SAFE SHIPPING ON THE BALTIC SEA

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2 SAFE SHIPPING ON THE BALTIC SEA 23 April 2010 Szczecin, Poland Organising Committee: SDr Jan Jankowski, Polish Register of Shipping Chairman of the Committee SMr Piotr Waszczenko, Short Sea Shipping in Szczecin Member SMr Jacek Wiśniewski, EuroAfrica Shipping Lines Member SDr Adolf Wysocki, Polish Shipowners Association Member Honorary Committee: SMr Willem De Ruiter, European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) SProf. Stanisław Gucma, Maritime University of Szczecin SMs Magdalena Jabłonowska, Shipping Safety Department, Ministry of Infrastructure, Poland SMr Paweł Szynkaruk, Polish Shipowners' Association The Symposium is organized under the auspices of the Polish Ministry of Infrastructure with the attendance of Ms Anna Wypych-Namiotko, Undersecretary of State.

3 CONTENTS Overview by Jan Jankowski, Polish Register of Shipping... 5 Foreword by Anna Wypych-Namiotko, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Infrastructure, Poland... 7 Foreword by Paweł Szynkaruk, President of Polish Shipowners Association... 9 Panel discussion and key points of Symposium presentations on Session I Conditions and criteria for the improvement of safe shipping in the Baltic Sea Capt René Sirol, Estonian Maritime Administration, Estonia HELCOM actions to improve safety of navigation and reduce environmental impact of shipping Anna Christine Brusendorff, Helsinki Commission, Finland Session II Ships and ships losses how safe is safe? Andrzej Jasionowski, University of Strathclyde, Scotland A risk based approach to maritime safety in the Baltic Sea Per Sønderstrup, Head of Centre, Danish Maritime Authority, Denmark A possible sea spectrum for the Baltic Sea Maciej Pawłowski, Gdańsk University of Technology, Poland Session III Navigational safety management on Southern Baltic Prof. Lucjan Gucma, Maritime University in Szczecin, Poland Ship exhaust emissions Jukka-Pekka Jalkanen, Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland Violation of regulations on the Baltic Magdalena Wesołowska, Maritime Office in Szczecin, Poland... 75

4 OVERVIEW The specificity of shipping in the Baltic Sea Region involves both natural and manmade hazards. A small enclosed water basin featuring a narrow outlet to more open waters causes that Baltic shipping encounters dangerous weather conditions hazardous particularly for some ship types. Heavy traffic of people and goods between the well-developed countries around the Baltic further contribute to enhanced risk. IMO Conventions do not always account for the specific nature of the Baltic Sea and substantial sea catastrophes in this region confirm this thesis. Discussions open to all shipping players, including regulatory bodies, decision makers and technical experts can be an effective instrument in the continuous drive to mitigate risks. A technically safe vessel is a necessary condition for safe shipping, but without safe ship operation, holistic studies of the Baltic natural conditions, traffic monitoring and surveillance, ship performance will not be appropriately safe. The Gdansk Symposium in 2009 focused on identifying the risks of possible shipping hazards and the potential consequences of possible catastrophes. The Symposium panel discussion led to suggesting the following problem areas for this year s agenda: Baltic Sea Regional Initiatives N N IMO versus Baltic Sea Region requirements today and more stringent requirements for the Baltic Sea for the future; Baltic Sea specifics in ISM audits. Rating the safety level N N N N Criteria of maritime administrations for determining ship safety level; Risk related insurance criteria for Baltic shipping; Violation of regulations on the Baltic; Overview of ship monitoring effectiveness for ship traffic, oil spills, detection and identification of vessels. Challenges of the growing trade on the Baltic N N Solutions aimed at reducing navigational risks (e.g. fishing nets, vessels, coasters); Baltic ship movement monitoring (e.g. east-west route monitoring); 5

5 N N N N Rescue and salvage structures around the Baltic; Emergency response; Grounding hazards; Lowering sulphur and nitrogen emission related risks versus consequences of using new kinds of propulsion fuels. Holistic survey of the Baltic Sea N N N Filling in hydrographical white spots; Hydrographical surveys (areas of depths up to 10 meters); Using HELCOM forum potential; N Developing Baltic wave spectrum and probability distribution of different sea states occurrence. The identification of hazards faced by the shipping sector and related discussions cannot be expected to solve directly the practical problems but raising awareness and better knowledge of necessary measures set the first step in moving forward. Jan Jankowski Polish Register of Shipping 6

6 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is with great pleasure that I participate again in the Symposium devoted to safe shipping on the Baltic Sea. Last year in Gdańsk, we only initiated a multilevel discussion on a number of crucial issues connected with identifying measures for progressing maritime safety on the Baltic. Our meeting today, which constitutes a follow-up to the 2009 event, gives us an opportunity to continue this debate in a still broader context, as we are happy to host distinguished speakers from European administrations and institutions. We are all aware of the importance of maritime transport for the EU economy. The growing trade on the waters of the Baltic Sea presents the countries in the region with new challenges. The increasing volume of traffic calls for effective regulations, including integrating national ship monitoring systems. Comprehensive information is needed about the movement of ships, the cargo they are carrying, their crew etc. in order to optimize traffic flows and to enable prompt response to casualties at sea. With a view to achieving these goals, Member States together with the EU Commission constantly improve the SafeSeaNet system developed for supporting exchange of data on vessel traffic. Poland fully participates in SafeSeaNet and is one of the few countries that exchanges all types of SSN notifications. Another issue forming an integral part of our maritime safety policy is protection of the natural environment of the Baltic. The most important measures to reduce deliberate or accidental pollution focus on such problems as ship-generated waste and cargo residues, oil spill accidents, ship exhaust emissions, harmful environmental effects of substances in anti-fouling systems, and ballast water management. What is essential for appropriate protection of the marine environment is continuous monitoring of waters, with possible assurance of high effectiveness in internationally coordinated action. Recent developments in this regard are very promising, as exemplified by the CleanSeaNet system developed by EMSA. Apart from enhancing safety of navigation at sea and environmental protection, a vital element of our policy is ensuring safety of vessels. At present, standard criteria of evaluating ship safety are being replaced by risk analysis. The Baltic countries are currently conducting advanced research on new risk-based criteria; Polish experts are engaged in IMO activities in this area, particularly in those concerning new ship stability criteria developed within the framework of SLF Subcommittee and Goal- Based Standards dealt with by the Maritime Safety Committee. The agenda of this Symposium also proves how important risk analysis is nowadays for maritime safety. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the organizers who made the Symposium happen again this year. I am grateful to the speakers who agreed to deliver presentations, and to all the participants who decided to join us. I wish everybody fruitful discussion resulting in cooperation towards working out the best approach and methodology to deal with our common problems and searching for the best solutions. Successful improvement of shipping safety in the Baltic Sea region requires our joint determined action. Anna Wypych-Namiotko Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Infrastructure, Poland 7

7 Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of Polish shipowners gathered in the Polish Shipowners Association I would like to extend a warm welcome to all the participants of the 3 rd Symposium on Safe Shipping in the Baltic Sea. During last year s meeting devoted to various aspects of safe shipping in the Baltic many subjects were discussed which deserve continuous consideration. The conclusions taken then indicated that, inter alia, as far as safe shipping is concerned no conflict exists between regional and international interests. The Baltic Sea is our common good and we will only be able to implement projects for the conservation of that reservoir if we conduct them in close cooperation between all the countries lying on its shores. The discussions also covered a series of initiatives aimed at improving the ecological quality of the Baltic. One such initiative involves an introduction of the amendment to the VI Chapter MARPOL Convention, obliging ship owners to use low sulfur fuels. However, a crucial part of our discussion was focusing on developing ways of preventing sea catastrophes on the Baltic. As it has been pointed out on many occasions, the Baltic constitutes a water reservoir that is highly sensitive ecologically, whose waters require extremely long period of thirty years to be exchanged. On the other hand, the Baltic is surrounded by many highly industrialized countries for which sea transport is a very important element of the economy. Every month as many as five thousand ships cross the sea, out of which over 20 per cent are tanker ships, carrying approximately 170 m tons of oil annually. The Baltic states have avoided sea catastrophes which would have such tragic consequences as the sinking of Prestige and Erica had. The last serious accident on the Baltic which have had impact on the natural environment took place in March 2001 at the German and Danish coast. During a collision, Baltic Carrier spilt 2700 tons of heavy fuel onto the sea. In April last year a Finnish ro-pax Finneagle spilt 5 tons of fuel at the coast of the Åland Islands in the eastern Baltic. It is not much, but it is worth reminding that a small spill of comparative scope which occurred in January 2006 at the Estonian shores killed as many as 5 thousand birds. Such examples only confirm the fact that as far as safe shipping on the Baltic is concerned we ought to act very decisively. The subject is frequently discussed within the scope of works of ECSA (European Community Shipowners Associations) as well as on our local turf, during the meetings of the Polish Shipowners Association. Shipowners see the need for actions aiming at improving the safety of navigation, thus, for instance, introducing TSS Traffic Separation Schemes at the most congested reservoirs of the Baltic. 9

8 Recently shipowners have been devoting a lot of attention in their debates to a proecological directive of the European Union, concerning the use of 0.1 per cent sulfur fuel at ports. The directive entered into force in January last year and it caused quite a stir in the shipping community. Shipowners were prepared on schedule to apply the regulation, but it turned out that work on this new type of fuel creates specific technical problems which shipping equipment suppliers find it difficult to cope with. There were also some difficulties in gaining access to the fuel from suppliers. The implementation of the new European Union regulations regarding sulfur contents is an example of a wider phenomenon which merits a few words of comment. So far the International Maritime Organization has been the leader in creating the legislation that affects navigation safety and environment protection. However, relevant European Union agencies have recently become equally active in this respect. Erika III package serves as the most distinctive proof of Brussels initiative. Let us only remind the readers that the package comprises a series of directives which, inter alia, set the quality standards of operation of the qualification societies operating within the territory of the Community regarding ship traffic monitoring the package initiates the establishment of an independent entity endowed with competences to restrict ship traffic, to issue orders to captains and to send an expert team with the task of evaluating the risks of a sea catastrophe, as well as the competences regarding examination of sea catastrophes. It imposes an obligation of standardizing the rules of post-catastrophe procedures, or eventually, the rules regarding shipowners civil liability it obliges the EU states to adapt the IMO convention into their legal systems related to shipowners liability for damage resulting from oil spills. Obviously, the activities of the HELCOM organization, including its flagship undertaking of the Baltic Sea Action Plan, must not be forgotten. The plan was adopted by the HELCOM members in Krakow in November 2007 and it serves as a road map of the key objectives linked with the protection of the Baltic environment. In February a conference was held in Helsinki which was mostly devoted to a discussion on the ways of implementing the Baltic Sea Action Plan. It was emphasized one more time that the ecology of the Baltic currently faces four major factors: eutrophication, ship traffic growing year by year, hazardous substances deposited on the sea bottom as well as climate changes. At the meeting, the Polish vice-prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak declared that Poland is going to allocate as much as 8 billion euro for the investments connected with the program of reducing the amount of pollutants that end up in the Baltic by 75 per cent until The Szczecin program of Improvement of water quality serves as a confirmation of his words, being the largest investment of that type in central-eastern Europe. Within the framework of the program, inter alia, a modern sewage treatment plant was built, over 160 kilometers of sewage network were replaced. Thanks to those investments the sewage produced by half-a-million population of Szczecin agglomeration will no longer pollute the Oder and the Baltic by mid Clearly, we are dealing with a number of initiatives conducted at multiple levels by various circles in a struggle for the clean Baltic. Shipowners get actively involved in those initiatives. At a great cost they replace single-hull tanker fleet with double-hull tankers, when entering the Baltic they switch to 1.5-sulfur fuel, and to 0.1-sulfur fuel while at port, in order to improve the effectiveness of navigation they install electronic maps and a series of other instruments which are to ensure a safer navigation and to decrease the risk of collisions and strandings. Soon, once the new IMO regulations have entered into force, a process will commence of installing devices for the elimination of organisms from ballast waters which could be harmful to the local marine environment. 10

9 All these actions, supported by the European Community Shipowners Associations and by its Polish member the Polish Shipowners Association, demonstrate that the shipowners community is highly effective in the implementation of pro-ecological strategies for the Baltic. It is thus small wonder that in the context of current threats to the Baltic Sea the mass media give less coverage to vessel-related risks, while the issue of constructing permanent installations, running at the sea bottom, such as Nord Stream gas pipe, is being widely reported. We will surely not be able to pass over that subject during a discussion at today s meeting. The symposium of Safe Shipping on the Baltic Sea is held for the third time. We can only say that the conference has already become a permanent feature in the calendar of the most important meetings of Baltic states representatives, devoted to shipping safety and ecology issues. I wish all the participants fruitful discussions with interesting conclusions, just like in previous years. I wish that the knowledge acquired today can be used for a safer operation of ships and the conservation of the natural environment of the Baltic. Paweł Szynkaruk President of Polish Shipowners Association 11

10 SAFE SHIPPING ON THE BALTIC SEA PANEL DISCUSSION AND KEY POINTS OF SYMPOSIUM PRESENTATIONS Disclaimer The opinions expressed during the panel discussion as collected by the Symposium Secretary do not necessarily present the standing on particular issues of represented organisations or bodies but are individual views, concerns and ideas as voiced by Symposium participants during the open discussion. Introduction The Symposium focused on the safety on the Baltic Sea. The discussions, the presentations all showed clearly our concern about the very sensitive Baltic Sea. The sea is a lifeline for the region and it is the domicile for many who are worried that it can suffer from lack of shipping safety. So we have a very strong regional interest in high-level safety of the shipping industry. The general public and politicians do not always realise the difficulties shipping faces and the high-level safety that we have already as compared to worldwide average. On one hand we have regional interests and on the other hand the international shipping community. We have to recognise regulations of international law introduced by IMO. 1. Is there a conflict between our regional and international interests regarding shipping safety? According to the participants there is no conflict. The regional and international requirements are in force and remain supplementary tools. IMO cooperation provides the widest forum for developing international instruments. On the regional level we should make better use of the existent infrastructure to hold discussions regionally before initiating any measures or making formal submissions. IMO is working on defining a worldwide safety level for shipping. Goal based standards processed by IMO assume that the safety level at sea will be defined irrespective of sea area (region). In this view, regional requirements taking into account the specificity of the region will need to be developed to satisfy the IMO defined safety level. We are now going into an era in which we will try to set or perhaps specify ourselves the acceptable safety level. We know more on the safety level today as we have been working in the area deciding that this or that is safe enough. Let us decide on the issue scientifically or through solid engineering that this is the level we should reach. Then we can make rules to reach that level. That will become a supreme value because failure to satisfy the level will exclude the possibility of operation. 13

11 Once decisions are made we will know better. We have never set such a level before. We have some indications of it but we have not decided the level yet. The GBS standards will altogether create a mandatory safety level. 2. Should we assume more stringent regional requirements? Some question that IMO is the only leading force in safety regulation issues. World economy and safety awareness are not equally developed worldwide so the world is compelled to accept lower standards. The idea of establishing one uniform set of standards across the world means for Europe and the United States, for example, lowering down the standards. On the other hand, it may be beneficial if Baltic Europe were the driving force that pulls the rest of the world up to higher safety standards. At the present moment there is a new policy discussed in the European Union regarding gas emissions, on EPC and a new convention in IMO on green house emissions. In the opinion of some this convention does not have much chance of going through because it will be difficult to enforce in third world countries. Should well developed countries forget about reducing green house emissions because not all can follow? This does not mean that better-developed countries should reject the idea. So if EU implements the concept that all ships operating around Europe have to meet the same standards, visiting ships will have to adhere to higher standards. The discussed European Union policy voices a view that not all countries in the world have to follow exactly the same route. It is important that all the ships that will be coming to Europe should be treated equally. This is the policy of setting new standards, which others may follow with time. So if EU implements the concept that all ships operating around Europe must meet the same standards, visiting ships will have to adhere to higher standards. 3. The initiators, activators, motivators and evaluators The shipping industry is highly dependent on politicians. It is very important to listen to the concerns expressed and we should take into consideration safety factors but this is a holistic issue. Authorities should be activators, motivators or perhaps evaluators of regional measures. There are problems with the media and politicians who raise the shipping safety profile. The media do not always get the facts on the table and it is they and politicians who rate the safety level. The situation is not poor though of course new measures are required. The traffic continues to grow in the region so we have to do everything now to prevent accidents in this region and we have a way to do it in the opinion of some through IMO. Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention and the new idea of even more stringent standards on the sulphur content in ships fuel is the hot topic during the discussions in ECSA (European Community Shipowners Associations). Shipowners support lower sulphur and nitrogen emissions, but also point out to the negative consequences of using new kinds of fuels: additional costs, potential danger of shifting transport from sea to land, periodic shortage of fuel s supply, technical problems with the engines etc. ECSA and its members also discuss solutions for reduction of CO 2 emissions. While shipping is responsible for only 2-4 percent of carbon emission (of human origin) worldwide, shipowners are committed to make some improvements in the industry. Shipowners take into account various ideas, for example, reduction of ship speeds, alternative fuels, increased efficiency of engines, optimisation of hull and propeller design etc. 14

