7 RISK ASSESSMENT AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Transcription

1 7 RISK ASSESSMENT AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 7.1 General The scope of the report includes the study of storage, handling and transportation activities of the raw materials of the proposed plant with respect to hazard identification, risk assessment and preparation of disaster management plan. Based on the hazard identification and analysis the major disaster scenarios would be worked out to estimate consequence of failure. A disaster management plan would also be derived to meet the emergency situation. 7.2 Risk Analysis Risk Analysis involves identification of hazards and the associated risks, if any, involved in the plant. Recognition of all possible hazards and analysis of the associated risks is an important first step to improve the safety and reliability of any installation. Such an analysis would provide the necessary inputs for the safe operation of the Plant. The risk analysis study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of the types of materials handled their inventories and vulnerable practices and operations. 7.3 Objective of Study The objectives of the study are: To identify the hazards associated with chemicals in handling, storage and processing. To study the chemical process operations. Assessing the safety related to the plant facilities and process equipment. Conducting Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) based on standard procedures including Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Providing guidelines for the containment and mitigation of any incident, in the form of consequence analysis and recommendations. 7.4 Hazards and Damage Criteria with respect to the proposed project A brief description of possible major hazards is discussed as follows: (a) Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) BLEVE stands for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. BLEVEs typically occur in closed storage tanks that contain a liquefied gas, usually a gas that has been liquefied under

2 pressure. A gas can be liquefied by either cooling (refrigerating) it to a temperature below its boiling point or by storing it at a high pressure. A common BLEVE scenario happens when a container of liquefied gas is heated by fire, increasing the pressure within the container until the tank ruptures and fails. When the container fails, the chemical is released in an explosion. If the chemical is above its boiling point when the container fails, some or all of the liquid will flash-boil -- that is, instantaneously become a gas. If the chemical is flammable, a burning gas cloud called a fireball may occur if a significant amount of the chemical flash-boils. ALOHA assumes that any liquid not consumed in the fireball will form a Pool Fire. ALOHA estimates the thermal radiation hazard from a fireball and/or a pool fire. Other potential BLEVE hazards include overpressure, hazardous fragments, smoke, and toxic byproducts from the fire (although ALOHA does not model these hazards). (b) Flash Fire: When a flammable vapor cloud encounters an ignition source, the cloud can catch fire and burn rapidly in what is called a flash fire. The part of the cloud where the concentration is in the flammable range, between the Lower and Upper Explosive Limits (LEL and UEL), will burn rapidly because that portion of the cloud is already pre-mixed to the right mixture of fuel and air for burning to occur. Following the rapid burning, the part of the cloud where the fuel-air concentration is above the UEL may continue to slowly burn as air mixes with the cloud. Possible hazards associated with a flash fire include thermal radiation, smoke and toxic byproducts from the fire. (c) Vapor Cloud Explosion: When a flammable chemical is released into the atmosphere, it forms a vapor cloud that will disperse as it travels downwind. If the cloud encounters an ignition source, the parts of the cloud where the Concentration is within the flammable range (between the Lower and Upper Explosive Limits) will burn. The speed at which the flame front moves through the cloud determines whether it is a deflagration or a detonation. In some situations, the cloud will burn so fast that it creates an explosive force (blast wave). The severity of a vapor cloud explosion depends on the chemical, the cloud size at the time of ignition, the type of ignition, and the congestion level inside the cloud. Two primary hazards are associated with a vapor cloud explosion: overpressure and hazardous fragments.

3 (d) Jet Fire: A jet fire, also referred to as a flame jet, occurs when a flammable chemical is rapidly released from an opening in a container and immediately catches on fire -- much like the flame from a blowtorch. Thermal radiation is the primary hazard associated with a jet fire. Other potential jet fire hazards include smoke, toxic byproducts from the fire, and secondary fires and explosions in the surrounding area. In some cases, heat from the jet fire may weaken the tank and cause it to fail completely -- in which case, a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) may occur 7.5 Methodology Adopted in the present study Collection of data/information with respect to facility, process, hazardous chemicals etc. Collection of meteorological data. Identification of hazardous chemicals as per the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals (MSIHC) Amendment Rules d Screening of hazardous nature of each chemical and confirmation with Fire Diamond. Tabulation of chemical as well as physical properties and storage details for each hazardous chemical. Identification of hazard associated with each chemical. Identification of release type and determine release rates. Simulation of each identified hazardous chemical for consequence analysis using ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres). ALOHA is an air dispersion model developed by environmental protection agency (EPAUSA), can be used as a tool for predicting the movement and dispersion of gases. It predicts pollutant concentrations downwind from the source of a spill, taking into consideration the physical characteristics of the spilled material. Input parameters to ALOHA model are location name, latitude and longitude of location, its elevation, building type, building surroundings, wind speed, direction (from meteorological department), wind measuring heights, ground roughness, cloud cover, stability class, inversion, humidity, tank type and orientation, tank dimension, state of chemical, temperature inside the stank, diameter of opening, leak type and height of opening ALOHA software was used to model the effects of each scenario taking into consideration the usual atmospheric conditions as well as the

