JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APO AE 09360 09 Aueust 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL33172. 1. (FOUO) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMS/I{DRC Reference Name: Abdal Razak Oadir o Aliases and Current/True Name: Zununjan Dawat. ABD AL Razak o Place of Birth: China (CH)) o Date of Birth: NO DOB o Citizenship: China o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9CH-000219DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He has beendiagnosed with Latent Tuberculosis but has refused treatment. Detainee has no travelrestrictions. 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subjecto the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement. b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 14 February 2004. CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20300709 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20300709

s E c R E T // NOFORN 20300709 For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of the Eastem Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The ETIM has been an ally of the Al-Qaida terrorist network since August 2001. Detainee willingly joined the ETIM and trained for military operations at its Al- Qaida sponsored training camps. Detainee was captured with other Uighurs, all of whom trained at the ETIM facility in Tora Bora mountain region of Afghanistan. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on detainee's statements. a. (S/NF) Prior History: Detainee claimed he originally left his home in East Turkistan in 1995 to find a better life involving legitimate business interests in Kyrgyzstan. Detainee purchased a poorly forged passport and attempted to cross the Kyrgyzstan border. Kyrgyz border guards arrested detainee and held him for two days. Kyrgyz officials returned detainee to the custody of the Chinese government. Chinese officials questioned detainee for fourteen days. After he was questioned, detainee paid a bribe and was released. In Late 1995, detainee successfully entered Kyrgyzstan and later Uzbekistan after he obtained a valid passport. b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee claimed he left Uzbekistan for a better financial future in Pakistan (PK). He went to Rawalpindi, PK, which has a large Uighur population. While in Rawalpindi, detainee stayed at a guesthouse in the Kashkar Rabat neighborhood (a popular stopover for Uighurs attending the Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA)). Detainee reports that he decided to leave Pakistan because of poor business opportunities and the Pakistani government's persecution of Uighurs. Detainee claimed he heard there were moneymaking ventures in Mazar-e-Sharif Afghanistan, (AF). c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee reports that he met two Uighurs while at bazaar in Kabul Afghanistan, AF. Detainee and the other two Uighers decided to create a political organization to help protect Uighur rights. Another Uighur informed detainee that a Uighur named Hassan Makhsum was also running an organization to protect Uighur rights. Detainee was told Makhsum could be found in the Kartisi neighborhood in Kabul, AF. Detainee found the house, however, Mahksum was not at home. Instead, detainee was greeted by Abdul Haq who took detainee to the ETIM Camp in the Tora Bora Mountains. Because detainee spoke Dari and Farsi, he was given the job of obtaining supplies from Jalalabad. Detainee was given $500 dollars to purchase clothing, food, and other necessities for the camp. Detainee did not see very many Uighurs when he was at the camp due to his status as a newcomer. 2

d. (S//NF) Capture lnformation: According to detainee's account, the Uighurs were surprised by the US air strikes against the Tora Bora camp after 9ll1. Detainee along with 18 other Uighurs hid in caves until it was safe to go to Pakistan. Detainee's group followed a small group of Arabs across the Afghar/Pakistan border into Pakistan. Originally, the people greeted them with kindness and told them to go to the Mosque for shelter. Later, the Pakistani army arrested the Uighurs and the Arabs. They were turned over to the US authorities on 05 January 2002. e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 06 August 2002 f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Eastem Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) o Taliban association with the Uighur organization in Afghanistan (AF). 5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: o (S/A{F) Detainee was a member of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which has been formally allied with Al-Qaida since August 2001. He trained at an Al- Qaida sponsored camp. He possibly fought alongside the Taliban against U.S./Coalition forces in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan. The ETIM has targeted U.S. personnel in Kyrgyzstan. o (S) Detainee admits he was a member of the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Organization, also referred to as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement. Detainee, however, denied targeting the United States, or any links to Al-Qaida. Detainee also acknowledged training in the ETIM camp in Tora Bora. He claimed the only objectives discussed at the Camp involved resistance to Chinese oppression and possible crippling of Chinese military installations using guerilla tactics. o (S/AfD Detainee admitted he attended and received small arms and combatant training at an ETIM sponsored training camp in Tora Bora, AF. ETIM leader Hassan 3 S E C R E T // NOF'ORN / I 2O3OO7O9

