Accident Investigations: Finding the Root Cause is NOT Enough

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Transcription:

Accident Investigations: Finding the Root Cause is NOT Enough Adrian L. epeda, PE A. L. epeda Consulting Inc.

ACCIDENT The concept DETERMINE ROOT CAUE & MANAGEMENT YTEM FAILURE DEVELOP APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION & MANAGEMENT YTEM MODIFICATION TO REDUCE THE RIK OF RECURRENCE The typical flow and scope of an accident investigation IMPLEMENT & MONITOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

LET UE THAT METHODOLOGY FOR THE FOLLOWING ACCIDENT: At 9:15AM on a Monday morning a pipe in a pipe rack to Production Unit A began to leak chlorine. The Emergency Alarm was sounded and the system containing the leak was isolated. The chlorine traveled offsite causing nearby neighbors to shelter in place for about 30 minutes. The accident investigation began

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL PROCEDURE ABOTAGE The investigation team agreed on five areas to investigate as potential causes

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL PROCEDURE ABOTAGE They immediately ruled out abotage and Act of God because of a complete lack of evidence that either had occurred.

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL PROCEDURE ABOTAGE They analyzed for procedural contributions to the accident but found no evidence that supported procedural causes. Non Existent Not Followed Inadequate Procedures did exist Procedures were followed Procedures were adequate at least while operating and that is all that mattered since the accident occurred during normal operations, not start up or shutdown. Existing Followed Adequate for operating; start up not checked because accident did not occur during start up

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL PROCEDURE ABOTAGE Non Existent Not Followed Inadequate Wrong Actions Omissions No issues while operating; start up not checked because accident did not occur during start up Existing Followed Adequate for operating; start up not checked because accident did not occur during start up And, they looked into how the plant was being operated---but found no evidence of incorrect actions being taken or critical steps being skipped. The cause must be mechanical.

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL Discounted as not a cause ABOTAGE Fatigue Corrosion Fracture Mechanical Wear PROCEDURE The investigation team agreed on four types of mechanical failures to investigate as potential causes

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL Discounted as not a cause ABOTAGE Fatigue Corrosion Fracture Mechanical Wear PROCEDURE After examining the section of pipe that failed, the team immediately ruled out Fatigue and Fracture because of a complete lack of evidence that either had occurred.

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL Discounted as not a cause ABOTAGE Fatigue Corrosion Fracture Mechanical Wear PROCEDURE Internall No explanation but did not cause this accident. Possible result of accident. External Caused after the leak started. Did not cause accident. Possible result of accident The team did find some corrosion both internally and externally. They rationalized that external corrosion was common in any chlorine leak because of the acidic atmosphere created when chlorine contacts moisture. They had no explanation for the internal corrosion, but both were minimal and could not have caused this breech in the pipe. Corrosion was noted but listed as not the cause of this accident.

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL Discounted as not a cause ABOTAGE Fatigue Corrosion Fracture Mechanical Wear PROCEDURE, but not the cause of this accident And finally, the team concluded that physical evidence pointed to mechanical wear. Eventually they determined that the pipe was resting directly on support steel and that the wear plate was not positioned on the pipe where it should have been. Temperature fluctuations caused the pipe to move and, over time, simply wore a hole in the pipe. Internal Thermal Changes No Options External Construction Error Caused by pipe movement on support steel Cause Wear plate in wrong place Inadequate PR Cause

CHLORINE RELEAE MECHANICAL Discounted as not a cause ABOTAGE Fatigue Corrosion Fracture Mechanical Wear PROCEDURE, but not the cause of this accident Cause found!!! Poor construction Inadequate pre start up safety review Let s fix those management systems and get back on stream NOW! Internal Thermal Changes No Options External Caused by pipe movement on support steel Construction Error Cause Wear plate in wrong place Inadequate PR Cause

AND THEY DID The piping system was dried by purging with plant supplied dry air and then chlorine was reintroduced in to the system. Production was restarted. Within 24 hours, a leak developed at an elbow and a chlorine cloud formed. Just as before, the Emergency Alarm was sounded and the system containing the leak was isolated. The chlorine traveled offsite causing nearby neighbors to shelter in place again for about 30 minutes. WHAT WENT WRONG????

FOCUING ONLY ON THE ROOT CAUE They focused on only the pathways that supported finding the Root Cause of that particular accident Because of this, they discounted all of the hints that something else might be wrong not related to that accident. They failed to recognize the importance of indicators of Near misses for other accident scenarios.

IN OTHER WORD They addressed the issues related to the accident that they had but did not recognize that several other near misses had also taken place. By not recognizing the near misses, they did not put appropriate safety systems in place to prevent them from becoming an accident. One of the unidentified Near misses caused the new accident.

WHAT DID THEY MI? The new accident was the result of internal corrosion caused by moisture left in the system after dry air purging. The moisture accumulated in areas where the piping changed direction from horizontal to upward vertical. When chlorine was introduced in to the system corrosion started immediately. The first accident occurred before the corrosion breached the piping. The new startup added additional moisture to the system accelerating corrosion.

CHLORINE RELEAE By focusing only on the potential root causes of this particular accident MECHANICAL Discounted as not a cause ABOTAGE Fatigue Corrosion Fracture Mechanical Wear PROCEDURE Internal External Internal External Caused by pipe movement on support steel No explanation but did not cause this accident. Possible result of accident. Caused after the leak started. Did not cause accident. Possible result of accident Thermal Changes No Options Wear plate in wrong place Construction Error Cause Inadequate PR Cause

CHLORINE RELEAE and ignoring data that was not supportive, near MECHANICAL miss information was not recognized or considered important. In fact, this information Discounted as was not a cause foretelling of the next accident that would occur! Fatigue Corrosion Fracture Mechanical Wear ABOTAGE PROCEDURE Internal External Internal External Caused by pipe movement on support steel No explanation but did not cause this accident. Possible result of accident. Caused after the leak started. Did not cause accident. Possible result of accident Thermal Changes No Options Wear plate in wrong place Construction Error Cause Inadequate PR Cause

ACCIDENT DETERMINE ROOT CAUE & MANAGEMENT YTEM FAILURE DEVELOP APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION & MANAGEMENT YTEM MODIFICATION TO REDUCE THE RIK OF RECURRENCE WHAT HOULD THEY DO TO UPPLEMENT THE CONVENTIONAL ROOT CAUE ANALYI PROCE? IMPLEMENT & MONITOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

ACCIDENT DETERMINE ROOT CAUE & MANAGEMENT YTEM FAILURE CATALOGUE IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL ACCIDENT CENARIO THAT DID NOT LEAD TO THE ACCIDENT BEING INVETIGATED BUT COULD CAUE ONE WITH IMILAR CONEQUENCE DEVELOP APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION & MANAGEMENT YTEM MODIFICATION TO REDUCE THE RIK OF RECURRENCE EVALUATE EACH POTENTIAL CENARIO FOR PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE IMPLEMENT & MONITOR CORRECTIVE ACTION IF PROBABLE, THEN IF DEEMED IMPROBABLE RECORD DECIION

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION QUETION?