RISK METHODOLOGY FOR FUDS

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RISK METHODOLOGY FOR FUDS 1 (AKA RAO SPEEDWAGON) 237 217 200 80 252 Assessing Risk and Defining the Remedial Objectives for 237 217 200 119 174 Munitions 237 Response 217 Sites 200 27.59 255 255 255 0 0 0 163 163 163 131 132 122 239 65 53 110 135 120 112 92 56 62 102 130 102 56 48 130 120 111 Kari L. Meier, Ph.D. Environmental and Munitions Center of Expertise (EM CX) 20 July 2017

2 EPA RI/FS GUIDANCE The objective of the RI/FS process is not the unobtainable goal of removing all uncertainty, but rather to gather information sufficient to support an informed risk management decision regarding which remedy appears to be most appropriate for a given site. 1 1 Guidance for Conducting Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies under CERCLA, U.S. EPA, October 1988 Note that the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) share the same objective.

AGENDA 3 Important Factors in the Conceptual Site Model (CSM) New FUDS Risk Management Process Developing the Remedial Action Objective (RAO) Post-Remedy Data Assessments

4 CSM DEVELOPMENT What we need to know to make decisions

TYPICAL CHARACTERIZATION: FOCUS ON HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTION 25

6

7 CHARACTERIZATION: VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION RI 0 Depth (inches) 5 10 15 20 25 30 75MM Fuzes/Boosters MD 20MM Low Order HE ParHal HE ProjecHle PD Element

RI 8 0 5 Depth (inches) 10 15 20 25 30 Depth of Contamination Land Use Depth 75MM Fuzes/Boosters MD 20MM Low Order HE ParHal HE ProjecHle PD Element

HOW DO WE USE IT? RI 9 0 Where are the munitions? 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 #md #mec

10 USING VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION Surface 100% 0 High Confidence Increased Possibility of False Negatives Reduction in Confidence? What s the Detection Limit? What Does It Mean? ß Verified Detection Depth

11 PERFORMANCE TESTING Surface 100% 0 System Test Seeds High Confidence Verification Seeds: Throughout Fieldwork Increased Possibility of False Negatives Reduction in Confidence? What s the Detection Limit? What Does It Mean? ß Detection Depth

12 VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION FS 0 Number of items [x] Surface Uncertainty à Land Use Depth = Confidence à ß Detection Depth ß Detection Depth Confidence à ß Detection Depth

CSM SUMMARY 13 Historically, RI s focus on horizontal distribution only -Depth of detection was not typically QC d adequately, so communication of confidence in data was inadequate. There are 3 critical vertical values to define in the RI -verified detection depth from instrument -land use depth -vertical distribution depth of data

RAO TOOL 14

15 BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT Purpose is to evaluate potential risk to human health and the environment in the absence of any remedial action. Toxicity and concentration of contaminants Fate and transport of contaminants Current and anticipated future land use Current and potential receptors (human and ecological)

16 FRAME OF REFERENCE MRSPP Implement Remedy (Throughout Project, until RC) PP/DD MEC HA PA FS SI RI Emphasis on Site Specific Data Here Supports Alternatives Analysis; (Not a Risk Assessment) We Are Here Assess Risk & Develop Remedial Action Objectives (RAOs)

17 THINK AHEAD: PLAN FOR RAO DEVELOPMENT In accordance with 40 CFR Part 300.430(e)(i), the Lead Agency shall Establish Remedial Action Objectives (RAOs) specifying contaminants and media of concern, potential exposure pathways, and remediation goals.

NOTICE! An acceptable remediation goal cannot be defined for an unknown or undefined risk!! Two choices: 1. RI is incomplete, need more data 2. No evidence, No risk, RC 18

19 MATRIX RELATIONSHIPS Designed to simplify relationships between: Quantity Accessibility Severity Matrix 1: Frequency of Encounter Sensitivity of Munitions Site Activities Matrix 2: Frequency with Severity of an incident Matrix 3: Sensitivity of items with consideration of Site Activities Matrix 4: Brings together all that is known about UXO or DMM that may remain

