Save this PDF as:
 WORD  PNG  TXT  JPG

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download ""

Transcription

1 Title of Paper Interpretation of IP15 in Process Plant Design: a Commonsense Approach Author 1 AJ Tuckett Company Address Author Background Foster Wheeler Energy Limited Foley House 5 Seaward Place Glasgow Scotland G41 1HH Andy is Chief Process Engineer for Foster Wheeler Energy Limited Glasgow Operations. He has a BSc (Hons) in Chemical Engineering from Loughborough University. He has over 20 years experience in process design and engineering of oil and gas projects Author 2 I R Calcott Company Foster Wheeler Energy Limited Address Foley House 5 Seaward Place Glasgow Scotland G41 1HH Author Background Iain is a Principal Process Engineer for Foster Wheeler Energy Limited Glasgow Operations. He holds a BSc (Hons) in Chemical Engineering from Heriot Watt University and has worked for over 17 years in process design and plant operation INTRODUCTION Hazardous area classification of process plants is often undertaken using as a basis the Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15 Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids. This code was re-issued as a second edition in August 2002 to take a more risk-based approach to area classification. As a consequence of this there are now additional considerations which must be taken into account when determining the hazardous radius. This paper summarises how Foster Wheeler has interpreted and applied the revised code on a number of recent projects for the oil and gas industry. The main differences between the second edition of the IP15 code and the first issue can be summarised thus: The second edition is based on an assessment of the risk to operators who work within hazardous areas. In addition it provides an updated, demonstrable methodology for specifying hazardous radius. This is achieved by assigning a level of release for secondary sources, and takes account of the period of time an operator spends exposed to a potential release source, and the probability of ignition of that release. D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 1

2 The new IP code is based on dispersion modelling taking into account variables such as pressure and mist/spray formation. As the radius is now based on dispersion modelling of specific release compositions there is no longer a distinction between heavier than air or lighter than air releases. Chapter 5 Classification of Individual Point Sources details the methodology for classification of the radius associated with equipment and piping. The difference now is that the release/leak source is now quantified, for example a flange leak is likely to have a diameter of 1 to 6 mm. In addition the diameter of the leak source is related to the level of release, with respect to secondary (Zone 2) releases. As before, the hazardous area is expected to be mainly Zone 2 with localised Zone 1s. METHODOLOGY FOR HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION There are a number of discrete steps that need to be completed in order to arrive at the hazardous area classification for a process plant. These form the basis of the work procedures employed by Foster Wheeler: Identify the point sources of release Determine the grade of release and fluid category Establish zone classification Determine hazard radius Preparation of hazardous area drawing Hazardous area classification review The procedure adopted is represented in a flowchart in Figure 1, each of the above steps are then discussed in more detail below. D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 2

3 Input Activity Output P&IDs Plot Plans Heat & Material Balance Identify Release Determine Grade of Release Amend Design to remove continuous; Primary sources Physical Properties Heat & Material Balance Determine Fluid Category Ventilation Establish Zone Classification Client s Operations Staff Input Level of Release Probability P occ IP15 Plot Plan Number of Releases N range IP15 Exposure IP15 Probability of Ignition P ign IP15/ Air Dispersion Hazardous Radius Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Review Revise Agreed Hazardous Area Classification Figure 1 D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 3

4 IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES OF RELEASE The starting point for any area classification is to determine all the potential sources of release. To do this, it is important that the process design of the facility is well-developed, and that a plant layout is available in at least a conceptual form. Typically, the following key documents are used when determining the sources of release: Equipment list Piping and instrument diagrams Heat and material balance Plot plan In addition, it is important for the process engineer to consider other potential sources of release which may not be shown on the above documents. Examples of these include oily water drain system, drain hubs and vent pipes, vents from balanced bellows relief valves, analyser vents, etc. It is important that all continuous, primary sources and secondary sources which are likely to have an impact on the extent of a Zone 2 outside the plant boundary are identified at an early stage. Small secondary releases within the process plant are less important, as they are unlikely to have an impact on the extent of hazardous zones. DETERMINE THE GRADE OF RELEASE AND FLUID CATEGORY The grade of a source is dependant on the likely frequency of release. The grades are defined in IP15 as, continuous, primary or secondary. Continuous release is considered, as a rule of thumb, for instances where it is likely to be present for a period in excess of 1,000 hours per year, primary releases for between 10 and 1,000 hours per year, and secondary for less than 10 hours. In addition to the above, where releases are present for less than 10 hours but occur on a frequent basis during normal operation, such as regular sampling, they should be considered as primary grades. During design, effort must be made to minimise the number of primary releases as far as is practicable. This can include such measures as installation of closed sampling systems, closed drain systems, and reducing the diameter of vents and drains. The fluid category is defined in IP15 as follows: Fluid Category A B C G (i) G (i) Unclassified Description A flammable liquid that on release, would vaporise rapidly and substantially. This category includes: a) Any liquefied petroleum gas or lighter flammable liquid b) Any flammable liquid at a temperature sufficient to produce on release more than about 40% vol vaporisation with no heat input other than from the surroundings A flammable liquid not in Category A, but at a temperature sufficient for boiling to occur on release A flammable liquid not in categories A or B, but which can, on release, be at a temperature above its flash point, or form a flammable mist or spray A typical methane-rich natural gas Refinery hydrogen Heavy oils etc with flash point greater than 100 o C handled at a temperature below flash point, which will not form a mist or spray on release D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 4

