NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION PART I. ... r FLIGHTMISSION RULE I,;;,"a_ I "'"""""" RATIONALE DOCUMENT " " I INST!

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1 NATIONAL AEONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTATION I PAT I INTODUCTION!... r FLIGHTMISSION ULE I,;;,"a_ I :::::::::::::::::::::::.:.:...:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:. "'"""""" ATIONALE DOCUMENT ::::::::::::::::::::::: ) 112GOUND" " " I INST!COMM i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i$i:i:i ::::::::::::::::::::::: AG_TDANCE i_i_ii_iii!ii_!_i_i_i_ APOLLO 14 r T.,_._o (AS-509/1IO/LM-8) _!iiiiiiiiii!iiiii ---'...i :::::::::::::::::::::::..,..:.:.:.:,:.:.:.:.:. ***,* - **%.%%*,. i<<<<<<<<<< :.'.:.',:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: _ii!iii::i::!i_iii!::_::! 4 SLV SYSTEMSI DEC":,,,',,,':,,5,,,0 15' si COO DINATED AN D PUBLISHED BY t_=o,t I "!!i"". FLIGHT CONTI_OL OPFI_AT,ONS BANCH,:,:*:*:.:@: '""''"_'*""" 19AEOMEDI CAL I MANNED HOUSTON,TEXAS SPACECAFT CENTE ImLUNAI SUFACE INDEXING DATA DATE i)p # T _:,_ SUBJECT b_atob LOg DISTIBUTION LIST APPENDIX A I 7

2 .. r.. F~IGHT MISSION U~E ATIONA~E DOCUMENT DECEMBE PEFACE THIS DOCUMENT IS COMPI~ED BY THE F~IGHT CONTO~ OPE~ATIONS BANCH (FCOB). F~IGHT CONTo~ DIVISION. MANNED SPACECAFT CENTE. HOUSTON. TEXAS. IT IS A COMP~EMENTAY DOCUMENT TO THE F~IGHT MISSION U~ES WHICH IS A CO~~ECTION OF ATIONA~E. HISTOY, AND SUPPOT DATA DESCIBIN~ O JUSTIFYING THE MISSION U~ES. COMMENTS CONCENING THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOU~D (FC2), BE DIECTED TO M. BAY M. WO~FE.FCOB THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE EPODUCED WITHOUT THE WITTEN APPOVA~ OF THE CHIEF, F~IGHT CONTO~ DIVISION. MANNED SPACECAFT CENTE. HOUSTON. TEXAS. II

3 CONTENTS II INTODUCTION PAGE AQ PUPOEE 1 B* ESPONSIBILITY 1 Ct OGANIZATION 1 If* SECTIONS 1 1 FLIGHT OPEATIONS GOUND GUPPOT INGTUMENTATION/CONNUNICATIONS 2-Z 3 TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 3-1 "4 $LV systems 4-1 S CSM SYSTEMS _'i 6 LM SYSTEMS SPACE ENVIONNENT 7-1 B LANDING AND ECOVEY AEONEDXCAL 9-i 10 LUNA SUFACE 10-1 I APPENDIX A " DISTIBUTION LIST A-1 Ill

4 INTODUCTION I PAT I I

5 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES PATI - :NTOOUCTZON ITEH Ao PUPOSE THE FLIGHT MIS6ZON ULE ATIONALE DOCUMENT CONTAZNS EXPLANATOY DATA THAT ALLOWS THE MISSION ULES TO BE SIMPLE STATEMENTS OF CONDITIONS/MALFUNCTIONS AND A BIEF ESULTANT ACTION ATHE THAN LENGTHY POCEDUAL DE$CIPTIO_S* THE ATIONALE ALSO POVIDES k OOCUHENTED COHPILATZON OF SYSTEM DATA PETINENT TO NON_NOHINAL SITUATIONS O ALTENATE NISSION PLANS* GENEAL POCEDUES FO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FLIGHT HISS ON ULE ATIONALE DOCUHENT AE CONTAINED. IN SECT]ON 3 OF THE HISSION ULE pepaation DOCUNENT* B* ESPONSIBILITY THE DIECTO OF FLIGHT OPEATION$o MEet HOUSTONt TEXASj HAS THE OVEALL ESPONSIBILITY FO THE PEPAATIONt CONTENTS AND CONTOL OF THE FLIGHT H SSION ULE ATIONALE DOCUMENTo IN ODE TO ASSIST THE DIECTO OF F6IGHT OPEATIONS IN THIS TAGK_ THE CHIEFo FCOBt HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS THE SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT AT THE HSC FO FLIGHT MISSION ULE ATIONALE* A5 THE SINGLE point OF CONTACTt FCGB IS THE CENTAL COODINATING AGENCY AND CONTOLS THE FLIGHT NIESION ULE ATIONALE DUING THE PUBLICATION PHASE ONLY* SINCE THE ULES CONTINUOUSLY CHANGEo NOT ALL ATIONALE ONFOHS TO ULES AS THEY EXIST AT PESENT* HOWEVE_ IN GENEALt THE ATIONALE IS OHPATIBLE WITH EXISTING ULES, THIS DOCUMENT WZLL NOT BE UPDATED* C* OGANIZATION THE FLIGHT MISSION ULE ATIONALE OOCUHENT IS SUBDIVIDED INTO TEN BASIC SECTIONS* " EACH SECTION IS OGANIZED SO THAT SUBGOUPINGS OF A SECTION FALL IN THE SAME ODE AS THE APPLICABLE PATS OF THE FLIGHT MISSION ULES DOCUMENT* MISSION EV I DATE SECTION GOUP. PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/IS/TO INTODUCTION 1

6 1 FLIGHT I OPEATIONS pat _ I

7 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center M_SSION ULES SECTION 1 - FLIGHT OPEATIONS ITE_ 2-1 PELAUNCH A, THE LAUNCH AZIMUTH CONSTA'INT OF 72 DEG IS AN ABITAY LIMIT WHICH POVIDES GOOD PEFOMANCE ESEVES AND MSFN COVEAGE= THE CONSTAINT FO 96 DIG IS AN EOO LIMIT TO ALLOW ACCEPTABLE _SFN COVEAGE THOUGH ]NSETI'ON, B, A LAND LANDING WITH A HOIZONTAL COMPONENT GEATE THAN 5_ FPS AT IMPACT IS CONGIDEED TO BE HAZADOUS TO CEW SAFETY= C. LAUNCH COVEAGE THOUGH INSETION IS EQUIED FO GOUND MONITOING FO ABOT SITUATIONS. COVEAGE FOM INSETION TO INSETION PLUS 60 SECONDS IS EQUIED FO VOICE COODINATION OF POST-INS_TION GO/NO-GOt MODE IV ABOTS* AND APOGEE KICK MANEUVEG, 2-2 LAUNCH A LAUNCH ABOT IS MOE HAZADOUS TO THE CEW THAN A EENTY. THE LANDING POINT CAN BE SELECTED FO A EENTY BUT CANNOT ALWAYS BE SELECTED FO AN ABOT. 2-3 EATH OBIT NO ATIONALE EQUIED* 2-11 TANSLUNA INJECTION A=I IA_ CEW SAFETY CONSIDEATION (B) IF THEE IS ANY FINITE POBABILITY OF ACHIEVING A LUNA LANDING MIS$ION_ TLI WILL BE ATTEMPTED* THIS PHILOSOPHY IS BASED ON THOSE SLV POBLEMS WHICH MAY DEGADE SLV PEFOMANCE BUT HAVE NO ADVESE IMPACT ON CEW SAFETY, PIO TO TLI IF IT IS CLEA THAT A LUNA LANDING MISSION IS NOT POSSIBLE_TLI WILL NOT BE PEFOMED BECAUSE OF A ISK VS GAIN EVALUATION. A,2 THE TLI COMMITS THE CSM TO A LONG ETUN TIME AND/O A LAGE ABOT _ANEUVE-- TMEEFOE_ THE CSM SHOULD HAVE EDUNDANCY IN ALL SYSTEMS BEFOE SUCH A COMMITMENT. B. WE DO NOT WANT TO CHANCE COMMITTING TO TLI WITH A BAD SYSTEM FO THE EASONS STATED IN A,ZD BUT WE DESIE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVEY OPPOTUNITY TO ACHIEVE A LUNA MISSION. THE TLI TAGETING IN THE IU IS SET UP TO ACCOMMODATE THE second AND THID EV OPPOTUNITIES. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS ULE IS CEW TAKEOVE FO A SATUN GUIDANCE EFEENCE FAILUE TO&E A, THE ISK OF CM DECOMPESSION IS CONSIDEED ACCEPTABLE TO ETIEVE THE LM, B, AN UNACCEPTABLE CEW ISK EXISTS IN PEFOMING A STAGING SEQUENLE OFF OF THE CSM/LM/S-IVB. IT CANNOT BE DETEMINEDt TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVELt WHAT THE DESCENT STAGE WILL DO UNDE THESE CICUMSTANCESt AND IF IT DID SEPAATE FOM THE S-IVBt AN EXTEMELY HAZADOUS ECONTACT CONDITION WOULD EXIST. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 FLIGHT GENEAL OPEATIONS Z-E

8 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 1 - FLIGHT OPEATIONS ITEF 2-13 TANSLUNA COAST A. NO ATIONALE EQUIED* Be IF SOME CONSUMABLE HAS DECEASED SO THAT A CICUMLUNA EATH ETUN PLUS A 12-HOU PAD CANNOT BE SATISFIEDP FLEXIBILITY IS DIMINISHED AND A SHOTE ETUN SHOULD BE SELECTED. THE Z2-HOU PAD I_ BASED ON THE TIME EQUIED TO MOVE THE LANDING POINT FOM ONE OCEAN TO THE OTHE, C, NO ATIONALE EQUIED. D. THE HYBID TAJECTOY FO THIS MISSION WAS DESIGNED TO SET UP CETAIN CONDITIONS FO LUNA OBIT OPEATIONS (LIGHTING AT TOUCHDOWNo 210-FT SITE COVEAGEt AND DPS ABOT CAPABILITY). IF LOT CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHEOt THEE IS NO EASON TO GO OFF A FEE ETUN TAJECTOY, E, NO ATIONALE EQUIED 2-14 LUNA OBIT INSETION A. WE DO NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE FEE ETUN TAJECTOy AND SPEND TIME IN LUNA OBIT lf ONE MOE FAILUE COULD BE CATASTOPHIC O A SAFE POWE LEVEL OF 40 AMPS COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED DUING TLC* B, IT IS PEFEABLE TO OO INTO LUNA OBIT AND ACCOMPLISH MINIMAL OBJECTIVES AS OPPOSED TO INHIBITING LOT BECAUSE THE NOMINAL MISSION CANNOT BE PEFOMED. C. NO ATIONALE EQUIED. D. NO ATIONALE EQUIED. E, A OPS MANEUVE IS AN ACCEPTABLE WAY OF ACHIEVING LUNA OBIT TO ACCOMPLISH LANDING SITE PHOTOGAPHY OBJECTIVES LUNA OBIT A THOUGH E. NO ATIONALE EQUIED, F, THIS ESEVES THE SPS BACKUP FO THE TEI THUS POVIDING EDUNDANT POPULSION SYSTEMS FO TEl INTAVEHICULA TANSFE THE ISK INVOLVED IN A HADSUIT IVT IS CONSIDEED ACCEPTABLE TO SAVE THE MIGSION DOCKED LM OPEATION NO ATIONALE EQUIED. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/1B/70 FLIGHT GENEAL OPEATIONS 1-2

9 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION }. - FLIGHT OPEATIONS ITEP_ 2-21 CSM/LM UNDOCKING AND SEPAATION A, INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY IS EOUIED TO PEVENT THE NEED FO AN EvT IN CASE EITHE VEHICLES DOCKING CAPABILITY IS LOST, B, EVT CAPABILITY IS EQUIED*TO GUAANTEE THAT THE LH CEWMEN CAN ETUN TO THE CSM EVEN THOUGH THE LM AND CSM CANNOT EDOCK FO ANY EASON* C. CEWMEN MUST EMAIN SUITED IN CASE THE NOMINAL MISSION IS ABOTED AND ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING IS EQUIED IN A HUY WITH THE ESULTANT PESSUE VESSEL INTEGITY HAZADS, THE CEWMEN AE NOT EQUIED TO WEA HELMENTS AND GLOVES= Do VHF VOICE BETWEEN LM AND CSM IS EQUIED TO POVIDE COMMUNICATION FO OPEATIONS OCCUING BEHIND THE MOON WHEN MSFN ELAY IS NOT AVAILABLE, 2-22 CSM LUNA OBIT UNDOCKED AoZt IF EDUNDANCY IS LOST IN CITICAL CSM SYSTEMS (LIFE SUPPDTP 5PS POPULSION AND GUIOANCE)P A,2 THE EMAINING CAPABILITY SHOULD BE USED TO ENDEZVOUS AND ETUN TO EATH ATHE THAN COMMIT TO LANDING, IF LM ESCUE CAPABILITY 1S LOST PIO TO CSM CICULAIZATION THE CSM SHOULD NOT DO THE CICULAIZATION BUN_ AND PUT THE VEHICLES INTO A ENDEZVOUS AND EDOCKING SITUATION, B, FO CSM FAILUES IN THIS PEIOD_ THE HOST TIME THAT COULD BE SAVED BY ABOTING IB TWO HOUS AND A ENDEZVOUS IS ALEADY EQUIED, ALSO_ CONTINUING KEEPS THE MISSION ON THE NOMINAL TIMELINE WHICH is EASIE TO PEFOM THAN A LM ABOT, O= THE ISK OF CONTINUING THE LUNA STAY WITH LOSS OF EDUNDANCY IN THE CSM IS NOT CONSIDEED WOTH THE GAIN LM PO[ THE LM WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAT POWEED DESCENT KNOWING THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PEFOM A LUNA LANDING WITH EVA, THE PIME OBJECTIVES ON THE H-2 MISSION CONCEN ACTIVITIES ON THE LUNA SUFACE AND IF THESE OBJECTIVES CANNOT BE METt THE GAIN IN PEFOMING A LUNA LANDING IS NOT WOTH THE ISK, 2-25 LM POWEED DESCENT A* EALY IN POWEED DESCENTt THE DPS WITH ITS EMAINING CONSUMABLES CAN BE ETAINED THOUGH INSETION= HOWEVEt FOM A CONSUMABLES LIFETIME STANDPOINT, IT is DESIABLE TO CONTINUE THE POWEED DESCENT TO PDI IN ODE TO ACHIEVE A ENDEZVOUS TIME WHICH I5 TWO HOUS SHOTE* Be DUING THIS TIME PEIODt THEE IS NO TIME ADVANTAGE TO ABOTING EALY AND IT IS PEFEABLE TO STICK TO THE NOMINAL TIMELINE IF POSSIBLE= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO Z41FNL L2/lfi/70 FLIGHT GENEAL OPEATIONS I Z-_

10 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION i - FLIGHT OPEATIONS ITE_ 2-26 LM LUNA STAY A, AN ANYTIME LIFTOFF COULD ESULT IN LAGE PHASING ANGLES AND EQUIE EXCEBSIVE AMOUNTS OF TIME TO ENDEZVOUS, THEEFOEt UNLESS THE CAPABILITY TO GET INTO OBIT 15 BEING LOST* IT 15 BETTE TO WAIT AND LIFTOFF WITH THE POPE PHASING, B, THE CAPABILITY EMAINING SHOULD BE USED TO ETUN TO THE CSM ATHE THAN CONTINUE THE MISSION, THE GAIN OF CONTINUING* DUING LUNA STAY WITHOUT EDUNDANCY, 15 N0T CONSlDEED WOTH THE ISK, 2-27 EVA A, EQUIED FO CEW SAFETY, EVA/MSFN VOICE IS EQUIED FO ADVISING THE CEW OP LM SYSTEMS STATUS. B. EQUIED FO CEW SAFETY, C, EQUIED FO CEW SAPETY, 1KM CONSTAINT ON THE OPS OPEATIONAL ADIUS IS BASED ON THE HEAT STOAGE CONSTAINT ON THE CEWMAN= THE 3 KM BSLS5 OPEATIONAL ADIUS IS BASED ON OPS 02 CONSUMABLE CONSTAINT FO LOW PUGE PLOW* D, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ONE EVA CEWMAN AND MSFN IS EQUIED FO EPOT OF LM STATUS AND PO EVALUATION OF PLSS STATUS, E, THIS ODE OF EGESS/INGESS WILL ASSUE THE CU WILL BE IN THE LEFT POSITION AND THE LMP IN THE IGHT POSITION FO ASCENT* F, THE EVA CEWMAN MusT BE ABLE TO INGESS APIDLY, THE TOUBLE SHOOTINGo EQUIING THE PESSUIZATION, COULD ESULT IN A SUIT POBLEM EQUIING A PESSUIZED CABIN BE ETAINED, G, EQUIED PO CEW SAFETY- H, A food FT LIMITATION FO i MAN EVA WILL SATISFY THE EQUIEMENT FO ALSEP DEPLOYMENT, I, TWO LIFE SUPPOT SYBTEMS AE MANDATOY TO SUPPOT A CEVT SHOULD CSN/LM DOCKING NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED, J, MAINTAIN BACKUP OPEATIONAL CAPABILITY TO ETUN TO THE LM SHOULD THE PLSS FAIL, K. THE CAPABILITY TO ASCEND WITH THE PLSS ONBOAD 15 EQUIED SHOULD AN ASAP ASCENT BE EQUIED O SOME POBLEM AISE PECLUDING CABIN DEPESS, L, TWO GOUND COMMANDS AE EQUIED TO FIE THE ABE MOTE_ HOWEVEt THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH GOOD OPEATIONAL PACTICE, 2-28 ASCENT IT IS NOT CITICAL THAT ASCENT BE ACCOMPLISHED ON THE NOMINAL ASCENT EV* IF A SYSTEM CITICAL FO ASCENT IS LOST IT IS PEFEABLE TO DELAY ASCENT TO OBTAIN FULL SYSTEMS CAPABILITY, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL 12/15/7( FLIGHT GENEAL OPEATIONS 1-4

11 p NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ - FLIGHT OPEATION_ ITE_ 2-29 ENDEZVOUS A_E THE LM ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS IS THE PIME METHOD AND IS KNOWN BEST* ALSO* IT IS BETTE TO USE THE LM POPULSION CONSUMABLES AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND CONSEVE THE CSM POPELLANTS* IF PLANE EOS WILL EXIST AT INEETIONp IT IS PEFEABLE TO PEFOM THE LONG NDZ TO ALLOW TIME FO A MANEUVE TO COECT THE PLANE EO, 2-30 ETENTION OF THE LM ABE STAGE IF CITICAL CSM SYSTEM EDUNDANCY IS LOST, CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO ETAINING THE LM ASC STAGS TO POVIDE THIS EDUNDANCY* THE DELTA VELOCITY ESEVED FO WEATHE AVOIDANCE MAy BE UTILIZED TO ETAIN THE NONIMAL ETUN TIME WITH THE ASC STAGE ATTACHED. 2-3Z TANSEATH COAST A* TO LESSEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A CM SKIPOUT O TO POVIDE CEW MINIMUM O LOADSe B* IT IS CONSIDEED SAFE TO GO INTO THE CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED THAN TO PETUB THE TAJECTOY AFTE El - 24 HOUS* Co THE EALIE THE 'MIDCOUSE COECTION THE LESS THE COECTION HAS TO BE AND THE MOE EFFICIENT 1T IS. Do SP5 CONSUMABLES MAY BE USED FO MCC S IF THE SM C5 consumables BECOME CITICAL* 2-32 ALTENATE MISSION A* EoO, B* L_O* IF A TLI IS NOT PEFOMED A HIGH INCLINATION E,O, MISSION WILL BE DONE TO OBTAIN PHOTOGAPHS FO EATH ESOUCE PUPOSES. AN LOI WILL BE PEFOMED THOUGH NO LANDING IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN DESCATES PHOTOGAPHY, C. THE FIST ODE OF PIOITY IN ETAINING O JETTISIONING THE LM IS TO EVALUATE ITS USEFULNESS IN POIVIDING CITICAL CAPABILITY THAT MAY BE LOST IN THE CSM. IF A DPS TEl 1S NOT TO BE PEFOMED THE LM SHOULD BE IMPACTED ON THE LUNA SUFACE TO PEVENT POTENTIAL COLLISION POBLEMS IN FUTUE MISSION. IF THE LM IS ETAINED FO TEIP THE PEFEED METHOD OF DISPOSAL IS OCEAN IMPACT TO PLACE THE TG/ POSSIBLE LM FAGMENTS FOM IMPACTING NEA POPULATED LAND AEAS* THE THID CHOICE* EMIAN IN LOoo WILL EXIST 1F IMPACT IS NOT POSSIBLE* NO CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO BINGING THE LM BACK AT TEI TO SATISIFY A PEFEENCE TO ACCOMPLISH AN OCEAN IMAPCT* THE ETUN TIME AND UNIOUE POCEDUES EUUIED WOULD POHIBIT THIS* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL _2/15/7C FLIGHT GENEAL OPEATIONS 1-5

12 2 GOUND SUPPOT. I NST/COMM

13 NASA - Manned Spac,cnft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 2 - GOUND iuppot INSTUMENTATIONICOMMUNICATIONS 1 4-2A I CONiOLE TELEMETY DISPLAYi A~E MANDATOY FO THE DISPLAY TO FIC'S OF MANDATOY SIV PAAMETES lone PCM GO~ND STATION IS EQUIED TO DIVE THE STIP CHAT ECODES WHICH DISPLAY MANDATOY SIV ANALOGS AND EVENTS. 4-4All ONE INDEPENDENT TAC~ING SOUCE IS EQUIED FO EAL TIME VEIFICATION OF LIV NAVIGATION AND FO POTECTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF THE LAUNCH ENVELOPE. 4-4A21 BOTH IU AND CMC TELEMETY VECTOS AE EQUIED TO INSETION PLUS 60 SECONDS FO DETEMINATION OF THE TAJECTOY AND OBIT. AN OBIT GOINO GO WILL BE MADE BASED ON THIS DATA. 4-4B I TCC DATA SELECT CAPABILITY IS MANDATOY FO SELECTION OF THE BEST AVAILABLE DATA SOUCE FO POCESSING. 4-5A 1 EITHE THE FD LOOP O AFD CONF LOOP IS MANDATOY FO USE AS THE PIME MCC INHOUSE VOICE LOOP FO MISSION CONTOL, 4-5BI ACCESS TO AT LEAST ONE OF THE PIME OIS CONTOL CICUITS IS MANDATOY FO COODINATION OF THE TEMINAL COUNT MCC-PAD ACTIVITIES, 4-5C lone DIECT VOICE CICUIT TO THE SO IS EQUIED FO TAJECTOy VEIFICATION AND BOOSTE SAFING, 4-5E lone AIG PATH VIA GSFC IS EQUIED TO ALL LAUNCH PHASE EMOTED SITES AND TO AT LEAST TWO SITES PE EVOLUTION THOUGH EV 3 FO VOICE COMMUNICATION WITH THE FLIGHT CEW, EMOTED 4-6A lone IBM 360/7» Is MANDATOY TO PEFOM AS THE MOC FO THE POCESSING OF MANDATOY SIV PAAMETES AND TAJ~~TOY DATA. 4-6C lone UNIVAC 494 IS MANDATOY ONLINE TO THOUGH POCESS MANDATOY SIV PAAMETES TO THE MOC. 4-7 lone MITE SYSTEM IS MANDATOY AS THE MASTE MCC TIMING STANDAD TO SUPPOT MANDATOY TCC/CCATS COMPUTES, 4-8A 1 BUS Al IS MANDATOY TO POVIDE UNINTEUPTABLE POWE FO THE DITV CONVETES, 4-8B I BUS A2 IS MANDATOY TO POVIDE UNINTEUPTABLE POWE FO THE DITV DATA DISTIBUTOS AND 20 SECONDS INTEUPTABLE POWE FO THE VSM, MI$SION IEV I DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 141FNL 11211!1/701GOUND SUPPOT 1 MCC INST/COMM 2-1

14 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION Z - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS 4-8D BUS 82 IS MANDATOY TO POVIDE 20 SECONDS INTEUPTABLE POWE FO MOC AND SS CONSOLES. 4-9A TEN D/TV CHANNELS AE MANDATOY TO POVIDE DISPLAYS TO MOC F/C'S OF MANDATOY S/V PAAMETES DUING THE LAUNCH PHASE THE FDO LAUNCH DIGITALS AE MANDATOY ON D/TV FO CONTINGENCY OBIT INSEKTION MANEUVE DATA MONITOING OF TFF LIMITS. AND 4-9B2 THE GAMMA VS. V PLOT IS MANDATOY ON AT LEAST ONE DISPLAy SYSTEM TO POVIDE FDO THE NECESSAY INFOMATION EQUIED TO CALL A80TS BASED ON LV BEAKUP, THE FO LAUNCH DIGITALS AE MANDATOy ON D/TV TO POVIDE A MONITO FO MODE III AND MODE IB MANEUVE DATA DISPLAY OF THE GAMMA (EI) VS. VIEI) PLOT IS MANDATOY TO MONITO FO G-LIMIT VIOLATIONS DUING LAUNCH O ABOT. 4-9B1 DISPLAY OF THE INSETION/INJECTION DIGITALS ON THE D/TV IS MANDATOY TO POVIDE A BASIS FO MAKING A GO/NO GO DECISION ON THE CSM G&N THE VSM IS MANDATOY TO POVIDE EQUIED D/TV OPEATION. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/1~/70 GOUND SUPPOT inst ICOMM MCC

15 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 2 - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS I I _-IOA ONE GSFC UNIVAC 494 COMMUNICATIONSPOCESSOIS MANDATOY TO THOUGH POCESS MANDATOY S/V PAAMETESTO THE MCC CCATS. _-IOB ONE WBD {50*0 KBPS) LINE IS MANDATOYBETWEEN GSFC AND MCC FO THE TANSMISSION OF MANDATOYS/V PAAMETESo.-10C_ ONE INCOMING {JJ} TTY CICUIT FOM GSFC TO MCC IS MANDATOY FO THE TANSMISSION OF LOW-SPEED ADA DATA, 4-11B ONE SOUCE OF ECEIVINGUSB TM 15 MANDATOYTO POVIDEMANDATOYCSM PAAMETES. _-12B IU CC5 (OP-lE) O IU VHF (DP-1) TELEMETY IS MANDATOY TO MONITO SIVB BULKHEAD DELTA PESSUE FOLkOWING S/C SEPAATION DUING TD&Ee CGM USB TELEMETY IS MANDATOY FO ABOT CUES TO MCC FOM LIFTOFF THOUGH $-IVB CUTOFF PLUS SO SEC. _-12D VHF O USE A/G VOICE IS MANDATOY FO MCC ABOT CUES THOUGH INSETION PLUS 60 SECONDS, _-13B ONE IU TM DOWNLINK IS EQUIED TWICE PE EVOLUTION THOUGH EV 3 TO POVIDE SIVB SYSTEMS DATA TO SUPPOT A TLI GO/NO GO* CSM USG TM IS MANDATOY TWICE PE EVOLUTION THOUGH EV S TO POVIDE CSM SYSTEMS DATA TO SUPPOT A TLI GO/NO GO. _-13C USB TACKING CAPABILITY AT AT LEAST TWO MSFN STATIONS PE EVOLUTION IS EUUIED THOUGH EV 3 TO POVIDE A TAJECTOYBASE FO TL! MANEUVEPLANNING* &-%30 A/G COMMUNICATIONS (VHF O USBI AT TWO MSFN BTATIONE PE EVOLUTION IS EQUIED THOUGH EV 3 TO POVIDE CAPABILITY TO ALET CEW OF POBLEMS AFFECTING CEW SAFETY, _-14 CCS TELEMETY I$ MANDATOY TO DETEMINE VEHICLE STATUS BEYOND VHF ANGE DUING POST S/C _&B SEPAATION, CCS COMMAND 15 MANDATOY TO POVIDE COECTIVE CAPABILITY FO AN SIVB BULKHEAD DELTA POBLEMS DUING TDSE, #-15 CSM USB TELEMETYt TACKINGt AND VOICE SUPPOT MUST BE AVAILABLE AT TWO 65 FOOT STATIONS TO _tb&c POVIDE MANDATOY SUPPOT DUING TLC AND LPO, _IESION :EV )ATE SECTION GOUP PAGE _POLLO 14 'NL!/15/70 3OUND SUPPOT GSFC/KSC/MSFN (NBT/COMM 2-3

16 NASA - Manned: Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 2 - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS 2O-lA BASELINE EQUIEMENT (ALL PHASES EXCEPT LAUNCH) 1. TWO-WAY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SPACECAFT, A= DEFINITION OF LOSS TWO-WAY SPACECAFT TO SPACECAFT VHF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS IS CONSIDEED LOST WHEN NO TWO-WAY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SPACECAFT CAN BE OBTAINED IN ANY OF THE FOU VHF VOICE CONFIGUATIONS, B, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF TWO-WAY VHF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SPACECAFT MEANS THAT SPACECAFT TO SPACECAFT COMMUNICATIONS IS LIMITED TO THOSE PEIODS WHEN BOTH SPACECAFT AE IN LINE OF SIGHT OF THE MSFN AND MSFN ELAY CAN BE PEFOMED= IN AODITION_ IF THE TOTAL LM VMF SYSTEM FAILS_ TWO-WAY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WITH AN EVA WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE. C. SPECIFIC OPEATIONS IMPACT {EFEENCE SPECIFIC MISSION ULE (i) NOMINAL MISSIQN (A) UNDOCKING AND PE-PDI - LOSS OF VHF VOICE BETWEEN SPACECAFT LIMITS CEW COODINATION TO THOSE PEIODS WHEN BOTH SPACECAFT AE IN MSFN LINE OF SIGHT, SINCE CEW COODINATION PLAYS A LAGE PAT IN PEFOMING A ENDEZVOUSt WE WILL NOT COMMIT TO A ENDEZVOUS WITHOUT THE CAPABILITY TO PEFOM THIS COODINATION, HOWEVEt AFTE PEFOMING A MANEUVE THAT COMMITS THE LM TO A ENDEZVOUS, THE LOSS OF VHF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE SPACECAFT IS NOT SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FO MISSION TEMINATION, (B) POWEED DESCENT " VEHICLE TO VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS AE NOT CITICAL TO COMPLETING A LANDING O PEFOMING A SAFE ABOT FOM POWEED DESCENT. (C) LUNA STAY - SINCE THE NOMAL LUNA STAY COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGUATION I5 MSFN ELAYP THE LUNA STAY NEED NOT BE ABOTED. DEPENDING ON THE VHF FAILUE MOOE_ EVA ACTIVITIES MAY STILL BE possible, (D) EVA - FO A TWO-MAN EVAw VHF VOICE BETWEEN ONE EVA CEWMAN AND THE LM IS NECESSAY FO EVA TO HSFN AND MBFN TO EVA COMMUNICATIONS. THIS LINK ENABLES THE GOUND CONTOLLES TO INFOM EVA CEWMAN OF LM AND EVCS/PLS5 OPEATING STATUS. LOSS OF THIS LINK COULD COMPOMISE CEW SAFETY= (El ENDEZvOuS AND DOCKING - EGADLESS OF WHICH SPACECAFT PEFOMED THE ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS AND OOCKINGt THE SAME POBLEMS AND CONSTAINTS WOULD BE PESENT DUE TO THE LOSS OF VFo SINCE THE LM IS NOMALLY THE ACTIVE VEHICLEt THEE WOULD BE NO EASON TO PEFOM ANYTHING OTHE THAN A LH ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS= {2) ALTENATE MISSION IF VHF COMMUNICATIONS IS LOST PIO TO UNDOCKING AND BOTH VEHICLES HAVE GOOD S-BAND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MSFN_ THEN AN UNOOCKING AND STATION KEEPING TYPE MISSION WILL BE CONSIDEED= DUE TO CONTINUOUS VEHICLE TO VEHICLE COODINATION EQUIED DUING ENDEZVOUS, CSH CICULAIZATION WILL NOT BE PEFOMED IF VHF IS LOST, DUING LUNA STAY_ A ONE-MAN EVA CAN BE PEFOMED IF EVCS TO EVCS VOICE COMMUNICATIONS THOUGH THE SPACECAFT IS POSSIBLE. 2. TWO-WAY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CSM O LM AND MSFN DUING ALL DOCKED ACTIVITIES AND BETWEEN BOTH SPACECAFT AND MSFN DUING UNDOCKED ACTIVITIES, A, DEFINITION OF LOSS IF WHILE IN LINE OF SIGHT OF THE MSFN EITHE THE LM O THE CSM CANNOT ESTABLISH DIECT TWO-WAY S-BAND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MSFN IN EITHE TO NOMAL O A BACKUP MODE OF OPEATIONS, THEN TWO-WAY S-BAND VOICE COOMMUNICATIONB BETWEEN THAT VEHICLE AND THE MSFN IS CONSIDEED TO BE LOST. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 GOUND SUPPOT FUNCTIONAL INST/COMM COMM-GENEAL 2-_

17 d NASA - Manned Spacecraft Canter MISSION ULES BECTION 2 - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS.m A CONT. B* GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF ONE VEHICLEtS S-SAND FOCES THAT VEHICLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE MSFN VIA ELAY THOUGH THE EMAINING VEHICLE. IN ADDITION_ VEHICLE TO VEHICLE COMMUNICATION IS CONSTAINED TO LINE OF SIGHT MISSION PEIODS WHICH IS AS LITTLE AS 20 MINUTES PE LUNA EVOLUTION DUING THE LUNA STAY MISSION PHABEe SHOULD THE EMAINING VEHICLE LOSE ITS S-BAND CAPABILITYt THEN BOTH SPACECAFT WOULD HAVE NO VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MSFN UNTIL THEY GET WITHIN VHF ANGE DUING TECe C. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT {EFEENCE SPECIFIC MISSION ULE 20-14) {i) NOMINAL MISSION CA) UNDOCKING THOUGH PDI AND LUNA STAY - THE SPACECAFT WHICH HAS LOST S-BAND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE COMMITTED TO ONLY 20 MINUTES OF MSFN CONTACT PE EV, DUING LUNA STAY OPEATIONS, THIS LIMITED CONTACT COMPOMISES GOUND CONTOLLE CAPABILITY TO INFOM THE CEW OF potentially HAZADOUS MISSION O SPACECAFT SITUATIONS. (B) LO GATE TO TOUCHDOWN - A COMMUNICATIONS FAILUE DUING THIS PEIOD IS NOT SEIOUS ENOUGH TO WAANT THE HAZADS INVOLVED IN AN ABOT OPEATION W_THOUT S-BAND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS, {C] ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING - A LM ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING IS STILL PEFOMED SINCE SPACECAFT TO SPACECAFT COMMUNICATIONS IS STILL AVAILABLE VIA VHF, S-BAND ELAY WILL ALLOW THE MALFUNCTIONING SPACECAFT TO TALK TO THE MSFN. (2) ALTENATE MISSIONS IF ONLY LM B-BAND COMMUNICATIONS IB LO_T AND VHF COMMUNICATIONS IS AVAILABLE BETWEEN SPACECAFTp ALTENATE MISSIONS WHICH DO NOT COMMIT THE LM AND CSM TO A ENDEZVOUS MAY BE PEFOMED, IF CSM S-BAND IS LOSTt NO ALTENATE MISSION WILL BE PEFOMED WHICH JEOPADIZES AVAILABILITY OF LM S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS FO TEC, NOTE---LOSS OF ONE O BOTH CSM TANSPONDES WHICH WOULD MEAN NO EDUNDANCY O COMPLETE LOSS OF CSH/HSFN COMM WOULD EWUIE UTILIZATION OF THE LM FO COMM DUING TANSLUNA COAST. 20-IS LAUNCH THEE AE NO COMMUNICATIONS FAILUES FO WHICH THE LAUNCH/INSETION PHAGE WILL BE TEMINATED. A. DEFINITION OF LOSS SPACECAFT TO MSFN COMMUNICATIONS IS CONSIDEED LOST IF COMMUNICATIONS CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED IN ANY OF THE FOU VHF CONFIGUATIONS O THE USB MODE, B, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT CONTINUING A LAUNCH/INSETION WITHOUT SPACECAFT TO MSFN COMMUNICATION5 IS NOT AS HAZADOUS AS SUBJECTING THE CEW TO A LAUNCH ABOT. ADEQUATE ONBOAD MONITOING DEVICES EXIST TO KEEP THE CEW COGNIZANT OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECAFT STATUS. 2D-it POWEED DESCENT ADDITIONAL EQUIEMENTS LM VOICE EQUIED TILL LO GATE, THEE AE NO CSM COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FAILUES FO WHICH LM POWEED DESCENT WILL BE TEMINATED, A* DEFINITION OF LOSS SAME AS 20-l-A. B, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT {EFEENCE SPECIFIC MISSION ULE 20-14) FOM PDI IGNITION TO TOUCHDOWNt THE FLIGHT CONTOLLES HAVE THE PIME ESPONSIBILITY FO IDENTIFYING SLOW DIVEGENCES IN THE GUIDANCE SYSTEMS (PNGS AND AGS}, MEASUEMENT ACCUACIES AE SUCH THAT THE MSFN CAN DETEMINE PIO TO LO GATE THAT THEE AE NO SLOW TENDS IN EITHE G_IDANCE SYSTEM THAT WOULD PECLUDE USING EITHE SYSTEM TO LO GATE, OBVIOUSLY_ TO ADVISE THE CEW OF THE ABOVE DETEMINATIOND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE LM MUST BE MAINTAINED TO LO GATE. MISSION tev DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 _NL 2/15/70 _OUND SUPPOT FUNCTIONAL INST/COMM COMM-GENEAL 2-5

18 ' NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 2 - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS 20-1D LUNA STAY ADDITIONAL EQUIEMENTS I. FO TWO-MAN EVA--VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MSFN AND ONE EVA, 2, FOM ONE-MAN EVA--VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MSFN AND LM O EVA PLUS DUPLEX VOICE BETWEEN THE LM AND EVA CEWMAN, 3. DUPLEX VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN BOTH EVA CEWMEN, A. GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT TWO-WAY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE MSFN AND AN EVA CEWMA_ (EITHE OIECT O VIA ELAY FOM THE OTHE CEWMAN) AND TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION5 BETWEEN EVA CEWMEN IS CONSIDEED A FLIGHT SAFETY DUE TO THE HOSTILE ENVIONMENT AND THE LACK OF EADILY AVAILABLE BACKUP HADWAE. B* SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EFEENCE SPECIFIC MISSION ULE 2O-lb THU 20-2_) FO LOSS OF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CEWMEN (EITHE EVA-I TO EVA-2 O EVA-2 TO EVA-I)_ THE MISSION MAY BE CONTINUED SINCE THE CAPABILITY STILL EXISTS TO COMMUNICATE BETWEEN CEWMEN VIA THE LM, THE LOSS OF THE ELAY CAPABILITY IN THE LM WILL ESTICT THE FLIGHT PLAN TO A ONE-MAN EVA SINCE A DUAL EVA WOULD ESULT IN THE LO_S OF ALL MSFN TO CEWMAN COMMUNICATIONS, 20-2 THIS DOCUMENTS THE PIME AND ALTENATE COMMUNICATION MODES FO BOTH A DUAL AND SINGLE EVA, AGB THE PIME NUDES AE DESIGNED TO ALLOW DUPLEX VOICE BETWEEN EVAtS_ VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE EVA CEWMEN AND THE MSF_, AND THE TANSFE OF EVA DATA FOM BOTH CEWME_ TO THE MSFN, THE BACKUP MODES AE DESIGNED TO ALLOW DUPLEX VOICE BETWEEN THE EVAISp VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE EVA CEWMAN AND THE MSFNp AND DATA FOM ONE EVA CEWMAN, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1W FNL 12/_5/70 GOUND SUPPOT FUNCTIONAL INST/COMM COMM-GENEAL 2-6

19 r NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center msslon mules SECTION 2 - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS 20-T/lO S 20-7 THOUGH DOCUMENT THE MANNE IN WHUCH THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WILL BE MANAGED FO THIS MISSION AND THEEFOE AE POCEDUAL IN NATUE AND EQUIE NO ATIONALE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAtE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/15/70 3OUND SUPPOT FUNCTIONAL [NST/COMM COMM-MNG 2-7

20 NASA - M=nned Spacecraft M SSION ULES Center SECTION 2 - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS ITEF 20-1Z LOSS OF TWO-WAY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SPACECAFT THE TWO MISSION PHASES THAT AE GEATLY COMPLICATED BY THE LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN VEHICLES AE ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING, HOWEVE_ IF THE MALFUNCTION OCCUS AFTE THE VEHICLES AE SEPAATED ENOUGH TO HAVE COMMITTED TO A ENDEZVOU$_ LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS IS NOT SUFFICIENT EASON TO TEMINATE THE ENTIE FLIGHT PLAN INCLUDING LANDING AND EVA. 20-1L LOSS OF TWO-WAY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MSFN LOSS OF TWO-WAY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CSM AND THE MSFN PIO TO TLI WILL BE SUFFICIENT LAUSE FO EENTEING SINCE THE CONTINUATION OF THE MISSION WOULD EQUIE A SUCCESSFUL TLI AND TD AND E TO EESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS VIA THE LM* EVEN THEN THE LOI MANEUVE WOULD NOT BE PEFOMED. LOSS OF CSM/MSFN COMMUNICATIONS POST-TLI WILL NOT BE CAUSE FO AN ABOT BUT IT WILL NO GO LOI. COMMUNICATIONS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY POWEING UP THE LM TO ACCOMPLISH A CICUMLUNA FLIGHT BUT THE ADDED ISK OF LO1 WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED SINCE UNDOCKING COULD NOT BE PEFOMED ONCE IN LUNA OBIT DUE TO CSM/MSFN COMMUNICATIONS FAILUE* ATIONALE FO THE LOSS OF LM/MSFN COMMUNICATIONS IS THE SAME AS STATED PEVIOUSLY IN THE ATIONALE FO MISSION ULE 2O-I-C. NOTE---FO 20-14At LOSS OF ONE O BOTH CSM TANSPONDES WHICH WOULD MEAN NO EDUNDANCY O COMPLETE LOSS OF CSM/MSFN COMM WOULD EQUIE UTILIZATION OF THE LM FO COMB DUING TANSLUNA COAST* LOSS OF TWO CSM AUDIO CENTES EATH OBIT WILL BE CONTINUED SINCE THE EMAINING CSM AUDIO CENTE CAN POVIDE THE EQUIED COMMUNICATIONS, TLI WILL NOT BE PEFOMED SINCE THE LOSS OF THE EMAINING AUDIO CENTE WOULD ESULT IN A TOTAL LOSS OF CSM COMMUNICATIONSm ALTHOUGH THE LM COULD BE USED FO VOlCEt IT HAS NOT BEEN EXTACTED O CHECKED OUT PIO TO TLIo AFTE TLI HAS BEEN PEFOMED0 THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED BUT IS NO GO FO LOT WITH THE LOSS OF TWO AUDIO CENTES, UNDOCKING WILL NOT BE PEFOMED BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE LOSS OF CGM/MSFN COMMUNICATIONs. HOWEVEt ONCE POWEED DESCENT 15 INITIATED IT WILL BE CONTINUED, IN ALL CASES_ IN EVENT OF LOSS OF TWO CSH AUDIO CENTESt THE LM WILL BE ETAINED FO POSSIBLE BACKUP COMMUNICATIONS EVA-EVA COMM A, DEFINITION OF LOSS VOICE FOM EVA TO EVA IS CONSIDEED LOST IF ONE EVA CANNOT ECEIVE THE OTHE* B, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT THE LOSS OF VOICE FOM EVA-TO-EVA EQUIES A CHANGE IN COMMUNICATION MODES= BECAUSE THE EVCS OPEATES ON DUPLEX ONLY_ DUPLEX VOICE MUST BE E-ESTABLISHED FO SAFE LUNA SUFACE OPEATION* C* SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (1) LOSS OF VOICE FOM EVA-2 TO EVA-Z (EF MISSION ULE 20-Z6)* IN THE DUAL EVA PIMS MODEt EVA-2 TALKS TO EVA-I ON THE 279,0 MHZ (FM) LINK, THEEFOEt A LOSS OF VOICE FOM EVA-2 TO EVA-E EQUIES A CHANGE TO A BACKUP MODE, EVA-I EMAINS IN THE A COMM switch POSITION AND EVA-2 SWITCHES TO B POSITION TO E-ESTABLISH DUPLEX COMMUNICATION* 121 LOSS OF VOICE FOM EVA-1 TO EVA-2 (EF MISSION ULE IN THE DUAL EVA PIME MODEt EVA-1 TALKS TO EVA'Z ON THE 259*7 MHZ (AM) LINK* THEEFOE_ A LOSS OF VOICE FOM EVA'Z TO EVA-2 EQUIES A CHANGE TO A BACKUP MODE, EVA-L SWITCHES TO B AND EVA-2 SWITCHES TO A TO E-ESTABLISH DUPLEX COMMUNICATION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 GOUND SUPPOT FUNCTIONAL INST/COMM OMM-SPECIFIC 2-8

21 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 2 - GOUND SUPPOT INSTUMENTATION/COMMUNICATIONS EVA DUPLEX OMM A* DEFINITION OF LOSS DUPLEX VOICE IS CONSIDEED LOST IF BOTH CEWMEN CANNOT DIECTLY COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHE IN PIME O BACKUP MODES* B* GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT THE LOSS OF DUPLEX VOICE INDICATES LOGS OF DIECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TwO CEWMEN* SUBSEQUENT FAILUES IN THE LM COULD ESULT IN THE COMPLETE ISOLATION OF EACH CEWMANe THE EVCS OPEATES ON DUPLEX ONLY BETWEEN THE TWO CEWMANe THEEFOEI DUPLEX VOICE 15 MANDATOY FO SAFE LUNA SUFACE OPEATION, Ce SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT 11) NOMINAL EVA - TWO HEN (EF MISSION ULE 20-18) FO DUAL OPEATION ON THE LUNA SUFACEr THE CEWMEN EGUIE EVA-TO-EVA VOICE TO CONDUCT SAFE LUNA OPEATIONS. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED EITHE IN THE PIME MODEt O BACKUP NODEBI IF THE EVA TO EVA DUPLEX VOICE COMMUNICATION CANNOT BE ESTABLISHEDt THE EVA MUGT BE TEMINATED, 12) ALTENATE EVA - ONE MAN (EF MISSION ULE 20-21) FO A ONE-MAN EVAt THE EVA AND LM CEWMEN EQUIE DUPLEX VOICE BETWEEN EACH OTHE FO SAFE LUNA SUFACE OPEATIONS* THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED EITHE IN THE PIME O BACKUP MODEl IF DUPLEX VOICE COMMUNICATION CANNOT BE ESTABLISHEDP THE EVA MUST BE TEMINATED_ EVA-MSFN COMM ' A* DEFINITION OF LOSG TWO-WAY VOICE BETWEEN MSFN AND CEWMEN I$ CONSIDEED LOST IF TWO-WAY VOICE.CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN MsFN AND EITHE O BOTH OF THE CEWMEN* BI GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT THE LOSS OF TWO-WAY VOICE BETWEEN HGFN AND BOTH CEWMEN IS UNACCEPTABLE FO SAFE LUNA SUFACE 0PEATIONB* SUBBEQUENT FAILUES IN EITHE EHU UNITS O THE LM NOTICED BY MSFN CANNOT BE ELAYED TO THE CEWMENe C= SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (1) NOMINAL EVA - TWO MEN (EF MISSION ULE 20-19) FO DUAL OPEATION ON THE LUNA GUFACE_ TWO-WAY VOICE BETWEEN MGFN AND ONE EVA IS MANDATOY FO SAFE LUNA SUFACE OPEATION, IF THE PIME EVCS MODE IS LUSTt A BACKUP MODE IS NECESSAY TO CONTINUE THE EVA* SIMPLEX VOICE THOUGH THE LM IS ACCEPTABLE WHEE ONE CEWMAN CAN ECEIVE. MSFN ONLYt AND THE OTHE CEWMAN CAN TANSMIT TO MSFN ONLVBUT THE TWO CEWMENMU_THAvE buplex VOI_E BETWEEN EACH OTHE* IF TWO-WAY VOICE WITH MGFN CANNOT BE E-ESTABLIGHEDo THE EVA MUST BE TEMINATED. (2) ALTENATE EVA - ONE MAN (EF MISSION ULE 20-2OI FO A ONE-MAN EVAJ TWO-WAY VOICE BETWEEN MSFN AND AT LEAST ONE CEWMAN IG MANDATOY FO SAFE LUNA SUFACE OPEATIONS* IF THE PIMAY EVCS MODE IS LOSTt A BACKUP MODE IS NECESSAY TO CONTINUE EVA, IF TWO-WAY VOICE WITH MSFN CANNOT BE E-ESTABLISHEDp THE EVA MUST BE TEMINATBDJ MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/1_/70 GOUND SUPPOT FUNCTIONAL INST/COHM COMM-SPECIFIC 2-9

22

23 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISS ON ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE mn m_mln 5-1 TEMINATION OF THE LAUNCH PHASE A_B&C COMMENTS THE ACCEPTABLE TAJECTOY ENVELOPE IS DEFINED BY A VEHICLE BEAKUP LINEr AN ABOT ENTY =IG== LIMITt AND A PEENTY SEQUENCING TIME EQUIEMENT, i 1, LAUNCH VEHICLE BEAKUP IS CAUSED BY CONTOL O GUIDANCE SYSTEM FAILUES WH CM ESULT IN EXCESSIVE ANGLE OF ATTACK AND AEODYNAMIC LOADING ON THE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECAFT, THE FIST STUCTUAL FAILUE OCCUS AT THE CM/BM TENSION TIES AND IS FOLLOWED SHOTLY BY LAUNCH VEHICLE BEAKUP, THE LIMIT LINE IS BIASED BY 8 SECONDS FO DATA SYSTEM DELAYS AND EACTION TIME, 2, THE ENTY lagll LOAD ESULTING FOM A LAUNCH ABOT IS LIMITED TO 1E IIGll, 3, THE NOMAL MINIMUM PEENTY SEQUENCING TIME ITFF) EQUIEMENT IS DEFINED BY THE TIME EQUIED FO m-- PATICIPATION (AI DATA SYSTEM DELAY (B) COMMUNICATIONS DELAY (C) J-2 TAILOFF (D) CSM/SmIV8 SEPAATION {El 2-SECOND SPS BUN (IF EQUIED FO ATE DAMPING) (FI SM JETTISON (GI MANEUVE CM TO ENTY ATTITUDE, THE SUM OF THE EQUIED TIMES PLUS AN OPEATIONAL PAD ESULTS IN 100 SECONDS AS THE LIMIT, THE NOMINAL TAJECTOY MAINTAINS MOE THAN 180 SECONDS AFTE TOWE JETTISON, FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES POCEDUE A, VEHICLE BEAKUP GAMMA VB* V ON THE LEFT POJECTION PLOTTEo MSK OO4Ol SS PLOTBOAD l, B, ENTY IIGI= LIMIT - GAMMA El V$, VEI ON MSK 0041 AND ON SS PLOTBOAD 3, C* PEENTY SEQUENCE TIME - FDO LAUNCH DIGITALSt MSK 0043_ TFF VG* IP ON MSK 0333 AND SS PLOTBOAD 2, A, INDICATION TAJECTOY TACE DEVELOPS TEND TOWAD ANY ONE OF THE LIMITS, B, ACTION 1, GO TO YELLOW STATUS, 2* IF TIME PEMITBt BIEF FD ON CONDITION, 3, GO ED IF CONDITION WOSENS* 4. GIVE FD MAKt TANSMIT ABOT EQUEST AT VIOLATION OF LIMIT, 5* CAPCOM'WILL ELAY MAK TO POVIDE SECOND ABOT CUE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3mZ