4 worst case atmospheric conditions. ALOHA is a computer program designed specially for use by people responding to chemical releases, as well as for emergency planning. ALOHA models key hazards - toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation (heat) and overpressure (explosion, blast, force) - related to chemical releases that result in toxic gas dispersions, fires and/or explosions. ALOHA allows for the specification of concentration limits for the purpose of consequence assessment (e.g., assessment of human health risks from contaminant plume exposure). ALOHA refers to these concentration limits as level-ofconcern (LOC) concentrations. Safety analysis work uses the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) and Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs) for assessing human health effects for both facility workers and the general public. Analysts have generally applied the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) ERPGs9 and TEELs 10 for the purpose of assessing human health effects for both facility workers and the general public. Recently, another alternative has become available to analysts. The National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances (NAC/AEGL Committee) has been developing acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs) to assist federal and state agencies and private sector organizations with their need for short-term hazardous chemical exposure information in terms of five emergency exposure periods (10 and 30 min, 1 h, 4 h, and 8 h) 7.6 Damage Criteria used in the ALOHA (a) Thermal Damage A Level of Concern (LoC) is a threshold level of thermal radiation, usually the level above which a hazard may exist. ALOHA uses three threshold values (measured in kilowatts per square meter) to create the default threat zones: Red: 10 kw/(sq. m.) -- potentially lethal within 60 sec; Orange: 5 kw/(sq. m.) -- second-degree burns within 60 sec; and Yellow: 2 kw/(sq. m.) -- pain within 60 sec. The thermal radiation effects that people experience depend upon the length of time they are exposed to a specific thermal radiation level. Longer exposure durations, even at a lower thermal radiation level, can produce serious physiological effects. The threat zones displayed by ALOHA represent thermal radiation levels; the accompanying text indicates the effects on people who are exposed to those thermal radiation levels but are able to seek shelter within one minute.

5 Below are some effects at specific thermal radiation levels and durations (on bare skin): Radiation Intensity (kw/m 2 ) Time of severe pain (s) Time for 2 nd degree burns (s) Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency et al (b) Overpressure: Overpressure, also called a blast wave, refers to the sudden onset of a pressure wave after an explosion. This pressure wave is caused by the energy released in the initial explosion the bigger the initial explosion, the more damaging the pressure wave. Pressure waves are nearly instantaneous, traveling at the speed of sound. An Overpressure Level of Concern (LoC) is a threshold level of pressure from a blast wave, usually the pressure above which a hazard may exist. ALOHA uses three threshold values to create the default threat zones: Red : 8.0 psi (destruction of buildings); Orange : 3.5 psi (serious injury likely); and Yellow : 1.0 psi (shatters glass). The following table relates overpressure values to the structural and physiological effects produced. Overpressure* (psi) Expected Damage 0.04 Loud noise (db); sonic boom glass failure 0.15 Typical pressure for glass failure 0.4 Limited minor structural damage Windows usually shattered 0.7 Minor damage to house structure. 1.0 Partial demolition of houses; made uninhabitable Corrugated metal panels fail and buckle. Housing wood panels blown in Range for slight to serious injuries from flying glass and other missiles 2.0 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses.