MRS Frequency of Use (Access) Likelihood of Encounter, Matrix 1: Amount of MEC vs. Access Condi=ons ONen IntermiQent Rare (e.g., less regular or (e.g., some irregular use, (e.g., very limited use, periodic use, some or access limited) access prevented) access) ß Derived from MEC HA à MEC is visible on the surface and detected in the subsurface. Frequent Frequent Likely Occasional InvesHgaHon of the MRS characterized the area as a Concentrated MuniHons Use Area (CMUA) where MEC is known or suspected (e.g., MD indicahve of MEC) is idenhfied). Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom MEC presence based on physical evidence only (e.g., MD indicahve of MEC), although the area is not a CMUA, or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 1.0/acre at 95% confidence). Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Unlikely Seldom Seldom Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Amount of MEC Regular (e.g., daily use, open access) MEC presence is based on isolated historical discoveries (e.g., EOD report), or A response achon has been conducted to remove MEC and known or suspected hazard remains to support this selechon, (e.g., surface removal where subsurface not addressed) or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 0.5/acre at 95% confidence). MEC presence is suspected based on historical evidence of munihons use only, or A response achon has been conducted to remove surface and subsurface MEC (UU/UE not achieved), or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 0.25/acre at 95% confidence). InvesHgaHon of the MRS did not idenhfy evidence of MEC presence, or A response achon conducted to achieve UU/UE. 20

Likelihood of MEC Encounter 21 Severity of Incident, Matrix 2: Severity vs. Likelihood of Encounter Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Severity of Incident Associated with Specific Hazards Catastrophic/Cri=cal: May result in 1 or more death or permanent total disability Modest: May result in 1 or more injury resulhng in emergency medical treatment, without hospitalizahon. Minor: May result in 1 or more injuries requiring first aid or medical treatment ß Defined in DA Pam 385-30à A A B B D B B B C D B C C C D Improbable: No injury is anhcipated D D D D D

22 Specific Land Use : Likelihood to Impart Energy High Sensi>vity ß Grouped from MRSPPà Sensi=vity: Suscep=bility to Detona=on Likelihood of Detona>on, Matrix 3: Muni>ons Sensi>vity vs. Likelihood of Energy to be Imparted High e.g., areas planned for development Moderate e.g., undeveloped, wildlife refuge, parks Not Likely e.g., not anticipated, prevented, mitigated 1 1 3 1 2 3 Propellant; Bulk Secondary HE, Pyrotechnics or Propellant; Pyrotechnic (not used or damaged) 1 3 3 Not sensi>ve 2 3 3 Moderate Sensi>vity High Explosive (HE) (used, unused, or Damaged); or Pyrotechnic (used or Damaged) Low Sensi>vity

ACCEPTABLE VS. UNACCEPTABLE 23 Acceptable and Unacceptable Site Conditions Result from Matrix 3 Result From Matrix 2 A B C D 1 Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable 2 Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 3 Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable

24 DEFINING REMEDIAL OBJECTIVES Decision Logic for Developing Acceptable End States for a Munitions Response Site

RI 25 0 5 Depth (inches) 10 15 20 25 30 Depth of Contamination Land Use Depth 75MM Fuzes/Boosters MD 20MM Low Order HE ParHal HE ProjecHle PD Element

26 THE REMEDIAL ACTION OBJECTIVE (RAO) IS: FS to reduce the unacceptable risk due to the presence of [name specific munitions] within [horizontal boundary] and [depth] to address exposure to [receptors] via [pathway] such that an acceptable scenario, defined by Matrix 4, is achieved. 0 Depth (inches) 5 10 15 20 25 30 Depth of Contamination Land Use Depth 75MM Fuzes/Boosters MD 20MM Low Order HE ParHal HE ProjecHle PD Element

EXAMPLE M-1 27 Evidence of Hazard Present 1870 Acres RI Results 13 76mm APHE 2.36-inch Rockets 105mm Smoke Canister 155mm HE Activities / Use 10,000 people per year Full Accessibility Recreational (i.e., camping, hunting, hiking, lake access) Defined Exposure Pathway Clearly Defined PRESENCE on surface likely subsurface Potential for Encounter is Likely Unacceptable Risk

