Integrated Coping Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events

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IAEA IEM on SAM in the Light of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, 17-20 March 2014, Vienna, Austria Integrated Coping Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Jaewhan Kim and Kwang-Il Ahn KAERI

Contents Introduction The irocs Approach for BDBEEs irocs: integrated, RObust Coping Strategies irocs Damage Conditions and Coping Strategies Conclusion

Damage Conditions by the Earthquake and Tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi Loss of Off-site Power (by the Earthquake) Loss of On-site Power Loss of Batteries Loss of Seawater Intake (Loss of Access to Ultimate Heat Sink) Loss of Core Cooling Core Uncovery, Fuel Melt, Hydrogen Generation Hydrogen Explosion Vessel/Containment Failure Release of Fission Products

Damage Conditions and Coping Strategies

irocs Coping Strategy for Damage Condition 1 and 2 * Coping Strategy for Condition 1 * Coping Strategy for Condition 2 EOP/ SBO Power Recovery inc. Mobile DGs RCS Cooling using TD-AFW - ADV: Local & Manual control (*Communication needs for improvement) Shedding of Unnecessary DCs RCS Makeup Using H.P. Portable Pump (from RWST) - Local/MCR Operation for Makeup Failure of TD-AFW (e.g., CST rupture, Crew fail.) CST Makeup (from demi. water/raw water /fire protection water/or seawater) - MCR/Local Operation for Makeup *Ref. FLEX in US SAMG Entry FRP-01 Feedwater Makeup using Portable Equipment or Fire Protection System; Supply of External Water Source (e.g., Pond or Seawater) *Required Time: ~ 2hr or more -> SAMG Entry Condition (CET>650 o C) SCDAP/RELAP5 MELCOR/MAAP *Time to VF from CD: 30min ~ 2hr *Time to VF from IE: 2hr ~ 4hr *Delay in RCS Depressurization & Injection -> Vessel Failure Preparing RCS Injection at TD-AFW Failure RCS Depressurization Need for dedicated equipment for RCS depressurization RCS Injection using Portable Equip. CTMT Injection (*External Injection/Spray)

Available Time vs. Required Time under Early Failure of TD-AFW Available Time from Accident Analysis Codes for SBO under TD-AFW Failure SCDAP/ RELAP5 MELCOR MAAP5 Rx Trip 0 0 0 Core Uncovery Rx Vessel Failure Time from CU to RVF 6,580 sec (1.8 hr) 8,570 sec (2.3 hr) 6,556 sec (1.8 hr) 15,237 sec (4.2 hr) 6,870 sec (1.9 hr) 13,300 sec (3.6 hr) 0.5 hr 2.4 hr 1.7 hr Required Time to Deploy Portable Equipment: 2hr or more (depends on degree of plant damage) Failure to maintain Reactor Vessel Integrity, If RCS Depressurization and Injection Strategy is to be Initiated after SAMG Entry Condition is met Ref. SAMG Entry Condition (CET > 650 o C)

FRP-01 irocs Coping Strategy for Damage Condition 3 and 4 * Coping Strategy for Condition 3 * Coping Strategy for Condition 4 Power Recovery inc. Mobile DGs RCS Inventory Makeup Using H.P. Portable Pump (from RWST or Other Water Sources) - Local/MCR Operation for Makeup RCS Cooling using TD-AFW - ADV: Local & Manual control (*Communication needs for improvement) Shedding of Unnecessary DCs Failure of TD-AFW (e.g., CST rupture, Crew fail.) FRP-01 *Required Time: ~ 2hr or more -> SAMG Entry Condition (CET>650 o C) SCDAP/RELAP5 MAAP *Time to VF from IE: 1.7hr ~ 3.8hr (SLOCA) *Innovative Approach required to prevent Core Damage (e.g. Installation of Diesel-driven H.P & L.P pumps) Feedwater Makeup using Portable Equipment or Fire Protection System; Supply of External Water Source (e.g., Pond or Seawater) *Required Time: ~ 2hr or more -> SAMG Entry Condition (CET>650 o C) RWST Makeup Using H.P. Portable Pump - Local/MCR Operation for Makeup CST Makeup - MCR/Local Operation for Makeup SAMG Entry RCS Depressurization (Might have been accomplished) RCS Injection using Portable Equip. CTMT Injection (*External Injection/Spray)

irocs Coping Strategy for Damage Condition 1 and 2 * Coping Strategy for Condition 1 * Coping Strategy for Condition 2 Loss of AC&DC AC/DC Power Recovery including Mobile DGs or Portable DCs Failure of TD-AFW RCS Cooling using TD-AFW (e.g., CST rupture, Crew fail.) - FW & ADV: local & manual operation - Alternate Instrumentation (e.g., SG L/P; RCS T/P, ) CST Makeup (from demi. water/raw water /fire protection water/or seawater) - Alternate Instrumentation for CST Level - Local Operation for Makeup RCS Makeup Using H.P. Portable Pump (from RWST) - Alternate Instrumentation (e.g., Reactivity, PZR L/P, RV L) - Local Operation for Makeup SAMG Entry (Alternate Instrumentation) Loss of AC&DC & Loss of HR Feedwater Makeup using Portable Equipment or Fire Protection System; Supply of External Water Source (e.g., Pond or Seawater) *Required Time: ~ 2hr or more -> SAMG Entry Condition (CET>650 o C) SCDAP/RELAP5 MELCOR/MAAP *Time to VF from CD: 30min ~ 2hr *Time to VF from IE: 2hr ~ 4hr *Delay in RCS Depressurization & Injection -> Vessel Failure Preparing RCS Injection at TD-AFW Failure RCS Depressurization Need for dedicated equipment for RCS depressurization RCS Injection using Portable Equip. CTMT Injection (*External Injection/Spray)

Concluding Remarks irocs: integrated, RObust Coping Strategies Possible Plant Damage Conditions Integrative Use of EOP and SAMG Robust Strategies Required Verification and Validation of irocs will be further pursued.