JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE November 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN : US9YM DP 1. (FOUO) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Fawz Bin Namen o Aliases and Current/True Name: Abu Omar. Fawaz Ahmed. Othman. and Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdullah Mahdi o Place of Birth: Shaira. OBB) Yemen (YM) o Date of Birth: 1980 o Crtizenship: Yemen o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM DP b 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee has a history of psychotic disorder diagnosed as schizophrenia; currently asymptomatic. 3. (S) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends that this detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). o This recommendation is contingent on a satisfactory agreement that allows the detainee to be supervised and/or secured in a psychiatric treatment facility until the assessed risk can be mitigated. If a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached for his continued detention in Yemen. he should be retained under DoD control. CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C R E T // NOFORN I

2 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I Detention ORCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM DP b. (S) Summary: Detainee has been assessed as having been trained at Al-Qaida's terrorist training camp Al Farouq and is an admitted jihadist, who personally swore bayat (oath of allegiance) to Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Detainee's quest for jihad was brought about by hallucinatory visions of American soldiers engaging sacred shrines in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA). He suffers from a severe psychological disorder that may allow him to be easily manipulated by extremist groups and possibly recruited as a martyr, indicating the highest commitment to jihad, and therefore the highest threat. Despite suffering from episodes of auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions, as well as a history ofjuvenile delinquency and personal failures, detainee managed to find direction and purpose within the Al-Qaida orgarrization. Due to his prior involvement and direct association with Al-Qaida, as well as his mental instability and great disdain for the US, it has been assessedetainee is a medium risk as he may once again seek acceptance and asylum in Al-Qaida, as well as actively pursue jihad, or martyrdom, if released from custody. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summar!: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on detainee's statements. a. Prior History: Detainee failed to complete high school and is a member of the Mahdi Tribe near the city of Ibb, Yemen. He spent the majority of his childhood moving back and forth between Yemen and Saudi Arabia (SA). As a youth in Saudi Arabia, detainee struggled with delinquency issues and claimed to have been arrested approximately 10 times for traffic violations. (Analyst note: Detainee stated Saudis arrested people like him for no apparent reason.) b. Recruitment and Travel: In1999, while on a Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA), detainee was on the roof of the Masjid Alharam along with Ahmed Dakhel and Al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator, Abu Hasan Al Palestini (aka Mohammed Abu Kmail), when he had visions of US soldiers aiming weapons at the Ka'ba. (Analyst note: The Ka'ba is a small stone building in the court of the Great Mosque at Mecca that contains a sacred black stone and is the goal of Islamic pilgrimage, as well as the point toward which Muslims turn in praying.) Upon this claim, Abu Al Hasan suggested detainee travel to Afghanistan for jihad, as well as assisted him in contacting Al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator, Abu Alhasan Al Qushunbi. (Analyst note: Detainee also described Qushunbi as a Saudi and soldier of UBL. Initially, detainee claimed he met with Qushunbi, only to later claim that they never met.) After several months of telephone conversations concerning travel plans, Qushunbi eventually arranged for detainee to acquire a visa, as well as coordinated the ticket transaction between detainee and two individuals named Mahmoud and Ibrahim. (Analyst note: Qushunbi provided the travel documentation because detainee's father disapproved of his jihad commitment. In addition, according to detainee's accounts, it is unclear if ') L s E c R E T //NOFORN I I