12 According to some shipmasters Owners should establish ISM procedures in their SMS identifying and accounting for risks. ISM audits on ships operating on the Baltic should especially look at the procedures included in guidelines for the determination of under keel clearance, for using pilot services according to international recommendations and for following recommended transit routes in the Baltic Sea. 4. Basic problems and related risks The Danish strategy for Baltic gateways, which are at the same time international straits, is to minimize the risks by enforcing proper preventive measures in terms of safety of navigation, proper aids to navigation, genuine international regulations for the operation and construction of ships and competent crews assisted by Vessel Traffic Systems and pilots. The Baltic Sea is in general a difficult navigation area due to a great number of fishing vessels, fishing nets, irregular traffic of coasters and random traffic flow in the southern part of Baltic States in the W - E direction. There are many areas lacking reliable measurement data exposing shipping to various risks; water depth, ice conditions, the weather, currents, changing water depth, sea waving. Discussions were held about the possibility of introducing certain kinds of recommendations for masters and crews that were not competent to navigate in the area to utilise Baltic Sea Pilotage widely on the Baltic Sea area. There are great risks for masters and mates who are not competent to sail in certain Baltic areas (ice conditions). The problem remains how to define these required competencies. There are areas, like ice risk conditions which provide grounds for such restrictions. Some masters and mates could be excluded from these restrictions; for example vessels operated in northern Canada, but most would fall under this rule. It is definitely a hot potato issue. Suggestions were voiced that perhaps discussions with insurers and other maritime players could help to find a common way to use the knowledge of pilots in this region. Nevertheless, there is no possibility of introducing compulsory pilotage, according to lawyers, on international waters (outside territorial waters). Various events close to catastrophes have taken place on the Baltic. A tanker fully loaded with crude oil 15 meters draft, sailing 15 knots from Primorsk suffered damage in Russian waters. It took the wrong lane when this happened and continued sailing into international waters, refusing to stay within Russian waters. It touched the bottom 13 meters and the whole (outer) bottom was torn off. Her course was amended. Finnish services warned and advised on what happened but there was no response, nobody replied. Information came from the owners that the ship reported loss of bottom plating following grounding. She was taken to a Finish port. The ship went on dock to Holland where the extent of damage could be clearly seen 200 meters of the (outer) bottom was torn off. There was a huge stone six cubic meters in the forepeak. If the stone was 40 cm higher the whole double bottom would have been torn off. We were very close to a big disaster. These were the Russian territorial waters we could do nothing. Dredging is only done on one side. This was discussed with the Russian authorities even the policy makers and now it is under control. The Russian side emphasised that they had to follow the vessel all the way on the Russian territorial waters. This incident was the biggest warning we had since the incident in the year

13 Although there is no defined criteria determining ships safety level administrations can assess the state of safety of their fleet on the grounds of some indicators such as MOU statistics, accident rate, number of accidents and lost ships and next assume measures to improve the safety level. Analysis of ships accident rate in Lithuania, for example, indicates that one of the reasons underlying accidents is lack of relevant legislative measures that results in poor technical maintenance of ships. Roll on roll off passenger vessels, also operating on the Baltic, are considered to be the most unsafe ships in operation due to the large open vehicle deck which particularly expose them to dangerous water volumes on deck. Alternative design configurations which compromise such measures as double sides extending from the double bottom to deck above the bulkhead, a perforated vehicle deck for free flow of floodwater, a buoyant (double) vehicle deck with sheer and double bottom of minimum height, can significantly improve their damage stability. The Baltic Sea is a small and shallow sea with very slow the water exchange. Each year part of the Baltic Sea is for about seven months covered by sea ice. These difficult conditions demand specific functioning of the transport chain. Maritime transport loads in the Baltic Sea continue to grow particularly the Russian oil transports in the Gulf of Finland. This significantly increases the risk of accidents and probability of an oil disaster. We all remember the pictures on TV of the Prestige breaking up in the Atlantic. A call was collected at the response/services: Can a catastrophe like that of Prestige happen on the Baltic? The answer was no. It cannot happen because we have other conditions, the short steep waves in the Sound and on the Baltic, but naturally this does not mean that we have no oil pollution problems resulting from ship damage. More and more DWT tankers and over, with more than 200 million tons of oil pass through the Baltic but the risk is not that high of their break up as they are designed so that they do not break up completely. The risk of oil pollution materialises in collision risks. Groundings do not pose such a big risk due to double bottoms but collisions are a risk. Oil pollution scenarios, grounding and collision and ice damage to propulsion remain a problem, the main reasons for accidents. Vessels suffer damage in ice conditions. If a great tanker suffers damage of her propulsion, engine or hull very little can be done. Of course the hazard of grounding appears. At present, icebreakers are not able to tow the big vessels. They can haul/keep in place ships of up to toners but not more. The oil pollutions hazards in view of the planned North Pipe construction of the underwater oil pipeline from Russia to Germany raise various opinions on the generated risks. A ship forced to throw anchor in emergency or attempting to avoid the pipe may drift too far. Some countries are against the project as emergency anchorage may break the pipe causing pollution of sea and coastal banks. This is a very sensitive issue in many Baltic countries. There is detailed documentation about environmental consequences of the project. In international legislation there are no measures to hinder such a project. Only environmental evaluations and permission aspects can be used as an interfering measure. There are still many questions but the investors are sure the project will be constructed. Kotka works have received an order for production of pipes with concrete casing. 16

14 5. Measures in place The existing monitoring systems (VTS, AIS, MAS etc.) and DW Routes with a traffic separation scheme (TSSs) provide practical support for safe ship operation in the Baltic Sea area and such measures should be further enhanced. The German strategy of dealing with marine emergencies involved reengineering of the former three different decision taking bodies into a Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) in Revision of the German Maritime Emergency Response Organisations in Federal Republic of Germany allocated responsibility for supervision of German territorial waters to the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs, leaving civil protection matters such as water quality and waste management control within the remits of Federal Coastal State Ministries and Agencies. These arrangements under a centralised command structure allow rapid and comprehensive control of all necessary operations in major maritime emergencies, utilising personnel, equipment and know-how of all authorities and institutions of the federal government, the coastal states and private organisations responsible for the sea and the coastal area Danish strategies involve effective monitoring systems for ship traffic, detection of oil spills and identification of ships that violate the regulations. The rather recent Swedish experience with the Chinese bulker colliding with a ship coming in from Gdynia shows the need for further measures. It was a fairly small oil spill of 500 tons. Nobody could cope with the problem. The Swedes have the wellequipped Coast Guard services and Danish colleagues but ended up on their own. Can we cope today? That is a good question. Incidents like this; like Erica and Prestige happen rarely. Something that happens every year is the grounding problem of multipurpose vessels with no heaters in the tanks, which make it impossible to pump out the oil. We can try handling the problem and getting better than we are today and follow the development of new techniques and technologies. The situation can be improved. We are benefiting from new technology and AIS data so can talk about the same things considering various data. And that is an improvement access to other data sources. The HELCOM Forum may, according to some, not be sufficient to analyse problems relating to protection of the Baltic Sea. There might be a slight way of revising HELCOM. Measures considered necessary could be realised through a revised HELCOM, which is the right organisations to represent and perform the relevant measures, however, it would require external financing. The problem of pilotage is widely discussed in BPAC meetings and also nationally with reference to the Belt and Sound. A rule on compulsory pilotage is not possible but the existing strong recommendation by IMO for certain vessels is followed literally by 98% of passing ships. It was highlighted in several presentations that the Baltic features regional phenomena not known by seafarers. Problems relating to visibility of fishing vessels and boats are to some extent solved by an amended directive on ship reporting of vessels over 15m, which should have AIS starting

15 In the field of monitoring ships, Sweden and Denmark are working jointly on the VTS in the Sounds. The Swedish and Danish Operator sit together in the same centre in Malmö and serve both the Danish and Swedish side. Another example of coordinated monitoring is the Finnish Maritime Administration and the Gulf of Finland Mandatory Reporting System, GOFREP where 3 centres cooperate closely aligned improving the flow of marine traffic and increasing safety. Matters relating to the Baltic Sea as a whole have been discussed on various fora. Not everything should be controlled but there are information gaps in some areas (lack of hydrographic data). Filling in this information gap would improve safety; particularly hydrographic measurements on some shipping routes. We are missing updated charts covering some areas. An analysis of data for HELCOM revealed that there was a substantial number of ships going east west and east and north, which are not covered by any monitoring. Many FSAs have already been made for certain sections of the Baltic like the Sounds, Born Holm Gap. The GOFREP project is in place, but a more holistic approach may be required. 6. Bilateral cooperation and a holistic approach We can differentiate between regional interest vessels and international interest vessels nevertheless both require hydrographical information. Hydrographic surveys of some regions date back to the end of the 19-century and could be outdated. Ships take new routes and proposals are made to conduct surveys of specified areas and to recommend rules and thorough surveys of areas of draught of up to 10 meters. We do not know enough about the dangers to maritime safety in the Baltic Sea area. This needs to be emphasised or new risk analysis made to find out what should be and what needs to be done. Certain areas of the Baltic sea region have problems with this. We do not have enough information available thus a FS of the Baltic is required. Smaller countries may have problems in carrying out such studies in their areas. Germany and Denmark are projecting a bridge of two centres to one for the Great Belt probably completing their project in 2018 covering the Great Belt and going all the way down. Perhaps the area will be split into two as too extensive to monitor by one centre. Hopefully there is still room for manoeuvring. The TSS (Traffic separation scheme) for Finish waters and area covered by Estonians are in place. Finland plans to cooperate with Sweden in the narrow passage (minor projects are already in place in the northern part). The traffic will also be increasing there. Huge panamaxes of nearly tonnes are starting more frequently to visit Finland, also in the north and will be trading regularly. This means intensified monitoring is necessary in this narrow passage. Poland is working with Germany on the safety in Pomorska Bay, facing similar problems like electric power cables and windfarms that are an obstacle in navigation routes. 18

16 7. Roundup We have cooperation around the Baltic and quality shipping but must continue forward. We have some ongoing cooperation initiatives and good ideas in place This conference provided an opportunity to highlight some very important aspects on navigation safety. Additional SRSs and VTSs according to the requirements of SOLAS are needed. Establishing of TSSs off and along the Polish coast in the E - W direction is necessary. VTS system and the traffic control are just now under the jurisdiction of individual countries. If the so called short sea shipping develops as rapidly as the European Union promotes certainly then the traffic on the Baltic Sea will be growing very fast and sooner or later we will not avoid to somehow coordinate those national control/monitoring systems. So in the opinion of some symposium participants sooner or later we will be in the situation that we meet, and discuss the coordinated way of developing coordinated traffic control. Additional routeing measures should be established where such measures would enhance safety. The implementation of the proposed routeing measures will provide a demonstrable decrease in the traffic characteristics that are of relevance to potential conflicts and the risk of groundings. There is a need to have, besides HELCOM groups, a platform for discussing and preparing proposals of ships routeing measures in the Baltic Sea, which at the final stage should be presented to IMO for adoption. Better identification of small vessels and nets should be introduced. Baltic development in traffic and risks indicate that a comprehensive risk assessment analysis comprising the whole Baltic Sea area should be carried out and the enhancement of maritime safety in the Baltic Sea waters still requires continuous forceful action. And that studies or analysis of the risks inherent in maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea Area are required in form of a holistic project. Without this kind of study we are unable to convince the decision makers about what to do and therefore the general recommendation is to speak the same voice to politicians and other decision makers to conduct a Risk Assessment Study of the entire Baltic so that there is a common pressure to make these evaluations or risk assessments covering the whole Baltic Sea to identify and define the dangers; in terms of traffic, hydrographis and weather related conditions such as ice, wind current and wave conditions the main activities necessary to improve safety. Such necessary projects as the development of a wave spectrum specially dedicated to the Baltic Sea should be carried out, developed possibly by establishing a Joint Baltic Sea Wave Project (JOBSWAP), The holistic study could be done of the whole Baltic Area from the safety point of view. This needs to be communicated in the Baltic countries because its implementation requires political decisions. We certainly do know a lot about safety on the Baltic which does not mean we know all that is relevant and the only way to proceed is through a holistic study that shows whether we need more projects on cooperation, assistance. 19

17 IMO is the basic forum for maritime safety and environment protection issues. What should we do in our region? We should hold discussions and communicate. Baltic interest in quality shipping, and the fact that vessels visiting our waters are generally in a satisfactory condition does not eliminate the necessity to monitor and to some extent control the traffic in the area. We have to monitor and control traffic as the number and size of vessels keep growing and can be dangerous. But shipping should also be part of ecosystems such as Nature We have to remember about projected and existing windfarms at sea, fishing and safety of fishing, crew qualifications, safety of shipping and EU regulatory issues. This is a problem that interlinks with the safe shipping aspect. Various bodies in the EU address Baltic issues not only DG TRANS but various working groups deal with harmonising legislation in various member states, bodies like DG MARE, DG FISHING and finally maritime forums like Strategy for the Baltic Sea, Baltic Development Forum gathering people involved in ecosystems, maritime, windfarm problems. Without raising awareness of politicians and Maritime Administrations in particular countries such measures are difficult to implement. Therefore, there is a great need for communication, discussions and initiatives within the Baltic regions with stronger participation of maritime authorities, also involvement in environmental issues. 20

18 Baltic Sea Regional Initiatives

19 Conditions and criteria for the improvement of safe shipping in the Baltic Sea Capt René Sirol, Deputy Director General Head of Maritime Safety Division Maritime affairs have long-term traditions with their culture going down to centuries. Maritime strategy has played an important role through centuries. Ships were built to sail the world in order to provide food and feed, discover new countries, make war and exchange goods and cultural heritage. To a large extent it holds true today. Speaking about evolving uses of the seas with their naval capabilities in the European Union (EU), for example, we can see that its strategy is to reroute cargo flow from motorways to rail and fairways. Special attention has been devoted to the implementation of short-sea shipping transport. From this point of view, one of the key issues of the EU is the development of the potential, competitiveness and safety of the EU maritime policy with emphasis on safe shipping and protection of the environment. Maritime affairs are governed and regulated by numerous conventions, codes, laws and regulations to make seagoing safe and environmentally friendly. It s a global task to ensure the safety of shipping. International standards and regulations in this field are the responsibility of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and the EU, in the European region, respectively. The EU requirements in this field are very strict. Throughout years of history major changes in the requirements of the maritime safety have taken place due to accidents that have brought significant loss of life at sea or caused severe marine environment pollution. This has paved the way to new and stricter measures for the improvement of safe shipping with relevant rules being worked out and stipulated by IMO for years. However, the question still arises how to ensure the fulfilment of the international obligations and regulations in force? The solution to the issue, as seen by the EU, is to take over the IMO regulations. It means that the EU shall have the power to establish the rules, regulations and procedures of the IMO in the EU legislation in conformity with the IMO regulations and the EU implements regulations either by enlarging their content or by taking them over on case by case basis. Provided with such powers, the EU is more influential in implementing the IMO rules and regulations when circumstances so require. There have been cases when the date of conformity with the IMO requirements, as seen by the EU, has often been shifted forward by regulations and directives. EU is also working out its own requirements for EU ships. For example there are the EU directives adopted on the safety and technical requirements of the fishing vessels, in force. Also, safety and technical requirements have been established and standards for passenger ships on domestic voyages have been worked out. 21