5 ESTABLISH ZONE CLASSIFICATION For an open, freely-ventilated area, the following Zones apply (depending on the grade of release): Continuous: Zone 0 Primary: Zone 1 Secondary: Zone 2 For enclosed areas, such as an analyser house, compressor shelter, and sumps, reference has to be made to IP15 to determine whether the applicable zone has to be increased to take account of inadequate ventilation. DETERMINE HAZARD RADIUS The method used to determine a hazardous radius is dependant on the grade of release. For primary and continuous releases, where the potential leaks sizes and fluid categories are within the limits of the tables within IP15 section 5 and Annex 6, the hazardous radius can be determined directly from these tables. For cases outside the limits, it is necessary to undertake dispersion modelling to determine the extent of a flammable cloud. In cases where this has been found to be necessary, Foster Wheeler typically use PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool) from DNV Software. For a secondary grade release it is first necessary to determine the level of release, and then to determine the hazardous radius either directly from IP15 or from dispersion modelling. The procedure used for determining level of release is described below. LEVEL OF RELEASE The level of release takes account of the period of time that personnel are exposed to a risk, determined from the number of sources of release to which they are likely to be exposed, and the likelihood of ignition. The level of release is either level I, level II or level III and is described as the release frequency. The release frequency is based on personnel risk only. It is the general intent that the level be assigned to an installation rather than determine the level for each individual point source. This can prove to be quite difficult when the boundary of an installation may have varying risks of ignition. The first step in determining the level of release is to establish exposure of personnel. In the IP Code exposure is determined from: Exp= P occ X N range Where P occ is the probability of an individual being on site within the hazardous area. N range is the time weighted average number of release sources which can affect the individual during their time within the hazardous area IP15 provides four values for P occ : D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 5

6 0.22: Individual spends 100% of all shifts exposed to a hazardous release 0.13: Individual spends an average of 5 hours per shift exposed to a hazardous release 0.055: Individual spends an average of 2 hours per shift exposed to a hazardous release 0.028: Individual spends an average of 1 hours per shift exposed to a hazardous release The likely exposure of personnel needs to be discussed with the plant s operating team, but in practice Foster Wheeler has found that in modern automated plants the exposure of personnel tends to be between 2 and 5 hours, giving rise to a P occ of between 0.13 and It is essential that the assumptions made in determining the probability of exposure are well documented and recorded in order to provide an audit trail for later review and to meet HSE requirements. The next step is to determine N range. The tables in IP15 give the average number of sources to which an individual will be exposed during his period within the hazardous area, depending on the activity which he is undertaking. Three levels are indicated: low, medium and high. The percentage of time an individual is then exposed to each of these levels then needs to be assessed. It is important that these values are discussed with the client s operating personnel. The basis for all decisions taken must also be recorded for record and audit purposes. Typical values of time an individual is exposed, used on previous projects are: Low: 20% Medium: 50% High: 30% It is now possible to determine the exposure from table C2 (in ID15). Depending on the assumptions made we would typically expect to arrive at an exposure of between 1.5 and 2.0. Before determining the level of release it is now necessary to determine the probability of ignition. In table C3 of IP15 the following four strengths of ignition are given: Controlled, probability of ignition, Weak, probability of ignition, 0.01 Medium, probability of ignition, 0.1 Strong, probability of ignition, 1 By taking account of the proportion of time the most exposed individual will spend exposed to each of the strengths of ignition, a value for P ign can be determined. Using the values of exposure and P ign, the appropriate level of release is determined from Figure C2 (in ID15). Referring to Figure C2, Foster Wheeler has found that in most instances, level I is applicable for process plant, but with certain areas close to strong sources of release exposed to level 2, in practice level 3 has not been encountered. The calculation of release frequency level is required to be made as a minimum for each type of plant area e.g. process area, utility area, offsite area. These calculations are carried out by the process department with input from client (operations/maintenance), and engineering disciplines as necessary. D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 6

7 The output of these calculations should be to provide a release frequency level for all areas of the plant which is subsequently used to establish hazardous radius for releases as per IP Code section 5.4. HAZARDOUS RADIUS For each source of release the hazardous radius can be determined using Chapter 5 and Annex C3 of IP15. The leakage rates of hydrocarbon, and hence the extent of hazardous radius, is dependent on the hole size through which the leak occurs combined with the operating pressure. Guidance is given in IP15 on the size of holes likely to occur for certain credible scenarios. If necessary, air dispersion modelling can be undertaken to determine the extent of hazardous zones. Foster Wheeler process group represents the above information in tabular form on a hazardous release schedule. HAZARDOUS AREA DRAWING The above information can be represented on a hazardous area classification drawing. This drawing is based on the plot plan for the process unit with the hazardous zones overlaid. Drawings are produced in both plan and elevation to give a full three dimensional representation of the hazardous area. HAZARDOUS AREA REVIEW Once the preliminary hazardous area classification drawing has been prepared a formal review is undertaken to confirm that the proposed area classification is in accordance with project requirements, and is endorsed by the various engineering departments and importantly the client/operations representative. The review team should typically be composed of the following personnel; Process engineer Project engineer Electrical engineer Instrument engineer Design safety engineer Client representatives, (including operations and maintenance personnel) The review will typically be chaired by the Project Engineer and follows a check list to ensure that the area classification drawing has correctly interpreted the information contained in the hazardous release schedule and to gain buy in and agreement on the various assumptions made during the hazardous area classification process, particularly with regard to operator occupancy and ignition sources. All actions arising from the review must be recorded and should be entered into a project design safety action tracking register to ensure an auditable trail to close out exists. Following the review meeting the hazardous area drawing will normally require to be updated to incorporate the actions of the review team before being released for engineering design use. D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 7

8 The approach employed by Foster Wheeler, as detailed above, results in the hazardous area classification of a process plant that follows the recommendations of IP15 and, importantly, can also be audited. By ensuring that the client is involved throughout the process and particularly during acceptance and agreement, it ensures that the design process is understood and accepted by the operator. Opportunities exist to modify the design of a process plant, to remove or downgrade hazardous releases to reduce the zone classification or the extent of a hazardous radius. By undertaking the hazardous area classification in a structured manner, these opportunities can be identified more easily and resolved. The formal hazardous area classification review is an important part of the process as it brings together a range of disciplines, and helps to ensure that the classification is agreed and accepted by all parties concerned, and that it meets project requirements. REFERENCES Institute of Petroleum, Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids, Part 15, 2nd Edition August D:\word2pdf\85926.doc Page: 8

PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSION RISKS TO THE CONTROL ROOM BUILDING OF A VINYL CHLORIDE PLANT

PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSION RISKS TO THE CONTROL ROOM BUILDING OF A VINYL CHLORIDE PLANT PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSION RISKS TO THE CONTROL ROOM BUILDING OF A VINYL CHLORIDE PLANT L.P. Sluijs 1, B.J. Haitsma 1 and P. Beaufort 2 1 Vectra Group Ltd. 2 Shin-Etsu (contact details: Vectra Group

More information

TABLE OF CONTENT

TABLE OF CONTENT Page : 1 of 12 Project Engineering Standard www.klmtechgroup.com KLM Technology #03-12 Block Aronia, Jalan Sri Perkasa 2 Taman Tampoi Utama 81200 Johor Bahru Malaysia TABLE OF CONTENT SCOPE 2 REFERENCES

More information

Process Safety Management Of Highly Hazardous Chemicals OSHA 29 CFR

Process Safety Management Of Highly Hazardous Chemicals OSHA 29 CFR Process Safety Management Of Highly Hazardous Chemicals OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 PSM - Definition Not all refining hazards are caused by the same factors or involve ve the same degree of potential damage.