24 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITEP --J D TEMINATION OF THE LAUNCH PHASE COMMENTS THEE AE CETAIN LAUNCH VEHICLE FA1LUE_ WHICH COULD CAUSE COl CAPABILITY TO BE LO&T AFTE IT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND CONSEQUENTLY WILL NOT ESULT IN A IIGO II OBIT. THESE FAILUES AE CAUSED BY GUIDANCE POBLEMS AND ESULT IN LAGE FLIGHTPATH ANGLE EXCUSIONS WITHOUT VIOLATING A ATE LIMIT* VS I5 AN IMPULSIVE COMPUTATION OF THE DELTA V EQUIED TO ACHIEVE A SAFE OBITa BY TEMINATING POWEED FLIGHT WHEN VS STATS INCEA$1NGt WE PEVENT THE SIZE OF THE MODE IV MANEUVES FOM BECOMING EXCESSIVE AND IN MOST CASEG STOP A DEVIATING VEHICLE FOM LOSING A COl CAPABILITY ALEADy GAINED, DEPESSED TAJECTOIES ESULTING FOM THESE TYPE FAILUES OFTEN ESULT IN LAND IP_E WITH MAGINAL O INSUFFICIENT FEE FALL TIME TO PEFOM A MODE III MANEUVE. PATICIPATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES GAMMA VS, VS DISPLAY FDO LAUNCH DIGITALS POCEDUE A. INDICATION - EITHE VS ON GAMMA VS VS BEGINS TO INCEASE O V/VS ON DIGITALS BEGINS TO DECEASE. B. ACTION i. GO TO YELLOW STATUS 2_ BIEF FD IF TIME PEMITS 3t GO TO ED IF DIVEGANCE CONTINUES 4, GIVE FD HAK AND TANSMIT ABOT EQUEST 5, CAPCOM WILL ELAY MAK AS SECOND CUE MISSION EV DATE BECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-2

25 NASA - Manned Spacecraft ulssio UL_S Center SECTION _ - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITE_ 5-1E TEMINATION OF THE LAUNCH PHASE COMMENTS ONCE THE LV HAS INSETED THE SPACECAFT INTO OBITo ANY CONTINUED THUSTING BEYOND THE INSETION point WILL PLACE THE G/C INTO INCEASINGLY ItOFF NOMINAL _t OBITS FOM WHICH A TLI CANNOT BE PEFOMED, THE TIMES EQUIED TO ;1All ECOGNIZE AND VEIFY AN OVESPEED CONDITION ItBll TANSMIT A EQUEST TO THE CEW TO TEMINATE S-IVB THUGTINGt AND licit THE TIME EQUIED FO THE CEW TO ACTUALLY TEMINATE THUSTING AE AS FOLLOWS--- (A) = B SECS (ECOGNIZE AND VEIFY), (B) 8 $EC5 (EQUEST CUTOFF), {C) 8 SECS (CEW SHUTDOWN). ALLOWING THE LV TO THUST FO THE PEIOD OF TIME EQUIED TO ECOGNIZE THE OvESPEED CONO TION W_LL PLACE THE LV AND S/C INTO AN OBIT INSTANTANEOUSLY CHAACTEIZED BY AN HA OF 200 N, M, THIS THEN BECOMES THE OVESPEED LINE OF THE PLOTBOAD FO WHICH THE LV WILL BE MANUALLY SHUT DOWN. AS THE BOOSTE WILL THUST FO AN ADDITIONAL 16 SECS BEFOE SHUTDOWN CAN BE EFFECTEDD THE S/C AND $LV WILL END UP IN AN OBIT CHAACTEIZED BY AN HA PATICIPATION GDO FOG FD CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES POCEDUE A. GAMMA VS, V PLOTBOAD, B. GUIDANCE OFFICE A. INDICATION - TAJECTOY TACE MOVES BEYOND NOMINAL INSETION CONDITIONS TO 200 N.M. LINE AFTE THE NOMINAL TIME OF GUIDANCE CUTOFF. B. ACTION - FOO WILL IMMEDIATELY INFOM THE FD THAT ItWE AE OVESPEED I; AND tiequest SHUTDOWNtl, THE CEW WILL THEN ATTEMPT SHUTDOWN VIA THE S-IVB/S-II STAGING SWITCH O THE THC IF THE SWITCH SHOULD FAIL TO EFFECT /0, SHOULD THE THC NOT YIELD C/O CONDITIONSp THE FDO WILL VIA A VEBAL CODE_ EQUEST THE EO TO TANSMIT MFCO. MISSION EV DATE!SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 ITAJECTOY AND LAUNCH 3UIDANCE 3-3

26 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center ulsslo, eules SECTION 3 _ TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-IF TEMINATION OF THE LAUNCH PHASE COMMENTS DUING FIST STAGE FLIGHT_ SHOULD AN OTHEWISE NOMAL OPEATING BOOSTE DEVIATE BEYOND THE EXIT HEATING LINE_ CATASTOPHIC SPACECAFT FAILUES DUE TO ATMOSPHEIC FICTION WILL ESULT, THIS ATMOSPHEIC HEATING WEAKENS THE STUCTUAL INTEGITY OF THE SMD SLAP AND DETEIOATES THE ELIABILITY OF THE PYOTECHNICS SUOUNDING THE SM AND THE SLA* PATICIPATION GOOt FOOt FDt CAPCOMp FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCE GAMMA VS, V PLOTBOAD POCEDUE A, INDICATION* TAJECTOY TACE DEVIATES TOWAD THE EXIT HEATING LINE, B, ACTION* 1, GO TO YELLOW STATUS, 2, IF TIME PEMITS_ BIEF THE FD* _* GO TO ED STATUS IF CONDITION wosens* 4, GIVE FD IIMAKI=t TANSMIT ABOT EQUEST UPON VIOLATION OF EXIT HEATING LIMIT* 3, CAPCOM WILL ELAY _IMAK II AS THE EQUIED SECOND ABOT OUE* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-4

27 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ - TAJECTOY ANO_OIDANCE 5-1G TEMINATION OF LAUNCH PHASE FO DECEASING ALTITUDEo COMMENTS--- SHOULD THE ELV EXPEIENCE A PEMATUE CUTOFF DUING THE LAUNCH PHASE VAIOUS ABOT MODES AE AVAILABLE TO EFFECT A SAFE ETUN OF THE B/C, THIS SAFE TAJECTOY ENVELOPE IS FUTHE MAINTAINED BY TAKING EFFECTIVE ABOT ACTION BEFOE THE SLV ENTES AN UNSAFE EGION, ONE CONCEN IS THE AMOUNT OF TIME EQUIED* ONCE ABOT ACTION HAS BEEN TAKENP TO IISHAPE t THE ABOT TAJECTOY AND PEPAE THE B/C FO ENTYo SHOULD A THUSTING MANEUVE BE EQUIED TO EFFECT THIS a*$hapingi _ SUFFICIENT TIME MUST BE POVIDED AT THE COMPLETION OF THIS MANEUVE FO ENTY PEPAATIONSo THIS TIME IS CALLED TFF (TIME OF FEE-FALL).AS LONG AS THE LAUNCH TAJECTOY ALTITUDE POFILE EMAINS ABOVE APPOX. BO N.M, THIS TFF CAN BE MAINTAINED. SHOULD9 HOWEVE, A DECEASING TEND IN ALTITUDE BE OBSEVED TFF MINIMUMS CANNOT BE GUAANTEEDQ THIS IS ESPECIALLY TUE IF THE CUENT FEE FALL IMPACT POINT IS ON A LAND MASS, IN THIS CASE THE TIME EGUIED TO SHAPE THE TAJECTOY (THUSTING MANEUVE TIME) INCEASES NON-LINEATY TO A POINT WHEE A LAND IMPACT CANNOT BE AVOIDED. PATICIPATION-'- FDO_ FDp FOt CAPCOM DATA SOUCES--- LAUNCH DIGITALSo H VS D POCEDUE--- WHEN THE ALTITUDE HAS ISEN ABOVE 80 N,M, AND THEN DECEASE BACK TO 80 N.MQ THE FOG WILL INSTUCT TO FD OF SAME AND COMMAND ABOTo MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-5

28 4 $ NASA - Manned MISSION Spacecraft Center ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-2 MOLD LES UNTIL MODE II CAPABILITY IS ESTABLISHED COMMENTS MODE II ABOTS EQUIE A MINIMUM TIME, BETWEEN ABOT AND DYNAMIC PESSUE = 16 PSF* OF loo SECONDS FO OIENTATION TO ENTY ATTITUDE* A TFF OF BO SECONDS TO 300_ FEET POVIDES THE EQUIED TIME, THEEFOE_ THE PEVIOUS ABOT CAPABILITY* LES_ SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED PIO TO ACHIEVING THAT CAPABILITY* DEPESSED TAJECTOIES CAN ESULT IN NOT MEETING THIS EQUIEMENT BY THE NOMINAL LES JETTISON TIME, PATICIPATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCE POCEDUE PIHAYo PDO LAUNCH DIGITALS, MSK 41 SECONDAYI TFF VS, IP DISPLAY* MSK 333 A* INDICATION TFF AS INDICATED ON ABOVE DATA SOUCES IS LESS THAN BO SECONDS AFTE STAGING, B* ACTION FDO ANNOUNCE OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOPP _'TAJECTOY I$ LOW HOLD TOWE JETTI=* CAPCOM ELAY SAME EPOT TO CEW OVE AI TO GOUND LOOPI CEW DELAY TOWE JETTISON= WHEN TFF EXCEEDS 80 SECDNDSP FDO ANNOUNCE OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOP I'OO FO TOWE JETT**, CAPCOM ELAY TO CEWt CEW JETTISON LES, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO ia FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-6

29 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-3A MODE IgP IIIo 1Vl APOGEE KICK COMMENTS MODE lit lilt IVt APOGEE NiCK A, THE GOUND HAS THE CAPABILITY OF SELECTING THE BEST OF FIVE DATA SOUCES {APLt SATP USBt I* AW* SHIP C-BAND} AND AS SUCH IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO EVALUATE THE PEFOMANCE OF THE CMC AND ANY EQUIED ABOT O COl MODE, FO MODE IV MANEUVESb POCEDUES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED SO THE CEW_ UPON ECEIVING A MODE IV ECOMMENDATION AND A Go EVALUATION OF THE CMCt CAN PEFOM A MODE IV MANEUVE WITHOUT ASSITSTANCE FOM THE GOUND, IN THE EVENT THE CMC IS DECLAED NO-GO FO MODE IV MANEUVESt THE GOUND WILL ASSUME EEPONSIBILITY FO SUPPOTING DATA EQUIED, B, MODE IVIS EXECUTED WITH THE CMC WILL BE PLANNED FO 1,5 MINUTES AFTE S-IVB C/O. A GOUND COMPUTED BACKUP SOLUTION WILL BE AVAILABLE FO EXECUTION AT 2+05 FOM S-1VB C/O, C, THE GOUND WILL BE PIME FO COMPUTATION OF MODE III ABOT MANEUVES BECAUSE THE CMC IS NOT ADEQUATELY CONFIGUED TO COMPOTE O MONITO MODE Ill MANEUVES WITHOUT GOUND ASSISTANCE, D, APOGEE KICK MANEUVES WILL BE USED WHEN THEY POVIDE A CONSIDEABLE DELTA V SAVINGS OVE MODE IV SOLUTIONS, THIS LIMITE UBE TO HIGH FLIGHT PATH ANGLE DISPESED CUTOFFS, THE CMC WILL BE PIME FO COMPUTATIONt THE GOUND WILL POVIDE APOGEE TIME TO AID CEW, IF THE CMC IS NO-GOt THE GOUND WILL POVIDE A COI PAD, E, AS LONG G&N IS tlgol=* THE CEW WILL HAVE A MOE IMMEDIATE CAPABILITY TO DETEMINE S-IVB OVESPEED CONDITIONS* IN ODE TO'CONSEVE TLI CAPABILITYt THE CEW WILL EFFECT AN 5-IVB CUTOFF WHEN* BY MONITOING Vl H AND H DOT O HA AND HPt THE CEW HAS DETEMINED A SAFE INSETION OBIT HAS BEEN OBTAINED, IN THE EVENT THE G&N 15 NO-GOP THE GOUND WILL ASSUME THE ESPONSIBILITY OF DETEMINING OVESPEED CONDITIONS AND WILL EQUEST THE CEW TEMINATE S-IVB THUST. PATICIPATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS TEAM CAPCOM FLIGHT FLIGHT CEW DIECTO DATA SOUCES FDO LAUNCH DIGITAL5 POCEDUE FO LAUNCH DIGITALS PEIGEE ADJUST TABLE A= INDICATION B* ACTION TAJECTOY IS NO-GO AT $-IVB CUTOFF DOE TO TAJECTOY POBLEMS* 1, FDO MAKS MODE IV CAPABILITY DUING POWEED FLIGHT. 2, AT S-IVB CUTOFF FDO MAKES GO/NO-GO, 3, IF OBIT IS NO-GO AND MODE IV CAPABILITY HAS BEEN ACHIEVEDP CAPCOM ELAYS MODE IV ECOMMENDATION, 6, IF OBIT IS NO-GO AND MODE IV CAPABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED_ ETO MAKES ABOT MODE DECISION AND FDO BENDS ABOT EQuEsT LIGHT ON, 5, EITHETHE FDO (MODE IV) O ETO (MODES II AND III) PASS APPOPIATE PADS TO CAPCOM FO ELAY TO THE CEW* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _4 FNL _2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-7

30 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-3B INTEUPTION OF ABOT AND COI MANEUVES COMMENTS ONE MINUTE AND 40 SECONDS'PIO TO _O0K FEET IS FELT TO BE THE MINIMUM TIME TO GET SEPAATED AND TO GET BLUNT END FOWAD BEFOE BEING AEODYNAMICALLY CAPTUED (EFEENCE ULE 5-1), FO THIS EASON_ ALL THUSTING MANEUVES SHOULD BE TEMINATED AT TFF = 1+#0, NOMINALLY THE ONLY MANEUVES THAT APPOACH THIS LIMIT AE HIGH DELTA V MODE IIi MANEUVES AND EALY MODE _VtS= PATICIPATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW ETOFIE OFFICE DATA SOUCES FDO LAUNCH DIGITALS CMC TFF EADOUT (EGISTE 3 VO6N##) TFF VS IP PLOTBOAD H VS D PLOTBOAD POCEDUE At INDICATION B= ACTION EFEENCES 1, TFF AS INDICATED ON ABOVE souces IS LESS THAN 1+40 AND DECEASING DUING A POWEED FLIGHT MANEUVE* I, IF TFF IS MAGINAL O A KNOWN TFF INTEUPT WILL OCCUo FDO O FO WILL GO AMBE AND BIEF FLIGHT PIO TO THE BUN, THE CAPCOM WILL ELAY THE CAUTION TO THE FLIGHT CEW. A. AAWG 2, WHEN THE TFF 15 VIOLATEDP FDO WILL ANNOUNCE ABOT AND SEND A AND B ABOT LIGHT ON* CAPCOM WILL ELAY ABOT TO THE FLIGHT CEW, 3, FO WILL DETEMINE THE ENTY POFILE AND PITCH ANGLE AT 30OK FEET= THE FO WILL ANNOUNCE ENTY POFILE AND PITCH ATTITUDE OVE FD LOOP AND CAPCOM WILL ELAY THE DATA, 4, THE ENTY POFILE WILL BE EITHE FULL LIFT O L9O DEPENDING ON LAND IP EVALUATION-- THE PITCH ANGLE AT ENTY WILL BE BASED ON A HAND PLOT, 5. FLIGHT CEW WILL EXECUTE SPS OFF BASED ON ONBUAD AND GOUND CUESD SEPAATE ASAP IN THE PESENT THUSTING ATTITUDE= OIENT THE CM BEF AND FLY THE ECOMMENDED BANK ANGLE, FO NO-VOICE OIENT THE CM USING THE HOIZON EFEENCE AND FLY L90. B, CEW OPINION MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO I# FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-8

31 t x NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION UL[S SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-3C INTEUPTION OF MODE II_ lli_ IV COMMENTS MODE III AND MODE IV MANEUVES DEIVED BY THE LAUNCH POGAM OF THE TCC AE DISPLAYED ONLY IF THE INSTANTANEOUS ALTITUDE DUING THE MANEUVE WILL EHAIN ABUVE 75 NoMo UNDE CETAIN CICUMETANCEE* SUCH AS MANEUVES PEFOMED AT WONG ATTITUDE_ LOW SP5 THUSTP O DELAYED IGNITION TIMEr IT IS POSSIBLE FO THE E/C TO DOP BELOW 75 NoH, DUING THE BUN, IN MOST OF THEBE CAEESt A LAND IP WILL EXIST AT THIS POINTt IF ANY IP EXISTS AT ALL, BECAUSE OF THE LOW ALTITUDE AND MAGINAL FEEFALL TIMEr TEMINATION OF THE MANEUVE IN FAVO, OF A MODE III IS NOT FEASIBLEo SIMULATION EXPEIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT UNDE THESE CICUMSTANCESt IT IB UETTE TO CONTINUE THE MODE IV MANEUVE AS LONG AS THE CUENT HP IS AT LEAST 300K FT, FO HP LESB THAN 3DOK FT* THE MANEUVE WILL BE TEMINATED AND AN ENTY ATTEMPTEDo PATICIPATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCE TFF VS* IP FDO LAUNCH DIGITALS FO LAUNCH DIGITALS ACTION 1* GO TO YELLOW STATUS* 2. BIEF FD IF TIME PEMITS* 5. AT LIMIT EGUEST FLIGHT TO TEMINATE BUNe 4e CAPCOM ELAY EQUEST* 5_ ETO FOLLOW WITH ENTY DATA* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 =NL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-9

32 L NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION E - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-3D UTILIZATION OF LIFT TO AVOID LAND FO LAUNCH ABOTS COMMENTS THE CM IS DESIGNED FO LAND LANDINGS BUT THEY MAY CAUSE VEHICLE STUCTUAL BEAKUPS AND POSSIBLE INJUY TO THE FLIGHT CEW, FO THIS EASONt EVEY ATTEMPT IS MADE TO INSUE A WATE LANDING, THE ULE APPLIES WHEN ENTY TAJECTOY CANNOT BE ALTEED WITH A BUN TO AVOID LAND= PATICIPATION ETOFIE OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCE5 POCEDUE FO LAUNCH DIGITALS PHI VS= LAMBDA PLOTBOAD FO ENTY DIGITALS A, INDICATION NO BUN FULL LIFT IMPACT POINT LOCATIONo ZEO LIFT IMPACT POINT LOCATION CAN BE USED 1F AVAILABLE (ENTY PHASE), Be ACTION 1, THE FO WILL DETEMINE IF THE FULL LIFT IMPACT IS ON LAND O WATEo {A) IF THE FULL LIFT IMPACT POINT IS ON LANDo THE FO WILL ECOMMEND LgO= THIS ENTY POFILE AIDS IN IMPACT PEDICTION (NO L/D) ANDt 1N SOME CASESP ALLOWS A WATE LANDING OFF THE WEST COAST OF AFICA, THE FO WILL ALSO ADVISE IF THE LgO IMPACT POINT IS ON LAND O WATE, (B) IF THE FULL LIFT IMPACT POINT I5 ON WATEy THE FO WILL ECOMMEND FULL LIFT= EXCEPTIONS TO THIS CASE AE WHEN THE TOTAL FOOTPINT IS IN WATE-- THE FO WILL THEN DETEMINE THE ENTY POFILE WHICH IS BEST SUITED TO GET TO THE INTENDED TAGET POINTo 2, THE CAPCOM WILL ELAY THE ENTY POFILE TO THE CEW AND ADVISE THE CEW OF A LAND LANDING IF THAT SITUATION EXISTS, EFEENCES OPEATIONAL OPINION MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-10

33 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-3E MODE lid fill IVt AND APOGEE KICK COMMENTS POCEDUE A, SPS BUN FAILUES INCLUDE NO SS BUNS AND PATIAL SPS BUN CASES, NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO CONTINUE THE FAILED SPS MANEUVE WITH THE SM CS= INSTEAD ALL ATTEMPTS AND EVALUATIONS MADE AE TO INSUE A SAFE EENTY {HP LESS THAN 40 NM) FO THE S/C. ALSO NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO PEFOM MANEUVES TO AVOID LANO_ EXCEPT FO VAYING THE LIFT OIENTATION, THE ONLY CS MANEUVES PEFOMED AE DONE AS CLOSE TO APOGEE AS POSSIBLE TO GET MAXIMUM CS DELTA V EFFICIENCY IN EDUCING HP LESS THAN 40 NMo B. NO SLA SEP CASES AE CONSIDEED AS NO SPS BUN CASES EXCEPT WHEN 40 LESS THAN HP LESS THAN 75, FO THIS LASEr DUE TO THE MASSES INVOLVED AND THE LOW SM-C$ ACCELEATIONt IT IS NOT PACTICAL TO USE THE SM-CS TO BING HP DOWN (DELTA V OBTAINED IN THIS CONFIGUATION IS APPOXIMATELY 35 FPS OVE 14 MINUTES). THEEFOE THE POCEDUE IS TO SEPAATE AND CONTOL HP WITH THE CM-CS. AGAP. C. IN GENEAL--- I, THE MODE II FAILUE CASES HAVE HPtS LESG THAN 40 NM AND NO C$ MANEUVE IS EQUIED= 2. THE MODE IVt AXi AND MODE III FAILUE CASES CAN HAVE HPIG GEATE THAN AO IN SOME CASEBt AND THEEFOE MAY EQUIE AN CS MANEUVES, (SEE ATTACHED GAMMA VG* V PLOT.) Ao INDICATION, 1. FLIGHT CEW EPOTS NO THUST O NO SLA SEPo 2, NO THUST CONFIMED BY G&C-- NO SLA 5EP CONFIMED BY EECOM. B, ACTION, 1, SPS FAILUES. (A) FO DETEMINE HP AND WHETHE APOGEE will BE BEYOND CYI AOS. ILl HP LESS THAN 40 NM - FO DO LAND IMPACT EVALUATION (EF, M, 5-5D1 AND ELAY TO CEW VIA CAPCOM ENTY POFILED PITCH AT =O5G_ AND GET 30O= (21 40 LESS THAN HP LESS THAN 75 NM - CEW OIENT FO SM-CS OEOBIT (HEADS DOWNt ETOGADE), FO ELAY TO CEW VIA CAPCOM AT CYI GETI DELTA Vt DELTA TBI PITCH AT.05GP GET 3OOKt AND ENTY POFILE= (31 SOME HP GEATE THAN 40 NM CASES EQUIE A LAGE AMOUNT OF DELTA V IF DELAYED TO CYI (CASES AE LOW GAMMA= Hie FO THESE CASESP FO WILL ADVISE BUN ASAP WITH 100 FPS ETOGADEt FLY LgO, CEW MAY TEMINATE BUN AT 100 FPS O HP 40 NM_ WHICHEVE COMES FIST. (B) FO NO-VOICE= CEW WILL USE GETI 19+DOm DELTA V 100 FPSP FLY L90, bun MAY BE TEMINATED ON 100 FPS O HP 40 NM* 2, NO SLA 5EP= (A) FO DETEMINES HP AND WHETHE APOGEE WILL BE BEYOND CYI AOS, (1) HP LESS THAN 40 NM - FO DO LAND IMPACT EVALUATION (EF. M 5-5D) AND ELAY TO CEW VIA CAPCOM ENTY POFILEr PITCH AT,05G AND GET BOOK, CEW WiLL PEFOM OM SEPAATION MANEUVE. _2) HP GEATE THAN 40 NM BUT L_S5 THAN 75 NM - FO WILL ADVISE CM-CS DEOBIT WITH DELTA V 70 FPS, IF APOGEE IS PIO TO CYIp CEW WILL SEPAATE IMMEDIATELY AND GETI WILL BE AGAPe 1F APOGEE IS AFTE CYIo CEW WILL SEPAATE 3 MINUTES PIO TO GETI= GETI = GET AND CAPCOM WILL GIVE CEW GETI= DELTA V AND L9D ENTY POFILE= CEW CAN TEMINATE BUN ON DELTA V O HP = 40 NM, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-_1

34 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 3 - TAJECTOYAND GUIDANCE 5-3E _ONT 3, CM SEP MANEUVE, (A) PITCH ENTIE 5TACK CONFIGUATION DOWN36 DEGo _-I (B) CM/(SM/S-IVB) SEP. (C} PITCH THE CM DOWNANOTHE 35 DEG TO 71DEG. (Ol OLL 180 DEGi (E) BUN OUT DELTA V= EFEENCE FCD OPEATIONAL OPINION= I Apogeekick line /NO-GOline scale]ii scale"l]i C01boundary "G _" ,Overspeedline _.o" (apogee= 500 nautical miles) Nominal = Scale I_ corners Time offreefallto Inertialvelocity, V (ft/sec X 10"3) Figure1. - Inertialflightpathangleversusinertialvelocity('y-V). olvloi o ooi I I I I ' AN_E AM LAUncH''_ APOLLO,.,NL,_,,,'TDT.EOTOY

35 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITE_ i-4a MODE III ABOTS - PEDICTED TFF LESS THAN 1H 40MIN AFTE CUTOFF COMMENTS POCEDUE A. THE CEW HAS STATED THAT 1+40 IS A VALID TIME CONSTAINT BETWEEN CUTOFF AND 300K FEET FO ENTY PEPAATIONS. FO MODE Ill ABOTS OFF THE NOMINALP TFF AT C/O VAIES FOM 1*26 TO 4+15, FO ABOTS OFF THE LATE POTION OF THE NUMINAL_ AS WELL AS CASES FOM AN OFF'NOMINAL TAJECTOYt CAE MUST BE TAKEN TO INSUE THE I+40 CONSTAINT, THIS WILL NOT ALWAYS ESULT IN A WATE LANDING. EFEENCES Bw A PATIAL SPS MANEUVE WILL BE PEFOMED ONLY TO AVOID A LAND LANDING+ AN LgO ENTY WILL BE FLOWN IN AN ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE ZP AS FA WEST AS POSSIBLE. C* ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO MAINTAIN THE 1+40 CONSTAINT AS WELL AS INSUE A WATE LANDING 1N AS MANY CASES AS POSSIBLE BY VAYING THE LIFT POFILE AND/O THE BUN TIME. WHEN PEDICTED TFF LESS THAN 1+40 FO THE NODE Ill MANEUVE. A, IF THE FULL-LIFT lp IS ON WATE. THEE WILL BE NO BUN+ Bo IF THE G AND N IS GO AND THE FULL-LIFT IP IS ON LANDI THE CEW WILL BUN AT GETI AND TEMINATE THE _UN AT TFF - _.40+ THEY WILL FLY L9O TO GET THE MODE lli IP AS NEA THE WEST COAST OF AFICA AS POSSIBLE. C, IF THE G AND N IS NO-GO AND THE FULL-LIFT IP 15 ON LAND+ THE AMOUNT OF TFF VIOLATION WILL BE SUBTACTED FOM THE COMPUTED BUN TIME. THE ESULTING BUN TIME ALONG WITH THE COESPONDING DELTA V WILL BE PASSED TO THE CEW+ THIS INSUES NO VIOLATION OF THE TFF CONSTAINT BUT MAY ESULT IN A LAND LANDING. THE CEW WILL FLY LgO TO GET THE MODE lii IP AS NEA THE WEST COAST OF AFICA AS POSSIBLE. Ao PELIMINAY LAUNCH ABOT STUDY FO APOLLO MISSION F/CSM-IO3/LM-3. B+ APOLLO MISSION TECHNIQUES SATUN V/APOLLO LAUNCH PHASE ABOTS. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-13

36 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-4B MODE Ill BUNS LESS THAN 2 SECONDS COMMENTS POCEDUE MODE Ill BUNS OF LESS THAN 2 SECONDS AE NOT WOTHWHILE BECAUSE A 2-SECOND BUN MOVES THE 1P ONLY ABOUT 25 N, M, THE FLIGHT CAN BEST BE SPENT BY PEPAING FO ENTY, EFEENCES MODE IXl BUNS OF GEATE THAN 2 SECONDS SHOULD BE PEFOMED TO AVOID LAND* THE FO WILL ANNOUNCE MODE Ill NO BUNP FLY L55o CAPCOM ELAY DATA TO CEW, THE FO WILL POVIDE PITCH AT *OBG FEET AND GET 30OK, AAWG. OPEATIONAL OPINION= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ :NL 2/15/T0 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-1_

37 N NASA- Manned.Speclcre,ftCenter ;,,_ MISS!ON UL[S_ SECTION 3 " TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-4C NO IGNITION BY GETI.10 SECONDS FO MODE Ill ABOTS COMMENTS POCEDUE A, THE DELTA V AND GETI COMPUTED FO NODE 'Ill IS A MANEUVE TO HIT AN L55 TAGET POINT,, IF THE GETI IS DELAYED THE IP.MOVES EAST APPOXIMATELY 5 NM/SECe ALSO9 TFF AFTE THE MANEUVE 1S EDUCED APPOXIMATELY. 1 S_CONO FO EACH SECOND OF DELAYI " ; Be THE WEST COAST OF AFICA IS!50 NM FOM THE'NODE IIi TAGET POINT, IN THE MODE Ill EGIME THE IP ASSOCIATED WITH LgO BANK ANGLE IS APPOXIMATELY 200 NM UPANGE OF THE IP FO AN L55 BANK ANGLED AFTE 60 SECONDS OF DELAY TIME TFF BECOMES A FACTO DUING THE MANEUVE, SINCE THE MODE Ill IP IS BASED ON AN L55 BANK ANGLEr WHEN THE CEW CAN BUN DELTA -TO ZEOt. AN L55 IS ACCEPTABLEBECAUSETHEYWILL HIT THE TAGEToWHENDELTA CANNOT BE BUNED TO ZEO BECAUSE OF THE TFF 'CON_TA:INTt A BUN.TO 'TFF AND L90 ENTY WILL KEEP THE CEW OFF LAND FO DELAYS UP TO TO SECONDS-, C, IF THE G AND N IS NOT AVAILASLEI THE OIGINAL MODE III DELTA V PASSED CAN BE used WITH AN L9O ENTY WHICH _ILL AVOID LAND" FO DELAYS UP TO 70 SECONDS FO MODE Ill ABOTS OFF THE NOMINAL TAJECTOY OCCUING BEFOE GET, Ao FO WILL MAK GETI + 10 SECONDS AND IF PEDICTED TFF IS NOT VIOLATED WILL ADVISE BUN DELTA O AND FLY LBB_ IF THE PEDICTED TFF W_LL BE VIOLATED FO WILL ADVISE BUN TFF ].+_O ANO FLY Lg0_ B= IF THE G AND N IS NO-GO AND T ABOT LESS THAN 1_.00 FO WILL ADVISE BUN OIGINAL MODE Ill DELTA V'PASSED AND FLY L9D*._:- C,, IF THE G AND N IS NO-GO AND T ABOT GEATE THAN l,_,.oot FO WILL ADVISE TO BUN A EDUCED DELTA V SO TFF LIMIT WILL NOT BE VIOLATED BUT AN ENTY TAJECTOY WILL BE ESTABLISHED, FO WILL ADVISE TO FLY LgO,, ; ":..'' _ "L' i _,_' ' "',:., MISS!ON EV DATE' i SECTION _H H i ;, _OUP'. PAGE APOLLO ],4 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND _ LAUNCH '. r GUIDANCE ' '' ::; ' _-15

38 NASA - Manned SpacecraftCenter MISSlOI ULES SECTION 3 " TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE CMC NO-DO FO ABOT MANEUVE AND MONITOING {SOFTWAE FAILUES) ELIABILITY OF THE CMC AS A DATA SOUCE O CONTOL DEVICE IS DEPENDENT ON THE INTENAL FUNCTIONING OF THE SOFTWAE, THE {MC IS POGAMMED TO ECOGNIZE INTENAL FAULTS AND CONDITIONS. UPON ECOGNITION OF SUCH A CONDITION, THE COMPUTE ISSUES A POGAM ALAMS CONSIDEED TO INVALIDATE THE CMC FALL INTO TWO CATEGOIESD THOSE WHICH SINGULALY AND CONTINUOUSLYe THE ALAMEp BY CATEGOYP AE AS FOLLOWED OCCUENCE CODE ALAM FAULT POGAM USING IMU WHEN ]MU TUNED OFF A PIPA FAILED CAUSED IS5 WANING ESTAT PHASE TABLE ENTIES DISAGEE G1607 VG INCEASING ICDU AND PIPA FAILS CAUSED ISG WANING IMU FAIL CAUSED ISE WANING IMU AND PIPA FAILS CAUSED ISS WANING IMU AND ICDU FAILS CAUSED IS$ WANING IMUt ICDUt AND PIPA FAILS CAUSED ISS WANING MAXIMUM ACCELEQMETE OUTPUT CONTINUOUS OCCUENCE ALAM CODE ALAM FAULT INTEGATION CAUSING OVEFLOW THAT ECTIFICATION WOULD NOT ELIMINATE NO SOLUTION FOM CONIC OUTINE P37 POSITION VECTO AT IGNITION TOO SMALL FOBIDDEN STEP EXECUTED ZEO O NEGATIVE WAITLIST DISP6AY SYSTEM ADDESS BUFFES FULL Z1210 JOB ALEADY WAITING IN PATICULA STALL OUTINE SQUAE OOT AGUMENT TOO NEGATIVE DISPLAY SYSTEM ALAM FOM INTENAL USE ILLEGAL EQUEST FO A FLASHINO DISPLAY NEW POGAM EQUEST CANNOT BE MADE 'AFTE Pll STATED TOO MANY JOBS ATTEMPTING TO USE JOB MISSION, EV GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-16 /

39 NASA_- Manned_SpacecreftCenter MISSION ULES SECTION E - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE DELAY OUTINE NO VAC AEAS AVAILABLE N0. JOB EGISTE SETS AVAILABLE NEW TASk CANNOT BE INSETED SUCCESSFULLY IN WAITLIGT SYSTEM NO VAC AEA AVAILABLE FO MAK DATA OPTICS USE NOT ALLOWED WITH EXTENDED 5-EA CONT VEB BEING PEFOMED PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT FLIGHT CEW DIECTO DATA SOUCE_ CMC DSKY/POGAM ALAM LIGHT _ : _ GUIDe 1N$/INJ DIGITALSt MBK 290 CMC MONITO I H/St MSK 966 CCATS CMC DOWNLINK EADOUT POCEDUE Ae INDICATION CEW OBSEVES POGAM ALAM LIGHT AND KEYS VOfi NO9 TO VEIFY ALAM, GDO OBSEVES POGAM ALAM LIGHT AND VEIFIES ALAM VIA CEW KEYING VO5 NO9 USING MSK 290 O VIA FAILEG5 USING MSK 966 O CCATS CHC DOWNLINK EADOUT* Be ACTION ALAM IS IDENTIFIED AS APPLICABLE TO A GO/NO-GO DECISIONo IF IT IS IN 'ICONTINUOUSml CATEGOY DSKY EO ESET IS EXECUTED TO veify E-OCCUANCE* AFTE IDENTIFICATION GDO DECLAES It CMC GO ON POGAM ALAM II O *tcmc NO'GO ON POGAM ALAMt" OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOP, CAPCOM ELAYS THE SAME OVE AI-TO-GOUND LOOP, MIBBION EV DATE ISECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _ FNL 2/_5/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE _mzt

40 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION IULIS SECTION_ - TAJECTOYANDGUIDANCE ITE_ 5-5B CITEIA FO CMC NO-GO FO ABOT MANEUVE DETEMINATION ANO/O MONITOING TFF EO COMMENTS EONEOUS NAVIGATION BY THE MC WILL BE EFLECTED IN ITS KNOWLEDGE OF TFF* SINCE THIS PAAMETE IS USED AS ABOT CITEIA_ ANY EO IN ITS COMPUTATION MUST BE _IMITED. CEW ABOT IS INITIATED FO TFF DECEASING BELOW 1.40o THE TIME EquIED FO 180 DEGEES PITCH ATTITUOE MANEUVE TO INSUE BEF IS 26 SECONDS. THUS FO MOST SENSITIVE CASE, CMC TFF GEATE THAN TCC TFFt AN EO OF 40 SECONDS CAN BE TOLEATED AND YET LEAVE TIME FO EOIENTATION TO INSUE SAFE CAPTUE, PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES POCEDUE GDO STIPCHATSt GUIDANCE INS/INJ DIGITALSt MSK 29 A. INDICATION GDO VEIFIES TFF TEND ON GO0 STIPCHATS AND OBSEVES DIFFEENCE OF CMC AND TCC TFF VALUES ON MSK 290 EXCEEDING LIMITS. B. ACTION GDO ANNOUNCES OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOP JmCMC NO-GO TFF EOleo CAPCOM ELAYS SAME TO CEW OVE AI TO GOUND LOOP* II MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_, FNL 2/15/70 TA,JECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-18

41 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES. Center SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY:ANDGUIDANCE 5-5C CITEIA FO CMC NO'GO FO ABOT MANEUVE DETEMINATION AND/O MONITOING (EO IN X AND/O Z PLATFOM AXIS NAVIGATED VELOCITY) COMMENT5 SINCE THE CMC IS USED FO OBITAL NAVIGATION AND TO DETEMINE CONTINGENCY MANEUVE ACTIONo SIGNIFICANT EOS IN ITS INPLANE NAVIGATIONAL STATE COULD ENDANGE THE CEW* SUCH EOS WILL BE IMMEDIATELY EFLECTED BY THE CMC KNOWLEDGE OF SENSED VELOCITY ALONG ITS X AND/O Z PLATFOM AXIS, G AND N DISPEEION ANALYSIS HAS SHOWN THAT A CONFIMED EO ALONG THE X AXIS OF _EATE THAN 50 FPS AND/O Z AXIS OF GEATE THAN 100 FPS INDICATES SOME COMPONENT WITHIN THE CSM G AND N IS OPEATING AT AN UNELIABLE LEVEL (APPOXIMATELY 9-SIGMA), THE CMC WILL BE DECLAED ItNO-GO II DUE TO INABILITY TO NAVIGATE POPELYo PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT CEW CAPCOM DATA SOUCES GDO STIPCHATS GUIDANCE INSETION/INJECTION DIGITALSt MSK 290 AGC DYNAMICS STAUB DISPLAY POCEDUE Ae INDICATION GDO DETECTS AND OBSEVES A TEND ON X AND/O Z AXIS VELOCITY DIFFEENCES FOM STIPCHAHS O MSK 290* CONFIMATION THAT THE EO IS 1N THE CMC IS THEN'MADE BY COMPAING ACTUAL TAJECTOY PATH WITH THAT OF CMC VIA THE AGC DYNAMIC STATUS DISPLAYo _ B! ACTION GDO ANNOUNCES CMC tino'go l DUE TO NAVIGATION EO OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOPt CAPCOH ELAYS SAME TO CEW OVE AI TO GOUND LOOPo ISSxON EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/ZS/TO TAJECTOY AND _ LAUNCH GUXDA_C_ 3-_9

42 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION IULES SECTION S - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITEF -SD CITEIA FO CMC NO-GO FO ABOT MANEUVE DETEMINATION AND/O MONITOING (CHC/TCC ECOMMENDATION DISAGEEMENT) COMMENTS AT TEMINATION OF LAUNCH PHASE POWEED FLIGHTo THE CMC WILL BE USED TO DETEMINE OBITAL STATUS AND/O CONTINGENCY MANEUVE EQUIEMENT* BECAUSE. OF DEGADED PEFOMANCE OF TME INETIAL SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTSt THE CMC NAVIGATION COULD INDICATE A SAFE PEIGEE WHILE THE 6EST TAJECTOY SOUCE INDICATES A PEIGEE LESS THAN SAFEo THE CEW WOULD TAKE NO ACTION WITH DISASTEOUS ESULTSo ON THE OTHEHANDP THE CM_ NAVIGATION COULD INDICATE A PEIGEE LESS THAN SAFE WHILE THE BEST TAJECTOY SOUCE INDICATES A SATISFACTOY PEIGEEe THE CEW WOULD UNNECESSAILY SEPAATE FOM THE SIVBt MAKE A CONTINGENCY SPS MANEUVEt AND THEEBY SACIFICE A LUNA MISSION* THUSP ANYTIME THE OBITAL GO/NO-GO ECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON BEST SELECTED SOUCE AND OMC TELEMETY DISAGEEt THE CMC WILL BE DECLAED I*NO-GOllo PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE DATA SOUCE POCEDUE FDO LAUNCH DIGITALSP MSK 043 A* INDICATION IN TCC HOLD PHASE_ FDO CALLS OUT THE BEST TAJECTOY SOUCE, GDO OBSEVES THE OBITAL ECOMMENDATIONS IN THE APL AND W BEST SOUCE tl COLUMNS OF MSK 043, B* ACTION IF OBSEVED ECOMMENDATIONS AE IN AGEEMENT9 GDO CALLS OUT OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOPI CMC IS I*GO_ * OTHEWI@Et GDO CALLS OUT CHC IS IeNO-GO. CAPCOM AOVISE5 CEW ACCODINGLYo MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL Z115/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-20

43 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE -. q..._. i 5-6 THE OBIT IS =GO'= IF HP GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO 75 N,M= COMMENTS A I=GOIt OBIT MUST POVIDE A LIFETIME OF ONE FULL EV WITHOUT DEGADING O FAILING SPACECAFT SYSTEMS* THE EFFECTS OF AEODYNAMIC HEATING ON SPACECAFT SYSTEMS DUING ONE PASS THOUGH PEIGEE AE MOE CONSTAINING THAN POVIDING tiobital LIFETIME=_* ODNANCE IN THE SLA SEPAATION UNIT AND IN THE CM/SM UMBILICAL GUILLOTINE FAILS FO PEIGEES LOWE THAN 71 N* M, AND 90 DEG ANGLE OF ATTACK= ATMOSPHEIC DENS1TYt INITIAL TEMPEATUESt AND DAG COEFFICIENTS CAUSE LITTLE CHANGE IN THE FAILUE ALTITUDE, A PAD FO THE UNCETAINTY IN PEIGE_ ALTITUDE PEDICTION BY MCC ADDED TO THE ODNANCE FAILUE ALTITUDE ESTABLISHED 75 N, M* AS THE MINIMUM PEIGEE ALTITUDE FO A =tgoll OBZT, PATICIPATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT DIECTO CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES POCEDUE PIMAYt FDO LAUNCH DIGITALSP MSK 41, SECONDAYp GAMMA VSe V DISPLAY MSK 40, A, INDICATION B, ACTION 1, TCC ECOMMENDS GO/NO GO, 2* V/VPS VEIFIES ECOMMENDATION* 3, V* GAMMAt H FOM SELECTED SOUCE VEIFIES ECOMMENDATION, 1. HP GEATE THAN O EOUAL TO 75 - FDO ANNOUNCES I FLIGHTt WE AE GOIt ON FD LOOP. 2 HP LESS THAN 75P - MODE IV - FDO ANNOUNGES PtFLIGHTt WE AE GO MODE IVt SEPAATE It ON FD LOOPo PASS MODE IV MANEUVE ASAP, CAPCOM WILL ELAY EPOT AND MANEUVE TO CEW, 3 HP LESS THAN 751 APOGEE KICK - FDO ANNOUNCES FLIGHT, WE AE GOt APOGEE KICKt SEPAATE II ON FO LOOP, PASS APOGEE KICK MANEUVE AGAPe CAPCOM WILL ELAY EPOT ANO MANEUVE TO CEW, _, HP LESS THAN 75o NO POSSIBLE MODE IV O APOGEE KICK - FDO ANNOUNCES ItFLIGHTo WE AE NO GOD SEPAATE tl ON FD LOOP* ETO FOLLOWS WITH ABOT MODE AND MANEUVE IF MODE Ill CAPCOM ELAYS EPOTS AND MANEUVE TO CEW, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LAUNCH GUIDANCE 3-21

44 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIONULES SECTION _ - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-20A EATH OBITAL ALTITUDE CONSTAINT COMMENTS THE MINIMUM PEIGEE ALTITUDE LIMIT IS ESTABLISHED TO POTECT AGAINST ATMOSPHEIC HEATING CAUSING DAMAGE TO S/C* TO POTECT AGAINST THIS DAMAGEr PEIGEE MUST BE MAINTAINED ABOVE 75 N,M* VIOLATIONS OF THIS LIMIT MUST BE COECTED ASAP* FO PLANNING PUPOSES IT IS DESIABLE TO ALLOW FO EASONABLE EXECUTION EOS WITHOUT VIOLATING THIS CONSTAINTm 85 N,M* ALLOWS FO THESE EOS WITHOUT SEIOUSLY LIMITING PLANNING FLEXIBILITY* THE MAINTENANCE OF CS DEOBIT CAPABILITY DEFINES THE MAXIMUM PEIGEE ALTITUDE AT ANY GIVEN POINT DUING THE MISSION* HOWEVEp WHEN THE CONSIDEATION OF LM POPULSION IS ADVANTAGEO_S_ THIS LIMIT MAY BE AISED= CUENTLYt NO CONSTAINTS HAVE BEEN DEFINED WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE MAXIMUM APOGEE ALTITUDE* PATICIPATION FDO FO FD G AND C CEW DATA SOUCE_ POCEDUES MISSION PLANNING DISPLAYSt OBIT DIGITALS A, NOMAL MISSION PLANNING. l, G AND C DETEMINES C5 DELTA V AVAILABLE FO DEOBIT THOUGH NEXT MANEUVE* 2, FDO/FO DETEMINE MAXIMUM PEIGEE ALTITUDE FO DELTA V* USE NOMINAL PEIGEE IF LOWE THAN MAXIMUM, _* FDO DETEMINE APOGEE ALTITUDE WHICH POVIDES LIFETIME THOUGH END OF MISSION, USE NOMINAL APOGEE IF HIGHE, 4* CALL GPMT FO MANEUVE OVE A MSFN STATION TO ESULT IN HA AND HP DESIED, B* PEIGEE VIOLATION* CALL PEIGEE ADJUST TABLE FO MANEUVE AT APOGEE O ASAP IF ADJUSTMENT AT APOGEE IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF TUE ANOMALy O PEMANEUVE MSFN COVEAGE, FDO OBIT DIGITALS SHOW TIME OF APOGEE AND TUE ANOMALY POBLEMS ANO PSAT SHOWS MSFN COVEAGE, MISGION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TL1 3-22

45 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center. MISSlO# ULES SECTION 3 " TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-20B EMEGENCY DEOBIT WITH HP LESS THAN 75 N=M, COMMENTS POCEDUE A= IT IS AGSUMED THaT AN'QBITAL MANEUVE CANNOT BE MADE TO COECT THE HP LES$_ ""_ THAN 75 NM POBLEM=,, : B= ANY MANEUVE PEFOMED WILL BE TO EDUCE HP LESS THAN 40 NM TO INSUE A SAFE EENTY= C= THE 5PS THUSTE WILL BE USED WHENEVE POSSIBLE, WHEN THE C$ THUSTE IS USEDt IT W1L-L BE AB CLOSE TO APOGEE AS POSSIBLE TO GET MAXIMUM DELTA V EFFICIENCY* D* TAGETING WILL BE DONE WHEE POSSIBLE (TUE ANOMALY LESS THAN 180 DEC) AND TIME PEMITS= A, IF HF IS GEATE THAN 40 NM BUT LESS THAN 75 NM --- 1, TUE ANOMALY GEATE THAN 180 DEG - IF SPSI$ GOt CEW WILL GO TO GPS DEOBIT ATTITUDE (HEADS OPt HOIZON MONITO)* IF SPS IS NO-GOt CEW WILL GO TO CS DEOBIT ATTITUDE (HEADS DOWN* ETOGADE}, CEW PEFOMS MANEUVE ASAP TO LOWE HP TO AT LEAST 40 NM IF POSSIBLE= CEW W1LL BUN ALL CG DELTA V AVAILABLE TO ACHIEVE 40 NM O WILL TEMINATE BUN WHEN TFF EUUALS 7 MIN= GOUND WILL POVIDE PITCH AT ENTY GET,05G AND ENTY POFILE= IF NO VOICE= CEW WILL FLY A L 90 ENTY= 2, TUE ANOMALY LESS THAN 180 DEG - CEW WILL GO TO C5 DEOBIT ATTITUDE= GOUND WILL POVIDE TIG DELTA V PITCH AT ENTY GET =05G AND ENTY POFILE= MANEUVE WILL BE PLANNED FO EXECUTION AT APOGEE= B= IF HP LESS THAN 40 NM AND-'- 1. TUE ANOMALY GEATE THAN 180 DEC - NO BUN= GOUND WILL POVIDE PITCH AT ENTYP GET =O_G AND ENTY POFILEo ENTY POFILE BASED ON LAND IP EVALUATION= 2= TUE ANOMALY LESS THAN 180 DEG - GOUND MAY POVIDE AN C5 MANEUVE IF TAGETING FO AN IP IS POSBIBLE* MISSIONEV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL Z!2flS/TO TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-23

46 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S m TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITEP 5-22 LIFT-OFF TIME UPDATE COMMENTS AT LIFT-OFF INDICATIONt THE CMC ECODS THE COMPUTE TIMEr ZEOS THE TIME EGISTES_ AND UPDATES TEPHEMEIS BY ADDING THE ECODED LIFT-OFF TIME TO THE PEVIOUSLY STOED VALUE. THE TEPHEMEIS QUANTITY IS THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME FOM EFEENCE (BASSELIAN) COODINATE SYSTEM DEFINITION TO LAST COMPUIE CLOCK ZEO, THE TEPHEMEIS QUANTITY AND COMPUTE CLOCk TIME AE utilized IN THE NAVIGATION SCHEMES FO DETEMINING EANTH LOCATION ELATIVE TO THE EFEENCE COODINATE FAME. BECAUSE OF THE GOUND/CMC O LM INTEFACE FO MANEUVE PEPAATION AND TAJECTOY MONITOINGt IT IS ESSENTIAL FO BOTH TIME BASES TO BE THE SAME. FO THIS EASON_ THE CMC L/O TIME IS USEOP AVOIDING P CMG UPDATE, NOMINALLY THE GND AND CMC LID SHOULD NAVE A DIFFEENCE OF LESS THAN O,B SECOND. IF THE CMC GMTLO DIFFES FOM THE SO GMTLO (FIST MOTION)t THE G G N PLATFOM IS IN EO (OLL POGAM OF SATUN STATS AT LIFT-OFF PLUS ZO SECONDS) THUS THE G G N IS IN EO AND NOTHING CAN BE GAINED BY USING THE CMC GMTLO, ALSO, THE MET IN THE CSM STATS WITH FIST MOTION AND USING A'GMTLO DIFFEENT FOM FIST MOTION CAUSES THE GOUND ELAPSED TIME TO BE DIFFEENT FOM THE S/C ELAPSED TIME, THE POBABILITY OF A DIFFEENCE GEATE THAN 5 SECONDS IS EMOTE SINCE THE CEW IS POISED TO BACK UP THE LIFT-OFF SIGNAL TO THE CMC BY ENTEING V75 WHICH WAS INSETED INTO THE DSKY IN PELAUNCH, DATA SOUCE POCEDUE GDO STATE BUFFE MONITOp MSK2ET_ VOICE LOOP TO SO, FO OBSEVES EVENT FOM CMC ON MSK267 TO OBTAIN CMC GMTLO, AFTE ECEIPT OF GMTLO FNOM SHOt THE APPOPIATE VALUE IS INPUT TO THE TCC VIA THE COMPUTE DYNAMICS, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15170 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI S-24

47 NASA -, Manned Spacecraft Canter MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-23 ETOFIE MANEUVE PLANNING TO ESULT IN THE TIME BETWEEN GETI AND 40OK GEATE THAN 9 MINUTEG COMMENTS.A= THE TIME BETWEEN ETOFIE IGNITION AND _00_ FEET IS CONSTAINEO FO TWO MAIN EAGONS+ FISTt A POSSIBLE ECONTACT POBLEM BETWEEN THE CM AND SM+ GECONDt A CEW PEPAATION TIME FO ENTY AFTE ETOFIE, Be THE CEW DESIES AS MUCH TIME A5 POSSIBLE AFTE ETOFIE TO pepae FO ENTY-- HOWEVE_ THE CEW HAS STATED THATt AS A MINIMUMP 10 MINUTES TFF AFTE ETOFIE (10 MINUTES TO 300K FEET) IS AN OPEATIONALLY GOOD NUMBE WHICH INCLUDES ANY CONTINGENCY POCEDUES WHICH MAY BE EQUIED, IN GENEALt ' FO 5PS-TYPE ETOFIESt TIME BETWEEN 4OOK FEET AND 30OK FEET IS 2 MINUTES-- ' THUSg FO ETOFIE PLANNING PUPOBEBt THE TFF AFTE THE ETO MANEUVE WILL BE AT LEAST 11 MINUTES BASED ON 9 MINUTES TO 400K FEET PLUS 2 MINUTES TO 300K FEET= FO CONTINGENCY TYPE ETO MANEUVE_ THE CEW ls EOUIED TO BUN " TU A LOWE TFF TO INSUE A SAFE ENTY= Co IN ATTEMPTING TO GE_ MoE TIME BETWEEN GETI AND 4OOK FEET-- PITCH ANGLE AT GETI_ DELTA V OF THE MANEUVEt O THE TAGET POINT CAN BE CHANGED, VAYING THE PITCH ANGLE AT GETI WILL NOT BE DONE BECAUSE! OPEATIONALLYt MAINTAINING THE LINE ON THE WINDOW OF THE SPACECAFT ON THE HOIZON IS DESIABLE= CHANGING THE TAGET POINT HAS VEY LITTLE EFFECT ON TFF EXCEPT WHEN LAGE CHANGES AE MADE= POCEDUE IF THE PLANNING MANEUVE HAS ET 400K LESS THAN 9 MINUTES, PO WILL VAY DELTA V TO INCEASE THE TIME= IF UNSUCCESSFUL+ INFOM PD THAT A NEW PTP MUST BE SELECTED BECAUSE OF THE TFF CONSTAINTS= EFEENCES FM MEMOANDUM 67-FM_7-_7 MISSION Ev DATE section GOUP.. PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/7( TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-25