20 One of the priorities of the EU is safe shipping. Its goal is maximum safety together with the protection of the marine environment in its waters. For this purpose, the requirements regarding marine safety measures are being worked out and improved which in turn, through the conformity of measures shows the way to the world since the vessels entering the EU waters shall comply with some of the standards of the EU norms and regulations, for example those for operating single-hull tankers in EU waters. In other words, the ships not complying with the required standard, the so-called substandard ships are not welcome; measures are being taken to deny entry to a port. To increase safe shipping it is necessary for shipping companies to implement safety systems within companies as well as on board the ship. This brings about extra expenses for the ship owners. It requires considerable investments for ships and its equipment to comply with all the standards. It s not rare when fulfilment of the standard is postponed to the last minute, and you discover with surprise that the deadline for different commitments has piled up to one and the same date. On top of that the expenses are exorbitant and the establishment, the shipping company is out of game. Human life at sea depends on the fulfilment of the set standards on board. Frequently ships do not comply with the set standards, i.e. the ships are substandard. Many shipping companies avoid expenses. Such companies should be called substandard companies. As long as the substandard shipping companies exist, there are substandard ships at sea. As I mentioned earlier, the EU has taken a strong stand in keeping those ships away from the EU ports. Thus, maritime administrations, classification societies and shipping companies should make a joint effort to ensure the safety of human life at sea, marine environment protection, as well as ship and cargo safety. This kind of cooperation is mutually beneficial. In the shipping today the rules are getting tougher. There is a constant flow of new obligations to consider, legalize and adopt as regulations for shipping companies to follow and administrations to inspect. Safe and environmentally friendly shipping is definitely the most significant aim in present day shipping. In order to understand where we stand, there are a number of criteria or requirements introduced, the fulfilment or non fulfilment of which forms the basis for safety assessment, the so-called landmark. Under the term criteria we mean how the ship owners, ships and crew comply with the specified requirements and fulfil them. There are a variety of measures introduced to inspect the fulfilment of the requirements, such as Port State Control, Flag State Control, etc, and sanctions applied. The capability and the competence of the Flag States and their administrations to comply with the standards is delegated to the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in a scope decided by the European Commission and with the duty to submit the relevant report to the European Commission. There is also a voluntary IMO audit, compulsory for EU Flag States, the duty of which is to audit how the convention has been implemented in the legislature by the Member State. The fulfilment of criteria is to ensure marine safety identical to the conditions determined by nature itself which is supplemented by the conditions provided on board or at shore in the name of safe shipping. Thus, under the term conditions we understand the condition and situation at sea, the conditions provided on board and on shore to provide safe navigation and handling. The current Symposium is confined to the states of the Baltic Sea. Out of 9 Baltic Sea states, only the Russian Federation is not a member of the EU. The Baltic Sea is practically an inland sea of the EU. Thus, we speak of the sea area of utmost importance to the EU. This poses increased challenges to the policy of the EU. 22

21 The area of the Baltic Sea is special. It is small, a little over square kilometres in size (incl. The Great Belt, The Sound, and The Kattegat). Predominantly shallow waters with the average depth of 55m. Salinity is low. The weather is changeable, from rough and stormy seas to rain, snow and fog. The heaving is sharp and short. Another characteristic feature is ice, mostly in the northern and eastern part of the sea. The ice season normally takes place from October-November to April-May. The annual maximum ice extent occurs between January and March, normally in late February early March. Thus, the ships and the crew of the Baltic Sea must be ready for work in icy conditions. On the other hand, the ships and masters from the southern seas lack the experience to work in icy conditions since they have not encountered icy waters before. To ease the situation the Baltic Icebreaking Management (BIM) has launched a webpage with relevant updated information regarding icy conditions in the area. The webpage is provided with a free training course for the masters working in icy conditions. Issues specific for the Baltic Sea region, like icebreaking and risk related to maritime safety, should in the future play an important role in the EU policy-making. During recent decades, there has been a significant increase in maritime traffic. Shipping in the Baltic Sea is very busy although we know that the area is relatively shallow and small. The traffic in the Baltic area has not only increased, but the nature of the traffic has also changed rapidly. Today, many of the shipping routes consist of frequent traffic, where fast ships are running between seaports on a fixed timetable. There are also certain routes that have dense passenger traffic. Perhaps the most interesting development, however, has been the rapid development of Baltic and Russian seaports. One tendency has been the increase of oil transportation, especially in the Gulf of Finland. The oil traffic in the east-west direction is very busy. So is the passenger ships traffic very intense, including high speed craft. Next to cargo and passenger carriers the Baltic Sea fishing fleet is very active. The Baltic Sea has always been an important sea route connecting the Nordic countries and Russia to continental Europe. Surrounded by nine countries, it also has some of the busiest maritime traffic in the world. In addition, the Baltic Sea has proved to be an important inter-modal link between various logistical chains, and moreover, a link to Russia. What are the requirements for the ship fleet? The ship is to be as safe as possible, equipped with relevant equipment and systems to navigate the ship and transport people and cargo from port to destination port. The crew of the ship and the conditions provided on board are one of the key factors which pave the way to conditions for safe navigation throughout the entire route. It is alarming that with more and more intensified safety rules the crew and in particular the watch crew are at risk and somehow forgotten. Notably, that holds true for the crew in short-sea merchant shipping. Technical equipment, demand and know-how are on the rise. New equipment with high expectations to meet the safety demand is being installed. Also, the quantity of the equipment is growing. The installation is sophisticated and user manuals are thick with information. Installation keys are multifunctional. In many cases the amount of information is too big to understand at first glimpse to reach or make an adequate decision. Safety and security devices are to be updated, upgraded and implemented which is an additional load for shipping companies and masters. 23

22 The scale of commitments for the present day masters and mates is exorbitant. He/she is committed to act as medical expert, radio officer, has to know the ship, have the know-how of the merchandise, be an installation expert in handling the sophisticated machinery and equipment, manage the paperwork, act as an expert in legal matters, have knowledge and expertise in relevant conventions, be fluent in public communication abroad, and eventually beside all of that to fulfil the duties of the navigator of a ship for which he may not have enough time. If a weaver makes a mistake due to insufficient knowledge or fatigue, the produce will be removed and replaced by another, fit for use. If the officer in charge accidentally commits a mistake, due to fatigue or incompetence, the outcome could be irreparable. It is good to mention here that Estonia has a practise that senior officers shall have professional higher education. We hold the opinion that the master must have wide general knowledge, and apart from STCW have good technical expertise and know-how. It was common practise in short-sea shipping years ago that a watch lasted for 4 hrs and free watch 8 hrs. Watch team included a deck watchman. The same applied to watching engineer if the engine room was not automated. Apart from that there was a radio officer, chef, boatswain, and often a doctor. Cargo handling was slow and there was sufficient time to stay in port. This in its turn provided extra time to get ready for the journey. It also enabled to have a good rest during the off watch period. Today in short-sea shipping regarding the ships and the crew we have come to the situation where there are only two navigators (the master and the mate) who keep watch 6 hrs over 6 hrs. Additionally there are a few sailors and an engineer. Crossings as a rule are very short. Cargo handling is often limited to a few hours due to efficiency making berthing time minimal. Nevertheless, there is a need for cleaning the hold deck, managing the paperwork and meeting various demands. And there might be a little time for navigation and rest. We seem to misunderstand that the primary duty of the officer of the watch is safe navigation between destinations. For example officer on duty should not be engaged with other duties or distractions when his/her only duty is watch the situation around and carry out necessary duties related to safety of navigation. This wording is clearly stipulated in COLREG, Rule 5. Rest time for the crew must be ensured. We know that specific rules are stipulated which regulate work and rest time to provide sufficient time for the rest of the crew members. In reality, things do not seem black and white. It is my understanding that in establishing new requirements it is of utmost importance to consider the ability of the crew to carry out their duties. Analyses must be conducted to find out what might happen if overloaded crew members are committed to fulfil additional duties. Maybe we could find more possibilities to use the potentials of shore for creating the conditions to ensure safe navigation through the shore based services? We already have some good examples such as the Gulf of Finland Ship Reporting System (GOFREP) or mentioned Baltic Icebreaking Management (BIM). Also, the IMO concept of e-navigation, which is in process of implementation in the frames of The Efficient Sea Project and to some extent also the SafeSeaNet (SSN). The purpose of such shore based assistance should not be limited to gathering information for the coastal states but such a back-up should be meant to assist even more the master and the crew in a way as to minimise the load on the crew. 24

23 There are a lot of questions to be answered. We want to find out if that is the way to make shipping safe. There might be an urgent need to increase the number of minimal crew. Flag State has the right to decide on questions like that and make rules stronger but in real life it is not so easy to do. We know that the shipowner may easily change the Flag State in order to avoid extra expenses. We are proud that the bridge is equipped with sophisticated systems and devices. It enables to get information due to its multifunctional use. But do we need it? Have we created the conditions for the crew to acquire relevant information and skills for safe navigation? The convention stipulates that necessary time must be foreseen to acquire relevant information and skills. What is the picture like in real life? Imagine a new master who has work experience of another ship with different technical systems. Does he/she have to read through all thick manuals and does he/she has time for that? Crew fatigue has posed a serious problem also for shipmasters. The Council of the Baltic Shipmasters recognises the problem where various rules bring about additional duties and ships with limited crew may, on the contrary, diminish the shipping safety. There are discussions in the maritime world to develop the so called to be awake system. The meaning is for the crew member on watch to push a certain button over fixed time period, to guarantee that he is awake. Do we see solutions here? Despite all efforts made, there are still many marine accidents in the world and most of them are caused by the human factor. The author of this paper does not mean to say that the enforced regulations with which criteria are established to guarantee maritime safety, including in the Baltic Sea are insufficient or that there is no justification for further rules to be worked out. My message to the forum is to consider carefully, when working out and establishing new criteria, all the for and against arguments and analyse if in real life situation it is feasible to load the crew, which is already reduced to maximum, with more duties and this way to ensure safe shipping or do we get the opposite effect and put the safety of navigation at risk? Especially in the Baltic Sea conditions where the sea is quite small, shallow, with many narrows but where the ship traffic is dense, where the weather conditions are variable and the sea is partly covered with ice in the winter time. When adding additional responsibilities to the crew, should we also look through and regulate in united way the requirements for minimum manning? Maybe it is good to take under consideration and discuss items mentioned here during the process for implementing the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. 25

24 HELCOM actions to improve the safety of navigation and reduce the environmental impacts of shipping Anne Christine Brusendorff The Baltic Marine Environmental Protection Commission (HELCOM), Finland Abstract Since the beginning of the environmental co-operation within HELCOM in the 1970s prevention of pollution from shipping has been a major issue. With its narrow straits, shallow waters, archipelago areas and the intense traffic taking place in the Baltic Sea, HELCOM has during the last 35 years decided on a great number of measures to prevent pollution from ships and ensure the safety of navigation. Many of these measures have been a result of Ministerial Meetings. The HELCOM co-operation has shown that both improved environmental protection and maritime safety can be gained at the regional level, because of the strong political willingness of the nine coastal countries, being ready to act promptly and to undertake efforts for this sake. The intense shipping and the steadily increasing maritime transportation, together with new and emerging issues, such as introduction of alien species, make it clear that the work to avoid adverse effects of shipping to the environment is not coming to an end, but has to be continued and maybe even intensified. HELCOM has to strive for additional and new ideas, new incentives, new solutions, as well as new ways to strengthen the co-operation. Keywords: regional co-operation, HELCOM, maritime safety, prevention of pollution. 1. The Helsinki Convention Concern among scientists around the Baltic Sea as to the ecological state of the sea area led to the signing of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area in In the light of political changes, developments in international environmental law and the law of the sea, a revised Convention was concluded in It entered into force on 17 January 2000 after ratification by all the countries bordering the Baltic Sea (i.e. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden) and the European Union. The aim of the 1992 Helsinki Convention is to prevent and eliminate pollution in order to promote the ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea area and the preservation of its ecological balance. The Convention applies to the Baltic Sea area, defined as the Baltic Sea and the entrance to the Baltic Sea bounded by the parallel of the Skaw in the Skagerrak at 57 o 44.43'N, including internal waters as designated by the Contracting Parties at the time of their ratification. The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (the Helsinki Commission - HELCOM) is the governing body. HELCOM meets regularly on an annual basis and unanimously adopts recommendations for the protection of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea area. This also includes amendments to the Convention. The work of HELCOM is prepared by five subsidiary bodies (the Monitoring and Assessment Group, the Maritime Group, the Land-based Pollution Group, the Nature Protection and Biodiversity Group and the Response Group). It is complemented by work carried out in different working groups and projects. 27

25 1.1 The role of HELCOM in the field of shipping Regional HELCOM activities have to take into account the international nature of shipping. This is manifested by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, requiring elaboration of global rules and standards but also stems from the mere fact that it is not in the interest of the Baltic coastal countries to regulate only ships flying under their flag. When assessing the risk for pollution of a sea area from ships, at least two aspects need to be taken into account, namely the sensitivity of the sea area in question; and the nature of the traffic, not only the number of ships but also the type and amount of cargo transported and the traffic situation in general. The Baltic Sea is a large body of brackish water with a low temperature and a slow water exchange rate, which makes it particularly sensitive to pollution. The natural conditions of the Baltic Sea result in a limited biodiversity, which in turn increases the vulnerability of the marine ecosystem. Thus, the natural vulnerability of the Baltic Sea ecosystems increases (due to fewer species) as one moves further away from the saline waters of the North Sea. In addition, the maritime transportation intensity in the Baltic Sea has increased significantly during recent years, both with respect to voyages connecting the Baltic ports with locations in other parts of the world and with respect to internal Baltic shipping. It is estimated that maritime transportation in the Baltic will increase even further. There are more than 2000 sizable ships at sea at any time. The heavy ship traffic in the Baltic Sea, coupled with narrow straits and shallow waters, leads to traffic junctions, and each year causes a number of incidents. Most of these do not lead to any discharges at all. But over the years there have been quite a number of incidents resulting in an oil discharge, and in a few cases discharges of other harmful substances. Acknowledging the sensitivity of the sea area and the very dense shipping traffic, the need for HELCOM to take actions is obvious; and indeed has also taken place in practice. HELCOM has adopted voluminous packages of measures to prevent pollution from ships, to improve the safety of navigation but also and thereby acknowledging that it will never be possible to totally eliminate the risk for a new accident measures to ensure the adequacy of emergency and response capacities in the Baltic Sea area Interlinkages between global, European and HELCOM Baltic standards The work of HELCOM within the field of shipping has concentrated on: jointly pursuing initiatives of the nine Baltic Sea States within the International Maritime Organisation; harmonising the implementation by the nine Baltic Sea States of international regulations, where possible, with the strictest demands; and initiating Baltic regional actions, either by making use of the possibility of HELCOM to act quicker than what is typically possible in international organisations or by pursuing specific Baltic interests that have not been taken into account in other international organisations. 28

26 Concrete examples of such initiatives by HELCOM falling into the above-mentioned three categories, include: Initiatives pursued within the International Maritime Organization: An example is the use of pilots by ships posing a risk to the marine environment. Already in the 1970s joint submissions by the Baltic Sea States led to the adoption by IMO of a recommendation to ships to make use of local pilotage schemes when navigating through the entrances to the Baltic. A joint submission by the Baltic Sea States to IMO during the early 2000 resulted in the extension of the coverage of ships which according to this IMO Resolution are recommended to make use of the local pilotage schemes. In the most recent joint submission by the Baltic coastal countries to IMO, it has been proposed to designate the Baltic Sea Area as a special area with regard to sewage. This would mean that cruise ships and passenger ships, either should deliver their sewage to port reception facilities or would only be allowed to discharge their sewage to the Baltic Sea area in accordance with established standards. Harmonised implementation of international regulations: In order to promote the use of Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), the use of which has been accepted by IMO as equivalent to paper charts and recently made mandatory for certain classes of ships, HELCOM has decided to cover major and secondary shipping routes by Electronic Navigational Charts (ENC). Availability of ENC is a precondition to be able to promote ECDIS, the use of which enables ships to display their own position in real time. And to follow this up the Baltic Sea States have jointly initiated within the 1982 Paris Memorandum of Understanding that, as a matter of priority, Port State Control Officers will intensify the control of paper charts on ships posing a risk to the marine environment. In one of the more recent initiatives by the Baltic coastal countries it is proposed to cover the whole Baltic Sea with re-surveys in order to ensure up-to date depth information and thus more safe sea areas for shipping. Actions initiated within HELCOM: Actions initiated within HELCOM, are either building on or filling a vacuum in international regulations. An example of the former is the common Baltic AIS (Automatic Identification System) monitoring system which has been operational since 1 July This system builds on the IMO requirements for ships to be equipped with AIS. With the establishment of land-based stations able to receive AIS data, the Baltic coastal countries have been able to gather information on ship traffic in the Baltic. This HELCOM work has also been a valuable input at European level to the implementation of the EU Directive on vessel traffic monitoring under which an AIS exchange system shall have been operational since the end of With the HELCOM system it has been possible to regularly monitor maritime traffic, not only to elaborate statistics on the nature and extent of shipping as well as the amount of cargo being transported in the Baltic Sea area, but also to more actively use the HELCOM system to supervise that ships are observing the established regulations in the Baltic Sea. And at the moment a Baltic-wide project is carried out, which, on the basis of the HELCOM AIS system, will assess the risk for ship accidents, the need for additional maritime safety measures as well as the adequacy of existing response resources. 29