More information

DSEAR-Classification of Hazardous Areas (Zoning) and Selection of Equipment

DSEAR-Classification of Hazardous Areas (Zoning) and Selection of Equipment OHSS: Classification of Hazardous areas (Zoning) and selection of equipment Guidance 202 DSEAR-Classification of Hazardous Areas (Zoning) and Selection of Equipment Contents Overview... 2 Assessing the

More information

Health and Safety Executive. Key aspects of HS(G) 253. Andrew Hall HID CI 1G. HM Specialist Inspector (Mechanical)

Health and Safety Executive. Key aspects of HS(G) 253. Andrew Hall HID CI 1G. HM Specialist Inspector (Mechanical) Health and Safety Executive Key aspects of HS(G) 253 Andrew Hall HID CI 1G HM Specialist Inspector (Mechanical) Human Factors Human Failures can be grouped into: Errors And Violations Errors are not intended

More information

API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 500 THIRD EDITION, DECEMBER 2012 ERRATA, JANUARY 2014

API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 500 THIRD EDITION, DECEMBER 2012 ERRATA, JANUARY 2014 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and Division 2 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 500 THIRD EDITION, DECEMBER

More information

Practical Modelling & Hazard Assessment of LPG & LNG Spills

Practical Modelling & Hazard Assessment of LPG & LNG Spills Practical Modelling & Hazard Assessment of LPG & LNG Spills UKELG 3 rd April 2012 Tony Ennis Introduction Refrigerated or pressurised Release scenarios & release rate Vaporisation Gas dispersion Consequences

More information

Risk Analysis and Hazard Reduction Report V1.0

Risk Analysis and Hazard Reduction Report V1.0 Risk Analysis and Hazard Reduction Report V1.0 2 Contents 1. Definitions and Risk Classifications 3 2. Risk and Hazard reduction associated with Personnel 4-5 3. Risk and Hazard reduction associated with

More information

PSM SOLUTIONS: AMMONIA SCR SYSTEMS

PSM SOLUTIONS: AMMONIA SCR SYSTEMS PSM SOLUTIONS: AMMONIA SCR SYSTEMS 1 Issues that surround the storage of anhydrous ammonia 1. Government Audit/Citation Exposure a. OSHA i. NEP ii. PQV b. EPA 2. Safety Issues a. Burns b. Respiratory c.

More information

Part 2.5 Dispersion Modeling Using ALOHA

Part 2.5 Dispersion Modeling Using ALOHA Part 2.5 Dispersion Modeling Using ALOHA Dr. Arshad Ahmad Email: arshad@utm.my 1 Software Commonly used for Risk Analysis Software SAFETI SFU CAFTAN ETRA HAZSEC. HAZTRAC. PHAST. WHAZAN EFFECTS. DAMAGE

More information

Pipeline Flooding, Dewatering and Venting Dr Aidan O'Donoghue, Pipeline Research Limited, Glasgow, Scotland

Pipeline Flooding, Dewatering and Venting Dr Aidan O'Donoghue, Pipeline Research Limited, Glasgow, Scotland Pipeline Flooding, Dewatering and Venting Dr Aidan O'Donoghue, Pipeline Research Limited, Glasgow, Scotland Abstract Flooding, cleaning, gauging, dewatering and venting of offshore oil and gas pipelines

More information

Determination of the Design Load for Structural Safety Assessment against Gas Explosion in Offshore Topside

Determination of the Design Load for Structural Safety Assessment against Gas Explosion in Offshore Topside Determination of the Design Load for Structural Safety Assessment against Gas Explosion in Offshore Topside Migyeong Kim a, Gyusung Kim a, *, Jongjin Jung a and Wooseung Sim a a Advanced Technology Institute,

More information

Introduction to HAZOP Study. Dr. AA Process Control and Safety Group

Introduction to HAZOP Study. Dr. AA Process Control and Safety Group Introduction to HAZOP Study Dr. AA Process Control and Safety Group A scenario You and your family are on a road trip by using a car in the middle of the night. You were replying a text message while driving

More information

"Although a good start with a good project, others are as much a hostage of the "human factor".

Although a good start with a good project, others are as much a hostage of the human factor. IBP1151_13 PIG LAUNCHERS AND RECEIVERS OPERATIONAL SECURITY Eduardo de Oliveira 1 IBP1151-13 PIG Launchers and receivers operational security Copyright 2013, Brazilian Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Institute

More information

Application of pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the vicinity of high pressure Natural Gas pipelines

Application of pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the vicinity of high pressure Natural Gas pipelines Communication 1737 Application of pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the vicinity of high pressure Natural Gas pipelines Founded 1863 Royal Charter 1929 Patron: Her Majesty the Queen

More information

ONSHORE GAS GATHERING FAQS

ONSHORE GAS GATHERING FAQS ONSHORE GAS GATHERING FAQS These Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) are intended to clarify, explain, and promote better understanding of the gas gathering line rules. These FAQs are not substantive rules

More information

Risk-Based Inspection Requirements for Pressure Equipment

Risk-Based Inspection Requirements for Pressure Equipment the pressure equipment safety authority Risk-Based Inspection Requirements for Pressure Equipment AB 505 Edition 2, Revision 2 Issued 2017-08-24 Table of Contents FOREWORD... ii 1.0 INTRODUCTION... 1 2.0

