SPECIAL MARITIME ADVISORY (MARAD) - JULY 2010

Transcription

1 SPECIAL MARITIME ADVISORY (MARAD) - JULY 2010 JULY 2010: SPECIAL MARITIME ADVISORY (MARAD) FOR VESSELS TRANSITING SOUTHERN RED SEA, BAB AL-MANDEB STRAIT, GULF OF ADEN, GULF OF OMAN, ARABIAN SEA, ARABIAN BASIN,SOMALI BASIN AND WIDER INDIAN OCEAN/ - POC/CUSNC.BWC/C5F/LOC:BAHRAIN/ CUSNC.BWC(AT)ME.NAVY.MIL/TEL: (COM) / - POC/CMF.BWO/CMF/LOC:BAHRAIN/ CMF.BWO(AT)ME.NAVY.MIL/TEL:(COM) / THIS MESSAGE UPDATES, SUPERSEDES AND CANCELS THE OLD ONE (JAN 2010) AND WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY AN UPDATED MARAD TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER THE MAIN UPDATES IN THIS MARAD HIGHLIGHT: THE NEED FOR INDUSTRY TO TAKE STRONG MEASURES TO ENSURE THEY FOLLOW INDUSTRY BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMP) (NOW AVAILABLE IN VERSION 3 - JUNE 2010): THE EXPANSION OF THE SEA AREAS IN WHICH PIRATE ACTIVITY IS POSSIBLE AND LIKELY: EVIDENCE THAT PIRATE ACTIVITY HAS EXPANDED INTO THE SOUTHERN RED SEA (SRS): THE EXTENDED RANGE FROM THE SOMALI COAST WHERE PIRATES CAN OPERATE EFFECTIVELY USING MOTHER SHIPS MEANS THAT THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR ACTS OF PIRACY TO OCCUR AS FAR NORTH AS THE GULF OF OMAN (GOO), AS FAR EAST AS THE MALDIVES AND AS FAR SOUTH AS COMOROS ISLANDS: PIRATES ARE AWARE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING COUNTER-PIRACY SELF PROTECTION MEASURES (BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND ACTIVE MEASURES SUCH AS PROFESSIONAL SECURITY TEAMS): THEY ARE RESOURCEFUL AND WILL TRY AND USE METHODS TO OVERCOME UPPERDECK OBSTACLES: THE FURTHER THE ATTACK FROM SOMALIA, THE MORE PERSISTENT THE PIRATES MAY BE: VIGILANCE NEEDS TO BE MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES OF DAY AND NIGHT WHEN TRANSITING AREAS WHERE A RISK OF PIRACY EXISTS. 1. BACKGROUND. 1.A. BMP MUST BE ADHERED TO. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF VESSELS TRANSITING THE HIGH RISK AREA WHO FAIL TO FULLY ADHERE TO THOSE BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THERE IS A FIRM CORRELATION BETWEEN SUCCESSFUL PIRATE ATTACKS AND LITTLE OR NO ADHERENCE TO BMP. MERCHANTS MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE THEMSELVES DIFFICULT TARGETS. THIS INCLUDES: 1.A.1. PASSIVE DEFENCE MEASURES. 1.A.1.A. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY PLAN. 1.A.1.B. REMOVE EXTERNAL LADDERS. 1.A.1.C. USE LOOKOUTS AT ALL TIMES. 1.A.1.D. USE SPEED AND MANEUVERS. 1.A.1.E. LIMIT LIGHTING. 1.A.1.F. REGISTER WITH MSC HOA AND REPORT TO UKMTO. 1.A.1.G. STAY IN COMMUNICATION WITH MSC HOA, UKMTO AND USMARLO. 1.A.1.H. AVOID HIGH RISK AREAS IF POSSIBLE. 1.A.1.I. PARTICIPATE IN GROUP TRANSITS.