27 HELCOM has also adopted several measures to address operational safety requirements for ships sailing in icy conditions, thus filling a gap in international regulations Summing up Intense shipping and increasing maritime transportation in the Baltic Sea necessitates the work of the Baltic coastal countries to closely co-operate with regard to improved environmental protection and maritime safety. Since the very beginning of the environmental co-operation in the Baltic Sea area pollution from ships has been one of the major concerns and a focal item of the protection efforts. Regional activities have to take into account the international character of shipping and thus, have to concentrate on combining the forces within IMO by joint initiatives and positions to strengthening the regional influence in the process of elaborating and further developing international rules. Additionally, regional measures are of great significance when promoting the harmonised and efficient implementation of international rules and standards, including enforcement thereof. Regional measures also make sense with regard to services to be provided by administration, such as Vessel Traffic Services, hydrographic and pilotage services. This is also true for response activities in case of a pollution incident. 30

28 Rating the Safety Level

29 Ships and Ships Losses How Safe is Safe? Andrzej Jasionowski University of Strathclyde, Scotland Introduction 853 human lives were lost when the passenger Ro-Ro ferry MV Estonia sank on the night of 27/28 th of September 1994 in the Baltic Sea, while on route between Tallinn, Estonia, and Stockholm, Sweden. Instantly, a panel of investigators from three countries, Estonia, Sweden and Finland, was set up and the accident was studied in some detail. The conclusions as to the causal factors as well as the established sequence of events leading to sinking of the vessel were published 37 months later in the official report 1. Primarily, inadequate design of the locking devices of the forward bow ramp was blamed for the tragedy. The conduct of this investigation was criticised widely. The main reason for the criticism derived from apparent lack of objectivity of the commission in examining and openly discussing alternative opinions on many aspects of the loss. Recognizing that some aspect of the loss require further study, the Swedish Government has assigned VINNOVA (The Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems) in its capacity as the responsible agent for the National Sea Safety Programme to commission a research project with the aim of studying the sinking sequence of the MV Estonia. The results were aimed to be used for advancing maritime safety provision for passenger ships of today and of the future. The resultant research project 2, carried out between March 2006 and May 2008, has led to unravelling of some of the most unexpected root causes of this and many other maritime disasters. This article aims to briefly introduce the underlying thesis, state clearly why tragedy such as that of MV Estonia will happen again unless firm actions are taken, and thus ultimately to attract reader s interest in philosophy of ship safety, or rather, shortcoming thereof. Cause of the loss of MV Estonia The loss of 853 people on the night of 27/28 th of September 1994 has resulted from a rapid loss of stability by MV Estonia. Therefore, all the circumstances and reasons for (a) breach of hull integrity allowing unobstructed ingress of sea water into the spaces of MV Estonia and (b) inadequate stability to allow orderly ship evacuation and abandonment in case of such water ingress, have to be considered as the causes of the disaster. There are many such reasons and circumstances, all of which contributed to greater or lesser extent to the loss. Clear identification of all of them specifically in relation to the loss of MV Estonia was found to be beyond the scope of the project in question, and was, therefore, left for future investigations

30 However, in view of the conclusion on the most likely sinking sequence of MV Estonia, and holistic view of the accident development shown in Figure 4, it was confidently stated that the lack of compliance with SOLAS requirements on forward collision bulkhead by MV Estonia on the night of 27/28 th of September 1994, see Figure 1 and Figure 2, was the direct contribution to unobstructed ingress of sea water into the car deck spaces after loss of bow visor, see Figure 3 and, therefore, that this was the direct cause of the ship loss in the light of the international maritime law. Figure 1 Positions of the upper extension of the collision bulkhead complying with the SOLAS 1974 rules and 1981 Amendments, JAIC. The purpose of the bulkhead is to prevent flooding of the Car Deck in case of breach of integrity in forward part of the ship. Side view. Figure 2 Positions of the upper extension of the collision bulkhead complying with the SOLAS 1974 rules and 1981 Amendments, JAIC. The purpose of the bulkhead is to prevent flooding of the Car Deck in case of breach of integrity in forward part of the ship. Top view. 32

31 Figure 3 Virtual picture of the bow visor falling off. Whilst this conclusion is precise and supported by the reasoning of an extensive study it is not sufficiently exhaustive, and falls short in fulfilling the key aim of the undertaking of the mentioned project, namely of furthering the maritime safety, for the reasons of the extent of the tragedy derive from root causes, or systemic risk inherent to the passenger ship industry and unmitigated by the SOLAS convention as yet, as explained next. Safety onboard passenger ships The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the system the function of which was to prevent the MV Estonia disaster, and which function failed in Thereafter, a clear recommendation on improvement of this function is made. System of Safety Provision The provision of safety is implemented in maritime industry by compliance with prescriptive, history-driven 3 rules and regulations 4, used by designers/ builders/operators, verified by Class Society and policed by Port State Control 5 during every stage of a ship s life. The development of maritime rules is driven by accidents, whereby the industry is forced to respond to societal concerns arising when accidents occur The regulatory system is a result of continuous amendment processes. Many amendments are results of major accidents, and amendments tend to address the safety deficiencies resulting in the latest accidents The regulatory system within the maritime industry consists of standards agreed internationally at International Maritime Organisation, IMO, regulations agreed regionally, national standards, unified requirements of the International Association of Classification Societies, IACS, and rules of the individual classification societies Port State has the power to detain ships with deficient standards of safety 33

32 Therefore, society is part of a system in which it plays a significant role, namely that of requesting Governments to mobilise adequate resources for the development and enforcement of safety standards, which would be commensurate with societal safety expectations. Every accident unacceptable to society is a demonstration that safety standards are not sufficiently reflective of societal expectations. Accidents development An accident is a conjunction (sequence) of undesirable events occurring despite measures taken to prevent each of these events from materialising and causing a loss, see Figure 4. In a holistic view, each of these events may be considered as the cause of the loss. Some events (phenomena) can recur for many permutations of initiations, and as such can be considered as critical or root cause of a loss. These phenomena should always be the target for all societal efforts of prevention of accidents. Prevention is implemented by putting forward safety standards and requisite measures of their implementation. In the case of the tragic loss of life on MV Estonia, many measures failed. Society has not requested sufficient efforts to be resourced by their Governments to develop adequate rules, regulations, guidelines and policing procedures. Class Societies did not develop requisite rules or guidelines. Designers and builders did not take active steps for over-design beyond minimum requirements by then-in-force IMO rules, Class Society rules, or the owner/operator rules, naturally due to commercial pressures. Port authorities have not implemented and policed implementation of even those regulations that were already in place. Crew did not have all the training and preparation, which could have prevented all the conditions that ultimately materialised in loss of forward enclosure, unobstructed inflow of water on deck, loss of stability and ultimately loss of life. Therefore, the causes of the accident (in fact any accident) can be ultimately attributed to society. 34

33 IMO requirements not implemented Operation stretched to the limit Maintenance schedule not followed Immediate rescue impossible Loss of stability is a recurring phenomenon causing large loss of life Knowledge gaps; no recognition of problem existence No sufficient pressure for better standards until a catastrophic accident Initial causes: Economic opportunity! Accident is a conjunction of many events occurring despite measures for their prevention ACCIDENT (e) IMO rules and regulations (f) Class Societies rules, guidelines (g) Designers/Builders practice, expertise (a) Societal requests for safety standards (b) Societal readiness for paying the cost (c) Governments deploying R&D (d) Profession develops requisite knowledge (h) Port / Flag States (i) Operators / Crew (j) Decision support (k) Rescue systems Figure 4 A holistic view of accident development. An accident unacceptable to society demonstrates failings of the whole system with many causes. In case of MV Estonia, the main cause (gap in the first barrier to the right from the accident) was lack of compliance with minimum standards. The most effective and least costly steps for safety provision are as far back as possible, starting with societal support for developing knowledge. Among the many causes of loss of life on MV Estonia one was a recurring phenomenon. Rapid loss of stability by a ship due to breach of hull integrity with subsequent flooding has been addressed by IMO since the loss of RMS Titanic. However, as the MV Estonia accident as well as statistics since then demonstrate, the phenomenon of loss of stability has not been adequately resolved to date. Historical trends Namely, the following Table 1, Figure 6 and Figure 7 all summarise the consequences in terms of loss of life attributable to flooding and loss of stability accidents. On the basis of a sample from LMIU database and the two accidents that took place recently, namely sinking of Al Salam, 2006, and Sea Diamond, 2007, it can be seen that at least one serious ship flooding accident has taken place every year on average, for the past 20 years. One in three 6 of these accidents was of catastrophic proportions, whereby at least 75% of people onboard lost their lives, i.e. CDF(r=75%)=35%, see Figure 7. 6 The estimate of CDF(r=75%)=35% is based on a sample of 23 fatal cases. When accounting for the sampling error at 99% confidence, the estimate of the true proportion of catastrophic flooding accidents among all fatal flooding accidents suffered by today s passenger fleet is between 11% and 61%. The sampling error is quantified on the basis of continuity-corrected version of the Clopper-Pearson confidence interval (an equal-tailed Bayesian interval or Jeffrey s prior interval) on the binomial proportion. Lawrence D. Brown, T. Tony Cai, Anirban DasGupta, Interval Estimation for a Binomial Proportion, Statistical Science, Vol. 16, No. 2, May 2001, pp

34 Therefore the historical average rate of catastrophic loss of life on ships in case of a serious flooding accident seems to be of the order of 35%. In other words, on the basis of accident records in the recent past, it can be expected that on average every three years there is a ship flooding accident where most, 75% or more, of persons onboard lose their lives, given that one accident takes place every year on average. Not every accident is a rapid loss of stability, see Figure 5. Moreover, safety measures since the loss of Estonia ought to have raised the safety standard of these ships considerably, yet, 16 flooding accidents with a total loss of nearly 3,000 lives that have taken place worldwide since MV Estonia tell a different story, see Table 1. Figure 5 Modern cruise vessel Sea Diamond, April 6 th The underlying cause of such loss of life seems to result from rapid loss of stability by a ship when subject to progressive flooding. While it has not been possible to determine if all of these ships were compliant with International Maritime Organisation requirements on stability, certainly MV Estonia has complied with the stability standards of SOLAS. It appears that this rate of vulnerability can be explained by the regulations on damaged ship stability, as can be seen from Figure 8 and Figure 9, which does correlate with actual data shown in Table 1, Figure 6 and Figure 7. Furthermore, there are indications 7, 8, 9, 10, see also Figure 11, that most modern stability standards do not raise the level of required stability much higher 11 beyond those which MV Estonia complied with, see Figure Jasionowski A, York, A, Investigation Into The Safety Of Ro-Ro Passenger Ships Fitted With Long Lower Hold, UK MCA RP564, 10 July 2007, Draft Report MCRP04-RE-001-AJ, Safety at Sea Ltd. Work published in 8 Ship Vulnerability To Flooding. Andrzej Jasionowski, Dracos Vassalos, Andrew Scott, Ship Vulnerability To Flooding, 3rd International Maritime Conference on Design for Safety, Berkeley California, September 26th 28th, Maciej Pawlowski, Dracos Vassalos and Andrzej Jasionowski, Risk Characterization of the Required Index R in the New Probabilistic Rules for Damage Stability, Proceedings of the 8th International Ship Stability Workshop, Istanbul, October not lower than 12.7%, which is within the confidence band of the historical data

35 Table 1 LMIU , 21 fatal flooding accidents plus accidents of Al Salam 12 and Sea Diamond. year ship name number of fatalities total number of persons onboard rate of fatalities 1987 Herald of Free Enterprise % 2000 Ciudad de Ceuta % 2000 Ytong I % 1999 Asia South Korea % 2004 Sam-Son % 1993 Jan Heweliusz % 1994 Estonia % 1996 Bukoba % 1996 Gurita % 1992 Royal Pacific % 2000 Express Samina % 1991 Moby Prince % 1994 Al-Qamar Al-Saudi Al-Misr % 1998 Princess of the Orient % 1991 Salem Express % 1999 Sleipner % 2001 Pamyat Merkuriya % 2002 Le Joola % 2003 San Nicolas % 2002 Mercuri % 2003 Wimala Dharma % 2006 Al-Salam Boccaccio % 2007 Sea Diamond %

36 LMIU , 21 flooding accidents plus accidents of Al Salam and Sea Diamond 100% r, rate of fatalities per flooding accident [-] 90% Al Salam 80% MV Estonia 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Sea Diamond 0% year Figure 6 Historical record of the rate of fatalities in a fatal flooding accident, LMIU, (red), and indication of accidents of Al Salam and Sea Diamond. LMIU , 21 flooding accidents plus accidents of Al Salam and Sea Diamond 1 - CDF(r), probability of r or higher rate of fatalities during flooding accident 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% PDF(r) 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0 35% = every 1 in 3 "flooding" accidents lead to at least 75% of persons onboard loosing life r, rate of fatalities per flooding accident [-] CDF(r) 99% confidence on CDF(r) PDF(r) Figure 7 Probability distribution for the rate of fatalities in a flooding accident, LMIU, , 21 fatal accidents plus Al Salam and Sea Diamond. Some 75% or higher fatality rate has happened in 1 in 3 casualties 6 in the last 20 years! 38

37 Figure 8 Survival index (probability of surviving a collision damage and flooding) for a sample of 18 cruise liners and passenger ships 13, all complying with SOLAS requirements, considered as representative of the world s fleet in On average, the fleet is expected not to survive in about 30% of collision damage cases. Figure 9 Survival index (probability of surviving a collision damage and flooding) for a sample of 19 passenger Ro-Ro ships, all complying with SOLAS requirements, considered as representative of the world s fleet in On average, the fleet is expected not to survive in about 30% of collision damage cases leading to progressive flooding. 13 Papanikolaou, A, Eliopoulou, E, Jensen, J, J, Report on regression analysis of sample ship results and on alternative formulations of Required Subdivision Index, WP5/Task , Document reference 5-52-D , GRD HARDER, 15 th June

38 R (required index of subdivision) MV Estonia size factor Figure 10 The Required index of subdivision (minimum probability of surviving a collision damage and flooding). The index hardly reaches 90% for the largest of ships, and remains at 75% for the average ship carrying 1000 people. 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 1 - A 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Solas 1974 Stockholm Agreement SOLAS 2009 Figure 11 MV Estonia s vulnerability to rapid capsize (the complement of index of survivability). New stability regulations would imply that the proportion of nonsurvivable cases among any statistically possible collision flooding accidents MV Estonia could have suffered would decrease from 31% for SOLAS 1974 to 12.7% for Stockholm Agreement and 14.1% for SOLAS2009. It seems only logical that a question as to how safe is safe is stated in view of these statistics, and whether a rational basis for recommending safety standards can be put forward? 40