More information

Fires and Explosions: What You Need to Know to Prevent Them

Fires and Explosions: What You Need to Know to Prevent Them Fires and Explosions: What You Need to Know to Prevent Them CSChE PSM Symposium Edmonton, Alberta 2007 Gerry Phillips, GC Phillips Consulting Ltd. Norman Nibber, Independent Risk Control Objectives Understand

More information

Health and Safety Executive/Local Authorities Enforcement Liaison Committee (HELA)

Health and Safety Executive/Local Authorities Enforcement Liaison Committee (HELA) Health and Safety Executive/Local Authorities Enforcement Liaison Committee (HELA) Local Authority Circular Subject: Food Industry Open Government Status: Open LAC Number: 31/2 Rev 1.0 Keywords: Fire and

More information

PURPOSE OF THE POLICY

PURPOSE OF THE POLICY Title: Safe Storage, Handling, Use and Disposal Procedures of Compressed Gas Cylinders Effective Date: November 2005 Revision Date: March 1, 2017 Issuing Authority: Responsible Officer: VP, Capital Projects

More information

Gas Accumulation Potential & Leak Detection when Converting to Gas

Gas Accumulation Potential & Leak Detection when Converting to Gas Gas Accumulation Potential & Leak Detection when Converting to Gas Coal to Gas / PCUG Conference Chattanooga, TN October 29, 2013 Robert G. Mudry, P.E. Airflow Sciences Corporation Introduction Coal to

More information

Operational Risk Using BowTie Methodology

Operational Risk Using BowTie Methodology Operational Risk Using BowTie Methodology Richard Emery, MMI Engineering Ltd, The Brew House, Wilderspool Park, Greenall s Avenue, Warrington, WA4 6HL. Management of risk on COMAH sites relies on diverse

More information

I.CHEM.E. SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 97 BUOYANCY-DRIVEN NATURAL VENTILATION OP ENCLOSED SPACES

I.CHEM.E. SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 97 BUOYANCY-DRIVEN NATURAL VENTILATION OP ENCLOSED SPACES BUOYANCY-DRIVEN NATURAL VENTILATION OP ENCLOSED SPACES M. R. Marshall* and P. L. Stewart-Darling* A simple mathematical model for the buoyancy driven ventilation of an enclosed space, using a two-pipe

More information

TABLE OF CONTENT

TABLE OF CONTENT Page : 1 of 11 Project Engineering Standard www.klmtechgroup.com KLM Technology #03-12 Block Aronia, Jalan Sri Perkasa 2 Taman Tampoi Utama 81200 Johor Bahru Malaysia TABLE OF CONTENT SCOPE 2 REFERENCES

More information

Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks API STANDARD 2000 SEVENTH EDITION, MARCH 2014

Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks API STANDARD 2000 SEVENTH EDITION, MARCH 2014 Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks API STANDARD 2000 SEVENTH EDITION, MARCH 2014 Special Notes API publications necessarily address problems of a general nature. With respect to particular

More information

SAFETY STUDY OF HYDROGEN SUPPLY STATIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF HIGH PRESSURE GAS SAFETY LAW IN JAPAN

SAFETY STUDY OF HYDROGEN SUPPLY STATIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF HIGH PRESSURE GAS SAFETY LAW IN JAPAN SAFETY STUDY OF HYDROGEN SUPPLY STATIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF HIGH PRESSURE GAS SAFETY LAW IN JAPAN Komori, M., Yoshida, T., Onoue, K. and Kikukawa, S., Mori, T., Takagi, K. Japan Petroleum Energy Center,

More information

HYDROSTATIC LEAK TEST PROCEDURE

HYDROSTATIC LEAK TEST PROCEDURE This information is proprietary and shall not be disclosed outside your organization, nor shall it be duplicated, used or disclosed for purposes other than as permitted under the agreement with Kinetics

More information

TABLE OF CONTENT

TABLE OF CONTENT Page : 1 of 22 Project Engineering Standard www.klmtechgroup.com KLM Technology #03-12 Block Aronia, Jalan Sri Perkasa 2 Taman Tampoi Utama 81200 Johor Bahru Malaysia S) TABLE OF CONTENT SCOPE 2 VESSELS

More information

LNG Marine Loading Arms and Manifold Draining, Purging and Disconnection Procedure

LNG Marine Loading Arms and Manifold Draining, Purging and Disconnection Procedure LNG Marine Loading Arms and Manifold Draining, Purging and Disconnection Procedure i The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) The Society of International Gas Tanker and

More information

Material Safety Data Sheet

Material Safety Data Sheet Material Safety Data Sheet XaarJet AB Box 516, SE-175 26 Järfälla Sweden Tel. +46 8 580 887 00 www.xaar.co.uk 1. Identification of the substance Product name: Xaar Oil-based Development Ink, IK820 2. Composition

More information

FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS WITH THERMAL FLUID SYSTEMS

FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS WITH THERMAL FLUID SYSTEMS FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS WITH THERMAL FLUID SYSTEMS Alison McKay, PROjEN plc, UK Richard Franklin, Heat Transfer Systems Ltd, UK Incidents relating to thermal fluid systems are unfortunately more common

More information

Engineering Safety into the Design

Engineering Safety into the Design Engineering safety into the design Peter Scantlebury P.Eng Technical Safety Manager Amec Foster Wheeler, Oil & Gas Canada Abstract Safety by design is Amec Foster Wheeler s systematic approach to engineering

More information

Discussion on Fugitive Emissions Standards Rich Davis

Discussion on Fugitive Emissions Standards Rich Davis Discussion on Fugitive Emissions Standards Rich Davis Business Development Manager Flexitallic LP Emissions Standards API 622 Type Testing of Process Valve Packing for Fugitive Emissions (under revision)

More information

INTERTANKO GAS FORUM Athens 8th of June 2016

INTERTANKO GAS FORUM Athens 8th of June 2016 INTERTANKO GAS FORUM Athens 8 th of June 2016 Co-Mingling of Cargoes on LPG Vessels BACKGROUND TO CO-MINGLING SOLAS REGULATION Discussion Points REASONS FOR CO-MINGLING CO-MINGLING ON DIFFERENT LPG VESSELS

More information

REPORT INVESTIGATION OF 3M CLEAN AND STRIP DISKS IN EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES. Client: 3M Norge A/S. Authors: Bjørnar A. Johnsen Geir H.