48 NASA - Manned Spacecraft,Center msslou ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-25 UPDATING ETOFIE MANEUVES FO POSITION CHANGES COMMENTS POCEDUE EFEENCE A, ONCE THE CMC HAS BEEN UPDATED FO ETOFIE WITH A NAV vecto* THE GOUND AND CMC_$ KNOWLEDGE OF THE PESENT CGM OBIT IS THE GAMED HOWEVEt AS THE GOUND ECEIVES MOE TACKING DATA* ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTUAL CSMt$ OBIT IMPOVES* THUSe THE POBLEM AISES AS TO WHAT CITEIA TO USE TO update THE CMC=S STATE VECTO* B, IN THE EVENT THE CMC NAV VECTO IS NOT UPDATED* A TAGET MiSS E_UAL TO THE POSITION EO OF THE CMC WILL ESULT AT SPLASHDOWN* IF THE CMC IS CONTINUALLY UPDATED O UPDATED JUST PIO TO ETOFIE*" POCEDUAL POBLEMS ESULT FO THE CEW SUCH AS ECHECKING HANEUVE DATA AS WELL AG CYCLING THOUGH CMC POGAMS AT THE LABT MINUTE* C* POCEDUALLY* THE GOUND WILL GCHEOULE NAV UPDATES APPOXIMATELY _ HOUS AND I HOU PIO TO THE PLANNED ETOFIE, CITEIA FO UPDATING AT ETOFIE MINUS i HOU IS BASED ON FDOIS COODINATED JUDGEMENT (APPOXIMATELY 1*5 N*M* IN POSITION O i FPS IN VELOCITY), D, UPDATING THE CMC NAV AFTE THE 1 HOU UPDATE CAUSES THE CEW POCEDUAL POBLEM SUCH AS USHING THOUGH CMC POGAMS AND DOING THE EQUIED LAST MINUTE ETOFIE CHECKS* FO THIS EASON UP TO 30 N_M, POSITION CHANGE WAS CHOSEN AS ACCEPTABLE FOM THE ETOFIE STAND-POINTQ THIS WOULD MEAN THE CMC COULD MISS THE TAGET POINT BY AS MUCH AS 30 N,M* WHICH I5 SLIGHTLY LAGE THAN AN EMS L SIGMA MISS DISTANCE, AS ETOFIE TIME APPOACHESt THE UPDATE CITEIA BECOMES MOE ELAXED* E, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH _0 NeM* POSITION CHANGE IS ACCEPTABLE FOM A ETOFIE STANDPOINT* THIS LAGE A POGITION CHANGE IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY* A CHANGE OF MOE THAN fi N,M* WOULD BE AE* F* TO EDUCE THE POBABILITY OF A ETOFIE UPDATE WITHIN _O MINUTES OF GETIt THE CITEIA FO AN UPDATE IS THAT LANDING EO WHICH CAUSES A VIOLATION OF ECOVEY ACCESSTIME (ZDEG OF LONOITUOE)_ THIS EO 1S SO LAGE THAT IT IS ALMOST A PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITYo THE POCEDUE USED TO DETEMINE POSITION EOS ENCOUNTEED FOM THE OIGINAL NAV VECTO UPLINKED TO THE S/C IS TO COMPAE THE CMC TM VECTO WITH THE PESENT OBIT VECTO ON THE VECTO COMPAE DISPLAY, THIS DISPLAY IS USED AFTE EACH DC TAKEN IN BY THE TCC AND IS ALSO USED 1N DECIDING TO UPDATE THE T-1 HOU NAV VECTO= ENTY DATA PIOITY MEETINGS* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI _-26

49 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-27 SPS FAILUES DUING EPO ETOFIE O NO SLA BEP COMMENTS POCEDUE A= ktofie SPS FAILUE6 INCLUDE NO 5PS BUNS AND PATIAL sps BUNS* PEIGEE ALTITUDE IS USED TO DETEMINE THE APPOPIATE ACTION THE CEW SHOULD TAKE SINCE THE HP VALUE IS A G AND N OUTPUT AFTE SPS {/0= B. THE SP5 FAILUES FALL INTO THEE AEAS AS A FUNCTION OF HP FO HPIS GEATE THAN 75 NaM= THE VEHICLE IS STILL IN A SAFE OBIT AND A NEW PTP CAN BE CHOBEN_ USING THE CSe 2* FO HPIS BELOW 75 N*M*o BUT ABOVE 40 N*M*_ THE S/C IS NOT ON A SAFE EENTY TAJECTOY AND NOT IN A SAFE OBITAL TAJECTOY DUE TO HEATING THAT THE S/C WILL ENCOUNTE* ALL ACTION INVOLVING THIS CASE IS TO ASsuE A SAFE ENTY BELOW HP OF 40 N.M* AND ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE TAGET POINTo 3* FO HPIS LESS THAN 40 N,M*P THE S/C HAS A SAFE ENTYP BUT IN A LAGE NUMBE OF CASEBP THE TAGET 1S NOT WITHIN THE AVAILABLE FOOTPINT= ALL ACTION IN THIS CASE INVOLVES USING ONLY THE SM DELTA V TO BUN ESIDUALS TO ZEO* Co IN THE EVENT THE BLA PANELS FAIL TO SEPAATED THE S/C IS LEFT WITHOUT AN SP5 ENGINE AND INSUFFICIENT DELTA V TO EENTE WITH THE COMBINED SM + CM CS DELTA Vo (NOMINALLY 170 FPS I5 NEEDED FO ENTY'' THE SM DELTA V = 35 FPS-- THE CH DELTA V = 80 FPG}o THE LOX DUMP CAPABILITY POVIDES SUFFICIENT DELTA V TO EDUCE THE HP WELL BELOW 75 NoMo-- HOWEVEo THE CONTOL OF DELTA V CUTOFF FOM THE GOUNOt THE BUN TIME INVOLVED (APPOX. 20 MIN)_ PLUS THE UNKNOWN ECONTACT POBLEMS DUE TO S-IVB EXPLOSIONS DUING ENTY MAKE EENTEING THE WHOLE STACK WITH LOX DUMP UNDESIABLE= OBIT SHAPING TO EDUCE THE NEEDED DELTA V TO DEOBIT WITH THE CM CS CAPABILITY IS A MOE OPEATIONALLY SOUND METHOD OF UTILIZING THE LOX DUMP CAPABILITY. D, MOE SM DELTA V CAN BE OBTAINED BY EDUCING THE WEIGHT OF THE S-IVB/CSM BTACK, THEE IS APPOXIMATELY lootooo POUNDS OF LOX ONBOAD THAT CAN GE DUMPED THUS CHANGING THE SM DELTA V FOM 35 FPS TO APPOXIMATELY 55 FP5* THE LOX DUMP IS OF COUSE POPULSIVE AND IS A TIME CONSUMING POCEBSo (LOX DUMP ATE IS APPOXIMATELY 1000 POUNDS/MIN)e THIS MODE OF OPEATION DOES NOT APPEA DESIABLE UNLESS A CONTINGENCY EXISTS WHEE A LAGE DELTA V IS EUUIED* E= THE HYBID TYPE ETOFIE WILL ALWAYS BE TAGETED FO 40 NoM* PEIGEE TO CONSEVE AS MUCH CM CS FUEL AS POSSIBLE, THE USE OF THE SM CB DELTA V DOES NOT APPEA PACTICAL FO THE HEAVY S-IVB/CSM STACKS DUE TO THE SMALL DELTA V GAINED OVE A LONG PEIOD OF TIME (ACCELEATION IB APPOXIMATELY 0,04 TO 0*05 FPS)* A. FO HP LESS THAN 75 N, M* BUT GEATE THAN 40 No Mop SOME TYPE OF C5 MANEUVE ACTION IS MANDATOY FO THE ECOVEY OF THE S/C, THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF THE SM CS AND CM CS IS TO APPLY DELTA V AT A ETOGADE PITCH ATTITUDE DIECTLY AGAINST THE VELOCITY VECTO* THIS EDUCES HP AS FAST AS POSSIBLE, THIS POCEDUE ASSUMES THE TUE ANOMALY IS GEATE THAN 180 DEG, IF THE TUE ANOMALY IS LESS THAN 180 DEG_ THE CEW SHOULD DELAY IGNITION UNTIL 180 OEO-- HOWEVEt THIS SITUATION WOULD BE AE AND VEY NON-NOMINAL* 8. FO HP LESS THAN 75 No Me BUT GEATE THAN _O N* M** THE CS MANEUVE CUTOFF CITEIA IS BASED ON FUEL AVAILABLE6 WHICH will BE KNOWN PIO TO ANY ETOFIE MANEUVE, THE C/O CITEIA IS AS FOLLOWS SM FUEL IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO OBTAIN HP LESS THAN 40 NoMe FO THIS CABEt A HYBID TYPE MANEUVE WILL BE USED (BUN AVAILABLE SM DELTA V-- COMPLETE MANEUVE TO HP 40 N.Mo WITH CM CS)* THE CEW WILL ALWAYS FLY L9O ENTYo Ze SM FUEL IS NOT A CONSTAINING FACTO, THIS SITUATION MAY EXIST EALY IN THE MISSION O WHEN THE SPS CUTOFF was CLOSE TO NOMINALo THE SM CS CUTOFF CITEIA IS BASED ON OBTAINING THE DESIED HP O A TFF 7 MINUTES WHICHEVE COMES FIST* THIS POCEDUE ALLOWS THE S/C TO GET TO THE TAGET O AS CLOSE TO THE TAGET AS POBBIBLEo MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-27

50 L NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-28 CHC GO/NO GO CITEIA TO COMMIT THE G AND N FO ENTY TWO TAJECTOY CONDITIONS MUST BE MET* COMMENTS l* A CHECK OF THE NAVIGATION OF THE O AND N THOUGH THE ETOFIE TO *2G IS MADE BY COMPAING A GOUND VALUE OF DOWNANGE EO WITH THAT COMPUTED BY THE CM * DOWNANGE EO IS COMPUTED BY DIFFEENCING THE ENTY ANGE BASED ON A CMC EFEENCE TAJECTOY WITH THE ANGE TO THE TAGET FOM,26, THE COMPAISON ACCUACY DEPENDS ON THE SOUCE U_ED TO OBTAIN THE PEDICTED DOWNANGE EO* MPAO EPOTS THAT USING THE TCC A COMPAISON OF +/- 100 NM IS ACCEPTABLE. 2, THE G AND N MUST BE OPEATED IN A GIVEN ENTY COIDO AS DEFINED BY MPAD, 1. IF THE DOWNANGE EO IS UNACCEPTABLE O THE ENTY COIDO IS VIOLATED* THE CEW WILL FLY A BACKUP ENTY POFILE* (EMS O BB) 2, THE O AND N WOULD FAIL A OE CHECK DUE TO IMPOPE NAVIGATION AFTE ETOFIE, THE DE CHECK WOULD ALSO FAIL FO IMPOPE G AND N ENTY COMPUTATIONS-- EITHE OF THESE FAILUES COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE CEW SAFETY POBLEMS SUCH AS HIGH OrS O LAGE TAGET MISS DISTANCES* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ :NL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TL1 3-28

51 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-29 CITEIA FO PEFOMINGLAUNCHVEHICLE NAVIGATION O TAGET UPDATES1 COMMENT Ae AN IU STATE VECTOUPDATE WILL BE EXECUTED FO IU ACCELEOMETEFAILUE{S) PIO TO EATH OUIT INSETION O IU NAVIGATION DISPESIONS EXCEEDING 6 SIGMA* AN UPDATE WILL NOT BE PEFOMEDFO IU GUIDANCE EFEENCEFAILUES SINGE TLI WILL BE EXECUTED BY CMC CONTOL* A SECONDUPDATE WILL BE PEFOMEDFO SLIPS TO SECONDOPPOTUNITY AFTE A FIST OPPOTUNITY UPDATE* UPDATING FO IU ACCELEOMETEFAIL{S} IS NECESSAY SINCE THE ONBOAD STATE VECTO IS EFFECTIVELY INVALIDATED BY BACKUP SCHEME INPUTS WHICH ASSUME THAT CETAIN PETUBATIONS AE PESENTt FO EXAMPLEt THAT BOTH UPPE STAGES AE 3 SIGMA LOW IN THUST* THE BACKUP SCHEME DOES POVIDE ENOUGHACCUACYTO ACHIEVE A SAFE PEIGEE OBITo THE IU NAVIGATION STATE WILL BE UPDATED when EOS EXIST THAT MIGHT COMPOMISETHE PIMAY MISSIONt I,E* UNACCEPTABLEMIDCOUSE COECTIONS* THE UNACCEPTABLE MIDCOUSE LIMIT IS ESTABLISHED AS 100 FPS AT SH 30 MIN AFTE TLI CUTOFF FO EITHE TLI OPPOTUNITY* DISPESIONS BASED ON 6 sigma PLATFOM AND VENTING UNCETAINTIES WEE FOUND BY MSFC TO BOUND THE MIDCOUSE CONSTAINT, THEEFOEt EOCITEIA BASED ON THESE LIMITS WILL BE USED TO EXECUTE AN UPDATE, IT IS DESIABLE TO GENEATE THE STATE VECTOUPDATE TIME- TAGGED AS CLOSE TO THE STAT OF TIMEBASE 6 AS POSSIBLE* IT IS ALSO DESIABLEt THOUGH NOT MANDATOYt TO OBSEVE INCOPOATION OF THE UPDATE BY THE IU* THUSI THE STATE VECTO WILL BE TIME-TAGGED TO OCCU AT THE MID-POINT OF THE LAST SITE PIO TO INITIATION OF TIHEBAGE So B, THEE AE NO KNOWNMISSION CONTINGENCYSITUATIONS Fo WHICH AN IU OBIT TAGET UPDATE WILL BE EXECUTED, PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE BOOSTESYSTEMS ENGINEE FLIGHT DIECTO DATA SOUCES LVDC TELMETY AND MSFN VECTO GUIDO INS/INJ DIOITALSt MSK 290 ybc_ocompae rmsf _9_ SLY NAY UPDATEt MSK 23B POCEDUE ONCE THE ACCELEOMETE FAILUE O IU NAVIGATION DISPESION OCCUS A MSFN BEST ESTIMATE OF THE ACHIEVED OBITS IS DETEMINEDo A TL1 SOLUTION FO THE DESIED OPPOTUNITY IS VEIFIED USING THE N_FN DEFINED OBIT IN IU NAVIGATION DISPESION SITUATIONS* DOWNANGE POSITION* SEMI-MAJO AXIS* AND COSSANGE VELOCITY AE EVALUATED AGAINST THE MSFN BEST VECTOo IF ESTABLZGHED LIMITS IN TEMS OF THESE THEE PAAMETES AE VIOLATED AN IV STATE VECTO IS EXECUTEDo ONCE UPDATED DECISION IS MADE GUIDANCE COODINATES WITH BOOSTE SYSTEMS ENGINEE ON PEPAATION OF THE UPDATE LOADo THE BOOSTE SYSTEMS ENGINEE PEFOMS UPLINK AND VEIFIES ONBOAD INCOPOATION* MISSION ' EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/1_/70 TAJECTOY AND :EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-29

52 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center YISSlOg ULES SECTION_ - TAJECTOY ANDaUIDANCE _-32 CITEIA FO TLI NO GO EASED ON MISALIGNMENT ATES BETWEEN THE IU AND IMU, {PLATFOM DIFT) COMMENTB THE TANSLUNA INJECTION BUN WILL NOT BE PEFOMED IF EITHE GUIDANCE 5YSTEH_ LAUNCH VEHICLE O SPACECAFTt IS UNACCEPTABLY DEGADED* DETEMINATION OF EXCEBSIVE FEE-FLIGHT GYODIFT IS MADE BY CONTINUALLY COMPAING DIFFEENCES BETWEEN IU AND IMU GIMBAL ANGLES TO VEIFY THAT EACH SYSTEM CAN ELIABLY MAINTAIN KNOWLEDGE OF ITS INETIAL POSITION, A DIFT OF MOE THAN DoS DEG/H ( APPOXIMATELY SIGMA) INDICATES AN uneliable IU EFEENCEt ALLOWING MOE THAN loo DEGEE OF ATTITUDE MIBALIGNMENT AT TLI* A DIFT OF i*5 DEG/H 1100 MEU) IN THE IHU IS CONSIDEED A FAILED SYSTEM* IF THE ABOVE ATES AE EXCEEDED IN EITHE SYSTEM TLI WILL BE NO-GO* PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT FLIGHT DIECTO CEW DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE STIP HATS POCEDUE EFEENCE GUIDANCE INSETION/INJECTION DIGITALSt MSK 290 (SAME AS 5-$5A1 t BA EVIEW' OF THE TLI GO/NO-GO CITEIA FO THE C-PIME HISSIONP tt TW NOTE NO= 68-FHT-T141 DATED 26 NOVEMBE 1968 AISBION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/lJ/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT $UIDANCE AND TLI 3-30

53 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSlOII ULES 6ECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-5_ DISPESED TLI CUTOFF COMMENT5 FO LAGE DISPESIONS AT TLI CUTOFFt THE PIMAY DECISION TO BE MADE ls WHETHE TO CONTINUE WITH A LUNA MISSION O TO POCEED WITH AN EATH OBIT ALTENATe, THE DECISION MUST BE MADE ELATIVELY QUICK BECAUSE IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO GO LUNAt THE FIST MCC MAY HAVE TO BE MOVED UP IN TIME SO AS TO AFFOD A SMALLE POPELLANT PENALTY, THE KEY FACTO AFFECTING THIS _UANTITY IS THE POPELLANT EMAINING FO CSH UNDOCKED MANEUVEING, THE CITEIA CHOSE_ IS BASED ON A DELTA V EQUIEMENT OF 5500 FPS EMAINING FO CONTINUING WITH A LUNA MISSION, THE NUMBE WAS CHOSEN BY CONSIDEING THE DELTA V EQUIED TO DO A DIECT ABOT AT APPOXIMATELY THE SPHEE {A DELTA V OF ABOUT 4500 FPS) PLUS EASONABLE PADS FO MIDCOUSES ON THE WAY BACK (log0 FPS)* TO MAXIMIZE THE MISSION CAPABILITIE$p THE FIST MCC WILL BE MOVED AS CLOSE AS PO$SIBLE TO THE END OF TD AND E, PATICIPATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS TEAM/FD* DATA SOUCES MCC TADEOFF DISPLAY, POCEDUES FDO DETEMINES DELTA V EMAINING AFTE COMPUTING BAP MCC AND ADVISE FD OF MISSION CAPABILITYo MISSION EV DATE EECTION! GOUp PAGE APOLLO _ FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-51

54 r NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIO# UL[S SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-35A CITEIA FO LAUNCH VEHICLE IU O CMC TLI GO/NO'GO BASED ON DIFFEENCES BETWEEN IU AND CMC VELOCITY COMPONENTS COMMENTS THE TANSLUNA INJECTION BUN WILL NOT BE PEFOMED IF EITHE GUIDANCE BYSTEMt LAUNCH VEHICLE O SPACECAFTP I$ unacceptably DEGADEDo IN ODE TO DETECT DEGADED PEFOMANCE IN EITHE SySTEH_ VELOCITY COMPONENT DIFFEENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEM5 AE MONITOED DUING LAUNCH PHASE* THE DIFFEENCE LIMITS FO WHICH TLI IS NO-GO AE--- DELTA X DOT GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO +/- 38 F$ (X DOT - VELOCITY ALONG IMU X-AXIS) DELTA Y DOT GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO./- T3 FPS (Y DOT - VELOCITY ALONG IMU Y-AXIS) DELTA Z DOT GEATE THAN O E_UAL TO./- B7 FPS (Z DOT - VELOCITY ALONG IMU Z-AXIS) DELTA VT GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO./- 34 FP5 VT - TOTAL INETIAL VELOCITY} THESE LIMITS AE BASED ON THE SB OF COMBINED 9-SIGMA IMU HADWAE EO SOUCES AND 3-SIGMA IU PLATFOM HADWAE EO SOUCES* SHOULD THE LIMITS BE EXCEEDED IT CAN BE CONCLUDED THAT ONE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS ISN T OPEATING POPELY O ELIABLY AND TLI WILL BE NO-GO, THE FAILUE SITUATION WILL ALSO BE SuBsTANTIATED BY CHECKING SELECTING OBITAL PAAMETES BASED ON NAVIGATION IN EACH BYSTEM AND PLATFOM DIFT ANALYSISo PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMIC_ OFFICE FLIGHT FLIGHT DIECTO CEW DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE STIPCHATS POCEDUE GUIDANCE INSETION/INJECTION DIGITALSt MSK 290 AGC DYNAMIC STATUS DISPLAY VECTO COMPAE DISPLAYt MSK 1590 ACTION EFEENCE GDO DETECTS AND CONFIMS FOM THE GUIDANCE STIPCHAT5 O GUIDANCE INSETION/INJECTION DIGITALS (MSK 290) THAT ONE O MOE COMPONENT DIFFEENCE LIMIT HAS BEEN VIOLATED* ONCE THE SYSTEM FAILUE HAS BEEN DETEMINED IT IB FUTHE VEIFIED BY ANALYZING SELECTED OBITAL PAAMETES BASED ON THE ONBOAD NAVIGATION STATE VECTO, ' 'iia EVIE_ O# ThE _LI _o)nol_o _i_ei[ ko T_E _;hzke MI_ON'iITW NOTE NO[ 6_'FMTL?I_; DATED 26 NOVEMBE 196Ba MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-3Z

55 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION NULLS SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-35B CITEIA FO LAUNCH VEHICLE IU TEMPOAY NO-GO GAGED ON DIFFEENCE BETWEEN IU AND CMC VELOCITY COMPONENTS COMMENTS THE TANSLUNA INJECTION BUN WILL NOT BE PEFOMED IF EITHE GUIDANCE SYSTEMP LAUNCH VEHICLE O SPACECAFT_ IS UNACCEPTABLY DEGADEDo IN ODE TO DETECT DEGADED PEFOMANCE IN EITHE SYSTEM VELOCITY COMPONENT DIFFEENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS AE MONITOED DUING LAUNCH, IF DIFFEENCES FALL IN THE FOLLOWING ANGES TLZ [$ TEMPOAILY NO-GO, DELTA X DOT IS BETWEEN +/- 7,# AND./- 35 FPS DELTA Y DOT IS BETWEEN +/-45 AND +/- 77 FPS DELTA Z DOT IS BETWEEN +/-27 AND./-B2 FPS DELTA VT IS BETWEEN./- 13 AND./- 33 FP$ ( X DOT t Y DOTI Z DOTt VT DEFINED IN ULE 5-35A) THE ABOVE THESHOLD VALUES AE BASED ON THE SS OF g-sigma. IU PLATFOM HADWAE EO SOUCES= IF THESE THESHOLD VALUES AE EXCEEDED IT INDICATES THEE IS AN ANOMALY IN A IMU EO SOUCE O AN IU EO SOUCE HAS DEGADED ABOVE 9-SIGMA, VIOLATION THEEFOE JUSTIFIES CALLING TLI TEMPOAILY NO-GO UNTIL INDEPENDENT CONFIMATION THAT THE SUSPECT SYSTEM IS THE IU, IF IT IS THE DEGADED SYSTEM TLI IS NO-GOD THIS IS DONE BY COMPAING SELECTED OBITAL PAAMETES BASED ON THE ONBOAD STATE VECTO5 WITH THE TUE NAVIGATION STATE (SEE ULE 5-35C AND 5-36) AND BY PLATFOM DIFT ANALYSISo PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFF E FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE STIPCHATS POCEDUE EFEENCE GUIDANCE INSETION/INJECTION DIGITALSt MSK 290 AGC DYNAMICS STATUS DISPLAY VECTO COMPAE DISPLAYp HSK 1590 (SAME AS 5-35A) I=A EVIEW OF THE TLI GO/NO-GO CITEIA FO THE C-PIME MISSIONt=t TW NOTE NO* 6B-FNT-TZ4* DATED 26 NOVEMBE ZgbB* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE I APOLLO I_'FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT i GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-33

56 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIOM ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITE -35C CITEIA FO TLI NO-GO BASED ON OBITAL DECISION PAAMETE VIOLATION COMMENTS THE TANSLUNA INJECTION BUN WILL NOT BE PEFOMED IF EITHE GUIDANCE SYSTEMt LAUNCH VEHICLE O SPACECAFT_ IS UNACCEPTABLY DEGADED. DEGADING PEFOMANCE IN EITHE SYSTEM IS FIST DETECTED BY VELOCITY COMPONENT DIFFEENCES (ULES b-3ba AND B} WITH INDEPENDENT CONFIMATION MADE BY ANALYZING SELECTED OBITAL PAAMATES, COMPAISON IS MADE BETWEEN THE IU STATE AND BEST GOUND STATE FO SEM1MAJO AXIS DIFFEENCE {DELTA A) AND MAXIMUM COSS ANGE VELOCITY (DELTA W DOT MAX), INPLANB AND OUT-OF-PLANE EO WILL ESULT IN SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION OF THESE QUANTITIE$o IF THE DIFFEENCES EXCEED THE FOLLOWING AT GET OF 1 H 45 MIN }STATES PASS) TLI 15 NO-GO--- DELTA A GEATE THAN 3.28 NM DELTA W DOT MAX GEATE THAN 32 FPS LIMITS AE BASED ON THE SS OF 9-SIGMA IU HADWAE EO SOUCES, CAE IS TAKEN TO ALSO INCLUDE 3-SIGMA MBFN TACKING ACCUACIES AND LAUNCH VEHICLE VENTING UNCETAINTY, PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT FLIGHT DIECTO CEW DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE STIPCHATB GUIDANCE INBETION/INJECTION OIOITALEI MBK 290 AGC DYNAMICB STATUS DISPLAY VECTO COMPAE DISPLAYt MSK i590 POCEDUE--- (SAME AS 5-35A) EFEENCE _IA EVIEW OF THE TLI GO/NO-GO CITEIA FO THE C-PIME MISSIONtIITW NOTE NO* A* FMT-7i4_ DATED 26 NOVEMBE 1988 MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO Zq FNL Z2/ZS/70!TAJBCTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-3#

57 NASA.Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-36 CITEIA FO TLI NO-GO BASED ON OBITAL DECISION PAAMETE VIOLATION COMMENTS THE TANSLUNA INJECTION BUN WILL NOT BE. PEFOMED IF EITHE GUIDANCE BYSTEMt LAUNCH VEHICLE O BPAC_CAFTt IS UNACCEPTABLY DEGADED* DEGADED PEFOMANCE IS FIST DETECTED BY VELOCITY COMPONENT DIFFEENCES {ULES 5-_5A AND B) WITH INDEPENDENT CONFIMATION MADE BY _ ANALYZING SELECTED OBITAL PAAMETES* COMPAISON IS MADE BETWEEN THE IU STATE AND BEST GOUND VECTO STATE FO DOWNANGE POSITION DIFFEENCE (DELTA V)* THIS _UANTITY WILL INDICATE A SIZABLE DEVIATION FO INPLANE NAVIGATION EOB* AT GET OF 56 MIN (CO PA55) TLI IS NO-D0 IF THE DIFFEENCE VIOLATES THE FOLLOWING--- DELTA V GEATE THAN 105t 100 FT. THIS LIMIT I5 BASED ON 9-SIGMA IU HADWAE EO GOUCEB_ INCLUDIJ_G A MAGIN FO _-51GMA NSFN TACKING UNCETAINTY AND LAUNCH VEHICLE VENTING EOS* PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT FLIGHT DIECTO CEW DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE STIPCHATB GUIDANCE INBETION/INJECTION DIGITAL$o MBK 290 AGC DYNAMIC STATUS VECTO COMPAE DISPLAYP MSK 1590 POCEDUE--- (SAME AS 5-35A) EFEENCE IIA EVIEW OF THE TLI GO/NO-GO CITEIA FO THE C-PIME MISSIONt II TW NOTE NO* 68-FMT-7Z4P DATED 26 NOVEMBE 1968 MISSION EV DATE 5ECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI _-35

58 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIO# ULES SECTION B - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCB 5-_7 CITEIA FO TLI NO-GO DUE TO CMC NAVIGATION EOS BASED ON OBITAL DECISION PAAMETES COMMENT THE TLI BUN WILL NOT BE PEFOMED IF THE SATUN IU PLATFOM EFEENC_ HAs FAILED AND THE CMC NAVIGATION STATE VECTO AT EOI INDICATES A SLOW DIFT DEGADATION OF THE CSM INETIAL PLATFOM (IMU), A SATISFACTOY IMU IS EQUIED BY THE CEW FO CONTINUING THE LUNA MISSION BEYOND TLI AND IN THE NOMAL CASE (NO IU EFEENCE FAIL) WOULD B_ D_EMED ACCEPTABLE UNDE THE CITEIA OF MISSION ULES 5-35A AND 5"32= HOWEVE_ WITH THE IU EFEENCE GONE_ THE LAUNCH AND DIFT COMPAISONS WILL BE INVALID AND OBITAL PAAMETE CMECK5 MUST BE MADE. COMPAISON IS MADE BETWEEN THE CMC STATE AND THE BEST GOUND STATE FO DIFFEENCES IN BEMI-MAJO AXIS (DELTA A) AND MAXIMUM CO$$ANGE VELOCITY {DELTA W DOT MAX) COMPAED AT GET = i HOU AND A5 MINUTEB AND DOWNANGE POSITION (DELTA V) COMPAED AT GET = _b MINUTEB= TL[ IS NO-GO IF THE COMPAISON EXCEEDE THE FOLLOWING LIMITS DELTA V 535t900 FEET 2* DELTA A 11.6 N=M= 3, DELTA W DOT MAX 78,7 FPS LIMITS AE BASED ON AN SS OF THE FOLLOWING--- PATICIPATION 1= 9 SIGMA SS OF ALL G AND N HADWAE EOS EXCEPT FO PAD INITIAL MISALIGNMENT EOS AND AOCBLBOMETE BIASES WHICH AE 3 SIGMA (SINCE THIS CAN BE WELL ESTABLISHED PE-LIFT-OFF) SIGMA MSFN ACCUACY= 3, A IO-POUND SIVB VENTING UNCETAINTY= GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE FLIGHT FLIGHT DIECTO CEW DATA SOUCES VECTO COMPAZBON DISPLAY MSK 1590 CMC TELEMETY VECTO MBFN BEST ESTIMATE TAJECTOY VECTO GUIDANCE OFFICE STIPCHATS IU EFEENCE FAILUE TELEMETY DISCETES POCEDUE--- (SAME AS 5-_5A) EFEENCE A= A EVIEW OF THE TLI GO/NO-GO CITEIA FO THE C-PIME MISSIONt Tw NOTE NO= 68-FMT-714_ DATED NOVEMBE 26t 1968 B, A EVIEW OF THE TLI GO/NO-GO CITEIA FO THE APOLLO F AND G MISSIONt TW NOTE NO. 552#,6-48t DATED APIL 2#P 1969 MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO $_ FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND EATH OBIT GUIDANCE AND TLI 3-3b

59 NASA -Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 -_TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-46A CITEIA FO CMC O LGC TEMPOAILY NOmGO FO MANEUVE CONTOL (SOFTWAE FAILUES) COMMENTS THE ELIABILITY OF THE CMC O LGC AS A DATA SOUCE AND CONTOL DEVICE IS DEPENDENT ON THE INTENAL FUNCTIONING OF THE SOFTWAE, THE CMC AND LGC AE POGAMMED TO ECOGNIZE INTENAL FAULTS AND EONEOUS CONDITIONS, UPON ECOGNITION OF SUCH A CONDITIONP THE COMPUTE ISSUES A POGAM ALAM, THE CMC AND LGC ALAMS WHICH INVALIDATE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY U_TIL CAUSE IS EMEDIED AE OUTLINED BELOW* THEY AE CATAGOIZED BY SINGLE AND MULTIPLE OCCUENCE= SINGLE OCCUENCE ALAM CODE ALAM FAULT BAD PIPA EADING (CMC ONLY) POGAM USING IMU WHEN IMU TUNED OFF A PIPA FAIL CAUSED ISS WANING Oll07 ESTAT PHASE TABLE ENTIES DISAGEE VG INCEASING ICDU FAIL CAUSED ISS WANING 0_777 ICOU AND PIPA FAILS CAUSED ISS WANING IMU FAIL CAUSED ISS WANING IMU AND PlPA FAILS CAUSED ISS WANING IMU AND ICDU FAILS CAUSED ISS WANING IMUt ICDU_ PIPA FAILS CAUSED ISS WANING CONTINUOUS OCCUENCE INTEGATION CAUSING OVE- FLOW THAT ECTIFICATION WOULD NOT ELIMINATE NO SOLUTION FOM CONIC OUTINE P37 POSITION VECTO it IGNITION TOO SMALL CMC ONLY] FOBIDDEN STEP EXECUTED 2_20# ZEO O NEGATIVE WAITLIST CALL 2_206 DISPLAY SYSTEM ADDESS BUFFES FULL MISSION EV DATE SECTION. i GOUP PAGE APOLLO I# FNL.2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND _ MANEUVES GUIDANCE 3-37

60 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE JOB ALEADY WAITING IN PATICULA STALL OUTINE SQUAE OOT CALLED WITH NEGATIVE AGUMENT DISPLAY SYSTEM ALAM FOM INTENAL USE ILLEGAL EQUEST FO A FLASHING DISPLAY {CMC ONLY} NEW POGAM EQUEST CANNOT BE MADE AFTE PII STATED {CMC ONLY) TOO MANY JOBS ATTEMPTING TO USE JOB DELAY OUTINE EXECUTIVE OVEFLOW-NO VACANT AEAS EXECUTIVE OVEFLOW-NO JOB EGISTE SETS NEW TASK CANNOT BE INSETED SUCCESSFULLY IN WAITLIST SYSTEM 3L207 NO VACANT AEA AVAILABLE FO MAK DATA PATICIPATION OPTICS USE NOT ALLOWED WITH EXTENDED VEB BEING PEFOMED GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT FLIGHT CEW DIECTO DATA SOUCES CMC DSKY/POGAM ALAM LIGHT POCEDUE CMC MONITO I H/So MSK 966 LGC MONITO H/St MSK 1594 CCATS CMC O LGC DOWNLINK EADOUT A, INDICATION CEW OBSEVES POGAM ALAM LIGHT AND KEYS VOSN09 TO VEIFY ALAM. GDO OBSEVES POGAM ALAM VIA FAILEGS USING MSK 966 {CMC)t MSK 1594 (LGC}_ O CCATS CMC/LGC DOWNLINK EADOUT, B, ACTION ALAM IS IDENTIFIED AS APPLIOAB_E TO A GO/NO-GO DECISION, IF 1T IS IN o'continuous=* CATEGOY DSKY EO ESET IS PEFOMED TO VEIFY E-OCCUANCE, AFIE IDENTIFICATION GDO DECLAES tl CMC GO ON POGAM ALAM tl OII CMC NO-GO ON POGAM ALAM= II _ISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND MANEUVES GUIDANCE 3-3B

61 NASA " Manned. Spacecraft Center MISSION eules.,section3 -TAJECTOYANDGUIDANCE ITEiv 5-_6E CITEIA FO CSM G AND N NO-GO BASED ON {MC/IHU ALIGNMENT DISCEPANCY (OPTICS/WINDOW/MAK CHECK) COMMENTS FO THHUSTING MANEUVESo THE CMC 15 EQUIED TO ESTABLI@H THE DESIED IMU ALIGNMENT AND OIENT THE SPACECAFT TO THE DESIED THUST DIECTION, PIO TO EACH MANEUVE THE GOUND POVIDES VISUAL CHECK DATA TO VEIFY THE C@M/IMU OIENTATION. IF THE VISUAL CHECK EXCEEDS THE SIGHTING UNCETAINTY_ {SEXTANT FOVt 2,2 peg-- HOIZON DEFINITIONt 4 BEG) THE CMC HAS FAILED TO OIENT THE CSM TO THE EQUIED THUST DIECTION, THIS IMPL E5 INHEENT EOS WOULD BE CEATED IF THE G AND N IS ALLOWED TO CONTOL THE MANEUVE, THE SIGHTING UNCETAISTY ACCOUNTS FO ATTITUDE HOLD DEADBANDt OPTICS POSITIONING_ AND ACTUAL HOIZON DEFINITION, PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES POCEDUE GUIDANCE OPTICS SUPPOT TABLED MSK 229 A. pepaation THE GOD GENEATES THE OPTICS DATA TO BE PASSED BY THE CAPCOM AS PAT OF THE MANEUVE PAD, B, ACTION AFTE THE LAST PE-MANEUVE IMU ALIGNMENTo THE FLIGHT CEW MANEUVES TO THE D_TEMINED THUSTING ATTITUDE, THE VISUAL SIGHTING DATA OBTAINED FOM THE MANEUVE PAD IS VEIFIED. IF THE SIGHTING DATA EXCEEDS THE UNCETAINTY THE G AND N IG ==NO-GO It= IF MANEUVE IS C1TICALt CEW CONTINUES PEPAATION FO SCS EXECUTION-- IF NOTt PEPAATION IS DELAYED UNTIL G AND N EO I5 ESOLVED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND MANEUVES GUIDANCE, 9-39

62 NASA - Manned_Spacecraft msston ULES Center SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-4GC CITEIA FO LM G AND N NO-GO BAEED ON LGC/IMO ALIGNMENT DISCEPANCY (COAS CHECK) COMMENTS FO THUSTING MANEUVESo THE LGC 15 EQUIED TO ESTABLISH THE DESIED IMU ALIGNMENT AND OIENT THE SPACECAFT TO THE DESIED THUST DIECTION, PIO TO CETAIN CITICAL MANEUVES THE GOUND POVIDES VISUAL CHECK DATA TO VEIFY THE LM/IMU OIENTATION. IF THE VISUAL CHECK EXCEEDS THE SIGHTING uncetainty (COAG CDDDINATESo +/- 2 DEG) THE LGC HAS FAILED T_ OIENT THE LM TO THE EQUIED THUST DIECTION* THUS INHEENT EOS WOULD BE CEATED IF THE G AND N IS ALLOWED TO CONTOL THE MANEUVE, THE SIGHTING UNCETAINTY ACCOUNTS FO ATTITUDE HOLD DEADBAND AND ASSUMES A CALIBATED COAS* PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES POCEDUE LM OPTICS SUPPOT TABLED MSK 239 A, pepaation THE GDO GENEATES THE OPTICS DATA TO BE PASSED BY THE CAPCDM AS PAT OF THE MANEUVE PAD, BI ACTION AFTE THE LAST PE-MANEUVE IMU ALIGNMENT THE FLIGHT CEW MANEUVES TO THE DETEMINED THUSTING ATTITUDE, THE VISUAL SIGHTING DATA FOM THE MANEUVE PAD IS VEIFIED. IF THE SIGHTING DATA EXCEEDS THE UNCETAINTY_ THE G AND N 15 IINO-GO If, IF MANEUVE IS CITICALP CEW CONTINUES pepaation FO AGS EXECUTION-- IF NOTo PEPAATION IE DELAYED UNTIL G AND N EO IS ESOLVED. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL L2/15/TO TAJECTOY AND MANEUVES GUIDANCE 3-40

63 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-46D CITEIA FO CMC/LGC NO-GO FO MANEUVE DETEMINATION AND/O MONITOING {STATE VECTO EO) COMMENTS THEE AE IN-FLIGHT SITUATIONS WHEE STATE VECTOS AE UPLINKED TO CMC/LOC WITHOUT SUFFICIENT SUBSEQUENT GOUND STATION COVEAGE TO VEIFY POPE ONBUAP ACCEPTANCE VIA TELEMETY, IN SUCH INSTANCES DATA IN THE FOM OF A GET, LATITUDE_ LONGITUDE* AND ALTITUDE VALID AT THE GET AE POVIDED, THIS GET IS INPUT INTO CNC/LGC AND THE STATE VECTU IS INTEGATED TO THIS TIME. THIS A CHECK ON THE ONBOAD COMPUTE POPE ACCEPTANCE OF A GOUND UPLINKED NAV VECTO AND ITS ABILITY TO INTEGATE POPELY. DATA PIOITY HAS SET THE ALLOWABLE DIFFEENCES IN LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE AT +/- 0,02 DEG AND +/- 0,2 N,N. IN ALTITUDE. PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE _APCDM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCE5 POCEDUE CHECKOUT MONITO DISPLAY* MSK 1619 APPLICABLE NAVIGATION UPDATE DISPLAY, MSK 276 O MSK 279 ACTION GOD GENEATES THE APPLICABLE NAVIGATION UPDATE AND POVIDES fo0 WITH THE UPDATE TIMETAG, FDO ADJUST THE TIMETAG BY A GIVEN INCEMENT AND GENEATES LATITUDE_ LONGITUDE* AND ALTITUDE ON CHECKOUT MONITO FO THE ADJUSTED TIME. THIS INFOMATION 15 VOICED TO FLIGHT CEW BY CAPCOM, CEW TAKES APPOPIATE ACTION TO VEIFY ONBOAD INTEGATION TO THE SPECIFIED POINT IN TIME, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND MANEUVES GUIDANCE 3-41

64 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 " TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ;-4T SPACECAFT TIMING COMMENTS A THOUGH F, G AND H, I AND J. TIMING EOS LESS THAN 2 SECONDS DUING THESE PHAGES DO NOT ADVESELY AFFECT THE MANEUVE AND/O THE MONITOING OF THE MANEUVE, EOS IN EXCESS OF 2 SECONDS AE EADILY DETECTED AND EASILY COECTED WHEN THE CMC AND LGC AE OPEATING NOMALLY, IN ODE TO USE THE DOWNLINK VECTOS ILGC AND AGS) FO COMPAISON WITH MSFN TO DETEMINE GUIDANCE SWlTCHOVE THE TIMING OF THE COMPUTES MuST BE WITHIN,3 SECONDS OF MSFN, THE ACTIVE VEHICLE COMPUTE TIMING MUST BE ACCUATE TO,5 SECONDS TO ACCOMPLISH ENDELVOUS AND SEXTANT TACKING, NOTE THE ABOVE AE L]MIT5 ON TIMING EOS AND UNDE NOMAL CONDITIONSP THE CLOCKS WILL BE MAINTAINBD AS ACCUATELY AS POSSIBLE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/70 TAJECTOY ANO MANEUVES GUIDANCE 3-42

65 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION3 - TAJECTOY ANDGUIDANCE 5-57 MCC EXECUTION CITEIA COMMENTS A, THE FLIGHT OPEATIONS-DIECTO HAS EQUESTED THAT_ IF OSSIBLE_ ALL SS MCCIS SHOULD BE GEATE THAN _ SECS, B, MCC2 AND MCC4 AE SELECTED AS THE PEFEED MCC EXECUTION POINTS FO THE FOLLOWING EASONS--- I. EPHEMEIS IS BETTE KNOWN AT MCC2 THAN AT MCO1t AND AT MCC_ THAN AT MCC3, 2, THE NOMINAL DELTA V GOWTH ATE BETWEEN MCCL AND MCC2 IS SMALL. 3, AT MCC4t THE TAJECTOY IS LESS SENSITIVE TO SMALL DISPESIONS THAN AT MCC3, C, MCC2 IS PEFEED OVE HCCEt IF THE COST IS NOT POHIBITIVE FO THE FOLLOWING EASONS -m" i, THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE STATE VECTO IS BETTE AT HCC2, {SAME AS B-I ABOVE,) 2, A MINO DISPESION AT MCC2 WILL NOT BE POPAGATED AS LONG AS WOULD BE THE SAME DISPESION, D. TO AVOID THE UNDESIABLE EGION 3 SECS O LESS SPS BUNS AND TO AVOID EXECUTING MCC3p A NON-FEE MCC2 WILL BE EXECUTED POVIDING A SAFE ABOT CAPABILITY AT LOI+2 HS EMAINS, E_ HCC2 WAS SELECTED AS THE NOMINAL POINT TO GO NON-FEE ETUN ON A HYBID MISSION FO THE FOLLOWING EASONS--- I, THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EPHEMEIS IS BETTE T_AN AT MOOt, 2, NOMINALLY THE DELTA V GOWTH ATE IS SMALL BETWEEN MCCZ AND MCC2, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSLUNA GUIDANCE COAST 3-A3

66 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-59 LOI TAGETING CONSTAINTS COMMENTS THE CONSTAINTS SPECIFIED IN THIS ULE AE FO USE IN BOTH THE TAGETING OF LOI AND THE EVALUATION OF THE FOUTH SCHEDULED MIDCOUSE. THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY IG THAT IF LO! CAN BE TAGETED WITHIN THESE CONSTAINTS THE MIDCOUSE COECTION WILL NOT BE EQUIED, THE TWO MAJO CONSIDEATIONS USED WHEN EVALUATING AN LOI MANEUVE AE THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE MANEUVE WITH ESTABLISHED MONITOING TECHNIQUES AND THE TOTAL DELTA V EQUIED FO THE LOI/DOI MANEUVE COMBINATION. THE SPECIFIC CONSTAINTS AND THEI ATIONALE AE AS FOLLOWS--- (1) THE PEICYNTHIAN OF THE APPOACH HYPEBOLA IS CONSTAINED TO BE WITHIN +1- ZO N,M, OF THE TAGETED PEICyNTHIAN. THIS ALTITUDE IS ESTABLISHED EITHE BY TLI O BY THE FIST EXECUTED MIDCOUSE COECTION. ALTHOUGH THE LIMITS AE 3OMEWHAT ABITAY (I,Eo_ VIOLATION DOES NOT NECESSAILY PESENT A CEW HAZAD)t THEY DO EPESENT A EASONABLE TOLEANCE AOUND TAGET, MOE SIGNIFICANT DEVIATIONS CAN LEAD TO undesiably LOW PEICYNTHIANS O NECESSITATE LAGE APSIDAL OTATIONS DUING LOI TO ESTABLISH ACCEPTABLE OBITAL CONDITIONS FO THE DOI MANEUVEo IN ANY CASEp MCC4 SHOULD NOT BE EQUIED FO PEICYNTHIAN ALTITUDE ADJUSTMENT UNLESS PEVIOUS CONDITIONS EPESENTED GEATE THAN } 51GMA DISPE31ON_. 2. THE ALTITUDE OF THE NODE IS CONSTAINED TO BE BETWEEN -EO AND +E5 N,M. OF THE TAGETED PEICYNTHIAN ALTITUDE. THE LOWE LIMIT IS DETEMINED BY i ABOVE WHILE THE UPPE BOUNDAY CONSTAINS THE APSIDAL OTATION POSSIBLE DUING LOI, THUS MAINTAINING THE ABOT MODES IN A NEA-NOMINAL TIME FAME. THIS BECOME5 ESPECIALLY IMPOTANT ON HYBID TAJECTOIES WHEE THE GAP BETWEEN MODES I AND II MUST BE WELL DEFINED IN ODE FO SPECIAL CEW POCEDUES TO BE IMPLEMENTED ACCOUINGLY, LAGE APSIDAL OTATIONS COULD WIDEN THIS GAP_ WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDEING EHEASED ABOT TECHNIQUES INADEQUATE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSLUNA GUIDANCE COAST _-44

67 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION_ - TAJECTOY ANDGUIDANCE ITE_ 5-60 LOI COMMITMENT CITEIA COMMENTS IN ODE FO LOT TO BE GO_ SEVEAL MAJO MILESTONES MUST BE MET (FOM A TAJECTOY/MANEUVE STANDPOINT). THESE INCLUDE--- A, COMMITMENT TO _ HOUS (AT LEAST) IN LPO, THIS EQUIEMENT MUST BE MET TO INSUE ADEQUATE POST LOT TACKING FO A VALID TEl SOLUTION, THIS ALLOWS A FULL UNPETUBED EV OF TACKING ON WHICH TO COMPUTE TEl, PESENTLYt ONE EV OF TACK IS THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE AMOUNT UPON WHICH TO BASE MANEUVE COMPUTATIONS, B, THEE SHOULD BE ENOUGH SPS FUEL FO LOT TEl PLUS TEC MCC AND ESEVES IN ODE TO COMMIT TO LOT-- HOWEVEt CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO USING THE DPS FO LOT WHEN TANSLONA MIOCOUSE EQUIEMENTS PECLUDE USING THE SP5 FO LOI AND TEl, THE BASIC PEMISE IS THAT EVEN WITHOUT A LUNA LANDING THEE IS STILL ENOUGH TO BE GAINED IN LUNA OBIT TO WAANT CONTINUING _ITH LOI* PATICIPATION FDO ETO FO G AND C DATA SOUCES LOT TE PLANNING/GPM DIGITALS MPT POCEDUES NOMINAL MISSION POCEDUE A, LOT WILL BE TAGETED BY FDO TO INSUE EXECUTION WITHIN CONSTAINTS, B, THE MANEUVE WILL BE TANSFEED TO THE MPT SO THAT ETO CAN COMPUTE A TE SOLUTION, C, THE DELTA v EQUIED FO THESE MANEUVES _PLUG TEC MCC AND _BEVESI MUST BE COMPAED AGAINST THE DELTA V EM AS SUPPLIED FOM G AND C, D, FO 51TUATION$ WHEE THE TIMELINE HAS BECOME COWDED EOMF MAY BE GOTTEN FOM NCC TADEOFF DISPLAYt THUS ELIMINATING ETO TEl CALCULATIONSt ETC,_ FOM THE WOK SCHEDULE. EFEENCE APOLLO TECHNIQUES DOCUMENT_ S-PA 9 TO 41t MISSION F/G TL MCC AND LOft FEBUAY 2_o 1969, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO it FNL L2/15/TO TAJECTOY AND TANSLUNA GUIDANCE COAST 3-4_