39 Recommendation on improvement of safety standards There are many defensive barriers that play a role in the provision of safety, as shown in Figure 4. All are important, and all need to continuously be revised. However, focus on some of the barriers put in place today can evidently bring more pronounced impact on safety assurance than others. To provide focus and a target, this article reiterates only one recommendation. 853 people died on the night of 27/28 th September 1994 because of rapid loss of stability of MV Estonia. On this night, the loss of stability resulted most likely from water inflow onto the car deck through the bow doors and unobstructed by the required but non-existing forward bulkhead. However, there are thousands of other possibilities of dangerous water ingress into a ship which can bring about complete and rapid loss of her stability, sometimes despite compliance with international requirements on stability. Therefore, it is recommended that a goal is adopted without delay whereby the rate with which catastrophic ship flooding accidents occur is lowered to a reasonable level, no more than 1%, from the historical average level of some 35% per every fatal flooding accident, so to ensure that such accidents do not repeat in one hundred years on average 14, 15. Attainment of such a goal requires predominantly that steps be taken swiftly to raise ship stability standards substantially and well beyond current levels. 100% Rate of catastrophic flooding fatal accidents [-] 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Future Figure 12 Attaining a goal of not more than 1% rate of occurrence of catastrophic flooding accidents would ensure that such accidents do not occur within mean recurrence interval of one hundred years on average for instance, off-shore installations are designed to withstand waves, which are exceeded not more often than once every one hundred years on average Given the frequency of occurrence of fatal flooding accident remains at a level of 1 per year 41

40 Note, however, that since mean recurrence interval of T mri 100 years only implies that such accident would occur on average every 100 years, there still remains a question on how likely is it that such accident will actually happen anytime up to the next 100 years? Likelihood of a catastrophic consequence A good probability assignment for such an event can be made based on the univariate geometric distribution, as follows: P n T mri n probability of an accident occurrence in n-years, where p 1/Tmri is annual probability of accident occurrence The distribution of probability ( 1 ) is shown below for example MRI s of 5, 100, 3,300 and 10,000 years (reflecting examples given below). It can be seen for instance that the intolerability criterion based on mean recurrence interval of 100 years implies 63.4% probability for occurrence of such an accident within 100 years. Engineering interpretation of this probability starts becoming difficult, but to help the imagination, consider that there are 10 planets Earth, each with exactly the same fleet of passenger ships. The question is how often would an accident involving large number of fatalities happen among these 10 planets, given that all ships are designed to 100-years criterion? Model ( 1 ) implies that in between 6 to 7 cases, 63.4% of 10, the accident would take place in the first 100 years. ( 1 ) 1 Probability of occurence of failure in n or less years P( n 5) P( n 100) P( n 3300) P( n 10000) n Number of years Figure 13 Probability distribution for n number of years during which at least one accident occurs. 42

41 A 100-years (or often higher) criterion on MRI, or 100-years reference period for which probability of occurrence of undesirable catastrophic event is assigned as design target, is quite a common engineering criterion for design of sensitive objects, such as bridges, highways, dams, houses, tornado shelters, etc 16,17,18,19. A 100-year MRI on wind loading for bridge design capacity would be used in San Francisco 16. Probability that such loading could occur in 100 years is 63.4%, see Figure 13. A freeboard for bridge clearance above river elevation would be designed for MRI of 100 years for flood in the State of Wisconsin 17. Probability that such flooding could occur in 100 years is 63.4%. Maximum elastic surface response earthquake spectrum for MRI of 3,300 was used to aid design of Suramadu Bridge. Probability for such response to occur in 100 years is 3%. A community shelter, a shelter that could be occupied by 12 or up to several hundred persons, would be designed for near absolute protection against e.g. a tornado in Kansas 19, whereby the design criterion for wind loading would be based on T mri 10,000, i.e. winds which could be exceeded within 100-years with less than 1% probability! Comparisons of probabilities for catastrophic scenario occurrence within 100 years for either of these design criteria is shown, again, in Figure 13. On this background it is proposed that the reasoning behind the aforementioned 100-years criterion is generalised for use for ship design, as the minimum. Although the principle of mean recurrence interval of 100 years as ship design target seems rather conservative when compared to current SOLAS regulations, it is still rather relaxed (accident occurrence in 100 years with 63% probability) when compared to design basis of e.g. hurricane shelters, which sets to assure that MRI for catastrophic collapses is not less than 10,000 years, with key motivation for it deriving from its purpose of housing a large number of people (several hundred). It is left to the reader s discretion to judge whether such revolutionary, as per today s ship safety standards, criterion could be considered safe? Conclusions MV Estonia sank on the night of 27 th / 28 th September 1994 due to loss of hull integrity, unobstructed inflow of water on deck and rapid loss of stability. The sinking mechanisms established were: (1) sudden heel due to loss of stability (floodwater on deck and free surface effects), (2) floating at side (side windows withstanding substantial hydrodynamic load) and flooding of lower compartments through the centre casing, (3) complete capsize (windows fail), (4) trim aft (centre of floodwater aft of CG) and sinking (loss of floatability) Design Criteria, March 2001, Skyway Structures, Prepared by T.Y. Lin International / Moffatt & Nichol Engineers, a Joint Venture for Caltrans/Division of Structures, San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, Contract 59A0040. Roadway standards, State of Wisconsin, Department of Transportation, Director, Bureau of Highway Development, Procedure , August 8, 1997 Masyhur Irsyam, Donny T Dahgkua, Dyah Kusumastuti, Seismic design criteria for SURAMADU cable stayed bridge, Faculty of Civil Engineering and Environmental, Bandung Institute of Technology. Storm Shelters Selecting Design Criteria, US Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, May

42 Although there were clearly many initiating causes of the loss in a holistic overview, lack of compliance with the IMO regulations on forward collision bulkhead is considered as the direct reason of the eventual loss in the light of maritime law, as it did not to any extent prevent inflow of water onto the car deck after loss of integrity of forward enclosure. However, the root cause of the loss derives from the fundamental flaw in the philosophy of maritime safety provision underlying current regulatory instruments of IMO, and pertaining to inadequate requirements on ship stability to mitigate consequences of very often recurring phenomenon of ship flooding. Therefore, it is recommended that the level of damage ship stability is raised substantially to meaningfully increase the safety standard of passenger ships. It is proposed that a goal to reduce the rate of catastrophic fatal flooding accidents from a 35% historical average to not more than 1% is adopted by all passenger ships without delay and with clear targets for achieving this goal within the foreseeable future. 44

43 A Risk Based Approach to Maritime Safety in the Baltic Head of Centre Per Sønderstrup The Danish Maritime Authority, Denmark Abstract This paper discusses approaches to risks management in order to minimize ship accidents in the Baltic Sea. During the last decade, a number of initiatives for the protection of the environment in the Baltic Sea have been implemented. However, we still need to see the long term effect of the many preventive measures introduced. Instruments like the Formal Safety Assessment guidelines developed by IMO are very helpful to support decision making. Our better knowledge of ships traffic, traffic routes, near miss statistics also have proven very valuable to improve guidance and information for maritime traffic. It could, however, be discussed if it is possible to minimize the relative low number of ship accidents seen in the Baltic Sea by introducing more external measures like new or adjusted traffic routes, enhanced maritime surveillance or stricter Port State control. In this respect, it is necessary to take a risk based approach and to build a philosophy to decide what measures are feasible and to evaluate their long-term effects. One of the core concepts that also applies in risk based approach is the concept of quality shipping. It is necessary to maintain a high focus on common goals to preserve a safe and secure Baltic Sea area. This is one of the tasks outlined also in the Baltic Sea Strategy as one of many valuable European level programmes. Keywords: risk management, oil transport, ships accidents The need to think risk based approach Baltic coastal State shipping is an important part of the national and regional infrastructure and supports economic growth in the region building not only on regional trade but also on international trade. Shipping is an important growth factor for the Baltic Sea region. At the same time ships pose a potential risk to the environment and the climate. There are two main pillars to handle risk from shipping. The first pillar is the direct impact from ships due to emissions from fuel consumption and other external factors like waste from ships. These direct impacts on the environment can be dealt with for example by setting regional or international binding limitations on shipping. It is, however, important to remember that due to the international character of shipping we see a large variety of ships nationality in the Baltic. That is also the reason why international regulations in general will have the best impact on shipping also in the Baltic Sea. The other risk pillar is related to safety and the environment. A ship carrying a product harmful to the marine environment can be severely damaged due to a collision, grounding or maybe even fire onboard. As a consequence of a serious accident a cargo like oil can severely harm the coastal line and the marine environment. 45

44 For ships, accidents first of all are a safety concern. Coastal States for example must maintain sufficient Search and Rescue facilities to support a ship in distress but also other marine emergency arrangements to handle oil spills. This risk of ships accidents are far more difficult to handle than the first risk pillar as there are numerous factors involved some of them unpredictable. Therefore there is a need to use a risk based approach. The Risk model Risks from accidents in general can be assessed by the common Risk model: Risk = Frequency x Consequence Although simple, it can be a very difficult task to estimate frequency and consequence as there are no simple answers to these factors especially trying to predict a future scenario. Still this model is commonly accepted to be a feasible way to structure and assess risks. The model is not better than the input you provide to the model. The key factor here is to include professionals that are experts in the fields necessary to build the right model and to interpret its results. When applied correctly, the risk model used in Formal Safety Assessments can build very valuable tools to decide what measures might have the best impact on the prevention of environment pollution. Statistics on Ship Accidents The statistics on the accidents in the Baltic Sea are prepared by HELCOM on an annual basis and are obtainable from their website. Information from HELCOM reports on accidents 2008 The accidents cover a range of different types and causes, which it is necessary to analyse in order to utilize the statistics properly. It can be seen from the figure that the tendency in the number of accidents is decreasing. In the same period ships traffic increased which means that the relative decrease in the number of accidents is even more. 4-9 percent of the accidents has led to pollution and there is no clear picture of the tendency in these accidents. 46

45 The observation for the Danish Great Belt is somewhat similar. The tendency is a decreasing number of accidents especially if the number is compared with the increase in ships traffic. Going back to the basic risk formula, the result is that it could be argued that the frequency in ships accidents is decreasing in the long term. But what about the other factor in the risk formula, i.e. consequence? The amount of oil transported through the Baltic Sea is still increasing, giving a higher frequency of traffic with oil tankers. And the risk of a major oil spill will still be high on the agenda because the consequences are severe and are difficult to compensate through minimization of the frequency of these ships. Therefore we need the best routes and vessel traffic services, the best information on ships navigation available and we need to enforce the legal regime already established in a best achievable manner. A Risk Based Approach to Safety of Navigation Illustration of a philosophy to handle risks in safety of navigation That is also why there is a need to structure a risk based approach. It is the experience of the Danish Maritime Authority that risks can be divided into some defence lines that is factors where incentives would have the highest impact on preventing an accident. These defence lines can be divided into three defence lines. 47

46 The 1 st line is the quality of ships and crews and the handling of the ships like route planning, proper bridge team including the use of pilot. The 2 nd defence line is the external factors like providing the ship with proper sea charts, traffic routes, land- and sea marks or, in general, aids to navigation. The 3 rd defence line is the external control of the ship i.e. monitoring ships navigation and the use of Port State control. Other key factors also include Flag State inspections through which the enforcement of maritime regulations should primarily be controlled. If the defence lines fail, it can be due to a lack of implementation of safety and environmental standards already developed. Root causes of accidents investigated might also show a need to develop new maritime regulations or safety standards. New requirements in terms of maritime surveillance, traffic routes, technical standards or strict Port State control. During the last decade there have been several 2 nd and 3 rd. line initiatives to manage risks from maritime traffic as for example; Monitoring ships traffic and Vessel Traffic Services; New traffic routes; Inspection of ships in Baltic ports (Port State Control); Phasing out of single hull oil tankers; Higher compensation rates for oil spills; Insurance for maritime claims (Bunkers and HNS convention); New regulations for transfer of oil at sea (STS operations); Increased capacity for oil spill response; EU 3rd maritime safety package. To effectively target the 1 st line of defence it is necessary to focus on the human factor. This is a more challenging task, because when it comes to human factors it depends not only on precise regulations for ships building but also on factors like safety culture. Therefore this has to be addressed by ensuring quality stakeholders in the industry. Ship owners need to address human factors by establishing a proper safety culture and to have thorough understanding of the impacts the shipping affects the environment with. Therefore there is a need, in the shipping community and amongst stakeholders, to maintain a high level of awareness of the risks that are prevailing in shipping. Conclusion The last decade of new safety and environmental measures provides a very broad and genuine framework to ensure that shipping can be operated on safe basis in the Baltic Sea area. On the environmental or climate side it is predicted that more is to come. Innovation in shipping towards use of more environmental friendly products is high on the agenda and use of LNG as fuel and new marine technology will support a common goal of protecting the Baltic Sea. Although we haven t seen the long term effects coming from some of the newly introduced safety measures, there seems to be tendency towards a fewer number of accidents. To reduce ships accidents further it is necessary to target the 1 st line of defence. To go a step further within the maritime regulatory framework there will be a need to focus more on the human factors like competent crews and operational procedures. 48

47 A possible sea spectrum for the Baltic Sea Maciej Pawłowski Gdansk University of Technology, Poland Abstract A sea spectrum is proposed for the Baltic Sea, of similar format as JONSWAP spectrum for the North Sea, based on three parameters, with the bandwidth parameter 0 less than 1. So far, despite the heavy shipping there is no reliable spectrum available for the Baltic Sea. 1. INTRODUCTION The ITTC spectral formulation for fully developed seas, derives from Bretschneider, and is given by the following equation: S( ) = (A/ ) e B/, (1) where A and B are constants. It is convenient to apply a substitution t B/ for calculating the spectral moments. For the n th moment, we get: m n ¼ AB ¼ n 0 B t ¼n e t dt AB ¼ n (¼n ), (2) B where (x) is the gamma function, defined for positive x by the integral (x) t x 1 e t dt. As the argument of the function gamma has to be positive, the moments exist only for n 4. The 4 th and higher moments are infinite. Therefore, the bandwidth parameter 0 is unity, which implies that the ITTC spectrum is wide-banded. Substituting n 0, 1and2, and making use of the well-known feature of the gamma function: (x) (x1) (x1), the following results for the first four moments: m ¼ A/B, m 1 ⅓ (1.75)A/B 3/4, m 2 ¼ a5a/ab m 4 = B. (3) For large, S( ) decays as. Due to this reason, the 4 th and higher spectral moments do not exist, which is far from reality. For real seas all moments exist and the bandwidth parameter 0 is less than 1, from the region 0.40, STANDARD SEA SPECTRA ITTC spectra are defined by two parameters A and B, as seen in equation (1). In order to define these parameters, we have to use two characteristic values describing wave intensity. The most important is the significant wave height h s 48, where 8 is the standard deviation of wave elevation. Hence, h s m 4A/B. The constant A is then given by the equation: A = ¼Bh s 2, (4) 49

48 depending on the other constant B, related to one of the wave periods. Most frequently, the characteristic period is used T = 25m /m. Making use of equations (3), the following results for the constant B: 1.55 B T T A spectrum with the above constants A and B is called the ITTC spectrum. It is easy to show that all the characteristic frequencies, such as the modal frequency m, the mean (average) frequency, and the average zero-crossing frequency are in proportion to B 1/4, which means they are in the same proportions between themselves. This in turn suggests that ITTC spectra have geometrical affinity, which can be proved rigorously. It is worth noting that the average peak frequency does not exist for ITTC spectra. According to Pierson and Moskowitz the constants A and B are as follows: A c g 2, B c (g/u) 4, (6) where c , c 0.74, g is the acceleration due to gravity, and U is the mean wind speed at 19.5 m above the sea surface. A spectrum with such constants is called the Pierson Moskowitz spectrum. As can be seen, it is a one-parameter spectrum, solely dependent on wind speed, which is not very convenient. In the applications, it is more convenient to utilise the significant wave height rather than the wind speed. To do so, the constant B has to be related to the significant wave height h s 48. Since 8 m, therefore (h s /) ¼A/B. Hence, B 4A/h s. (5) 30 m 2 s 25 S( ) h s =11 m m m 5 m 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 (1/s) 1,2 Figure 1. Pierson Moskowitz spectra as a function of significant wave height h s The Pierson Moskowitz spectra, depending on the significant wave height h s, are shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, the modal frequency m decreases with the significant wave height h s, which can also be deduced from equation (7) for the modal frequency: m (0.8B), (7) 50

