DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

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REPLY TO ATTENTION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 3 September 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL33172. SUBJECT: Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued 1. (FOUO) Personal Information: o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Mohammed Hassan o Aliases and Current/True Name: Mohammed Mohammed Hassen. Mohammed Aludaini. Omar Hassan. Samir Muhammed Hassan. Mohammed Aludaini o Place of Birth: Ta'izz. Yemen rym) o Date of Birth: 20 April 1983 o Citizenshio: Yemen Citizenship: Yemen 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He has no known drug allergies. 3. (S/NF) Detainee Summary: a. (S) Background and Capture Data. Unless otherwise noted, the following background notes are based solely on the detainee's statements: o Recruitment and Travel: Detainee's father, an administrator with the rank of colonel in the financial section or diplomatic corps of the Yemeni Security Service, sent him to Pakistan (PK) to study with the Jama'at Tablighi (JT). The detainee's father had met Imam Ahmed Marish, who was the leader of the JT in Ta'izz,YM, a decade earlier at the Al-Noor Mosque in Ta'izz. Detainee's father admired Marish and his organization and arranged with Marish for detainee to travel to Pakistan. Marish called unidentified contacts in Pakistan to alert them to detainee's arrival. Detainee's father paid for his son's plane ticket to Pakistan. Detainee left for Pakistan from Sana'a, Yemen, around June 2001. He arrived in Karachi, PK, and spent approximately four days in a hotel before he flew to Lahore, PK. CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources REASON:E.O. 12958 Section 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20290903

S E C R E T //N O F O RN //20290903 o Training and Activities: When he arrived in Lahore, the detainee traveled to the JT headquarters in Raiwind, PK. At Raiwind, the detainee stayed at alarge mosque called the JT Mosque. There, he studied the history and rituals of Islam for hve months. He then traveled to Faisalabad, PK, where he attended the Jami'a Salafia University for four months. Detainee met a Yemeni named Imad who told him about an Arab house off campus where other Yemeni students lived. Detainee visited the house and, on his first visit, decided to spend the night. (Analyst note: Association with JT and visiting a house are two coverstories encountered with other detained Al-Qaida members. Al-Qaida used JT as a cover to facilitate international travels.) r Capture Information: The house was raided by Pakistani authorities around 0200 hours the next moming (28 March 2002). The detainee and fifteen others were arrested and held at the Crescent Textile Mill in Faisalabad, PK. Many of the fifteen arrested with the detainee have been identified by senior Al-Qaida personnel. Detainee was turned over to US authorities approximately May 2002. b. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 19 June 2002. c. (S) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO, source can provide information on: o The Jama'at Tablighi Non Govemmental Organization (NGO). The safehouse in Faisalabad, PK d. (S/ {F) Reasons for Continued Detention: o (S/A.JF) During his most recent interview, the detainee contradicted portions of his story. The interrogators have noted that the detainee was deceptive during numerous interrogations and that he is not forthcoming with information. (Analyst note: In a note dated January 2004, his father provided the detainee with advice which could be taken to re-enforce countei-interrogaiio, techniques: "...be as I taught you to be, return bock to us quickly: love all people, do notfollow the screamers, nor the careless..." The note about the screamers couldbe a riference to those detainees that cause disturbances. The note about the careless could be a reference to those detainees that inadvertently, or otherwise, provide information to their interrogators. During his repatriation interview, the detainee stated he was not a devote Muslim, yet his letters home contain numerous religious statements such as "thanlcs to Godfor 9v9ry thing and I am praying to God to set free all the Muslims and to grant them victory and God promised us with victory and stabilization if we follow his Islamic law on this earth. " The detainee is likely dedicated to jihad.). (S) Detainee was captured in a safehouse located in Faisalabad, PK, outside the Jami'a Salafia University that he attended. A man named Issa ran the safehouse. Analyst Note: This "(Jniversity" is a religious madrasa (school) and not a statefunded or state regulated school. Religious madrasas in Pakistan are perceived to encourage militancy, religious extremism, and intolerance while thriving on an anti-western sentiment. The curriculum is 2 S E C RE T //N O F O RN I I 20290903

Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9YM-000681 (S) solely based on religious studies and such "Universities" should not be confusedfor statefunde d accr edited s chools. o (S/A{F) Many of the 14 persons arrested with the detainee have confirmed Al-Qaida connections. It is assessed that the detainee is being deceptive in his claims that he was ignorant to his associates' activities and that the detainee himself is a member of Al-Qaida. o (S/ {F) Abu Zubaydah, a high ranking Al-Qaida lieutenant and aid to UBL, has identified detainee from a photograph as someone who may be Yemeni and who he may have seen in Afghanistan (AF). (Analyst note: The detainee's story of remaining in Pakistan studying for over five months is deemedfalse. The detainee likely, as noted by Abu Zubaydah, traveled to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan the detainee would have attended training, unless received in Yemen prior to his departure.) o (S) ISN US9YM-000682 identified detainee stating he first met the detainee at the safehouse where he taught English to the detainee. (Analyst's Note: YM682's statement indicates that the detainee was at the safehouse for a longer period than just one night. The detainee likely ended up at the safehouse after fleeing Afghanistan.) o (S) ISN US9YM-000252DP stated that he saw detainee in Kandahar, and knows him as a fighter who traveled between Kandahar and Host, AF. (Analyst note: Al-Qaida had training camps established in both Kandahar and Khowst areas.) o (S/A{F) Senior Al-Qaida facilitator Abu Yasir Al-Jaza'iri has identified US9YM- 000688DP, another detainee captured at Issa's safehouse in Faisalabad with the detainee, claiming YM688 was with a large group of Yemeni who were fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan and were seeking to retum to Yemen. (Analyst note: It is believed that the detainee was also part of this group offleeing Yemeni.). (S) Detainee's travel was facilitated by the Jama'at Tablighi NGO. Detainee and his family are also connected to a key leader of the JT in Yemen. The JT has been identified as a Counter-Terrorism Tier 2 NGO target. (Analyst's Note: Tier 2 NGOs are defined as having demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests. Extremists, including Al-Qaida, sometimes use this organization as a cover to hide illegal movements offunds and activities. (S/A{F) The name Al Muhajer Al 'Udini/Al 'Adini was identified on a list of Al-Qaida personnel as a prisoner at GTMO. At GTMO, the only detainee with this name is the detainee. Al 'Udini is a varient of Aludaini, and it is probable that Al Muhajer Al 'Udini is an alias for the detainee. Additionally, the name Jamal Qasim Salim aka Talha Al Muhajir Al-'Adini was noted on a list of 128 Al-Qaida recruits along with their safe deposit boxes. (Analyst note: Due to the similarity of the alias, it is possible this is the detainee, and would indicate an additional alias for him.). Another possible identification of the detainee comes from a list of Yemeni jihadists believed by the Yemeni Political Security Organization to be in Afghanistan. The list included the name Muhammad Muhammad 'Ali Ghanim Al-'Adini. e. (S) Intelligence Focus: JTF GTMO has determined that this detainee is of medium intelligence value due to knowledge of: o Yemeni Security Service assistance to to Al-Qaida J s E c RE T //N O F O RN//20290903

S E C RE T //N O F O RN I I 20290903 Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9YM-000681 (S) o Travel Facilitation o Training o Recruiting. Al-Qaida training camps o Khowst and Kandahar, AF o Curriculum o Trainers and trainees o Jama'at Tablighi NGO o Associates and leadership o Funding o Operations o Jama'at Tablighi Mosque and religious studies facilitated o International travel o The Jamea Salafia University in Faisalabad, PK o Curriculum o Ideology o Recruitment o Safehouse Associations o Description and biographic details on Abu Zubaydah. Description and biographic details on Al-Qaida operatives o Ingress and egress routes thru Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaida safehouses in Pakistan and Afghanistan, their operations, and associates 4. (S) Detainee's Conduct: This detainee has a history of being passive. The detainee has minor accounts for failure to comply with a guard. He has had contraband confiscated on several occasions. 5. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 24 February 2004, arrd he remains an enemy combatant. 6. (S) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Summary: It is assessed this detainee is a member of Al-Qaida and/or its global terrorist network. Detainee has links to key facilitators in the Al-Qaida intemational terrorist network. At present, detainee is exhibiting counter-interrogation resistance techniques and is completely uncooperative with debriefers. It is assessed that the detainee is being deceptive and withholding key information pertaining to his timeline, associates, and activities. Detainee's interactions may have made him privy to sensitive operational information on Al-Qaida and Taliban activities and personalities. Upon fuither exploitation, detainee could yield insight regarding Al-Qaida operations within Pakistan and Afghanistan and possibly worldwide. Based on the detainee's association with extremist radicals and senior level Al-Qaida associates, his 4 S E C R E T //N O F O RN I I 20290903

S E C R E T //N O F' O RN I I 20290903 uncorroborated and likely false claimed period in Pakistan while attending the Jami'a Salafia University, and his identification as a jihadist, it is imperative detainee be retained in the custody of the US Government or the Yemen Government. His continued detention will allow for funher exploitation of his past affiliation with various terrorist groups and prevent him from engaging in further terrorist activity. It has been determined that, due to his commitment, detainee poses a medium to high risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be transferred for continued detention to his country of origin (Yemen) if a satisfactory agreement can be reached that allows access to detainee andlor access to exploited intelligence. If a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached for his continued detention in Yemen, he should be retained under DoD control. 7. (S) Coordination: JTF GTMO notified the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) of this recommendation on 3 September 2004. On 9 April 2004 CITF assessed the detainee as a low risk. CF: CITF-GTMO le JAY W. HOOD Brigadier General, US Army Commanding f, S E C RE T //N O F' O RN I I 20290903