68 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITEF 5-Bl PEMATUE LOI SHUTDOWN COMMENTS A. SPS SHUTDOWN BUT WITHIN SPS OPEATING LIMITS, PATICIPATION CEW WHEN POSSIBLE, IT IS DESIABLE TO ACHIEVE A STABLE LUNA OBIT, IF THE SP$ 5HUTSDOWN PEMATUELY DUE TO A GUIDANCE O CONTOL POBLEM BUT 15 STILL OPEABLE_ A MANUAL ESTAT SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN A STABLE LUNA OBIT, DATA SOUCES POCEDUE EFEENCE COMMENTS ONBOAD MONITOING CEW WILL USE STANDAD SPS ESTAT POCEDUES, MISSION ABOT PLAN. B, SPS SHUTDOWN AND OUT OF GPS OPEATING LIMITS, i, WITH THE SPS OUT OF LIMITSt A LOI ABOT MUST BE PEFOMEDe THE LOI ABOT CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THEE BASIC EGIONS WITH THEE BASIC POCEDUES, CA) THE FIST EGION CALLED MODE I HAS A POST-ABOT TAJECTOY ESULTING 1N A DIECT ETUN TO EATHe THE DELTA V EQUIED FO A MODE I INCEASES AS LOI POGESSES THOUGH THE ABOT EGION, {B) THE SECOND EGIOND O MODE lip 15 A TWO-IMPULSE ABOT IN WHICH THE FIST IMPULSE ESULTS IN A STABLE LUNA OBIT (CLEA PEIGYNTHIAN WITH A PEIOD LESS THAN ABOUT 40 HS)J THE SECOND IMPULSE IS BASICALLY A TEI PEFOMED NEA PEICYNTHIANo THE DELTA V EQUIED FO A NODE ii ABOT DECEASES AS LOI POGESSES THOUGH THE ABOT EGION. (C) THE THID EGIONt O MODE IIIp HAS A PE-ABOT TAJECTOy THAT IS A STABLE LUNA OBIT AND IS BASICALLY A TEI MANEUVE* THE DELTA V EQUIED FO A MODE III ABOT INCEASES AS LOI POGESSES THOUGH THE ABOT EGION, 2, IDEALLY_ THE LM DPS DELTA v CAPABILITY EXCEEDS THAT EQUIED TO ABOT, HOWEVEt SOME AEAS OF THE MODE I ABOT EGION EQUIE MOE DELTA V THAN IG AVAILABLE IN THE DPSt ABOTS FOM THESE AEAS EQUIE AN ADDITIONAL BUN FOM THE LM APS,... IA) FO MODE I ABOTSt THE MODE I ABOT EGION IS SUBDIVIDED INTO THEE DIFFEENT AEAS WHICH AE DEFINED AS A FUNCTION OF THE LOI DELTA VM (MAGNITUDE) EXISTING AT GP$ CUT OFF, DEPENDING ON THE VALUE OF DELTA VM THEE DIFFEENT TYPES OF ABOT MANEUVES AE PEFOMED (l) IN THE AEA DEFINED BY DELTA vm OF 0 TO 238 FPS (APPOXIMATELY O TO 33 SEC) A DP$ BUN WILL BE PEFOMED AT LOI IGN + 2 H* THIS MANEUVE WILL BE COMPUTED ON THE GOUND* LOI IGN + 2 H, WAS CHOSEN FOM IGNITION TIME OF THIS DPS BUN BECAUSE THE LM CAN BE PEPAED FO A G.N BUN BY THE CEW IN THAT TIME SPAN, THEEFOE BASED ON THIS IGNITION TIME THE THE DELTA VM OF 23_ FPS INTO THE LOI BUN EPESENT5 THE POINT AT WHICH ALL THE DELTA V CAPABILITY IN THE LM OPS IS UTILIZED IN THE ABOT BUN, TO DELAY THE IGNITION SIGNIFICANTLY WOULD INCEA3E THE EQUIED ABOT DELTA V BEYOND THAT AVAILABLE IN THE OS, MISGION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/7O TAJECTOY AND TA_SLUNA GUIDANCE COAST 3-_6

69 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ " TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ONTtl 12) IN THE AEA DEFINED BY DELTA VM OF 2BB TO _4B FPS (APPOXIMATELY _S TO TO 1.15 A DP$ BUN WILL BE PEFOMED AT LOI IBN+ BO MIND THIS MANEUVE IS EASED ON A CEW CHAT OF ABOT DELTA V VESUS DELTA V GAINED AND A SET OF PE-LOI ESTABLISHED FDAI ATTITUDES, LOI IGN. 30 MINI WAS CHOSEN FO IGNITION OF THIS DP5 BUT BECAUSE THE LM CAN BE PEPAED BY THE CEW IN THAT TIME SPAN, THEEFOE BASED ON THIS IGNITION TIME THE SPEAD BETWEEN DELTA VM INTO THE LOI BUN EPESENTS THE ENTIE DELTA V CAPABILITY OF THE DPS, TO DELAY THIS IGNITION SIGNIFICANTLY WOULD INCEASE THE EQUIED ABOT DELTA V BEYOND THAT AVAILABLE IN THE DPS, IS) IN THE AEA DEFINED BY DELTA VM OF 5A5 TO 725 FP5 (APPOXIMATELY Z+Z5 TO l+bo) A DPB BUN TO DEPLETION WILL BE pefomed AT LOI IGN + 30 HIM FOLLOWED BY A SUPPLEMENTAL APS BUN AT DP5 IGN. 2 He THE DPS MANEUVE AT LOI ION + _0 MIN IS BASED ON A CEW CHAT OF ABOT DELTA V VESUS DELTA V GAINED AND A SET OF PE-LOI ESTABLISHED FDAI ATTITUDES, THE APS SUPPLEMENTAL BUN IS COMPUTED BY THE GOUND BASED ON POST-DPS BUN TACKING*LOI IGN + 30 MIN WAS CHOSEN FO IGNITION OF THE OPS ABOT BoN BECAUSE THE LM CAN BE PEPAED BY THE CEW_ AND THE DELTA V AVAILABLE FOM THE APS CAN SUPPLEMENT THE DPS TO ACHIEVE THE EQUIED DELTA V. TO DELAY THE IGNITION SIGNIFICANTLY WOULD INCEASE THE EQUIED ABOT DELTA V BEYOND THAT AVAILABLE, (B) FO MODE I1ABOTSt A DPS BUN IS EQUZED AT LOI ION. 2 HS with A SECOND IMPULSE OCCUING NEA PEICYNTHIAN (EXACT TIME IS A FUNCTION OF THE OBITAL PEIOD AND OIENTATION), IF THE EQUIED SECOND IMPULSE IS BEYOND THE EMAINING DPS CAPABILITY, THE ADDITIONAL DELTA V SHOULD BE APPLIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTE DPS DEPLETION IN ODE TO EDUCE THE DELTA V COAST, THE MODE II MANEUVES AE COMPUTED ON THE GOUND, THE ABOT MODE CHANGEOVE FOM MODE I TO MODE II OCCUS WHEN THE EQUIED ABOT DELTA VIS FO BOTH MODES AE THE SAME, IC) FO MODE Ill ABOTS_ THE DPS ALONE CAN PEFOM THE TEl, THE MODE III EGION IS ENTEED WHEN THE PE-ASOT TAJECTOY HAS A CLEA PEICYNTHIAN AND A PEIOD OF LESS THAN ABOUT 15 HS, ALL MODE III MANEUVES AE COMPUTED ON THE GOUND, 3, FO A SHUT DOWN OF THE BPS ENGINE AT ANY POINT DUING THE LOI BUN_ THE OPS O DPS+APS ENGINE(S) HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO POVIDE THE NECESSAY DELTA V FO THE APPOPIATE ABOT MANEUVE SEQUENCE, THE SPS CONTOL LIMITS HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO VAIOUS ABOT MODE EGIONS OF THE LOI BUN TOt AS FA AS POSSIBLE, PECLUDE A SHUTDOWN IN OTHE AEAS OF THE MODE I EGION, IN THE FIST AEA OF THE MODE I EGION (DELTA VM FOM O TO 238, O TO BB SEC) THE TIGHT LIMITS APPLY, IF THE ENGINE IS GOXNG TO DEGADE THE TIGHT LIMIT WILL INCEASE THE POBABILITY OF SHUT DOWN IN THIS AEA, A SHUTDOWN HEE ESULTS IN A LOI TIC. 2 H* DPS ABOT BUN TAGETED BY THE GOUND WHICH IS MOE ACCEPTABLE THAN AN ABOT OFF THE CEW CHAT AT LOI TIG+ _O MIN, WHEN DELTA vm=2bbt ABOT 33 SIC INTO THE LOI BUN* THE LOOSE CONTOL LIMITS BECOME EFFECTIVE AND AE IN EFFECT UNTIL DELTA VM-ZSZ2t ABOUT 3+20 INTO THE BUN, THIS ENCOMPASSES THE EMAINDE OF THE MODE I EGIONp ALL THE MODE IIw AND THAT POTION OF THE MODE Ill WHEE THE OBITAL PEIOD IS ABOUT 7 HS, THE ELAXATION OF THE LIMITS TO ALLOW OPEATION OF THE SPS IN A MOE DEGADED CONDITION INCEASES THE POBABILITY OF GETTING BEYOND THE EGION WHEE AN ABOT OFF THE CEW CHAT IS EQUIED, O A DPS+APS BUN IS EQUIED,THE _MITS._E _EPT L_O_,ACO$S TH_MQp I AND F_BT. PAT,OF ;THE,MODE. _III E_ON INo_bE _0 A_T_'JN A'_ONAEL_'_U_ bety_l"peibb"jg_ea_en'f_a_'b EQUAL TO 7 HS) SINCE VIOLATION OF THE TIGHT SPS CONTOL LIMITS PECLUDES A LUNA LANDING ANYWAY, OPEATION OF THE SPS BELOW THESE LIMITS HAS LITTLE TO GAIN AND THE DELTA V EQUIED FO TEl INCEASES THOUGHOUT MODE IIl, THE LIMITS BECOME TIGHT AGAIN THOUGHOUT THE EMAINDE OF THE LOI BUN, IF THE ENGINE IS OPEATING UNDE TIGHT LIMITS AT THIS TIME IN ALL POBABILITY IT WILL CONTINUE TO OO SO SINCE IT HAS BEEN BUNING FO 3+SO,IF FOHCED TO SHUT DOWN IN THIS EGION THEE IS MOE THAN SUFFICIENT DPS DELTA V TO DO TEI WITH, THEE IS ALSO THE APS FO A BACKUP TO THE DPS_ ALSO THE TIGHT LIMITS PEHIT AN SPS ESTAT SO THAT IT COULD SEVE AS A FUTHE BACKUP TO THE DPB AND APS ENGINESo MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/T0 tajectoy AND TANSLUNA _UIDANCE COAST 3-47

70 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITE_ CONTll PATICIPATION CEW FO FDO DATA SOUCE ONBOAD MONITOING ETUN TO EATH DISPLAYS GENEAL PUPOSE MANEUVE TABLE POCEDUES--- AJ MODE I 1, DELTA VM FPS (0-33 SEC) A* TEMINATE LOI ON SPS TIGHT CONTOL LIMITS B, EXECUTE DPS BUN AT LOI IGN+2 H USING GOUND COMPUTE 2. DELTA VM FPS (33 SEC-I-15) A, TEMINATE LOI ON BPB LOOSE CONTOL LIMIT B= EXECUTE DPS BUN AT LOI ION.30 MIN USING DATA FOM THE CEW CHAT 3, DELTA VH FPS 1Z ) B, MODE If, A, TEMINATE LOI ON SPS LOOSE CONTOL LIMITS, B, EXECUTE DPS BUN TO DEPLETION AT LOI IGN+ 30 MIN (USING CEW CHAT( AND A SUPPLEMENTAL APS BUN AT LOI ION + 2 1/2 HS USING GOUND COMPUTE* 1. TEMINATE LOI ONLY FO VIOLATION OF SPS LOOSE LIMITS (SPS UNSAFE), 2, EXECUTE DPS BUN AT LOI ION + 2 HG (GOUND COMPUTED)* 3, EXECUTE OPS TEl (GOUND COMPUTED) NEA PEICYNTHIAN* SUPPLEMENT WITH APS IF EQUIED, C, MODE Ill. 1. TEMINATE SPG ON TIGHT OPEATING LIMITS WHEN PEIOD IS LESS THAN 7 HS (CEW CHAT)= 2. EXECUTE DPS TEl NEA PEICYNTHIAN (GOUND COMPUTED) -T D, THESE POCEDUES MINIMIZE THE NEED FO TWO-IMPULSE ABOT BUNS BY TEMINATING LOI (TIGHT LIMITS) IN THE EALY PAT OF MODE I AND WELL INTO MODE IlIo ALSO ALLOW THE GPS TO BUN (LOOSE LIMITS( IN THE EST OF MODE I_ MODE IX AND THE EALY PAT OF MODE Ill, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSLUNA GUIDANCE COAST 3-48

71 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIO ULES SECTION _ - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-62 SPS FAILUES COMMENTS DATA PIOITY HAS ESTABLISHED THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES FO SPS FAILUES AT IGNITION--- A. IF THE SPS FAILS AT IGNITION FO A MOCP THE GOUND WILL PASS A FLYBY MANEUVE FO EXECUTION WITH THE DPB O THE SM-CS, B, IF THE SPS FAILS AT IGNITION FO LOIP THE CEW WILL EXECUTE THE MCC5 ABOT MANEUVE ALEADY ONBOAD WITH DPS O SM-CS AT PC +2 HOUS, C, IF THE SPS FAILS AT IGNITION OF DOlt THE GOUND WILL PASS A DPS TEl AS SOON AS PACTICAL {EALIEST WOULD BE 4-_/2 HOUS AFTE LOI), PATICIPATIUN FLIGHT CEW CAPCOM FD FDO ETO DATA SOUCES MCC TADEOFF TE DIGITALS POCEDUES EFEENCES THE MISSION TECHNIQUES FO THIS PATICULA FAILUE WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS--- A, FO SPS FAILUES AT MCC 1, FDO WOULD TAGET A FLYBY MOC WHICH would BE CONSISTENT WITH THE DESIED ETUN TIME AND LANDING AEA (AS SPECIFIED BY THE ETO) AS WELL AS SATISFYING THE FLYBY ALTITUDE CONBTAINTS (60 LESS THAN HP LESS THAN 150O), 2, ETO WOULD COMPUTE ATE MCC TO INSUE ALL CONSTAINTS HAVE BEEN MET {FLIGHT TIMEr LANDING AEAt ETC,) B, FU SPS FAILUES AT LOI i. CEW WILL EXECUTE THE PC +2 MANEUVE ALEADY ONBOAO UNLESS CONDITIONS DICTATE ANOTHE MANEUVE, 2, ETO COULD CALCULATE A MANEUVE AT A LATE T1ME_ TO A DIFFEENT LANDING AEA O FO A DIFFEENT ETUN TIME DEPENDING ON LM PEPAATION TIME_ DPS DELTA V AVAILABLEt AND TIME CITICALITY OF THE SITUATIONo C, FO SPS FAILUES AT DOI E, ETO WILL COMPUTE A DPB TEI FO EXECUTION AS SOON AS PACTICAL, THE NOMINAL TIME FO THIS MANEUVE WOULD BE DOE + A-i/2 MOUBI 2, IF IT IS DECIDED TO EMAIN IN LPO LONGE THAN SPECIFIED TIME (ABOVE)p ETO WILL COMPUTE THE DPS TEl CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSION PLAN, APOLLO TECHNIQUES DOCUMENT_ S-PA-9TO4_t MISSION F/G CONTINGENCY POCEDUESt FEBUAY 12t 1969= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _4 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSLUNA GUIDANCE COAST 3-_9

72 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center 1- :m MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE _-76 DOI TAGETING Z. DUING TLCt LOI AND OOI AE TAGETED TO PODUCE A GOUNDTACK THAT IS OPTIMUM FO PHOTOGAPHING SPECIFIC LANDMAKS AND TO PODUCE THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS AT PDI--- A* 5OiOOO FT* HP, B* DESIED AZIMUTH Ce ZEO OUT-OF-PLANE EO (WEDGE ANGLE} 2. IF A DISPESION OCCUS DUING LOft OOI WILL BE TAGETED WITH THE FOLLOWING ODE OF PIOITY--- A, PODUCE A 50rOOD FT HP AT POI KEEP THE WEDGE ANGLE ZEO BUT VAY THE DESIED AZIMUTH +/- 10 DEG IN ODE TO ACHIEVE A DESIED PHOTOGAPHIC GOUNDTACK= (DESIED IS DEFINED AS WEDGE ANGLE AT THE PHOTO SITE LE55 THAN *25 DEGo} B, PODUCE A 50tOOO FT HP AT PDI VAY THE AZIMUTH +/- _0 DEG AND THE WEDGE ANGLE AT PDI UP TO =5 DEG IN ODE TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE PHOTOGAPHIC GOUNDTACK,(ACCEPTAGLE 15 DEFINED AS WEDGE ANGLE AT THE PHOTO SITE LESS THAN,5 DEG,} C, IF AN ACCEPTABLE PHOTOGAPHIC GOUNDTACK CAN NOT BE FOUND BY APPLYING 2Bt THEN ALL PHOTO CONSTAINTS ON THE GOUNDTACK AE DOPPED, DOI WILL THEN BE TAGETED TO ACHIEVE A 50_O00 FT HP AT PDIt WITH ZEO WEDGE ANGLE AT PDI AND NO CONGTAZNT$ ON THE AZIMUTH ISEE MISSION ULE 5-S1 FO FUTHE INFOMATION) MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LUNA OBIT GUIDANCE 3-50

73 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 " TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE _-77 DOI COMMITMENT CITEION COMMENTS BY GENEAL AGEEMENTt A to, FO OOZ WILL NECES@ITATE AT LEAST TWO EVOLUTIONS IN THE POST-MANEUVE OBIT* THE PUPOSE FO THE ULE IS TO POVIDE ONE FULL EV OF TACKING TO OBTAIN A POSTBUN VECTO WITH WHICH TO COMPUTE TEl, THIS MANEUVE COULD THEN BE PASSED ON THE NEXT FONT SIDE PASS, PATICIPATION FO0 ETO FD DATA SOUCE5 POCEDUES EFEENCES LM DESCENT PLANNING DISPLAY ETUN TO EATH DIGITALS THE NOMINAL MISSION TECHNIQUES WOULD BE--- A, FDO WILL COMPUTE DOI IN OBSEVANCE WITH MISSION ULE 5-76, B, FO0 WIlL TANSFE THE MANEUVE TO THE MPT, C* ETO WILL COMPUTE A TEI MANEUVE TO INSUE ETUN CAPABILITY, THIS MANEUVE WOULD NOT BE PASSED* APOLLO TECHNIQUES DOcuMENTt S-PA-9 TO 4It MISSION F/G TL MCC AND LOIP FEBUAY ETp _969, _ MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND LUNA OBIT GUIDANCE I 3-5_

74 NASA - Manned.Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE BAIL OUT MANEUVE ECOMMENDATION FOLLOWING DOlo FDO WILL EVALUATE THE GNCS_ EMSI MSFN DOPPLE EBIDUALSt AND MSFN SHOT AC AND ECOMMEND A STAY/NO STAY OEOLSION* A STAY ECOMMENDATION EQUIES THAT THE POST-DOI TAJECTOY HAVE AT LEAST A i N,Ma CLEAANCE ABOVE THE HIGHEST PEAK ON THE GOUNDTACK, THE HIGHEST PEAK IS 2*9 NoH* ABOVE THE ADIUS LL5 AND OCCUS AT 7,6 DEG E, TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST A 1 NeM* CLEAANCE ABOVE THIS PEAKp A Hp=3*8 NoN, MUST BE CONFIMED, THE FOLLOWING CHAT WILL BE UTILIZED FO THE STAY/NO STAY ECOMMENDATION--- GNCS 5 S S $ 5 X X X ENS S/NS/X S/NS/X S/NS/X 5/X NS $ S S MSFN NS 1 DOPPE + NS S X X X S NS ESIDUALS PILOT PT OF ATT,DE\ MSFN SINB/X _/NS/; N5 S/) X X X B/X NS S/NS/_ SHOT AC I ACTION E N$ NS NS B S NS NS S NS NS NOTES--- S= STAY NS= NO STAY X= NOT AVAILABLE/INVALID PILOT EPOT OF PITCH ATTITUDE DEVIATION DOWN WEIGHTS THE DOPPLE VOTE DUE TO ADIAL VELOCITY EOS AT DOI WHICH DOPPLE CANNOT DIFFEENTIATE FOM HOIZONTAL EOS (PITCH ATTITUDE DEVIATION ONLY)! I MISSION,,S CTXON EV,DATE LPAI APOLLO Z_IFNL 112/15/70 ITAJECTOY AND LUNA OBIT I I I GUIDANCE?-52

75 x NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISS1011 ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITEW 5-B1 LPO PLANE AND ALTITUDE CONSTAINTS COMMENTS THE PLANA OIENTATION OF _HE LPO GOING INTO POWEED DESCENT WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE TAGETING OBIT DETEMINATION AND EXECUTION OF THE TLC MCCIS AND LOT. DOI EXPECTED EOS AFTE THE LOI TEuUENCE AE PEDICTED TO BE WITHIN 0.5 DEG OUT-OF-PLANE AND 2 DEGEE5 IN AZIMUTH= CEW TAINING AND ONBOAD DATA (MAPSt ETC=I WILL BE BASED ON THESE EXPECTED EOS. THE DOT MANEUVE WILL BE TAGETED TO ACHIEVE A PEICYNTHIAN OF 501GO0 F'T AT PDI, THE PEDICTED HEIGHT OF PEICYNTHIAN AT PDI WILL BE MONITOED TO ASSUE THAT AT PDI IT WILL BE BETWEEN 30rOOD AND 7G_O00 FT, IF A COECTION IS EQUIED_ IT WILL BE MADE PIO TO LM ACTIVATION IMMEDIATELY AFTE CEW WAXEUP. THE CITEIA FO AN ALTITUDE COECTION WILL BE BIASED USING PEMISSION O EAL-TIME COMPUTED ALTITUDE UNCETAINTY AND POPAGATION BIASES. THE ANTICIPATED LIMITS AE 33t000 AND 67_000 FT* IF h COECTION IS EQUIEDt PEICYNTHIAN WOULD UE AISED TO 35t000 FT FO LOW VIOLATION O LOWEED TO 50t000 FT FO HIGH VIOLATIONS, AN IMMEDIATE COECTIVE MANEUVE WILL BE SCHEDULED FO CASES IN WHICH THE CUENT PEICYNTHIAN DOPS BELOW 30,000 FT* THIS NUMBE IS CONSIDEED TO BE THE LOWE BOUNDAY FO GUAANTEED CEW SAFETY* THE ADJUSTMENT TO PEICYNTHIAN WOULD BE TAGETED TO INSUE THAT AN ADDITIONAL ALTITUDE COECTION PIO TO POT WOULD NOT BE NECESSAY, THE TAGET PEICYNTHIAN WOULD BE BIASED USING WOST CASE POPAGATION AND ALTITUDE UNCETAINTIES, TO MAINTAIN THE APPOACH OVE FAMILIA TEAINP AND ACCEPTABLE PEICYNTHIAN CONDITIONSt ADDITIONAL MANEUVES WILL BE SCHEDULED IF NEEDED TO COECT DISPESIONS PIO TO UNDOCKING* PATICIPATION FDO FD CEW DATA SOUCES LM DESCENT FDO OBIT PLANNING DIGITALS CHECKOUT MONITO POCEDUE EFEENCE FDO WILL USE OPTIONS OF THE LOP DISPLAY TO COECT PLANA DISPESIONS DETELTED PIO TO UNDOCKING= OPEATIONAL OPINION MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL _2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE _-SB

76 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-82 NOUN 69 COECTION LIMITS COMMENTS TO COECT FO ANY DOWNANGE POSITION EO AT PDI_ THE GOUND COMPUTES THE EO IN THE ONBOAD STATE VECTO AND UPLINKS THE DOWNANGE COMPONENT AS A CHANGE TO THE POSTION OF THE LANDING SITE, THIS COECTION IS BOUNDED IN MAGNITUDE AS FOLLOWS--- A, A MINIMUM COECTION OF BOO0 FT IS used, THIS LIMIT IS DEIVED FOM THE ACCUACY OF THE TECHNIQUES USED IN COMPUTING rhe DOWNANGE EO, UNDE SOME CICUMBTANCESt EXTEMELY SMOOTH DATAt CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO USING SMALLE COECTIONS, B. AN UPPE LIMIT OF 35oOOO FT IS USED, THIS NUMBE IS DEIVED FOM THE ADIAL ABOT LIMIT OF 35 FPS, THIS IS BECAUSE THE N69 COECTION DOES NOT COECT ANY EOS IN THE STATE VECTO_ BUT ONLY ALLOWS A BAD STATE VECTO TO LAND AT THE IGHT PLACE, A 35tOO0 FT EO TANSLATES INTO A 35 FPS ADIAL EO. ANY GEATE COECTION WOULD BE CAUSE FO ABOT, PATICIPATION FDO DATA SELECT CEW POCEDUE THE DATA SELECT COMPUTES THE NE9 COECTION USING DOPPLE ESIDUALS AND THE LEA POCESSO, SELECT THEN VOICES THE COMPUTED COECTION TO FDO, IF THE N69 IS WITHIN LIMITS AND THE THUST IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE COECTION_ THE FDO ELAYS THE NS9 TO THE CEW THU THE CAPCOM AT TWO MINUTES INTO THE DESCENT. THE CEW INPUTS THE NED VIA THE DSXY CICULAIZATION MANEUVE TAGETING COMMENTS THE CICULAIZATION MANEUVE CAN BE TAGETED TO ESULT IN A CICULA OBIT AT ANY SPECIFIED TIME. THE CHOICE OF TIME IS ABITAY BUT SHOULD BE CHOSEN TO SIMPLIFY ENDEZVOUS. THE TWO CHOICES AE AT PDI TIME O NOMINAL ENDEZVOUS TIME. THE SECOND OPTION WAS SELECTED BY DATA PIOITY BECAUSE OF THE ELATIVELY LOW POBABILITY OF HAVI_:G TO ABOT A DESCENT AND THE DESIABILITY OF MAKING THE NOMINAL ENDEZVOUS AS CLEAN AS POSGIBLE LLS POSITION UPDATING VIA SEXTANT SIGHTINGS COMMENTS DUING THE LUNA OBITS JUST PIO TO THE DESCENT MANEUVEt SEXTANT LANDMAK TACKING WILL BE UTILIZED BY THE CSM TO ACCUATELY DETEMINE THE CSM POSITION ELATIVE TO THIS KNOWN LANDMAK, BY KNOWING THE EXACT INETIAL POSITION OF THE CSM (MSFN) ANO THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE LANDING SITE ELATIVE TO THE OBSEVED LANDMAKt THE INETIAL POSITION OF THE LLS MAY BE ACCUATELY DETEMINED AND THUS COMPATIBLE WITH THE INETIAL TAGETING OF THE POWEED DESCENT MANEUVE, IIO_EVEkP ANY DIFFEENCES BETWEEN THE BEST PEMIS$10N VALUE OF THE LLS (PHOTOGAPHS) AND THOSE UP THE SEXTANT SIGHTINGS MUST BE SCUTINIZED FO EASONABLENESS, EACH INTENDED LANDING SITE HAS INDIVIDUAL AMOUNTS OF DATA AVAILABLE EPESENTING ITS KNOWN INETIAL ELATIVE ACCUACY, THUS9 A EASONABLE DIFFEENCE_ IN TEMS OF ABSOLUTE NUMBE VA ES WITH EACH SITE, _ISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE 3-54

77 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITE -85 ALLOWABLE PLATFOM MISALIGNMENT FO POI, COMMENTB--- THE POWEED DESCENT SHOULD NOT BE INITIATED IF THE PGNS WILL ACCUMULATE POWE NAVIGATION EOS SUCH THAT A LM ABOT WITH THE PUNS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE AN OBIT WITH A PEICYNTHIAN GEATE THAN 30_OOO FT. THESE NAVIGATION EOS CAN ESULT FOM UNCOMPENSATED STATIC DIFTS OF THE LM PLATFOM. IF DIFT ATES OF A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO GIVE 0,S DEC MISALIUNMENT ABOUT PITCH (Y AXIS] AND YAW (x AXIS) EXIST AT POI THEN THE MANEUVE WILL BE SLIPPED ONE EVOLUTION IN AN EFFOT TU COMPENSATE THE DIFTI THIS MIBALIGNMENT MAGNITUDE ALLOWS A DESCENT ABOT FOM THE H3 TAJECTOY AT ANYTIME WITH A ESULTANT SAFE OBIT. THE DIFT ATES AE ESTABLISHED BY SUCCESSIVE P_21_ AFTE FINE ALIGNING THE PLATFOM USING GOUND COMPUTED TOWUEING ANGLESo PAIICIPATION--- GUIDANCE OFFICE LM CONTOL CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES--- LM OPTIC5 suppot TABLEt NSK 239 TOQUEINO ANGLE_ FOM LM PUNS P52 POCEDUE--- THE LM PLATFOM IS COASE ALIGNED TO THE CSM PLATFOM AT LH ACTIVATION. COASE ALIGN INFOMATION IS THEN PASSED BY THE FLIGHT CEW TO THE GOUND WHO IN TUN COMPUTES FINE ALIGN TOQUEING ANGLEB FO EXECUTION BY THE CEW VIA V42, THIS EBULTS IN A LM PLATFOM ALIGNED WITHIN THE ACCUACY OF THE POCEDUE, THE COMPLETE POCEDUE 15 THEN EPEATED EXCEPT THAT A SECOND V42 ISN ft EXECUTEDG THE INTENT BEING THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFT WILL SHOW UP IN THE GOUND COMPUTED FINE ALIGN ANGLES= ALSO TWO BUCCEBBIVE P52tS AE PEFOMED TO FUTHE VEIFY STATIC DIFT. WHEN UNACCEPTABLE DIFT EXIST THEN PDI IS DELAYEDt IF NECESGAYt UNTIL ADEQUATE GYO COMPENSATION IS PEFOMED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE _-55

78 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITEt_ 5-89 LANDING ADA CONSTAINTS COMMENTS IN ODE TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE POWEED DESCENT MANEUVEJ UNCETAINTIES IN LOCAL TEAIN/ALTITUDE MUST BE MEASUED VIA LANDING ADA TO EFFECT TOUCHDOWN. HOWEVEt THIS DATA MUST BE _UALITATIVELY JUDGED PIO TO ITS INCOPOATION. SHOULD LANDING ADA DATA NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFOE THE PNGS ESTIMATE OF A_TITUDE EACHES IO_OUO FEETp AN ABOT WILL BE PEFOMED. THIS ACTION IS SUBSTANTIATED BY DISPESION ANALYSIS WHICH DEMONSTATE THAT THE PNGS ESTIMATE OF ALTITUDE CAN BE SIGNIFICANTLY IN EO, SHOULD THIS EO BE SUCH THAT THE P_US IS ACTUALLY LOWE THAN ITS OWN ESTIMATEt THE EMAINING _UIDANCE/TAJECTOY POFILE WILL UNKNOWINGLY PENETATE THE LUNA SUFACE, CONVESELYJ IF THE PNGS WEE TULY HIGHE THAN ITS OWN ESTIMATED CONTINUATION OF THE POWEED DESCENT WOULD ESULT IN FUEL DEPLETION. PATICIPATION CEW GO0 FDO A. SIXTY SECONDS AFTE LANDING ADA LOCK ON HAS BEEN A_HIEVEO_ THE DIFFEENCE IN ALTITUDE ESTIMATES BETWEEN THE PNG$ AND THE LANDING ADA MUST BE WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TOLEANCE. ESTABLISHING A LIMITING DIFFEENCE PEVENTS LAGE ALTITUDE,tDELTAS,t FOM CAUSING UNACCEPTABLE TANSIENTS IN THE DESCENT GUIDANCE/TAJECTOY LOGIC, B* DISPESION ANALYSIS HAVE ALSO SHOWN THAT IF ACCEPTABLE LANDING ADA IS CONTINUALLY AVAILABLE TO HIGH GATEt A SUBSEQUENT LOSS WILL NUT DEGADE THE PNGS ABILITY TO EACH A SAFE POINT FOM WHICN THE PILOT MAY TAKEOVE AND LAND MANUALLY, C&D THE ABOVE IS ALBO TUE IN THE CASE WHEE THE LANDING ADA HAB BEEN ACCEPTABLE BUT INTEMITTENT THOUGHOUT P-63 SO LONG AS THE UNCETAINTY IN ALTITUDE IS LESS THAN io00 FEET AT HIGH GATE O LESS THAN 1000 FEET WHEN LOCK ON IS EGAINED. DATA SOUCE POCEDUES SHOULD ANY OF THE ABOVE CONSTAINTS BE VIOLATEOt THE GOUND WILL ECOMMEND AN ABOT. MISSION EVIDATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO L4 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE 3-56

79 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 3-90 CITEIA FO TEMINATION OF POWEED DESCENT (PGNS NAVIGATION EOS) A,I=2 3,4 COMMENT THE POWEED DESCENT PHASE WILL NOT BE CONTINUED IF THE PGN5 HAS NAVIGATION EOS SUCH THAT A LM ABOT WITH THE PGNS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE AN OBIT WITH A PEICYNTHIAN ALTITUDE GEATE THAN 3O_OOO FEET. SINCE PNGS NAVIGATION EOS CAN AISE FOM INITIAL CONDITION EOS (IMU MIBALIGNMENT O STATE VECTO EO) O FOM POWEED FLIGHT FAILUES (PIPA BIAS. IMU DIFT_ ETC=)t THE AGS MAY O MAY NOT CONFIM A PGN$ EO, IN ADDITIONo FO LOW TAJECTOIES. THE PGNB WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PEFOM A SAFE ABOT WITHOUT LANDING ADA ALTITUDE INFOMATION BEING INCOPOATED INTO THE STATE VECTO= ULE 5-90A - 1 POVIDES THE LIMITS FO THE CASES WHEE THE PGNS NAVIGATION EOS AE CAUSED BY POWEED FLIGHT FAILUESI THE TAJECTOIES AE LOWt AND LANDING ADA ALTITUDE INFOMATION IS MISSING, ULE 5-BOA L 2 POVIDES THE LIMITS FO THE CAGES WHEE THE PGNS NAVIGATION EO5 AK CAUBED BY POWEED FLIGHT FAILUES, THE COSSANGE LIMIT IS BASED ON THE G AND N PIPA FAIL EDLINE. ULE 5-90A - 3 POVIDES THE LIMITS FO THE CASEG WHEE THE PGNS NAVIGATION EOS AE CAUSED BY INITIAL CONDITION EOBo THE TAJECTOIES AE LOW. AND THE LANDING ADA ALTITUDE INFOMATION IS MISSING* ULE 5-90A - 4 POVIDES THE LIMITS FO THE CASES WHEE THE PGNS NAVIGATION EOS AE CAUSED BY INITIAL CONDITION EOS AE CAUBED BY INITIAL CONDITION EOSt O A COMBINATION OF POWEED FLIGHT AND INITIAL CONDITION EOS= PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE CAPCOM DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE GTIPCHATS POCEDUE GUIDANCE ASCENT/DESCENT DIGITALS LAD_ MSK 088 ACTION GOO DETECTS AND CONFIMS FOM THE GUIDANCE STIPCHATS O M&K 2Z8 THAT A COMPONENT DIFFEENCE LIMIT HAS BEEN VIOLATED* THE DEGADING SYBTEM IS VEIFIED BY COMPAING THE VELOCITY DIFFEENCE BASED ON ALL SOUCES* If THE DEGADATION 15 VEIFIED IN THE PGNSo GDO ANNOUNCES tipgns NO-GOt ABOT OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOP* AFTE DIECTION FOM FLIGHT DIECTOt CAPCOM ELAYB THE SAME OVE TME AI TO GOUND LOOP= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/1B/7O TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE S-57

80 0 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-90 POWEED DESCENT TEMINATION A.St71 8 COMMENTS 5. IN THE EVENT THE GUIDANCE COMMANDED THUST SHOULO BEGIN TO INCEASE INOMALLY DECEASES) PIO TO P-S_/S4 POGAM SWITCH9 THE GUIDANCE WILL _LTIMATELY COMMAND APID AND SEVEE ATTITUDE GYATION$o THESE TANSIENTS AE T IN ESPONSE TO SUCH THINGS AS A LOW THUSTING ENGINE O FAILUE OF THE GUIDANCE TO CONVEGE UPON THE EQUIED HIGATE TAGETS. IN ANY EVENT_ THE GUIDANCE WILL FAIL TO CONVEGE WITH THE IMPLICIT ESULTS BEING CATOSTOPHIC, IN THAT POGAM SWITCH OCCUS AT A TOO OF 80 SECS, THE ADDITIONAL 20-SEC TIME D_LAY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FO THE GOUND TO ESPOND AFTB TGO= 80 SECS, 7. AS DESCIBED ABOVEt ONCE THE POINT WHEE THE TIME DELAY FO GOUND ESPONSE TO INCEASING THOTTLE COMMANDS HAS BEEN PASSEDe THE CEW MUST ACTIVELY O_GEVE THE THOTTLE ESPONSE. AS THE CEW HAS NO MEANS OF VISUALIZING A THOTTLE INCEASEI THEY NEED ONLY ESPOND TO A FAILUE TO HAVE THE THUST ENTE THE THOTTLEABLE EGION= 8, SHOULD THE THUST FAIL TO COME UP TO THE FTP FOLLOWING IGNITION, THE GUIDANCE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MEET THE DESIED HIGATE CONDITIONS AS WILL BE EVIDENCED BY AN INCEASING GTC CITEIA FO TEMINATION OF POWEED DESCENT (FAILUE OF LGC POGAM CHANGE) A.9 COMMENT TO EDUCE GUIDANCE SENSITIVES IN THE EGION OF HIGH GATE_ THE LGC _AKING PHASE (PSi) TAGETS AE POJECTED PAST THE ACTUAL DESIED CONDITIONS. FO THE NOMINAL TAGETED DESCENT POFILE, THE HIGH GATE CONDITIONS AE SATISFIED A SPECIFIED DELTA TIME BEFOE THE TAGET CONDITIONS. THE DELTA TIME IS STOED IN EASABLE MEMOy AS TENDBAK AND CUENTLY EQUALS 02 SECONDS. THE LGC AUTOMATICALLY EXITS PE3 ANO CALLS PS_ ON THE FIST COMPUTATION CYCLE AFTE T GO EQUALS bo SECONDS. IF THIS DOES NOT OCCU/ THE LGC HAS FAILED INTENALLY. FAILUE OF THE PGNS EQUIES 5WITCHOVE TO THE AGS. THEEBY TEMINATING POWEED DESCENT. PATICIPATION FLIGHT CEW GUIDANCE OFFICE CAPCOM DATA SOUCES POCEDUE ONBOAD DSKY GUIDANCE ASCENT/DESCENT DIGITALSt MSK 218 A. INDICATION CEW OBSEVES DSKY DISPLAYS FAIL TO CHANGE TO PG# WHEN THE PO3 T GO DECEASES TO 60 SECONDS. GUIDANCE OFFICE OBSEVES TELEMETY INDICATION OF P6_ AFTE T GO DECEASES TO 60 SECONDS ON MSK 218. B, ACTION IF CEW TAKES ACTION_ SWITCHED TO AGS AND ANNOUNCES _ABOTt LGC NO-GO* Pb4 FAIL TM OVE AI TO GOUND LOOP, IF GDO TAKES ACTION, ANNOUNCES lllgc NO-GOt P64 FAIL SWITCHOVE TO AGS AND ABOTtI_ OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOPt CAPCOM ELAYS SAME OVE AI TO GOUND LOOP, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO I# FNL [2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE 3-5_

81 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ " TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-90 CITEIA FO TEMINATION OF POWE DESCENT (PGNS POGAM ALAMS) A,IO COMMENT THE ELIABILITY OF THE LGC'A5 A CONTOL DEVICE I5 DEPENGENT ON THE COMPUTATIONAL INTEGITY OF THE SOFTWAEt THE LGC IS POGAMED TO ECOGNIZE INTENAL FAULTS O EONEOUS CONOITIONSP AND CONSEQUENTLY ISSUES A POGAM ALAM. THE ALAMS WHICH AE CUNSIDEED TO INVALIDATE THE LGC AS A GUIDANCE SYSTEM AE LISTED BELOW--- ALAM CODE ALAM FAULT AOT MAK SYSTEM IN USE POGAM USING IMU WHEN TUNED OFF ACCELEATION OVEFLOW IN INTEGATION NO 50LUTION FOM TIME-THETA O TIME-ADIUS OUTINE UNUSED CCS BANCH EXECUTED PHASE TABLE FAILUE_ ASSUME EASABLE MEMOY DESTOYED WAITLIST ON JOB FUNCTION CALL_O WITH ZEO O NEGATIVE DELTA TIME SQUAE OOT CALLED NEGATIVE AGUMENT KEYBOAD AND DISPLAY ALAM DUING INTENAL USE 00#02 FINDCDUW NOT CONTOLLING ATTITUDE (CONTINUING) PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT CEW CAPCOM DATA SOUCES POCEDUE POGAM ALAM LIGHT LGC MONITO H/St ASCENT/DESCENT DIGITALS MGK 218 GUUND O FLIGHT CEW OBSEVES THE POGAM ALAM LIGHT, AND IDENTIFIES THE ALAM VIA VO5NO9 O LGC DOWNLIST OF FAILEG=$* IF THE ALAM IS ONE LISTED ABOVE_ GUIDO ANNOUNCES. tllgc NO-GOt 5WITCHOVE TO AG5 AND ABOT'to MISSION EV DATE ISECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE 3"59

82 } NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - TAJECTOY AND fiuidance..m B POWEED DESCENT TEMINATION COMMENTS--- SHOULD AN ABOT BE EQUIED DUING THE LATTE POTIONS OF THE POWEED DESCENT TAJECTOYP IT CANNOT BE PEFOMED IF THE ALTITUDE ATE (AT THE TIME OF THE ABOT) CANNOT BE NOLLED BY THE ABOT MANEUVEt PIO TO PENETATING THE LUNA SUFACE, CONVESLY SHOULD THE ALTITUDE ATE EXCEED THE ABILITY OF THE LM TO NULL IT PIO TO PENETATION A SUCCESSFUL LANDING OBvIOuSLY CANNOT BE COMPLETED AND AN ABOT IS EQUESTED* PATICIPATION FDO FD CAPCOM DATA SOUCE H VS H DOT ANALOG LAD POCEDUE--- DUE TO SIGNIFICANT TIME DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH POCESSING THE TAJECTOY INFOMATION BY WHICH THIS DECISION IS MADE THE FDO MUST CAEFULLY A_$ESS THE CUENT VEHICLE STATE IN ELATIONSHIP TO THE ABOT LIMIT LINE* DEVIATIONS AWAY FOM THE NOMINAL THAT WILL CLEALY VIOLATE THIS LIMIT LINE MUST BE ECOGNIZED AS EPESENTINU AN ABOT SITUATION AND APPOPIATE EACTIONIS EQUISITE NO TAJECTOY CONSTAINTS AFTE CEW TAKEOVE COMMENTS THOUGHOUT POWEED DESCENT_ THE GOUND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MONITO POPE OPEATION OF THE PNGS AND AGS AND THE EFFECT THAT THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM HAS ON THE DESCENT TAJECTOY. THIS MONITOING ALLOWS LIMITATIONS TO BE IMPOSED ON THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM TO AVOI_ UNSAFE CONDITIONS, ONCE THE CEW HAS ASSUMED MANUAL CONTOL_ NO INITIALIZATION O PEDICTIONS OF THE ESULTANT TAJECTOY CHAACTEISTICS CAN BE MADE-- AND THUS NO VALID MEANS OF LIMITING THE CEWIS ACTIONS CAN BE ESTABLISHED, THE POBLEM IS FUTHE COMPLICATED BY THE TIME DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTION/EACTION/ACTION CYCLE NECESSAY TO AVET AN _DEBIAbLE SITUATION. PATICIPATION N/A DATA SOUCE N/A POCEDUE N/A MISSION EV ]DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND DESCENT GUIDANCE 9-60

83 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE LM LIFT-OFF DELAY COMMENT--- THE ENTIE ENDEZVOUS SEQUENCE IS DETEMINED BY THE CONDITIONS AT INSETION*THESE CONDITIONS* THOUGH SOMEWHAT COECTABLE VIA A TWEAK MANEUVEI AE TIGHTLY BOUNDED BY THE TIME OF LIFT-OFF, IM ODE TO AVOID GEATLY DISPESED O EVEN ENTIELY DIFFEENT ENOEZVOUG BEQUENCES_ EXCEBSIVELY LATE LAUNCHES MUST BE PEVENTED, IN MOST INSTANCEG AN EALIE DOCKING TIME IS OBTAINED BY DELAYING LIFT-OFF ONE EV AND LAUNCHING ON TIME, FO THE COELLIPTIC SEGuENCE ENDEZVOUSt LAUNCH MAY BE DELAYED 90 SECONDS WITH NO SLIP IN DOCKING TIME AND NO CHANGE IN THE ENDEZVOUB POFILE, FO THL SHOT KENDEZVOUSt THE ACCEPTABLE DELAY IS ZO SECONDGt BUT THE CITEION HEE IS ONE OF EASONABLENESS ATHE THAN PECISE NUMBES* DELAYS GEATE THAN 10 SECONDS BEGIN TO PODUCE LAGE TWEAKS AS WELL AS LAGE TPI DELTA VISo FUTHEMOEt IT IS FELT THAT 10 SECONDS IS ADEQUATE TIME FO THE NECESSAY CEW TOUBLE-GHOOTINB AND ANY POBLEM NOT SOLVABLE IN THIS TIME FAME I5 THE TYPE POBLEM THAT COULD MAKE THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS MAZADOUSt THUG A ONE-EV DELAY IN LAUNCH IS WELL ADVISED, PATICIPATION--- CEW POCEDUES--- IF LAUNCH IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY INITIATED CEW WILL POCEED THOUGH NO AUTO IGNITION CHECKLIBT, IF NO IGNITION AFTE THATP LAUNCH IS DELAYED ONE EV WHILE THE POBLEM IS ATTACKED BY GOUND AND CEW. MIB$ION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _q FNL 12/lfi/7OlTAJECTOY AND ASCENT GUIDANCE _-bl

84 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center u0sslou eules SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-I02, CITEIA FO GUIDANCE 5WITCMOVE TO AG5 (PGN$ FAILUE) COMMENTS THE ELIABILITY OF THE LGC AS A CONTOL DEVICE IS DEPENDENT ON THE COMPUTATIONAL INTEGITY OF THE SOFTWAE, THE LGC IS POGAMED TO ECOGNIZE INTENAL FAULTS O EONEOUS ONDITIONG, AND CONSEQUENTLY ISSUES A pogam ALAM, THE ALAMS WHICH AE CONSIDEED TO INVALIDATE THE LGC AS A CONTOL DEVICE AE LISTED BELOW--- ALAM CODE ALAM FAULT AOT MAK SYSTEM IN USE POGAM USING IMU WHEN TUNED OFF ACCELEATION OVEFLOW IN INTEGATION NO SOLUTION FOM TIME-THETA O TIME-ADIUS OUTINE UNUSED CCS BANCH EXECUTED Oi10T PHA_E TABLE FAILUEe ASSUME EASABLE MEMOY DESTOYED WAITLIST ON JOB FUNCTION CALLED WITH ZEO O NEGATIVE DELTA TIME 2E302 SQUAE OOT CALLED with NEGATIVE AGUMENT 2_50_ KEYBOAD AND DISPLAY ALAM DUING USE PATICIPATION GUIDANCE FLIGHT CEW OFFICE CAPCOM DATA SOUCES POCEDUE LGC MONITO-H/St ASCENT/DESCENT DIGITALSt MSK 1594_ MSK 218 POGAM ALAM LIGHT A= INDICATION GOUND O FLIGHT CEW OBSEVES POGAM ALAM LIGHTt AND IDENTIFIES THE ALAM VIA VOSNO9 (DISPLAY ALAM CODE) O LGC DOWNLINKED FAILEGIS, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND ASCENT GUIDANCE 3-62

85 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE CITEIA FO GUIDANCE SWITCHOVE TO AGB {PONE NAVIGATION EOS) COMMENT DUING ASCENT THE INSETION CONDITIONS AE PEDICTED BY APPLYING THE EXPECTED ACCELEATION POFILE TO THE ONBOAD AND GOUND NAVIGATION SDUCE$o THE ACCELEATION THE ADS EPHEMEIBe THE INSETION CONDITIONS MONITOED POFILE IS GENEATED FOM THE STATE OF THE CUENT GUIDANCE SYSTEM AND THE NOMINAL INSETION TAGETBe THE PEDICTION CAPABILITY CAN BE UBED TO DETEMINE THE EUUIEMENT FO GUIDANCE SWITCH OvE TO THE AGED IN DOING SOP THE EXPECTED PGNS POFILE IS APPLIED TO AE PEICYNTHION AND APOCYNTHIAN ALTITUDES AND WEDGE ANGLE* THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE HP I$ S0_ODD FEET TO INSUE CEW SAFETYo THE ACCEPTABLE LIMITS FO HA AND WEDGE ANGLE AE TAGET VALUE PLUG AO NINe AND 1tO DEGEEt ESPECTIVELY, THESE VALUES AE ABITAILY SELECTED AS A EASONABLENESS LIMIT* BINCE SWITCHOVE WILL NOT BE EQUESTED AFTE T GO DECEASES BELOW 30 SECONDS_ A SLIGHTLY DIFFEENT VALUE WILL BE USED FO CALLING SWITCHUVE ON HPt PELIMINAY EO ANLYSIS INDICATEE THAT IF HP DECEASES TO 40rOOD FEET AT T GG = 30 SECONDEr A 70 PECENT POBABILITY EXISTS THAT HP WILL DECEASE BELOW 30tODD FEET AT INSETIONt ALLOWING LESS THAN A TO PECENT CHANCE OF OBTAINING ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS SEEMS UNEASONABLEo THEEFOEt switchove WILL BE EQUESTED IF AGE PEDICTED MP DECEASES TO 4Or000 FEET* SINCE THE HA AND WEDGE ANGLE LIMITS AE STICTLY ABITAY_ NO POTECTION WILL BE APPLIED FO THE 30 SECOND EALY DECISIONe PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE CAPCOM DATA SOUCES POCEDUE DELTA VS HP_ MGK 217 GUIDANCE ASCENT/DESCENT DIGITALBt MSK 218 A, I_OICATIGN GDO OBSEVES HAt HP_ O SIGMA APPOACH LIMIT VALUEe GOO DETEMXNES WHICH SYSTEM IS DEGADING BY COMPAING VELOCITY OMPONENTSt ATTITUDESD AND selected TAJECTOY PAAMETES BASED ON ALL NAVIGATION SOUCESe B* ACTION IF EOS AE DETEMINED TO BE IN THE PONE AND T GO 1S GEATE THAN _O seconder ODD DECLAES ttguidance SWITCHOVEt PGNS NAVIGATION tl OVE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOPo CAPCDM ELAYS SAME TO CEW OVE THE AI TO GOUND LOOP= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND ABCENT GUIDANCE 3"63

86 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE _-103/ CITEIA FO GUIDANCE 5WITCHOVE TO AG_ (PGN5 FAILUE) COMMENTS SAME AS MISSION ULE 5-I02A PATICIPATION SAME AS MISSION ULE 5-I02A DATA SOUCES POCEDUE SAME AS MISSION ULE 5-_02A SAME AS MISSION ULE 5-EO2A MISSION _EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ =NL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND ASCENT GUIDANCE 3-b4

87 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIOm ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE _.i..n-. i-1031 CITEIA FO GUIDANCE SWITCHOVE TO AOS (PGNS FAILUE) COMMENTS DUING THE POWEED ASCENT PHASED CONTOL WILL BE SWITCHED TO THE AGS WHEN THE PGNS NAVIGATION DEGADES TO THE EXTENT WHEE A SAFE insetion OBIT CAN NO LONGE BE OBTAINED, THE DEGADATION IN THE NAVIGATION IS MONITOED BY COMPAING TAJECTOY PAAMETES BASED ON PGNSt AGSI AND MSFN SOUCES, THE PIMAY PAAMETES MONITOED AE VELOCITY COMPONENT DIFFEENCES, THE LIMiTiNG VALUES OF THE DIFFEENCES HAVE BEEN ECOMMENDED BY GUIDANCE AND PEFOMANCE BANCH/MPAD AS DELTA VX 24 FPSp DELTA VY 90 FPGo AND DELTA VZ 37 FPSe THE VALUES WEE DETEMINED BY DISPESION ANALYSIS USING THE MONTE CALO TECHNIQUE= THE VALUES EPESENT EOS WHICH PECLUDE MAKING A SAFE OBIT insetion= THUS= IF THE PGN5 NAVIGATION IS CONFIMED AS THE DEGADED SYSTEM AND ANY PGNS-MSFN VELOCITY DIFFEENCE EXCEED THE LIMITING VALUEr SWlTCHOVE TO AGS GUIDANCE WILL BE EXECUTED, IN SITUATIONS WHEE A VALID MSFN VECTO ISN'T AVAILABLE OOPPLE/PGNS ESIDUALS WILL BE USED TO CONFIM ANY AGS/PGN$ DIFFEENCES, THE LIMITING DOPPLE/PGNS ESIDUALS AE DEPENDENT ON THE LANDING SITE GEOMETY ELATIVE TO THE EATH/MOON LINE, FO HOt THE LIMIT VALUES HAVE BEEN DETEMINED BY MPAD TO BE 10 FPS FO DOWN ANGE EOS AND 55 FPS FO ADIAL EOS, A LIMITING VALUE OF DELTA VY=4E FPS WILL BE MAINTAINED FO DIECT ENDEZVOUS AND DELTA vy=go FPS WILL APPLY FO A COELLIPTIC SEWUENCE, THIS IS TO PECLUDE UNDESIEABLE OUT-OF-PLANE CONDITIONS AT TPI FO THE DIECT ENDEZVOUS= IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ONLY 0=5 DEO { 45 FPSI OF WEDGE ANGLE _S STEEED OUT BY THE AGS DUING ASCENT, PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE CAPCOM FLIGHT FLIGHT CEW DIECTO DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE ASCENT STIPCHAT5 GUIDANCE ASCENT/DESCENT DIGITALSt MSK 218 TAJECTOY PLOTBOADS POCEDUE TLM SOUCE COMPAISON_ MSK 0085 THE GDO MONITOS THE MSFN_ PGNS_ AGS VELOCITY DIFFEENCES, THE GDO IN COOPEATION WITH FDO DETEMINES THE EONEOUS SYSTEM BY SWITCHING SOUCES ON TAJECTOY PLOTBOADS= IF THE PGNS IS DETEMINED AS THE DEGADED SYSTEM AND ANY DIFFEENCE VALUE EXCEEDS THE LIMITING VALUEP GDO DECLAES OVE THE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOPt olpgns NAVIGATION NO-GOw AGS SWITCHOVE II, CAPCOM ELAYS ECOMMENDATION TO CEW OVE AI TO GOUND LOOP= FLIGHT CEW PLACES THE GUI_ CONTOL SWITCH TO AGS, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO14 FNL 12115/70 TAJECTOYAND ASCENT GUIDANCE 5-65