49 which results from the equation: S'( ) 4B 5 = 0. Equation (7) yields B 1.25 m. Inserting it to equation (6) yields: m (0.8c ) (g/u) 0.877(g/U). (8) Equating B 4A/h s to B given by equation (6) yields a standard relation between wind speed and sea severity: U 4 (c /4c )(gh s ) 2. Hence, U (c /4c ) (gh s ) 2.186(gh s ). (9) For instance, for h s 9 m, the standard wind speed U 20.5 m/s. 3. JONSWAP SPECTRUM The JONSWAP formulation is based on an extensive wave measurement programme known as the Joint North Sea Wave Project carried out in the years The spectrum concerns wind-generated seas with fetch limitation. Wind speed and fetch length are inputs to this formulation, which is as follows:, 2 exp ( 2 m / 2 8 m, S (10) c S PM 1 where is a random parameter, 3.3 on average,, x is the scale parameter, for m, and 0.09 for m, m 5b3.5(g/U) x is the modal frequency, x gx/u is the dimensionless fetch, x is the fetch length (in m), and S PM ( ) is the Pierson Moskowitz spectrum. The scale parameter, c, if x , which is quite large. Therefore, in most cases, c. The parameter is called the peak-shape parameter and it represents the ratio of the maximum spectral energy density to the maximum of the corresponding Pierson Moskowitz spectrum. The term associated with the exponential power of is called the peak enhancement factor, and the JONSWAP spectrum is the product of the Pierson Moskowitz spectrum (with B m ) and the peak enhancement factor. The effect of the peak-shape parameter on the JONSWAP spectrum for wind speed U 30 m/s and fetch length x 280 km is shown in Figure m 2 s S( ) = 1 (1/s) Figure 2. Effect of peak-shape parameter on JONSWAP spectra 51

50 The modal frequency in this case m 0.509/s and the ratio,/c 1.606, which means that the area under the original Pierson Moskowitz spectrum for 1 is increased by 60.6%. The -value increases area under the spectrum, hence sea severity. Assuming A,g, and B 1.25 m, the first equation in (3) yields for the area under the JONSWAP spectrum with 1 the value: m,g / m. (11) The parameter is actually a random variable, approximately normally distributed from 1 to 6, with mean 3.3 and variance 0.62, as shown by Ochi [1]. Similarly to the scale parameter,, also the peak-shape parameter can be presented as a function of dimensionless fetch: = 7 x (12) The JONSWAP spectral formulation, as given by equation (10), is a function of wind speed and fetch length, resulting in a spectrum of certain significant wave height, unknown beforehand, which is not very convenient. Ochi, in his book [1], provides a relationship between the resultant significant wave height, wind speed and fetch length, as follows: U = k x h s 1.08, (13) where U is in m/s, x in km, h s in m, and k is a constant depending on -value. Its reasonable quadratic approximation is as follows: k = (14) Ochi derived equation (13) by regression, using equation (10) for various combinations of fetch length and wind speed. With the help of equation (13) the JONSWAP spectrum can be presented now for a specified significant wave height h s and fetch length x. 4. NONSTANDARD SPECTRA ITTC spectra do not describe best real seas, as they are wide, with the bandwidth parameter 01, whereas for real seas this parameter is from the range 0.40, This is the effect of too slow decay of ITTC spectra for large ; they should decay exponentially, whereas they decay as 1/ 5. A question arises here, whether sea spectra could be approximated better to allow for an exponential decay, yielding all spectral moments. Before we answer this question, we prove first that the ITTC spectra have geometrical affinity. 4.1 Nondimensional ITTC spectrum Dividing the ITTC spectrum, given by equation (1), by the area m = ¼A/B, yields a spectrum of unit area, as follows: S 1 ( ) = (4B/ 5 ) e B/ 4. (15) It is handy to introduce a new constant b in place of B (1/b) that has the dimension of time. The above unit-area spectrum now takes the form: S 1 ( ) [4b/(b ) ]e 1/(b ), which can be presented shortly, as follows: S 1 ( ) bs(b ), (16) 52

51 where s(x b ) is a unit-area nondimensional ITTC spectrum, given by: s(x) (4/x 5 ) e 1/x 4, (17) where x b. Equation (16) is a mathematical statement that between the unit-area spectrum S 1 ( ) and the nondimensional spectrum there is an affinity. The scale of transformation along the axis is 1/b. If b 1 s the graph is diminished linearly b times along the axis, and increased b times along the vertical axis, to keep the area constant. When b 1 s, it is the opposite the graph is increased 1/b times along the axis, and reduced b times along the vertical axis. The general ITTC formulation can be presented with the help of the nondimensional spectrum. Multiplying the unit-area spectrum, given by equation (16), by the area m, we get: S( ) = ¼Ab s(x), (18) where b B 1/4, x b, whereas s(x) is the nondimensional (universal) ITTC spectrum, given by equation (17) and shown in Figure 3, common for all the spectra. 1.6 s (x) x = b Figure 3. Nondimensional ITTC spectrum The largest energy density equals s m 5b1.25 e and occurs at the nondimensional modal frequency x m The spectrum begins practically at x The nondimensional spectrum is a generic spectrum to obtain any ITTC spectrum, the abscissa axis is divided by b = B, and the ordinate axis is multiplied by ¼Ab. In particular, maximum of spectrum occurs at m (0.8B) and equals S m 1.515b¼Ab 0.379Ab 5. Spectral moments of the nondimensional spectrum, denoted by s n, are given by equations (3), in which A 4, and B 1. Applying substitution x = b in the integral m n = 0 B n S( )d, for n = 0, 1, 2 and using for spectrum equation (18), it is easy to express spectral moments by moments of the nondimensional spectrum: m n = ¼Ab 4 n s n, for n = 0, 1, 2, (19) 53

52 It follows from equation (18) that in order to carry out calculations, it is sufficient to approximate the nondimensional spectrum s(x), given by equation (17). Note that this function can be considered as if it were a probability density function since it satisfies all the conditions required for the probability density function. Hence, for the approximation any probability density function that diminishes exponentially can be used. There are many possibilities, discussed in [2]. The most efficient appears to be the log-normal distribution, presented below. 4.2 Log-normal distribution Probability density of the log-normal distribution is given by the equation [3]: ln x a 2 f x exp, 2 (20) 25 - x a - where a, 2 and - are constants to be fixed; a is a lower bound. The modal value occurs at a point x a Г exp(2- ). Moments of any order n = 0, 1, 2, with respect to the lower bound are as follows: s n ' = exp[½(n-) 2 + n2]. (21) To get moments with respect to the origin, they have to be suitably transformed, which is not difficult. We get these: s s ' Г a, s s ' Г 2as a, s s ' Г 3as a s 1 Г a, s s ' Г 4as a s 2 Г a s 1 a, etc. (22) Knowing the nondimensional moments s n, moments of the spectrum itself can be found with the help of equation (19). The coefficients in equation (22) follow the pattern of the Pascal triangle. The best method of finding the constants a, 2 and -, describing the log-normal distribution (20) is the least squares method. Minimising the sum of squared deviations between the functions s(x) and f(x) at the range x 1.7 yields: a 0.545, , The differences between the two curves are at the second decimal place, i.e., around the thickness of a line, as can be seen in Figure 4. Statistical parameters of the two discussed spectra are compiled in Table 1, where x m is the nondimensional modal frequency, x is the zero-crossing frequency, x is the mean (characteristic, visual) frequency, and x is the peak frequency. As can be seen, the lognormal approximation of ITTC spectrum has practically the same modal frequency x m. The mean frequency x is identical with the centre of gravity of the area under the spectrum, whereas the zero-crossing frequency x is the same as radius of inertia of the spectrum area. Therefore, for any spectrum the following holds x x supported by Table 1. The nondimensional frequency is understood as x b, where b B. Table 1. Statistical parameters for nondimensional spectra of various approximations x m x x 1 x 2 0 ITTC B 1 log-normal

53 1.6 s (x) x = b Figure 4. Nondimensional ITTC spectrum and log-normal distribution 4.3 Nondimensional JONSWAP spectrum The nondimensional ITTC spectrum s(x), shown in Figure 3, refers to fully developed seas at open sea, whereas the JONSWAP spectrum represents wind-generated seas with fetch limitation. Contrary to ITTC spectra, for given wind speed and fetch length the resulting sea severity (in terms of the significant wave height h s ) is random, having, however, a determinate modal frequency. In literature there is no explanation for this randomness, which probably results from the time elapsed from the previous storm. The random sea severity is governed by the peak-shape parameter, of random nature, whose mean value equals 3.3. Dividing the JONSWAP spectrum, given by equation (10), by the area m,g / m for spectrum with 1, and introducing, as before, the nondimensional frequency x b, leads to a nondimensional JONSWAP spectrum s (x): 2 2 exp xx m / 2 8 xm s x s x (, (23) where s(x) is the nondimensional ITTC spectrum, given by equation (17) and shown in Figure 3, whereas x m is the nondimensional modal frequency x m Graphs of s (x), shown in Figure 5, illustrate the effect of -parameter on the nondimensional JONSWAP spectra. Since spectrum with 1 has a unit area, other spectra, with 1, have areas obviously greater than 1 (see Table 2). Table 2. Area under nondimensional spectrum s (x) as a function of -value m The area m of the nondimensional JONSWAP spectra varies almost linearly with the -parameter. Its linear and quadratic approximations are these: m Г, m Г (24), 55

54 10 s * (x) 8 = b Figure 5. Nondimensional JONSWAP spectra s (x) as a function of -parameter For the mean value of 3.3 m With the help of the above quantity, the area under the JONSWAP spectrum can now be easily calculated as the product of the area for 1, given by equation (11), and the quantity m : m m,g /5 m. (25) The -related m factor has the meaning of a coefficient of amplification for the JONSWAP spectrum. Since m h s 16, and substituting for, and m the expressions given at equation (10), the following is obtained for sea severity: h s xbx am. (26) For fetch length x m and wind speed U 30 m/s, x Assuming 3.3, the above yields for h s b m m. Solving equation (26) with respect to wind speed, yields: U m x h s, (27) where U is in m/s, x in km, h s in m, and m is a constant depending on -value. Contrary to equation (13), showing some degree of approximation, equation (27) is strict. Normalising the nondimensional spectrum s (x) with respect to the coefficient of amplification m, a unit-area nondimensional JONSWAP spectra s JP (x) is obtained, shown in Figure 6. The ratio between the maximum density for specified -value and 1, denoted by, has the meaning of a real peak-shape parameter. As seen in Figure 6, the greater the -value, the greater the -value is. Values of are shown in Table 3. The -value can be very well approximated relative to the logarithm of : Гlg lg, (28) 56

55 2 1.6 s JP (x) = 1 6 b Figure 6. Normalised JONSWAP spectra s JP (x) as a function of -parameter Table 3. -value as a function of -value for the JONSWAP spectrum lg Assuming that the modal density is times greater relative to the nondimensional ITTC spectrum and applying affinity transformation we get that the latter spectrum has to be times reduced along the abscissa axis with the centre of transformation at the modal frequency. The area and the modal frequency are then unchanged. The following results in such a case for the normalised JONSWAP spectra: s JP (x') s[x x m Г (x' x m )], (29) where s(x) is the generic nondimensional ITTC spectrum, given by equation (17), x b is the nondimensional frequency, the constant b = B x m / m, x m 0.8 1/ , and x' is a new x after transformation. The peak-shape parameter governs the concentration of the spectrum around the modal value. Comparison between the normalised JONSWAP spectrum for the extreme value of = 6 (curve 1) and a spectrum obtained through the affinity transformation (curve 2) is shown in Figure 7. As can be seen, there are some modest differences between the two curves, particularly in regions away from the modal frequency. 57

56 A perfect approximation for the normalised JONSWAP spectra s JP (x) can be achieved by applying the log-normal distribution, given by equation (20). Minimising the sum of squared deviations between the functions s JP (x) and f(x) at the range x < 2 yields: a , , As can be seen in Figure 8, computed for the extreme value of 6, differences between the two curves are invisible in the scale of this figure. 2 s JP(x) 2 s JP(x) b b Figure 7 Figure A spectrum for the Baltic Sea The JONSWAP spectrum was developed for the North Sea. There is a need to develop a similar spectrum for the Baltic Sea. Bearing in mind that the Baltic Sea is a shallow sea in comparison to the North Sea, the spectral formulation can be developed as an extension of the JONSWAP spectrum to account for wind-generated seas in finite water depth, using the concept of the similarity law, developed by Kitajgorodskij. Such a spectrum is given as a product of the JONSWAP spectral formulation and a transformation factor 1( h ), given by k k 3 M M 1 h, 3 M (30) kb M kb h h/ g accounting for water depth, where h = (h/g) is a dimensionless circular frequency, h is the depth of water, and k = k(, h) is the wave number associated with the dispersion relationship for waves in finite water depth ( 2 = gk tghkh). Figure 9 shows the transformation factor 1( h ). As can be seen, it increases asymptotically from 0 at h = 0, to a value 1 for h > 2. Since 1, the transformation factor decreases the area under the spectrum. 58

57 Figure 9. Transformation factor as a function of dimensionless frequency h Alternatively, the spectrum for the Baltic Sea could be the same as the JONSWAP formulation, except a new equation for the scale parameter, =,(x, h), accounting in addition for the depth of water, and perhaps for the modal frequency m. 5. CONCLUSIONS The paper demonstrated that the ITTC and JONSWAP spectra can be reduced through affinity transformation to a common unit-area nondimensional spectrum that can be precisely approximated by the log-normal distribution. Such spectra, contrary to the original ones, are narrow-banded, with the bandwidth parameter 0 less than 1, and have moments of any order. In a similar manner a wave spectrum for the Baltic Sea could be developed, either through the law of similarity, described in the foregoing, or through establishing a Joint Baltic Sea Wave Project (JOBSWAP). In addition, scatter diagrams with probability of occurrence of various sea states around the Baltic Sea could be delivered through this project. The knowledge of the two deliverables is essential for better prediction of ship motions while operating in the Baltic Sea, both for short- and long-term predictions. 6. REFERENCES 1. Ochi, M., K.: Ocean waves, Cambridge University Press, 1998, ISBN X, pp Pawłowski, M.: Sea spectra revisited, Proceedings, 10 th International Conference on Stability of Ship and Ocean Vehicles STAB 2009, St. Petersburg, June, 2009, pp , ISBN Det Norske Veritas: Proban distributions, 1996, Report No /Rev. 1 59

58 Challenges of the Growing Trade on the Baltic

59 Navigational safety management on Southern Baltic Lucjan Gucma Maritime University of Szczecin, Poland Abstract The paper presents the concept and development of a navigational safety management method on coastal areas. The method could be used on the areas where ship traffic monitoring is implemented. Nowadays the already implemented Automatic Identification System (AIS) could be used for this purpose. To develop the safety management method it is necessary to create a mathematical model of navigational safety. The model is needed to predict how the changes made in traffic or navigational markings will influence the safety of navigation. The traffic monitoring will deliver all necessary data about incidents (near misses) which could be the circumstances of accidents. Usually the number of accidents is not sufficient to assess the risk on its basis, especially when it is necessary to consider spatial distribution. A new method of incident analysis based on the AIS traffic monitoring will be therefore proposed. Keywords: safety of navigation, risk management, ship accident 1. Introduction Safety management systems based on risk assessment methods are the most advanced tools for safety improvement and control in different areas of human activities. Statistical data of ships, navigational accidents could be used for safety monitoring and management. The most important issue in maritime transportation regarding dynamic safety management systems is lack or small number of navigational accidents (yearly probability of accident for a given ship varies from 1x10-1 to 2x10-2 ). This phenomenon leads to problems with insufficient statistical accuracy. To overcome those problems, a novel method of navigational incidents analysis is proposed. The method is based on AIS (Automatic Identifications System) monitoring which is the standard for large ships nowadays. AIS range (up to 10 Nm) is suitable to use it in coastal areas. Radar monitoring systems are also suitable for those purposes when proper data records are available. The incident (near miss) is defined as an event or series of events which could lead to an accident but due to preventing action no losses occurs. The incident (I) or near miss (NM) could be the premise of an accident. The knowledge of incidents and their causes could come from their observation and analysis and is crucial for the system safety determination. A potentially dangerous situation (PDS) is defined similarly as an incident with such difference that the operator is not aware of that. The second important part of safety management system is the stochastic model of navigational safety. The model could be used for risk assessment and in the case when risk reduction measures are necessary. The model is capable of predicting navigational safety of the system after proposed changes under some simplification. 61