6 Non reinforced concrete or cinder block walls shattered Range for 1-90% eardrum rupture among exposed populations % destruction of home brickwork 3.0 Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundation 5.0 Wooden utility poles snapped Nearly complete destruction of houses 7.0 Loaded train cars overturned. 9.0 Loaded train box cars demolished Probable total building destruction Range for 1-99% fatalities among exposed populations due to direct blast effects Note: * These are peak pressures formed in excess of normal atmospheric pressure by blast and shock waves. (c) Hazardous Fragments: One of the major hazards associated with any explosion is flying debris (hazardous fragments) propelled by the explosion's pressure wave. Hazardous fragments come from two primary sources: container fragments and debris from the surrounding area. If an explosion is likely to occur, first responders must be aware of the possibility of hazardous fragments and take necessary precautions to shield responders and others from the potentially fatal fragments. Some hazardous fragments may be projected into areas well beyond those affected by the thermal or overpressure explosion hazards. (d) Toxic release: For toxic release, there are several hazard classification systems in use. Some chemicals have not been classified in every system. ALOHA determines its default toxic Level of Concern (LOC) values based on the following: i. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) that is used to predict the area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The guidelines define three-tiered AEGLs as follows: AEGL-1: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic non sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.

7 AEGL-2: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape. AEGL-3: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death. Each of the three levels of AEGL -- AEGL-1, AEGL-2, and AEGL-3 -- is developed for Formaldehyde (37% solution) for which this is applicable for this unit. AEGLS are available for each of five exposure periods: 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours. ALOHA only includes AEGL values with an exposure period of 60 minutes. ii. The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) The American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) has issued three levels of ERPG values based on toxic effect of the chemical for use in evaluating the effects of accidental chemical releases on the general public. The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) that is used to predict the area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The ERPGs are three-tiered guidelines with one common denominator: 1-hour contact duration. Each guideline identifies the substance, its chemical and structural properties, animal toxicology data, human experience, existing exposure guidelines, the rationale behind the selected value, and a list of references. ERPG 1: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor. ERPG 2: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action. ERPG 3: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life threatening health effects. The most important point to remember about the ERPGs is that they do not contain safety factors usually incorporated into exposure guidelines. Rather, they estimate how the

8 general public would react to chemical exposure. Just below the ERPG-1, for example, most people would detect the chemical and may experience temporary mild effects. Just below the ERPG-3, on the other hand, it is estimated that the effects would be severe, although not life-threatening. The ERPG should serve as a planning tool, not a standard to protect the public. iii. Temporary Emergency Exposure Levels (TEELs) There are three TEEL levels that are important for responders to consider: TEEL-1: Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor. TEEL-2: Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action. TEEL-3: Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects. iv. Immediate Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) level is a limit originally established for selecting respirators for use in workplaces by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). A chemical's IDLH is an estimate of the maximum concentration in the air to which a healthy worker could be exposed without suffering permanent or escapeimpairing health effects. We recommend that appropriate respirator (as per NIOSH) be kept handy/easily available. The IDLH was not designed to be an exposure limit for the general population. It does not take into account the greater sensitivity of some people, such as children and the elderly. Note: For AEGLs, ERPGs and TEELs, the rank number increase with the hazard level, so that AEGL-3 is more hazardous than AEGL-1. Typically, the 3 values are used for the most hazardous (red) threat zones because they represent the threshold concentration above which health effects may be life threatening. 7.7 Consequence Analysis Hazardous chemicals have been identified using the Schedule-I, Part-II of MSIHC Rules The chemicals having hazardous nature but not listed in the said notification are

9 screened and confirmed using Fire Diamond [National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Diamond] classification. The project will store and handle number of flammable chemicals. List of such chemicals and their storage capacity is given in Table7.1. Properties related to fire and explosion hazards of these chemicals are given in Table 7.2.The Storage area is shown on the layout of the project given at Figure The hazardous chemicals selected for the present study is based on the nature of hazardous chemicals as per NFPA and their storage capacity. 7.8 Details of Storage Facilities: The raw materials (required for the manufacture of products) are stored in varieties of drums and containers (for liquid raw materials) and bags (for solid raw materials) which are in turn stored in the raw materials storage area. The details, mode of storage and the quantity of raw materials is as per details below in Table 7.1 The chemicals are all stored in very small quantities as per manufactures and/or distributor s packaging. There is no bulk storage (tanks, pressure vessels) of any of the chemicals used as raw material for the production.