2 1.A.2. ACTIVE MEASURES. 1.A.2.A. SECURE HATCHES, LIMIT ACCESS TO CREW AND CONTROL SPACES. 1.A.2.B. RIG FIRE HOSES. 1.A.2.C. RIG BARRIERS, BARBED WIRE FENCING. 1.A.2.D. EMPLOY NON-LETHAL MEASURES. 1.A.2.E. UTILIZE PROFFESSIONAL SECURITY TEAMS. 1.B. FAILURE TO FOLLOW BMP DEMONSTRATES AN ACCEPTANCE OF INCREASED RISK AND PUTS A VESSEL AND HER CREW IN DANGER. 1.C. THE SW MONSOON (JUN - SEP) IS ASSESSED TO HAVE ONLY MARGINAL INFLUENCE ON PIRATES CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT PIRACY OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF ADEN (GOA) AND THEREFORE ATTACKS ARE LIKELY AT ALL TIMES. DURING THIS PERIOD PIRATES MAY CAPILITISE ON PREVIOUS SUCCESSES NORTH OF THE IRTC IN OR NEAR YEMENI TERRITORIAL WATERS. HISTORICALLY IN THE BAB AL-MANDEB STRAIT (BAM) AND SOUTHERN RED SEA (SRS) FISHERMEN ROUTINELY DEFEND THEIR NETS AND AREAS FROM OTHER FISHERMEN AS WELL AS TRANSITING MERCHANT VESSELS. IT IS COMMON TO SEE SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF SKIFFS OPERATING IN GROUPS (THREE TO FIVE SKIFFS) TRYING TO WARD OFF MERCHANT VESSELS AWAY FROM THEIR AREA. FOR SELF DEFENCE THESE FISHERMEN ARE TYPICALLY ARMED AND MAY ESCALATE TO FIRING WARNING SHOTS NEAR OR AT VESSELS. THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH AN ATTEMPT TO PIRATE A VESSEL. ALTHOUGH SIMILAR, THE TRIPWIRE THAT TRANSCENDS THE NORM IS THE PRESENCE OF LADDERS AND AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL. WITH THIS BACKGROUND IN MIND IF A VESSEL FEELS THREATENED THEN EARLY ALERTS WITH AMPLIFYING INFORMATION SHOULD BE MADE WITH A KEEN EYE FOR PIRACY TRIPWIRES. AT THE TIME OF THIS MESSAGE THERE HAVE BEEN FEW ATTEMPTS TO BOARD A VESSEL AND ONE SUCCESSFUL PIRACY ATTACKS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF BAM. THERE WAS ALSO A SINGLE SUCCESSFUL PIRATING OF A DHOW IN JULY RECENT ATTACKS INDICATE THAT PIRATE OPERATING AREAS NOW EXTENDS INTO THE SRS. 1.D. IN THE SOMALI BASIN (SB) THE SW MONSOON WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PIRATES CAPABILITY DURING PERIODS WITH STRONG WINDS AND HIGH SEA STATE BUT PIRATE ACTIVITY CANNOT BE RULED OUT. DURING AUTUMN TRANSITION (SEP - NOV) IT IS ASSESSED THAT INCIDENTS OF PIRACY IN THE SB AND THE WIDER INDIAN OCEAN WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY. HISTORICAL DATA SUGGESTS THAT AS THE MONSOON EFFECTS DIMINISH FROM THE SOUTH TO NORTH PIRACY ACTIVITY WILL CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASE AS WELL. FISHING VESSELS WITHIN THE SOMALIA BASIN FOLLOWING THE MIGRATING TUNA FISHERY WILL LIKELY BE THE FIRST TO ENCOUNTER PIRATES. THE MONTHS OF OCT AND NOV WILL LIKELY HAVE EXTREMELY HIGH PIRACY ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THE SB AND THE WIDER INDIAN OCEAN FROM 23 DEGREES NORTH TO 12 DEGREES SOUTH AND OUT TO 070 DEGREES EAST. THROUGH USE OF MOTHER SHIPS, ACTS OF PIRACY HAVE OCCURRED MORE THAN 1000 NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF THE COASTS OF TANZANIA, KENYA AND

3 SOMALIA, 500 NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF THE SEYCHELLES, AND AS FAR NORTH AS RA`S AL HADD, OMAN, IN THE NORTH ARABIAN SEA (NAS). IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS ACTIVITY WILL SPREAD FURTHER EAST TOWARDS THE MALDIVES, SOUTH TOWARDS MADAGASCAR, NORTH EAST FURTHER INTO THE NAS/GULF OF OMAN (GOO) ATTACKS HAVE TAKEN PLACE THROUGHOUT DAYLIGHT HOURS AND, AT NIGHT, WITH OR WITHOUT MOONLIGHT. ALL VESSELS ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO BE VIGILANT AND PREPARED FOR ATTACKS AT ALL TIMES DURING TRANSITS OF THE SEA AREAS MENTIONED ABOVE. 