88 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE )-103( CITEIA FO SWITCHOVE TO AGS GUIDANCE (AGS PEDICTED INSETION CONDITIONS} COMMENT SEE ATIONALE FO MISSION ULE 5-_02B PATICIPATION N/A )ATA SOUCES N/A POCEDUE N/A _-103C CITEIA FO GUIDANCE SWITCHOVE TO AGS (PGN$ FAILUE WITHOUT MSFN CONFIMATION) COMMENT SEE ATIONALE FO MISSION ULE 5-103B PATICIPATION N/A DATA SOUCES N/A POCEDUE N/A i MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL L2/1_/70 TAJECTOY AND ASCENT 3UIDANCE 3-b6

89 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE DECLAATION OF AGS NO-GO FO NAVIGATI65 EOS COMMENT SINCE CONSIDEATION MAY BE' GIVEN TO UTILIZE THE AO& FO GUIDANCE CONTOL FO INSETION_ ITS NAViGATiON MUST BE MONITOED TO insue THE CAPABILITY FO EACHING A SAFE OBIT. THE NAVIGATION IS INITIALLY MONITOED IN THE NAME MANNE AS THE PENS BY COMPAING VELOCITY COMPONENT DIFFEENCES. ONCE ANY VELOCITY DIFFEENCE IG VIOLATED. THE PEDICTED AGS INSETION CONDITIONS AE EVALUATED. THE AG$ IS DECLAED NO-GO WHEN EOS ESULT IN INSETION CONDITIONS THAT VIOLATE THE FOLLOWING--- HP LESS THAN FEETt HA GEATE THAN THE TAGETED VALUE PLUS #O NAUTICAL MILESt O A WEDGE AN_LE GEATE THAN 1 DEGEE. PATICIPATION GUIDANCE OFFICE FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICE CAPCOM FLIGHT CEW DATA SOUCES GUIDANCE ASCENT STIPCHATS GUIDANCE ASCENT DESCENT DIGITALSt HSK 218 TAJECTOY plotboade POCEDUE THE GDO MONITOS MSFNo PGNG9 AGE VELOCITY DIFFEENCES AND PEDICTO INSETION CONDITIONS* THE GDO AND FDO COOPEATE TO DETEMINE THE EONEOUS SYSTEM BY SWITCHING PEDICTO SOUCES* IF THE AGE I5 DETEMINED TO BE THE DEGADED SYSTEM AND EXCEEDS THE LIMITS. GDO DECLAES I AGS NAVIGATION NO'GO D OVE THE FLIGHT DIECTO LOOP* CAPCOM ELAYS THE SAME TO CEW OVE THE AI TO GOUND LOOP* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND ASCENT GUIDANCE 3-67

90 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE I NO GUIDANCE SWITCHOVE AFTE T GO 30 SECONDS COMMENT GUIDANCE SWITCHOVE IS EQUESTED WHEN THE PIMAY SYSTEM HAG DEGADED AWAY FOM NOMINAL TO AN UNACCEPTABLE EXTENT* AFTE SWlTCHOVEt LAGE STEEING TANSIENTS AE INCUED AS THE BACKUP SYSTEM ATTEMPTS TO COECT THE DEVIATION* IF Sw TCHDVE IS TO BE EXECISED_ ADEQUATE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED PIO TO INSETION FO THE TANSIENTS TO _E DAMPED OUT, AS A ESULTt THE GOUND WILL NOT EQUEST GUIDANCE SWITCHOVE AFTE T GO E_UAL$ 30 SECONDS, THE TIME INTEVAL WAS SELECTED BASED ON PEVIOUS MISSION EXPEIENCE AND ACCOUNTS FO DATA DELAYS AND EACTION TIMES, PATICIPATION N/A DATA SOUCES N/A POCEDUE N/A MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1# FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND ASCENT GUIDANCE 3-68

91 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-i11 ENDEZVOUS MANEUVE SELECTION LOGIC COMMENTS--- THEE AE SEVEN ACCEPTABLE. TECHNIQUES WHICH POVIDE ONBOAD ENDEVOUS NAVIGATION, EACH OF THESE SCHEMES WILL POVIDE COECTED STATE VECTOS WITH WHICH ONBOAO COMPUTES CALCULATE ENDEZVOUS MANEUVES, THE ULE IS POVIDED THAT THE CEW MIGHT HAVE A BASIS FO SELECTING THE MOST COECT OF THE SOLUTIONS AVAILABLE, BY EXAMINING THE THEE AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS (PGNCSp AGS_ CMC IN ODE OF PIOITY) THE CEW WILL ESSENTIALLY VOTE TWO-OF-THEE AND EXECUTE THE HIGHE PIOITY OF THE MOE CLOSELY AGEEING SOLUTIONS, AGEEMENT HAS BEEN DEFINED BASED ON THE PEDICTED ACCUACIES Of THE VAIOUS NAVIGATION 5CHEMES AND_ WHILE SOME CASES MAY EALIZE BETTE AGEEMENT THAN THIEf THE NUMBES POVIDED AE ADEQUATE FO ALL ENDEVOUS POFILESt INCLUDING DESCENT ABOTS, IT IS ECOGNIZED THAT CETAIN JUDGEMENTS WILL BE MADE BY THE CEW WHEN NAVIGATION SYSTEMS PEFOMANCE BECOMES DEGADED DUE TO ONBOAD MALFUNCTIONS, IN SUCH CASEGt WHEN GOUND ASGISTANCE.IS UNAVAILABLEP CEW JUDGEMENT 15 DEPENDED upon TO EXECUTE THE MOST COECT OF THE AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS. DATA SOUCES CSM LM PATICIPATION CEW POCEDUE ONBOAD MIGSIQN EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/7G TAJECTOY AND ENDEZVOUS GUIDANCE 3-69

92 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ENDEZVOUS TAGETING CONSTAINTS COMMENTS LIFT-OFF WILL BE COMPUTED FO BOTH THE COELLIPTtC SEQUENCE AND THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS OBSEVING SEVEAL CONSTAINTS* THESE GUIDELINES AE DESIGNED TO AFFOD AN ENTIELY NOMINAL ENDEZVOUS IN TEMS OF CEW TAININGw ELATIVE VEHICLE TAJECTOIESP ETC, t SO AS TO MAXIMIZE THE APPLICABILITY OF THIS TAINING* THE FIST CONSTAINT IS A 15 NM DELTA He FO THE COELLIPTIC SEQUENCE THIS DELTA H, 1S ESTABLISHED AT CDHo WHILE IN THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS IT IS ONE OF THE TPI OFFSET CONDITIONS TO BE ACHIEVED= THIS NOMINAL DELTA H STANDADIZES THE ENTIE TEMINAL PHASE TAJECTOY* OTHE TPI POSITION CONSTAINTS IFO THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS) AE THAT TPI WILL OCCU 38 MINUTES AFTE INSETION AT A PHASE ANGLE OF 1,69 DES* FO THE OELLIPTIC SEQUENCE ENDEZVOUSt TPI WILL OCCU 16 MINUTES PIO TO SUNISE AT AN ELEVATION ANGLE OF 26,b DES* DATA pioity HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS WILL BE ATTEMPTED (FOM A TAJECTOY STANDPOINT)t ONLY WHEN THE INSETION WEDGE ANGLE IS PEDICTED TO BE ZEO* THIS CITEION WAS DETEMINED BECAUSE OUT OF PLANE CONDITIONS AT TPF AE GENEALLY UNDESIABLE AND COMMITTING TO THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS KNOWING THESE CONDITIONS WILL EXIST WAS THOUGHT TO BE ILL-ADVISED, THUSt ONLY AS LONG AS ASCENT YAW STEEING CAN EDUCE THE INSETION WEDGE TO ZEOt WILL THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS BE CONSIDEED AN ACCEPTABLE TECHNIQUE, THE FINAL CONSTAINT APPLIES ONLY TO THE COELLIPTIC SEQUENCE* SPECIFICALLY_ LIFT-OFF WILL BE ESTABLISHED SUCH THAT CDH SHOULD BE APPOXIMATELY ZEO DELTA V, THIS CITEION WAS ESTABLISHED IN DATA PIOITY AS A DESIABLE CONSTAINT SINCE IT MAXIMIZES THE POBABILITY OF BEING ABLE TO FOEGO DH THUS AFFODING A LONGP UNDISTUBED TACKING AC FO THE TP[ SOLUTIONSt IN ADDITION TO ELIMINATING ONE MANEUVE* DATA SOUCES PT (ENDEZVOUS PLAN TABLE) LTT (LAUNCH TAGETING TABLE) MPT PATICIPATION FDO POCEDUES COELLIPTIC ENDEZVOUS SEOUENCE_" BY UTILIZING THE VAIOUS CONTOLS AVAILABLE IN THE LAUNCH WINDOW POGAMt FDO CAN ESTABLISH THE NOMINAL DELTA H AND TPI TIMES, THE GENEAL TECHNIQUE USED IS TO VAY BOTH HOIZONTAL AND ADIAL INSETION VELOCITY UNTIL THE DESIED CONDITIONS AE MET, THIS IS NOMALLY DONE utilizing CUVES SUPPLIED BY MPAD= THE FINAL MANEUVE WILL BE TANSFEED FOM THE LAUNCH WINDOW (PT) TO THE MPT* SHOT ENDEZVOUS--- ALL SHOT ENDEZVOUS CONSTAINTS CAN BE MET WITH ONE ITEATION OF THE LAUNCH TAGETING TABLE_ ALL CONSTAINTS AE MET AUTOMATICALLYt THUS ELIMINATING THE NEED O_.M_NUAL._TEAT_O_, THE HA_UVE _L_ E_ COffPUT_D, IN THE LTT_ TaNSFeED TO THE LAUNC_ M MISSION EV I DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/E5/70 TAJECTOY AND ENDEZVOUS GUIDANCE 3-70

93 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE COELLIPTIC SEQUENCE ENDEZVOUS EXECUTION CONSTAINTS COMMENTS THE NOMINAL DELTA H IS DEFINED AS THE TAGETED DELTA H DUING ENDEZVOUS PLANNING, THIS DELTA H WILL BE MAINTAINED WITHIN +/" 5 MINUTESt A5 LONE AS CONDITIONS WILL ALLOW. IT WILL HOWEVEt BE THE FIST CONSTAINT TO BE SLIPPED IN THE PESENCE OF EAL TIME DISPESIONS_ ETC, TP1 WILL NOT BE MOVED ANY EALIE THAN 31 MINUTES PIO TO SUNISE DUE TO CSM TACKING CONSTAINTS, NAMELYP Bl MINUTES ALLOWS THE CMP _ MINUTES AFTE SUNSET IN WHICH TO OBTAIN SEXTANT TACKING FO _IS TPI SOLUTION, SINCE THE CMC SOLUTION IS INVOLVED IN THE VOTING LOGIC CONCENING WHICH TPI TO EXECUTE AND SINCE SEXTANT TACKING IS EQUIED {ALONG WITH VHF ANGING) TO OBTAIN A CMC SOLUTION_ THIS CONSTAINT MUST BE OBSEVED, THOUGH TPI IS SCHEDULED 16 MINUTES PIO TO SUNISEt THIS CONSTAINT ALLOWS IT TO BE MOVED UP TO Z5 MINUTES EALY IF EAL TIME CONDITIONS DICTATE, THEE IS NO CONSTAINT ON MOVING TPI LATE THAN NOMINAL. THE DELTA T BETWEEN CDH AND TPI IS NOMINALLY 38 MINUTES, THIS PESENTS A COMFOTABLE TIMELINE FO ENDEZVOUS NAVIGATION_ MANEUVE COMPUTATION AND BUN PEPAATION, IN THE PESENCE OF EAL-TIME DISPESIONS* THIS DELTA MAY BE SHOTENED TO AS LITTLE AS 30 MINUTESp BUT THIS IS UNDESIEABLE, IT WILL BE MAINTAINED ABOVE 32 AS LONG AS IS FEASIBLE* THIS CONSTAINT WILL BE THE LAST GUIDELINE TO BE VIOLATED, DATA SOUCES ET (ENDEZUOUS EVALUATION TABLE) PT (ENDEZVOUS PLAN TABLE) MPT {MISSION PLAN TABLE) PATICIPATION FOG FLIGHT CEW POCEDUES DUING THE COUSE OF ENDEZVOUS PLANNINGt FDO WILL EXAMINE PAAMETES SUCH AS DELTA Mt TPI TIME ELATIVE TO SUNISEt ELEVATION ANGLE. ETC, THE NOMINAL LIFT-OFF WILL MAINTAIN ALL OF THESE PAAMETES AT THEI PEMISSION VALUES, AFTE INSETIONt HOWEVE_ IF DISPESIONS BEGIN TO DEVIATE THE TAJECTOY FOM THE NOMINAL_ CETAIN OF THESE PAAMETES WILL BE ALLOWED TO VAY, THE THEE PAAMETES THAT ALLOW THE MOST FLEXIBILITY IN MANEUVE COMPUTATION/EXECUTION AE TPI TIME_ DELTA H, AND FINALLY THE DELTA T FOM CDH TO TPI, THESE QUANTITIES WILL BE VAIED, AS EQUIEDt IN THE ODE THEY AE LISTED. EPESENTATIVE VAIATIONS AE--- +/- 5 MINUTES_ +/- 3 N,M,* AND + B TO 5 MINUTES, ONLY UNDE THE MOST EXTEME CICUMSTANCES WOULD THE DELTA T FOM CDH TO TPI BE DECESASED SIGNIFICANTLY* AS THE DELTA T IS CITICAL IN OBTAINING GOOD ONBOAO TPI SOLUTIONS. DELTA T IS CITICAL IN OBTAINING GOOD ONBOAD TPI SOLUTIONSI IN FACT* DELETING CDH HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE* IN CASESP AN ACCEPTABLE ALTENATE TO SHOTENING THE DELTA T BETWEEN THE TWO MANEUVES. ENGINEEING JUDGEMENTt COUPLED WITH SIMULATION EXPEIENCEJ MUST TEMPE THE VAIOUS TADEOFFS THAT HAVE TO BE MADE DUING ENDEZVOUS PLANNING, MISSION!EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/ZB/70 TAJECTOY AND ENDEZVOUS GUIDANCE 3-71

94 J NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ = TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITEt -114 TWEAK/BAIL-OUT DECISION CITEIA COMMENTS DATA PIOITY HA5 ESTABLISHED CETAIN CITEIA IN THE PESENCE OF WHICH THE BAIL-OUT MANEUVE (TO TANSFE FOM THE SHOT ENDEZUOUS SEQUENCE TO THE STANDAD COELLIPTIC SEQUENCE) WILL BE EXECUTED, THE PIMAY CONSIDEATION IS THE DELTA V LIMIT WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED USING TWO ATIONALE, THE FIST IS THAT ETOGADE TWEAKS AE NECESSAILY LIMITED TO 60 pps DUE TO LM -X OB BUN CONSTAINTS CONSIDEATIONS, SINCE THIS LIMIT EXISTS AND ANY VALUE FO EITHE POBIGADE O OUT-OF PLANE TWEAKS GEATE THAN 60 FPS WOULD BODE ON uneasonableness_ THE SECOND ATIONALE I5 SIMPLY A EASONABLENESS TEST, THUS, THE ULE STATES THAT ANY TWEAK LAGE THAN SO FPS WILL ESULT IN EXECUTION OF THE BAIL-OUT MANEUVE* THE SECONDAY (IN TEMS OF POBABILITY) CONSIDEATION IS A PUE TAJECTOY CONCEN, NAMELY THAT THE BAIL-OUT WILL BE EXECUTED IF THE POST-TWEAK PEICYNTHIAN IS LESS THAN 5 MINUTES, ALTHOUGH THIS peilune IS ALWAYS BEHIND THE SPACECAFT, AND pope EXECUTION OF THE ENSUING ENDEZVOUS WOULD ESULT IN CONTINUAL INCEASES IN PEILUNEt IT SEEMS WELL ADVISED TO MAINTAIN A CLEA OBIT AT ALL TIMESt IF ONLY TO POTECT AGAINST THOSE EMOTE FAILUES THAT COULD LEAVE THE LM IN A LOW/IMPACTING OBIT WITHOUT POPULSION* DATA SOUCES--- AM SHOT AM PATICIPANTS POD FLIGHT CEW POCEDUES AFTE INSETIONt FDO WILL EXAMINE THE TWEAK MANEUVES ON THE SHOT AM DISPLAY* AFTE DECIDING WHICH OF THE THEEt AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS (PNGSt AGS_ MSFNI IS MOST COECT, THE ULES WILL BE INVOKED, IF EITHE CITEIA IS VIOLATED_ HE WILL ECOMMEND EXECUTION OF THE BAIL-OUT MANEUVE TO THE plight DIECTO, THE SOLUTION FO THE BAIL-OUT MANEUVE IS AVAILABLE ON THE AM DISPLAY AND WILL BE FOM THE SAME SOUCE AS THE ONE USED FO THE TWEAK DECISION* THE DECISION WILL BE VOICED TO THE CEW AT APPOXIMATELY INSETION PLUS 2 MINUTE5 ALONG WITH THE IGNITION TIME AND DELTA V COMPONENTS. THE CEW WILL EXECUTE THE TWEAK AT INSETION PLUS _ MINUTES O THE BAIL-OUT AT INSETION PLUS 5 MINUTES= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL,2/15/701TAJECTOY AND ENDEZVOUS GUIDANCE 3-72

95 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5-1Z5 EQUIED ENDEZVOUS NAVIGATION TECHNIQUES COMMENTS--- DATA PIOITY HAS ESTABLISHED THAT IN ODE TO COMMIT TO THE SHOT ENDEZVOUSP TWO INDEPENDENT ONBOAD NAVIGATION METHODS MUST BE AVAILABLE, THE LISTED TECHNIQUES EPESENT THOSE METHODS THAT AE ADEQUATE TO SUPPOT THIS ENDEZVOUS POFILE, BASED ON THIS GOUNDULEP A MATIX WAS CONSTUCTED TO IDENTIFY THOSE COMBINATIONS OF FAILUES WHICH VIOLATE THIS CITEION (SEE ULE 3-81), THE ATIONALE BEHIND THIS DECISION WAS--- I* DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SHOT ENDEZUOUS TAJECTOY TO 3G DISPESIONSp THE GOUND (UTILIZING MSFN DATA) IS NOT NOMINALLy CONSIDEED AN ACCEPTABLE SOUCE FO TPI, 2, THE GOUND CAN COMPUTE AN ACCEPTABLE CSIo CDHI AND TPI SEQUENCE USING M_FN DATA, SINCE THIS SEQUENCE IS ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS DESIEABLE THAN THE NOMINAL TECHNIQUEt IT IS THE PIMAY BACKUP AND WILL BE EXECUTED IN ALL CASES _EXCEPT TIME CITICAL), DUING THE COELLIPTIC SEQUENCE HOWEVE_ THE GOUND IB ONLY A BACKUP FO MANEUVE COMPUTATION AND WILL PASS SOLUTIONS FO EXECUTION ONLY WHEN VEHICLE SYSTEM FAILUES MAKE ONBOAD NAVIGATION IMPOSSIBLE* 3, A GOUND COMPUTED TPI {FO THE BHOT ENDEZVOUB) IS THE LEAST DESIEABLE OF THE OPTIONS FO ENDEZOUS, IN CITICAL BITUATIONS HOWEVEt BOUGHT ABOUT BY SINGLE O MULTIPLE FAILUES POST-TWEAKt THE GOUND WILL PASS TPI FO ONBOAD EXECUTION* HOWEVEt ONBOAD NAVIGATION IS ECOGNIZED AS MANDATOY FO MCC 2 COMPUTATION THESE CASGS= COMMITMENT TO THE SHOT ENDEZVOUB MAY INVOLVE TWO DIFFEENT TIME-FAMES, MAJO SYBTEM5 VEIFICATION WILL BE CONDUCTED PIO TO LIFT-OFF, IF AT THAT TIME ALL CITICAL SYSTEMS AE VEIFIED-WHETHE BY ACTUAL TEST O ASSUMPTIONS BABED ON PEVIOUS PEFOMANCE-L/O WILL BE TAGETED ASSUMING THE SHOT POFILE* IF SYSTEM FAILUES CAUSE VIOLATION OF THE MATIX IN ULE S-Blt L/O WILL BE TAGETED FO THE COELLIPTIC SEQUENCE, ANOTHE _O/NO GO OPPOTUNITY IS PESENTED IN THE TIME FAME BETWEEN INSETION AND THE TWEAK/BAIL OUT DECISION, SINCE THIS TIME FAME (2-3 MINUTES) IS TOO BIEF FO MAJO SYSTEM CHECKSt ONLY THE MANDATOY LM COMPUTES WILL BE VEIFIEDt BASED UPON THEI ASCENT PEFOMANCE, ALL OTHE SYSTEMS WHICH WEE VEIFIED ON THE SUFACE AE ASSUMED TO BE FUNCTIONING POPELY. FAILUE OF A MANDATOY COMPUTE WOULD NOMALLY ESULT IN EXECUTION OF THE BAIL OUT MANEUVE, PATICIPANTS--" FLIGHT DIECTO FDO GUIDANCE CONTOL TELMU G&C ce_ POCEDUES--- l* PIO TO L/O* ALL INVOLVED MOC POSITIONS MUST IDENTIFY TO FLIGHT ANY FAILED SYSTEMS, THIS MAY EQUIE CEW CHECKS* FLIGHT WILL DETEMINE WHICH ENDEZVOUS POFILE IB TO BE EXECUTED, 2, FDO WILL TAGET L/O AB A FUNCTION OF THE POFILE TO BE FLOWN, 5, AT INSETION_ STATUS OF ANY MANDATOY LM COMPUTE WELL CHECKED, BAING FAILUE OF A COMPUTE_ THE NOMINAL ENDEZVOUS TIMELINE WILL POCEED, 4, FOO WILL PASS THE TWEAK O THE BAIL OUT MANEUVE IN ACCODANCE WITH THE POST-INSETION DECISION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND ENDEZVOUS GUIDANCE _-73

96 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center M SS O_ ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE 5"12Z TEC MCC ENTY TAGETING COMMENTS A= THE STEEP TAGET LINE IS FO THE CENTE OF THE COIDO= THIS INSUES A SAFE ENTY FOM HIGH GS (THE NOMINAL IS ABOUT 6G) AND AT THE SAME TIME_ IT AVOIDS FLYING IN A SENSITIVE EGION OF THE COIDO THAT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO SKIPPING OUT. THE G AND N OPEATES VEY WELL FOM THE STEEp TAGET LINE EXCEPT THAT IT LIMITS THE MAXIMUM ANGE CAPABILITY TO LESS THAN 2000 N,Mat BUT THE NOMINAL ENTY ANGE IS APPOXIMATELY 12_0 N.M,o SO THIS DOES NOT CAUSE ANY POBLEM, THE EMS ENTY MODE USES THE CONSTANT G MODE UNTIL THE ENTY VELOCITY FALLS B_LON 2fl_300 FPS_ AND THEN THE EMG IS USED FUN ANGING 30 ITS OPEATION IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE STEEP TAGET LINE, B, THE SHALLOW TAGET LINE ALLOWS THE G AND N TO FLY ITS MAXIMUM ANGING CAPABILITY OF 2300 N,M, FO LUNA ETUN VELOCITIES. THIS IS A SKIP-TYPE ENTY WHICH IS A VEY SENSITIVE TYPE OF ENTY. FO VELOCITIES EQUAL TO O LESS THAN 31_000 FS_ THE STEEP TAGET LINE LIMITS THE G AND N GUIDED ANGE TO AOUND 1300 N,M. FO VELOCITIES EQUAL TO O LESS THAN _lto00 FPSp THE SHALLOW TAGET LINE IS EQUIED IN ODE FO THE G AND N TO FLY GEATE ANGES. 5_122 TEC MCC PHILOSOPHY COMMENTS EFEENCE A AND B. THE G AND N IS THE BEST MODE FO CONTOLLING A BUNP AND IS DESIED, WHEN THE GAMMA IS OUTSIDE THE ENTY OOIDOp AN MCC WILL BE SCHEDULED* AS SOON AS IT CAN BE WOKED INTO THE TIMELINE BECAUSE IT IS DESIABLE TO STAY WITHIN THE COIDO AT ALL TIMES. C, AN SPS MINIMUM IMPULSE BUN ESULTS IN A DELTA V THAT IS A FUNCTION OF THE MASS OF THE VEHICLE CONFIGUATION. PEMISSION TANSEATH PLANNING ESULTS IN A DELTA V E_UIVALENT TO A MINIMUM IMPULSE VALUE WHICH EFLECTS NOMINAL MANEUVES, BUT MANEUVES AE NEVE COMPLETELY NOMINALt HENCE, A PEMISSION DELTA V BASED ON THE NOMINAL MAY NOT BE ELEVANT TO THE EAL TIME MINIMUM IMPULSE DELTA V, IN PACT_ IT IS POBSIBLE TO DEFINE A DELTA V SMALLE THAN THE EAL TIME MINIMUM IMPULSE DELTA V WHICH MEANS THAT TO use THE SPS FO AN MCC, ONE WOULD HAVE TO VIOLATE THE ULE, THEEFOE= IT IS BEST TO DEFINE THE DELTA V AS THAT INHEENT IN A MINIMUM IMPULSE SPS BUN, DATA PIOITY OPEATIONAL OPINIONS= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE GUIDANCE ENTY 3-74 APOLLO 1 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSEATM

97 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE TEC MCC FO LANDING AEA CONTOL COMMENTS ASB* AN MCC CAN BE USED TO, CONTOL THE LANDING AEA PIO TO E1-24 MS FO AVOIDING BAD WEATHE, O FO ECOVEY ACCESSe EI DELTA V EQUIED TO CHANGE LANDING LONGITUDE 1 DEC HS APPOX. 5 FPS 24 HS APPOX. 25 FPS 15 HS APPOX, 55 FPS THE DATA ABOVE SHOW THAT AFTE EI-24 HSt IT TAKES OUITE A BIT OF OELTA V TO CHANGE THE LANDING AEA VEY MUCH. IF A LAGE MCC I5 DONE_ IT WOULD EQUIE SEVEAL HOUS OF TACKING AND THEN ANOTHE MCC PIO TO ENTY, BUT PIO TO EI-24 HBt THE AEA CAN BE CHANGED WITHOUT MUCH DELTA V AND WITH PLENTY OF TIME TO TACK AND DO ANY NEEDED MCC, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE LOCATION OF THE OPEATIONAL FOOTPINT HAS AS ITS PIMAY OBJECTIVE THE EQUIEMENT THAT IT CONTAIN NO LAND MASSES* BECAUSE OF THE ELATIVELY LAGE NUMBE OF SMALL ISLANDS IN THE MID-PACIFIC AEA* IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO MEET THE ABOVE EQUIEMENT= IN THESE CASES, SMALL LAND MASSES AE ACCEPTABLE WITHIN THE FOOTPINT, POVIDED THAT THEY AE AWAY FOM THE PIME AND BACKUP TAGETS WITHIN THE FOOTPINT, THAT ISt IN AEAS WHEE OPEATIONAL OPINION DICTATES THAT LAND IMPACT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY BECAUSE THESE AEAS EPESENT EXTEME GUIDANCE DISPESIONS WITHIN SYSTEM LIMITS, IN EAL TIME FO EASONS OF WEATHE AVOIDANCEt GUIDANCEP O TAJECTOY ANOMALIES, IT MAY BECOME NECESSAY TO SHIFT THE FOOTPINT TO ACCOMMODATE A ELOCATION OF THE TAGET POINT, IN SUCH CASESD THE SHIFT OF THE FOOTPINT MAY ESULT IN CONTAINING LAND MASSES* IF THIS OCCUSt A EAL TIME AGEEMENT MUST ESULT BETWEEN FDB AND LD TO BUY OFF ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THESE LAND MASSES within THE FOOTPINT* NOTE--- THE AEA THAT IS OPEATIONALLY ACCESSIBLE IS BASED UPON ENTY FLIGHT PATH ANGLES BETWEEN " 6*3 DEGEE TO " 6,6 DEGEE (MEC-7 EXECUTION CITEIA) AND THE DISPESIONS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH OF THE ENTY MODES. THE El POINT AND THE CONSTANT 4G ANGE POTENTIAL VAY AS THE ENTY FLIGHT PATH ANGLE VAIES ABOUT THE NOMINAL OF -6=5 DEGEE* THE EI POINT CHANGES 10 No, PE ez DEGEE AND THE CONSTANT 4G ANGE POTENTIAL CHANGES 25 NoMo UPANGE PE -.1 DEGEE AND 45 N*M. DOWNANGE PE +,2* THE G AND N LANDING AEA - THE 70 NoN*TO EITHE SIDE OF THE GOUND TACK IS THE COSSANGE CAPABILITY OF THE G AND N AT 1250 N,M. THE 91BN*MoUPANGE IS THE SHOTEST POSSIBLE ANGE FO A CONSTANT 4B ENTY* THE 2000NON* DOWNANGE IS BASED ON FLYING THE G AND N TO THE MAXIMUM OPEATIONAL ANGE OF 1800 N,M* AND A_LOWING AH ADDITIONAL _ NoM.=PA_I,, :;;... _ ;. = _',!rf " "'_... 'L''i; :... THE EMS LANDING AEA - THE +/- 52 N,M* IN COSSANGE 15 THE EMS COGSANGE DISPESION. THE 61 N,M, UPANGE BOUNDAY IS THE SUM OF--- A. 26 NoM* FOM EMS DISPESION* B. lo NoMo FOM -*Z DEGEE FLIGHT PATH ANGLE CHANGE* C. 25 N.M. FOM 4G ANGE POTENTIAL CHANGE. THE 91 N*Mo DOWNANGE BOUNDAY IS THE SUM OF--- A, 26 N.M. FOM EMS DISPESION. B. 20 NoN* FOM &.2 DEGEE FLIGHT PATH ANGLE CHANGE* C. 45 N.M. FOM 4G ANGE POTENTIAL CHANGE. FO AN EALY G AND N FAILUE_ THE EMS ENTY IS TAGETED TO THE CONSTANT 4G. TAGET POINTy THEEFOEt THE OPEATIONAL FOOTPINT ASSUMES THAT THE EMS TAGET POINT5 AE COINCIDENT WITH THE CONSTANT 4G TAGET POINTSe MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _4 FNL 2/15/70!TAJECTOY AND TANSEATH GUIDANCE ENTY _-75 i

98 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ONTmI THE CONSTANT 4G LANDING AEA - THE +/- 27 N,M*t IS THE COSSANGE DISPESION FO A CONSTANT 4G ENTY, THE ZlO N*M= UPANGE BOUNDAY 15 THE SUM OF _- A, 73 N,M= FOM 4G DISPESION= Bo _0 N,M, FOM ",_ DEGEE FLIGHT PATH ANGLE CHANGE, C= 25 NeM* FOM #G ANGE POTENTIAL CHANGE, THE _40 N,M, DOWNANGE BOUNDAY IS THE SUM OF--- A* 73 N,M, FOM 4G DIGPEBION, Be 20 N*M, FOM +,20EGEE FLIGHT PATH ANGLE CHANGE, C, _5 NeHe FOM 4G ANGE POTENTIAL CHANGE* NM-- _-152 aa-' oll rightconstant 4g IP /-- 70 NM,15NM-/, / ' /_"-_-._----' NM 2000 NM "_gotl le_-'_-,:\ Constant 4g entry dispersion area Constant X--EMS dispersionarea 4g IP :MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO Z4 _NL,2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSEATH GUIDANCE ENTY 3-76

99 NASA -Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE ITE_ BACKUP ENTY CONSTAINTS COMMENTS EFEENCE A, THE CONSTANT G ENTY 'IS A BACKUP TO THE G AND N ENTY MODE, AFTE PEAK G THE LIFT VECTO 15 MANUALLY BANKED TO THE IGHT (NOTH) AND CONTOLLED TO MAINTAIN A PEDETEMINED G-LEVEL. A CONSTANT G MODE OF EQUAL TO O LESS THAN 3 G IS VEY SENSITIVE AND MAY SKIP OUT, A CONSTANT G MODE OF EUUAL TO O GEATE THAN 5 G IS DIFFICULT TO CONTOL BECAUSE IT EQUIES SEVEAL LAGE COECTIONS (30 DEG - 50 DEG) OF THE LIFT VECTO OIENTATIONS TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTANT G, THEE IS ALSO A CEW HAZAD ASSOCIATED WITH SUSTAINED GJB OF 5 G, B, T_E EMS IS USED FO ANGING ONLY WHEN THE G AND N HAS FAILED, IN THIS CASE. THEE IS NOT ANY POSITIVE CHECK ENTY, IT COULD CAUSE A TAJECTOY THAT WOULD SKIP OUT AND BE CATASTOPHIC-- BUT, ONCE THE VELOCITY 15 EQUAL TO O LESS THAN FPS AN EMS FAILUE WOULD ONLY CAUSE A MISS OF THE TAGET, DUING THE EALY PAT OF THE ENTY, THE CONSTANT G MODE CAN BE FLOWN U$1NG THE EMS G DISPLAY AND CHECKED BY THE G-METE O VICE VESAo IF THEY DISAGEEt A SEAT-OF-THE-PANTS MEASUEMENT MUST BE USED TO DETEMINE WHICH IS COECT, MEMOANDUM, SUBJECT--- LOAD FACTO DUATION ENCOUNTEED DUING LUNA ETUNS ENTY WITH THE CONSTANT G BACKUP MODE_ DATED AUGUST 7t _gbbo MISSION EV DATE GECTION GOUP i _ PAGE... APOLLO I# FNL L2/15_70 TAJECTOY AND TANSEATH " GUIDANCE ENTY 3-77

100 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE J i-126 WEATHE AVOIDANCE DUING ENTY COMMENTS EFEENCE THE G AND N HAS THE CAPABILITY OF FLYING AN ENTY FOM 1100 N,M, TO 2500 N,M, ANGEr BUT IT HAS BEEN AGEED WITH THE CEW IN DATA PIOITY MEETINGS THAT IHE ANGE WILL BE LIMITED TO iboo N,M= A ANGE OF LESS THAN 1800 N,M, AVOIDS THE USE OF P6b, P86 TAGETS FO A TAJECTOY THAT SKIPS TO A EGION WHEE THE DAG LEVEL IS LESS THAN Oa2G, THEEFOEt THE G AND N ENTY ANGE CAN BE VAIED FOM llo0 NoM, TO IdOO N,M, FO AVOIDING WEATHE AND THE EMS ENTY ANGE CAN VAY FOM iioo NoM= TO 16DO N,M, FO WEATHE AV)IDANCE, OPEATIONAL OPINIONS, DATA PIOITY S-PA-gT-O40 (TEIp MCC AND ENTY), MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSEATH GUIDANCE ENTY 3-78

101 L NASA - Manned Spacecraft (;enter MISSION ULES SECTION _ - TAJECTOYAND GUIDANCE PEDICTED ENTY COIDO VIOLATION AFTE THE LAST MCC OPPOTUNITY COMMENTS THE LAGT MCC I5 SCHEDULED AT EI-3 HSp AND IT TAKES ABOUT AN HOU OF TACKING TO DETEMINE AN ACCUATE STATE VECTO AFTE THE BUN, AT EI-3 HSt IT TAKES FPS TO COECT 1 DEG GOWSOFAPIDLY, GAMMA AT EIp BUT AFTE ABOUT EI-2 HSo THE DELTA V EQUIED TO COECT GAMMA AT EI IF THE UNDESHOOT LINE 15 EXCEEDED, FULL LIFT SHOULD BE FLOW UNTIL AFTEPEAK G TO AVOID HIGH GSo THEN THE CONTOL MAY SE GIVEN TO THE G AND N TO GET AS CLOSE TO THE TAGET AS POSSIBLEJ EFEENCE IF THE OVESHOOT LINE 16 EXCEEDEDt NEGATIVE LIFT SHOULD BE FLOWN UNTIL AFTE 2G_S AE EACHED TO ASSUNE CAPTUE, IN THIS CASE THE G AND N WOULD FLY UP AGAINST THE ZOG LIMITEo TYING TO HIT THE TAGET, BUT WOULD STILL LAND LONG-- THEEFOEP AFTE CAPTUE A CONSTANT 4G THE ENTY HIGH SHOULD GtS, DE FLOWN, THE 4G ENTY HAS A SHOT ANGE ASSOCIATED WITH IT AND WOuLo AVOID OPEATIONAL OPINION, DATA PIOITY S-PA-gT-040 (TEIt MGCo AND ENTY), MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PA_E APOLLO 14 FNL 12/ifi/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSEATH GUIDANCE ENTY _-79

102 * i NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION _ - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE TEM G AND N NO-GO CITEIA DUING ENTY COMMENTS A* AND B* WHEN THE ENTY ANGE IS GEATE THAN 1350 N*M*t THE CMC WILL ENTE PSb WHICH DISPLAYS A TAGET VELOCITY AS VL AND OL AND CAN BE USED TO QUALIFY THE CMC NAVIGATION PIO TO PEG IN ODE TO COMMIT THE G AND N FO THE EMAINDE OF THE ENTY* THE CEW IS VOICED THE G AND N GO/NO-GO* THE LIMITS AE BASED UN VA]OU$ EOS SOUCES {ATMOSPHEEt L/Dr G AND N 3 SIGMA EOSm ETC*) WHICH AE FIXED PEMISSIONt HOWEVEt THE LIMITS MUST ALSO INCLUDE A BIAS FU THE SPECIFIC ENTY ANGE AND ENTY CONDITIONS WHICH CANNOT BE FIXED PEMISSIUN, THEEFOE_ THE LIMITS ON VL AN_ DL WILL BE DETEMINED FOM CUVES DUING EAL TIME, C* AND D* E, AND F* THE G AND N IS DESIGNED SUCH THAT IT SHOULD ALWAYS FLY THE ENTY WITHIN THE EMS ON-SET AND OFF-SET LIMIT LINES* IF THE G-METE AGEES WITH THE G INDICATED BY THE EMBo THEE AE TWO INDEPENDENT SOUCES THAT INDICATE THE G AND N IS NOT PEFOMING POPELY* AT El-Z7 MIN, A HOIZON MONITO ATTITUDE CHECK IS MADE ON THE G AND N, T_ CEW OIENTS THE $/C TO A HEADS DOWN_ BLUNT-E_D FOWAD ATTITUDE with THE _i.7 DEC WINDOW MAK ON THE HOIZON AND COHAE THE PITCH GIMBAL ANGLE with THE PAD VALUE* IF THE DIFFEENCE IS GEATE THAN +/" 5_ T_E O AND N 15 NO-GO* G_ NO ATIONALE EQUIED* 5-E31 TEl ABOTS AND ESIDUAL TIMMING PHILOSOPHY COMMENTS ONCE THE GPS BUN HAS BEGUN FO THE TEl MANEUVE THEE SHOULD BE NO MANUAL SHUTDOWNS _UI_G THE BUN, THEE SHOULD BE AS MANY MANUAL ESTATS AN NECESSAY TO COMPLETE THE BUN= WHEE THEE 15 A PEMATUE SHUTDOWN FO CAUSES OTHE THAN A MANUAL SHUTDOWNt ACTIbN i_ PEDICATED ON THE OB DELTA V CAPABILITY BECAUSE THE CS IS THE ONLY VIABLE THUSTE CAPABILITY EMAINING, EXPEIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE COMPUTED TEI MANEUVE PEF(}MED UNDE G+N CONTOL HAS NEVE ESULTED IN TEC MIOCOUSES TOTALING GEATE THAN 8 FP$, IT CA_ ALSU BE SHOWN THAT THE DELTA V NEEDED TO COECT TEl DISPESIONS AT CUTOFF GOWS TO 2,_ TIMES THAT VALUE AT TEl.17 HOUSt MCC 5 NOMINAL EXECUTION TIME= IT IS DESIED TO MAINTAIN 20 FP5 FO CS DELTA V MCC CAPABILITY, THEEFOE IF THE ENGINE SHUT_ DO'_N WITH TEl UELTA v EMAINING GEATE THAN CS DELTA V CAPABILITY LES_ 20 FPs THE SP5 SHOULD BE NESTATE_ ASAP AND THE TAGETED BUN COMPLETED, THIS WILL MAINTAIN ALL C5 DELTA V CAPABILITY TO PEFUM MIDCOUSEB WITH, THE BUN NEED NOT BE TIMMED SINCE TH_ COECTIVE DELTA V _OwTH ATE i_ GMALL AND CAN BE TAKEN CAE OF WITH THE HiDCOUSE MANEUVES, IF THE ENGINE 5HUTB DOWN WITH TEl DELTA v EMAINING LESS THAN CS DELTA V CAPABILIIY LES_ 20 FPB THE CEW AT THEI DISCETION CAN EITHE ESTAT THE SPS U ube THE CS A_AP TO COMPLETE THE TAGETED BUN= THE BUN NEED NOT BE TIMMED FO THE ABOVE EASON* IF THE _P5 IS UBEDt ALL CS DELTA V CAPABILITY EMAINS FO MIDCOQSE CUHECTIO=_* IF THE CS IS U3EU TO COMPLETE THE BUN AT LEABT 20 FP5 EMAINS FO MIDCOUSE COECTIU_5 WH CH HAS BEEM SHOWN TO BE SUFFICIENT, IF THE CUTOFF ESIDUALS AE LESS THAN 5 FPS THE C5 CAN BE USL_ TO TIH TJ_E BUN PLtPELY. ANY EOS CAN BE TAKEN OUT IN THE MIDCOUSE, ITtS BEST TO TIM THE bvn ACCUATELY IN x AND Z BECAUSE THEY AFFECT LONGITUDE AND COIDO CONTOL FO LNTI<Y, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1# FNL 12/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSEATH GUIDANCE ENTY _-_O

103 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIOU ULES SECTION 3 - TAJECTOY AND GUIDANCE CONTOl ALL THE ABOVE IG APPLICABLE TO A DPS TEI ALSO* WHEE A DPG TEI ls DUNE WITH AN OPEATIONAL $PS AS A BACKUP AND THE DPS SHUTDOWN IN THE MODE lli EGIONt THE DP$ SHOULD BE ABANDUNED AND THE EPE ETAGETED FO THE NEXT TEl WHICH WILL OCCU NEA THE NEXT PEICYNTHION* THIS ls THE OPTIMUM TIME IN TEMS OF DELTA Ve IF THE SHUTDOWN OCCUS IN THE MODE I EGION THE DPS SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND THE SPS TAGETED AT TEl + 2 HOUS TO ACHIEVE ENTY CONDITIONS* AT LEAST TWO HOUS I5 NECEGSAY TO CONFIM THE OIGINAL NANEUVEt BUILD A USABLE VECTO TO COMPUTE THE COECTIVE HANEUVEt DO THE CONPUTATIONSe EADY THE SYSTEMS AND PASS THE DATA TO PEFOM THE MANEUVEe IT IS NOT WISE TO WAIT MUCH BEYOND 2 HOUS BECAUSE THE TAJECTOY THAT EEULTE FOM A BHUTDOWN IN THE MODE I EGION IS A NON-EATH ENTEING TAJECTOY AND THE SOONE THE CEW GETS BACK ONTO THE COECT TAJECTOY THE SETTE EINCE THE COECTIVE DELTA V EQUIED GOWB APIDLY, IN THE CASE WHEE THEE NO 5PS O DPS IGNITION ON THE OIGINAL TEl MANEUVE IT IS BETTE TO SLIP i EVIt DO MALFUNCTION POCEDUES AND TY AGAIN AT THE NEXT OPPOTUNITYI NO CAPABILITY IE LOST SLIPPING 1EVt BECAUSE THE LANDING TIME EMAINE THE SAME FO ONLY ABOUT A _0 FPG INCEAEE IN TEI DELTA Vm DATA EOUCEG ONBOAD MONITOING ETUN TO EATH DISPLAYE FDO OBIT DIGITALS CHECKOUT MONITO PATICIPATION CEW FDO FO FD POCEDUE Am NO SPS O DPS IGNITION lm ETAGET TEl FO 1EVe LATE 2m CEW EXECUTE STANDAD MALFUNCTION POCEDUEE Bo PEMATUE BPE SHUTDOWN 1* CEW ESTAT ASAP AND COMPLETE THE TAGETED BUN WITH NO TIM _ TIM_1 _ AND _ IF SHUTDOWN E$IDUALE LEES THAN _ FPE* Cm PEMATUE DPS SHUTDOWN WITH OPEATIONAL spg AS BACKUP* i_ MODE IIl EGION CA) ETAGET SPS FO NEXT TEl 2* MODE I EGION {A) ETAGET BPS FO TEI+ 2 H* MISSION EVI DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 TAJECTOY AND TANSEATH GUIDANCE ENTY 3aO_

104 I 4 SLV SYSTEMS

105 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION A - SLV SYSTEMS 6-i S-IC STAGE LOSS OF THUST THE S-IC STAGE ENGINE STAT SEQUENCE USUALLY BEGINS AT TEl - 8,9 SECONDS AND SHOULD ATTAIN 90 PECENT THUST PIO TO LIFTOFF, NOMINAL TIME FO INBOAD ENGINE CUTOFF IS TEl + i_4,6 SECONDS-- OUTBOAD ENGINES AT TB2 + 2BoB SECONDS, TWO ENGINE OUT AUTO ABOT IS DEACTIVATED AT TBI. 120 SECONDSo FO EALY ENGINE OUT (APPOX, 20 SECONDS) HIGH-Q WILL OCCU 25 TO 30 SECONDS LATE THAN NOMINAL CONDITIONSo FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES I, LOX O FUEL PEVALVE CLOSES PEMATUELY 2* PEMATUE ENEGI ATION OF ENGINE CONTOL SOLENOID 3, GAS GENEATO CONTOL VALVE CLOSES PEMATUELY 4. FUEL CUTOFF SENSO SENSES PEMATUELY AFTE AMING 5, _ATTEY NO, i LOSS OF POWE 6= NO POWE TANSFE SIGNAL FOM MAIN POWE DISTIBUTO 7, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE B, PEMATUE THUST-NOT'Ok SIGNAL 9, PEMATUE ENGINE CUTOFF SIGNAL FOM TIME DISTIBUTO 10, GIHBAL DUCT FAILS 11, SLIDING JOINT FAILS 12, PEMATUE IqTWO ADJACENT OUTBOAD ENGINES OUT tt CUTOFF GIGNAL FOM POPULSION DISTIBUTO MALFUNCTIONS OCCUING AT LIFTOFF O WHEN THE VEHICLE IS IN THE PAD VICINITY CAN CAUSE PAD FALLSACK_ COLLISION WITH HOLDOOWN AMS O OTHE PEIPHEAL GOUND EQUIPHENTt O COLLISION WITH THE LAUNCH TOWE. DUAL ENGINE FAILUES ESULT IN FALLBACK FO ALL CASES EXAMINED AND FO ALL FAILUES FOM 0 TO 30 SECONDS, SINGLE ENGINE FAILUES - (ENGINE i O _ BETWEEN TEl + 0 SECOND AND TEl. _,5 SECONDS - ENGINE 2 O 3 BETWEEN TBI+ 0 SECOND AND TEl SECONDS) WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF CONTOL DUING THE INTEVAL TBI+ I}3 SECONDG AND TBI. 151 SECONDSt ALL OTHE SINGLE ENGINE FAILUES AE CONTOLLABLE, FO TWO ADJACENT SIDE CONTOL ENGINES FAILEDt LOSS OF OLL CONTOLLABILITY ESULTS, ADJACENT CONTOL ENGINE FAILUES POM 0 TO 30 SECONDS ESULT IN STUCTUAL FAILUE BUT TWO OPPOSITE CONTOL ENGINES FAILED AE LESS SEVEE AND WILL NOT ESULT IN BEAKUP, CONTINGENCY CONDITION LOSS OF THUST - ENGINE 3 O 4 THIS ULE APPLIES ONLY FO THE UNIQUE CASE OF ENGINE 3 O 4 THUST LOGS BETWEEN O TO 45 SECONDS, IT ]G AN INFOMATION ULE ONLY AND IS USED TO INFUM THE ANGE SAFETY OFFICE THAT ENGINE 3 O 4 18 OUT, FAILUE POINTS (ENGINE 3 O 41 l, LOX PEVALVE CLOSES PEMATUELY 2. GAS GENEATO CONTOL VALVE CLOSES PEMATUELY 3. SWITCH SELECTO PEMATUE SIGNAL A, PEMATUE THUST-NOT-OK SIGNAL 5. PEMATUE ENGINE CUTOFF SIGNAL FOM TIME DISTIBUTOS CONSEQUENCES LOSS OF THUST ON ENGINE 3 O 4t unde CETAIN WIND CONDITIONSt MIGHT CAUSE THE VEHICLE TO VIOLATE A ANGE SAFETY DESTUCT LINE, IN THE EVENT OF ENGINE 3 O A LUSS OF THUSTt THE ANGE SAFETY OFFICE WILL USE AN ALTENATE DESTUCT LINE ESPECIALLY FO THIS UNIQUE CASE. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS

106 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4-5LV SYSTEMS l -2 LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL DUING BOOST PHASE LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL CAUSES LOSS OF GUIDANCE AND POSSIBLE LOGS OF VEHICLE, FAILUE POINTS l. ST-12A PLATFOM FAILUE LOSS OF ATTITUDE EFEENCE 2* LVDC/LVDA FAILUE LOSS OF ATTITUDE COMMAND O ATTITUUE EO SIGNAL 3. FLIGHT CONTOL COMPUTE FAILUE ANGULA ATE SIGNAL LOST O SATUATED ATTITUDE EO SIGNAL LOST O SATUATED 4, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE INADVETENT SEQUENCING O INHIBITING OF STAGE COMMAND 5, CONTOL EDS ATE GYO FAILUE LOSS OF ANGULA ATE SIGNALS 6= CONTOL SIGNAL POCESSO LOG8 OF ANGULA ATE 51GNAL5 CONSEQUENCES A. S-IC BUN TOWE COLLISION CAN OCCU AT LIFTOFF. DUING HIOH-_ EOION, APID DIVEGENCE WILL OCCU WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE CEW, IN THE POST NIGH-Q EGION, THESE FAILUES WILL CAUSE EITHE HIGH ATES O DIVEGENCE FOM THE NOMINAL FLIGHT PATH WITH NO STUCTUAL BEAKUP O LOSS OF CEW. B. S-II 8UN THESE FAILUES WILL ESULT IN EITHE HIGH ATES O DIVEGENCE FOM THE NOMINAL FLIGHT PATH WITH NO STUCTUAL BEA_,UP O LOSS OF CNEW. C, S-IVB BUN EFFECTS AE TME SAME AS FO S-II BUN _ 6-602) VehicIe Eates (8o O2_ -, , ) LVDC/LVDA Computational Failure L( of Abnormal Attitude Error _rol Signals Loss of Attitude Control Alert Failure to Initiate Proper Guldence Sequence Abnormal Actuator N-IVB (Actuator Engine _ardover). [I_-Eo--_%rFlg nition --Failure of S-IVB Engine IIydraulics _, Abnormal S.IC Engine Actuator (Actuator Ilardover) LOGIC SCHF_IE present Implies before there is an output that all inputs must he is _u flclent for an output Implies that any single input