REPORT INVESTIGATION OF 3M CLEAN AND STRIP DISKS IN EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES. Client: 3M Norge A/S. Authors: Bjørnar A. Johnsen Geir H. REPORT INVESTIGATION OF 3M CLEAN AND STRIP DISKS IN EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES Client: 3M Norge A/S Authors: Bjørnar A. Johnsen Geir H. Pedersen Bergen, June 2005 Ref. no.: GexCon-05-A440400-1 Rev. no.: 01

More information

GUIDELINE FOR THE LOCATION OF OCCUPIED BUILDINGS IN INDUSTRIAL GAS PLANTS

GUIDELINE FOR THE LOCATION OF OCCUPIED BUILDINGS IN INDUSTRIAL GAS PLANTS GUIDELINE FOR THE LOCATION OF OCCUPIED BUILDINGS IN INDUSTRIAL GAS PLANTS AIGA 093/16 Asia Industrial Gases Association 3 HarbourFront Place, #09-04 HarbourFront Tower 2, Singapore 099254 Tel : +65 6276

More information

Analysis of hazard to operator during design process of safe ship power plant

Analysis of hazard to operator during design process of safe ship power plant POLISH MARITIME RESEARCH 4(67) 2010 Vol 17; pp. 26-30 10.2478/v10012-010-0032-1 Analysis of hazard to operator during design process of safe ship power plant T. Kowalewski, M. Sc. A. Podsiadło, Ph. D.

More information

Gas Vapor Injection on Refrigerant Cycle Using Piston Technology

Gas Vapor Injection on Refrigerant Cycle Using Piston Technology Purdue University Purdue e-pubs International Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Conference School of Mechanical Engineering 2012 Gas Vapor Injection on Refrigerant Cycle Using Piston Technology Sophie

More information

Becker* Products Below Ground Ball Valve Regulators

Becker* Products Below Ground Ball Valve Regulators GE Oil & Gas Becker* Products Below Ground Ball Valve Regulators Reduce Noise Levels at Large Volume Regulator Stations GE s Becker* Below Ground ball valve regulator has the long-term proven reliability,

More information

Pigging as a Flow Assurance Solution Avoiding Slug Catcher Overflow

Pigging as a Flow Assurance Solution Avoiding Slug Catcher Overflow Pigging as a Flow Assurance Solution Avoiding Slug Catcher Overflow Aidan O'Donoghue, Pipeline Research Limited, Glasgow, UK This paper sets out to provide an initial method of assessing the bypass requirements

More information

6.6 Relief Devices. Introduction

6.6 Relief Devices. Introduction 6.6 Relief Devices Introduction Relief devices are used to help prevent a catastrophic failure of equipment and/or minimize the effects of any unanticipated or uncontrolled events. As such, relief devices

More information

Level MEASUREMENT 1/2016

Level MEASUREMENT 1/2016 Level MEASUREMENT 1/2016 AGENDA 2 A. Introduction B. Float method C. Displacer method D. Hydrostatic pressure method E. Capacitance method G. Ultrasonic method H. Radar method I. Laser method J. Level

More information

DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS ZONES FOR A GENERIC HYDROGEN STATION A CASE STUDY

DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS ZONES FOR A GENERIC HYDROGEN STATION A CASE STUDY DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS ZONES FOR A GENERIC HYDROGEN STATION A CASE STUDY Nilsen S. 1, Marangon A. 2, Middha P. 3, Engeboe A. 4, Markert F. 5, Ezponda E. 6, Chaineaux J. 7 1 Oil and Energy Research

More information

Gerga Pressure Reduction Station

Gerga Pressure Reduction Station The Quantitative Risk Assessment QRA Study For Gerga Pressure Reduction Station Prepared By Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company December 2015 Page 2 of 151 CONTENTS Executive Summary 12/151

More information

DSEAR Assessment. To be completed in conjunction with any generic risk assessment for the task/activity being undertaken.

DSEAR Assessment. To be completed in conjunction with any generic risk assessment for the task/activity being undertaken. DSEAR Assessment This specific risk assessment process must be completed if the substances that you are working with, handling or storing are flammable, extremely flammable, highly flammable, oxidising,

More information

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET Page { PAGE1} of 6 COMPANY: SIGNET PTY LTD ADDRESS: 56 INGLESTON ROAD, WAKERLEY, QLD, 4154 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE: (07) 3364 2100 (8AM to 5PM) MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION Product Name

More information

3.0 Manage. hazardous substances. risks IN THIS SECTION:

3.0 Manage. hazardous substances. risks IN THIS SECTION: 3.0 Manage hazardous substances risks IN THIS SECTION: 3.1 Hazardous substances can damage your health 3.2 Applying substance controls 3.3 Prepare an inventory of your hazardous substances 3.4 Find and

More information

Fundamentals of NGL Sampling Systems. By Dominic Giametta & Jim Klentzman

Fundamentals of NGL Sampling Systems. By Dominic Giametta & Jim Klentzman Fundamentals of NGL Sampling Systems By Dominic Giametta & Jim Klentzman The purpose of this paper is to discuss in depth the systems we use as a standard to sample natural gas liquids, or NGL s. Before

More information

Confined Space Entry

Confined Space Entry Confined Space Entry Purpose The purpose of this chapter is to establish methods to identify confined spaces, classify them according to their risks, and establish guidelines necessary for the safe preparation,

More information

Project & Task Work Health and Safety Risk Management Procedure

Project & Task Work Health and Safety Risk Management Procedure Project & Task Work Health and Safety Risk Management Procedure Related Policy Work Health and Safety Policy Responsible Officer Executive Director Human Resources Approved by Executive Director Human

More information

Recommendations on Checking Anaesthesia Delivery Systems

Recommendations on Checking Anaesthesia Delivery Systems Page 1 of 11 Recommendations on Checking Anaesthesia Delivery Version Effective Date 1 Oct 1992 (reviewed Feb 07, Feb 02) 2 2004 3 Nov 2011 4 Dec 2016 Document No. HKCA T1 v4 Prepared by College Guidelines

