S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2030O6O3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE 09360 3 June 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL33172. 1. (FOUO) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Lahassimi Najib o Aliases and Current/True Name: Najeb Lahassini. Abdul Rahman. Abdul Ralman. Najeb Lahassihi o Place of Birth: Sattat. Morocco (MO) o Date of Birth: 28 September 1978. Citizenship: Morocco o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9MO-000075DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health with the exception of chronic traumatic orthopedic injuries. He has no known allergies and is currently not taking any medications. Detainee is followed by Behavioral Health Service for Personality disorder. He has no travel restrictions. 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD (DoD) on l1 November 2003. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20300603 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20300603
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O300603 JTF GTMO.CG For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of Al-Qaida who willingly traveled to Afghanistan with other suspected recruits and participated in hostilities against the US and its allies. Detainee was present during themazar-e-sharif prison uprising and was likely a participant. Detainee has received training at an Al-Qaida run camp and was a fighting member of the Arab Brigade that assisted the Taliban while fighting in Tora Bora, Afghanistan (AF), against the US and Northern Alliance. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summar!: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements. a. (S) Recruitment and Travel: Sometime after November 7999, detainee attempted to leave Morocco several times without a valid passport, was arrested and returned to Morocco by various authorities. On about the fourth attempt, detainee departed Morocco and crossed the water into Spain. In late December 2000, detainee traveled to France (FR), where he spent two weeks in Paris, FR, then continued by feny to Dover, United Kingdom (UK) in early January 200I. After disembarking the ferry, detainee was arrested by British authorities and was taken to London, UK, where he was processed for asylum. Once detainee was released and provided papers, he made his way to an Arab section of London, UK, near Baker Street. At the Baker Street Mosque, detainee met Hamed al Sudani, who offered him food and a place to stay. Detainee stayed with Hamed for five months and during this time became a devoted Muslim. At the end of May 2007, Hamed convinced detainee to go with him to AF and live as a true Muslim. Hamed provided a fake passport for detainee with a Pakistani visa and a plane ticket to Lahore, Pakistan (PK). Detainee and Hamed flew together. Prior to this trip, Hamed instructed detainee not to talk to him while on the plane and if they were arrested for any reason to say he was alone and doing leisure travel. After landing in Lahore, PK, Hamed bought them both tickets to Islamabad, PK, where they visited the house of Abdul Haq Al Jazeeri whom Hamed had fought along side against the Russians during the Afghan war. Abdul Haq arranged for a guide who took them to the Afghanistan border the next day. b. (S) Training and Activities: Upon arriving in Jalalabad, AF, they went to the house of Abu Mohammed Al Jazeeri. Mohammed was another friend of Hamed who had fought along side him against the Russians during the Afghan war. Detainee and Hamed stayed with Mohammed for almost five months. During July through August 2007, Mohammed trained detainee, Hamed and others who stayed at his home. Each morning Mohammed would drive the trainees to a valley outside of Jalalabad, AF, for training. Mohammed told the students the Taliban owned the training site and they were being permitted to use it. He was trained in AK-47s, RPGs and PK machine gun. Detainee completed his training in August 2001, after which he returned to stay at Abdul Haq's house with Hamed. During this time detainee was 2 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20300603
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 203006O3 subjected to intense pro Taliban teachings. On September 11,2001detainee was told to prepare to fight because the Americans were coming. He was sent to the mountains outside of Jalalabad, AF, along with Hamed and approximately one hundred other Arab fighters. Detainee claims that he only prepared defensive positions while in the mountains. c. (S) Gapture Information: In late November 2001, detainee and the others in his fighting group were told to retreat tomazar-e-sharif, AF, where they would surrender their weapons to the Afghan Duston (aka Dostum) Army. Thereafter, they would travel to Khandahar, AF, and be allowed to return to their home country. Detainee and approximately three hundred fighters were taken to the El-Janki (variant Qala-e-Jenki) prison compound on 29 November 2001. Sometime throughout the detention process, some of the prisoners broke free and overpowered several troops. These prisoners took over the prison's weapons and engaged Dostum's troops. Detainee was untied by one of the prisoners as the fighting broke out. Shortly after being untied detainee claims an RPG round severely damaged his left arm. After being hit by the RPG he laid in the courtyard while the gunfight continued between the prisoners and Dostum's troops. Detainee advised the fighting continued for five days. Some time during the fighting all the injured prisoners were placed in the basement of courtyard house number two (Analyst Note; this was done by the Arab fighters). Detainee claims on the seventh day Dostum's troops began pumping water into basement and between one hundred to one hundred and thirty prisoners drowned, including his friend Hamed. On the eighth day of frghting, the surviving prisoners were taken out of the basement and placed on stretchers, then taken to a Red Cross shelter. Detainee was taken to a hospital in Sheberghan, AF, where he remained for thiny days. After this hospital stay detainee was flown to Khandahar, AF, turned over to US custody and subsequently flown to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. d. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 7 February 2002 e. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following: Arab foreign fighters 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 3 S E C R E T // NOF'ORN I I 20300603
