In World War II, the last sea battle pitted the Navies of

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1 Palmyra Historical Society Special Edition Newsletter Fall 2016 An Inspiring and Tragic Story: The Battle off Samar Island Terry Tutton In World War II, the last sea battle pitted the Navies of Japan and the United States in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, in Philippine waters, and was the largest ever fought. The battle had no precedent. It involved more ships, more men and had more casualties than any other in world history. In World War II, there were nearly a half a million Us combat deaths and is a staggering number by today s standards (over 8000 from Wisconsin alone.) In an action that never really should have occurred, a small group of the smallest of American warships, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and escort carriers turned back the largest fleet the Japanese had put to sea in the entire war. This incredible feat changed the course of the war. The heroism displayed by a small group of American civilian sailors has become part of U.S. Navy legend. As long as there is a U.S. Navy, their story will be remembered and studied. Palmyra sailor, George Holcomb (Figure 1) was killed when his destroyer, the U.S.S. Hoel (Figure 2) was sunk. This is their story and George Holcomb s proud legacy. Figure 1. George Holcomb, Signalman Second Class USN Figure 2. USS Hoel in the screen of the Jeep carriers the day before the battle off Samar During the first and second year of the war in the Pacific, things did not go well for Americans but, as the war progressed, American forces, fighting island by island, gradually pushed the Japanese back toward their homeland. By 1944 the Japanese had their backs to the wall. In order to maintain a fighting force, the Japanese had to keep the shipping lanes open between the home islands and Southeast Asia, as their rubber and fuel oil came from there. They got most of their oil from Malaya and Indonesia. The American strategy was to cut the shipping lanes. The Japanese knew in the fall of 1944 that the Americans would attack in the Philippines or Taiwan (Formosa). Taiwan was closer to Japan but the U.S. had strong ties to the Philippines and Gen. Douglas MacArthur s I shall return phrase became a rallying cry. The Japanese made elaborate plans for any contingency. Due to the great distances involved, the U.S. Pacific Command (controversially) was split in two. Gen. MacArthur commanded the south Pacific land and sea forces. With his office in Brisbane, Australia, he had control of New Guinea and the chain of islands extending northwest. Adm. Chester Nimitz, headquartered in Pearl Harbor, commanded the huge expanse of the rest of the Pacific. On July 28, 1944, MacArthur and Nimitz met with President Roosevelt in Pearl Harbor to put their cases to the President. MacArthur thought the Philippines should be liberated and suggested the southernmost island of Mindanao as a starting point. Nimitz favored bypassing the Philippines and attacking Taiwan. Roosevelt decided on the Philippines. About this time Adm. William Bull Halsey s 3rd fleet was attacking many sites in the Philippines, and he noticed that Japanese air defenses were very weak. As a result he suggested bypassing Mindanao and attacking the more northerly island of Leyte at Leyte Gulf. This was decided upon. Under MacArthur the invasion at two sites in Leyte Gulf began Oct. 17,1944. The 7th fleet was commanded by Adm. Thomas Kincaid and protected the invasion area and points south, and just to the immediate north of the Gulf was a force of escort carriers and their escorts. The 7th fleet was made up of older, slower ships and included no large, fast carriers. Halsey s 3rd fleet was positioned to the north of Samar Island. Halsey s fleet consisted of the newest and fastest carriers, battleships, cruisers, and escort ships.