107 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4-5LV SYSTEM5 Loss of Attltude Control Alert TL - F_ D26 VL DIEMB - EM D25r_ 1--_ l-j h_ ILVDC/LVDA Computational Failure D TLC MC26D9 S-_C P Act. (>--+5 ) - Gl-101 thru GI-104 A C Y Act. (>+5 ) - G2-1OI thru G2-I04 T _l_ Ahno_ls-I_Engine A:t ator (Actuator.a_dover) _rs/ Abnormal S-IVB Engine Actuator S-_B AC P Y Act. Act. (>-+5 ) (>+5") - Gi-403 G2-403 r, _Pr--_ r _o Burn T (Actuator ardover) Hydraulic System Pressure (<1700 PSIA) - D S-_VB c_ Bvdraulle eservoir Pressure (Approx. O) - D _ out Of Failure of S-1VB Engine H_draullcs Y Hydraulic Level (Approx. 0 Percent) - L7-403 D m 3 IGM Initiate g E Fall to oll ; Q Fall to Stop Pitch Failure to Initiate Proper Guidance Sequence U Fall tost_oll E... Fall to Chan_o Time Bass '. r x-sx (>A) H _ Vote oll Ladder (>A) E of oll Error (>A) _ 3 Xy-Oy (>B) B Vote I Abnormal Attitude Error P_itchLadder (>B) H B 2 (>._. Pitch Error (>B) H _3 of Sisnal Xz-Gz (>B) H m Vot_ Yaw Ladder (>B) H D ' of Yaw Error (>B) H D 3 -- A " 5 (S-It, S-II Burn_ A - 3.5" (S-IVB Burn) B " 5 (S-lC, S-lI & SmlVB Burn) MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL _2/15/70 SLY SYSTEMS 4-3

108 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS ITE_ 6-_ L.VJ PLATFOM FAILUE - ACCELEOMETE THEE PENDULOUS INTEGATING _YO ACCELE_OMETE8 AE MOUNTED ON THE INNE GIMBAL OF THE ST-E24 AND OIENTED SUCH THAT EACH INPUT AXIS IS ALIGNED WITH THE ESPECTIVE X_ Yt AND Z AXES CTHUSTt COSSANGE AND DOWNANGE AXES AT LIFTOFF) OF THE VEHICLE* EACH ACCELEOMETE IS USED TO CONVET DYNAMIC ACCELEATION ALONG ITS INPUT AXIS TO A PECESSION ABOUT ITS ESPECTIVE OUTPUT AXIS, THIS PECESSION* MONITOED BY AN OPTICAL ENCODEt IS POPOTIONAL TO THE INTEGAL OF ACCELEATION AND POVIDES VELOCITY INFOMATION TO THE LVDA. SIGNAL GENEATO PICKOFFS FO EACH AXIS MEASUES THE PECESSION ANGLE AND POVIDES A NULL SI3NAL TO THE ACCELEOMETE TOQUE MOTOS* FAILUE POINTS FAILUE OF THE FOLLOWING ESULTS IN ZEO O EONEOUS OUTPUT AND CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF PETINENT VELOCITY DATA EQUIING SWITCHING TO ALTENATE CHANNEL O TO FAILUE BACKUP INFOMATION. CONSEQUENCES l* ENCODE FAILUE 2. ACCELEOMETE FAILUE 3. PLATFOM AC POWE SUPPLY FAILUE 4, ACCELEOMETE SEVO LOOP FAILUE 5o GN2 BEAING SUPPLY FAILUE ACCELEONETE FAILUE IN ONE O MOE AXES WILL ESULT IN THE VEHICLE ACHIEVING A DEGADED OBIT* FAILUE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON VEHICLE TAJECTOY DUING S-IC BUN* FAILUE IN ANY AXIS WILL ESULT IN UTLILIZING PESTOED F/M POFILE DATA FO THE FAILED AXIS IN THE GUIDANCE COMPUTATION* AN LVDC NAVIGATION UPDATE MAY BE EQUIED TO POPELY INITIATE TB6 AND FO ACCEPTABLE TLI BUN NAVIGATION* MIBSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO IA FNL 12/).5/70 SLV SySTE'MS A-A

109 NASA - MannedSpacecraft Center MiSSiON ULES SECTION4 - SLYSYSTEMS 61_ LIV" INETIAL PLATFOM ATTITUDE EFEENCE FAILUE THE ATTITUDE OF THE VEHICLE is MEASUED IN THE PLATFOM INETIAL COODIANTE SYSTEM USING DUAL BPEED EBOLVES (FINE AND BACKUP GIMBAL ANGLES) FO EACH OF THE THEE AXES' THE ESOLVES MOUNTED ON THE GIMBAL PIVOT POINTS OUTPUT A PHASE SHIFTED SIGNAL WHICH IS POPOTIONAL TO THE DIFFEENCE IN POSITION BETWEEN THE VEHICLE BODY AND THE SPACE FIXED EFEENCE" FAILUE POINTS FAILUE IN ANY OF THE FDLLOWINO AEAS ESULTS IN A ZEO O EONEOUS GIMBAL ANGLE EAOINbS AND WILL EQUIE BACKUP MODE OF OPEATIONI CONSEQUENCES 1" GYO FAILUE 2, ESOLVE FAILUE 3, POWE SUPPLY FAILUE A. GN2 BEAING SUPPLY FAILUE 5, GIMBAL SEVO LOOP FAILUE FAILUE OF THE ST-E26 INETIAL PLATFOM ATTITUDE EFEENCE SYSTEM IN ONE O MOE AXES WILL CAUSE A FAILUE OF THE GIMBAL ANGLE EASONABLENESS TEST, THE ATTITUDE EO COMMAND8 FO THE FAILED AXIS WILL BE FOZEN AT THE LAST PEFAILUE VALVE BY THE FLIGHT POGAM DUE TO THE FAILUE OF THE GIMBAL ANGLE EASONABLENESS TEST, THE GIMBAL ANGLE EASONABLENESS TEST FAILUE WILL INDICATE A GUIDANCE EFEENCE FAILUE BY SETTING D# AND DB (MODE CODE 26 _IT D8 SET TO t'onetl) AND ENABLE CICUITY FO SPACECAFT GUIDANCE CONTOL OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE, THE CEW SHOULD INITIATE SPACECAFT GUIDANCE CONTOL WHEN ONBOAD DIBPLAYS INDICATE A LAUNCH VEHICLE GUIDANCE EFEENCE FAILUE, A FAILUE DUING LAUNCH PHASE WILL ESULT IN THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS IF SPACECAFT GUIDANCE CONTOL is NOT INITIATED--- S-IC BUN - ATTITUDE ATES WILL INCEASE AND EXCEED THE EDS AUTO ABOT LIMITS IN HIGH-O EGION, S-If BUN AND S-IVB BUN PIO TO LABT _0 SECONDS OF FLIGHT - ATTITUDE EO WILL INCEASE AND THE VEHICLE WILL FAIL TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTOY OBIT, S-IVB _UN DUING LAST 50 SECONDS OF ELIBHT - VEHICLE MAY BE INSETED INTO PAKING OBIT BUT WILL ULTIMATELY ABOT DUE TO TUMBLE, NOMINAL S-IVB CUTOFF WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED FO A FAILUE PIO TO ENTY OF THE HIGH SPEED LOOP FO THE ASCENT TO OBIT AND OUT OF OBIT PHASES OF THE MISSION, OBITAL COAST PHASE - VEHICLE DIFT ATES OF./" 0,2 DEGEE/SECOND IN PITCH AND YAW AND */" 0,5 DEGEE/SECOND IN OLL MAY BE EXPEIENCED_ ASSUMIN_ AN OPEATIONAL S'IVB APS, SECOND S-IVB BUN PIO TO'ENTANCE OF THE HIGH SPEED LOOP - THE EONEOUS GIMBAL ANGLE VALUES MAY CAUSE THE NAVIGATION CALCULATIONS TO DIVEGE FUM THE END CONDITIONSo PEVENTING THE (F/M) C ACCELEATION POFILE FOM BEING ESOLVED, FAILUE TO ESOLVE THE ACCELEATION POFILE WILL ESULT IN THE ABILITY TO ENTE THE HIGH SPEED LOOP AND THE VEHICLE FAILUE TO ACHIEVE POPE TLI, SECOND S-IVB BUN AFTE ENTANCE OF THE HIGH SPEED LOOP - THIS FAILUE HAS NO MAJO EFFECT ON NOMINAL TLI PAAMETES. SPACECAFT GUIDANCE CONTOL SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE CEW ANY TIME THE ATTITUDE EFEENCE FAILUE OCCUS BETWEEN LIFTOFF AND NOMINAL SPACECAFT SEPAATION, IF A OUIDANCE EFEENCE FAILUE AND AN E-IC ENGINE FAILUE OCCU BETWEEN LIFTOFF ANU LIFTUFF PLUS 50 SECONDS_ THE CEW SHOULD ABOT IF THE CEW ABOT LIMITS AE EXCEEDED DUING MAX-_ TO PECLUDE LAUNCH VEHICLE STUCTUAL BEAKUP. STUCTUAL BEAKUP WILL OCCU BECAUSE THE SPACECAFT GUIDANCE SCHEME DOES NOT INCLUDE AN ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY, MISSION EV DATE SECTION BDUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL L2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-5

110 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION A - SLV SYSTEMS 6-E EXCESSIVE ATTITUDE EO IN PITCH O YAW DUING S-If BUN EXCESSIVE ATTITUDE EO IN PITCH O YAW DUING THE S-II BUN CAN CAUSE FIO0 LIMIT LI_NES TO BE COSSED IN S-I! O S-IVB FLIGHTt O POSSIBLE LOSS OF PLATFOM IF FAILUE IS IN THE YA_ PLANE, FAILUE POINTS Z* IU FLIGHT CONTOL COMPUTEt S-II PITCH EO AMPLIFIE O FILTE 2, IU FLIGHT CONTOL COMPUTE_ S-IT YAW ATTITUDE EO AMPLIFIE O FILTE CONSEQUENCES A FEw FAILUES OF THE PITCH O YAW ATTITUDE EO AMPLIFIES O FILTE_ WILL ESULT IJ_ A ZEO SIGNAL TO the PITCH O YAW BEVO AMPL2FIES, THE PITCH Ok YAW ACTUATOS WILL NOT ESPOND TO THE COMMAND. THE ATTITUDE EO WILL BUILO UP UNTIL AN ABOT LIMIT IS EACHED O UNTIL S-IVB STAGING, _FTE STAGING TO S-IVB_ THE ESULTS OF THE FAILUE WILL BE EL1MINAT_U DUE TO THE CHANGE IN FILTE AND THE AgDITION OF A TIPLE EOUNDANT CICUIT, 6-? S-II STAGE LOSS OF THUST THE S-II STAGE ENGINE STAT SEQUENCE USUALLY BEGINS AT TB_ + 1,4 SECONDS AND SHOULD ATTAIN 90 PECENT THUST BY TB3 + 5 SECONDS* THE S-IT DEPLETION CUTOFF CICUITY IS THE PIMAY SIGNAL FO S-II ENGINES CUTOFFe THE CICUITY IS ENABLED AT TB3 + 5 MINUTES 55,0 SECUNDS WITH NOMINAL CUTOFF OCCUING AT TB3 + B MINUTES _#,1 5ECONOS, FAILUE POINTS 1, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2, LOX PEVALVES FAIL CLOSED 3. LH2 PEVALVES FAIL TO OPEN PIO TO ESC A* LOX O LM2 VENT VALVES FAIL OPEN 5, LOSS OF ENGINE EADY O STAT SIGNAL b, LOSS OF MAIN BATTEY POWE 7, LOX O LH2 TANK PESSUE EGULATO EGULATES LOW 8, LOX O LH2 FILL AND DAIN VALVES FAIL TO EMAIN CLOSED 9, PEMATUE ENGINE CUTOFF SIGNAL FOM EOA CONSEQUENCE5 LOSG OF THUST ON A SINGLE ENGINE DOES NOT CAUSE LOSS OF CONTOL, paking OBIT INSETION IS POSSIBLE FU ANY SINGLE ENGINE OUT ANY TIME IN S-IT FLIGHT, _ITH ONE ENGINE OUT AT O LATE THAN TB3 PLUS 2 MIN, i SEC,_ THE SPACE VEHICLE HAS A 50 PECENT POBABILITY OF ACCOMPLISHING TLI. TLI CAPA_ILI[Y IS LOST FO --- CA) LOGS OF THUGT OCCUS ON THE CENTE ENGINE PIO TO TB3 PLUS i MIN, 5& 5EC,t (B) LOSS OF THUST ON AN UPPE ENGINE PIO TO TB3 PLUS 2 MIN 31 SEC,t {C) LOSS OF THUST ON A LOWE ENGINE PIO TO TB3 PLUS 2 MIN 3b SEC. LOSS OF THUST OF S-IT ADJACENT ENGINES INDICATES A DECEASE OF COKTOL AUTHOITY FOM PEVIOUS VEHICLES* THE DECEASE IB CAUSED BY THE C_ BEING CLOSE TO THE ENGINE GIMBAL PLANE, SMALLE _OMENTS THUS ESULT WHEN THE CONTOL ENGINES AE DEFLECTED TO COMPENSATE FO THE MOMENT CAUSED BY LOSS OF THUST* B-IT DUAL ADJACENT ENGINE FAILUES ESULT IN LOSS OF CONTOL FO EALY FAILUES, TLI CAPABILITY FO THESE CASES IS LOST PIO TO TB3 PLUS _ MIN _0 SEC, EALY STAGINU CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED AS EALY AS 3 MIN_ SEC FO THE ThO ENGINE OUT CASE_t IF SAFE EDS LV SEPAATION ATES AE NOT EXCEEDED, NO LOSS OF CONTOL OCCUS FO A SINGLE S-IC ENGINE OUT FOLLOWED BY A SINGLE B-IT ENGINE OUT* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 18 FNL 2115/70 SLV SYSTEMS A-8

111 i NASA - Manned MISSION Spacecraft Center ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYETEMS 6-B S-IT GIMBAL SYSTEM FAILUE (SINGLE ACTUATO HADOVE - INBOAD) THE S-IT HYDAULIC SYSTEM POVIDES ATTITUDE CONTOL BY GIMSALLING ONE O MOE OF THE FOU OUTBOAD ENGINES DUINQ POWEED FLIGHT, THE SYSTEM CONSISTS OF POU INDEPENDENT) CLOSED-LOOP) HYDAULIC CONTOL SUBSYSTEMS) WHICH POVIDE POWE FO GIMBALLINGe ELECTO-HYDAULIC ACTUATOS) MOUNTED IN PEPENDICULA PLAhES, FUNISH GIMBAL FOCES BY EXTENDING O ETACTING SIMULTANEOUSLY O INDIVIDUALLY IN ACCODANCE WITH ELECTXCAL INPUT SIGNALb, THE PIMAY COMPONENTS AE THE MAIN HYDAULIC PUMP) AUXILIAY PUMP) AUXILIAY PUMP ELECTIC MOTO) ACCUMULATO ESEVOI MANIFOLD ASSEMBLY) AND TWO SEVUACTUATOMS, FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES I, FAILUE OF SEVOACTUATO 2. FAILUE OF ELECTICAL CABLE ASSEMBLY 3. EONEOUS INPUT SIGNAL IF A HADOVE INBOAD ACTUATO FAILUE OCCUS) THE FIST EXPECTED STAGE DAMAGE WOULD BE BUN-THOUGH OF THE FLEXIBLE CUTAIN POTION OF THE BASE HEAT SHIELD, PIO TO S-IT INBOAD ENGINE CUTOFF) S-I! STA_E DAMAGE WOULD OCCU WITHIN 15 TO 20 SECONDS AFTE ACTUATO FAILUE, AFTE S-If INBOAD ENGINE CUTOFF, S-IT STAGE DAMAGE WOULD OCCU WITHIN 25 TO 30 SECONDS AFTE ACTUATO FAILUEo POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES AE FAILUE OF AN ENGINE ELECTICAL CONTOL PACKAGE WITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THUST AND OTHE UNDETEMINABLE EFFECTS, COLLAPSE OF THE THUST STUCTUE DUE TO INDUCED THEMAL STESSES AND LOSS OF ENGINE THUST, AND/O LOSS OF S-II/SIVB SEPAATION COMMAND CAPABILITY DUE TO WIING HANESS DAMAGE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION" GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/i5/7{] SLV SYSTEMS 4-7

112 y NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4-5LV SYSTEMS 6-9 S-II SECOND PLANE SEPAATION FAILS TO OCCU THE S-If AFT INTESTAGE NOMALLY SEPAATES AT TB3 + 30o7 SECONDS, FAILUE POINTS i. FAILUE OF ELECTICAL CABLE ASSEMBLY 200W_ 2o FAILUE OF ELECTICAL CABLE ASSEMBLY 206A7W4 3, FAILUE OF ELECTICAL CABLE ASSEMBLY 2ObWZ4 4= LSC SEPAATION ASSEMBLY FAILUE 51 INADEQUATE OUTPUT OF S-IC/S-II SECOND PLANE SEPAATION TIGGE 6, INADEQUATE OUTPUT OF S-IC/S-II ODNANCE AM 7. SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE CONSEQUENCES SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO EXCESSIVE TEMPEATUES* FAILUE TO JETTISON THE S-IC/S-II INTESTAGE WILL LEAD TO EXCEEDING THE THEMAL ENVIONMENT LIMITS IN THE S-II BOATTAIL AEA WITH COSS BEAM AND/O OTHE STUCTUAL FAILUE DUE TU HEAT FLOW AOUND THUST CUTAIN POM IMPINGEMENT ON INTESTAGEe EXCESSIVE TEMPEATUES AE EXPECTED APPOXIMATELY e6 SECONP5 AFTE S-IC OBECO (APPOXIMATELY 35.3 SECONDS AFTE NOMAL INTESTAGE JETTISON)o MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/13/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-8

113 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 6-10 S-IVB LOSS OF ENGINE HYDAULIC FLUID THE INDEPENDENTt CLOSED-LOOP S-IVB HYDAULIC SYSTEM GIMBALS THE J-2 ENGINE DUING BOOSTt COASTt AND ENGINE BUN OPEATIONS. A MAIN HYDAULIC PUMP. AN AUXILIAY MOTO-DIVEN HYDAULIC PUMP_ AN ACCUMULATO-ESEVOIo TWO SEVUACTUATOMSp AND INTECONNECTING TU_E AND HOSE ASSEMBLIES COMPISE THE S-IVB HYDAULIC SYSTEM. EACH OF TWO IDENTICAL $EVOACTUATO ASSEMBLIES POVIDES MECHANICAL FOCE TO GIMBAL THE J-2 ENGINE. THE SEVO VALVE WITHIN EACH ACTUATO DIVETS FLUID TO ONE SIDE O THE OTHE OF THE ACTUATO PISTONS IN ACCODANCE WITH SIGNAL_ ECEIVED BY THE SEVO VALVE TOQUE MOTO FOM THE FLIGHT CONTOL COMPUTE IN THE IU. FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES 1, PITCH O YAW ACTUATO MALFUNCTION 2. MAIN HYDAULIC PUMP FAILUE 9. HYDAULIC HOSE O TUBING FAILUE 4. AUXILIAY MOTO-DIVEN HYDAULIC PUMP FAILUE IGNITION OF THE S-IVB STAOE WITHOUT AN OPEATIVE HYDAULIC SYSTEM WILL JEOPADIZE CEW SAFETY, THEE WILL BE A LOSS OF ENGINE _IMBAL CONTOL DUING MAINSTAGE OPEATIONt WHICH POBABLY WILL ESULT IN EXCESSIVE VEHICLE ATTITUDE ATES A_D GUIDANCE EO, IN THE CASE WHEE THE AUXILIAY HYDAULIC PUMP ALONE FAILS IDETECTED BY A LOSS OF SYSTEM PESSUE AND A ISE IN ESEVOI LEVEL TO A VALUE GEATE THAN 50 PECENT1. IT IS FELT THAT THIS WOULD NOT SEIOUSLY AFFECT SYSTEM OPEATION. THE MAIN ENGINE-DIVEN PUMP WILL DEVELOP SOON ENOUGH DUING MAINSTAGE IGNITIUN TO MAINTAIN HYDAULIC PESSUE EQUIED FO FLIGHT CONTOL DUING S-IVB BUN. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/1_170 SLV SYSTEMS

114 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 6-El S-IVB STAGS LOSS OF THUST THE S-IVB SHOULD ATTAIN 90 PECENT THUST BY TB4. 6,5 SECONDS, APPOXIMATELY 148,4 SECONDS OF S-IVB BUN IS EQUIED TO EACH A 75 NAUTICAL MILE PEIGEE with NOMINAL S-IC AND S-If PEFOMANCE, S-IVB ENGINE CUTOFF IS SCHEDULED TO OCCU AT TB4 + 2 MINUTES 27*7 SECONDS POM A VELOCITY CUTOFF FO A FIST BUN DUATION OF 146,7 SECONDS, FO SECOND BUN, THE S-IVB SHOULD ATTAIN 90 PECENT BY TB6 + 9 MINUTES 40,4 SECONDS, LENGTH OF THE S-IVB second BUN IS 36_.2 SECONDS, FAILUE POINTS io FUEL TANK PESSUIZATION CONTOL MODULE LEAKS EXTENALLY 2, LH2 TANK VENT AND ELIEF VALVE LEAKS O FAILS TO EMAIN CLOSED B= PEVALVE FAILS CLOSED 4, CONTINUOUS VENT CONTOL MODULE FAILUE 5, AMBIENT CONTOL HELIUM FILL MODULE FAILUE 6, INADEQUATE THEMAL CONDITIONING 7, MAIN OXIDIZE O FUEL VALVE FAILS CLOSED 8, OXIDIZE TUBINE BYPASS VALVE FAILUE 9, ASI O ASI VALVE FAILUE 10, STAT TANK DISCHAGE VALVE FAILUE 11o MAINSTAGE CONTOL MODULE FAILUE 12= pematue THUST-NOT-OK SIGNAL CONSEQUENCES J-2 ENGINE FAILUES WHICH CAUSE THE S--IVB TO FAIL TO ATTAIN THUST WILL PODUCE THE SAME EFFECT AS TOTAL LOSS OF THUST BUT WILL CAUSE NO STUCTUAL BEAKUP DUE TO THE LACK OF AEODYNAMIC FOCES, SUBSEQUENT ATTITUDE CONTOL CAN BE MAINTAINED BY THE APS, A petubed OBIT CAN BE ACHIEVED FO LOSS OF THUST DUING THE LAST 2 SECONDS OF S'IVB FIST BUN, OBITAL INSETION MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH SPS BUN FOLLOWING GET OF 8 MINUTES 37 SECONDSQ FO SECOND BUN, IF THE S-IVB STAGE FAILS TO ATTAIN THUSTo THEE WILL BE NO ESTAT AND LOSS OF A MISSION OBJECTIVE* 1F THE 8-IVB LOSES THUST AFTE MAINSTAGE OKt TLI OBJECTIVES WILL BE LOSTo i MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE I APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV systems 4-10

115 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ - 5LV SYSTEMS ITEF VB COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVEIS) FAIL OPEN THE _OX TANK IS PEPESSU'IZED PIO TO LIFTOFF TO SB TO AZ PsiA BY A COLD _relium FLOW FOM GSE. HELIUM FLOW IS CONTOLLED BY THE NOMALLY CLOSED COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES, TH_ FLIGHT CONTOL PESSUE SWITCH (SENSING TANK ULLAGE PESSUE) CONTOLS PNEPESSUIZATION BY OPENING AND CLOSING THE COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES. THE COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES CAN BE CLOSED BY FOU SIGNALS---SWITCH SELECTO COMMAND-LOX TANK FLIGHT CONTOL PESSUE SWlTCHt ACTIVATION OF LOX TANK EGULATO BACKUP PESSUE 5wlTCHt AND ESE COMMANDo THESE SIGNALS APPLY POWE TO A SET OF MOMENTAY CONTACTS THAT OPEN AND EMOVE POWE FOM THE SOLENOID OPEATED SHUTOFF VALVES AND ALLOW THEM TO CLOSE, THE ABSENCE OF ALL OF THE SIGNALS WILL ALLOW THE MOMENTAY CONTACTS TO ETUN TO THEI NOMALLY CLOSED POSITIONt APPLYING POWE TO OPEN THE SHUTOFF VALVES. DUING BOOST THE LOX TANK PNBSSUIZATION SHUTOFF VALVES CLOSEU CO_MANU I_ SENT b SECONDS AFTE LIFTOFF TO OISABLE SWITCH CONTOL OVE THE SHUTOFF VALVES, THE COFIMAND WILL BE EMOVED PIO TO ESC TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FO ANY WE_uIEO BOOST MAKEUP PESSUIZATION WITHOUT DANGE OF VENT FEEZING. FAILUE POINTS i, COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES FAIL OPEN 2. MOMENTAY CONTACT FAILS IN THE NOMALLY CLOSE POSITION CONSEOUENCES IF THE SHUTOFF VALVES FAlL OPEN DUING BOOSTt THE LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE WILL ISE TO THE VENT ELIEF SETTING AND THE HELIUM FLOW WILL BE VENTED OVEBOADI THIS MAY ESULT IN INSUFFICIENT HELIUM EMAINING FO ADEQUATE PESSUIZATION OF THE LOX TANK DUING BUNS* IN ADDITIUNt THEE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT AFTE A TANSIENT P=IOD OF PESSUIZATION SYSTEM CHILLDOWNt THE COLD HELIUM FLOW COULD FEEZE OXYGEN IN THE VENT SYSTEM AND CAUSE A BLOCKAGE OF THE PILOT POPPETS IN THE LOX TANK VENT AND ELIEF VALVES, THE LOX TANK ULLAGE PEBSUE COULD THEN ISE PAST THE ELIEF SETTING TO A POTENTIALLY HAZADOUS LEVEL, 7-i PIO Tu ESTAT, INSUFFICIENT POPELLANT EMAINS FO ACHIEVEMENT OF ACCEPTABLE ALTENATE MISSIONS S-IVB ENGINE FIST BUN VELOCITY CUTOFF IS SCHEDULED TO OCCU AT TB4 + 2 MINUTES 27,7 SECONDS _IVING A FIST BUN DUATION OF 14E.7 SECONDSI S-IVB ENGINE SECOND BUN WILL INJECT THE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECAFT INTO AN ACCEPTABLE LUNA TAJECTOY BY A GUIDANCE VELOCITY CUTOFF, THE ESIDUAL POPELLENT EMAINING AT TLI cutoff O THE 105tOOO NM APOGEE 15 DEFINED BY EALTIME ANAYSIS CONSIDEING THE FIST S-IV_ BUN CHAACTEISTICS (THUSTtFLOW ATEr BUNTIMEt ETC,), SUFFICIANT POPELLENT IS DEFINED SUCH THAT THE POPELLENT EVALUATION IN EAL TIME WILL INDICATE A ONE PECENT ) POBABILITY OF ACHEIVING A NM APOGEE AT CUTOFF. THIS POBABILITY IS BASED ON PEFOMANCE CAPABILITY ONLY, AND IF THEE AE HADWAE FAILUE_ DUING THE MISSION_ CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE FAILUE ON PEFOMANCE FAILUE POINTS ANY FAILUE WHICH ESULTS IN EDUCED POPELLENTS FO SIVB SECOND BUN CONSEQUENCES if ADUITIONAL POPELLANT IS USED DUING AN EXTENDED 5-1VB FIST BUN O IS LOST DUING EATH OBITAL COAST BECAUSE OF A MALFUNCTION PIO TO SECOND BUN_t IT IB POSSIBLE THEE WILL N_T BE ENOUGH POPELLANT TO PEFOM A GUIDANCE VELOCITY CUTOFF AT TLI, IF SUFFICIENT POPELLANT DOES NOT EMAIN, THE STAGE WILL BE CUT OFF BY A DEPLETION CUTOFF CAUSING THE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECAFT TO BE INJECTED INTO AN EXTEMELY OFF-NOMINAL LUNA TAJECTOY* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1# FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS

116 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTIONA - SLVSYSTEMS ' 7-2 LOSS OF ONE AP$ MODULE DUING TBSt TB8 PIO TO ESTATt O TB7 THE APS POVIDES ATTITUDE CONTOL OF THE $-IVB IN THE OLL AXIS DUING J-2 ENGINE BUN AND IN ALL THEE AXES DUING COAST FLIGHT, THE APS ENGINES AE LOCATED IN TWO MODULES l_o DEGEES APAT ON THE AFT SKIT OF THE S'IVB* EACH NODULE CONTAINS FOU ENGINES--- THEE 15U POUND THUST ENGINES AND ONE 7O POUND THUST ENGINE--AND CUNTAINS ITS uwn OXIOIZEt FUEL_ AND PESSUIZATION SYSTEM THAT UTILIZES NITOGEN TETQXIDE AS T_E OXIDIZE AND MUNONE]HYL HYDAZINE AS THE FUEL, THE 1SO-POUND THUST ENGINES UTILIZE EIGHT CONTOL VALVES (FOU FU FUELp FOU FO OXIDIZE) 1N A FAIL-SAFE_ SEIES-PAALLEL AAN_tMENT, THE ENGINE FIING COMMANDS_ WHICH CONE FOM THE IUP ACTUATE THE _UAD-EDUNDANT ENGINE VALVESt ALLOWING THE POPELLANT TO FLOW INTO THE THUST CHAMBE, NO IGNITION SYSTEM IS EQUIED= SINCE THE FUEL AND OX DIZE AE HYPEGOLIC, AN ABLATIVE MATEIAL IN THE THOAT OF THE NOZZLE ABSOBS HEAT AND SLOWLY BUNS AWAY DUING MOTO OPEATIONw THEEBY COOLING THE MOTOk, FAILUE POZNT5 l, POPELLANT SYSTEM LEAK 2a HIGH AND LOW HELIUM SYSTEM LEAK 3, EXCESSIVE USAGE OF POPELLANT O HELIUM DUE TO COMMANDS CONSEQUENCES LOSS OF ONE AP5 MODULE DUING S-IVB COAST PEIODS WILL ESULT LN THE LOSS OF A[TITUD_ CONTOL OF THE VEHICLE UNLESS ACTION IS TAKEN TO EMOVE PITCH ANO YAW CONTOL FOM THE APS MODULES, BY GOUND COMMANDING lis-ivb BUN MODE A AND B ONIIP APS PITCH AND YAW CONTOL COMMANDS WILL BE SE_T TO THE S-IVB J-Z ENGINE GIMBAL SYSTEM, BY COMMANDING _FCC POWE UFF A AND B, t POWE TO THE IU FLIGHT COMPUTOE IS TUNED OFFI WHICH ASSUHES EMOVAL OF A_L CONTOL SIGNALS TO THE APS MODULES, DUING COAST PEIODSt THE CEW WO_LD CONTOL THE VEHICLE IN PITCH AND YAW WITH THE CSM CSo DUING S-IVB SECOND BUN_ THE $-IVB _iimbal SYSTEM CA_ MAINTAIN PITCH AND YAW CONTOL, ONE OPEATIVE AP ODULE CAN MAINTAIN ULL CONTOL DUING S-IVB BUN, LOSS OF EITHE APS MODULE PIO TO O DUING POPELLANT DuMP NAY ESULT IN LO_S OF ATTITUDE CONTOL AND FAILUE TO MAINTAIN POPE LUNA IMPACT ATTITUDE MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL 2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-1Z

117 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 7-3 J-2 ENGINE MAIN FUEL VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE THE MAIN FUEL VALVE IS A BUTTEFLY-TYPE VALVE, SPING LOADED TO THE CLOSED PO$1TIONP PNEUMATICALLY OPEATED TO THE OPEN POSITION, AND PNEUMATICALLY ASSISTED TO THE CLOSED POSITION, THE PUPOSE OF THIS VALVE IS TO CONTOL THE FLOW OF FUEL TO THE THUST CHAMBE, THE MFV IS CLOSEU DUING THE ENGINE CUTOFF SEQUENCE BY DEENEUIZING THE IGNITION PHASE CONTOL VALVE WHICH OUTES HELIUM CONTOL SYSTEM PESSUE THOUGH THE NOMALLY OPEN POT TO THE CLOSING ACTUATO OF THE MFV, OPENING CONTOL PESSUE FoM THE MFV IS VENTEO THOUGH THE NOMALLY CLOSED POT OF THE IGNITION PHASE CONTOL VALVE, THE VALVE IS SPING LOADED TU THE CLOSED POSITION AND STATS TO CLOSE AS SOON AS OPENIMo PESSUE 15 VENTED, FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES 1, LOSS OF ENGINE CONTOL PNEUMATICS 2, MAIN FUEL VALVE FAILS OPEN 3, MAIN IGNITION PHASE SOLENOID AND MAIN HELIUM CONTOL SOLENOID FAIL OPEN IF THE MAIN LH2 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE AT FIST BUN CUTOFF AND CANNOT BE COMMANDED CLOSEDo LH2 WILL BE DUMPED OVEBOAD AND WILL ESULT IN POPULSIVE VENTING DUING OBITAL COAST, LOSS OF FUEL COULD JEOPADIZE THE MISSION BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE POPELLANT EMAINING FO A NOMINAL TLI CUTOFF, THE COMMAND ACTION AFTE FIST BUN SHOULD BE TO CLOSE THE N, O, (NOMALLY OPEN) FUEL PEVALVE AND ECICULATION SHUTOFF VALVES TU CONTAIN THE FUEL, THE LH2 FEED HADWAE AND ENGINE CHILLDOWN WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE ONBOAD SEQUENCED 18,6-SECOND FUEL LEAD WHICH STATS WHEN THE PEVALVES AE OPENED, NO LOX HADWAE CHILLOOWN WILL Bh ACCOMPLISHED AND IS CONSIDEED SATISFACTOY FO A SAFE ENGINE STAT. AN LH2 LEAD EXCEEDING 1B,6 SECONDS IS CONSIDEED AS UNDESIABLE BECAUSE THE ENGINE WILL BE OVECHILLED AND WILL EXPEIENCE A HAD STAT AND POBABLY EXPEIENCE COMBUSTION INSTABILITY, THE LOX AND LH2 PEVALVES AND ECICULATION SHUTOFF VALVES AE CLOSED AT TLI CUTOFF BY AN ONBOAD SEQUENCE, FO A MAIN LH2 VALVE FAILUE TO CLOSE, THEE WILL BE A SIMULATANEUUS LH2 AND LOX DUMP AT THE TIME OF LOX DUMP INITIATION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS

118 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLY SYSTEM (: TEM 7-4 J-2 ENGINE MAIN OX1DIZE VALVE FALLS TO CLOSE THE MAIN LOX VLAVE IS A BUTTEFLY-TYPE VALVE, SPING LOADED TO THE CLOSED POSIT UN_ PNEUMATICALLY OPEATED TO THE OPEN POSITION_ ANO PNEUMATICALLY ASSISTED TO THE CLOSED position, THE PUPOSE OF THIS VALVE IS TO CONTOL THE FLOW OF OXIDIZE TO THE THUST CHAMBEo THE NOV IS CLOSED DUING THE ENGINE CUTOFF SEQUENCE BY O_ENE_IZING THE MAINSTAOE CONTOL VALVE WHICH OUTES HELIUM CONTOL SYSTEM PHEESUE THOUGH THE NOMALLY OYEN Pur TO THE CLOSING ACTUATO OF THE NOV, OPENING CONTOL PESSUE FOM THE NOV IS VENTED THOUGH THE NOMALLY CLOSEO POT OF THE MAINSTAGE CONTOL valve. THE VALVE IS SPING LOADED TO THE CLOSED POSITION AND STATS TO CLOSE A3 SOON AS OPE_ING PESSUE _5 VENTEO, :ALLUE points CONSEQUENCES l, LOSS OF ENGINE CONTOL PNEUMATICS 2, MAIN LOX VALVE FALLS OPEN 3, MAINSTAGE CONTOL SOLENOID AND THE HELIUM CONTOL SOLENOID FALLS UPEN IF THE MAIN LOX VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE AFTE A BUN PEIODF THEE WILL BE sevee ENGINE DAMAGE BECAUSE OF A HIGH MIXTUE ATIO AT CUTOFF, THEE WILL BE A LOSS OF LOX OVEBOAD, DUING OBITAL COASTt LOX WILL BE DUMPED THOUGH THE J-2 ENGINE AND WILL ESULT IN POPULSIVE VENTING IF THE PEVALVE AND ECICULATION VALVE AE NOT CLOSED, A SECOND BUN SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED WITH THIS FAILUE BECAUSE ENUINE DAMAGE ESULTING FOM THE FIST BUN LOX-ICH CUTOFF CANNOT BE ASSESSED IN EAL TIME, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4--i4

119 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS -- I... I 7=5 FAILUE TO SAFE THE ANGE SAFETY ECEIVES AFTE INSETION THE ANGE SAFETY SYSTEM IS THE SYSTEM WHICH PEMITS THE ANGE SAFETY OFFICE TO DESTOY THE VEHICLE IF IT BECOMES A SAFETY HAZAD DUING POWEED FLIGHT, THE SYSTEM IS SAFED upon OBIT INSETION BY GOUND COMMAND FOM THE ANGE SAFETY OFFICE (SO), THE SAFE COMMAND DISAMS THE SYSTEM BY EMOVING POWE FOM THE DECODE AND EBW FIING UNIT, FAILUE POINTS 1, CONTOLLE ASSEMBLY FAILUE 2, DECODE FAILUE 3, ELAY FAILUE CONSEQUENCE5 FAILU_ TO SAFE THE ANGE SAFETY ECEIVES AFTE INSETION WITH THE POPELLANT DlSPESZON SYSTEM NOT AMED DOES NOT POSE A POBLEM, IT IS DESIABLE TO HAVE THE ANGE SAFETY ECEIVES DISABLED, INADVETENT AMING OF THE POPELLANT DISPESION _YSTEM (EBW FIINe UNITS) I$ A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION, SHOULD THIS CONDITION EXIST, IMMEDIATE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO SEPAATE THE SPACECAFT TO A SAFE OISTANCE* IF THE POPELLANT DISPESION SYSTEM IS INADVETENTLY AMED, ATTEMPTS TO SAFE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL THE SPACECAFT IS AT A SAFE DISTANCE, MISSION EV DATE SEOTION GOUP PA_E APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/7C SLV SYSTEMS _-15

120 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS T-6 S-IVB COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE AT S-IVB ENGINE SHUTDOWN (TB5 AND TBT)P THE COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES AE CLOSED TO TEMINATE pessuization HELIUM FLOW TO THE LOX TANK BY THE SWITCH SELECTO COMMANDS _tlox TANK FLIGHT PESSUE SYSTEM OFF II AND IILOX TANK PESSUIZATION SHUTOFF VALVES CLOSE ON II AND STAY CLOSED UNTIL ENGINE ESTAT PEPAATIONS (TBO} PLUS 9 MINUTES 3B.4 SECONDS* THIS POVIDES SUFFICIENT NPSH FO SAFE ENGINE ESTAT AND IS USED TO PESSUIZE THE LOX TANK DUING MAINSTAGE OPEATION* FAILUE POINTS Z, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2, MAGLATCH ELAY FAILS TO SET 3, DIODE FAILS OPEN 4, ELAY FAILS TO ACTUATE 5, COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES FAIL OPEN CONSEQUENCES FAILUE OF THE COLD HELIUM VALVES TO CLOSE COULD ESULT IN UNCONTOLLED COLD HELIUM FLOW INTO THE LO TANK. FAILUE TO DISABLE THE LOX TANK PESSUIZATION system O OF A LOX VENT TU OPEN COULD LEAD TO AN EXCESSIVE DELTA P LOAD ON THE _-IVB COMMON BULKHEAD, FAILUE TO CLOSE THE SHUTOFF VALVES WILL ESULT IN THE TOTAL DEPLETION OF COLD HELIUM AND LOSS OF SECOND BUN TLI CAPABILITY BECAUSE THE LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED AT A LEVEL 3UFFICIENT TO POVIDE THE EQUIED J-2 ENGINE LOX NPSH DUING SECOND BUN, THE PATIAL LOSS OF COLD HELIUM COULD MEAN INSUFFICIENT GAS AVAILABLE FO LOX AND/O LH2 TANK BUNE NEPESSUMIZATIUN PIO TO S-IVB ESTAT AND THE USE OF THE AMBIENT EP_SSUIZATION SYSTEM WOULD BE EQUIED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12115/70 SLV SYSTEMS

121 w NASA -Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 7-7 S-IVB AUXILIAY HYDAULIC PUMP FAILS THE ELECTICALLY DIVENt VAIABLE DELIVEYI FIXED ANGLE, CONSTANT DISPLACEMENT PUMP SUPPLIES OPEATING PESSUE HYDAULIC FLUID FO PEFLIGHT ENGINE GIMBALLING CHECKOUTSP NULL POSITIONING DUING BOOST PHASED AND FLUID CICULATION TO MAINTAIN DESIED TEMPEATUE DUING BOOST AND COAST PHASE, FAILUE POINTS A, FAILUE TO TUN ON i, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2, FAILUE OF MAGLATCH ELAY TO SET 3, LOSS OF SEQUENCE POWE 4, FAILUE OF ELAY TO ACTUATE 5, AFT BATTEY NO, 2 DEPLETED b, FAILUE OF HPU MOTO-DIVEN SWITCH TO TUN ON 7, FAILED PUMP O MOTO 8. FOZEN PUMP SUCTION LINES B, FAILUiYE TO TUN OFF CONSEQUENCES I, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2, MAGLATCM ELAY FAILS TO ESET 3. FAILUE OF GOUND CONTOL ELAY TO EMAIN DEACTUATED 4. FAILUE OF ELAY TO DEACTUATE 5. LOSS OF AFT BUS NO, i 6. FAILUE OF HPU MOTO-DIVEN SWITCH TO TUN OFF A, FAILUE TO TUN OFF FAILUE TO TUN OFF THE HYDAULIC PUMP WILL DEPLETE AFT NO, 2 BATTEY IN APPOXIMATELY 90 MINUTES AND OVEHEAT THE SYSTEM IN 70 NINUIES_ WHICH MEANS A PATIAL LOSS OF HYDAULIC FLUID, AN INCEASE IN HYDAULIC TEMPEATUE CAUSES AN INCEASE IN FLUID VOLUMED AND IF THE PUMP IS SUCCESSFULLY TUNED OFF_ ANY FLUID VOLUME GEATE THAN THE ESEVOI CAPACITY WILL BB VENTE D OVEBOAD, B, FAILUE TO TUN ON FAILUE OF THE HYDAULIC PUMP TO TUN ON DUING THE THEMAL CYCLE PIO TO ESTAT COULD LEAD TO FEEZING OF THE HYDAULIC OIL AND FAILUE OF THE MAIN HYDAULIC PUMP AT ESTAT, FO A LOSS PIO TO ENGINE EGTAT THEE WILL BE _o SYSTEM PESSUE TO FILL THE ACCUMULATO AND CENTE THE ENGINE. THIS COULD D_LAY TIME FO EFFECTIVE _UIDANCE CONTOL DUING ESTATt HOWEVE, ATTITUDE C_NTUL WOULD NOT SEI(IUSLY BE AFFECTED DUING THE STATIN_ TANSIENT SINCE FULL HYDAULIC SYSTEM PESSUE WOULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE MAIN (LNGINE-DIVEN) PUMP UY THE TIME THE ENGINE IS UP TO 90 PECENT THUST, FO THE CASE _UING T_Tt THE PUMP OFF COMMAND SHOULD BE SENT {ABAP) TO PECLUDE T_E POS_IL_ILITY L)F PU_P STAT WHILE THE CHILLDOWN PUMPS AE OPEATINGt BECAUSE THE INUSH SUGE CUENT MIGHT POSSIBLY DAMAGE THE INVETE CUCUIT, FO LOSS OF THE PUFP PIO TO PASSIVATIONP THEE WILL BE NO SYSTEM PESSUE fc CENTE THE ENGINE, THIS WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF THUST VECTO CONTOL, WHEN FLLIID IS NOT CICULATED9 C AND C5_-4O_ WILL EVET TO A LOCALIZED TEMPEATUE_ WITh GS0-4O_ AT A HIGHE TEMPEATUE DUE TO ITS LOCATION NEA THE LOX TUBINE, UUING CICULATION THE SYSTEM TEMPEATUES WILL CONVEGED _ISSION EV DATE _EOTION GOUP PAGE AkOLLO L4 PNL 2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS A-iT

122 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MiSSiON ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 7-7 CONT Co AUXILIAY HYDAULIC PUMP IS--- ON WHEN OFF WHEN DAI-AO3 GEATE THAN 17DO PSIA D LESS THAN itoo P_IA L7-&O} LE_S THAN 50 PECENT L7-401_ GEATE THAN 50 PEP{CENT M GEATE THAN 20 AMP$ M22"AU4 APPOXIMATELY ZEO AMP5 D GEATE THAN _._7 PSIA D_-2-_*03 LESS THAN B9 psia MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAbE APOLLO Z4 ;FNL E/ZS/70 SLY SYSTEMS 4-18

123 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center _I_T_E3 MISSION ULES SECTION 4-5LV SYSTEMS 7-8 LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL (4-(_![_._S:.602, 6-602_ > Vehicle ates and (8-602r , ) > Vehicle ate_ ands] i Loss of Attitud@ Control Durln 8 Orbit I Loss of Attitude Control Aler_ ATTITUDE CONTOL OF THE ENTIE SATUN VEHICLE IS CONTOLLED THOUGH TBE INSTUMENT UNIT. THIS CONIOL IS NECESSAY TO KEEP THE VEHICLE IN THE COECT LAUNCH TAJECTOY FO POPE OBIT INSETION AMP FO MAINTAINING THE COECT VLHICLE ATTITUDE WHILE IN OBIT* FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES l, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2. LVDC FAILUE 3. sr-i24 PLATFOM FAILUE 4, APE FAILUE LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL DUING OBIT WILL EVENTUALLY ESULT IN EXCESSIVE ATES IN THE AFFECTED AXIS AJ_O AN INABILITY TO PEFOM EQUIED MANEUVES. THE LV/CSM ATTITUDE WILL BE UNC_NTKOLLABLE AND WILL DIVEGe, F_ISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE AFOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-_9

124 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 7-g CONT TLC - EMD26 _ V MEMB - EMD25 I LVDC/LVDAComputatfonaI Fa_]ur D ID TLCMC26D9 S-IVB Burn Mode On (KZ0_-602_Q!I._--_ Pitch APS Firing Inactive 2 (K ,K135_404) _ of -- Sw Sel Functions"FCC S-IVB Burn 3 Failureto Mode Off A&B" not issued _ Failureto Change Failureto Inlt_ateProperGuidanceSequene Time Base Vote ec on f_f_ or_ Sw Sel Sequencingin New Time Base not issued _ Time in PreviousTime Base ' 2 ' Continuesto Count 4, of --J Time Base Mode Code Bit "I_, ema_ns Zero* * MC25D2 Zero Indicates Not in TB5 MC25DI Zero Indicates Not in TB6 Loss of Attitude Control Alert During Orbit Xx-Ox (>A)B _ Vote oll Ladder (>A)H > 2 of ol] Error (>A) I _-:')_!-_'_)_Ij#0-603 "_ Vote _ Abnom_al Attitude Error Signal Pitch Ladder (>B) g _ 2 --_, of Pitch Error (>B) B _ 3 A _ 3.5o (TB5,TB6 to TB sec, xz-oz (>B)H _ Vote TB7 + O to TB sec) A = 4.5 (AfterTB see) Yaw Ladder (>B) B _i z_2 i_ = 2.5 (TBS,TB7 + 0 to TB sec) Iot. B " 3.5 (TB6 to TB sec) Yaw Error (>B) IB ffi4.5o (AfterTB sec) k MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAUE APOLLO l_ FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-20

125 ll _ 11 _ '_ [ :'_ ;:" : _::: _:: :::: ::_:_ ll ; ' ;_I l: _[ _ NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIOM ULES SECTION 4-5LV SYSTEMS T-9 CONTINUOUS VENT SYSTEM EGULATO FAILS TO OPEN THE CONTINUOUS VENT SYSTEM POVIDES FO LH2 TANK VENTING DUING COAST TO ASSIST IN POPELLANT SETTLING AND THEMAL CONDITIONING BY PEVENTING THE SULK TEMPEATUE FOM INCEASING. THIS HELPS TO ENSUE POPE CONDITIONS FO ENGINE ESTAT. FAILUE POINTS l. SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2. SEQUENCE FAILS TO INITIATE LM2 CONTINUOUS VENT SHUTOFF VALVE OPEN 3+ lo AMP" MAGLATCH ELAY FAILS A, ACTUATION CONTOL MODULE (LH2 CONTINUOUS VENT SHUTOFF VALVE) FAILS TO OPEN CONSEQUENCES IF THE EGULATO (CONTINUOUS VENT ELIEF valve) FAILS TO OPEN AND THE OIFICE ICONTINUOUS VENT OIFICE SHUTOFF VALVE) DOES OPENt POPELLANT CONTOL WILL BE MAINTAINED BUT THE LIQUID SATUATION TEMPEATUE WILL ISE ABOVE ENGINE ESTAT LIMITS, THE HIGH BULK TEMPEHATUE WILL CAUSE INADEQUATE NPSM AND THE J-2 ENGINE NPSH EQUIEMENT WILL NOT BE MET THOUGHOUT SECOND BUN, A DEGADED OFF-NOMINAL BUN WILL ESULT IN A POBABLE CUTOFF THAT IS CEW SAFE= :_ii!!!!!_i_iii_iii_+_: +_i _+_+_Liiiiiiiii_++ ii!!+_!!iii!iiiiii_!!!!!!_!!!!!!!!!! 22 ++i :::::!!!!HIEII_IIIIFFiI_[_';;H'il :: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :;.;: :;; u, :... i:;!: : ; ; : _-, :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 20! i_; + 7 _!IIIIHII!!!!!!!!!!!;!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ' ;I-_.1 :..._+u+h+_ Note-Blowdowrl Lothepressure : _L:_ :++_' ' +. ' md_catedbythe curve = ---._::4;z + = :;_ ;_-H.+_+FH -ua-a"t^estan_"-ressure I_:_E= =- : : between 15 and 23 psia LL_ "14 + :. _1 =:++::: +:_;' - _; q _...,t2 'I'".+.,.+_.,,+; I[;IIHIIUI;:I:::tN:::;::+;J;I:I;';lll;I::U:::::::::::;:IlLI;II+ltlllll;... i_' i 101:30:00 101:00:00 100:30;00 TB6 Timefromendof blowdownto TB6(hr:min:sec) Maximum allowable LH 2 tar_k ullage pressure following blowdown. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS _-2_ I

126 q NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS I 7-10 FAILUE TO TEMINATE APS ULLAGE ENGINEIS) THUST THE ULLAGE ENGINES AE USED TO POVIDE A POSITIVE G FOCE TO THE STAGE PIO AT SECOND BUNP AND TO POVIDE POPELLANT SETTLING DUING TANK VENTINGe FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES i. SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2. SEQUENCE FAILUE Ai ULLAGE ENGINE NO. 1 POPELLANT VALVE(S) FAIL OPEN B, ULLAGE ENGINE NO, 2 POPELLANT VALVE{S) FAIL OPEN 3, MAGLATCH E_AY FAILS TO ESET FAILUE TO TEMINATE THE APS ULLAGE ENGINE{S} THUST WILL ESULT IN DEPLETION OF AP$ POPELLANTS IN A MATTE OF MINUTES, THE DEPLETION OF APS POPELLANTS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL. AP5 POPELLANT IS DEPLETED GOONE FON THE SINGLE APS ULLAGE ENGINE I_ON_ DUE TO THE EQUIEMENT TO BUN THE PITCH ENGINE IN THE SAME MODULE TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTOL, MISSION EV' DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-22

127 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION _ - 5LV SYSTEMS ITEN 7-11 IU STALE VECTO DIFFES FOM THE MSFN STATE VECTO BY 8 SIGMA IU EOS AND CVS UNCETAINTIES AND IS CONFIMED BY A COMPAISON OF IMU TO MSFN, THE ALLOWABLE MIOCOUSE SHOULD BE THE NOMALLY ALLOTTED LAUNCH VEHICLE 3 SIGMA IU EOS PLUS SOME PECENTAGE OF THE SPS END OF MISSION ESEVES, FAILUE POINTS 1_ LVDC/LVDA FAILUE 2, ACCELEOMETE FAILUE CONSEQUENCES THESE FAILUES COULD AFFECT THE SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PIMAY MISSION OBJECTIVES, IF THE IU STATE VECTOt AS COMPAED TO A COESPONDING ADA (MSFN) VECTOt EXCEEOS THE VALUES OF 6 SIGMA IU PLATFOM EOS_ AND IS CONFIHEO AS TO TEND BY A SPACECAFT (IMU) VECTO COMPAISON WITH MSFN_ THEN THE IU SHOULD BE COECTED TO HAKE THE PIMAY MISSION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/TO!BLV SYSTEMS 4-23