1.E. ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS INDICATES THAT PIRATES EXPLOIT THE FOLLOWING COMMON VULNERABILITIES: 1.E.1. LOW SPEED, AND SLOWING OR STOPPING OF VESSEL: 1.E.2. LOW FREEBOARD AND/OR UNSECURED ACCESS POINTS CLOSE TO WATERLINE: 1.E.3. INADEQUATE VISUAL LOOKOUT: 1.E.4. INADEQUATE PLANNING AND ADHERENCE TO BMP: 1.E.5. VISIBLY LOW STATE OF SELF PROTECTIVE MEASURES (BMP): 1.E.6. WHERE A SLOW RESPONSE IS EVIDENT, OR A SHIP FAILS TO MAKE PLAIN TO THE PIRATES, BY ACTIVITY ON DECK, SOUND SIGNALS OR ALTERATIONS OF COURSE, THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SEEN. 2. INTERNATIONALLY RECOMMENDED TRANSIT CORRIDOR (IRTC). 2.A. ON 01 FEBRUARY 2009 THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOMMENDED TRANSIT CORRIDOR (IRTC) THROUGH THE GOA WAS ACTIVATED. THIS CORRIDOR WAS ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE A MEASURE OF TRAFFIC SEPARATION AND REDUCE THE RISK OF COLLISION BETWEEN VESSELS, WHILE ALLOWING MARITIME FORCES TO CONDUCT DETERRENT OPERATIONS IN THE GOA WITH A GREATER DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY. THE IRTC IS ENDORSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO). 2.B. THE IRTC INCLUDES SEPARATE EAST BOUND AND WEST BOUND TRANSIT LANES. EACH LANE IS FIVE NM WIDE, SEPARATED BY A TWO NM BUFFER ZONE. THE EAST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 045 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 11 DEGREES 48 MINUTES NORTH AND 11 DEGREES 53 MINUTES NORTH. THE LANE IS ORIENTATED ALONG A STRAIGHT LINE COURSE OF 072 DEGREES AND TERMINATES AT 053 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14 DEGREES 18 MINUTES NORTH AND 14 DEGREES 23 MINUTES NORTH. THE WEST BOUND LANE BEGINS AT 053 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 14 DEGREES 25 MINUTES NORTH AND 14 DEGREES 30 MINUTES NORTH. THE LANE IS ORIENTATED ALONG A COURSE OF 252 DEGREES AND TERMINATES AT 045 DEGREES EAST BETWEEN 11 DEGREES 55 MINUTES NORTH AND 12 DEGREES 00 MINUTES NORTH. THE IRTC IS NOT MARKED OR DEFINED BY VISUAL NAVIGATIONAL MEANS, NOR IS IT INTENDED TO BE A DEDICATED TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME BUT IN ORDER FOR WARSHIP PATROLS TO BE EFFECTIVE, VESSELS TRANSITING THE GOA ARE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO ADHERE TO THESE GUIDELINES REGARDING USE OF THE IRTC. 2.C. TRANSIT THROUGH THE IRTC DOES NOT PROVIDE A GUARANTEE AGAINST PIRACY. THUS SAFE TRANSITS THROUGH THE IRTC REQUIRE COLLECTIVE

4 SECURITY EFFORTS BY THE TRANSITTING VESSELS AND THE PATROLLING WARSHIPS WHERE VESSELS ARE TO ADHERE TO BMP. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT WHEN VESSELS ADHERE TO THESE BMP WITHIN THE IRTC THERE IS ADEQUATE TIME FOR MILITARY UNITS TO RESPOND TO A PIRATE ATTACK. INADEQUATELY PREPARED VESSELS (I.E. NOT ADHERING TO BMP) REMAIN AT RISK: RECENT SUCCESSFUL PIRATINGS IN THE IRTC HAVE UNDERLINED THIS FACT. 3. PRE-SAILING ADVICE TO COMPANIES AND MASTERS. 