2 The Japanese had an intricate four-part plan for the defense of the Philippines. Success depended on perfect timing, which was hard to attain. They had no carriers with a full complement of planes. Without carrier plane protection, despite antiaircraft fire from the ships, even the biggest, fastest ships were vulnerable. The Japanese had lost over four hundred carrier planes four months earlier in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (Mariana s), and many more in the Taiwan carrier-plane air battle early in October. After this they could only put up about 100 planes. Not only had their carrier fleet been decimated but, more importantly, they had lost so many pilots they only had a few left that could land on carriers. This shortcoming would prove fatal. The fourth task force that put to sea from Japanese waters was comprised of carriers with almost no airplanes. Adm. Ozawa s was the carrier commander. His goal was to be discovered. He wanted to lure Adm. Halsey s powerful 3rd fleet north to meet him. That would leave the waters east of Samar Island, particularly San Bernardino Strait, unprotected. The Japanese were willing to sacrifice the almost empty carriers to lure Halsey north. For the whole war, Halsey had wanted to battle the Japanese carriers. Though Halsey was specifically ordered to protect San Bernardino Strait when the Japanese were sighted to the north, he took his whole fleet, consisting of a fast carrier Task Force 38 and four Task Groups that each had carriers, battleships, cruisers, and escort vessels. To understand why this happened we need to look at the Japanese. The scheme for defending the Philippines encompassed nearly the entire Japanese fleet, including 4 of 6 carriers, 9 of 9 battleships, 21 of 22 cruisers, and 31 of 35 destroyers. For the Japanese Navy, timing was vital. Ozawa s carrier fleet was steaming down from the north. Adm. Nishimura departed Brunei in Borneo with his 1st Striking Force, made up of only a few older ships and no carriers. Adm. Shima departed Japanese waters with the 2nd Strike Force, made up of even fewer ships. The idea was that these two forces would meet southwest of Leyte Gulf and approach the invasion area through the Suriago Strait. Adm. Kurita departed Lingga Roads, a large base south of Singapore. He was to steam west of the Philippine Islands, turn east into the Sibuyan Sea, go through San Bernardino Strait, and head south along the eastern side of Samar Island and into Leyte Gulf (Figure 3). With Kurita coming from the north and Nishimura and Shima from the south in a pincher action, they hoped they could destroy the American supply ships, disrupt Gen. MacArthur s landings and, thus, prevent an invasion of the Philippines. Kurita s Center Force was impressive. It consisted of five battleships, two of them Musashi and Yamato (Figure 4) being the largest ever built and possessing the largest (18.1 inch) guns. The best our battleships had were 16 inch guns. Also, the Center Force included 12 cruisers and Figure 3. Japanese and American naval routes 1. Four of Kurita s fleet sunk by American submarines. 2. Kurita s Center Force attacked by Halsey s carrier planes. The Musashi sunk. 3. Halsey s fast fleet heads north to attack Ozawa s carriers. 4. Nishimura s and Shima s fleets annihilated in Surigao Strait. destroyers. Despite the lack of carriers, this was the largest fleet the Japanese had put to sea in the entire war. Things did not go well for this huge fleet right from the start. About half way up the western side of the Philippine Islands, just west of Palawan Island, two American submarines sunk four Japanese cruisers, including Adm. Kurita s flagship. Kurita was lucky to be pulled out of the sea. The Yamato became his flagship for the rest of the battle. On 24 October, Kurita s fleet was in the Sibuyan Sea when Halsey s carrier planes found them and did considerable damage, Figure 4. Yamato, one of two of the largest battleships ever built. Both were sunk

3 including sinking the Musashi. A warship, no matter how big, is vulnerable to airplanes. Kurita had no air cover and the land-based Army planes he was supposed to get never came. In the afternoon he turned his fleet to the west and seemed to be retiring from the battle, or so Halsey thought. The onslaught from the air stopped. Kurita then did an about face and headed for San Bernardino Strait with the hope that Halsey would not be there. Despite their losses, the Japanese Center Force was still very formidable. The Strait is so narrow the Japanese ships came through single file about midnight. Now they headed south to the east of Samar Island and toward Leyte Gulf. Kurita could hardly believe the Strait had been left unguarded. North of Leyte Gulf, Adm. Kincaid, commander