60 2. Model of navigational safety management system (NavSMS) Procedure of navigational safety management is a multistage iterative algorithm which consists of following steps: 1. Establishing the risk based safety factors with kind of accident, navigational area and ships consideration. 2. Hazards definition and identification. 3. Defining the acceptability of risk with individual societal and economical risk levels for given risk levels. 4. Risk assessment with consideration of accident databases. 5. Incident analysis in the given area to improve risk assessment and enable dynamic risk assessment. 6. Risk analysis (comparing current level of risk with tolerable levels). 7. Decision making about necessity of changes in the system, 8. Introduction of necessary changes into the system. 9. Application of stochastic model of navigational safety to determine how the proposed changes influence risk and the safety. 10. Practical implementation of necessary changes and risk control options. 11. Repeating the procedure until satisfactory results are achieved. 12. Periodical (for example yearly) risk control on the basis of given safety factors. The general diagram of the above procedure is presented in Fig. 1. Fig. 1. Procedure of navigational safety management in coastal areas 3. Navigational risk and its acceptability criteria Navigational risk R is defined as probability P of certain loses C in a given time: R PC Different safety factors are used. The risk based safety indicators related with risk acceptability (tolerability) are usually based on [Trbojevic 2005]: 1. individual risk criteria, 2. societal risk criteria, 3. economical risk and acceptable losses level criteria. Individual risk for different kinds of ships together with two criterion levels is presented in Fig. 2 based on [Skjong 2002]. 62

61 Fig. 2. Individual risk criteria in maritime transportation [Skjong 2002] Societal risk acceptance criteria expressed reluctance to accidents with more than one fatality. The tolerable curves are presented in Fig 3 [Skjong 2002]. Fig. 3. Societal risk criteria in maritime transportation [Skjong 2002] Third acceptable risk criterion is used when no human life or health is affected in an accident. It is usually expressed by monetary value which is tolerated to be lost within certain activity. 4. Stochastic model of navigational safety The stochastic model of navigational safety will be used as the basic tool for risk assessment and analysis. The model will be used also as the tool for fitting the proposed changes into the system. The model is based on microscopic simulation principle which means that each ship is modelled as individual object with several functions and attributes. There are implemented models of navigator behaviour in given situations and simplified models of ship s dynamics. External conditions influencing safety of navigation are also modelled with use of statistical distributions. There are various models of navigational accidents. The time in the stochastic model is intentionally accelerated to maximal achievable by computer processor to obtain maximum range of simulation scenarios. Chosen variables in the model are forecasted by models and changed to predict future behaviour of the system. The basic diagram of the model is presented in Fig. 4 [Gucma & Przywarty 2007]. 63

62 Fig. 4. General diagram of stochastic model of navigational safety The example of results achieved by the model is presented in Fig. 5. The long time distribution of accidental oil spills due to collisions on the southern Baltic Sea is divided into several classes. Such results [Gucma & Przywarty 2007] could be very useful for decision makers to define high risk areas [tons] < > Fig. 5. Example of results achieved by the model 5. Navigational incident management model One of the most important elements of the presented navigational safety system is navigational incident analysis method. The model of incidents is completely independent from the ship and is based on external monitoring by AIS (Automatic Identification System). It is assumed that there is no possibility to build detailed causal model of incident by such monitoring system. 64

63 Two separate models of navigational accidents are created: grounding and collision. The models are capable of finding standard behaviour of navigators in given areas and of identifying situations where potential dangerous situation could exist. Navigational accidents are relatively rare events. A typical triangle of accident severity as compared to incidents, involving the human element, is presented in Fig. 6. Fig. 6. Typical distribution of accidents severity [Bird and Germain 1996] 5.1. Monitoring of incidents in different areas of transportation The most important problem of incident investigation is concerned with monitoring and observing incidents. Comparing to other branches of transportation the marine transportation is most complicated in this aspect due to a relatively small number of serious accidents and lack of special procedures of mandatory and anonymous incident reporting like for example in aviation (Fig. 7). Fig. 7. Monitoring and observing incidents for three different branches of transportation (A- Accidents, I&NM Incidents and near misses, PDS-Potentially dangerous situation) 5.2. Dynamic navigational safety management based on incidents The basic assumption of the incident investigation model is as follows: n / n f const i a where: n a number of accidents; n i number of incidents; f ia accident/incident factor. ia 65

64 The above model is valid only for similar navigational conditions, for given ship kinds and in given water area (Fig. 8). Fig. 8. Model of navigational incidents analysis The number of incidents I in given time could be found by the following formula: I f ( a, c, n, s, na) where: a area; c meteorological conditions; n navigational conditions; s ship size and characteristics; n a number and severity of recorded accidents. The qualification of grounding incidents is based on the following three factors (Fig. 9): I g f ( D, d, v) where: D distance to the danger; d CG course difference; v speed of ship. Those three factors enable to investigate the incident severity S I which is directly proportional to the above factors: Si ( D, dcg, v). CG Fig. 9. Model of grounding incident analysis The model of collision incidents is dependant on four factors (Fig. 10): I c f ( DCPA, dcc, v 1, v2) where: D CPA distance to closest point of approach; d CC course difference; v 1,v 2 speed of ships. 66

65 Similar to the grounding incidents all the above factors affecting collisions (D CPA, d CC, v 1 and v 2 ) are directly proportional to collision incident severity (Fig. 11). Fig. 10. Model of collision incident analysis 5.3. Results of incident model Figs 11, 12 and 13 present results of collision incident analysis. Places of possible incidents are presented according to severity (distance between ships passing each other) Linia brzegowa Linia brzegowa Kursy przeciwne (0-0,1) Kursy przeciwne (0,1-0,2) Kursy przeciwne (0,2-0,3) Kursy przeciwne (0,3-0,4) Kursy przeciwne (0,4-0,5) Kursy przeciwne (0,5-0,6) Kursy przeciwne (0,6-0,7) Kursy przeciwne (0,7-0,8) Fig. 11. Possible incident places in collision situation (opposite courses) 67

66 Linia brzegowa Linia brzegowa Kursy przecinające się (0-0,1) Kursy przecinające się (0,1-0,2) Kursy przecinające się (0,2-0,3) Kursy przecinające się (0,3-0,4) Kursy przecinające się (0,4-0,5) Kursy przecinające się (0,5-0,6) Kursy przecinające się (0,6-0,7) Kursy przecinające się (0,7-0,8) Kursy przecinające się (0,8-0,9) Kursy przecinające się (0,9-1,0) Kursy przecinające się (1,0-1,1) Kursy przecinające się (1,1-1,2) Fig. 12. Possible incident places in collision situation (crossing courses) Linia brzegowa Linia brzegowa Kursy równoległe (0-0,1) Kursy równoległe (0,1-0,2) Kursy równoległe (0,2-0,3) Kursy równoległe (0,3-0,4) Kursy równoległe (0,4-0,5) Fig. 13. Possible incident places in collision situation (parallel courses) 5.4. Influence of ships traffic Strong influence of ships traffic is observed in the analyzed area. The density of traffic in given area is presented in Fig

67 Fig. 13. Density of ships traffic in analysed area 6. Conclusions The presented model of navigational safety could be applied in any coastal area where AIS monitoring exists. The model requires monitoring and that reduces its usability to coastal regions. The incident model is quite novel but requires stable accident to incident ratio functions in given areas. The research conducted in this field reveal interesting dependencies between navigational accidents and incidents. The presented concept of safety management on coastal sea areas is under validation on the Polish coast and southern Baltic area. The results are very promising and the presented navigational safety management system will be applied as recommended in this area. References 1. Bird F.E. Germain G.L Practical Loss Control Leadership Det Norske Veritas. 2. Gucma L., Przywarty M. Probabilistic method of ships navigational safety assessment on large sea areas with consideration of oil spills possibility, International Probabilistic Symposium Ghent Trbojevic V.M Risk criteria for ports and ships. Maritime Transportation and Exploitation of Ocean and Coastal Resources Guedes Soares, Garbatov & Fonseca (eds) Taylor & Francis Group, London, 4. Skjong R Risk Acceptance criteria: Current proposal and IMO Position. Surface transport technologies for sustainable development EU Commission Conference. Valencia. 69

68 Ship exhaust emissions Jukka-Pekka Jalkanen Air quality research, Finnish Meteorological Institute, Finland Abstract Automatic Identification System (AIS) provides an excellent opportunity not only for vessel traffic control, but also for detailed analysis of ship traffic over long time periods. Since the AIS data has been archived by the Baltic Sea states to a common HELCOM data server since 2005, it is possible to study trends and developments in traffic densities and exhaust emissions over several years. It can be stated that the Baltic Sea shipping is a significant source of atmospheric pollutants, like NO x and SO x, already easily surpassing emission levels of several countries. In 2007 the emission levels of Baltic Sea shipping were estimated as 400 kilotons (NO x ), 137 kilotons (SO x ) and 19.3 megatons (CO 2 ), respectively. The NO x levels are larger than the combined total NO x emissions of Finland and Sweden (2007, NO x : 347 kilotons), and for SO x shipping corresponds to the combined emissions of Finland, Sweden and Denmark (2007, SO x : 139 kilotons). An emission prediction model, STEAM, can be used to generate ship specific emissions estimates when data from the AIS archive is combined with detailed knowledge of ships engine setup. Heavily trafficked fairways in the Southern Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland can be easily identified as areas with significant emissions and estimates of fuel consumption and CO 2 output for individual ships can be generated. This information can be very useful in assessing the costs and benefits of future policy options regarding ship traffic in the Baltic Sea area. Keywords: Emissions, Automatic Identification System, AIS 1. Background The AIS position reports for 2007 consist of over 270 million automatic messages sent by 9497 vessels in the Baltic Sea. From AIS it is possible to identify ships using the IMO registry number and the MMSI code as well as to determine the vessel location and instantaneous speed. When this information is combined with detailed technical data of ships, physical dimensions, installed engines and design speed, a prediction of instantaneous engine power and also emissions can be made. The Ship Traffic Emission Assessment Model (STEAM) was developed to facilitate the studies of shipping as an emission source, a sector which was previously known only approximately. The details of the model and the process description can be found elsewhere.[ 20 ] There is a significant number of small vessels which are not required to carry AIS equipment at all, but they can use it voluntarily. It is likely that the emission estimates presented in this paper are underestimated. For Finland only, it has been estimated that the NO x emissions of small craft without AIS would be about 9 kilotons.[ 21 ] However, similar investigations for the entire Baltic Sea can be difficult, since no centralized data source exists which would describe the activity of small vessels in detail. 20 Jalkanen J.-P., Brink A., Kalli J., Pettersson H., Kukkonen J., Stipa T., A modelling system for the exhaust emissions of marine traffic and its application in the Baltic Sea area, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 2009, Mäkelä K, Calculation system for Finnish waterborne traffic emissions,

69 2. Geographical distribution of emissions from Baltic Sea shipping When analyzing the year 2007, AIS data with the STEAM model yields an estimate of the exhaust emission from the Baltic Sea shipping. The geographical distribution can be seen in Figure 1. Figure 1. Geographical distribution of the 2007 NO x emissions (in tons) from Baltic Sea shipping. (From reference [20]) The use of AIS data makes it possible to study the emissions with unprecedented detail, since the location of ships can be determined with an accuracy of a few meters because the AIS position reports contain GPS navigation data. Furthermore, the instantaneous emissions can practically be studied with any time interval without the need to resort to daily averages calculated from annual emissions. The overall trend of ship emissions has been increasing up to the year Due to the economic recession, the increasing trend in emissions has been reversed. Increase in ship traffic from was more than 10% judging from the estimated fuel consumption, but turned to a decrease of 2% in

70 3. Classification of emissions according to specific criteria Since the emissions are calculated ship by ship, it is possible to estimate the emissions by vessel type, flag state, engine stroke, build year and so on. Figure 2. NO x emissions from Baltic Sea shipping by flag, NO x emissions of over 10 kt are shown, constituting 84 % of total NO x emissions from shipping. In Figure 2, emissions from shipping are shown according to the flag state. Ships flagged to the HELCOM countries emit roughly 50 % of the total NO x, one third is emitted by ships flagged outside EU and the remaining 16 % by ships flagged to some other EU member state outside the Baltic Sea. At any given time there are over 2000 ships sailing the Baltic Sea and on monthly level ships can be observed. Seasonal variation of shipping reveals that during the summer months (June, July, August) emissions reach maximum probably due to increased passenger traffic. During 2007 ships in the Baltic Sea were estimated to release 400 kilotons of NO x, 137 kilotons of SO x and 19.3 megatons of CO 2 to the atmosphere. Total fuel consumption was estimated at 6205 kilotons, which corresponds to energy consumption of 264 petajoules (10 15 J). These emissions make Baltic Sea shipping an emissions source comparable to several countries in the Baltic Sea area. Since sulphur is almost completely removed from land based traffic sources, shipping roughly corresponds to the combined SO x emissions of Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Similar observations can be made with NO x, where the emissions from Baltic Sea shipping (400 kilotons) surpass the combined total NO x emissions of Sweden and Finland (347 kilotons).[ 22 ] 22 EMEP, Expert emissions, 2007: 73

71 4. Applications The emission model can be used as a decision support tool. Cost estimates of policy options for specific fleets can be made based on the fleet fuel consumption as well as estimates of environmental and health effects. The studies of health and economic effects would require specific additional models describing the pollutant transport, human exposure and cost. The STEAM model is quite flexible, facilitating studies from port level details all the way up to sea regions or even globally, provided that AIS data from these areas is available. 74

72 Violation of regulations in the Baltic Sea in a view of the Maritime Office in Szczecin Magdalena Wesołowska Maritime Office in Szczecin, Poland mwesolowska@ums.gov.pl 1. Organisational structure of Maritime Administration in Poland The organizational chart of maritime administration (governmental sector and subordinate bodies) in Poland consists of institutions presented in Figure 1. At present the Minister of Infrastructure is responsible for the sector of maritime affairs. There are two relevant departments in the Ministry: Maritime Safety Department and Maritime Transport Department. The Minister of Infrastructure is also responsible for inland shipping issues and maritime higher education. Due to institutional reorganization the fishing sector has returned under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Tasks in the field of preparedness, combating marine pollution, search and salvage operations are performed directly by Search and Rescue Services in co-operation with other relevant bodies. In the process of supervising/monitoring, detection, investigation/prosecution, imposing penalties and response to the effects caused by violations of maritime safety, security and environment protection regulations the following entities are involved: Minister of Infrastructure Maritime Offices: in Szczecin, Słupsk and Gdynia Marine Chambers (Courts) Search and Rescue Services (SAR) Ministry of Infrastucture Maritime Safety Dept. Maritime Transport Dept. Maritime Offices Maritime Academies Search and Rescue Services (SAR) Maritime Institute Marine Chambers Inland Shipping Offices Regional Inspectorates of Marine Fisheries Figure 1. Organizational structure of maritime administration and related bodies 75

73 2. Competences and scope of activities/jurisdiction Three maritime offices, located in Szczecin, Słupsk and Gdynia, are responsible for the control of compliance with regulations regarding maritime safety, protection of marine environment from ship-generated pollution and investigation, imposing sanctions in case of violation of these requirements. Maritime Office in Szczecin (MOS) supervises the area of internal seawaters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, seaports, marinas and coastal zone from the meridian 15º23 24 E to the west border of Poland the geographical jurisdiction of MOS is presented in Figure 2. Figure 2. Territorial jurisdiction of maritime offices The following organizational divisions in Maritime Office in Szczecin are authorized to carry out inspections, investigations, prosecution including imposing of sanctions on behalf of the Director of Maritime Office in Szczecin regarding the provisions of SOLAS, COLREG, MARPOL, STCW, LOAD LINES, DUMPING, ILO, HELCOM, and relevant EU law: Safety of Shipping Inspectorate (IBŻ) Supervises issues related to maritime safety and security particularly regarding ships inspections carried out by FSC and PSC officers, security of ships and port facilities; Marine Environment Protection Inspectorate (IOŚM) Marine environment protection is provided by monitoring of Polish sea waters and routine ships inspections, conducting investigations to identify the polluters and cooperation with SAR during combating oil spills; Harbour Master s Office (KP) Harbour Master s Offices located in Szczecin and Świnoujście by means of VTMS, AIS continuously supervise safety of navigation in waterways and ports, which is ensured by monitoring, exchange of information, warnings, orders and traffic management and routine controls. Routine controls are addressed according to the plan to all particularly sensitive matters essential for port activities and shipping: compliance with traffic regulations, technical condition of port equipment and infrastructure, fire protection and handling cargos, especially dangerous goods 76

