Power Supply Facilities Failure (Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A), etc.) March 22, 2013 Tokyo Electric Power Company

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< Reference > Power Supply Facilities Failure (Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A), etc.) March 22, 2013 Tokyo Electric Power Company

Occurrence of Events in a Chronological Order At around 6:57 PM on March 18, 2013, there was an incident where the power supply facilities in the Main Anti-earthquake Building at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station momentarily stopped. Upon investigation, the regular M/C (Metal-clad switch gear) in the Process Building, common M/C4A and Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) were found to be stopped due to the incident. [ Events in a chronological order ] March 18 6:57 PM: The power supply facilities in the Main Anti-earthquake Building momentarily stopped. 7:18 PM: BUS power supply of the common M/C4A, regular M/C in the Process Building and Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) was confirmed to be suspended. 10:01 PM to 10:15 PM: Insulation resistance test performed on the regular M/C in the Process Building and Units 3-4 M/C (A). No abnormality found. March 19 From 2:10 AM: Soundness investigation performed on the regular M/C in the Process Building. 3:00 AM: Nitrogen separator (B) recovered. 9:04 AM: The regular M/C in the Process Building received power. No abnormality found with the parameters (Vo and others). 10:01 AM: The common M/C 4A received power from the regular M/C in the Process Building. The common PC 4A and 4C also received power. 2:20 PM: Unit 1 SFP alternative recovered. 4:13 PM: Unit 4 SFP alternative temporarily recovered by a temporary diesel generator. 10:26 PM: Unit 4 SFP alternative recovered by the regular M/C in the Process Building. 10:43 PM: Unit 3 SFP alternative recovered. March 20 12:12 AM: The common pool recovered. *Reason why recovery required a substantial amount of time: In a normal process of recovery after a failure, the location of failure is identified first. Then the location of failure is detached and the sound power line is recovered. In this case, investigation was initially performed assuming that the location of failure is a part of Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A), however, the location of failure could not be identified. Thus, the entire Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) was identified as the location of failure and was detached. It took a substantial amount of time switching to an alternative power line. 1

Power Supply Structure of the Affected Facilities Facilities suspended due to the momentary stop of the power supply SFP alternative system requirements Approx. 14.6 days (Unit 3 pool temperature increase rate: 0.146 /h) Approx. 4.52 days (Unit 4 pool temperature increase rate: 0.368 /h) Approx. 7.34 days ( pool temperature increase rate: 0.226 /h) M/C (1B) M/C (2B) Okuma line 3, 4L Backup M/C at the substation M/C (2A) Unit 1 SFP alternative (Secondary system) Nitrogen separator (B) Backup M/C in the Process Building Regular M/C in the Process Building (3A) (3A) (4A) (4B) Circuit breaker opened (5B) Circuit breaker opened Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) M/C4A transformer pool temporary P/C transformer (5A) (4A) (10A) -1 transformer -2 transformer P/C4A Legend Receiving power Power supply suspended Affected facilities which have been recovered pool Unit 4 SFP alternative (Secondary system) Unit 3 SFP alternative (Primary and secondary systems) Unit 4 SFP alternative (Primary system) 2

Overview of Investigation of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) (Performed on March 20) [ Investigation of Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) ] (1) Appearance inspection of Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) Results: Trace of short circuit found on 5A unit of Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A): See photos and A dead small animal was found on the floor of the same unit: See photo (2) Appearance inspection of the power receiving cable, insulation resistance test, conduction resistance test Results: No abnormality found (3) Appearance inspection of the circuit breaker, insulation resistance test Results: Discoloration found: See photo Regular M/C in the Process Building M/C 2A M/C 2B Backup M/C in the Process Building Scope of investigation 4A 3A 3A Backup M/C at the substation (1) 5B (2) (3) Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) 5A 4A 10A Location of failure Transformer pool cooling Transformer panel Unit 4 SFP alternative cooling system (secondary) / -2 Transformer panels Unit 3 SFP alternative Load systems at the time of the incident 3

Investigation of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) Unit (5A) A trace of short circuit was found on the primary conductor (R, S, T phases) of the current transformer in the back of 5A unit of Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A). Also, a small animal was found dead on the floor of the same unit. 5A Trace of short circuit Trace of short circuit Front side Circuit breaker Back side 5B Circuit breaker Dead small animal < Side view > < Back side view > 4

Assumed Cause of Power Supply Failure of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) A small animal got into Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) Short circuit occurred due to the small animal getting close to the current-carrying area Overcurrent was generated among the backup M/C in the Process Building, regular M/C in the Process Building and Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) Since the same overcurrent value is set for the M/C circuit breakers above, the circuits were cut simultaneously and power supply failure occurred. Cooling systems for Unit 3 SFP, Unit 4 SFP and the common pool were suspended. M/Cs other than the above were affected by the potential changes accompanying the momentary stop of power supply, Unit 1 SFP alternative (secondary system) and nitrogen separator (B) were suspended. 5