3 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I Mahmoud and Ibrahim are separate individuals or actually one.) One of these individuals provided detainee with a plane ticket from Jeddah, SA, to Pakistan (PK). Detainee traveled from Jeddah to Karachi, PK, then to Quetta, PK. (Analyst note: Although never disclosed by the detainee, it is highly likely that he resided at the Embassy Hotel in Karachi, which is a known Al-Qaida transient facility. Whereas in Quetta, it is highly probable that detainee resided at the Daftar Taliban guesthouse, which is normal for Al-Qaida recruits traveling to Afghanistan.) From Quetta, detainee traveled by bus to the Afghanistan border to be transported by motorcycle to Kandahar, AF, where he resided for 10 days at the Al Nibras (aka Haji Habbash) Al-Qaida guesthouse with others awaiting transport to Al Farouq. The individual in charge of the guesthouse was named Sakr (Eagle). During this time, UBL and a Kuwaiti named Suleiman Abu al-khuth arrived at the guesthouse to deliver a Khatba (lecture) to the recruits. (Analyst note: It has been assessed that Suleiman Abu al-khuth is actually Sulayman Abu Gaith, who is a prominent spokesman for Al-Qaida and known to accompany UBL.) c. Training and Activities: While at Al Farouq, detainee spent approximately five weeks in basic training, as well as personally met and swore bayat to UBL. Near the completion of his training, detainee claimed to have become "bored" and asked the camp director, Abdul Khoduz, for permission to leave. Khoduz permitted him to leave on the condition that he proceeds north to join the jihad. (Analyst note: Detainee has also stated that it was his recommendation, not Abdul Khoduz, to travel to and fight on the Konduz Line in Khwaja Ghar, AF.) From Al Farouq, detainee traveled by plane to the Al-Ansar guesthouse in Kandahar for approximately 10 days. Abu Zubail al-hayly operated the Al-Ansar guesthouse. Detainee then traveled by plane to Kabul, AF, where he resided for two hours at a guesthouse operated by senior Al-Qaida operative, HamzaAl-Ghamdi, and three to four days at a UBL guesthouse for Arabs. (Analyst note: Before conversion to an Arab guesthouse, the house belonged to Ahkmed Shami Massoud and was previously a Saudi Arabian ambassadorial residence. Detainee claimed the house was lavishly decorated on the inside and housed 30 to 50 Arabs.) Detainee then traveled to the Konduz Line near Khwaja Ghar, AF and joined the Abu Hassan Group commanded by Abu Hassan Al Abyani. According to detainee, some of the members of the Abu Hassan Group were as follows: Abu Al Walid Al Maki, Quais, Asem, A'Shiq Al Hur, Majid Thawabal Utaibi, Usama Al Quasimi, Amar, A'tiyah AlZahrani" Mugwar, and Talut. (Analyst note: Talut is accurately identified as JTF GTMO detainee US9SA DP, who is a highly trained Al-Qaida member and unit commander of UBL's Arab Brigade.) Detainee identified two adjacent units named the Abu Rabeen Group, commanded by Omar Al Nejdi, and the Omar Al Saif Group, commanded by Toufiq Saber Muhammad Al Marwai. Detainee also identified the overall leader of the Arab forces, Abdul Al Salam (aka Abdel Salaam Al-Hadramy, aka 3 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I

4 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I JTF GTMO.CG Prince of the Arabs), his deputy, Garib (aka Gharib), and a senior Al-Qaida regionaleader, Abd Al Hadi Al Iraqi. (Analyst note: US9YM DP identified Gharib as one of the Afghanistan Emirs' who gave the order to surrender.) d. Capture lnformation: After the U.S. bombing campaign commenced, detainee fled the frontlines and was captured near the village of Mulla Qoli, AF, with two Uzbeks named Abdul Rahman and Thaker Jan. (Analyst note: Rahman may be JTF GTMO detainee US9UZ DP and Jan may be US9UZ DP.) He was captured on 14 December 2001 by Massoud's forces in Konduz, AF. After one day of confinement a villager's house, detainee was transferred and detained in the Mulla Qoli jail. He joined several Punjabis and witnessed Momen, a Northern Alliance Commander, execute a Punjabi leader. Detainee was turned over to American forces on 3 May e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 8 June 2002 f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Al Farouq terrorist training camp in Kandahar, AF o Curriculum of mountain warfare, artillery, and urban warfare schools taught by Al- Qaida in various locations o Al-Ansar guesthouse in Kandahar, AF. Al-Qaida recruiters and travel facilitators named Abu Al Hasan (Saudi) and Abu Al Hasan Al Qushunbi, a Palestinian who encouragedetainee to travel to Afghanistan. 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. Assessment: It has been determined that the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may likely pose a threato the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Gontinued Detention: o (S/AIF) Detainee is an admitted Al-Qaida member, and dedicated jihadist who. personally swore bayat (oath of allegiance) to UBL at Al Farouq. (Analyst note: Detainee later recanted this statement and stated he fabricated this story for his debriefers. However, detainee also stated to his debriefers that he had gone to jihad prepared to die, and if no resolution leading to release were forthcoming, he would prefer to die. Detainee met UBL on several occasions and claimed to have been personally 4 s E c R E T //NOFORN I