3.A. EU. EU HAS ESTABLISHED A WEB-BASED RESOURCE ( FOR SHIPS TO RECEIVE THE LATEST ALERTS, AND REGISTER THEIR VESSELS PRIOR TO TRANSITING PIRACY RISK AREAS IN THE REGION. THE WEBSITE ALSO INCLUDES ADVICE TO MASTERS, WEATHER INFORMATION, MARITIME INTELLIGENCE AND LINKS TO OTHER APPROPRIATE ORGANISATIONS. SHIPPING COMPANIES ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO REGISTER THEIR VESSELS WITH THE MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE - HORN OF AFRICA (MSC- HOA) AT OR BY TO POSTMASTER(AT)MSCHOA.ORG PRIOR TO SAILING, OR AT LEAST 96 HOURS PRIOR TO ENTERING THE HIGHEST RISK AREAS IN THE GOA AND SB. VESSEL MOVEMENTS CAN BE SUBMITTED ONLINE, BY OR BY FAX THE MSC-HOA WEBSITE SHOWS TIMES OF GROUP TRANSITS, AND IN ADDITION THEY WILL VESSELS WITH INFORMATION ON VESSELS TAKING PART IN GROUP TRANSITS THROUGH THE IRTC, AS WELL AS PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT OF EACH VESSELS VULNERABILITY. THE EU HAS PRODUCED AN ANTI-PIRACY PLANNING CHART (CHART NO FCS6099) WHICH GIVES DETAILS OF THE TRANSIT CORRIDOR, MSCHOA WEBSITE AND PREPARATIONS TO TAKE BEFORE TRANSITING THE AREA AS WELL AS NUMBERS TO CONTACT AND ACTIONS TO TAKE IF UNDER ATTACK. CHARTS HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ALL CHANDLERS AND AGENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM CHART OUTLETS VIA THE UK HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE ( 3.B. IMO. COMPANIES SHOULD ALSO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH IMO REGULATIONS, DETAILS OF WHICH CAN BE FOUND THROUGH SELECT OPTION QUOTE SAFETY UNQUOTE, FOLLOW LINKS TO QUOTE PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY UNQUOTE, AND LINK TO QUOTE PIRACY IN WATERS OFF COAST OF SOMALIA UNQUOTE. ADVICE IS ALSO GIVEN IN IMO CIRCULAR MSC.1/CIRC.1332 DATED 16 JUNE 2009 TITLED PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS IN WATERS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA. THIS GIVES A SUMMARY OF BMP AND DETAILS OF THE SOMALI SITUATION. 3.C. NATO. NATO ALSO MAINTAINS A WEB SITE AT WHICH HAS INFORMATION ON DEFENCIVE MEASURES, BMP AND PIRACY ALERTS. 3.D. OTHER SOURCES OF ADVICE. COMPANIES MAY ALSO VISIT HEADLINES AND NEWS ID 75 HEADLINES AND NEWS ID 75 TO VIEW THE BOOKLET TITLED QUOTE PIRACY - THE E AFRICA/SOMALI

5 SITUATION UNQUOTE, WHICH COVERS SELF PROTECTION MEASURES USED BY VESSELS. ANTI-PIRACY BEST PRACTICE ADVICE IS ALSO AVAILABLE AT SHIPPING.ORG/HOME/, THEN SELECT QUOTE SEARCH UNQUOTE, AND THEN QUOTE PIRACY UNQUOTE. 4. ADVICE TO MASTERS ON APPROACHING PIRACY HIGH RISK AREAS. 4.A. ON APPROACHING A PIRACY HIGH RISK AREA MASTERS OF ALL VESSELS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO CONTACT UNITED KINGDOM MARITIME TRADE OPERATIONS (UKMTO DUBAI) VIA TO UKMTO(AT)EIM.AE, OR PHONE UKMTO PROVIDES A SERVICE TO SEA AREAS FROM THE NORTHERN RED SEA THROUGH THE ARABIAN SEA AND INDIAN OCEAN TO 10 DEGREES SOUTH AND 78 DEGREES EAST. ON INITIAL CONTACT MASTERS ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE DETAILS OF THEIR TRANSIT, AS WELL AS THE TYPE, NATURE AND NUMBER/QUANTITY OF PASSENGERS AND CARGO. UKMTO WILL ISSUE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IN LINE WITH BMP ON COUNTER PIRACY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN. MASTERS SHOULD THEN CONTACT UKMTO DUBAI AT LEAST DAILY THROUGHOUT THEIR TRANSIT OF THE AREA. IN CERTAIN SEA AREAS UKMTO WILL ASK FOR MORE FREQUENT CONTACT. 4.B. CMF, AS WELL AS FORCES FROM NATO AND EU NAVAL FORCE (EUNAVFOR)CONTINUE TO PATROL IN THE GOA AND SB, AND HAVE SOME EFFECT IN DETERRING ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING. WARSHIPS FROMJAPAN, RUSSIA, INDIA, MALAYSIA AND CHINA ALSO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE CONDUCTING ESCORT OPERATIONS IN THE GOA. IN ADDITION A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ATTACKS HAVE BEEN THWARTED THROUGH MERCHANT VESSELS ADHERENCE TO BMP PRIOR TO ENTERING, AND DURING TRANSIT THROUGH, AREAS WHERE THERE IS A RISK OF PIRACY. DESPITE THE INCREASE IN PRESENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE REGION, AS WELL AS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MEASURES, PIRATE ACTIVITY HAS CONTINUED AND A NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL SHIPS AND PLEASURE CRAFT HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED AND SEIZED. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE PIRATES ARE OPPORTUNIST IN NATURE AND CONTINUE TO ADAPT THEIR MODUS OF OPERANDI IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUCCESS RATES. IN AREAS WHERE PIRATES BELIEVE THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER NAVAL VESSELS, PIRATE ATTACKS WILL LIKELY BE MORE PERSISTENT. DETERRENCE PROVIDED BY NAVAL VESSELS IN THE OPEN WATERS EAST OF SOMALIA, THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA AND SURROUNDING THE SEYCHELLES IS LIMITED DUE TO THE SIZE OF THE POTENTIAL PIRACY THREAT AREA. GIVEN THE HIGH VOLUME OF SHIPPING, PARTICULARLY IN THE GOA, AND THE RATIO OF MERCHANT VESSELS TO NAVAL VESSELS, THE SAFETY OF ALL SHIPS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED. MASTERS ARE THEREFORE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO BMP TO MAKE THEIR VESSELS LESS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK WHEN OPERATING IN ANY AREAS OF POTENTIAL PIRACY. 4.C. THROUGHOUT 2009 AND FIRST HALF OF 2010 THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN INCIDENTS OF PIRACY ON VESSELS TRANSITING OFF THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA AND IN THE VICINITY OF THE SEYCHELLES. DUE TO THE EXTENDED

6 RANGE AT WHICH PIRATE MOTHER SHIPS (I.E. A LARGER VESSEL DEPLOYED AS A FORWARD OPERATING PLATFORM FOR EXTENDED RANGE OF OPERATION AND ENDURANCE) CAN OPERATE, ATTACKS HAVE TAKEN PLACE FURTHER EAST, SO EVEN BEYOND PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED 600 NAUTICAL MILES EAST FROM THE AFRICAN COAST VESSELS CAN NO LONGER BE SAFE AND CONSEQUENTLY MASTERS SHOULD REMAIN VIGILANT AND TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID, DETER AND DELAY POTENTIAL PIRATE ATTACKS EVEN BEYOUND 600 NAUTICAL MILES OF THE COAST. THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR MOTHERSHIP PIRACY EVENTS TO EXTEND AS FAR EAST AS THE MALDIVES AND SOUTH TO MADAGASCAR, THOUGH NO SUCH EVENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE THUS FAR. BMP ADVICE DEFINES THE HIGH RISK AREA FOR PIRACY ATTACKS AS AN AREA BOUNDED BY SUEZ TO THE NORTH, 10 DEGREES SOUTH AND 78 DEGREES EAST. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL VESSELS TRANSITTING THE AREA CONTACT UKMTO OR MSCHOA FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION PRIOR TO ENTERING THE HIGH RISK AREA. 4.D. WARNINGS OF ACTIVE PIRATE GROUPS WILL BE ISSUED WHEN KNOWN ATTACKS HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTED AND PIRATE ATTACK GROUPS ARE THOUGHT TO REMAIN ACTIVE. MARINERS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO ADHERE TO ANY RECOMMENDATIONS MADE WITHIN THESE WARNING MESSAGES. FAILURE TO DO SO HAS RESULTED IN VESSELS BEING ATTACKED BY KNOWN PIRATE GROUPS. 4.E. ROUTING THROUGH AREAS WHERE THE WIND SPEEDS REMAIN ABOVE FORCE 4 WITH INCREASED SEA STATES IS LIKELY TO OFFER SOME PROTECTION FROM SUCCESSFUL PIRACY ATTACKS. 5. RISK ASSESSMENT. 