10 Table Details of Hazardous Chemicals & Storage Details S. No Name of the chemical Physical S.No. of Nature MOC/Mode Max storage Usage per Dimensions Storage state Schedule I, of storage Requirement week in mm parameter Part II As (Length per MSIHC width) rules 1 Anisoyl chloride* Liquid -- Flammable. HDP drum 1.0 MT 25L X 2 Nos C Schedule MT 210L X 2 Nos C Dichloromethane* Liquid G-8drum 2 Part 2 (400) Toxic Schedule 1 MS + HDP MT 210L X 2 Nos C Toluene Liquid 3 Part 2 (628) Flammable drum chlorobutyrylchloride* liquid -- Flammable HDP drum 0.5 MT 25L X 2 Nos C 5 Trifluroacetic acid* liquid -- Toxic HDP drum 0.5 MT 25L X 2 Nos C 6 Sodium methoxide* liquid -- Toxic. HDP drum 0.5 MT 25L X 2 Nos C 7 Cyclohexanone* liquid -- Flammable. MS drum 1.0 MT 210L X 2 Nos C Schedule MT 25L X 2 Nos C IPA Liquid HDP drum 8 Part 2 (334) Flammable. Schedule 1 Flammable. 0.5 MT 25L X 2 Nos Sodium Hydroxide HDP drum 9 Solid Part 2 (571) C Schedule 1 Flammable. 25L X 2 Nos C Ethanol HDP drum 10 Liquid Part 2 (248) 0.3MT Schedule 1 Flammable. 25L X 2 Nos C GI Drum 11 Acetonitrile Liquid Part 2 (7) 0.5 MT Schedule 1 Toxic 25L X 2 Nos C HDP drum 12 Hydrochloric acid Liquid Part 2 (313) 0.5 MT Schedule 1 Flammable. 25L X 2 Nos C HDP drum 13 Diethylamine Liquid Part 2 (196) 0.5 MT Schedule 1 Toxic 25L X 2 Nos Fiber Drum 14 AlCl 3 * Solid Part 2 (22) 1.0 MT C Schedule 1 Toxic 25L X 2 Nos Thionyl chloride GI Drum 15 Liquid Part 2 (620) 0.3 MT C 16 Triethylamine Liquid Schedule 1 Flammable. GI Drum 0.5 MT 25L X 2 Nos C

11 Hexane Acetic acid Ethyl acetate Methylamine H 2 SO 4 2-aminopyridine Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Part 2 (652) Schedule 1 Part 2 (306) Schedule 1 Part 2 (2) Schedule 1 Part 2 (247) Schedule 1 Part 2 (378) Schedule 1 Part 2 (591) Schedule 1 Part 2 (26) Flammable. Flammable. Flammable. Flammable. Toxic Flammable. MS Drum HDP Drum MS Drum MS Drum HDP Drum HDP Drum 1.0 MT 0.3 MT 1.0 MT 0.5 MT 0.3 MT 0.5 MT 25L X 2 Nos L X 2 Nos L X 2 Nos L X 2 Nos L X 2 Nos L X 2 Nos C C C C C C

12 S. No Name of the chemical Sp. gravity Table Details of Hazardous Chemicals & their properties Vapour density Flash point ( C) Boiling point ( C) Melting point ( C) LEL (%) UEL (%) NFPA Health Flammability Reactivity 1 Trifluroacetic acid* NA NA NA Sodium Hydroxide 2.13 NA NA NA NA Hydrochloric acid NA NA NA AlCl 3 * 2.44 NA NA NA Sublimes NA NA Thionyl chloride NA NA NA H 2 SO NA 270 to to NA NA Dichloromethane* NA 2.9 NA Toluene NA chlorobutyrylchloride* NA Anisoyl chloride* NA Sodium methoxide* NA Cyclohexanone* IPA Ethanol , Acetonitrile , Diethylamine Triethylamine Hexane Acetic acid , Ethyl acetate , Methylamine NA 100 NA NA NA aminopyridine NA NA NA NA 3 1 0

13 Classification of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Quadrant Code Meaning 4 Too dangerous to enter - vapor or liquid 3 Extremely hazardous - use full protection Health Hazard 2 Hazardous - use breathing apparatus 1 Slightly hazardous 0 Like ordinary material 4 Extremely flammable. 3 Ignites at normal temperatures Flammability 2 Ignites when moderately heated Hazard 1 Must be preheated to burn. 0 Will not burn Reactivity Hazard 4 May detonate - evacuate area if materials are exposed 3 Strong shock or heat may detonate - use monitors 2 Violent chemical change possible 1 Unstable if heated - use normal precautions 0 Normally stable. 7.9 Discussion and evaluation of results on Consequence Analysis The present study defined the safety relevant loss of containment events (LOC) that could happen in the selected hazardous relevant equipment. Accordingly, the following five major accident scenarios were identified: Scenario 1: Leaking tank, chemical is burning and forms a pool fire Scenario 2: BLEVE, tank explodes and chemical burns in a fire ball Scenario 3: Leaking tank, chemical is not burning and forms an evaporative puddle - Toxic area of Vapour cloud Scenario 4: Leaking tank, chemical is not burning and forms an evaporative puddle Flammable area of Vapour cloud Scenario 5: Leaking tank, chemical is not burning and forms an evaporative puddle Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion Consequence analysis for failure scenarios with respect to each hazardous chemical considered have been tabulated as Table 6.3 and threat zone for each consequence analysis is drawn in Figures. Hazards and response recommendations with respect to each hazard for each hazardous chemical have been described in hereunder.