128 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS i 7-i_ IU EGG WATE VALVE FAILS TO CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSED THE ENVIONMENT CONTOL SUBSYSTEM IECS) MAINTAINS ACCEPTABLE THEMAL UPEATING CONDITIUNS FO lu AND S-IVB ELECTICAL COMPONENTS DUING PEFLIGHT AND FLIGHT OPEATIONS* THE ECS CICULATES COOLANT TO THE ELECTICAL EQUIPMENT ACKS AND ABSOBS HEAT GENEATED BY THE EQUIPMENT, THE COOLANT IS COOLED BY CICULATION THOUGH A SUBLIMATO THAT USES WATE TO COOL THE COOLANT SOLUTION, THE ECS WATE VALVE CONTOLS WATE FLOW TO THE SUBLIMATO, FAILUE OF THE VALVE IN THE CLOSED POSITION WILL ESULT IN OVEHEATING AND A FAILUE IN THE OPEN POSITION WILL ESULT IN OVECOOLING OF THE ELECTICAL COMPONENTS, FAILUE POINTS i. ELECTICAL FAILUE TO SOLENOID 2* VALVE FAILUE _, THEMISTO FAILUE CONSEQUENCES IF THE ENVIONMENTAL CONTOL SYSTEM LOGIC FAILS TO CYCLE THE WATE VALVE OPEN AND CLOSED POPELYI OVEHEATING O OVECOOLING OF IU COMPONENTS WILL ESULT, HOWEVEt SENDING THE ECS LOGIC INHIBIT COMMAND AND WATE VALVE OPEN O CLOSED COMMANDt AS THE CASE MAY BEt MAY EMEDY THE FAILUE, IF THIS IS UNSUCCESSFULt THE FOLLOWING WILL ESULT--- OVEHEATING " THE 5T-127 INETIAL PLATFOM AND THE LVDAtS TWO POWE SUPPLY TEMPEATUES WILL INCEASE BUT WILL NOT EACH THEI UNACCEPTABLE TEMPEATUES BY THE END OF THE 7-HOU MISSION FO THE LAUNCH VEHICLE. THE LVDC MEMOY TEMPEATUE WILL EACH ITS unacceptable TEMPEATUE OF 123,8 DE_EE F AT APPOXIMATELY 4,3 HOUS AFTk FAIuUE,FO THE T-HOU LAUNCH VEHICLE MISSIONp THEE WILL BE NEGLIGIBLE DEGADATION OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM DUE TO THE TEMPEATUE INCEASE OF THE ST-124 INETIAL PLATFOM, HOWEVE_ ASSUMINO A CITICAL POTION OF MEMOY IS LOST DUE TO LVDC MEMOY OVEHEATINGt THE LVDC MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SATISFACTOILY pefom ITS NAVIGATIONt GUIDANCE AND SEQUENCING FUNCTIONS, OVECOULING - THE ST-124 INETIAL PLATFOMt LVDC MEMOYt AND THE LVDAmS TWO POWE SUPPLY TEMPEATUES WILL DECEASE BUT WILL NOT EACH THEI UNACCEPTABLE TEMPEATUES BY THE END OF THE 7-HOU MISSION FO THE LAUNCH VEHICLE= THEE WILL BE NEGLIGIBLE DEGADATION Of THE LAUNCH VEHICLE NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM DUE TO OVECOOLING FO. THE 7-HOU PIMAY MISSION* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l# FNL _2/15/TO SLV SYSTEMS 4-2_

129 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS ITEF 7-14 S-IVB STAGE COMMON BULKHEAD DELTA PESSUE EACHES O EXCEEDS--- A, MINUS 20 PSIO B, PLUS 30 PSID C, MINUS 26 PSID--PLUS 36 PSIO THE COMMON BULKHEAD WILL STUCTUALLY FAIL AT THE ULTIMATE LIMITS OF MINUS 92,5 PSIQ O PLUS 42,G PSID IF COECTIVE ACTION IS NOT TAKEN, PLUS DELTA PESSUE IS DEFINED AS LOX TANK ULLPC_E PESSUE GEATE THAN THE FUEL TANK Ui.LAb_ PESSUE, MINUS DELTA PES_U=<E IS DEFINED AS A FUEL TANK ULLAGE PESSUE GEATE THAI THE LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE, FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES l* LH2 PESSUIZATION VALVE(S) FAILING OPEN - (HIGH LH2 ULLAGE PESSUE) 2, Lrl2 PESSUIZATION VALVE(S) FAILING CLOSED - (LOW LH_ ULLAGE PESSUE} B* COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVE(S) FAILS CLOSED - (LOW LOX ULLAGE PESSUE( 4o COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVE(S) PAILS OPEN - (HIGH LOX ULLAGE PESSUE) b, LH2 VENT VALVE FAILS CLOSED - (HIGH LM2 ULLAGe) b, LH2 VENT VALVE FAILS OPEN - (LOW LH2 ULLAGE) 7a LOX VENT VALVE FAILS OPEN - {LOW LOX ULLAGE) 8, LOX VENT VALVE PAILS CLOSED - (HIGH LOX ULLAGE) THEOETICALLYp THESE LIMITS SHOULD NOT BE EACHED _UING S-IVB BUN, if A VENT VALVE FAILS OPEN_ PESSUE WILL DOP TO SATUATION LEVELS AND EMAIN U_TIL EI_GINE STAT, UNDE NOMAL CONDITIONS THE LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE WILL BE APPOXIMATELY 7 PSI HIGHE THAN THE LHZ TANK ULLAGE PESSUE* SHOULD A FAILUE OCCU IN THE LH_ OH LOX PESSUIZATION SYSTEM O SHOULD A LOX VENT VALVE FAILi THE NOMAL CONDITIONS COULD BE CHANGEU-- IoE,e LH2 TANK PESSUE HIGHE THAN LOX TANK PESSUE O HIGH LOX TANK PESSUE ANU LOW LH2 TAN_ PESSUE= DUING THE BOOST PHASE THE S-IVB BUND NPSH LIMITATIONS WOULD BE EXCEEDED BEFOE BULKHEAD ESTAINT_ AE JEOPADIZED, MISSION EV uate SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/&5/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-25

130 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SLCTION 4 - _LV SYSTEMS ITEF 7-15 LOSS OF S-IVB STAGE PNEUMATICS THE STAGE PNEUMATIC SYSTEM MuST BE MAINTAINED AT A PESSUE OF wvo PSIA TO PNOPELY ACTUATE pneumatic VALVES AND SUPPLY PUGES. ENGINE PUM_ PUGE FAILS ON lhe ENGINE PUMP PUGE CONTOL-- WHICH IS CONTOLLED BY A PESSUE SWITCH-- IS OPENED FO io MINUTE_ FbLLOWING S-IVB ENGINE SHUTDOWN, ALLOWING THE TuBOPUMP SEAL CAVITY AND THE GAS GENEATO TQ _T. PUGE{) OF HAZADOUS MIXTUE OF LH2 AND LOX, AN AMBIENT HELIUM SUPPLY _F;UTOFF VALVE IS LOCATED AFTE THE EGULATO AND CAN _E CLOSED BY GOUND COMMAND IF THE PU{:E CANNOT BE TEMINATED O A LEAK DEVELOPS DOWNSTEAM OF THE VALVE, FAILUE POII%TS LOSS OF S-IVB STAGE PNEUMATICS I. PNEUMAIlC LGULATO FAILS CLOSED 2, AMBIENT HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVE FAILS CLOSED 3. PNEUMATIC EGULATO BACKUP PESSU_ SWITCH FAILS IN ENEGIZED POSITION 4. LOSS OF PNEUMATIC BOTTLE PESSUE CONSEQUENCES ENGINE PUGE CONTOL SOLENOID VALVE FAILS OPEN I. PESSUE SWITCH FAILUE 2, SwITC_ SELECTO FAILUE 3. SEUUENCE FAILUE 4. AFT PESSUE SWITCH POWE FAILUE IF THE STAGE PNEUMAT _S 15 LOSTt THE VALVE ACTUATION SEQUENCES AND PUGE BE_UENCES CANNOT UE COMPLETED AS POGAMMED O_ BY GOUND COMMAND, PIMAY VALVE ACTUATION sewuences THAT would BE LOST AE CONTINUOUS VENT SYSTEM AND POPELLANT TANK VENTS OPEATION AND CUNFIG_AIIOr_ FON CHILLOOWN. A NEGULATON DISCHAGE PESSUE OF AT LEAST B20 PGIA IS EQUIED TO HOLD THE LUX ANU _H2 PEVALVLS _LQSED OUING CHILLDOWNo IF THE EI\GI_4E PJMP PUGE CANNOT 8E TEMINATED, THE STAGE PNEUMATIC HELIUM will BE DEPLETED Ai,J P,_cUMATIC _ALVE ACTUATION CAPABILITY WILL 8E LOST IN TB7 WHICH WILL EsuLT IN AN INAEILITY TO F.L_I THh STAGE SAWING EUUIEMENTS, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/_5/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-26

131 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 -SLV SYSTEMS I LOW LH2 TANK ULLAGE PESSUE DUING OBITAL COAST, LH2 ULLAGE PESSUE IS MAINTAINED BETWEEN 19.5 AND 21.0 PSIA BY _AVIN_ 7ME CONTINUOUS VENT SYSTEM 09EN, THE CONTINUOUS VENT SYSTEM ALLOWS CO_TOLLEO VENTING OF THE BOILOFF OH2 FOM THE LH2 TANK. THE VENTING POVIDES A POPULSIVE FOCE TO ASSIST IN POPELLANT SETTLING AND THEMAL CONDITIONING BY PEVENTING THE BULK TLMi'EAIUE FOM inceasing. A PESSUE DOP BELOW 19.5 PSIA IS INDICATIVE OF A CONTINUOU_ VENT EGULATO MALFUNCTION O A VENT SYSTEM LEAK. THE LH2 TANK IS PEPESSUIZED BY THE CYOQENIC EPESSUIZATION SYETEM (02/H2 BUNE) DUING ESTAT PEPAATIONS TO A PESSUE BETWEEN _B AND 3E PSIA. THE AMBIENT HELIUM EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM SEVES AS A BACKUP TO CYOGENIC EPESGOIZATION IF CYUGE_IC BPESSUIZATION IE IMPAED BECAUSE OF TANK LEAKAGE O A EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM FAILUE. DUING HAlf,STAGE OPEATIONS_ THE LH2 TANK IS PESSUIZED BY GASEOUS HYDOGEN BLE_D FNOM THE J-2 ENGINE. THE FLIGHT CONTOL PESSUE SWITCH MAINTAINS THE ULLAGE PESSUE BETWEEN 28 AND BE PSIA BY CYCLING VALVES IN THE LH2 TANK PESSUIZATION CONTOL MODULE. FAILUE POINTS i. LH2 VENT AND ELIEF VALVE FALLS OPEN O PATIALLY OPEN 2. LM2 LATCHING VENT AND ELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN O PATIALLY OPEN 3. LH2 CONTINUOUS VENT SYSTEM EGULATO FAILS OPEN O EGULATES TO A LOW PESSUE DUING COAST 4. CyOGENiC AND AMBIENT EPEBSUIZATION FAIL TO initiate 5. LH2 TANK CVS EGULATO FAILS TO CLOSE FO EPESEUIZATION CONSEUUENCES. THE LH2 TANK ULLAGE PESSUE DUING OBITAL COAST MUST BE MAINTAINED ABOVE THE EQUIED LIMIT SD THAT THE EPESSUIZATION SYSTEMS CAN SUFFICIENTLY INCEASE THE PESSUE TO ENSUE THE J-2 ENGINE LH2 PUMP WILL NOT CAVITATE DUE TO LOW NPSH, IF THE TANK ULLAGE PESSUE IS BELOW NPSH EMUIEMENTS AT ENGINE STATt THE FUEL PUMP WILL CAVITATE WIT_ A SUBSE_UE_T CEW-SAFE SHUTDOWN, A LOW ULLAGE PESSUE DUIN_ COAST WOULD ALSO ESULT IN ADDITIONAL POPELLAN7 LOSSES DUE TO 7_E LOWE THAN EXPECTED SA7_ATI_N P_ESS_E _F THE POPELLAiiT. THE 02/H2 BUNE MAY NOT STAT O MAY BUN THOUGH IF T_E LH2 ULLAGE PESSUE IS BELOW _7 PSIAp THEEBY MAKING IT NECESSAY TO USE THE BACKUP AMBIENT EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM TU POVIDE THE EMUIED NPSH FO ENGINE STAT. IF THE BUNE DuES OPEAT_ ANU THE ULLAGE PESSUE IS LOW BECAUSE OF LEAKAGEt THE EFFECTIVENESS DF CNYOGENIC EESSUIZATIO_ WILL _E IMPAIED AND AMBIENT EPESSUIZATION WILL ALSO BE EMUIEU, IF THE OVEBOAD LEAKAGE IS GEAT ENOUGHt THE ULLAGE PESSUE INCEASE FOM AMBIENT EPESSUIZATION WILL NOT WL SUFFICIENT. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/?0 SLY SYSTEMS _-27

132 NASA - Manned Spacecraft (;enter MISSION ULES SECTION 4 = 5LV SYSTEM LOW COLD HELIUM SUPPLY PESSUE DUING ESTAT PEPAAT[ONS_ OLO HELIUM HEATED BY THE 02/H2 BUNE IS USED TO PESSUIZE THE LH2 AND LOX TANKS TO THE POPE ESTAT pessues* FOLLOWING BUNE OPEATIONt AMBIENT HELIUM IS used TO PESSUIZE THE TANKS IF THE BUNE SYSTEM WAS NOT SUFFICIENT, COLD H_LIUM IS ALSO USED DUING S-IVB ENGINE BUN TO PESSUIZE THE LO TAN_* FAILUE POINTS l. COLD HELIUM DUMP MODULE IVENT ANU/O ELIEF) FAILS OPEN 2 LOX TANK PESSUIZATION SHUTOFF VALVES FAIL OPEN 3, EPESSOIZATION PLENUM AND VALVE ASSEMBLY (LO AND/O LH2) SOLENOID FAILS OPEN CONSEQUENCES IF THE COLD HELIUH SPHEE PESSUE DECEASES BELOW _O00 PSIA pio TO O_/H2 BUNE I6NITIONt THEE WILL NOT BE ENOUGH GOLD HELIUM EMAINING AFTE LO AN_ LH2 TANk C_YOGENIC EPESSUIZATION TO PESSUIZE THE LO TAN_ DUING BUN TO MEET THE J-_ SPEC _PSM. VIOLATION OF LOX J-2 ENGINE SP_C NPSH WILL CAUSE CAVITATION OF THE LOX ToBOPOMP WITH FAILUE TO STAT O ENGINE PEFOMANCE DEGADATION WITH A CEW-SAFE 5HOTDOWNo IF THE COLD HELIUM PESSUE IS BELOW 300 PSIA_ THEE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT COLD _ELIOM FO LOX TANk PESSUIZATION DUING THE BUN, IF THE BUNE _S ALLOWED TO CO_TINUE TO OPEATE AFTE THE COLD H_LIOM PESSUE DECEASES BELOW 450 PBIA9 THEE MAY NOT be SUFFIGIENT COLD HELIUM FO LO TANk PESSUIZATION DUING THE BUN* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV systems

133 i i NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES S{'; TION _+ - SLV SYSTEMS Center ITF 7-19 LOW LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE THE LOX TANK IS PEPESSUIZED BETWEEN 38 PSIA AND 41 PSIA DUING THE ESTAT SEQUENCE TO POVIDE THE LOX HEAD (NPSH) CONDITIONS EQUIED FO J'2 ENGINE STAT, THE 02/N2 BUNE 1S USED FO HEATING COLD HELIUM FO PEPESBUIZING THE LOX TANK. AN AMBIENT HELIUM EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATICALLY PEPESSUIZ E THE LOX TANK SHOULD THE O2/HZ BUNE FAIL O BE INHIBITED, DUING MAINSTAGE THE LOK TANK PtSSuIZATION IS MAINTAINtO BETWEEN 38 AND 41 P-_IA BY THE FLIGHT CONTOL PESSUE SWITCH, PESSUIZATION GASES DUING MAINSTAGE OPEATION CONSIST OF COLD HELIUM FLOWING THOUGH THE J-2 ENGINE HEAT EXCHANGE, FAILUE POINTS 1_ COLD HELIUM SUPPLY SHUTOFF VALVE FAILS CLOSED 2. LOX TANK VENT AND ELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN 31 LOX AMBIENT HELIUM EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM FAILS 4. FLIGHT CONTOL PESSUE SWITCH FAILS 51 02/H2 BUNE FAILS CONSEQUENCES LOW LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUES MAY ESULT IN UNACCEPTABLE ENGINE PEFOMANCE AND/O PEMATUE CEW-SAFE ENGINE SHUTDOWN DUING SECOND BUN DUE TO CAVITATING HEAD LOSSES. MAXIMUM HELIUM USAGE DUING BUNE EPESSUIZATION COUPLED WITH LOW LOX TANK PESSUE WILL USE EXCESS COLD HELIUM SUPPLY SUCH THAT THE NOMAL OVECONTOL PESSUIZATION ENEGY ATES CANNOT BE "MAINTAINED THOUGHOUT SECOND BUN, UNDE THESE CONDITIONS* THE LOX TANK PESSUIZATION SYSTEM IS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN A POSITIVE PESSUE ISE ATE ANDI THEEFOE_ AN INITIAL TANK PESSUE IS EQUIED TO ASSUE COMPLIANCE WITH J-2 ENGINE LOX NPSH EQUItMENTS THOUGHOUT BUN. IF THE CYOGENIC EPESSuIZATION SYSTEM IS INHIBITEOI THE AMBIENT EPESIUIZATION HELIUM WILL BE USED TO BING THE TANK PESSUES TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL, LOW ULLAGE PESSUES AT ESC WILL ESULT IN VIOLATIOh OF NPSH EQUIEMENT PIO TO CUTOFF. THE COMMAND ACTION WILL INHIBIT BUNE OPEATION TO SAVE (.OLD HELIUM FO BUN INSTEAD OF CONSUMING IT FO EPESSUIZATION. ' EQUIED LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE PIO TO BBNE STAT :.. FO VAIOUS ULLAGE PESSUE DECAY ATES L_:..:',:.,.!DO DO !" 0 TO 50 PSZA _. _ ; :.u;:.... "':",... i":'.'i... ::_ BI,_/_... V_//,3/r BW LIMIT ';: ;/f/ "... I : ": /,/ : " i / /...i," I ivvnyi... i{. (ci7 [:7: '- "-'i" q - t';::tt'y':_'. ;! 33 ' ' '.;' l' : I <;,:;," 0 " : " ',!;:...7. O. ;2 10 " 20 ; : " 5.. ; -6_ ;.. _.: i :" _:!..!"! _. TIME F_ IDlllLl_ IT,U_ (Mill)..:,..,..+!.:., l,vlo., o=..o,

134 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS ITEF 7-20 S-IVB J-2 ENGINE STAT BOTTLE PESSUE OUTSIDE ESTAT LIMITS THE STAT BOTTLE IS FILLED WITH GH2 AND IS STOED UNDE A NOMINAL PESSUE OF 12_0 PGIA, THE GH2 18 USED TO GIVE THE INITIA_ SPIN TO THE TUBINE DUING THE STAT 5EOUENCEJ _AILUE POINTS 1, STAT VENT AND ELIEF VALVE FAILS TO ELIEVE 2* STAT TANK ELIEF PESSUE _HIFTED HIGH CONSEQUENCES EXCESSIVE PESSUE IN THE STAT TANK COULD ESULT IN ELEVATED OXIDIZE SYSTEM POWE _UILDUP CAUSING HIGH LOX PUMP DISCHAGE PESSUES DUING THE STAT TANSIENT, THIS HIGH PESSUE COULD ESULT IN DAMAGE TO THE FUEL TUBINE AND ASSOCIATED OFF-NOMINAL ENGINE MIXTUE ATIO PEFOMANCE, THE FAILUE WOULD ESULT IN A CEW-SAFE SHUTDOWN DUING TANSITION O IF THE ENGINE OBTAINS MAINSTAGE THEE WOULD BE POBABLE OFF-NOMINAL PEFOMANCE DUE TO ENGINE DAMAGE SUSTAINED DUING ENGINE STAT, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL i12/15/70 SLV systems _-30 i

135 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION A - SLV SYSTEMS i 7-22 S-IVB LOSS OF ENGINE HYDAULIC FLUID THE INDEPENDENTt CLOSED LOOP S-IVB HYDAULIC SYSTEM GIMBALS THE J-2 ENGINE DUING BOOSTo COASTp AND ENGINE BUN OPEATIONSo A MAIN HYDAULIC PUMPt,AN AUXILIAY MOTO-DIVEN HYDAULIC PUMPo AN ACCUMULATO-ESEVOIt TWO SENVUACTUATOSt AND INTECONNECTING TUBE AND HOSE ASSEMBLIES COMPISE THE S-IVB HYDAULIC SYSTEM. EACH OF TWO IDENTICAL SEVOACTUATO 'ASSEMBLIES POVIDES MECHANICAL FOCE TO GIMBAL THE a--2 ENGINE, THE SEVO VALVE WITHIN EACH ACTUATO DIVETS FLUID TO ONE SIDE O THE OTHE OF THE ACTUATO PISTONS IN ACCODANCE WITH SIGNALS ECEIVED BY THE SEVO VALVE TOQUE MOTO FOM THE PLIGHT CONTUL COMPUTE IN THE IU. FAILUE POINTS 1, PITCH O YAW ACTUATO MALFUNCTION 2, MAIN HYDAULIC PUMP FAILUE 3, HYDAULIC HOSE O TUBING FAILUE 4o AUXILIAY MOTO-DIVEN HYDAULIC PUMP FAILUE CONSEQUENCES IGNITION OF THE S-IVB STAGE WITHOUT AN OPEATIVE HYDAULIC SYSTEM WILL JEOPADIZE CEW SAFETY, THEE WILL BE A LOSS OF ENGINE GIMBAL CONTOL DUING MAINSTAGE OPEATIONt WHICH POBABLY WILL ESULT IN EXCESSIVE VEHICLE ATTITUDE ATES AND GUIDANCE EO, IN ADDITION THE VEHICLE WILL BE UNABLE TO EXECUTE EQUIED TAJECTOY COECTIONS= MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/Z5/70 SLV SYSTEMS #-31

136 4 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 7-25 LOX NON-POPULBIVE VENT FAILS TO OPEN DUING OBITAL VENTING OF THE LOX TANK_ THE VENT GAS IB DIECTED OVEBOAD BY MEANS OF A NON-pOPULSIVE VENT SYSTEM DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE VEHICLE OIENTATION PETUBATIONS CAUSED BY VENTING, THE TANK 15 VENTED AFTE THE SECOND BUN TO PEVENT NON-POPULSIVE ELIEF VENTING DUING TD&E_ AND TO PEVENT UNACCEPTABLE COMMON BULKHEAD POSITIVE DEFFE_NTIAL PESSUE DUING LH2 TANK NON-POPULSIVE VENTING, AFTE LOX LUMP IN TB_ THE VENT IB LATCHED OPEN TO SAFE THE TANK AND TO PEVENT BULKHEAD UIFFEENTIAL PESSUE DUING LH2 TANK SAFING, FAILUE POINTS Io ACTUATION CONTOL MODULE - LOX TANK NPV VALVE - FAILS TO ACTUATE 2o SEQUENCE - NPV OPEN COMMAND - FAILS TO ACTUATE ACTUATION CONTOL MODULE 3. _O AMP HAGLATCH ELAY FAILS 4, LOX NPV FAILS CLOSED CONSEQUENCES IF THE LOX TANK NPV IS NOT OPENED AT TB7o THE ISE IN LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE DUE TO ULLAGE AND LIWUID HEAT INPUTS WILL ESULT IN ANDOM O CONTINUOUS NON-POPULSIVE ELIEF VENTING DUING SPACECAFT SEPAATIONp DOCKINGo AND 5C/LM EJECTION. IN ADDITIONt DUE TO THE BLOWDOWN OF THE LH2 TANK, THE COMMON BULKHEAD POSITIVE DIFFEENTIAL PESSUE MAY INCEASE TO A VALUE IN EXCESS OF 35 PSID, IF THE LOX NPV IS NOT LATCHED OPEN AT TB8 AFTE LOX DUMPt THE ISE IN LOX TANK ULLAGE PESSUE DUE TO ULLAGE AND LIQUID HEAT INPUTS WILL ESULT IN EVENTUAL NON-POPULSIVE ELIEF VENTING. IN ADDITION, DUE TO THE BLOWDOWN OF THE LH2 TANKt THE COMMON BULKHEAD POSITIVE DIFFEENTIAL PESSUE MAY INCEASE TO A VALUE IN EXCESS OF 36 PSID, SINCE THIS MAY OCCU AT A TIME BEYOND THE LIFETIME OF THE STAGEr THE COMMON BULKHEAD DIFFEENTIAL PESSUE MISSION ULE MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE FO FUTHE COECTIVE ACTION. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL _2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS _-32

137 ITEH NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS 7-26 LH2 LATCHING VENT VALVE FAILS TO OPEN THE LH2 LATCHING VENT VALVE IS LATCHED OPENED FO Z5 MINUTES AT TB7 + Oe_ SECONDS AND AGAIN AT TB NIN 0o4 $EC TO VENT THE LH2 TANK PIO TO AND AFTE SPACECAFT SEPAATION= THE VALVE 15 PEMANENTLY LATCHED OPEN AT TB MINUTES 27 SECONDS. FAILUE POINTS lo LH2 LATCHING ELIEF VALVE LATCH 2e LH2 LATCHING ELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED CONSEQUENCES FAILUE TO VENT THE LH2 TANK PIO TO AND AFTE SPACECAFT OPEATIONS MAY ESULT IN UNDESIABLE LH2 TANK VENTING THAT HAY ESULT IN PETUBATIONS DUING TD6E* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-33

138 NASA - Manned Spacecreft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLY SYSTEMS J j ITE_ 7-27 ENGINE STAT BOTTLE DUMP FAILS TO INITIATE AT THE COMPLETION OF THE PIMAY S-IVB MISSIONP THE ENTIE STAGE WILL BE PASSIVATED O SAFED BY BLEEDING DOWN PNEUMATIC BOTTLES AND SYSTEMS AND DUMPING EMAINING POPELLANTS* BY THE END OF second BUN THE STAT BOTTLE WILL HAVE BEEN ECHAGED TO A PESSUE LEVEL OF APPOXIMATELY _t_so PSIA* THE PESSUE SHOULD NOT INCEASE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THIS VALUEJ SINCE STAT BOTTLE DUMP IS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AFTE SECOND BUN CUTOFF AT STAT OF TIME BASE T, ANY INCEASE IN PESSUE ABOVE THE ELIEF SETTING OF ZtSOO +/- 25 PSIA WILL CAUSE VENTING OF EXCESS pessue THOUGH THE STAT BOTTLE VENT AND ELIEF VALVE* THE GH2 STAT BOTTLE WILL BE DUMPED BY OPENING THE VENT AND ELIEF VALVE* failue POINTS - 1. STAT BOTTLE VENT VALVE FAILS CLOSED Z* STAGE PNEUMATIC POWE CONTOL MODULE FAILS CLOSED 3* ELECTICAL COMMAND FAILUE CONSEQUENCES THE S-IVB STAGE WILL NOT BE IN A SAFE CONDITION IF THE STAT BOTTLE DUMP IS NOT INITIATED O IF THE PESSUE IS NOT BELOW lt200 PSIA AT 70 DEGEES F* I MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 SLV SysTEMS #-34

139 i i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - BLV SYSTEMS _ ITE_ 7-28 FAILUE TO INITIATE COLD HELIUM DUMP AT THE END OF THE S-IVB SECOND BUNt GAFING OF THE STAGE WILL BE INITIATEDt INCLUDING COLD HELIUM DUMP, COLD HELIUM IS DUMPED THOUGH THE LH2 TANK VENT _EN THE EPESSU_ILAT[ON SYSTEM MODE SELECT OFF (CYOGENIC MODE) AND EPESSUIZATION CONTOL VALVES OPEN COMMAND 15 GIVEN BY THE ONBOAD SEQUENCE, FAILUE POINTS i. LH2 CYOGENIC EPESSUIZATION VALVES FAIL TO'OPEN 2, ELECTICAL O COMMAND FAILUE 3= LOX PESSUIZATION MODULE EGULATO FAILS CLOSED CONSEQUENCES IF THE COLD HELIUM SPHEES FAIL TO DUMP THOUGH THE LH2 CYOGENIC EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM_ IT CAN BE DUMPED THOUGH THE LDX TANK BY OPENING EITHE THE LUX CYOGENIC EPEGSUIZATION VALVES O LOX PESSUIZATION VALVES, IF THESE ALTENATIVES FAILt THE COLD HELIUM CANNOT BE DUMPED AND THE $-IVB CANNOT BE SAFED, THE SPHEE PESSUE COULD INCEASE TO 3500 PSIA AG THE TEMPEATUE INCEABE$ FOM 50 TO 400 DEGEES, THIS IS UNACCEPTABLY CLOSE TO THE AMBIENT TEMPEATUE SPHEE BUST PESSUE AT 3950 PSIA, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL E2/lfi/70 SLV BYGTEMS 4-3_

140 i j NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION # - SLV SYSTEMS 8-2 S-IVB STAGE 02/H2 BUNE FUEL POPELLANT VALVE FAILS CLOSED THE 02/H2 BUNE USES LDX AND LH2 FOM THE MAIN POPELLANT TANKS TO HEAT COLD HELIUM FO EPESSUIZATION OF THE OXIDIZE AND FUEL TANKS, A THEMAL VOTIN_ CUCUIT THAT SENSES THE TEMPEATUE IN THE GH2 LINE UPSTEAM OF INJECTO NO, 2 POVIDES AN INDICATION OF A BUNE NO-LIGHT O FLAMEOUT* THE CICUIT WILL AUTOMATICALLY SHUT DOWN THE BUNE WHEN THE TEMPEATUE IS BELOW -409 TO -411 DEGEES F, THE CICUIT WILL NOT DETECT A BUNE MALFUNCTION DUE TO THE LH2 POPELLANT VALVE FAILING CLOSED {1) AT BUNE STAT BECAUSE THE TEMPEATUE WILL EMAIN ABOVE THE VOTING CICUIT SETTINGS AND 12) DUING BUNE OPEATION BECAUSE THE LOX-ICH MIXTUE WILL CAUSE HIGH BUNE TEMPEATUES, FAILUE POINTS l, LH2 POPELLANT VALVE FAILS CLOSED 2, ACTUATION CONTOL MODULE ILH2 POP VALVE) FAILS CLOSED CONSEQUENCES 9, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 4, MAGLATCH ELAY FAILS TO SET IF THE LH2 POPELLANT VALVE FAILS CLOSED DUING BUNING OPEATIONS THE BUNE VOTING CICUIT WILL NOT DETECT THE MALFUNCTION AND HIGH BUNE TEMPEATUES WILL ESULT, ALSO LOX WILL BE DUMPED OUT OF THE BUNE DUE TO THE LOX MANIFOLO SHUTOFF VALVE EMAINING OPEN= THE COLD HELIUH EPESSUIZATION SHUTOFF VALVES WOULD EMAIN OPEN UNTIL THE AMBIENT EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM IS INITIATED DUING TB6 O UNTIL THE BUNE SHUTDOWN COMMAND IS GIVEN, IF THE COLD HELIUM SHUTOFF VALVES EMAIh OPEN FO THE ENTIE BUNE EPESSUIZATIONt THE ESULTANT COLD HELIUM BOTTLE PESSUE WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET THE LOX TANK PESSUIZATION EQUIEMENTS DUING SECOND BUN AND A SAFE LOW NPSH ENGINE SHUTDOWN WOULD OCCU PIO TO THE COMPLETION OF SECOND BUN, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14iFNL _2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-36

141 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center mssm. ULSS SECTION 4 " SLV SYSTEMS -.i LH2 CH1LLDOWN SYSTEM FAILS THE J-2 ENGINE LH2 PUMP IS PECONDITIONED PIO TO ESTAT TO ENSUE THE INLET CONDITIONS AE ACCEPTABLE FO STAT* LH2 _S CICULATED FOM THE TANK THOUGH A LOW PESSUE FEED OUOTw THE J-2 ENGINE LH2 TUBQPUMP_ AND BACK TO THE TANK THOUGH A ETUN LINE, THE LH2 CHILLDUWN PuMP IS TUNED ON AND THE N. O, LH2 PEVALVE IS CLOSED AFTE INITIATION OF TIME BASE 6, LH2 'FLOWS TO THE INLET OF THE TUBOPUMP THOUGH THE N. O* CHILLDOWN VALVE THAT EMAINS IN THE OPENED CONDITION AND BACK TO THE TANK THOUGH THE N, O, BLEED VALVE= JUST PIO TO ENGINE STAT THE PEVALVE IS OPENED* AFTE ENGINE STAT THE BLEED VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE CHILLDOWN PUMP TUNED OFF* FAILUE POINTS le LH2 CHiLLDOWN PUMP PAILS OFF 2Q LH2 CHILLDOWN VALVE FAILS CLOSED 3o LH2 BLEED VALVE FAILS CLOSED 4o LH2 PEVALVE FAILS OPEN CONSEQUENCES IF THEE IS A FAILUE AT ONE OF THE FAILUE POINTSt LH2 ECICULATION WILL NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED, THE ONBOAD SEQUENCED LH2 FUEL LEAD DUING THE ENGINE STAT SEWUENCE WILL POVIDE LH2 FEED SYSTEM AND J-2 ENGINE CHILL FO ESTAT* THEE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT LH2 PUMP CAVITATION WILL OCCU ESULTING IN A FAILUE TO EACH MAINSTAGE AND A CEW SAFE ENGINE SHUTDOWN,. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-37

142 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - GLV SYSTEMS 18-4 LOX CHILLDOWN SYSTEM FAILS DUING ESTAT PEPAATIONS THE J-2 ENGINE LOX PUMP AND FEED HADWAE PUMP IS PECONDITIONED PIO TO ESTAT TO ENSUE THE INLET CONDITIONS AE ACCEPTABLE FO STAT= LOX IS CICULATED FOM THE TANK THOUGH A LOW PESSUE FEED DUCTt THE J-2 ENGINE LOX TUBOPUMPt AND BACK TO THE TANK THOUGH A ETUN LINE= THE LOX CHILLDOWN PuMP IS TUNED ON AND THE N, O_ LOX PEVALVE IS CLOSED AFTE INITIATION OF TIME BASE b* LOX FLOWS TO THE INLET OF THE TUBOPUMP THOUGH THE N* D= CHILLDOWN VALVE THAT EMAINS IN THE OPENED CONDITION AND BACK TO THE TANK THOUGH THE N. OJ BLEED VALVE= JUST PIO TO ENGINE STAT THE PEVALVE IS OPENED= AFTE ENGINE STAT {ENGINE HELIUM CONTOL SOLENOID ENEGIZED) THE BLEED VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE CHILLDOWN PUMP TUNED OFF. FAILUE POINTS 1= LOX CHILLDOWN PUMP FAILS OFF 2= LOX CHILLOOWN VALVE FAILS CLOSED 3= LOX BLEED VALVE FAILS CLOSED 4o LOX PEVALVE FAILS OPEN CONSEQUENCES IF THEE IS A FAILUE AT ONE OF THE FAILUE POINTBP LOX CHILLDOWN WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A GOUND COMMANDED SEOUENCED LOX LEAD OF APPOXIMATELY 8 SECONOS(ALTENATE SEQUENCE 6 O)o THE LOX LEAD WILL IMPOVE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL ENGINE STAT= HOWEVEP A LOX LEAD EXCEEDING 8 SECONDS IS UNDESIABLE BECAUSE THE ENGINE INJECTO WILL BE OVECHILLED WHEN COMBINED WITH THE NOMAL 8 SECOND LH2 LEAD= DUE TO COMBUSTION INSTABILITY NOTED ON AS 504t A TLI INHIBIT WILL BE CALLED FO A LOX LEAD LAGE THAN 20 SECONDS. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-3B

143 {.* NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center msslo. ULES SECTION 4 - SLV EYSTEMS 8-B S-IVB CONFIMED HADOVE ACTUATO DUING OBITAL COASTt NO HYDAULIC POWE IS SUPPLIED TO THE ACTUATOS EXCEPT WHEN THE AUXILIAY HYDAULIC PUMP IS TUNED ON FO THEMAL CYCLE, IN THE POWE UFF CONDITIONp ENGINE POBITION WILL VAY +/- _ DEGEES DEPENDING ON DUCT LEAOSt GIMBAL BEAING FICTIUNP ETC* DUING THE ENGINE IGNITION STATING TANSIENTt MOMENTAY PITCH O YAW ACTUATO EXCUSIONS AS HIGH AS +/- 3 DEGEES AE NOMALLY EXPEIENCED* LAGE ACTUATU DEFLECTIONS MAY OCCU AT THIS TIME DEPENDING ON VEHICLE ATTITUDE. THE ACTUATOS NAY BE OFFSET FOM NULL DUING ENGINE BUN AS MUCH AS +/- I*5 DEGEES DUE TO THUST MISALIGNMENTp ENGINE INSTALLATIOt_- TOLEANCESt UNCOMPENSATED GIMBAL CLEAANCES AND THUST STUCTUE COMPESSION EFFECTS, AFTE THE INITIAL ENGINE BUN STATING TANSIENTSt THEE SHOULD BE VEY LITTLE MOVEMENT OF THE ACTUATOS DUING POWEED FLIGHT. FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES l* SEVOACTUATO VALVE DUING SECOND S-IVB BUN_ AN ACTUATO HADOVE FAILUE PODUCES APID DIVEGENCE OF ATTITUDE EO AND BODY ATEr TUMBLINGP AND IMMEDIATE LOSS OF CONTOLo THIS IS THE MOST LIMITING CASE FO MANUAL ABOT TIMING AND ANY DELAY MUST BE MINIMIZED TO PEVENT EXCEEDING THE SPACECAFT PLATFOM TUMBLE LIMITS, EDS STUDIES SHOW THAT FO EVEN A 2-SECOND BUN OF THE J-2 THE VEHICLE WOULD COMPLETE ABOUT 3 1/2 EVOLUTIONS BEFOE A ECOVEY COULD BE MADE WITH THE AP5, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO lq FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS _-_9

144 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS...! ITE_v 8-7 CONTINUOUS VENT SYSTEM EGULATO FAILS TO CLOSE DUING ESTAT SEQUENCE THE CVS IS CLOSED DUING ESTAT PEPAATIONS SO THAT THE LH2 TANK CAN BE EPESSUIZED TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL FO ESTAT, DUING ENGINE BUNt THE VENTS MUST BE CLOSED IN ODE THAT THE LH2 TANK PESSUIZATION SYSTEM CAN POVIDE ADEQUATE NPSP, DUING J=2 ENGINE OPEATION, ULLAGE PESSUE IS POVIDED BY GH2 BLEED FOM THE J-2 ENGINE* THE GASES FLOW TO THE TANK THOUGH THEE O_FICED FLOW PATHS* ONE PATH IS ALWAYS OPENt AND NOMALLY OPEN SOLENOID VALVES CONTOL THE OTHE TWO, AFTE J-2 ENGINE STAT_ A SWITCH SELECTU COMMAND CLOSES ONE SOLENOID VALVE AND ENABLES THE FLIGHT CONTOL PESSUE SWITCH TO CONTOL THE OTHE VALVE, FAILUE POINTS CONSEQUENCES 2. CONTINUOUS VENT EGULATO FAILS OPEN 2, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 3, MAGLATCH ELAY FAILS TO SET IF THE CVS EGULATO FAILS OPEN AT INITIATION OF ESTAT PEPSt THE EGULATO WILL VENT GAG AT A ATE EQUAL TO THE CYOGENIC EPESSUIZATION ATE, HOWEVE_ THE AMBIENT EPESSUIZATION SYSTEM WILL POVIDE ADEQUATE NPGP FO ESTAT, DUING BUN THE COECTIVE ACTION WILL OPEN ALL THEE PATHS OF THE LH2 pessuization CONTOL MODULE TO POVIDE THE ADDITIONAL pe$suant EQUIED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-40

145 A OLLO,IFNLr2'I,,TOISLV SYSTEMS' NASA - Manned Spacecraft Canter mss,o..ules' SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS I ITEtV 8-8 LOSS OF ATTITUDE SECOND BUN Vehicle are8 _. _% (4-602, 5-602, 6-602) (8-6O2, _i_-602, 13-_o,) l J / I l.oss of Attitude Control Alar ATTITUDE CONTOL OF THE ENTIE SATUN VEHICLE IS CONTOLLED THOUGH THE INSTUMENT UNIT, THIS CONTOL IS NECESSAY TO KEEP THE VEHICLE IN THE COECT LAUNCH TAJECTOY FO POPE OBIT INSETION AND FO MAINTAINING THE COECT VEHICLE ATTITUDE WHILE IN OBIT, FAILUE POINTS 1, SWITCH SELECTO FAILUE 2, LVDC FAILUE 3. ST-124 PLATFOM FAILUE 4, APS FAILUE CONSEQUENCES LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL DUING OBIT WILL EVENTUALLY ESULT IN EXCESSIVE ATES IN THE AFFECTED AXIS AND AN INABILITY TO PEFOM EQUIED MANEUVES, THE LV/CSM ATTITUDE WILL BE UNCONTOLLABLE AND WILL DIVEGE*

146 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - SLV SYSTEMS i TEM S NT, Lose of Attit_e _mtrml Alert _ri_ Orbit L V HEM A - KM'D24,., and D MEM B - EM D25 LVDC/LVDA Computational Failure C TI_ TLC MC26D9 - Dd D26 y Hydraulic eservoir Pressure (Appro_, O) _ ut3 f D Hydraulic Level (Approx. 0 Percent) - L7-403 ;'ol::::;:;;; gor i p Failure to econflgure FCC _Fallure to Initiate Proper Guidance Sequence C C Pall to Change Time Base YT - ME24D15 & ]6 T _ MC24D17 & 1S S ZET _ MC24D19 & 20 rod ETE _ MC24D13&14 T Losa of Attit_e Control S-IVB Second Burn 2 _ Attitude eferenee Faiiure 4 Piatform GN2 C_5 PSID_Dll_603 _ 1 Guid 6Dll Volt_l_l M 6DI0 Amps(<IOA)-MI6-601 :_o_ Gyro Pickups(=O)-EdO, 41, 4 oll Ladder (>A) H56-6@3, oll Error (_A) H _ of. Xy-0y (>B) E Itud Error Signal Pitch Ladder (>B) E Pitch Error (>B) E XZ-OZ (>B) XX-OX (>A) E _ t: i Yaw Ladder _>B) H Yaw Error (>B) H MISSION EV ioate SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 5LV SYSTEME 4-42

147 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTZON _ - SLVSYSTEMS ITE_ -.w i S-IVB AMBIENT HELIUM DUMP FAILS TO INITIATE AS A PAT OF THE A5-50? MISSION_ THE S-IVB STAGE WILL GO THOUGH A PASSIVATION SAFING POCEDUEp INCLUDING DUMPING THE AMBIENT HELIUM BOTTLE. TMIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY OPENING THE ENGINE PUMP PUGE VALVE AND DUMPING THOUGH THE ENGINE TuBOPUMP PUGES AND GAS GENEATO PUGE* FAILUE POINTS 1. ENGINE PUMP PUGE CONTOL VALVE FAILS CLOSED 2= ELECTICAL COMHANO FAILUE CONSEOUENCEb THE $-IVB STAGE WILL NOT BE IN A tisafeit CONDITION IF THE PESSUE I5 BELOW 2pOOO PSIA AT 210 DEGEES F {1/4 BUST PESSUE)* THE AMBIENT HELIUM SPHEE PESSUE WILL NOT INCEASE SIGNIFICANTLY FOM THE PESSUE AT THE TIME OF THE FAILUE, IN TME EVENT OF FAILUNE TO DUMP THIS BOTTLE_ THE CONTINUOUS BLEED POVIDED BY THE LOX CHILLUOWN PUMP PUGE AND _NOMAL LEAKAGE WILL ESULT IN MEETING THE 4tOO0 PSIA AT 310 DEGEES F CONTINGENCY CASE (1/2 BUST PESSUE), MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SLV SYSTEMS 4-#3

148 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - blv SYSTEMS ITEF 9-2 LOX DUMP FAILS TO INITIATE AT THE TEMINATION OF S-IVB SECOND BUNt THE S-IVB STAGE WILL BE PASSIVATED-- 1. Eit LOX DUMPEO_ LH2 VENTED_ AMP PESSUE BOTTLES BLOWN DOWN. THE LUX DUMP IS ACCOMPLISHED BY OPE_IN_ THE J-2 ENGINE _AINSTAGE CONTOL SOLENOID AND THE E_GIN_ HELIUM CONTOL SOLENOI_t ESPECTIVELY, THIS ALLOWS LOX TO BE DUMPED THOUGH THE ENGINE THUST CHAMBEo FAILUE POI_TS CONSEQUENCES lo DEPLETED ENGINE CONTOL HELIUM SUPPLY 2. LOX PEVALVE FAILS CLOSED 3, SEQUENCING FAILUE 4. FfAIN LOX VALVE FAILS CLOSED {ENGINE) 5, MAINSTAGE CONTOL SOLENOID FAILS CLOSED 6o ENGINE HELIUM CONTOL SOLENOID FAILS CLOSED LOSS OF LOX DUMP AND ITS ESULTING THUST OF APPOXIMATELY?OU POUNDS COULD PEVENT THE S-IVB FOM ENTEING THE LUNA IMPACT TAJECTOY AND WILL CAUSE LOX TANK SAFING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY VENTING THOUGH THE LOX NPV. F MISSION EV DATE isection GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/?0 SLV SYSTEMS _-44

149 4 J NASA - Manned Spacecraft Canter MISSION ULES SECTION 4 - $LV SYSTEMS 9-3 ENGINE CONTOL BOTTLE HELIUM DUMP FAILS TO INITIATE AT THE TEMINATION OF SECOND BUNI THE S-ZVB WILL BE PASSIVATED-- I, E,= THE POPELLANTS DUMPED AND PESSUE BOTTLES BLOWN DOWN= THE STAGE AMBIENT EPESSUIZATION SPHEES AE CONNECTED TO THE ENGINE CONTOL BOTTLE AND THUS SUPPLY HELIUM TO CONTINUOUSLY EPLENISH THE ENGINE CONTOL BOTTLE. THE AMBIENT EPESSUIZATION SPHEE AE DUMPED TO APPOXIMATELY 1500 PBIA AT THE INITIATION OF DUMP= THE ENGINE CONTOL SPHEE PEBGUEo DUING LOX AND LH2 DUMPt WILL THEN ALBO BLOW DOWN TO APPOXIMATELY 15OO PSIA, FOM THIS POINTD THE FLOW IS A COMBINED AMBIENT AND CONTOL BOTTLE HELIUMo FAILUE POINTS 1, ENGINE HELIUM CONTOL SOLENOID VALVE FAILS CLOSED 2= E_ECTICAL COMMAND FAI6UE CONBEQUENCES IF THE ENGINE CONTOL BOTTLE DUMP FAILS TO INITIATE= THE STAGE WILL NOT BE COMPLETELY SAFED, IF THE PESSUE IG NOT BELOW THE 9=700 PBI (AMBIENT) MAXIMUM SAFE OPEATING PEGSUE THE BOTTLE IS NOT CONSIDEED SAFEo I MISSION EVI DATE BECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 BLV SYSTEMS 4-45

150 5 CSM SYSTEMS I

151 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS.-... CM5 EECOM MISSION ULE ATIONALE (BASED ON MISSION ULES EFFECTIVE THIS DATE) INTODL:TION " APOLLO 12 CSM EECOM MISSION ULES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO POVIDE FO CEW SAFETY AND A HIGH POBABILITY OF SuccESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION OBJECTIVES. TO ACHIEVE THIS THE FOLLOWING CITEIA HAVE BEEN USED--- A. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF LM SYSTEMS AS BACKUP TO CSM SYSTEMS. THE LM SYSTEMS WILL NUT BE USED UNTIL A FAILUE O A POGESSION OF FAILUES HAS DEPIVED THE CSM OF AN ESSENTIAL CAPABILITY. AT THAT TIMEr THE LM SYSTEMS WILL NOMALLY BE uged FO THE MOST PACIICAL ETUN TO EATH, B, ONCE LUNA OBIT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED_ FAILUE OF A COMPONENT O SYSTEM WHICH LEAVES THE CSM WITH ONE EMAINING CAPABILITY TO PEFOM AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONt WHEE THIS FUNCTION IS NOT EQUIED TO MAINTAIN CAPABILITY TO PEFOM TEl WITH THE CSMt AND WHEE THE LIKELIHOOD OF FAILUE OF THE EMAINING COMPONENT O SYSTEM IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEAN TIME BEFOE FAILUE POBABILITYt THE MISSION WILL NOMALLY BE CONTINUED. THE ATIONALE IS--- FOM LUNA OBIT THE ETUN TO EATH TIME IS AT LEAST 2 DAYS AND FOM SOME POINTS EvEN LONGE, THUS SITUATEO_ THE SPACECAFT ANO GEW AE ALEADY COMMITTED TO ENDUING THIS SUBSTANTIAL PEIOD OF SOME DEGEE OF ISK OF THE EMAINING COMPONENT O system FALLING. TO CONTINUE WITH THE NOMINAL MISSION WILL INCEASE THE MISSION TIME BY AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE EMAINING SCHEDULED TIME IN LUNA OBITI AND THE INCEASE IN TIMEr THOUGH SIGNIFICANTt ODE5 NOT EXCESSIVELY INCEASE THE TOTAL MISSION TIME_ ELATIVELY SPEAKING. BECAUSE OF THISo THE OBJECTIVES WHICH CAN BE ACHIEVED _Y CONTINUING THE MISSION WITH SUCH A CON01TION AE CONSIDEED WOTH THE SLIGHT INCEASE IN ISK. C. THEE AE NO CSM EECOM SYSTEMS FAILUES FO WHICH POWEED DESCENT WILL BE TEMINATED. POWEED DESCENT EQUIES APPOXIMATELY 12 MINUTES FOM INITIATION TO TOUCHDOWN AND ELIABLE ECOGNITION OF POBLEMS IN THIS TIME FAME IS UNLIKELY, ADDITION OF THE CSM AUX BATTEY WILL ALLOW LIFTING OFF AT T3 WHICH WILL PEMIT ADDITIONAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS TIME, II, MISSION ULES ATIONALE A, BY MISSION PHASE--- 1, LAUNCH - THE ONLY EASONS FO WHICH LAUNCH WILL BE ABOTED AE--- (A) FAILUES WHICH ESULT IN LOSS OF A VIABLE ENVIONMENT FO THE CEW. THIS OCCUS ONLY AFTE LOSS OF CABIN INTEGITY AND FAILUES WHICH ESULT IN LOSS OF THE SUITED CAPABILITY (l.e=o LOSS OF SUIT INTEGITY_ BOTH MAIN EGULATOS O DEMAND EGULATOS FAILED CLOSED, LOSS OF BOIH SUIT CUMPESSOS_ O LOSS OF THE 02 MANIFOLD,) SINCE THE CEW CANNOT SUVIVE UNDE THESE ENVIONMENTAL CONDITIONSt IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE CEW ETUN TO THE EATH'S ATMOSPHEE IMMEDIATELY, (B) FAILUES WHICH ESULT IN LOSS OF ELECTICAL POWE SOUCES TO THE EXTENT THAT THE 2-i ENTY CANNOT BE ACHIEVED, {THIS OCCUS ONLY WITH LOSS OF ALL SM POWE SOUCES AND ONE ENTY BATTEY,) SINCE CONTINUATION CAN ONLY HAVE OISASTEOU5 ESULTSt AN IMMEDIATE ABOT 15 NECESSAY, 2, POWEED DESCENT- THEE AE NO CSM EECUM SYSTEM FAILUES FO WHICH POWEED DESCENT WILL BE TEMINATED, LIFTOFF FOM THE LUNA SUFACE WILL BE PEFOMED NU SOONE THAN T3 FO ANY CSM EECOM SYSTEM FAILUES, THE AUX BATTEY IS CAPABLE OF POVIDING SUFFICIENT ELECTICAL ENEGY TO SUPPOT TEl AND A LOW POWE ETUN TO EATH. 3, ALL OTHE POWEED FLIGHT - THEE AE NO FAILUES FO WHICH THESE WILL BE TEMINATED, NOMINAL COMPLETION OF THESE POWEED PHAS=S, IN EACH CASE_ WILL PLACE THE SPACECAFT ON AN EXPECTED AND EASONABLY WELL KNOWN TAJECTOY FOM WHICH A PEPLANNED ETUN MANEUVE CAN BE MADE, EALY TEMINATION OF A MANEUVE LEAVES THE SPACECAFT ON AN UNKNOWN TAJECTOY WHICH WILL EQUIE TIME TO DETEMINE, IN THE MOST POBABLE FAILUE CASESw IT 15 SAFE TO COMPLETE THE MANEUVE, IN THOSE OTHE CASES WHEE THE CEW IS IMMEDIATELY ENOANGEEDJ TEMINATION OF THE MANEUVE WILL NOT IMPOVE THE SITUATION SLGNEFIO_NTLY, A. TANSPOSITION_ DOCKING9 AND EXTACTION - THE ONLY FAILUE FO WHICH TD&E WILL BE INHIBITED IS FAILUE OF THE DOCKIN_ LATCHES TO THE EXTENT THAT LESS THAN THEE LATCHES LOCATED 120 DEGEES APAT O THE STUCTUAL EQUIVALENT EXIST. WITH THIS CONDITION_ THE DOCKED CONFIGUATION IS 'STUCTUALLY' UNSOUND AND DAMAGE TO THE SPACECAFT MAY ESULT, ALTHOUGH TD&E AS OUTLINED HEE CAN BE PEFOMED WITH A MULTITUDE OF FAILUESt THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE MISSION. WILL BE CONTINUED, NO DOES IT MEAN THAT TDSE WILL B_ PEFOMED - JUST THAT IT COULD BE PEFOMED IF DESIED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT suit INTEGITY 15 NOT EQUIED FO TDGE* FO MISSION ULE PUPOSES AND FO PACTICAL PUPOSES_ CABIN INTEGITY is NOT CONSIDEEO A SINGLE POINT FAILUE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO i:+ FNL L2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS EECOM B-1