More information

Operational Settings:

Operational Settings: instrucalc features more than 70 routines associated with control valves, ISO flow elements, relief valves and rupture disks, and calculates process data at flow conditions for a comprehensive range of

More information

Marine Risk Assessment

Marine Risk Assessment Marine Risk Assessment Waraporn Srimoon (B.Sc., M.Sc.).) 10 December 2007 What is Risk assessment? Risk assessment is a review as to acceptability of risk based on comparison with risk standards or criteria,

More information

EVALUATING AND INTERPRETING APPLICATION UNIFORMITY OF CENTER PIVOT IRRIGATION SYSTEMS

EVALUATING AND INTERPRETING APPLICATION UNIFORMITY OF CENTER PIVOT IRRIGATION SYSTEMS Page Break EVALUATING AND INTERPRETING APPLICATION UNIFORMITY OF CENTER PIVOT IRRIGATION SYSTEMS With rising fuel prices it is increasingly important that irrigation systems apply water uniformly in order

More information

Confined Space Entry Procedure

Confined Space Entry Procedure Purpose The purpose of this chapter is to establish methods to identify confined spaces, classify them according to their risks, and establish guidelines necessary for the safe preparation, entry and rescue

More information

SAFETY DATA SHEET EVO-STIK CARPET SPRAY ADHESIVE

SAFETY DATA SHEET EVO-STIK CARPET SPRAY ADHESIVE Revision Date September 2011 Revision 3 1 / 6 SAFETY DATA SHEET SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/MIXTURE AND OF THE COMPANY/UNDERTAKING 1.1. Product identifier Product name Product No. 132801

More information

Analysis of the application and sizing of pressure safety valves for fire protection on offshore oil and gas installations Annex I

Analysis of the application and sizing of pressure safety valves for fire protection on offshore oil and gas installations Annex I Analysis of the application and sizing of pressure safety valves for fire protection on offshore oil and gas installations Annex I Article draft The annex contains an article draft, based on an investigation

More information

Temperature Influence on the Flammability Limits of Heat Treating Atmospheres

Temperature Influence on the Flammability Limits of Heat Treating Atmospheres Temperature Influence on the Flammability Limits of Heat Treating Atmospheres John Dwyer, Jr., James G. Hansel, Tom Philips Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Allentown, PA Abstract The flammability limits

More information

INOGATE Technical Secretariat UK Experience European Standards Implementation Key Expert Phil Winnard Session 2 Georgia, October 2015

INOGATE Technical Secretariat UK Experience European Standards Implementation Key Expert Phil Winnard Session 2 Georgia, October 2015 INOGATE Technical Secretariat UK Experience European Standards Implementation Key Expert Phil Winnard Session 2 Georgia, October 2015 BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS FOR ENERGY SECURITY www.inogate.org EN 12186

More information

EXAMINER S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION STATEMENT OF THE CASE

EXAMINER S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION STATEMENT OF THE CASE OIL AND GAS DO0KET NO. 01-0249550 THE APPLICATION OF REGENCY FS LP UNDER RULE 36 AND RULE 46 TO DISPOSE OF OIL AND WASTE CONTAINING HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS INTO ITS TILDEN GPI WELL NO. 1, TILDEN, S. (WILCOX

More information

Hazardous material transport accidents: analysis of the D.G.A.I.S. database

Hazardous material transport accidents: analysis of the D.G.A.I.S. database Environmental Health Risk II 131 Hazardous material transport accidents: analysis of the D.G.A.I.S. database S. Bonvicini & G. Spadoni Department of Chemical, Mining Engineering and Environmental Technologies,

More information

The modern, fast and easy to use risk analysis tool. Advanced Features. Using HAZID in BowTie Pro

The modern, fast and easy to use risk analysis tool. Advanced Features. Using HAZID in BowTie Pro The modern, fast and easy to use risk analysis tool Advanced Features Using HAZID in BowTie Pro Enterprise Business Centre Admiral Court Poynernook Road Aberdeen, AB11 5QX, UK Tel: +44 (0) 1224 51 50 94

More information

Regulated Oil and Gas Companies under National Energy Board Jurisdiction

Regulated Oil and Gas Companies under National Energy Board Jurisdiction File 185-A000-41 8 August 2003 Regulated Oil and Gas Companies under National Energy Board Jurisdiction Dear Sir / Madam: Guidance Notes for Pressure Equipment under National Energy Board Jurisdiction

More information

CONFINED SPACE ENTRY & RESCUE

CONFINED SPACE ENTRY & RESCUE Training Brochure CONFINED SPACE ENTRY & RESCUE Introduction This training program is a 2-days training, which comes with an adequate training in confined space rescue operations, with intensive practical

More information

NEW IGC CODE AND IGF CODE

NEW IGC CODE AND IGF CODE NEW IGC CODE AND IGF CODE SAFETY ASPECTS Raffaele Piciocchi Gas Center - Greece SAFETY4SEAS - Athens 1 October 2014 Content NEW IGC CODE DRAFT IGF CODE 2 The New IGC Code A new IGC Code has been approved

More information

System Pressure Manager Standard & System Pressure Manager Plus

System Pressure Manager Standard & System Pressure Manager Plus System Pressure Manager Standard & System Pressure Manager Plus Installation, Commissioning & Servicing Instructions Note: THESE INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE READ AND UNDERSTOOD BEFORE INSTALLING, COMMISSIONING,

More information

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET. Oxygen, Refrigerated Liquid DOT Hazard Class: 2.2

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET. Oxygen, Refrigerated Liquid DOT Hazard Class: 2.2 DOT ID No: UN 1073 MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET Oxygen, Refrigerated Liquid DOT Hazard Class: 2.2 Emergency No.: +971-6-5336481 Page No. : 1/5 DOT Shipping Label : Non Flammable; Oxidizer Date last updated:

More information

CONTROL VALVE TESTING

CONTROL VALVE TESTING The optimal functioning of the Control valve not only exists of sufficient body & seat tightness, but more important, the total "performance" of the valve and its controls! For an accurate and reliable