Power Supply System at the Time of the Incident Okuma line 3L, 4L Yonomori line 1L, 2L M/C 2B Backup M/C 2A M/C 1A M/C 1B transformer M/C 5B Not available due to to Tsunami countermeasure work D/G (B) M/C Evaporative concentration treatment facility M/C Backup M/C in the Process Building 3A 3A Circuits cut simultaneously as as the same overcurrent value is is set for for the circuit breakers.* Regular M/C in the Process Building 4B 5A 1B D/G (B) M/C 4B M/C 4A 4A Since there are two circuit breakers on on the same line, the one in in the upper level is is set to to operate. D/G (A) M/C D/G (A) M/C 3A M/C 3B Receiving power from A system Receiving power from B system *In the case that the regular M/C receives power from Power supply suspended the backup M/C in the Process Building, the area of Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) power supply suspension is smaller if 4A is shut down 5B 6A Location of failure in prior to 3A. However, they were set to shut down P/C 4C simultaneously considering the case where the Trip CB 4A 10A 5A backup M/C receives power from Units 3-4 temporary Circuit breaker M/C via the regular M/C. The possibility of using tie P/C 4A line will be reduced upon completion of power supply duplication, etc. 6 Lines not yet receiving power

Photo Condition of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) container Location where the cable is drawn in A small animal is assumed to have entered from the opening of Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) 7

Photo Investigation of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) Unit (5A) An arc was generated when a small animal got close to the conductor and short circuit occurred. 15cm 15cm Trace of short circuit 8

Photo Investigation of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) Unit (5A) Soot found on the side surface of the unit The soot found on the side surface of the unit is assumed to be due to an arc. 9

Photo Investigation of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) Unit (5A) The small animal is assumed to have died after getting hit by an arc. Approx. 25cm Small animal found dead 10

Photo Investigation of Units 3-4 Temporary M/C (A) Unit (5A) Discoloration found 11

One-line Diagram of / Transformer Panels and Transformer after Recovery M/C 2B Okuma line 3L, 4L M/C 2A The recovery of the common pool was relatively easy because of the redundant power cable from the backup M/C at the substation. M/C 1B Backup M/C in the Process Building Regular M/C in the Process Building Backup M/C at the substation The recovery of Units 3 and 4 SFP alternative cooling systems was relatively easy since power cable installation for reliability improvement had been completed. M/C 4B 3B 3B M/C 4A 4A 5B Units 3-4 temporary Recovered on March 19 5B 6A M/C (A) Main load system: 10A 4A Recovered on March 19 D/G (For Unit 4 SFP) 5A Recovered on March 20 Unit 3 SFP alternative Main load system: Unit 4 SFP alternative Main load system: pool 12

Power Supply Duplication and Reliability Improvement Power supply reliability improvement work is being implemented for the following systems which were suspended due to the power supply failure. Units 1-4 SFP alternative s - The power supply for Units 1-2 SFP alternative s will be multiplied. - The load systems previously receiving power from Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) will be connected to the permanent common M/C4A and the regular M/C in the Process Building. Furthermore, the cable of Units 3-4 SFP alternative s will be made redundant to allow for connection with common M/C4B and the backup M/C in the Process Building in the case of M/C failure. Work to be completed at the end of March 2013 pool The common pool will be duplicated through recovering the power supply for the common pool M/C and P/C. Work to be completed at the end of September 2013, however, work implementation ahead of schedule is being considered. 13

Reliability Improvement Work (Units 1-4 SFP Alternative Cooling Systems) 66kV switchyard in the south side D/G M/C (B) transformer B transformer A D/G M/C (A) D/G (A) D/G (B) M/C 2B Power supply car 500kVA M/C 2A Backup M/C at the substation M/C 1A Power supply car 750kVA M/C 1B Units 3-4 temporary M/C load system switching M/C 3A M/C 3B Evaporative concentration treatment facility M/C Backup M/C in the Process Building M/C 4B Regular M/C in the Process Building M/C 4A Cable redundancy allowing for power supply switching Switched Unit 3 SFP alternative Unit 1 covering Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) Unit 4 SFP alternative cooling system (Secondary system) pool temporary P/C Power supply duplication for Units 1-2 SFP Unit 2 SFP alternative Switchboard Unit 1 alternative IA compressor Newly installed Unit 1 SFP alternative Cable connection made on Unit 1 SFP alternative cooling system side (March 26) N2 supply equipment (PSA4) 14

Reliability Improvement Work ( Pool Cooling System) 66kV switchyard in the south side transformer B transformer A M/C 2B Power supply car 500kVA M/C 2A M/C 1A Power supply car 750kVA M/C 1B Backup M/C in the Process Building Regular M/C in the Process Building Units 3-4 temporary M/C (A) Backup M/C at the substation M/C 3A M/C 3B Evaporative concentration treatment facility M/C D/G M/C (B) D/G (B) D/G P/C (B) M/C 4B Recovery of the common pool power supply pool M/C (B) M/C 4A Initially planned to be completed at the end of September 2013 pool M/C (A) D/G (A) D/G M/C (A) D/G P/C (A) pool temporary P/C pool backup (Primary system) pool cooling system B system (Primary and secondary systems) pool cooling system A system (Primary and secondary systems) pool (Secondary system) pool regular (Primary system) Implementation ahead of schedule being considered 15