5.A. DUE TO THE INCREASED RESOLVE, CAPABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY OF PIRATES, ALL SHIPS SHOULD UNDERTAKE A FULL PIRACY RISK ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO PLANNING TRANSITS THROUGH AREAS WHERE THERE IS A RISK OF PIRACY. VESSELS SUCH AS PASSENGER LINERS, VESSELS CARRYING DANGEROUS CARGO OR OTHERWISE DEEMED TO BE OF HIGH VALUE ARE PARTICULARLY AT RISK, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE SPEED AND MANEUVERABILITY LIMITATIONS AND LOW FREEBOARD MAKE THE VESSEL MORE VULNERABLE. IN CONDUCTING SUCH AN ASSESSMENT, OWNERS AND MASTERS OF VESSELS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE ATTACK AND ADHERE TO INDUSTRY BEST MANAGEMNET PRACTICES TO ENSURE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SELF DEFENCE. HIGH FREEBOARDS MAY NOT NECESSARLIY DETER PIRATES IF THERE ARE UNSECURED ACCESS POINTS AT OR NEAR THE WATERLINE. 5.B. LUXURY YACHTS, PLEASURE CRAFT AND SAILBOATS SHOULD AVOID THESE AREAS AS THEY ARE AT SEVERE RISK OF BEING PIRATED. IN ADDITION THE CONSEQUENCES OF A PIRATING MIGHT PROVE TO BE MORE COMPLEX AND ENDURING THAN THOSE RELATED TO THE PIRATING OF A MERCHANT VESSEL. 6. VESSEL DEFENSIVE MEASURES. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED: 6.A. ALL PASSENGERS AND CREW SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSITING THESE AREAS AND BE FULLY BRIEFED ON THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO PROTECT THEMSELVES IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK.

7 6.B. THOROUGHLY PREPARE YOUR SHIP AND CREW FOR ANY TRANSIT THROUGH THE PIRACY AREA. THIS CAN BE AT THE COMPANY LEVEL OR INDIVIDUAL SHIP LEVEL FOR EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PREPARATIONS, AND INCLUDE VOYAGE PLANNING TO AVOID HIGH RISK AREAS WHERE POSSIBLE. ALL VESSELS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO CONDUCT THEIR PASSAGE THROUGH THE GOA IN THE IRTC IN GROUPS BASED ON THEIR TRANSIT SPEED. KNOWN AS GOA GROUP TRANSITS, PARTICIPATING VESSELS SHOULD PASS THROUGH THE EAST AND WEST EXTREMITIES OF THE IRTC AT THE PRESCRIBED TIMES AND TRANSIT AT THE PUBLISHED SPEED. SHIPS IN THIS SCHEME ARE NOT TO WAIT FOR OTHER VESSELS OR WARSHIPS. DETAILS ARE PUBLISHED AT AND FURTHER CLARIFICATION CAN BE OBTAINED BY ING POSTMASTER(AT)MSCHOA.ORG. 6.C. DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO MAKE YOURSELF A DIFFICULT TARGET. MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT YOU HAVE SEEN THE PIRATES (INCLUDING SOUND SIGNALS: CREW MOVEMENTS ON UPPER DECK, BUT NOT IN EXPOSED POSITIONS: OVERT WATCHING/INDICATING BY LOOKOUTS) AND ARE PREPARING TO DEFEND YOUR SHIP. DO NOT PRESENT AN ATTRACTIVE TARGET FOR ATTACK. 6.D. EMPLOY SPEED AND MANEUVER TO AVOID ATTACK, THOUGH BEWARE OF MANEUVRING IF THIS REDUCES SPEED. CONDUCT TRANSIT OF HIGH THREAT AREAS AT MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE SPEED AT ALL TIMES. MAINTAIN A FULL VISUAL AND RADAR WATCH THROUGHOUT TRANSIT. SMALL PIRATE SKIFFS ARE DIFFICULT TO DETECT ON RADAR AND ALL VESSELS SHOULD PROVIDE EXTRA LOOKOUTS IF POSSIBLE, AT ALL TIMES OF DAY AND NIGHT. LOOKOUTS SHOULD BE POSITIONED TO ENSURE A 360 DEGREE UNOBSTRUCTED FIELD OF VIEW WITH FULL VIEW OF ALL FREEBOARD AREAS. AVOID TRANSITING NEAR SMALL BOATS WHENEVER POSSIBLE. DUE TO THE VAST NUMBER OF SMALL BOATS IN THE REGION, MOST OF WHOM ARE LEGITIMATE FISHING BOATS THAT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM PIRATE VESSELS, TRANSITING NEAR SMALL BOATS MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE AT TIMES. ACTIVELY WATCH CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH WITH SUSPICIOUS VESSELS AND TAKE EARLY ACTION TO INCREASE THE CLOSETS POINT OF APPROACH. AFT LOOKOUTS MUST BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT FOR SMALL BOATS APPROACHING FROM