14 Table Consequences Analysis for Failure Scenarios of Hazardous Chemicals Scenario Considered & Consequences 1. TOLUENE Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from VCE Damage Distance Red Threat Zone Orange Threat Zone Yellow Threat Zone Threat Zone <10 meters (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (AEGL-3 (60 min)) predictions less reliable for short distances. (10800 ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short Distances. No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 11 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec (AEGL-2 (60 min)) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) 18 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec (AEGL-1 (60 min)) predictions less reliable for short distances. -- (1800 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 3 The fireball spread to a diameter of 9 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3

15 2. ISOPROPANOL (IPA) Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec 11 meters (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (AEGL-3 (60 min)) predictions less reliable for short distances. (12000 ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 16 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec ( AEGL-2 (60 min)) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. 15 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) 26 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec (AEGL-1 (60 min)) predictions less reliable for short distances. -- (400 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 4.6 The fireball spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.4 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.4 The puddle spread to a diameter of ETHANOL Tank Flammable chemical is 15 meters The burning puddle

16 burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (PAC-3) predictions less reliable for short distances. (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 13 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec ( PAC 2) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) 20 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec ( PAC-1) predictions less reliable for short distances. spread to a diameter of 6.3 The fireball spread to a diameter of 9 The puddle spread to a diameter of 8 Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion Scenario Considered & Consequences 4. ACETONITRILE - (3300 ppm= 60% LEL) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.-- No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time (1800 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. The puddle spread to a diameter of 8 The puddle spread to a diameter of 8 Damage Distance Red Threat Zone Orange Threat Zone Yellow Threat Zone Threat Zone

17 Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion <10 meters (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (670 ppm = AEGL-3 (60 min)) predictions less reliable for short distances. ( ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short Distances. No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 12 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec ( 320 ppm= AEGL-2 (60 min)) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) 20 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec (13 ppm=aegl-1 (60 min)) predictions less reliable for short distances. -- (30000 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 7 The fireball spread to a diameter of 9 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 5. DIETHYLAMINE Tank Flammable chemical is 13 meters The burning puddle

18 burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion 6. TRIETHYLAMINE Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (2000ppm=PAC-3) predictions less reliable for short distances. ( ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 11 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec ( 200ppm=IDLH) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) 20 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec 66meters (15ppm= PAC-1) -- (17000 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 15 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) spread to a diameter of 4 The fireball spread to a diameter of 1 The puddle spread to a diameter unknown The puddle spread to a diameter unknown The puddle spread to a diameter unknown The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 4

19 Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (1000 ppm = PAC-3) predictions less reliable for short distances. 14 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec ( PAC 2) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. 24 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec 75 meters ( 3 ppm = PAC-1) predictions less reliable for short distances. The fireball spread to a diameter Of2 The puddle spread to a diameter of 1.3 Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion Scenario Considered & Consequences (80000 ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances.-- No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time (12000 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. The puddle spread to a diameter of 1.3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 1.3 Damage Distance Red Threat Zone Orange Threat Zone Yellow Threat Zone Threat Zone 7. HEXANE Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire <10 meters (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 17 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 7

20 Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion 19 meters (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (8600 ppm = AEGL-3 (60 min)) predictions less reliable for short distances. ( ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short Distances. No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time 60 sec 29 meters 48 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) (2.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within pain within 60 sec 60 sec ( 2900 ppm= AEGL-2 (60 (NA=AEGL-1 (60 min)) min)) because effects of nearfield patchiness make predictions less reliable for dispersion predictions less short distances. reliable for short distances. -- (30000 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. The fireball spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3 8. ACETIC ACID Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 7