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O30O603 b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: r (S//ltlF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of Al-Qaida who has received training and participated in hostilities against US and coalition forces. o (S) Due to the following it is assessed the detainee was part of Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) Arab Brigade, and participated in support the Taliban in the Tora Bora cave complex as well as in Kunduz, AF.. (S/A{F) Detainee's admitted to being a member of a group of one hundred Arab fighters in Jalalabad, AF. Arabs fighting in units supporting the Taliban were under the control of UBL's Arab Brigade (aka 55'n Arab Brigade). UBL's Arab Brigade is known to be UBL's primary formation supporting Taliban objectives. It was almost exclusively comprised of Arabs, many whom had affrliations to other international terrorist groups. Al-Qaida leaders commanded the brigade and UBL is also thought to have participated closely in its command and control.. (S) Detainee has admitted that after about one month in the mountains of Jalalabad, AF, detainee and his travel companion, Hamed al-sudani traveled to Kunduz, AF, to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. (Analyst Note: Detainee is contradicting an earlier statement of not partaking in hostilities.). (S) Suleyman Sa'd Mohamed Al-Khaldi, ISN US9SA-000121DP (ISN 121), an assessed Al-Qaida member who was part of UBL's Arab Brigade, identified detainee as a fighter, placing him in Kunduz, AF, or Kandahar, AF, and Qala-e- Jenki. (Analyst Note: Detainee was likely seen in Kunduz, AF, since his unit was relocated from Tora Bora to Kunduz, AF, to fight the Northern Alliance.) (S) Detainee trained at Khaldan camp, a well-known Al-Qaida training camp.. (S) Detainee acknowledges receiving training from Abu Muhammed Al Jazeeri an Al-Qaida member. (Analyst Note: Khaldan camp was widely recognized as a top Al-Qaida training facility, Muhammed Al Jazeeri was a weapons and tactical course trainer.). (S) Detainee also admitted to watching many videos about jihad narrated by Abu Hamza Al Masri. The videos preached jihad against the "infidels", defined as anyone who does not believe in Islam. (Analyst Note: Detainee's indoctrination continued throughout his training. This information contradicts his claim of being tricked into training and into fighting in Tora Bora, AF) (S/A{F) Detainee was recruited in a manner consistent with Al-Qaida recruits.. (S) Detainee stayed with Hamed Al Sudani while in the United Kingdom for five months and during this time became a devoted Muslim, by watching videos. (Analyst Note: Detainee is likely using a counter interrogation technique by keeping his details vague. It is more likely that during this period, detainee was getting indoctrinated and prepared to travel for jihad. Al Sudani was probably a 4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 203O06O3
S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2030O603 member of the Abu Doha network, known for recruiting at mosques in the United Kingdom and facilitating travel to Afghanistan for jihad.) ' (S) When flying to Pakistan Hamed instructed detainee not to talk to him, and if caught not to divulge that he and Hamed were traveling together. (Analyst Note: This information indicates that Hamed was briefing the recruit in order to protect his own identity as a recruiter if captured.) o (S/A{F) The detainee has been identified by the following Al-Qaida figures. Due to the detainee's extreme uncooperative disposition, JTF GTMO has not been able to corroborate or validate this information.. (S/A{F) AbuZubaydah, a senior Al-Qaida operative and close associate of UBL, stated detainee might possibly be a Yemeni national who may have trained Al-Farouq camp. Also that detainee was possibly in charge of a group of 20 fighters rnzurmat, AF after l lseptember 2001 attacks.. (S) David Michael Hicks, ISN US9AS-000002DP (lsn 002), who is a confirmed sworn fighter for Al-Qaida and subject to trial by Military Commission, identified detainee as a guest in a Taliban guesthouse in Kandahar.. (S) Feroz Ali Abassi, ISN US9UK-000024DP QSN 024), a known Al-Qaida member with extensive training, identified detainee as Najib whom Abassi had seen at the Finsbury Park Mosque. ISN 024 also stated that a fellow Al-Qaida member had also seen detainee at the Al-Farouq camp. (Analyst Note: Finsbury Park Mosque, which was well known for recruitment of North Africans in the UK into Al-Qaida and for training to AF.). (S) Detainee was injured during the uprising at Qala-e-Jenki (variant Al Janki) likely due to his participation. It is assessedetainee is withholding information in regards to his true involvement in the uprising. (Analyst Note: As the tensions escalated between Al-Qaida Arab fighters and the Northern Alliance soldiers, some of the Arab fighters took over the prison's weapons cache engaging in a full-blown battle against the Northern Alliance. Eventually with the intervention of the US, the Northern Alliance was able to regain control of the prison. Some of the Arab fighters hid in the basements until five days later, when they were flushed out by the Northem Alliance. Detainee was amongst those that held out until the end after the fighting had ceased.) c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a high threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior pattern has been one of hostility and aggression directed towards the guard force and staff. In the last three months, the detainee has been overheard making a death threat and harassing a Block NCO. Detainee's Report of Disciplinary Infraction history shows a long list of incidents to include: failures to comply, refusals, destruction of government property, throwing of feces, urine, and other items, spitting, death threats/threats of a harmful nature, physical assaults, contraband, crossblock/camp communications, and three recorded forced cell extractions. Most of the s E c R E T //NOFORN I 20300603
S E C R E T i /NOFORN / I 2O3OO6O3 detainee's discipline is listed as failures to follow guard instructions, unauthorized communications, and assaults towards the guards. The detainee has a very turbulent and aggressive history and has recently shown this pattern while on Hotel Block. However, he has not received any disciplinary actions for these incidents. 6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.. (S) Detainee is assessed as a member of Al-Qaida. Detainee was recruited in Europe, was indoctrinated into jihad and traveled for training and likely to engage in hostilities. He was involved with the Arab Brigade and present at the Qala-e-Jenki uprising. Due to his uncooperative nature, he has yet to divulge the full details of his participation in the above listed activities. He still adheres to his cover storv and has vet to reveal his true participation with Al-Qaida. b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:. Knowledge of terrorist activity due to his association and proximity to Al-Qaida and its members o Training camps; Khaldan and Al-Farouq training camps' cadre and leadership o UBL's Arab Brigade leadership and battle engagements o Actual events and involvement in the Qala-e-Jenki prison uprising. Recruitment/Facilitation terrorists network in Europe o Facilitation and recruitment personnel 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on l9 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. 6-,.il,n- AY W. HOOD rigadier General, USA Commandins 6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 203006O3