ASTERN. MANEUVER AGGRESSIVELY IF UNDER ATTACK. MANEUVER TO REMOVE ANY LEE FROM EITHER SIDE OF SHIP (SEA STATE DEPENDENT). IF ENGINEERING OR OTHER TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CAUSE REDUCED SPEED, IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY. 6.E. ADOPT PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES. TAKE DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS PRIOR TO ENTERING HIGH THREAT AREAS, INCLUDING RIGGING FIRE HOSES, AND RAISING, OR POSITIONING INBOARD, ANY OUTBOARD EQUIPMENT SUCH AS PILOT LADDERS. CONSIDER OTHER NON-LETHAL MEASURES SUCH AS FOCUSED SONIC DEVICES, BARBED WIRE AT VULNERABLE POINTS OR DUMMY GUARDS. CONSIDER RIGGING SIGNS IN SOMALI, STATING THAT ANY WIRE DEFENCES RIGGED ARE ELECTRIFIED. CONSIDER ANY MEASURE WHICH WILL MAKE YOUR VESSEL A DIFFICULT TARGET FOR PIRATES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PIRATES TEND TO BE YOUNG AND AGILE, AND ARE INCREASINGLY AWARE OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES EMPLOYED, AND IT IS ASSESSED AS LIKELY THAT THEY WILL BEGIN TO ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES, BUT THAT SHOULD NOT PREVENT SHIPS USING SUCH MEASURES TO DELAY OR DETER BOARDING.

8 6.F. ACTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES INCLUDING EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SECURITY TEAMS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. PROPERLY TRAINED SECURITY TEAMS, WITH EXPERIENCE IN MARITIME DEFENSIVE PROCEDURES, ARE KNOWN TO BE AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURE. IF EMPLOYING SECURITY TEAMS, CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE POTENTIAL FOR RISK TO HUMAN LIFE DURING ANY PIRACY ATTACK, DUE TO INADVERTENT ESCALATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, AND QUALIFICATION OF ANY PRIVATE SECURITY FORCE IS VERIFIED, AND THAT THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SHIPS OWNERS, MASTER AND THE SECURITY TEAM CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED UPON CONTRACTUALLY. HOWEVER IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THAT THE ISSUE OF RELEVANT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION CANNOT BE DECIDED UPON CONTRACTUALLY, UNCLOS REQUIRES THAT THE FLAG STATE SHALL EFFECTIVELY EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION. 7. IF UNDER ATTACK. 7.A. IF A VESSEL COMES UNDER ATTACK, IT IS TO IMMEDIATELY BROADCAST ON ALL AVAILABLE RADIO CIRCUITS, ACTIVATE GMDSS, MAINTAIN MAXIMUM SPEED AND CONSIDER MANEUVER, REPORT TO UKMTO AS WELL AS MSCHOA AND ACTIVATE ALL AVAILABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES. EARLY DISTRESS CALLS ON VHF CHANNEL 16 HAVE PROVED PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN THE GOA IN GETTING A PROMPT MILITARY RESPONSE. ATTACKS CAN LAST FROM A FEW MINUTES TO HOURS: KEEP MAKING YOURSELF A DIFICULT TARGET, DO NOT IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER UPON APPROACH OF SUSPECTED PIRATE BOATS. ATTACKS HAVE BEEN THWARTED IN MANY CASES WHERE DEFENSIVE MEASURES WERE USED AND THE VESSELS BECAME DIFFICULT TARGETS. 7.B. UKMTO DUBAI IS THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT FOR ANY VESSEL UNDER ATTACK, OR APPROACHED AND NEEDING GUIDANCE WHILE AT SEA. CONTACT UKMTO DUBAI AT OR BY TO UKMTO(AT)EIM.AE. 8. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT MARITIME LIAISON OFFICE (MARLO) BAHRAIN, TELEPHONE /3926, OR TO MARLO.BAHRAIN(AT)ME.NAVY.MIL, OR CONTACT MSC-HOA AT , BY TO POSTMASTER(AT)MSCHOA.ORG, OR VIA THEIR WEBSITE