Likelihood of Encounter, Matrix 1: Amount of MEC vs. Access Condi=ons Regular (e.g., daily use, open access) MRS Frequency of Use (Access) ONen (e.g., less regular or periodic use, some access) IntermiQent (e.g., some irregular use, or access limited) Rare (e.g., very limited use, access prevented) 28 Amount of MEC MEC is visible on the surface and detected in the subsurface. Frequent Frequent Likely Occasional InvesHgaHon of the MRS characterized the area as a Concentrated MuniHons Use Area (CMUA) where MEC is known or suspected (e.g., MD indicahve of MEC) is idenhfied). MEC presence based on physical evidence only (e.g., MD indicahve of MEC), although the area is not a CMUA, or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 1.0/acre at 95% confidence). MEC presence is based on isolated historical discoveries (e.g., EOD report), or A response achon has been conducted to remove MEC and known or suspected hazard remains to support this selechon, (e.g., surface removal where subsurface not addressed) or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 0.5/acre at 95% confidence). MEC presence is suspected based on historical evidence of munihons use only, or A response achon has been conducted to remove surface and subsurface MEC (UU/UE not achieved), or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 0.25/acre at 95% confidence). Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Unlikely Seldom Seldom Unlikely Unlikely InvesHgaHon of the MRS did not idenhfy evidence of MEC presence, or A response achon conducted to achieve UU/UE. Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely

Likelihood of MEC Encounter 29 Severity of Incident, Matrix 2: Severity vs. Likelihood of Encounter Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Severity of Incident Associated with Specific Hazards Catastrophic/Cri=cal: May result in 1 or more death or permanent total disability Modest: May result in 1 or more injury resulhng in emergency medical treatment, without hospitalizahon. Minor: May result in 1 or more injuries requiring first aid or medical treatment A A B B D B B B C D B C C C D Improbable: No injury is anhcipated D D D D D

30 MEC SensiHvity Matrix: Likelihood of DetonaHon Sensi=vity: Suscep=bility to Detona=on MATRIX 3: Specific Land Use Site Ac=vi=es: Rela=ve Energy Imparted to Muni=ons During Encounter High e.g., areas planned for development Moderate e.g., undeveloped, wildlife refuge, parks Not Likely e.g., not anticipated, prevented, mitigated Sensi>ve 1 1 3 High Explosive (HE) (used, unused, or Damaged); or Pyrotechnic (used or Damaged) Propellant; Bulk Secondary HE, Pyrotechnics or Propellant; Pyrotechnic (not used or damaged) 1 2 3 1 3 3 Prac>ce or Riot Control 2 3 3

31 Matrix 4: Defining Unacceptable Site CondiHons SensiHvity Category from Matrix 3 Acceptable and Unacceptable Site Condi>ons Severity Category From Matrix 2 A B C D 1 Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable 2 Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 3 Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable

Matrix 4: Defining 32 Unacceptable Site CondiHons Acceptable and Unacceptable Site Condi>ons Severity Category From Matrix 2 A B C D SensiHvity Category from Matrix 3 1 Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable 2 Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 3 Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable

33 MEC SensiHvity Matrix: Likelihood of DetonaHon Sensi=vity: Suscep=bility to Detona=on MATRIX 3: Specific Land Use Site Ac=vi=es: Rela=ve Energy Imparted to Muni=ons During Encounter High e.g., areas planned for development Moderate e.g., undeveloped, wildlife refuge, parks Not Likely e.g., not anticipated, prevented, mitigated Sensi>ve 1 1 3 High Explosive (HE) (used, unused, or Damaged); or Pyrotechnic (used or Damaged) Propellant; Bulk Secondary HE, Pyrotechnics or Propellant; Pyrotechnic (not used or damaged) 1 2 3 1 3 3 Prac>ce or Riot Control 2 3 3

34 AlternaHve 1: EducaHon Only, where Likelihood of Encounter with something Catastrophic is Frequent Acceptable and Unacceptable Site Condi>ons Severity Category From Matrix 2 A B C D SensiHvity Category from Matrix 3 1 Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable 2 Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 3 Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable

35 Amount of MEC MATRIX 1: Accessibility Matrix: Likelihood of Encounter MEC is visible on the surface and detected in the subsurface. InvesHgaHon of the MRS characterized the area as a Concentrated MuniHons Use Area (CMUA) where MEC is suspected. InvesHgaHon supports MEC presence based on physical evidence only (e.g., MD indicahve of MEC), although the area is not a CMUA, or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 1.0/ acre at 95% confidence). MEC presence is based on isolated historical discoveries (e.g., EOD report), or A response achon has been conducted to remove MEC and known or suspected hazard remains to support this selechon, (e.g., surface removal where subsurface not addressed) or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 0.5/ acre at 95% confidence). MEC presence is suspected based on historical evidence of munihons use only, or A response achon has been conducted to clear surface and subsurface MEC (UU/UE not achieved), or The MEC concentrahon is below a project-specific threshold to support this selechon (e.g., less than 0.25/ acre at 95% confidence). InvesHgaHon of the MRS did not idenhfy evidence of MEC presence, or A response achon conducted to achieve UU/UE. Regular (e.g., daily use, open access) MRS Access Condi=ons ONen IntermiQent (e.g., less regular or (e.g., some irregular periodic use, some use, or access limited) access) Rare (e.g., very limited use, access prevented) Frequent Frequent Likely Occasional Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Occasional Seldom Unlikely Unlikely Seldom Seldom Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely

Severity of Incident Associated with Specific MEC items MATRIX 2: MEC Severity Catastrophic: MEC that may result in 1 or more death or permanent total disability Modest: MEC that may result in 1 or more injury resulhng in emergency medical treatment, without hospitalizahon. Minor: MEC that may result in 1 or more injuries requiring first aid or medical treatment Likelihood of MEC Encounter Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely A A B B D B B B C D B C C C D Improbable: No injury is anhcipated D D D D D 36

AlternaHve 2: Surface Clearance Only, where Likelihood of Encounter with something Catastrophic is Frequent 37 Acceptable and Unacceptable Site Condi>ons Severity Category From Matrix 2 A B C D SensiHvity Category from Matrix 3 1 Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable 2 Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 3 Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable

AlternaHve 3: 38 Surface Clearance and EducaHon, where Likelihood of Encounter with something Catastrophic is Frequent Acceptable and Unacceptable Site Condi>ons Severity Category From Matrix 2 A B C D SensiHvity Category from Matrix 3 1 Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable 2 Unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 3 Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable

39 POST REMEDY DATA ASSESSMENT 0 REMEDIAL ACTION Number of items [x] Surface Land Use Depth = Action Limit Confidence à ß Verified Detection Depth Did we meet the RAO?

40 UNDERSTAND THE VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION Surface LU-Depth = Action Limit (AL)? ß Confidence à ß detection ßdetection

POST REMEDY DATA ASSESSMENT REMEDIAL ACTION 41 Yes (AddiHonal Response AcHon is NOT Required) Did the physical remedy support an acceptable end state? (meet the RAO?) No (AddiHonal Response AcHon is Required) Is UU/UE Supported? Will inclusion of LUCs support an acceptable end state? Yes 5YRs are NOT required Response Complete No 5YRs are required Response Complete Yes Implement LUCs UU/UE not supported, 5YRs are required Response Complete No Must consider addihonal Response AcHon

42 HOW DO WE GET BETTER? CHARACTERIZATION! Better Characterization Data Specify and Track Location & Depth (Model the CSM) Report Types with Nomenclature (know sensitivity and severity) Establish QC and QA Criteria with Appropriate Documentation for the Data (not just a safety QC) Understand and Discuss Land Use Scenarios Depth of Use Detection Depths Land Use Depths Other Site Depth (e.g. to bedrock, etc.)

43 HOW DO WE GET BETTER? PLAN FOR A POST REMEDY ASSESSMENT Better Tracking of Remediation Data Specify and Track Location & Depth Types with Nomenclature Establish QC and QA Criteria with Appropriate Documentation for the Data (not just a safety QC) Determine how the Achievement of the Remedial Action will be measured against the RAO to establish the Acceptable End State.

44 BOTTOM LINE: TECHNOLOGY IS CATCHING UP! We can No Longer Say (before data): We CAN T get it all or We ll NEVER get UU/UE or We ll NEVER get buy-in from the Regulator

THANK YOU 45 kari.l.meier@usace.army.mil