How can you characterize the source term for each pathway through the CET with a limited number of detailed calculations?

Solution: CET End-state Binning Rather than calculate a source term for each end-state of the CET, define rules to group end-states with similar source terms. Each group is referred to as a source term bin or release category Rules (binning criteria) are based on knowledge gained from multiple source term calculations

Example Release Category Assignments Process similar to PDS analysis Define binning criteria from results of calculations Link each CET end state to a unique Category Vessel at Low Pressure No Early Contain. Failure Early F.P. Release to Pool No Core- Concrete Interaction No Late Contain. Failure Late Release to Pool Sprays Operate Auxiliary Building Retention RELEASE CATEGORY PDS LP CFE POOL DF CCI CFL POOL SPRYS AB RC 1 1 3 2 4 4 5 2 2 3 3 4 4 5

The Process of Developing Rules for Source Term Binning 1) Perform preliminary calculations of fission product release as part of accident progression analysis Start with dominant accident sequences from Level 1 Also examine low-frequency, but potentially high source term sequences 2) Review results to identify features of plant design and accident phenomena that control magnitude/timing of release

Example: Preliminary Calculations Station Blackout Low Pressure Cases System or Phenomenon State 2 4 5 6 8 DC power for 6 hrs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes RCS Depressurization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Functional Containment Vent Functioning Containment Spray Ex-vessel debris quench No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No High Pressure Cases System or Phenomenon State 1 3 7 9 10 DC power for 6 hrs Yes Yes No Yes No RCS Depressurization No No No No No Functional Containment Vent Functioning Containment Spray Ex-vessel debris quench No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Develop an initial list of calculations based on results of PDS analysis At least one calculation for each class of accident sequences Consider variations in variables known to influence severe accident progression and source term

Release Fraction as a Measure for Comparing Source Terms Bin or group calculated source terms into broad classes based on magnitude and timing of release to the environment Release fractions for Iodine (I-131) and Cesium (Cs-137) are established measures of early and long-term health effects, respectively Binning criteria can be based on one, or both measures Release Category Fractional Release of Initial Core Inventory Lower Bound Upper Bound RC1 1.0 0.1 RC2 0.1 0.01 RC3 1.E-2 1.E-3 RC4 1.E-3 1.E-4 RC5 1.E-4 1.E-5 RC6 1.E-5 1.E-6 RC7 1.E-6 1.E-7 RC8 No release

Example: Results of Preliminary Calculations Iodine Release Case Fraction 1 6.4E-03 2 3.0E-05 3 2.7E-06 4 3.0E-07 5 1.8E-05 6 2.6E-04 7 2.3E-03 8 5.3E-04 9 1.5E-02 10 3.5E-04 Iodine Release Fraction 1.E-01 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6 RC7 Case Number

Example: Observations from Preliminary Calculations Factors in the calculated accident progression that explain differences in source terms Containment failure mode Early vs late; rupture vs leak; vent Reactor vessel pressure at time of lower head failure Additional factors that might be important, but insufficient information to be certain Coolability of debris after lower head failure Depth of water covering ex-vessel core debris Leak rate (hole size) in containment pressure boundary

Source Term Analysis Process (continued) 3) Perform additional calculations, as needed, to Determine source term for non-dominant accident sequences Confirm design features & accident phenomena that govern release 4) Define source term binning parameters Governing design features/accident phenomena 5) Identify a unique calculation that represents the source term for each release category Perform additional calculations, if needed, for some release categories

Example: Additional Calculations Low Pressure Cases System or Phenomenon State 2 4 5 6 8 11 13 DC power for 6 hrs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes RCS Depressurization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Functional Containment Vent Ex-vessel debris quench Increased Containment Leakage No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No High Pressure Cases System or Phenomenon State 1 3 7 9 10 12 15 DC power for 6 hrs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes RCS Depressurization No No No No No No No Functional Containment Vent Functioning Containment Spray Ex-vessel debris quench No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Clarify the effects of specific phenomena Increased leakage Deep pools of water for scrubbing ex- vessel releases

Example: Complete Set of Calculations Iodine Release Case Fraction 1 6.4E-03 2 3.0E-05 3 2.7E-06 4 3.0E-07 5 1.8E-05 6 2.6E-04 7 2.3E-03 8 5.3E-04 9 1.5E-02 10 3.5E-04 11 1.1E-03 12 4.8E-02 13 8.1E-04 14 2.2E-07 15 1.1E-03 16 1.5E-03 Iodine Release Fraction 1.E-01 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Case Number RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6 RC7

Search for Common Characteristics of Accident Progression that Explain Differences in Release Late Containment Leak, RPV failure at high pressure, Debris not cooled after vessel failure Late Containment Rupture Late Containment Leak & RPV failure at Low Pressure Iodine Release Fraction 1.E-01 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Case Number Late Containment Vent RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6 RC7 Early Containment Leak or Vent Late Leak, RPV failure at high pressure

Result: Common Features form Basis for Source Term Binning Criteria Release Category Containment Performance Early Containment Performance Late RV Pressure @ VB Debris Cooling RC-1 Rupture - - - RC-2 Leak - - - Vent - - - Isolation Failure - - - RC-3 RC-4 - Rupture - - - Leak High No - Vent - - - Leak High Yes RC-5 - Leak Low No RC-6 - Leak High No RC-7 - Leak Low Yes

Typical Source Term Binning Characteristics Time, size & location of containment failure Plant or accident features that attenuate airborne fission product concentration Release path through auxiliary building(s) Atmosphere sprays Effectiveness of ex-vessel debris cooling Availability of water after RPV lower head failure Cover debris with pool of water (scrubbing) Cool RPV surfaces reduces revolatilization

Cautions: Potential Traps in Source Term Binning Criteria Characteristics important to the release & transport of some species may not be important for others; examples: Noble gases transport always a special case. Iodine is transported primarily in soluable form; i.e, strongly affected water (pools/spray); other species not as sensitive to presence of water CsOH and Te can be chemically bound to stainless steel structures when other volatile species can be re- volatilized Using Iodine/Cesium for source term binning is a surrogate for direct calculation of health effects; trends should not be broadly applied to other species.

Cautions (2): Potential Traps in Source Term Binning Criteria Different definitions of early and late are used in different studies Early containment failure in some Level 2 PSAs means at or before time of RPV failure Early in other PSAs,, may represent a specific time (e.g., x.x hrs) based on (Level 3) PSA assumptions regarding offsite consequences Either definition can be used, depending on objectives of the study. Terms should be carefully defined in PSA documentation.

Summary Integrated severe accident progression and radionuclide release/transport calculations provide the primary basis for supporting CET quantification and source term assessment Sensitivity calculations are necessary to support confidence in results obtained from baseline calculations Calculations should address wide range of accident sequences Results of detailed calculations used to identify characteristics of severe accident behavior that govern source term Characteristics used to develop rules or binning criteria Apply binning criteria to end-states states of CET to assign each path to a release category