74 and fuels. Irrespectively of the plan, inspections and investigations are conducted in case of suspected or reported violations of law. For the inspection purpose, to approach vessels and monitor national marine waters (including fairway Świnoujście-Szczecin and port waters) in the jurisdiction of MOS, officers have at the disposal three fast motor boats. 3. Sanctions for violations Violation of MARPOL, SOLAS, COLREG, LOAD LINES, DUMPING, HELCOM, ILO and EU relevant provisions in Poland is subject to administrative law, not criminal law (unless it is caused by a criminal action). Financial and non-financial sanctions are imposed by administrative decisions. Administrative decisions are issued by Director of Maritime Office or an authorized officer/inspector. The offender has the right to appeal to change the administrative decision to: minister competent for maritime economy, provincial administrative court, chief administrative court. a\ Nonfinancial sanctions The Director of Maritime Office, on the basis of an administrative decision, may: prohibit to use a ship, prohibit to use a ship for an intended application, and point out offences that must be eliminated to enable this particular application, in case of refusal to eliminate above mentioned offences order a ship not to leave the port, terminal or territorial waters (detention of a ship), or prohibit to enter the port or terminal, prohibit a ship of foreign nationality to enter the port which according to the MoU results in a prohibition to enter all Polish ports and ports of contracting parties of MoU, regarding ships flying the Polish flag cancel relevant documents, certificates etc. b\ Financial sanctions List of offences and respective maximum level of financial sanctions that could be imposed is comprised in national legal acts set out below. More detailed requirements can also be issued in regulations adopted by Maritime Office Director as regulations and order regulations (in line with national acts). National acts implementing international legal acts: Act on the maritime safety: The Act imposes the following requirements: The vessel can be used in shipping, provided: N it meet safety requirements for its construction, fixed installations and equipment, set out in: international conventions: SOLAS, COLREG, MARPOL, LOAD LINES; provisions of act on maritime equipment of 20 April 2004 r. (Journal of Laws No.93, item 899); N meets the requirements of safety and hygiene and sanitation, as defined in: ILO Conventions 92, 133, 147; N qualifications of the members of ships crews comply with the requirements of: STCW, SOLAS, ILO Conv. 69 and

75 Financial fines N The owner shall be liable to a monetary equivalent to units of account referred to as the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), as defined by the International Monetary Fund, for the infringement of requirements regarding: 1) notification of the vessel to the initial or periodic inspection. 2) manning the ship with crew of required number and skills, 3) transport on board vessel of: grain bulk, bulk cargoes, dangerous goods, containers, items weighing one thousand kilograms or more, 4) safety of passenger ships and passengers in domestic passenger shipping, as defined in the rules of the specific conditions of shipping practice, 5) the passenger ferry ro-ro specific stability requirements specified in the provisions of the specific conditions of safe practice of navigation. N Each person shall be liable to a fine up to but not exceeding twentyfold average monthly wage for the preceding year, for the infringement of requirements regarding: 1) using the international signal to summon aid or using a signal that could be mistaken for an international emergency call signal for other unreasonable purpose or using the label reserved for the SAR, 2) non-communicating the information about the risk of human life at sea, 4) failing to count or record number of passengers taking a sea voyage aboard passenger ship, 5) not providing information: required before extensive inspection of the vessel, events affecting the safety of the ship and shipping; required prior to entry to the port; any deficiency posing danger to the ship s safety (refers to pilot). N Master shall be liable to a fine not exceeding twentyfold average monthly wage for the preceding year, If he/she: 1) fails to fulfil its obligation to submit the ship for inspection, 2) infringes requirements of: chapter V SOLAS; transfer by means of communication to other ships and coastal State authorities navigational warnings about the danger he perceives; proceedings in case of receiving a distress message according to SOLAS and SAR Convention; chapter IV SOLAS by ship carrying grain in bulk; 3) brings the ship from the port disregarding the prohibition of the inspection body, 4) does not observe an order to leave port, terminal or the territorial sea or the prohibition of entry into port or terminal or otherwise violates the established order applied to shipping and port, 5) does not ensure compliance with safety of ship requirements: to allow the ship for navigation in the scope of its construction and equipment in accordance with SOLAS, COLREG, LOAD LINES, MARPOL, act on the ship equipment and health, work safety and sanitary conditions required by ILO: 92, 133, 147, as well as relevant qualifications of the crew according to STCW, SOLAS, ILO: 69 and 74; 6) breaches regulations concerning safety requirements for passenger ships and passengers in domestic passenger shipping, 7) breaches regulations concerning particular stability requirements of passenger ro-ro ferries. 78

76 Act on prevention of sea pollution from ships The following international agreements shall apply to prevent sea pollution from ships: MARPOL, HELCOM, DUMPING, the act on substances depleting ozone layer (Regulation 2037/2000/WE). This Act also applies to ships covered by European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 782/2003 of 14 April 2003 on the prohibition of organotin compounds on ships. Financial fines N Owner of a ship remaining within Polish sea areas or owner of a ship flying the Polish flag outside Polish sea areas that polluted the marine environment, in relation to ship operation or dumping of waste or other matters without valid permit or in contradiction to the conditions of such permit. shall be liable to a monetary equivalent to units of account referred to as the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), as defined by the International Monetary Fund. N ship owner shall be liable to a fine up to maximum amount of SDR if failing to fulfil legal duties or breaching any legal prohibitions regarding: 1) carrying dangerous or polluting cargoes, not reporting required information, 2) not complying with the requirements of the Act of 20 April on substances depleting ozone layer 3) operating a ship on which organotin compounds are present on the hull, 4) operating a ship from which substances depleting ozone layer, nitrogen oxides are emitted to the atmosphere, 5) using fuel with unacceptable sulphur content on the ship. N N Shipper that fails to fulfil the obligation to submit a declaration on dangerous or polluting cargoes to the master set for loading onto a ship for the purpose of transportation shall be liable to a fine up to maximum amount of SDR. Supplier, who supplies fuel that does not comply with provisions of MARPOL, shall be liable to a fine up to maximum amount of SDR. N Master or any other crew member shall be liable to a fine not exceeding twentyfold average monthly wage for the preceding year If he/she fails to fulfil his legal duties in that he/she: 1) does not exercise due care of the ship s seaworthiness or ability for other maritime operations as regards prevention of sea pollution, 2) does not maintain a logbook for entries concerning oil, cargo and ship-generated waste in accordance with requirements, 3) does not submit the ship for survey or inspection, hinders or prevents its execution in the extent stipulated in the MARPOL Convention, 4) causes pollution of marine environment, 5) does not report information on any pollution noticed or an incident posing danger of pollution, 6) does not take necessary measures to prevent, minimize or remove pollution of marine environment occurring as a consequence of an accident, 7) does not report, on request of relevant bodies, information on: registration, port of registration, last and next port of call etc. in case of reasonable suspicion that the ship caused pollution; 79

77 8) breaches regulations on delivery of waste to port reception facilities and does not inform the port authority of ship-generated waste or cargo residues on board, 9) does not notify inspection authorities of incidents significantly affecting the service condition of ship, its machinery, posing a danger to marine environment, 10) breaches regulations concerning incineration of waste on ship, 11) does not comply with obligations with respect to labelling, setting up and maintenance of a device log, checking for leaks, service and repairs of devices or installations that contain refrigerant qualifying as a controlled substance. N Whoever fails to fulfil obligations laid down in provisions of regulation 782/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of on the prohibition of organotin compounds on ships, shall be liable to a fine up to maximum amount of SDR. Act on the marine areas of Republic of Poland and Maritime Administration Financial fines N Every person shall be liable to a fine not exceeding twentyfold average monthly wage for the preceding year, If he/she: 1) stops or anchors a ship outside of the site intended for this purpose, 2) runs a vessel off water lanes or fails to the course indicated by a competent authority, 3) runs a vessel into a zone closed for navigation and fishery and leaves fishing equipment in such zone, 4) removes vessel from port neglecting prohibition, 5) loads or unloads goods to/from vessel in a location not set for such purpose, 6) establishes communication with the coast in a manner endangering navigational safety, 7) leaves a vessel at a prohibited location, 8) embarks or disembarks persons on/from a vessel breaching customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations, 9) breaches regulations issued by Maritime Office Director essential to ensure safety of life, health or property, marine environment protection at sea, in port, technical belt, safety of shipping and ports, 10) disregards an order to submit a ship to inspection and enter indicated port in case of suspected violation of this act (refers to foreign ships within the Polish marine waters, 11) damages or relocates navigational lights and marks or uses them not as intended, 12) activates equipment that adversely affects the efficiency of navigational lights and marks, 13) breaches regulations concerning keeping and storing vessel documentation on board, 14) breaches regulations concerning displaying or raising flag, 15) disregards the obligation to submit a vessel for measurement, 16) disregards the obligation to submit vessel or even subject to registration in the vessel s log book or in maritime office, 17) disregards the obligation to place the name, port of registry or vessel identification number on the vessel, 18) undertakes transportation of passengers without a civil liability insurance document required by art of Sea Code. 80

78 c\ Marine chambers The jurisdiction of marine chambers is to rule on matters of maritime accidents. Marine Chambers (Courts) operate under Provincial Courts and are established to determine the reasons for marine accidents involving: ships of Polish nationality; ships of foreign nationality, if the accident occurred within Polish internal waters, territorial sea or if the court received a submission to start a prosecution from owner or master of such ship, passenger ro-ro type ferries and fast passenger ships, if an accident occurred outside Polish waters if the last port of call was in the Polish territory. 1st Instance Marine Chamber in Gdańsk and Marine Chamber in Szczecin (depending on the territorial jurisdiction); 2nd Instance Appeal Marine Chamber in Gdańsk. Marine Chambers pronounce involving jurors. Following the initiation of proceedings, Marine Chambers carry out investigation by means of officers from Harbour Master s Office. Marine chambers investigating casualties follow provisions of Criminal Procedure Code as appropriate. Sanctions If a crew member or pilot of a ship holding a document setting out its powers in shipping issued by the competent Polish body, showed lack of necessary skills to ensure maritime safety or through gross negligence caused the casualty, or contributed to its creation, the Marine Chamber in the ruling/adjudication may deprive his right to exercise those powers in the partial or full extent for the period from 1 year to 5 years. 4. Detected infringements of regulations Recorded offences concern only the territory of geographical jurisdiction of Maritime Office in Szczecin, i.e. part of the Baltic proper, marine internal waters embracing approach fairway Świnoujście Szczecin (67 km length) and port waters. Table 1. Number of infringements within 5 years period detected by Maritime Office inspection divisions IBŻ IOŚ KP Σ Σ

79 Figure 3. Number of infringements within 5 years period detected by Maritime Office inspection divisions Harbour Master s Office (KP) Offences against safety of shipping including offences against Maritime Office Director s Regulations and Order Regulations are listed in Table 2. In all cases the cause was recognized as human factor and financial fines were imposed. Table 2. Infringements recorded by Harbour Master s Office within years Description of infringement Σ Posing situation of collision - sailing too close to another vessels fore; any other forbidden manoeuvring Ship s agent did not submit in due time required documents on registration forms before entry to the port according to regulation of MI of Violation of pilotage rules Ship s pilot with no reason and agreement with VTS officer overtook 1 1 another vessel on the fairway to a location not intended for this purpose Ship s pilot did not report black out failure on the ship 1 1 Unmoorage/change of berth without permit from VTS officer Master did not include information in ETA on side plating perforation due 1 1 to cargo shifting during storm Navigating without required safety documents Command of a ship after drinking alcohol (1 collision with berth) Inappropriate moorage of barge drifting due to broken ropes No suitable lighting on a barge at berth 1 1 Continuous listening watch on channel 69 of ensured, no response to VTS 1 1 calls Commence of loading of a ship without permit Lack of control lists after loading Dangerous overloading of a vessel of around 500 t 1 1 Loading of a barge with scrap without due safety requirements part of 1 1 scrap felt into the water as a result of overloading and stroke a hydrofoil Violation of MO Dir. Regulations on sport and recreational sailing within 3 3 sea waters Ship was manned with not sufficient number of qualified crew members 1 1 Leaving the port without tug assistance 1 1 Break of buoy by a ship 1 1 Fishing on a boat within port territory 1 1 Σ

80 Safety of Shipping Inspectorate (IBŻ) The following cases of infringements were detected by the Safety of Shipping Inspectorate within the years : 2006 (1 case): N Navigation without valid Safety Certificate 2008 (3 cases): N Vessel did not report to the MO the fact of taking part in a collision with another vessel and did not comply with the requirement of going through an inspection, left the port to continue the journey without validation of safety certificate. N Vessel did not submit/transmit required reports to VTS Tallinn, no response to calls on VHF channels 61, 16, 70, incorrect ETA information in AIS. N Detected by PSC: violation of the Polish requirements regarding Oilfield (the vessel entered the zone forbidden for navigation), no response to calls on VHF and instructions to alter the course (3 cases): N 2 cases navigation without any acceptable reason inside the traffic separation zone (contravention of COLREG Rule 10 b(ii)) N No adequate safety equipment on a fishing vessel (invalid batteries in safety belts). In all cases the cause was recognized as human factor and financial fines were imposed. Marine Environment Protection Inspectorate (IOŚM) Offences against regulations for the prevention of pollution to marine environment from ships are listed in Table 3. The greatest amount of pollution was 3 m 3 (petroleum substance). The most frequently the amount of pollution substance was ranging from up to 0.1 m 3. Most of the cases concerned pollution with petroleum substance (i.e. fuel, lubricating oil, oily waste etc.) and paint and residues after hull cleaning in the shipyard. Table 3. Infringements recorded by Marine Environment Protection Inspectorate within the years Description of infringement Σ Pollution of port waters with petroleum substance Pollution of port waters with paint and residues after hull cleaning in the shipyard Use of non-mechanical measures (chemical agents) to remove petroleum substance from the water surface without permit of MO Director Pollution of port waters with tar while loading of a ship Pollution of port waters with residue after washing cargo hold Pollution of port waters with sewage 1 1 Pollution of port waters with copper slag after cleaning of construction elements of vessel Falsification/distortion of entries in the "waste record book" or lack thereof, and removal/disposal/discharge of waste in contravention of the principles set out in the waste management plan and cargo residues from ships and/or inappropriate storage of any receipts or certificates confirming the delivery of waste from a ship to PRF Delivery of fuel with sulphur content in contradiction with information in delivery note Use of fuel with unacceptable sulphur content on a ship Σ

81 Figure 4. Number and type of infringements detected within years Some of the causes and circumstances of infringements are as follows: of the work overflow of the tank during the transfer of fuel from the vessel to a barge; overflow of tank during loading of tar; lack of security and supervision of repair work in the yard or during finishing touches of a new-built vessel, lack of security and supervision of the work while bunkering, oil leakage from the motor-operator opening hold leads, master ordered to pump out ballast water contaminated with oil preserving ballast tanks against corrosion, leakage from the dry dock while hull washing, lack of adequate security and precaution measures during exchange of hydraulic installation, pump out of bilge water, leakage from the oil cooler while starting the engine, improper storage of oily rags on board and sawdust, inefficient transfer system of bilge water, no reports of pollution, sewage treatment plant malfunctions, intentional discharge. The most common cause was lack of prevention measures and supervision of work. Technical malfunctions and human failures due to mistake or negligence occurred as well. In some cases intentional actions were noted. In some cases of accidental pollution a fine was imposed because the polluter did not report this fact to the Maritime Office as required. 84

82 Marine Chamber Accidents within qualified to be subject to Marine Chamber in Szczecin prosecution and concluded with ruling, are listed in Table 4. Table 4. Number and type of accidents recorded by Marine Chamber in Szczecin within the years Σ Type of accident groundings collisions other Σ Figure 5. Number and type of accidents recorded by Marine Chamber in Szczecin within the years

83