of MacArthur s 7th fleet, had three escort carrier task units. They went by the code names of Taffy 1, 2, and 3, the northern most being 3 and closest to San Bernardino Strait. Each escort carrier task unit was made up of 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, and 4 destroyer escorts. Escort task units were never meant for direct confrontational battle. Their function was to protect island landings and submarine patrol. Escort carriers were small and built on merchant ship hulls. They carried about 30 planes each and they were almost defenseless, having only one 5-inch gun and no armor. Sailors variously called them jeep carriers, Kaiser coffins, one torpedo ships, and some sailors called them combustible, vulnerable, and expendable. The screening ships were destroyers of the latest model, Fletcher Class, and called the greyhounds of the fleet and smaller destroyer escorts. George Holcomb s destroyer, the USS Hoel, was part of Taffy 3 and carried the screening ships commander, William Thomas. Taffy 3 was commanded by Adm. Clifton Ziggy Sprague. About dawn on October 25, a search plane from Taffy 3 reported a large fleet, including battleships and cruisers, heading directly toward Taffy 3 (Figure 5). Sprague couldn t believe they were Japanese ships, but assumed they were part of Halsey s fleet that had been guarding San Bernardino Strait. Further reports came in that said pagoda masts had been sighted. This could only mean Japanese ships because their battleships and cruisers had very tall masts. Ziggy Sprague knew he was in big trouble because his escort carriers could only make 18 knots, half the speed of the Japanese ships. It was a mismatch that should have dispensed with the whole of Taffy 3 in short order. Sprague ordered his 6 carriers to launch all planes with whatever ordnance they had on board. The planes were loaded with ordnance for bombing Japanese positions on land, but not ships. This plane launching took time, which Taffy 3 could ill afford. After the planes were launched, the carriers turned south with no real hope of outrunning the still dangerous Japanese fleet. As the big Japanese ships began shelling the American Figure 5. Japanese in pursuit of Taffy 3 (Battle of Samar) ships, Adm. Sprague ordered the destroyers to lay down a smoke screen. The smoke and two passing squalls gave the American ships a brief respite. Sprague said later that he expected to be swimming within minutes! As Sprague s carriers headed south, he ordered, Little boys, attack. It was almost unthinkable that 3 destroyers and 4 destroyer escorts should attack the mighty Japanese armada head on. The destroyer, USS Hoel, the destroyer with Palmyra s George Holcomb aboard, led this dangerous attack. Each destroyer had 10 torpedoes. To get in range to shoot them, however, they had to be fairly close. The destroyer s 5-inch guns could do no serious damage to the Japanese ships, but hits could be damaging to sailors caught on deck. The American destroyers released 39 torpedoes with only one hit. Meanwhile, U.S. carrier planes were successfully harassing the Japanese ships. Even though some of the planes had no weapons left, they kept flying just to harass and confuse the Japanese. The big Japanese ships began scoring many hits on the small ships. The Hoel headed for the nearest Japanese battleship, the Kongo, and launched 5 torpedoes. The Hoel s last 5 torpedoes were

4 Figure 6. Comparison of U.S. and Japanese shell sizes (a picture of a display at Turner Museum) The largest gun any ship in Taffy 3 had was 5 inches. A 5-inch casing is standing in the upper left of the picture. The battleships and the cruisers that our small destroyers and destroyer escorts were up against had guns of the diameters pictured to the right of the shell casing. The 16- and 18-inch shells did not need to hit a ship to cause great destruction. If the shell hit close to a ship, the concussion could rip ship seams open. These large caliber shells were usually reserved for use against carriers, battleships, and cruisers. Shell and bomb concussion caused serious wounds in sailors. launched at the cruiser Haguro. All the while the ships were firing at point blank range. The Hoel was hit by over two dozen large caliber shells (Figure 6) and soon became a twisted mass of steel. Bodies and body parts were soon all over the ship and the deck ran red with blood. Among other things, the mechanical steering was knocked out. George Holcomb, as a signalman whose battle station was on the bridge, was ordered aft to help with manual steering. Below deck in the rear of the ship, there was a wheel that could be manually turned to turn the rudder. The rudder could not be turned fast and the work was exhausting. George was never seen again.