S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3OO7O9 Mahksum founded this camp. Usama bin Laden personally invited ETIM elements to undergo training in Afghanistan and the organization was assessed to be under Al- Qaida control.. (S/A{F) Abdul Haq, a Uighur ETIM leader was in charge of detainee's camp. Abdul Haq was a leader and facilitator at the Jalalabad Uighur guesthouse and a weapons trainer at the ETIM Tora Bora, AF, camp until coalition bombing permanently closed the facility. o. (S/A{F) Senior Al-Qaida Operative Abu Zubaydah described the relationship between ETIM and Al-Qaida as a'opositive one.". (S/AIF) Al-Qaida backed the ETIM financially.. (S//I{F) Trained ETIM personnel.. (S/AIF) Manufactured fraudulent passports for ETIM members. o (S/AIF) Zubaydah claimed there was a loose association of Turkistanis consisting of businessmen and students who also participated in training at Al-Qaida. Other sources report before the start of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, ETIM recruiters were officially received in Pakistan's colleges. o (S//NfF) ETIM leader Hassan Makhsum established close relations with the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden (UBL), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) after the relocation of the ETIM to Afghanistan. o (S/AfD ETIM reorganized and adopted the name Hizb-ul Islami Turkestani or Islamic Party of Turkistan (HIT or IPT). o (S/AfF) Makhsum attended a meeting in August of 2001 that established the "United Front of Mujahdin" also called the "League of Islamic Mujahdin" (LEVO). The group included ETIM, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Qaida members. Mahksum was a member of the group's high council and military council. o (S/AfD Mahksum was reportedly in close and regular contact with UBL between 2000 and 2002. By Feb 2002, shortly after detainee's capture, Mahksum was reported to be located with Osama bin Laden in eastern Afghanistan. Some reports suggest that in August of 2002, Chinese intelligence officials arrested Mahksum. o (S/AfD During Operation Enduring Freedom, between 320 and 600 ETIM sponsored individuals were reportedly fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. During this time, ETIM operated camps in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan where Uighur expatriates conducted small arms training. These camps were reportedly funded by Al-Qaida and the Taliban and directly supervised by ETIM founder Hassan Makhsum and several of his subordinates. 4

S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3OO7O9 Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9CH-0002 19DP (S) o (S/AIF) Detainee was captured with numerous ETIM members who also attended the ETIM camp in Tora Bora. o (S/AfF) The following detainees are ETIM members and attended the ETIM camp at Tora Bora. Hassan Anvar, US9CH-000250DP (ISN 250); Ahmed Adil, US9CH-000260DP (ISN 260); Akhdar Qasem Basit, US9CH-000216DP (ISN 276); Bahtiyar Mahnut, US9CH-000277DP (ISN 277), Haji Mohammed Ayub, US9CH- 000279DP (ISN 279); Saidullah Khalik US9CH-000280DP (ISN 280); Abdul Ghappar Abdul Rahman, US9CH-000281DP (ISN 281); Hajiakbar AbdulGhupur, US9CH-000282DP (ISN 282); Abu Bakr Qasim, US9CH-000283DP (ISN 283); Abdullah Abdulqadirakhun, US 9CH-0002 I 5 DP (ISN 285 ); Dawut Abdurehim, US9CH-000289DP (ISN 289); Adel Abdulhehim,US9CH-000293DP (ISN 293); Emam Abdulahat, US9CH-000295DP (ISN 295); Hozaifa Parhat, US9CH-000320DP (ISN 320); and Ahmed Mohamed, US9CH-000328DP (ISN 328). c. (S//NF) Detainee's Gonduct: Detainee is assessed a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant, with a few spikes in regards to his returning to his bay and his minor contraband, and being non-hostile toward the guard force and staff. 6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determinedetainee is of LOW intelligence value.. (S/AIF) Detainee had the placement and access within the ETIM to know how the organization was formed and organized. He should be able to provide information on where they received operating funds and the supporthey received from other terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida. b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) o ETIM personalities o ETIM Leadership special emphasis on Abdul Haq o Recruitment o Training o Monies received by the ETIM Uishur movement inside China and Turkistan 5

S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3OO7O9 o Al-Qaidaaffrliations 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 14 February 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. AY W. HOOD aior General, USA Commandins 6