ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EPR AT DUKOVANY NPP

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ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND EPR AT DUKOVANY NPP 27-29 September 2017 Vienna IAEA Miroslav Trnka

OVERVIEW General EOPs and SAMGs (changes) DAM (FLEX) EDMG Equipment (new + ongoing projects) Staff (drills and exercises) 1

CZECH REPUBLIC NPP Temelín 2 Units VVER 1000/V320 Unit 1-2002 Unit 2-2003 Installed capacity 2 x 1125 MWe NPP Dukovany 4 Units VVER 440/V213 Unit 1-1985 Unit 2-1986 Unit 3-1986 Unit 4-1987 Installed capacity 4 x 500 MWe 2

HISTORY OF EOPs AND SAMGs 1993 begin development of EOPs, Westinghouse philosophy 1999 implementation of EOPs 2001 begin development of SAMGs 2003 implementation of SAMGs 2010 upgrade SAMGs shutdown mode and Spend Fuel Pool 2013 begin development of DAM Program (FLEX) 2015 begin development of EDMG 2016-2017 upgrade of SAMGs 3

MAIN CHANGES IN PROCEDURES EOPs Blackout procedure the first version of procedure was for several hours blackout, now is at least for three days. New SAMG guideline Blackout and loss DC power Changed structure of SAMG by PWROG philosophy DAM procedures (incorporate to others procedures, especially Blackout procedures) EDMG procedure Technical specification for mobile equipment and for SA equipment 4

DAM PROCEDURES Short, single-instructions on the use of mobile and portable devices to fulfill some functions, sometimes in several variations. Usage in SAMGs, EOPs (blackout), SD EOPs, EDMG Issue from 2014 - This is necessary to drill shift and fire brigade Examples: Feeding SGs by mobile pump Makeup RCS using pump powered by mobile DG Loss of vital instrumentation or control power SFP makeup Isolation of Hydroaccumulators 5

EXTENSIVE DAMAGE MITIGATION GUIDELINE (EDMG) The Guideline provides: Initial actions and alternative methods of plant operation and communication ERO activation Initial damage assessment and muster of available resources Initial immediate operational response actions Reactor trip verification Core cooling restoration Local immediate actions: Security threats Medical services Fire fighting Radiological monitoring 6

EXTENSIVE DAMAGE MITIGATION GUIDELINE - EDMG ENTRY CONDITIONS EDMG is entered if command and control capability is disabled: From Shift supervisor Intervention Procedure -OR - Whenever ANY of the following conditions is satisfied: Control of plant equipment cannot be established from MCR or ECR Use of EOPs is not feasible 7

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND FOR SA EQUIPMENT Who care about devices and where devices is placed Who control availability and how often Testing How long is possible to be inoperable Corrective action 8

KEY PARAMETERS MEASUREMENT Portable I&C Devices SAMG entry parameters Measurement from transmitter or on line to Control Room Measurement in voltage or current transform to real value of parameter Not measured in breach of the sensor or routes between sensor and transmitter 9

TECHNICAL CHANGES - READY In Vessel Retention Hydrogen Recombiners PAR SBO DGs, 2 per two twin units, 3 MW Mobil DGs, 4 per for units, 300 kw Ultimate FWPump - third one Possibility to depressurise SGs to low (zero) pressure, modificatinn of SGSV 10

MAIN TECHNICAL CHANGES - ONGOING Independent line to depressurization of RCS Add to atmosphere to containment during big subpressure from air trap, support hydrogen recombiners Long term heat sink system Hydrogen concentration measurement independent of oxygen concentration New sources of boron water and independent pump, high pressure and low pressure The Third independent system for Spent Fuel cooling 11

DRILLS Recognition of the site Feeding SGs by fire brigade pump Feeding reactor, SFP by the fire brigade pump Alternative supply of selected pumps via mobile DGs Alternative supply emergency switchyard 0,4 kv via mobile DGs Diesel refueling for long-term operation DG 12

13 IN VESSEL RETENTION

ALTERNATIVE FEEDING OF RCS Injection after loss of cooling into RPV, SFP or spray system using Fire brigade pump Valves and quick operated valves is possible to open/close by portable devices New procedure for using these devices Injection using T-joints is necessary to cut piping (RCS) Injection using flange dismantling, without cutting (SFP, spray systém) Objímka 14

15 T-JOINT

16 PLACE TO CUTTING

17 FLANGE

18 PLACE FOR FLANGE AIR PIPING

19 USAGE OF FLANGE

20 PORTABLE DRIVER

21 CONTROL QOV BY PORTABLE DRIVER- CONNECTION

MOBIL DG 4 320 kw (+ 4 cable cars) Supply one division of battery section (valves, I&C measurement, PAMS) + one pump directly about 70 kw 22

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Car for emergency staff Independent Connection by Pager or mobile phone Satelite phone Field phones Cameras 23

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Hose truck with pump 6 m 3 / minute for long distance transport of water up to 2.6 km - 1 pc Another pump 6 m 3 / min at a trailer for water- supply 1 piece 24

DAM FEEDING OF SG (AND SFP) Fire brigade mobile pump 7 pc (2 pumps portable) 25

26 FIRE BRIGADE TRUCKS 3

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Fuel tank truck - Volume (15 m 3 + 2 m 3 ) Refiling to SBO diesel Refiling to small power generators 27

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Backhoe loader TEREX release routes - removing snow, debris and other obstacles Tipper truck with a hydraulic arm and a snow blade for releasing routes - removing snow, debris and other obstacles 28

TRUCK WITH LIFT Lift until to 44 meters Two person TV camera Remote control 29

RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE Enhacement of resources and equipment for emergency Response 30

RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE Providing of alternative means of abnormal occurrence management during loss of primary control centers Diverse Emergency Control Centre (off site Emergency planning zone) Mobile Emergency Control Centre (container workplace) 31

END Do not forget that prevention is more important than repression Question? 32