5 Even though the Hoel was in dire straits, two of the forward 5-inch guns continued to fire as the ship settled into the water. Soon it was over. The ship sank at 8:55 am. The life boats were all shot up, so men in the water had a raft, floater nets, and their kapok life jackets. Most of the survivors in the water were wounded, some seriously. Out of a crew of 325 men on the Hoel, 267 were lost. Of the men in the water, 40 men died of wounds, exposure, and sharks. As the Hoel sailors were struggling for their lives in the water, the battleship Yamato and the cruiser Haguro steamed by at close range. The men in the water were not shot at. The destroyer Johnston and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts (Figure 7) met the same fate as the Hoel. The third destroyer, the Herrman, despite considerable damage, survived along with three destroyer escorts. The six escort carriers trying to escape to the south were all hit by shells but only the Gambier Bay was sunk, with the loss of 119 men. The escort carrier St. Lo was hit by the first kamikaze suicide plane of the war in just the right spot and there was a gigantic explosion and the ship sank quickly with the loss of 114 men. Why weren t all the escort carriers sunk quickly? Kurita, for all his experience, had never seen an American carrier and he thought he was seeing Halsey s big, fast armored carriers. Consequently, many of the shells that hit American carriers were armor piercing. They went through the ships and left only a hole the diameter of the shell. Figure 7. Destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts or Sammy B Just when the Japanese cruisers were closing in on the American escort carriers, they inexplicably turned north along with all of the ships of the Japanese fleet and steamed away from the battle. Had they stayed they could have destroyed all three Taffys and steamed into Leyte Gulf, their objective. When Adm. Ziggy Sprague was thinking he was about to lose all of his ships, the Japanese retreated. He couldn t believe it. Why in the world would they do that when the Japanese were poised to annihilate Taffy 3? The Japanese Center Force retreated back through San Bernardino Strait and back to Japan, but as they went their troubles were not over. In their trek west to get out of the battle area, planes from Halsey s carriers harassed them. The Japanese had suffered a loss from which they never recovered. The Japanese Navy was not a threat for the rest of the war. Yet, there was brutal fighting ahead, namely Iwo Jima and Okinawa and the bombing of Japan. It is difficult to convey what a mismatch the Battle off Samar was. Destroyers like the Hoel were not large. All three of the Taffy 3 destroyers were 376 feet long and 39 feet at the greatest width. They had five 5-inch guns, ten 40mm guns, seven 20mm guns, 10 torpedoes, and 28 depth charges. Nineteen of these Fletcher Class destroyers were lost during the war. Walking the length of the ship on the main deck and below deck, a person gets the idea of how small the warship really is. How over 300 men were packed into the ship is a mystery to me. Enemy battleships and cruisers were monstrous by comparison. The idea of our small ships going directly after these huge ships is almost unthinkable. When Adm. Ziggy Sprague ordered, Little boys, attack, every man on those ships knew they were on a likely suicide mission. The purpose, of course, was to try to buy enough time for the escort carriers to escape. I suggest that it is impossible for anyone other than a sailor to imagine being on a small ship being struck by more than two dozen large caliber shells (recall Figure 6). Men from the five American sunken ships were in the water and most of them were wounded. Prompt rescue would have saved many of them. All were hopeful. All were desperate. After two days and two nights and on into the third day, they were finally picked up. Forty of these men succumbed to wounds, exposure, or sharks. The men of Taffy 3 were under the command of Adm. Clifton Ziggy Sprague, and all three Taffy s were part of Adm. Kincaid s 7th fleet responsible to Gen. MacArthur. Sprague s first duty was to save as much of his task group as possible. It was also his responsibility to radio the fleet flagship in Leyte Gulf to request a rescue. He did not. It was Adm. Kincaid s duty to know what was going on with his fleet. He had to have known about the Battle off Samar and about the loss of ships. He also did not initiate a rescue mission. Captain Adair of Adm. Kincaid s staff was listening to radio traffic from pilots when he heard a pilot call in, Many men in the water. Then he gave the coordinates. Adair was curious enough to inquire whether a rescue mission had been sent out. It had not. He then took the initiative to get a rescue mission organized and on the way. To the men in the water, Capt. Adair was the true hero. Sprague, however, received the Navy Cross. Why did Adm. Halsey leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded? His orders said he was to guard the Strait but also included, In case opportunity for destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet offers or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task. Halsey felt that because they had done serious harm to Kurita s fleet and had not seen any covering Japanese planes, Kincaid s forces could handle Kurita. What he could have done is to leave just one task group out of his 3rd fleet to guard the Strait. He had to have known the Japanese had few carrier planes left and he had more than enough assets to overwhelm the Japanese carriers that were coming south from more northerly wa-