More information

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET Page { PAGE1} of 6 COMPANY: SIGNET PTY LTD ADDRESS: 56 INGLESTON ROAD, WAKERLEY, QLD, 4154 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE: (07) 3364 2100 (8AM to 5PM) MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION Product Name

More information

Tube rupture in a natural gas heater

Tube rupture in a natural gas heater Tube rupture in a natural gas heater Dynamic simulation supports the use of a pressure safety valve over a rupture disk in the event of a tube rupture HARRY Z HA and PATRICK STANG Fluor Canada Ltd A fast

More information

SAFETY DATA SHEET. CLASSIFICATION Flammable aerosol, Category 1 Skin irritant, Category 2

SAFETY DATA SHEET. CLASSIFICATION Flammable aerosol, Category 1 Skin irritant, Category 2 SECTION 1: PRODUCT AND MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATION PRODUCT IDENTIFIER: OTHER VARIANTS: INTENDED USE: MANUFACTURER: BOP Insecticide Spray Citronella and Evergreen versions of BOP Insecticide Spray Household

More information

Goldfields Gas Pipeline Access Arrangement Comments on Pipeline Capacity Modeling and the Impact of Changing Gas Quality

Goldfields Gas Pipeline Access Arrangement Comments on Pipeline Capacity Modeling and the Impact of Changing Gas Quality Goldfields Gas Pipeline Access Arrangement 2015 2019 Comments on Pipeline Capacity Modeling and the Impact of Changing Gas Quality Draft: 29 May 2016 Contents Page 1. Background... 2 2. Modeling Methodology...

More information

VALVE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION API 622 API 624

VALVE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION API 622 API 624 VALVE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION API 622 API 624 Written by Rich Davis Manager Business Development Western Hemisphere & China Flexitallic L.P., Deer Park, Texas Presented By: Steve Butler, Shell Global

More information

Dynamic Simulation for T-9 Storage Tank (Holding Case)

Dynamic Simulation for T-9 Storage Tank (Holding Case) Dynamic Simulation for T-9 Storage Tank (Holding Case) CASE 1: 19,642 Kg/Hr (Holding: 52 o C), No Liquid Draw Workshop Description Estimation of vapor flow rate coming out from the T-9 tank for holding

More information

KL73 KROWN RUST INHIBITOR & LUBRICANT (AEROSOL)

KL73 KROWN RUST INHIBITOR & LUBRICANT (AEROSOL) MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET 1. PRODUCT AND PREPARATION INFORMATION Manufacturer: Emergency telephone numbers: Supplier s Name and Address: Product Name: Synonyms: Chemical Family: Molecular Formula: Product

More information

Exercise 5-2. Bubblers EXERCISE OBJECTIVE DISCUSSION OUTLINE. Bubblers DISCUSSION. Learn to measure the level in a vessel using a bubbler.

Exercise 5-2. Bubblers EXERCISE OBJECTIVE DISCUSSION OUTLINE. Bubblers DISCUSSION. Learn to measure the level in a vessel using a bubbler. Exercise 5-2 Bubblers EXERCISE OBJECTIVE Learn to measure the level in a vessel using a bubbler. DISCUSSION OUTLINE The Discussion of this exercise covers the following points: Bubblers How to measure

More information

Developing a Policy for Auto Transportation of Medical Oxygen in High Pressure Cylinders and Cryogenic Vessels

Developing a Policy for Auto Transportation of Medical Oxygen in High Pressure Cylinders and Cryogenic Vessels Developing a Policy for Auto Transportation of Medical Oxygen in High Pressure Cylinders and Cryogenic Vessels Since 1993, Applied Home Healthcare Equipment LLC has published numerous publications, videos,

More information

RISK ASSESSMENT A UNIVERSITY GUIDE TO PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK REGULATIONS 1992

RISK ASSESSMENT A UNIVERSITY GUIDE TO PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK REGULATIONS 1992 RISK ASSESSMENT A UNIVERSITY GUIDE TO PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK REGULATIONS 1992 PERSONNEL DIVISION REVIEWED AUTUMN 1999 CONTENTS Page 1 INTRODUCTION 1

More information

Recognition, Evaluation, and Control of Hazards

Recognition, Evaluation, and Control of Hazards Recognition, Evaluation, and Control of Hazards Latest revised date: October 26, 2011 Page 1 of 8 1.0 Introduction Memorial University has established a system for the recognition, evaluation, and control

More information

SEMPEO SQA Unit Code FP2M 04 Maintaining mechanical devices and equipment

SEMPEO SQA Unit Code FP2M 04 Maintaining mechanical devices and equipment Overview This standard covers a broad range of basic mechanical maintenance competences that will prepare you for entry into the engineering or manufacturing sectors, creating a progression between education

More information

Work Equipment: LOCAL EXHAUST VENTILATION

Work Equipment: LOCAL EXHAUST VENTILATION Health & Safety Services Safety Code of Practice 46: Part 4 2 nd Edition, September 2014 Work Equipment: LOCAL EXHAUST VENTILATION University of Reading 2015 Page 1 Contents 1 Scope... 3 2 Introduction...

More information

EMERGENCY RESPONDER INFORMATION

EMERGENCY RESPONDER INFORMATION EMERGENCY RESPONDER INFORMATION Ammonia is a Toxic Gas When released can come out as liquid and as a vapor cloud at the same time. Vapor cloud can be heavier than air Vapor cloud can be white or invisible

More information

IMO PROMOTION OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MARPOL 73/78 AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS

IMO PROMOTION OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MARPOL 73/78 AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION E IMO MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION COMMITTEE 53rd session Agenda item 16 MEPC 53/16 16 March 2005 Original: ENGLISH PROMOTION OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MARPOL

More information

Significant Change to Dairy Heat Treatment Equipment and Systems

Significant Change to Dairy Heat Treatment Equipment and Systems Significant to Dairy Heat Treatment September 2008 Page 1 Significant to Dairy Heat Treatment Equipment and Systems September 2008 1 Background Requirements for the assessment of dairy heat treatment equipment

More information

Application of fuzzy logic to explosion risk assessment

Application of fuzzy logic to explosion risk assessment International Symposium MKOPSC, 2010 College Station, TX, USA Application of fuzzy logic to explosion risk assessment A.S. Markowski*, M.S. Mannan**, A. Kotynia* * Process and Ecological Safety Division,

More information

Ingestion: - No special treatment is generally required. - Do not make the patient vomit to prevent risks of aspiration in the respiratory tract.