21 Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (250 ppm=erpg-3) predictions less reliable for short distances. ( ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time <10 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 33 meters ( 35ppm=ERPG-2) 13 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec 66 meters (5ppm= ERPG-1) -- (40000 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. The fireball spread to a diameter of 2 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.2 Meters The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.2 Meters The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.2 Meters 9. ETHYL ACETATE Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Pool Fire (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 11 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 7 Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid 14 meters 24 meters The fireball spread

22 Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec (10000 ppm = PAC-3) predictions less reliable for short distances. (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec (400= PAC 2) because effects of nearfield patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances. (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec ( 400 ppm = PAC-1) predictions less reliable for short distances. to a diameter Of 2 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.2 Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion 10. METHYLAMINE Tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank JET Fire Tank Explodes and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) ( ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances.-- No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time 10 meters (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within 60 sec 23 meters (10.0 kw/(sq m) Potentially lethal within60 sec 10 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within 60 sec 32 meters (5.0 kw/(sq m) 2nd degree burns within (21800 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. 13 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec) 52 meters (2.0 kw/(sq m) pain within 60 sec The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.2 The puddle spread to a diameter of 3.2 The burning puddle spread to a diameter of 2 The fireball spread to a diameter Of 12

23 Puddle Toxic Vapour Cloud 115 meters (500 ppm = ERPG-3) 60 sec 316 meters (100 ppm=erpg-2) 873 meters ( 10 ppm = ERPG-1) The puddle spread to a diameter of 4 Puddle Flammable area of Vapour Cloud Puddle Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion ( ppm= 60% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances.-- LoC was never exceeded (8.0 psi = destruction of Building) No part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time 15 Meters (3.5 psi = serious injury likely) (21800 ppm= 10% LEL) predictions less reliable for short distances. 33 Meters (1.0 psi = shatter glass) The puddle spread to a diameter of 4 The puddle spread to a diameter of 4

24 Figure 7.1 Toluene Threat modeled for BLEVE Figure IPA - Threat modeled for pool fire

25 Figure IPA - Threat modeled for BLEVE Figure 7.4 Ethanol - Threat modeled for thermal radiation from pool fire

26 Figure Ethanol - Threat modeled for BLEVE Figure Acetonitrile - Threat modeled for BLEVE

27 Figure Diethylamine - Threat modeled for pool fire Figure Diethylamine - Threat modeled for toxic vapour cloud

28 Figure Diethylamine - Threat modeled for BLEVE Figure Triethylamine - Threat modeled for pool fire

29 Figure Triethylamine - Threat modeled for Threat modeled for toxic area of vapour cloud during leakage Figure Triethylamine - Threat modeled for BLEVE

30 Figure Hexane - Threat modeled for Pool Fire Figure 7.14 Acetic acid - Threat modeled for toxic vapour cloud

31 Figure Acetonitrile - Threat modeled for toxic area of vapour cloud during leakage Figure Ethylacetate - Threat modeled for pool fire

32 Figure Ethylacetate - Threat modeled for BLEVE Figure Methylamine - Threat modeled for toxic vapour cloud

33 Figure Methylamine - Threat modeled for vapour cloud explosion Figure Methylamine - Threat modeled for jet fire

34 Figure Methylamine - Threat modeled for BLEVE All the scenarios and results depicted in this report are worst case situations. In actual practice, these situations would not arise up to this extent because appropriate pre-emptive precautionary measures and safety related installations would be a part of process as well as plant. It may be noted that consequences analysis for each hazardous chemical has been carried out considering the stability class D and wind speed for that area. The risk assessment of the proposed project has identified no hazardous events, which would project damaging energies outside of the plant boundary. Events identified for offsite facilities are estimated to occur at extremely low incident frequencies and/or not to significant levels of consequence. Management of hazardous event scenarios and risks in general can be adequately managed to acceptable levels Identification of other General Hazards Identification of Hazard is the vital step in hazard analysis and includes the process of collecting information and the basic elements and qualities of hazardous chemicals to be transported, handled, and stored. The data to be collected includes the location of Storage and identification of hazards associated with spillage. Hazards are broadly classified as Falls and falling objects.