6 ters. Halsey, throughout the war, had wanted to battle the Japanese carrier fleet. Here was his chance, and he took all of his ships. When it became apparent that Kurita s Center Force was bearing down on Leyte Gulf, Kincaid radioed a desperate message to Halsey to send help. The message got back to Nimitz at Pearl Harbor and he sent Halsey a message that read, Turkey trots to water GG where is task force thirty four RR the world wonders. What the message was translated to was, Where is the task group that is supposed to be guarding San Bernardino Strait? All messages were sent in this fashion in an effort to confuse the enemy reading them. The translator should have stripped off the words the world wonders, but he didn t. When Halsey got this message, he was beside himself because he thought he was being reprimanded by the commander-inchief of the Pacific fleet. Halsey knew he was too far north to send timely help but he did anyway and, of course, they did not get to the area in time to do any good except for his carrier planes to harass the retreating Japanese. This whole affair bedeviled Halsey the rest of his life. None of the three admirals were ever taken to task for the breaches of duty discussed. As the whole battle was analyzed in later years, it was discovered there were plenty of mistakes made by both sides. The big question was why did Kurita turn his forces and retreat when on the cusp of victory? No one had an answer until after the war when Kurita was interviewed. He made a number of observations which follow but are told in my words. A. The Japanese had never seen an American carrier. Kurita and most of his subordinate officers knew that Halsey, with his fast fleet of big ships, were somewhere near the Strait. They misidentified the small escort carriers and thought they had run into Halsey s fleet. Misidentification of ships was common on both sides during the war. Not all of Kurita s commanders made this mistake. Several of the cruiser commanders that were the closest to the American carriers recognized the Taffy 3 carriers as escort carriers. They were mystified when Kurita gave the order to turn back. B. Kurita was not a young man. The previous day his flagship was sunk and he was lucky to be pulled out of the water covered with oil. The Musashi, one of two of the largest battleships in the world, had been sunk and Halsey s planes did considerable damage to other ships. All carrier planes were under the command of Adm. Marc Pete Mitscher. By the time the battle with Taffy 3 started early in the morning of October 25, Kurita had not slept for at least 36 hours and he was exhausted. (One of Mitscher s task groups of big fast carriers was commanded by war hero and Senator John McCain s father, John Slew McCain.) C. The Taffy 3 destroyers shot 39 torpedoes at Japanese ships with only one hit. If a torpedo wake is spotted soon enough, a ship can usually maneuver so the fish misses. To do this the target ship has to turn quickly so either the bow or stern are pointed directly at the oncoming torpedo(s) to present the narrowest target possible. One of the problems is that trying to evade torpedoes can take the ship away from the action. At one point the Yamato and another big ship found themselves 7 miles to the north of the action. All the while the Taffy 3 carrier planes were harassing the Japanese ships. D. Kurita knew his ships had enough fuel to get to Leyte Gulf but not enough to get home. The high speed maneuvering burned an excessive amount of fuel. E. The invasion of Leyte Gulf beaches had occurred five days earlier. Kurita reasoned that if he got to the Gulf, the transport ship would already be unloaded and maybe gone and there wouldn t be much damage he could do. F. Kurita knew that Adm. Kincaid had a battleship force just to the south of the Gulf and he suspected that Halsey s fleet would be approaching from the north and he would likely get caught between the two fleets. G. Kurita was one of the few Japanese officers that sincerely cared about his men. He did not believe in sending men to their deaths in a lost cause. All Japanese admirals were graduates of Etijima, the Japanese Naval Academy where the Code of Bushido was drilled into them. The same was true of the Army from private to general. The code was an allegiance to the Emperor. It was considered and honor to give one s life for the Emperor. To surrender or be captured was considered the height of disrespect and dishonor. That is why so many Japanese killed themselves rather than be captured. Bushido was literally beaten into both army and navy recruits. Boot camps were brutal in the extreme and created fanatical troops, many with mean streaks. Kurita believed to continue would be to lose ships and men for no good cause. In the whole battle of Leyte Gulf, considering all the separate battles, the Americans lost one fast carrier (the Princeton), two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort with the total loss of 1200 men. The Japanese lost four carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and 9 destroyers with the total loss of 10,000 men. [ t \ 6