5 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I congratulated by UBL for his oath of allegiance. Despite having no prior knowledge of 11 September 2001 attacks, detainee stated he was huppy about the attacks, and does not feel that those who supported the attacks should be punished.). (S/A{F) Detainee trained at the Al Farouq terrorist camp in Afghanistan. (Analyst note: Al Farouq is an Al-Qaida operated terrorist camp where individuals receive the following training: Basic Military Training, City/Urban Tactics, Mountain Tactics and Intelligence lt aryet Gathering. ) o (S/AIF) While at Al Farouq, detainee states a lecture from Abu Mohammed Al- Dehmi inspired him to fight jihad. (Analyst Note: Detainee previously claimed his inspiration was received through visions he saw while on his hajj journey to Mecca, Saudi Arabia.). (S/AIF) Detainee stayed at the Al Nebras guesthouse operated by an individual named Sakr, which is known for harboring Al-Qaida members. (Analyst note: JTF GTMO detainee, US9YM DP, identified Sakr as having a high position in the Saudi government, as well as possibly being an officer in the military. It was also here that detainee heard UBL and Sulayman Abu Gaith lecture on jihad, as well as where he viewed the USS Cole attack on video.) o (S/A{F) Detainee traveled to the Khwaja Ghar area outside of Konduz, Afghanistan (AF), to fight in jihad against the Northern Alliance as a low level fighter with the Abu Hassan Group. (Analyst note: It has been assessedetainee, as well as his associates and commanders at Khwaja Ghar, are members of the Arab Brigade. It is believed that UBL closely participates in the command and control of the brigade, which is UBL's primary formation supporting Taliban objective. The commanders and numerous fighters of the Arab Brigade are known Al-Qaida members.). (S//l{F) Detainee actively sought jihad, recruitment, and entrance into Al-Qaida by several known Al-Qaida operatives. (Analyst note: According to the Saudi Security Service, Ibrahim, otherwise known as Saudi based Al-Qaida operative and recruiter, Ibrahim Husayn Ali al-harithi (aka Anjasha), is well known for his ability to entice Saudi youth into seeking military training at extremist camps such as Al Farouq.) o (S/A{F) Detainee stated he stayed at a guesthouse ran by Hamza Al-Ghamdi, senior Al-Qaida operative, for a couple of hours in Kabul, AF, before traveling to the UBL guesthouse (former Saudi Ambassador's Residence) in Kabul, where he would stay for four days. (Analyst note: When questioned about Harnza Al-Ghamdi on a later date, detainee could not remember this name or ever mentioning it. It should be noted detainee is very cooperative during debriefings and shows very few signs of deception. However, due to detainee's psychological disorder, short attention span, and speech impediment, he is extremely difficult to interview and his accounts are often filled with inconsistencies and contradictions.) 5 S E C R E T /i NOFORN I I

6 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN : US9YM DP c. (S) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee has a past history of passive aggressive behavior with the willingness to assaulthe guard force; however, he does not exhibit this behavior on a regular basis. The majority of detainee'significant activity includes hiding contraband and refusing to comply with the rules. He has expressed mixed threats of extremist aggression, such as informing the guards that he would kill infidels. The most serious of his negative behaviors have included threatening to cut a guard's throat, assault (punching), and spitting on guard personnel. This detainee's force protection towards guard personnel is moderate. 6. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S//NF) Assessment: JTF GTMO has determinedetainee is of LOW intelligence value. o (S/AIF) Detainee has been cooperative during debriefings and is substantially exploited. He has identified and provided information on numerous JTF GTMO detainees and senior Al-Qaida leaders, as well as elaborated on Al-Qaida guesthouses, camps, and units and leadership along the Khwaja Ghar front in Afghanistan. However, due to his severe psychological disorder and deteriorating attention span, the reliability and accuracy of the information provided by the detainee will forever remain questionable. b. Areas of Potential Exploitation: o N/A c. Current Gollection Potential Demonstrated: o Currently, the detainee has the potential of answering the following: o Potentially can answer 0 Priority 1 Requirements o Potentially can answer 0 Priority 2 Requirements o Potentially can answer 0 Priority 3 Requirements o Has 0 total outstanding SDRs and EVALs o Potentially can answer 0 AHRs o Potentiallv can answer 0 TSCRs 6 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I

7 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 12 August 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. fu/'/j"p- ( /^Y I w. HooD \-z g6tudier General, US Army Commanding 7 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I