35 Fire and Explosion Hazards. Material Handling Hazards. Health Hazards due to Toxic Chemicals. Storage and Handling. The following probable hazards are identified for the project Hazards due to falls and falling and rolling objects. Mechanical hazards due to material handling and transportation. Fire hazards. Health hazard due to toxic vapours of chemicals. Hazards Due To Falls, Falling and Rolling Objects - Injuries to personnel and damage to equipment are caused due to falls and falling and objects from heights. Hazards Due To Mechanical Operations - Injuries may be caused to working personnel due to the following actions like lifting and transporting chemical containers. Fire Hazards - Flammable chemicals are stored in the chemical storage. So it is susceptible to catch fire either at the places of storage or during the transportation, if source of ignition is available. These chemical fires may cause to catastrophic effects. Hazards caused By Material Handling, Storage and Transportation - Most of the raw materials are either toxic, flammable or corrosive or a combination of all. The raw materials are received by road drums and bags. Handling of raw material includes unloading of the material from the trucks, and stacking them at their respective places and weighing them. Transportation of the raw material includes supply of raw material from stores to processing area. During this process hazard may occur due to the mishandling of the material by workmen Risk Management (a) The following safeguards are proposed for mitigation of the hazards Non-sparking tools should be used where solvents are handled Preventive maintenance schedules should be followed to avoid unwanted incidents

36 Keep the safety appliances as mentioned below Eyes wash cum drench shower Goggles Apron Shoes Rubber gloves Face shields Keep the following types of fire fighting in the premises Water point CO 2 Foam Dry chemical powder Painting should be done to avoid corrosion. Service lines are properly places & designed (b) Chemical storage The drums, carboys storage area will be perfectly made of least porous concrete so that the solvent or chemical if leaks will not be absorbed into the floor thus reduces the fire hazard potential Proper exhaustive ventilation will be provided Raw materials and solvents should be properly separated as per their compatibility and named labels will be fixed. Display of MSDS sheets and posters of national safety council will be followed Transferring of solvents and chemicals from one container to another container will be done through proper siphoning system. No smoking boards will be displayed Drum trolleys are to be used for transportation of drums

37 The workers and supervisors may be given proper training in handling hazardous chemicals, use of safety gear, first aid fire extinguishers. Non-sparking tools should be used while working with the solvents/chemicals & inflammable chemicals. The workers should be given training in first aid, personal protective appliances, fire fighting appliances etc. (c) Storage and Handling of Hazardous Chemicals A storage and Handling of Hazardous chemical is inevitable, they carry inherent characteristic risk to the employees due to the properties of chemicals such as toxicity & flammability. Accident due to fire by flammable substances is possible in chemical storage. The disastrous effect of fire and release of toxic fumes in storage is due to improper storage, improper handling or poor maintenance of the storage. Chemical in any form can be stored, handled and used if their physical, chemical and hazardous properties are thoroughly understood and necessary precautions are taken. Each chemical has its specific character. Hence, chemicals do not co-exist. They need their independent space, while storing. When two chemicals come in contact, they react generating heat and by product gases. Ambient temperature and moisture can trigger the reaction. Halogenated compounds acquire aggravated properties. It is only wise to treat every chemical as Toxic. Chemicals are potential enough to destroy the flesh and the skin is ultra-sensitive to chemicals. Chemicals on contact, the affected parts of the body should he washed thoroughly with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes, to dilute the aggressive nature of the chemical, as water is the only universal solvent and the best diluent. Then only further treatment is to be followed. Chemicals are handled in standard containers like MS, HDPE, GI Drums, PVC Carboys, etc. All the chemicals are to be arranged and stored in accordance with their compatibility, dry, well ventilated, with flameproof electrical equipment s and lighting. All the chemicals are to be provided with identification labels. Eye wash/drench shower is to be provided at a strategic location for emergency purpose. Chemical Safety Data Sheets and handling procedure, First Aid measures are to be prepared and displayed for information and safety of the working personnel.