7 Lt. John Dix, the communications officer on the Hoel, survived and was George Holcomb s immediate superior. His experience on that day had to have weighted heavily on him. He wrote an epic poem, Missing off Samar, of 36 pages, just about the action of the Hoel on October 25 and published it in He distributed it to Legion Posts and libraries in towns or nearby towns where all 253 Hoel dead were from. On the first page, Dix neatly printed a message specifically written for the man from that town. I found out about the poem and Dix s extraordinary effort because, during my research on this subject, I found out about and got in contact with the Johnston/Hoel Association. There is a monument to all the men lost on these two ships in a cemetery in San Diego. At this point neither of Palmyra s copies of the poem had survived as far as I could tell. One day not long after the Turner Museum had opened with an initial display, Palmyra Answers the Call to WWII, Dorothy Johnson, our treasurer, brought in a box of things that her husband, Norm, had salvaged one day when the Legionnaires were cleaning out the Legion Hall. Norm was an Army veteran and had served in Europe. I glanced in the box and one of the first things I saw was a little blue booklet, Missing off Samar (inscribed page, Figure 8). I could not believe my good luck. About three years later, the librarian called me and said they were cleaning and had a number of things they were going to throw out. Would I like to come and take a look? I did and, as I looked at the discarded material, I saw Missing off Samar. It was the library s copy of Dix s personally inscribed poem!. Both copies of the original poem by Dix had been found. It seemed like a miracle. Figure 8. Inscribed page about Holcomb in John Dix s Missing off Samar poem, presented to the Palmyra American Legion. The enormity Dix s poem projects suggests that what happened on Oct. 25, 1944, weighted heavily on his mind. I interviewed survivors from the Hoel, Johnston, and the Roberts. One survivor told me that the battle was so traumatic and mind numbing he could not talk or read about it for 40 years. Likely many of the survivors felt the same way. The Johnston/Hoel Association was not formed until years after the war but it was active when I was doing my research in Sometime after John Dix completed his poem of memorial tribute and the distribution of it, he committed suicide. [ t \

8 I have written about this subject before (Newsletter, Winter 1998). Since then, new information has come to light. The battle of Leyte Gulf was immensely complex. It was hard for me to understand it. It was hard to take what is detailed in the extreme and reduce it to a paper that is understandable, which I hope this paper is. When I started volunteering at the Palmyra Historical Society s Carlin House Museum, I found out almost immediately that we had almost nothing on WWII and even less on other wars. I resolved then that my first priority would be to collect and preserve WWII papers and artifacts. A major focus has been to bring to light the contribution made by Palmyra area men and women, both in service and on the home front. Now, 21 years later, we have in the Turner Museum extensive files and a substantial collection of artifacts and uniforms. The historical society has published two booklets on WWII and on the lawn, by our museum entrance, is a large granite monument that has the names of all the Palmyra area service men who have given their lives since the Civil War. Our gratitude is immeasurable. Freedom is as precious as life itself. It has been costly. Too many Americans lie in graves on land and in the deep all around the world. They gave their lives for our freedom. We can never repay our debt, but we can remember their sacrifice. Many adult Americans today know little about WWII and probably less about Korea and Vietnam. We must teach every generation about our history. We must guard our freedom with vigilance. As John McCrae wrote in his immortal post-wwi poem, In Flanders Fields, To you from failing hands we throw the torch; Be yours to hold it high. [ t \ The U.S. Naval Task Group The ships of Taffy 3 (Task Unit ) Rear Adm. Clifton Ziggy Sprague commander Escort Carriers (CVE) Fanshaw Bay (Sprague s flagship) St. Lo (sunk) White Plains Kalinin Bay Gambier Bay (sunk) Kitkun Bay Screening Ships Commander William Thomas Destroyers Hoel (sunk, George Holcomb s ship) Johnston (sunk) (GQ Johnny) GQ = General quarters = battle stations Heermann Destroyer Escorts Samuel B. Roberts (sunk) ( Sammy B ) Dennis Raymond John C. Butler World War II destroyers can be seen at various places around the country. The best place to see one is in Baton Rouge, LA. It is the USS Kidd and is identical to the Hoel. There is a very nice museum attached to the ship. [ t \ Acknowledgements Battle survivors in the Battle off Samar who were particularly helpful are: From the USS Hoel Sam Lucas, Glen Foster From the USS Johnston Bill Mercer, Bill Hollenbaugh, George Williams From the USS Samuel B. Roberts Jack Yusen Special thanks to Richard Haney PhD for proofreading and offering many useful suggestions and to Pauline Peyer for newsletter layout. Any errors are mine alone. [ t \ References Cutler, Thomas, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: Oct. 1944, 1984, Harper Collins Hornfischer, James, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. 2004, Bantam Prados, John, Storm of Leyte. 2016, nal Caliber

9 Figure 9. Battle at Betio Island While not related directly to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the information included with this island shot further exemplifies the need to remember the tragedies of war.

10 1916 Old Settlers Day 2016 If you joined us for Old Settlers Day this summer, you surely enjoyed the regaled stories of celebrants, Martha and Ike Parker. If you missed it, we hope you ll consider joining us for the event next summer. And perhaps you can encourage a few others to join the fun. Below is a blast from the past postcard announcement for Old Settlers Day, What a charming piece of history. 10 Palmyra Historical Society P.O. Box 265 Palmyra, WI 53156