Ingestion: - No special treatment is generally required. - Do not make the patient vomit to prevent risks of aspiration in the respiratory tract. 1. PRODUCT AND COMPANY NAME: Product name: OIL - Commercial use: vacuum pump lubricant Supplier: ALCATEL VACUUM TECHNOLOGY FRANCE 98 avenue de BROGNY BP 2069 74009 ANNECY CEDEX FRANCE Telephone: (33) 4

More information

Frequently Asked Questions Directive 056 Facilities Technical

Frequently Asked Questions Directive 056 Facilities Technical Frequently Asked Questions Directive 056 Facilities Technical October 2017 This document clarifies and supports some of the technical requirements related to Directive 056: Energy Development Applications

More information

2600T Series Pressure Transmitters Plugged Impulse Line Detection Diagnostic. Pressure Measurement Engineered solutions for all applications

2600T Series Pressure Transmitters Plugged Impulse Line Detection Diagnostic. Pressure Measurement Engineered solutions for all applications Application Description AG/266PILD-EN Rev. C 2600T Series Pressure Transmitters Plugged Impulse Line Detection Diagnostic Pressure Measurement Engineered solutions for all applications Increase plant productivity

More information

Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 1536 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4799 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4845 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4848

Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 1536 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4799 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4845 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4848 Cal/OSHA Gas Systems for Welding GAS WELDING Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 1536 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4799 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4845 Cal/OSHA T8 CCR 4848 When performing gas welding, the following precautions, work procedures,

More information

SAFETY SHEET. (D.M. nr /01/92 - S.O.G.U. nr /02/92) Product: GAS CONTROL Sheet 4050 v. 0 Page

SAFETY SHEET. (D.M. nr /01/92 - S.O.G.U. nr /02/92) Product: GAS CONTROL Sheet 4050 v. 0 Page SAFETY SHEET Product: MAXY GAS Sheet: 4832 v. 1 1 PRODUCT AND SUPPLIER IDENTIFICATION Sheet No. 4832 v.1, dated 10/02/98 Product MAXY GAS Mixture of hydrocarbons Container Can (Spray can with threaded

More information

Flexible hoses - Non-metallic materials

Flexible hoses - Non-metallic materials CLASS PROGRAMME Type approval DNVGL-CP-0183 Edition December 2015 The electronic pdf version of this document, available free of charge from http://www.dnvgl.com, is the officially binding version. FOREWORD

More information

INSPECTION, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF GASFITTING WORK DONE UNDER SUPERVISION

INSPECTION, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF GASFITTING WORK DONE UNDER SUPERVISION ISSN 1172-3416 NZ GCP 1 : 1993 NEW ZEALAND GAS CODE OF PRACTICE for INSPECTION, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF GASFITTING WORK DONE UNDER SUPERVISION Issued by the Secretary of Commerce in accordance with

More information

Ball Float Steam Trap UNA 45 MAX, UNA 46 MAX, UNA 46A MAX PN 40/Class 300 DN 40, 50, 65

Ball Float Steam Trap UNA 45 MAX, UNA 46 MAX, UNA 46A MAX PN 40/Class 300 DN 40, 50, 65 Data Sheet 819346-02 Issue Date: 05/17 Ball Float Steam Trap UNA 45 MAX, UNA 46 MAX, UNA 46A MAX PN 40/Class 300, 50, 65 UNA 45hl MAX, UNA 46hl MAX, UNA 46Ahl MAX UNA 45v MAX with cover for mounting electrode

More information

Implementation of Directive 1999/92/EC : some concerns for the definition of ATEX zones

Implementation of Directive 1999/92/EC : some concerns for the definition of ATEX zones Implementation of Directive 1999/92/EC : some concerns for the definition of ATEX zones Jacques Chaineaux, Lionel Perrette To cite this version: Jacques Chaineaux, Lionel Perrette. Implementation of Directive

More information

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET 1. Product and Company Identification 1.1 Identification of the substance or preparation Flowershop Air Freshener 300ml 1.2 Company Identification Statestrong Limited, Boundary

More information

YATES SUPER SHIELD NURSERY. Combination insecticide and fungicide to control various pests and diseases on roses and ornamentals.

YATES SUPER SHIELD NURSERY. Combination insecticide and fungicide to control various pests and diseases on roses and ornamentals. 1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MATERIAL AND SUPPLIER Product Name: Recommended Use: YATES SUPER SHIELD NURSERY Combination insecticide and fungicide to control various pests and diseases on roses and ornamentals.

More information

GAS COMPRESSION SYSTEM

GAS COMPRESSION SYSTEM GAS COMPRESSION SYSTEM The gas compression system at HI 376 A consists of two natural gas turbine-driven Compressors (CBA-4020/4070). Both Compressors are needed for the volume of gas being compressed.

More information

SAFETY DATA SHEET. 1. Product and company identification. 2. Hazards identification. Page 1 of 5 Pot & Pan Detergent. Product Name POT & PAN DETERGENT

SAFETY DATA SHEET. 1. Product and company identification. 2. Hazards identification. Page 1 of 5 Pot & Pan Detergent. Product Name POT & PAN DETERGENT 1. Product and company identification SAFETY DATA SHEET Product Name Product Code POT & PAN DETERGENT C-P01 UN/ID No. Recommended use of the chemical Recommended Use DOT (US): NON HAZARDOUS Hand washing

More information

HIGH WIND PRA DEVELOPMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM IMPLEMENTATION Artur Mironenko and Nicholas Lovelace

HIGH WIND PRA DEVELOPMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM IMPLEMENTATION Artur Mironenko and Nicholas Lovelace HIGH WIND PRA DEVELOPMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM IMPLEMENTATION Artur Mironenko and Nicholas Lovelace April 27, 2015 Overview Introduction High Wind PRA Development Tasks High Wind PRA Lessons Learned

More information