Producer - Consumer Dialogue - Rising to New Challenges - Klaus Rehaag Head, Oil Industry & Markets Division Editor, Oil Market Report International Energy Agency Paris, France klaus.rehaag@iea.org Asia Oil And Gas Conference - Kuala Lumpur, 13-15 June, 2004
Overview Question: is the dialogue working? Is there life after Amsterdam (IEF) What are the next steps? New challenges Not just about crude Capacity is tight throughout entire system Rising to the challenges
Number of successes: Is the Dialogue Working? Venezuela supply disruption and build-up up to Iraqi conflict JODI data exercise Riyadh Secretariat Joint IEA-OPEC investment study Far better understanding of each other Better lines of communication Technical meetings Speak the same language Market stability Fair and reasonable prices Conservation and efficiency (CO2, flaring) Need for investment Expand energy access to developing nations
But Problems Remain Commonality of long-term interests conflicts with short-term term actions Low stock policy Production quotas High prices Lack of data transparency Speak the same language, but Belies underlying philosophic differences Supply management vs. market reliance Deregulation vs. state monopolies Price bands Fair and reasonable price
Life After Amsterdam International Energy Forum (IEF) Long-term investment focus Almost derailed by price environment & concern about impact on global g economies Successes: JODI, Riyadh Secretariat, commitment to supply more physical barrelsb Question: Where does the dialogue go next? Not enough to sit back and wait need to push agenda forward But philosophic differences unlikely to go away anytime soon Imperative we find ways to work together, in our mutual interests Investment challenge, economic growth, environmental protection
Faced With New Challenges Important structural changes taking place Previous 5 years (1998-2002) Disconnect: economic growth and oil demand growth Was attributed to shift in OPEC policies after Jakarta OPEC sacrifice market share to maximize revenue Non-OPEC capacity growth, particularly Russia Consequence rising OPEC spare production capacity Successful - low stock, high price supply management policy Consequence low oil demand growth
kb/d FSU Oil Production 1991-2004 12000 11000 10000 FSU, not simply Russia, has been the engine of non-opec supply growth 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Russia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Others
mb/d 4 3 2 1 0-1 -2-3 Stagflation Annual World Demand Growth Mb/d Anemic oil demand growth Collapse of FSU 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 1998 2002 demand growth anemic, but not unprecedented
What has Changed? Economic growth & 0il demand growth have exploded 2004: 2.3 mb/d oil demand growth and counting Not just US and China, BUT China is a key driver Higher call on crude as spare production capacity falling Iraq Venezuela, Nigeria Mature fields declining Indonesia North Sea Therefore, short-term term spare production capacity is tight
Oil Demand Recovery: OECD Vs Non-OECD (mb/d) Non-OECD, notably China, drives oil demand growth 4 3.5 OECD China Non-OECD ex. China 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0-0.5-1 1Q02 2Q02 3Q02 4Q02 1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04 3Q04 4Q04 Oil Demand Growth: 2003: 1.7 mb/d (2.3%); 2004: 2.3 mb/d (2.9%)
Chinese Vs Global Demand (Mb/d) (mb/d) 6.5 83 6 5.5 China: a runaway train? 81 79 5 77 4.5 75 4 73 3.5 71 3 69 2.5 67 2 1Q1993 4Q1994 3Q1996 2Q1998 1Q2000 4Q2001 3Q2003 65 China quarterly demand World demand (right scale)
mb/d 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 OPEC Spare Production Capacity * Effective spare capacity of around 1.5 mb/d kb/d 32000 31000 30000 29000 28000 27000 26000 25000 24000 0 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 23000 Iraq OPEC-10 (Effective Capacity) Ven/Nig/Ind OPEC Production * IEA definition: available in 30 days and sustainable for 90 days
OPEC has the Reserves, but Cost money to build and maintain spare capacity Money which is often needed elsewhere Given uncertainties, may be reluctant to investing Demand growth real, here to stay? What about Iraq? Russia capacity & infrastructure constrained or continue relentless ess expansion? Growth in OPEC spare capacity historically associated with: Internal political discord Pressure on prices Notwithstanding, supply growth in Nigeria, Algeria
Mbd 12 Historical OPEC Spare Production Capacity - Tells a Much Different Story - 10 8 Source: EIA 6 4 2 0 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Costs money to build & maintain spare capacity. Given internal OPEC policies, may contribute to market tension and potential downward pressure on price.
Capacity is Tight Elsewhere In System Not just limited spare production capacity Refining, transportation logistics constrained Crude & product stocks low In a deregulated environment, pressure to reduce costs, maximize efficiency, minimize spare capacity Shareholders demand competitive returns (ROCE) Trends to minimizing spare capacity unlikely to reverse
Unmistakable Downward Trend - US-50 Crude Stocks - 360 US-50 Industry Crude Oil Stocks (mb) 27 US-50 Industry Crude Oil Stocks (days of forward demand) 350 340 25 330 320 23 310 300 21 290 280 19 270 260 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 17 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Industry more efficient (mergers & acquisitions, information technology, just-in-time inventory management practices)
Refinery Utilization Rates Already High in U.S. & Europe, Set to Improve in Asia... Percent 100 90 80 70 60 Industry overbuilt capacity very costly from a margin perspective took a long time to wear off US Europe Asia 50 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Who will process incremental crude? Source: Purvin and Gertz INC.
Limited Surplus Capacity Tanker Market Oil Tankers in Lay-Up Waiting For Contract Contango % 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 Like stocks and spare production and capacity, the tanker market is stretched contributing to higher freight rates and increased price volatility 40,000 30,000 20,000 <200,000 200-299,999 >300,000 10,000 0 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Who will ship incremental barrels (primary yards full)? Source: Kearney
Not Just About Production Tight capacity, in a period of uncertainty, fuels speculation and drives prices Concern NOT simply about spare production capacity: Need ships and pipelines to transport crude Need refineries to process crude Need market structures to support building stocks Takes TIME to increase capacity need to plan and invest in advance, not wait until faced with critical shortages Adequately supplying the market is key
Rising to New Challenges Investments in upstream and downstream are critical: Re-gain control over the market - add spare capacity to cope with uncertainty and diminish speculative influence Keep up with surging economic growth and oil demand Provide access to energy for developing nations Question: Who is prepared to finance this investment, and under what terms? Notwithstanding our differences, producers and consumers must find a way to work together and cooperate Investors will shy away unless we collectively establish that the oil industry is viable, and has a healthy future
Conclusions Philosophic differences will remain but imperative to push the producer consumer consumer agenda forward Need to mobilize investment to generate spare capacity and restore confidence and market stability Need to act on commitments to data transparency, technical meetings and collaborative studies Need to fund R&D and promote conservation But most important, need to supply the market restore confidence in the integrity of the dialogue process