38 7.12 Recommendations The Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment has shown that since the Plant handles chemicals in small quantities and since there is no bulk storage of any chemicals involved none of the accident scenarios will contribute to major onsite risk and no offsite risk. The maximum impact of any spill, leak is limited to having localized impacts/ hazards at the operating personnel / plant personnel level. Proper ventilation to be provided in process areas to prevent build up of flammable vapours that may lead to explosion. While no serious risk is expected, Management is advised to review and ensure safety of drums and containers storing chemicals/solvents from accidental spills or people being exposed to it. Some specific measures to eliminate and/or mitigate these hazards are given below: Regular Inspection of storage drums, cans should be carried out Firefighting should be readily available. Access to the raw materials storage should be kept clear at all times to enable fire engines to reach them at the shortest time. Elimination of all sources of ignition near or around the storage area, equipment and pipelines carrying flammable substances. Enforce strict adherence to safety standards and laws (e.g., full compliance to the supplier s instructions)

39 Figure 7.22 Layout for chemical storage

40 7.13 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Introduction Emergency planning is an integral part of the overall loss control program and is essential for any well run organization. This is important for effective management of an accident / incident to minimize losses to people and property, both in and around the facility. The important aspect in emergency management is to prevent by technical and organizational measures, the unintentional escape of hazardous materials out of the facility and minimize accidents and losses. Not only are unrecognized hazardous conditions which could aggravate and emergency situation be discovered, the emergency planning process also brings to light deficiencies such as lack of resources necessary for effective emergency response. Emergency planning also demonstrates the organizations commitment to the safety of employees and increases the organizations safety awareness. Objectives of Disaster Management Plan The objectives of the plan is to describe the facility s emergency response organization, the resources available and response actions applicable to deal with various types of emergencies that could occur at the facility with the response organization structure being deployed in the shortest time possible during an emergency. Thus, the objectives of emergency response plan can be summarized as. Repaid control and containment of the hazardous situation. Minimizing the risk and impact of event / accident, Effective rehabilitation of the affected persons and prevention of damage to property In order to effectively achieve the objectives of emergency planning, the critical elements that form the backbone of the plan are: Reliable and early detection of emergency and careful planning. The command, Co- ordination, and response organization structure alone with efficient trained personnel. The availability of resources for handling emergences. Appropriate emergency response actions. Effective notification and communication facilities. Regular review and updating of the plan. Proper training of the concerned personnel.

41 Defining a Disaster A disaster can be defined as an occurrence of such magnitude so as to create situation in which normal pattern of life within an facility is suddenly disrupted, adversely affecting not only the personnel and property within the facility but also in its vicinity. Such an occurrence may result in on- site implications like: Fire and / or explosion, Leakage of flammable material, Leakage of toxic material etc., all of which may lead to temporary / permanent damage to the surroundings. Incidents having off site origins can be: Natural calamity like earthquake, cyclone etc., Air raids / marine attack. Crashing of aircrafts or flying objects. Other incidents which can also result in a disaster are: Agitation / forced entry by external group of people Sabotage An important aspect of the disaster is its unforeseen nature. Thus, by definition itself, a disaster is impossible to control completely. However, occurrence of events which lead to a disaster may be minimized through proper technology and engineering practices. Declaring Fire Emergency 1. Any one discovering a fire shall attempt to put out the fire by using the first aid fire fighting appliances. 2. Simultaneously, he would shout FIRE, FIRE, FIRE/THEE, THEE, THEE (in local language) till the assistance arrives. 3. Any one or his colleagues who hears, shall immediately inform the Shift In-charge and Control Room over phone or in person giving the exact location of the emergency.

42 4. The Incident Controller on hearing the incident of emergency, would proceed to the scene of emergency and assess the situation and decide whether a major emergency exists or is likely to escalate into major one. 5. If a major one, he would activate the on-site emergency plan by sounding the siren to code and informs the Store Controller. 6. The key personnel would report to the emergency control centre and take respective charge Declaring Chemical leakage or fire in the Storage Area 1. Any person discovering Chemical leakage or fire would immediately inform the control room giving the exact location of leakage or fire. 2. The Incident Controller would proceed to the storage to assess the situation. Meanwhile, the person discovering fire shall try to extinguish it, if it is safe to do so, using suitable fire extinguishers. 3. If the leakage could be attended safely, he would call the maintenance and get it attended 4. Chemical leakage from storage Drum shall be collected and not allowed to spread. 5. If the leakage is very heavy, the Store Controller shall be informed and on his confirmation, he would take suitable action. 7. If the leakage has caught fire, the Incident Controller would initiate the On-site Emergency Plan by operating the siren to emergency code. The Site Controller would be informed. Recovery Procedures 1. The procedures outlined in this section are intended for re-establishing normal operations at the earliest after an emergency. In addition, the procedure also provides for determining the cause of the accident, so that such incidents can be prevented in future. 2. The following are the requirements of a recover procedure : a. Incident investigation b. Establishing a recovery team c. Damage Assessment d. Clean-up and restoration