152 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS,... i 5, POST DOCKING/LM JETTISON = THE LMt WITH O WITHOUT THE DESCENT STAGE WILL BE ETAINED THOUGH TEl (WITHIN DELTA V CONSTAINTS) FO THOSE CSN SYSTEMS FAILUES WHICH LEAVE THE CSM WITH ONE EMAINING CAPABILITY TO PEFOM AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION AND whee SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE EMAINING CAPABILITY WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED AND/O EPLACED BY THE LM SYSTEMS* B, BY SPACECAFT SYSTEM O COMPONENT - MISSION PHASES DISCUSSED IN THE PEvIOuS SECTION (SECTION A) AE NOT COVEED IN THIS SECTION, I, ENVIONMENTAL CONTOL SYSTEM CA) CABIN INTEGITY - CABIN INTEGITY IS EQUIED TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE ALL MISSION phases, THE LOSS OF CABIN INTEGITY NECESSITATES THE ELIANCE ON THE SUITS TO POVIDE THE CEW WITH A VIABLE ENVIONMENT* THE SUITS AE UNCOMFOTABLE, AE EXTEMELY FATIGUING WHEN CEW ACTIVITY IS NEQUINBDt CAN LIMIT CAPABILITY TO PEFOM OUTINE CEW FUNCTION$_ AND CAN PLACE ONE O ALL CEWMEN IN A HAZADOUS ENVIONMENT AB A ESULT OF ONLY A SINGLE FAILUE, FO THESE EASONSt IT IS CONSIDEED unsafe AND IMPACTICAL TO CONTINUE THE MISSION WITH LOSS OF CABIN INTEGITY, {8) FIE O SMOKE IN CABIN - TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE ALL MISSION PHASES_ THE CABIN MuST BE FEE OF FIE OH SMOKE* ASIDE FOM THE OBVIOUS IMMEDIATE HAZAD TO THE CEw, FIE WILL DAMAGE EL_UIPMENT IN THE SPACECAFTp THE EXTENT OF WHICH IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL NOT BE KNOWN* CONSLQUENTLYt EVEN IF THE FIE HAS BEEN CONTOLLEDt ALL MISSION PHASES WILL BE TEMINATED If A FIE HAS OCCUED, (C) 02 MANIFOLD LEAKS - THE 02 MANIFOLD IS DEFINED AS THAT POTION OF THE 900 PS,IA SYSTEM OOW,_STEAM OF THE SM SUPPLY VALVE9 AND THE EO0 PSIA SYSTEM* 02 MANIFOLD LEAKS ESULT IN EXCESSIVE O2 USAGE AND OVEPESSUIZATION OF THE CABIN AND/O LOSE OF CAPABILITY TO PESSUIZE WATE TANKS IEBULTIN_ IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF WATE DuMP CAPABILITY W1TH ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON FUEL CELLG)_ LOSE OF WATE EMOVAL FOM THE CABIN (WITH ESULTING HIGH HUMIDITY AND EXCESSIVE FEE WATE IN THE CABIN), AND LOSS OF AUTOMATIC CABIN PESSUE CONTOL, IF THE LEAK EBULTB IN EXCESSIVE DEPLETION OF THE OXYGEN SUPPLY, 1T WILL BE NECESSAY TO [BOLATE THE MANIFOLD. CAdIN PESSUE CAN BE MAINTAINE0 BY MANUALLY INTODUCING OXYGEN INTO THE CABIN THOUGH THE UPTUED MANIFOLD O THOUGH THE EPESS 02 VALVE. WITH THE EXISTENCE OF COLD CABIN WALLS AND COLD GLYCOL LINESo IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ExcEsSIVE HUMIDITY WILL ESULT FOM LOSS OF 5UIT LOOP WATE EMOVAL CAPA_ILITYI ALTHOUGH CONSIDEABLE FEE WATE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY EXIST IN THE CABIN* THIS CAN BE COLLECTED FOM ITS CONDENSATION POINTS USING THE VACUUM CONNECTION TO THE OVEBOAD DUMPS, IF NECESSAYP FOCED EVAPOATION CAN BE USED TO DISPOSE OF EXCESS FUEL C_LL WATE ONC_ THE WATE TANKS AE FULL. IT WILL BE NECESSAY TO CHECK rhe CO2 CANNISTES peiodically TO I_UNE T_AT SWELLING DOES _OT OCCU AS A ESULT OF THE ADDITIONAL _ATE IN THE CABIN ATMOSPHEE, BECAUSE THESE CAPABILITIES DO EXISTt THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED ONCE UNDOCKING HAS BEEN PEFUNr_ED, (UNDOCKING WILL NOT BE PEFOMED WITH THIS CONDITION BECAUBE THE BACKUP MEANS OF CEW TANSFE FOM THE LM TO THE CSM_ lle,t EVTt IB LOST*) THE INCEASE IN MISSION TIME ESULTING FOM CONTINUING THE NOMINAL MISSION PODUCES A SLIGHT INCEASE IN ISK _HICH IS CONSIDEED ACCEPTABLE IN LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES WHICH CAN BE ACHIEVED. HOWEVEt BECAUSE THIS POBLEM WILL E,DIE CONSIDEABLE CEW ATTENTION AND BECAUSE IT DOES EPESENT SOME INCEASE IN ISK TO CEw BAFETYP ALL MISSION PHASES PIO TO UNDOCKING WILL BE TEMINATED, (UI NAI;_ G_ ESULATUNS- TLI WILL BE INHIBITPD IF ONE MAIN 02 EGULATO HAS FAILED CLOSED BECAUSE FAILUE OF THE EMAININ_ EGULATO IN THE CLOSED POSITION WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF THE CAPABILITIES DISCUSSED IN 'IC11 ABOVE (FO O2 MANIFOLD LEAKS WHICH EuUIE ISOLATION OF THE MANIFOLD}, BECAUSE OF THE CEW TASKS INVOLVED AND THE INCEASE i,_ ISK TO TmE CEW, TLL WILL NOT BE PEFOMED, IF ONE MAIN _2 EGULATO HAS FAILED OPEN AND THE OTHE IB FUNCTIONING NOMALLY, TLI WILL BE PEFOMED. FULL CAPABILITY EMAINS BY MANUAL EGULATION OF THE FAILED OPEN EGULATO IN THE EVENT THE OTHE EGULATO FAILS CLOSED. ONCE TLI HAS BEEN PEFO_IED_ THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED AS LUNG AS ONE MAIN EGULATO PEFOMS NOMALLY BECAUSE FULL CAPABILITY EMAINS, IF THE EGULATO FAILS PIO TO UNOUCKING_ TH_ LOSS OF CAPABILITY ASSOCIATED WIIH THIS FAILUE E_UIH_S _IISSIO_ TEMI_XATION-" NOWEVE_ THE EMAINING CAPAGILITY AS DESCIBED IN _tc_ ABOVE WILL ALLOW SATISFACTOY TEMINATION OF THE NISSIUN* ONDOCKING WILL NOT BB PEFOMED IF BO]H MAIN EGJLATO_ HAVE FAILED _ECAUSE THE BACKUP CAPABILITY TO TANSFE THE CEW FD_ THE LM TO THE CSM IS LOST, AF[E UNDOCKING NAB BEEN PEFOMED_ THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED B_CAUSE ADDITIONAL ISK ASSOCIATED WITH CONTINUING FO IHE ADDITIONAL TIME INVOLVED WITH BOTH MAIN EGULATOS FAILED IS CONSIDEED ACCEPTABLE IN LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES WHICH CAN BE ACHIEVED, ' ISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1A F'NL L2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS EP.:CUM

153 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSSONUL_S SECTION 5 - CBM SYSTEMS 1TEN (E) ECS COOLANT LOOPSt ECS ADIATOBp AND ECS EVAPOATOS - NEITHE ECS EVAPOATO 15 EQUIED TO INITIATE O CONTINUE ANY MISSION PHASE, EATH OBIT WILL BE CONTINUED AS LONG AS EITHE COOLANT LOOP WITH ITS ASSOCIATED ADIATO IS AVAILABLE AND AS LONG AS IT IS PACTICAL, THIS CAN BE OONE BECAUSE BY POWEING THE SPACECAFT DOWN AFTE FAILUE OF THE BMAININU COOLANT LOOP, AT LEAST 4 HOU5 OF POWEED DOWN OBIT LIFETIME FOLLOWED BY 1,5 HOUS POWEED UP CAN BE ACHIEVED AFTE LOS5 OF ALL COOLINGw WHICH WILL ALLOW A SATISFACTOY ENTY, TO COMMIT TO TLI O LOI O TO CONTINUE TLC EQOIES BOTH COOLANT LOOPS AND BOTH ADIATOS, IF EITHE LOOP IS LOSTp AN ADDITIONAL FAILUE WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF ALL COOLING, IN PAI_TICULA_ LOSS OF THE PIMAY LOOP WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF THE G&N SYSTEM WHICH WILL MAKE MISSION CONTINUATION IMPACTICAL* SINCE LOSS OF EITHE ADIATO MAKES THE ESPECTIVE LOOP DEPENDENT UPON ITS EVAPOATO WHICH IS LIMITED IN CAPABILITY BY THE WATE AVAILABLEP THE LOOP IS LOST ALTHOUGH ULTIMATE LOSS WILL BE EXTENDED until THE WATE SUPPLY 15 EXPENDED, CONSEOUENTLYt LOSS OF THE ADIATO IS TEATED AS LOSS OF THE ESPECTIVE LOOP AFTE TLI. AFTE LOI_ THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED IF THE SECONDAY LOOP IS LOST AS LONG AS THE PIMAY LOOP IS AVAILABLE, THE SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE PIMAY COOLANT LOOP IS ASSOCIATED WITH MEAN TIME BEFOE FAILUE CITEIA ESTABLISHED IN THE INTODUCTION, ALSO_ CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING THE MISSION IF THE PIMAY ADIATOS AE LOST AS LONG AS THE SECONDAY LOOP AND THE PIMAY LOOP WITH EVAPOATIVE COOLING ONLY AE STILL AVAILABLE, IN THIS CONFIGUATION FULL CAPABILITY EMAINSt AND THE OBJECTIVES MAKE IT WOTHWHILE TO CONTINUE, AFTE POT HAS BEEN INITIATEOP THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED TO T3 EVEN IF ALL COOLING IS LOST, EVEN THOUGH THE TIME EQUIED FO ENDEZVOUS WILL BE IN EXCESS OF THE NO COOLING CAPABILITY OF CSM SYSTEMSI ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE CSM CAN CONTINUE FO AN EXTENDED PEIOD POWEED DOWN WITH NO COOLING, SINCE A POWE DOWN WILL BE EQUIED PIO TO COMPLETION OF ENDEZVOUS IN ANY CASE_ THE LUNA LANDING MAKES IT WOTHWHILE TO CONTINUE, AFTE TOUCHDOWN_ THE NOMINAL MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED IF THE PIMAY LOOP IS LOST AS LON_ AS THE SECONDAY LOOP EMAINS, SINCE THE GGN WOULD HAVE TO BE POWEED DOWN PIO TO COMPLETING A ENOEEVOUSt NOTHING IS LOST BY CONTINUING THE NOMINAL LUNA STAY, THE POBABILITY OF FAILUE OF THE SECONDAY LOOP IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEAN TIME BEFOE FAILUE CITEIA DEVELOPED IN THE INTODUCTION, {F) SUIT INTEGITY - SUIT INTEGITY IS EQUIED TO BE GO FO UNDOCKING TO POVIDE A BACKUP MEANS OF CEW TANSFE (EVT) IN THE EVENT THE TWO SPACECAFT CANNOT BE EDOCKED, ALL OTHE MISSION PHASES WILL BE CONTINUED WITH LOSS OF SUIT INTEGITY BECAUSE CABIN CAN POVIDE ALL NECESSAY LIFE SUPPOT FUNCTIONS, FO MISSION ULE PUPOSESt CABIN INTEGITY IB NOT CONSIDEED A SINGLE POINT FAILUE, (G) GLYCOL LEAK IN COMMAND MODULE - TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE ALL MISSION PHASESt THE COMMAND MODULE MOST BE FEE OF GLYCOL LEAKSt GLYCOL IS TOXIC AND ITG PESENCE IN THE CM ATMOSPHEE IS HAZADOUS TO THE CEW, IT IS NECESSAY TO MINIMIZE EXPOSUE TO THIS ENVIONMENT-- CONSEQUENTLY, ALL MISSION PHASES WILL BE TEMINATED IF A GLYCOL LEAK HAS OCCUED, THE LM WILL BE ETAINED FO TEl TO POVIDE THE CEW WITH A NON-TOXIC ENVIONMENT FO TANSEATH COAST FO AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE, {H) EXCESSIVE CABIN HUMIDITY - TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE ALL MISSION PHASESt THE COMMAND MODULE MUST BE FEE OF EXCESSIVE CABIN HUMIDITY, EXCESSIVE HUMIDITY ETADS THE CEW'S CAPABILITy TO EJECT BODY HEAT, THE CAPACITY OF THE HUMAN BODY TO ETAIN HEAT WITHOUT A EDUCTION IN PHYSICAL CAPABILITY IS LIMITED (APPOXIMATELY 400 BTU), IT IS NECESSAY TO MINIMIZE EXPOSUE TO THIS ENVIONMENT-- CONSEDUENTLY_ ALL MISSION PHASES WILL BE TEMINATED IF' EXCESSIVE CABIN HUMIDITY OCCUS, THE LM WILL BE ETAINED FO TEl TO POVIDE THE CEW WITH A SATISFACTOY ENVIONMENT FO TANSEATH COAST, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS EECOM

154 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 _ CSM SYSTEMS ITE_ (1) POTABLE H20 TANK AND WASTE H20 TANK - NEITHE THB POTABLE TANK NO THE WASTE TANK IS EQUIED TO INITIATE O TO CONTINUE ANY MISSION PHASE EXCEPT EATH OBITt WHEE THE POTABLE TANK IS NECESSAY FO DINKING WATE, NEITHE EVAPOkATO IS EQUIED FO ANY MISSION PHASE-- THEEFOEt THE WASTE TANK IN NOT NECESSAY, IF THE potable TANK IS LOST_ THE LM WATE SUPPLY CAN BE USED FO CEW CONSUMPTIONt ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE NECESSAY TO AMEND THE LM TIMELINE BECAUSB OF DEPLETION OF LM WATE BY THIS MEANS, THE AMOUNT OF WA[E AVAILABLE IN THE ASCENT STAGE AFTE A NOMINAL LUNA STAY AND ENDEZVOUS WILL BE APPOXIMATELY 25 POUNDS, WHILE THIS IS LESS THAN NOMINAL CEW CONSUMPTIONt IT IS ADEQUATE TO ALLOW A SAFE ETUN TO EATH, (J) SUIT COMPESSOS - ONE SUIT COMPESSO O THE VACUUM CLEANE IS EQUIED TO CONTINUE EATH OBIT SINCE ENTY CAN BE PEFOMED IN A TIME FAME COMPATIBLE with CO2 BUILDUP IN THE CM AND USE OF THE O2 FACE MASKS, BOTH SUIT COMPESSOS MUST BE AVAILABLE TO PEFOM ILl, IF ONE SUIT COMPESSO HAS BEEN LOST BETWEEN LAUNCH AND TLIt THE OTHE COMPESSO WILL NATUALLY BE SOMEWHAT SUSPECT. IN ADOITIONP IT IS CONSIDEED UNDESIABLE TO COMMIT TU A LUNA MISSION with ONLY ONE _uit COMPESSO. AFTE TLIt ONLY ONE SUIT COMPESSO IS EQUIED TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE ALL MISSION PHASES. IF THE EMAINING COMPESSO AND THE VACUUM CLEANE AE LOST_ AN AANGEMENT CAN BE MADE USING THE SUIT HOSES AND THEI INTECONNECTS TO ALLOW THE LM SUIT FANS TO PUMP 02 THOUGH THE CM SUIT LOOP FO CO2 AND WATE EMOVAL, CSM POWEH O LM OWE MAY BE USED TO POWE THE LM SUIT FANS UNDE THIS AANGEMENT IF THE LM DESCENT STAGE IS STILL ATTACHED, THIS CONFIGUATION SHOULD POVIDE ADEQUATE CO2 EMOVAL TO ALLOW SAFE TEMINATION OF THE MISSION, FO LOSS OF BO[H SUI_ COMPESSOS AND THE VACUUM CLEANE, THE LM DESCENT STAGE WILL BE ETAINED FO TEl IF POSSIBLE. IF THE DPSCENT $TA_E CANNOT BE ETAINEDP THE ASCENT STAGE WILL BE ETAINED. (K) SuIT CICUIT - THE SUIT CICUIT IS EQUIED TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE ALL MISSION PHASES, IF THE SUIT CICUIT IS LOSTt THE CAPABILITY TO POVIDE CO2 EMOVAL AND WATE EMOVAL IS LOST. LOSS OF CO2 EMOVAL PLACES THE CEW IN A HAZADOUS ENVIONMENT, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE MISSION MUST BE TEMINATED. lit MAY BE DESIABLE TO UTILIEE LM SYSTEMS IN A MANNE SIMILIA TO THAT DESCIBED IN iijil ABOVE,) IF POSSIBLE. THE LM WILL BE ETAINED FO TEl TO UTILIZE THE LM SUIT CICUIT DUINS TANSEATH COAST, AN EVALUATION OF THE CAPABILITY EMAINING IN THE LM ASCENT STAGE AND THE FAILUE WHICH CAUSED LOSS OF THE SUIT CICUIT WILL BE MADE TO DETEMINE WHETHE O NOT IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS TO ETAIN THE LM ASCENT STAGE ONLY FO TEl. 21 IUVEBOAD DUMPS- AT LEAST ONE OVEBOAD DUMP IS EQUIED TD CONTINUE EATH OBITt TO INITIATE TLI, TO CONTINUE TLC AND TO INITIATE LOI, THESE PHASES WILL BE TEVINATED BECAUSE ONE DUMP 1S NECESSAY TO ALLOW DUMPING OF WASTE WATE {INCLUDING FUEL CELL WATE PODUCTION) AND TO ALLOW DISPOSAL OF UINEe AFTE LOI HAS BEEN PEFOMEDp THE NOMINAL MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED WITH LOSS OF ALL OVEBOAD DUMPS, THE FLUID STOAGE CAPACITY OF THE CSM (WHICH INCLUDES FIVE-Oi_E GALLON BAGS_ S UTSlS AND CTAIS) COUPLED WITH FOCED WATE BOILING TO MANAGE FUEL CELL WATE PODUCTIONt _HOULD ALLOW ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A NOI_INAL LUNA STAY, m MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/]5/70 CSM SYSTEMS EECOM 5-4

155 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION B - CSM SYSTEMS 3= CYOGENIC STOAGE SYSTEM OXYGEN STOAGE TANKS-- HYDOGEN STOAGE TANKS - FO EATH OBIT THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED WITH A MINIMUM OF ONE 02 TANK AND ONE H2 TANK_ SO LONG AS SUFFICIENT QUANTITY EMAINS IN THE TANK TO ALLOW MISSION CONTINUATION, THIS CAN BE DONE BECAUSE ENTY AEAS AE ALWAYS EADILY AVAILABLE IF THE LMAININO TANK IS LOST (WITHIN i O 2 HOUS), ALL OTHE MISSION PHASES - HYDOGEN - BOTH H2 TANKS AE EQUIED TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE ALL MISSION PHASES {EXCEPT POT), THIS EQUIEMENT EXISTS BECAUSE " (i) LOSS OF THE EMAINING TANK ESULTS IN LOSS OF THE FUEL CELLS PLACING ALL POWE EQUIEMENTS ON THE SM AQX BATTEY AND ENTY BATTEIES (THESE POWE SOUCES AE SUFFICIENT FO LOW POWE LEVEL ETUNS_ ONLY), (2) ALTHOUGH SUFFICIENT H2 IS MAINTAINED IN EACH TANK TO ALLOW AT LEAST A POWEED DOWNp SAFE ETUN TO EATH_ SUFFICIENT WUANTITY IS NOT AVAILABLE TO PEMIT MISSION CONTINUATION, ONCE POWEED DESCENT HAS BEEN IJ_ITIATED, THAT PHASE WILL BE CONTINUED TO ALLOW A LUNA LANDING with A LUNA STAY FO A DUATION OF ONE CSM EVOLUTION (TB), THE POWEED DESCENT PHASE IS TOO SHOT TO PEMIT ADEQUATE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND THE ADDITIONAL TIME INVOLVED IN LANDING WITH A TB LIFTOFF DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCEASE THE TOTAL MISSION TIME, ESSENTIALLY_ THE SAME ATIONALE APPLIES TO OXYGEN EXCEPT THAT THE OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM HAS THEE TANKS. THE AMOUNT OF OXYGEN AVAILABLE IS ALMOST DOUBLE THE NOMINAL MISSION EQUIEMENTS, SINCE TWO TANKS (TANKS i.2) CAN MEET MISSION OXYGEN EQUIEMENTS WITH AMPLE MAOINSP IT IS APPAENT THAT LOSS OF ONE TANK (PATICULALY, TANK 3) COULD BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING THE CAPABILITY TO PEFOM THE NOMINAL MISSION, FO THESE EASONS CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING THE MISSION AFTE TLI WITH THIS FAILUE IF SYSTEM INTEGITY EMAINS. IN BOTH H2 AND 02 SYSTEMS, EDLINES AE BASED ON LOSS OF A SINGLE TANK - THUS_ THE OXYGEN EDLINES AE BASED ON THE TWO LOWEST TANKS MOWEVEP NOMINALLY EITHE TANK E O TANK 2 WILL HAVE SOFFICIENT QUANTITY TO ALLOW A SINGLE TANK ETUN. 4. ELECTICAL POWE SYSTEM CA) FUEL CELLS - TWO FUEL CELLS AE EQUIED TO CONTINUE EATH OBIT, TWO FUEL CELLS AE ADEQUATE TO POVIDE ALL NOMINAL FUEL CELL FUNCTIONS-- HOWEVE_ ONE FUEL CELL CAN ONLY SUPPLY A SEVEELY POWEED DOWN OPEATION_ ELSL BATTEY SUPPLEMENT WILL BE EQUIED. ADDITIONALLYt FAILUE OF TWO FUEL CELLS SEVEELY UNDEMINES THE CONFIDENCE IN THE EMAINING FUEL CELLt AND FAILUE OF THE EMAINING FUEL CELL WOULD EQUIE AN ASAP ENTY USING THE AUX BATTEY AND ENTY BATTEIES, ALL THEE FUEL CELLS AE EQUIED TO INITIATE TLI, EVEN THOUGH TWO FUEL CELLS CAN SUSTAIN ALL NOMINAL FUEL CELL EQUIEME_NTS_ IT IS CONSIDEED UNDESIABLE TO COMMIT TO A LUNA MISSION WITHOUT FULL ELECTICAL POWE CAPABILITY, FOM TLI THOUGH PDI INITIATION CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING THE MISSION IF ONE FUEL CELL HAS BEEN LOST. IF THE FAILUE IS A ANDOM FAILOEt THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED SINCE TWO FUEL CELLS CAN SUSTAIN NOMINAL EQUIEMENTS, IF THE FAILUE IS A TYPE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SEIOUS SUSPICION OF THE INTEGITY OF THE TWO EMAINING FUEL CELLS_ THE MISSION WILL BE TEMINATED. ONCE POWEED DESCENT HAS BEEN INITIATEDt IT WILL BE CONTINUED AND SO LONG AS ONE FUEL CELL EMAINE LUNA STAY NEED NOT BE TEMINATED UNTIL TB, (B) ENTY BATTEIES - TWO ENTY BATTEIEB AE EQUIED TO CONTINUE EATH OBIT, THIS IS NECESSAY BECAUSEP ALTHOUGH EATH OBIT COULD BE CONTINUED GN ONE BATTEY AND A SAFE ENTY PEFOMEDt FAILUE OF THE EMAINING BATTEY WILL LEAVE THE SPACECAFT INCAPABLE OF PEFOMING AN ENTY. THEE ENTY BATTEIES AE EQUIED TO INITIATE TLI, ALTHOUGH TWO BATTEIE_ WITH THE BATTEY CHAGE CAN POVIDE ALL BATTEY _E_ULEMENT_t IT IS CONSIDEED UNDESIABLE TO COMMIT TO A LUNA MISSION WITHOUT FULL ELECTICAL POWE CAPABILITY, ONCE TLI HAS BEEN PEFOMEOt CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING ALL MISSION PHASES WITH TWO ENTY BATTEIES. IF THE FAILUE IS JUDGED TO BE A ANDOM FAILUE, THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUEO SINCE ALL MISSION EQUIEMENTS CAN BE SUPPLIED BY TWO BATTEIES AND THE BATTEY CHAGE, IF THE FAILUE IS SUCH THAT THE INTEBITY OF THE OTHE TWO BATTEIES IS SUSPECTt THEN THE MISSION WILL BE TEMINATED TO MINIMIZE THE EMAINING MISSION TIME AND EDUCE THE ISK OF LOSING THE TWO EMAINING BATTEIES PIO TO ENTY, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 :NL.2/J.5/?0 CSM SYSTEMS EECOM 5-5

156 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - CSM SYSTEMS ITE_ {C) MAIN BUSES-- BATTEY BUSES-- AC BUSES-- AND PHASE A OF AC BUSES -,ALTHOUGH ALL ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS DEIVE POWE FOM EDUNDANT SOUCESt LOSS OF ANY ONE OF THESE BUSES WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF SOME vey useful FUNCTIONS AND_ MOE IMPOTANTt WILL ESULT IN A SPACECAFT CONDITION SUCH THAT ONE ADDITIONAL FAILUE WILL ENDE THE SPACECAFT INCAPABLE OF ETUNING THE CEW TO EATH, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE ADDITIONAL FAILUE NECESSAY FO THIS CONDITION IS NOT LIMITED TO L055 OF THE EMAINING BUS SINCE SOME OF THE SPACECAFT CONTOL POPULSION SYSTEMS AE EDUNDANT BUT EACH OF THE EDUNDANT SYSTEMS HAS A SINbLE ELELTICAL POWE SOUCE, CONSE_UENTLY_ ALL MISSION PHASES WILL BE TEMINATED IF ANY ONE OF THE LISTED BUSES IS LOST. IF POSSIBLB_ THE LM DESCENT STAGE WILL BE ETAINED FO TEl AND THE DESCENT POPULSION SYSTEM WILL BE USED TO PEFOM THE TEI BUN, THIS IS DONE TD POTECT AGAINST THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE FAILUE DUING THE TEl BUN WHICH WOULD EITHE LEAVE THE SPACECAFT INCAPABLE OF COMPLETING THE BUN D LEAVE THE SPACECAFT IN AN UNCONTOLLABLE CONDITION, THE LM ASCENT STAGE WILL BE ETAINED FO TEI FO LOSS OF A MAIN BUS O AC BUS AS A BACKUP ELECTICAL POWE SOUCE AND FO TACKING_ COMMUNICATION5_ ATTITUDE CONTOL FO ENTY AND MCC CAPABILITIES WHICH WOULD BE LOST IN THE CSM IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHE_ BUS FAILUE, {D) BATTEY ELAY BUS - THE BATTEY ELAY BUS IS EQUIED TO CONTINUE EATH OBIT_ TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE TANSLUNA COASTt TO INIIIATE AND CONTINUE LUNA OBIT_ TO INITIATE PDI, AND TO CONTINUE LUNA STAY, IF THE BATTEY ELAY BUS IS LOSTt THE CAPABILITY TO SWITCH FUEL CELLS_ INVETB5 ANB THE AUX BATTEY ON AND OFF BUSES AND THE OvECUENT/OVEVOLTAGE POTECTION IS LOST. TO CONTINUE THE MISSION WITH THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDEED UNSATISFACTOYt PATICULALY IN LIGHT OF POBABLE FUEL CELL SWITCHING EQUIEMENTS AS DEMONSTATED BY THE FUEL CELL ANOMALIES DUING APOLLO?t 9_ AND 10 MISSIONS. ALSOt THE LOSS OF SWITCHING CAPABILITY LEAVES THE SPACECAFT IN A CONDITION WHEE A SINOLE FAILUE (THE POSSIBLE SINGLE FAILUES AE GEATLY INCEASED IN THIS CONDITION) CAN ESULT IN LOSS OF THE BUS OPt AS IN THE CASE OF SHOTED BUSESt CAN ESULT IN LOSS OF AN AC BUS_ A MAIN DC BU5_ AND TWO FUEL CELLS. (E) INVETE5 - ALL MISSION PHASES WILL BE CONTINUED SO LONG AS TWO INVETE5 EMAIN OPEABLE, TWO INVETES CAN SUPPLY ALL SPACECAFT AC LOADS WITH EDUNDANT AND SEPAATE SOUCES FO THE TWO AC BUSES, IF ONE ADDITIONAL INVETE IS LOSTt THE EMAINING INVETE CAN SUPPLY ALL AC LOADS ON BOTH AC BusES NECESSAY FO A SAFE ETUN TO EATH, CONTINUING THE MISSION ON A SINGLE INVETE IS NOT CONSIDEED DESIABLE BECAUSE AFTE LOSS OF TWO INVETES THE EMAINING INVETE BECOMES SuSPECTt AND LOSS OF THE THID INVETE WILL ENDE THE SPACECAFT INCAPABLE OF PEFOMING A SAFE ETUN TO EATH. IF T_O INVETES AE LOST THE LM DESCENT STAGE WILL BE ETAINED FO TEl IF POSSIBLE_ AND THE DESCENT POPULSION SYSTEM WILL BE USED TO PEFOM THE TEl BUN, THIS IS DONE TO POTECT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF LOSS OF THE EMAINING INVETE DUING THE tel BUN, THE LM ASCENT STAGE _ILL BE ETAINED FO TEl FO THE SAME EASONS IN (C) ABOVE. 5, DOCKING SYSTEM IA) DOCING LATCHES - TO EMAIN DOCKED FO INACTIVE MISSION PHASES EQUIES AT LEAST THEE GOOD DOCKING LATCHES LOCATED 120 DIG, APAT O THE STUCTUAL EQUIVALENT, INDICATIONS AE THAT THEE LATCHES SO LOCATED CAN MAINTAIN TUNNEL PESSUE AND SUSTAIN THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITM C5 MANEUVES AND ATTITUDE CONTOL, TO PEFOM ANY DOCKED SPS BUN O OP$ BUN HE_UIES AT LEAST NINE GOOD DOCKING LATCHES, THIS NUMBE OF LATCHES CAN 5USTAI_ ALL NOMINAL LOADS ON THE INTEFACE ASSOCIATED WITH MAJO BUNS WHEEAS ANY FEWE LATCHES SIGNIFICANTLY INCEASES THE POSSIBILITY OF STUCTUAL FAILUE. {B) GN2 BOTTLES - TO UNDOCK EQUIES THAT AT LEAST TWO GN2 BOTTLES IN THE DOCKINO SYSTEM BE AVAILABLE FO EOOCKING, TO PEMIT UNDOCKINGt EASONABLE ASSUANCE MUST BE AVAILABLE THAT EDOCKING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED, BASED ON THE FAILUE MODEt CONSIDEATION WILL BE GIVEN TO UNDOC_INO WITH ONE ON2 BOTTLE, THAT ISP IF THE FAILUE WHICH HAS ESULTED IN A ONE-BOTTLE EDOCKING CAPABILITY IS THE ESULT OF AN ELECTICAL FAILUE IN ONE SYSTEM (DISCOVEED AT TO&It THUS EQUIING THE USE OF A THID BOTTLE). THEN UNDOCKING WOULD BE PEFOMED WITH ONLY ONE BOTTLE EMAINING. CONVESELY_ IF THE FAILUES WHICH ESULT IN ONE-BOTTLE CAPABILITY AE THE ESULT OF SEPAATE FAILUES OF TWO Gh2 UDTTLESo UNDOCKINb WILL NOT BE PEFOMED BECAUSE THE EMAINING BOTTLE IS SUSPECT. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/iF/TO CSM systems EECOM

157 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSmONULES SECTIONS - CSMSYSTEMS 6t SEQUENTIAL SYSTEM (A) SMJC NOT ACTIVATED - IF THE SEVICE MODULE JETTISON CONTOLLE (SMJC) ACTIVATES PEMATUELYt IT WILL SHUT DOWN AUTOMATICALLY IN 25 SEC. THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED IF THE SOUCE OF ACTIVATION CAN BE DETEMINED ANO ISOLATED= IF THE SOUCE OF ACTIVATION CANNOT BE ISOLATED_ THEN THE ATIONALE OF (b) APPLIES, {B) SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS - TO CONTINUE EATH OBITp TO INITIATE TLIP TO CONTINUE TLCt AND TO INITIATE LOI EQUIES THAT BOTH SEQUBNIIAL SYSTEMS BE OPEABLE, TO CONTINUE THE MISSION INTODUCES THE ISK OF A SINGLE FAILUE LLAVING THE SPACECAFT INCAPABLE OF PEFOMING ENTY, ONCE LUNA OBIT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED_ THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED WITH FAILUE OF ONE SEQUENTIAL SYSTEM, THIS WILL BE DONE BECAUSE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A FAILUE IN THE EMAINING SYSTEM IS ASSUCIATEU WITH THE MEAN TIME BEFOE FAILUE POBABILITY DEVELOPE_ IN THE INTODUCTION_ AND THE SEQUENTIAL SYSTEM IS INACTIVE IN LUNA OBIT EXCEPT FO DOCKING AND LM FINAL SEPAATION, SINCE THE ETUN TO EATH limes AE LENGTHY_ THE SLIGHT ADDITIONAL ISK ASSOCIATED WITH CONTINUING THE MISSION WITH THIS CONDITION IS OFFSET BY THE VALUE OF THE OBJECTIVES WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED, T, INSTUMENTATION SYSTEM CA) CITICAL INSTUMENTATION - CITICAL INSTUMENTAIION IS DEFINED AS THAT INSTUMENTATIONw EITHE TELEMETEED O QNBOANDt EQUIED TQ DETEMINE THE GO/NO-GO STATUS OF THE SPACECAFT. CITICAL INSTUMENTATION INCLUDES THE PIMAY INSTUMENTATION WHICH IS THE DIECT MEANS OF DETEMINING THE STATUS OF A PATICULA FUNCTION AS WELL AS SECONDAY INSTUMENTATION WHICH IS THE INDIECT MEANS OF DETEMINING THE STATUS OF A FUNCTION. TO LOSE CITICAL INSTUMENTATION EQUIES THE LOSE OF MOE THAT ONE PAAMETE, ALTHOUGH GOUPING OF PAAMETES TO SPECIFICALLY DEFINE CITICAL INSTUMENTATION HAS NOT BEEN ATTEMPTED BECAUSE OF THE ALMOST LIMITLESS POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS_ IT IS_ NEVETHELESSt ECOGNIZED THATP AT SOME POINT AFTE A CONTINUOUS POGESSION OF INSTUMENTATION FAILUESt SUFFICIENT INSTUMENTATION WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO DETEMINE SYSTEMS STATUS. ONE EADILY ECOGNIZED GOUP OF CITICAL INSTUMENTATION IS THAT GOUP OF PAAMETES SIGNAL CONDITIONED BY THE COLD-PLATED SCE, TO CONTINUE EATH OBIT INITIATE TLIt LOIo CIC O CONTINUE LUNA OBIT AND LUNA STAY NEQUIE5 THAT CITICAL INSTUMENTATION BE AVAILABLE, THIS IS DONE UECAUSE IT IS CONSIDEED UNSAFE TO CONTINUE THE MISSION WITHOUT THE ABILITY TO DETEMINE SYSTEMS STATUS. ONCE TLI HA5 BEEN PEFOMEDt TLC WILL BE CONTINUED TO PEFOM A FLYBY AND ETUN TO EATH, CONTINUING THE MISSION IN THIB CONFIGUATION IS CONSIDEED MO_ DESIABLE THAN A DIECT ABOT, ALSOP CONTINUING TLC EPESENTS A STEADY STATE OPEATION WHICH IS THE CONDITION WHEE ANOMALIES AE LEAST LIKELY TO OCCUt AS OPPOSED BY THE PETUBATION ON SPACECAFT SYSTEMS IMPOSED ON SPACECAFT SYSTEMS BY THE DIECT ABOT SP5 _UN, ONCE DOI HAS BEEN PEFOMED THE MISSION WILL BE CONTLNUEO TO ALLOW A LUNA LANDING WITH A LUNA STAY OF THE DUATION OF ONE CSM LUNA OBIT. THIS IS DONE BECAUSE THE LOSS OF INSTUMENTATION ITSELF DOES NOT PESENT A HAZAD TO THE CEW EXCEPT WHEN CO_POUNDED BY ACTUAL SYSTEMS FAILUES, THE LIKELIHOOD uf A COMPOUNDING SYBTEM FAILUE IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEAN TIME BEFOE FAILUE POBABILITY DEVELOPED IN THE INTODUCTION, (B) CSM TELEMETY - CSM TELEMETYt EITHE HIGH BIT ATE O LOW BIT ATEr IS EQUIED FO ALL MISSION PHASESt EXCEPT THAT ONCE CINC HAS BEEK PEFOMED THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED TO I_CLUDE A LUNA LANDING AND A LUNA STAY OF TME DUATION UF ONE CSM LUNA OBIT* TELEMETY IS NECESSAY TO CONTINU_ THE MISSION (EVEN THOUGH MOS[ CITICAL PAAMETES AE DISPLAYED ONUOAD) BECAUSE IT IS NECESSAY TO ELIEVE THE CEW OF THE CONTINUOUS DUTY OF MONITOING SPACECAFT SYSTEMS. DUING HIGH ACTIVITY PEIODS AND SLEEP PEIODS THE CEW CANNOT EASONABLY PEFOM THESE TASKS, HOWEVE-- ONCE CIC HAS BEEN PEFOMEDt A ENDEZVOUS IS NECESSAY, TO ALLOW A LUNA LANDING WITH A LUNA STAY WITH DUATION OF ONE CSM LUNA OBIT ADDS LITTLE TO TOTAL MISSION TIME AND THE OBJECTIVES _HICH CAN be ACHIEVED BY A LUNA LANDING MAKES IT WOTHWHILE TO CONTINUE. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_+ FNL Z2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS EECOM B-7

158 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION5 - csmsystems CSM O&C AND POPULSION ATIONALE T}QE FOLLOWING IS THE ATIONALE FO THE GEM GSC AND PUPULSION MISSION ULES, THIS INCLUDES SECTIONS 15_ 16P 17_ AND 18 OF THE APOLLO i_ MISSION ULES, LAUNCH THE MOST IMPOTANT FUNCTION OF THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM IS TO POVIDE FO SAFE ETUN OF THE CEW, THIS INVOLVES THE CAPABILITY TO EFFECT A DEOBITo THEE IS NO SINGLE FAILUE NO EASONABLE COMBINATION OF FAILUES IN THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM WHICH PECLUDE A DEOBIT, TIIEE AE FAILUES WHICH WILL CAUSE A DEGADED METHOD OF CUNTOL FO THE DEOBZT MANEUVE AND SUBSEQUENT ENTY-- HOWEVE_ THIS SUBJECTS THE CEW TO LESS OVEALL POTENTIAL HAZAD THAN A LAUNCH ABOT, IN ADDITIONt THE MAJOITY OF THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM IS IN A PASSIVE O MONITOING btate DUING THE LAUNCH PHASEt THUS MAKING IT DIFFICULT= AND IN SOME CASES IMPOSSIBLE, TO DETECT AND ISOLATE FAILUES* EATH OBIT TO EMAIN IN OBITt THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM MuST ALWAYB POVIDE A MINIMUM OF THEE BASIC THINGS--- ADEQUATE ATTITUDE CONTOL OF THE SPACECAFTP GPG DEOBITt AND ONE BACK-UP OEOBIT METHOD IBM U HYBID), ADEQUATE ATTITUDE CONTOL CONSISTS OF DIECT CS AND ATE DAMPING IN EACH AXIS AS A MINIMUM, DIECT CS IS THE EDUNDANT BACKUP CS CONTOL MODE OPEATED FOM PAALLEL HAD STOP 5WITCHES IN EITHE HC, IT CONTOLS AN INDEPENDENT SET OF CS VALVE CONTOL COILS, THUS POVIDING A CONTOL PATH TO THE THUSTES THAT IS INDEPENDENT OF ANY AuTO CONTOL* IT IS THE PIMAY (AND FO CETAIN FAILUES THE ONLY) METHOD OF ECOVEY FOM AUTOMATIC CONTOL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, ATE DAMPING I5 CONSIUEED THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CAPABILITY FO EXTENDED OPEATION OF THE CONTOL SYSTEM, OPEATION OF THE CONTOL SYSTEM WITH NO ATE INPUTS DOES NOT POVIDE A W_LL BEHAVED VEHICLEt GENEALLY EQUIES CONSIDEABLE CEW ATTENTIONt AND IN THE PESENCE OF DISTUBING FOCES CAN C_USE EXCESSIVE POPELLANT CONSUMPTION, ATE DAMPING IS NOT MANDATOY FO VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONTOL (E,O. SOS MINIMUM IMPULSE IS ADEQUATE AND USES LITTLE POPELLANT)_ BUT IS A PEEQUISITE FO MOST M_SSION ACTIVITIES EOUI_O ATTITUDE CONTNOLo ATE DAMPINO CAN BE POVIDED BY EITHE THE SEE USING EDUNDANT BMAGS AS THE ATE DATA SOUCE O THE OPeC CS DAP USING THE ISS AS THE ATE DATA SOUCE, THEE AIE THEE BAbIC [ECMN _UES AVAILABLE FO DEOBIT-- SPSe SM CS AND HYBID, THEE AE EASOi_S OTHE THAI UIDANCE AND CONTOL POBLEMS FU NUT BEING ABLE TO ACCOKPLISH A PATICULA DLD_IT h_ethod, HOWEVEt AT LEAST SPS DEOBIT AND ONE OF THE OTHE TWO DEOBIT METHODS MUST BE AVAILABLE TU STAY IN OBIT-- A_D WHICHEVE AE APPLICABLEt THE _UIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM MUST SUPPOT, T_IE PIr,:AY METHOD OF DEOBIT IS THE SP$, TO BUN THE SPSt THE CONTOL system MUST POVIDE A SEV(} LOOP IN PITCH AND YAW TO DIMBAL THE ENGINE AND A CONTOL MODE TO POVIDE INPUTS TO THE $EVO LOOP, THEE AxE TWO COMPLETELY EDUNDANT (INCLUDIN@ POWE SUPPLIES) SEVO LOOPS IN EACH AXIS, Tt!EI_E AE FOOI METHODS OF POVIDING INPUTS TO THE SEVO LOOPS--- CMC TVC DAP)* SOS AUTO TVC ATE CUMMAND AND MTVC ACCEL COMMAND, MTVC ACCEL COMMAND IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE MODE OF TVC DUE TO THE LACK {)F ATE DAMPING CICUITY, THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THIS MODE HAS BEEN DEF_OKSTATEO _N CS IMULATOS AND _ISSION EVALUATOS, I... MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO EW!FNL 2/15/7O GEM SYSTEMS GUIDANCE& CONTOL S-E

159 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center M_SS_ONULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS 15-2 CONT THE PIMAY METHOD OF BACKUP DEOBIT IS THE SM C5, THE SECONDAY METHOD IS A HYBID USING SM CS FISTt AND THEN CM CS. BO_H METHODS EQUIE THE ABILITY TO DO ATE DAMPED TANSLATIONS WITH THE SM OSe THE THC IS NECESSAY FO THE TANSLATION COMMANDSt AND THE ATE DAMPING MAY BE POVIDED BY EITHE THE SOS O THE CMC (CS DAPI, DIECT ULLAGE AND ATTITUDE HOLD WITH DIECT CS IS NOT CONSIDEED AN ADEQUATE METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING TANSLATIONS DUE TO HIGHE POPELLANT CONSUMPTION AND PILOT VAIABILITY AFFECTING THAT CONSUMPTION, BOTH METHODS ALSO EQUIE AN ONBOAO ATTITUDE EFEENCE. FO MOST CS DEOBITSt A LIGHTED HOIZON IS NOT AVAILABLE FO SEVEAL EASONS, THE BUN AC IS EXTEMELY LON_ THE ENTY FLIbHT PATH ANGLE IS SMALLOW_ AND if DAYLIGHT EQUIEMENTS IN THE ECOVEY AEAS AE MAINTAINED (PLUS THE FACT THE MANEUVE MUST BE DONE AT APOGEE DUE TO POPELLANT ESTICTIONS} THE MANEUVE MAY WELL BE ENTIELY O PATIALLY WITHOUT A HOIZON EFEENCE. THE ONBOAD ATTITUDE EFEENCE MAY BE POVIDEQ BY IMU O THE GUC AND ON EITHE FOAl, ATES AND ATTITUDE EOS AE DESIABLE_ BUT NOT MANDATOY, THE HYBID METHOD EQUIES SEVEAL ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENTS, ALL CONNECTED W1TH THE OM POTION OF THE MANEUVE, THE ATE DAMPING MUST BE BOB BECAUSE THEE IS NO CS DAP FO THE CM (NOTE THE SM CS DAP COULD BE USED-- HOWEVE_ ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE MASS AND INETIA IS ESTICTED TO THE CSMt AND HENCE_ ITS ABILITY TO POVIDE ATE DAMPED ATTITUDE HOLD IS SLOPPY AT BEST), THE TECHNIQUE DOES NOT CONTINUALLY APPLY THUST IN A CONSTANT DIECTION, TO DETEMINE THE DELTA V TO APPLYJ A CMC DISPLAY OF PEIGEE ALTITUDE IS MONITOEDt AND THE BUN IS TEMINATED WHEN PEIGEE IS NoNe THISt IN TUNt EQUIES THE IMU TO SENSE THE DELTA Vl THE CMC TO NAVIGATEp AND EITHE DSKY (BOTH ENCODE AND DECODE) TO PNQVIDE CONTOL OF AND DISPLAYS FOM THE CMC, IT IS POSSIBLEI POVIDED THE PESCIBED ATTITUDES AE MAINTAINEDt TO UO THE CM POTION ON TIME ONLY, THE PEFEED METHOD USES THE CMC, HOWEVE, BOTH HCIS AE EQUIED TO MAINTAIN PITCH ATTITUDE WHILE FIING THE OPPOSING PITCH JET TO OBTAIN THE DELTA V, AGAIN_ AN ALTENATE TECHNIQUE EXISTB USING ONLY 1 HC AND IIWOBBLINOII THE S/C ACOSS THE DESIED PITCH ATTITUDE BY FIING FIST PLUS THEN MINUS PITCH* THE 2 HG METHOD IS PEFEABLE. THEE AE TWO INDEPENDENT WAYS TO OBTAIN ULLAGE-- ONE U_ING THE SCS O CMC {CS OAP)P AND THE OTHE USING THE DIECT ULLAGE PUSMBUTTONe THE FOME USES THE THC (+X) FO THE ULLAGE COMMANDS AND THE AUTO CS OOILS9 WHILE THE LATTE USES THE DIECT ULLAGE PUSHBUTTON AND THE DIECT GS COILS, ALL NON'CITICAL SPS BUNS AFTE THE STOAGE TANKS AE _MPTY EUUIE THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM POVIDE AN ULLAGE TO SETTLE POPELLANTS IN THE BUMP TANKSt THEEBY PECLUDING HELIUM INGESTION INTO THE BALL VALVE/ENGINE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT}, THE TLI GO/NO GO DECISION IS ESSENTIALLY A COMMITMENT TO ALLOW THE SPACECAFT TO BE SUBJECTED TO A HIGH SPEED ENTYt AND TO SUSTAINED SYSTEMS OPEATION, SPS CONTOL EDUNDANCY IS EUUIED TO ASSUE THAT ABOT AND MCC CAPABILITY IS AVAILABLE FO THE TANSLUNA AND TAHSEATM COAST PHASES, LM CAPABILITY IS NOT CONSIDEED IN THE TLI COMMITMENT BECAUSE IT COULD POSSIBLY NOT BE AVAILABLE IF TD&E IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED_ AND BECAUSE THE LM IS NOT CH_CKED OUT PE-TLI, THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEMS MUST THEEFOE POVIDE TWU GOOD SEVU LOQPS_ AND TVC CONTOL VIA BOTH THE CMC {DAP) AND THE SCS, BOTH CMC AND SOS TVC AE EQUIEDt BECAUSE THE SOB TVC MODE5 AE NOT ENTIELY INDEPENDENT OF SINGLE POINT FAILUES (E,G, LOSS OF AC2 PHI A CAUSES LOSS OF ATE CMDt ACCEL CMDP AND SEVEELY DEGADES SOS AUTO TVC), DIECT OB AND ATE DAMPING AE NEEDED FO THE SAME EASONS AS LISTED IN THE EATH OBIT PHASES, THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AUTOMATIC PASSIVE THEMAL CONTOL SHOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE (ATTITUDE HOLD IN PITCH AND YAW), EITHE CMC {DAP) O SOS PTC IS ACCEPTABLE* THE G&N IS THE PIME NAVIGATION AND CONTOL SYSTEM_ ANDt AS SUCH MUST 8E FULLY OPEATIONAL PIO TO COMMITTING TO A HIGH SPEED ENTY, TO POVIDE HIGH SPEED ENTY CAPABILITYt THE CMC MUST BE OPEABLE TO POCESS THE INETIAL INFOMATION OBTAINED BY THE ISSe OPTICSI COAS O OTHE BACK UP METHODS MUST BE AVAILABLE TO POVIDE ESSENTIAL ALIGNMENT INFOMATLON TO ESTABLISH THE ENTY COIDO AND NECESSAY HIGH SPEED ENTY ATTITUDE CONTOL, THE MOO DSKY IS EQUIED TO POCESS CEW INSTUCTIONS TO THE CMC. AN OPEATIONAL FLIGHT DIECTO ATTITUDE INDICATO 1S EQUIED TO POVIDE TLI MONITOING CAPABILITY TO THE CEW, TWO SOUCES OF ATTITUDE INFOMATION MUST BE AVAILABLE FO THE HION SPEED ENTY IN OkOE TO COMMIT TO TNANSLUNA COAST, FOU DISPLAYS (NOT COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT) AE AVAILABLE i_ THE SPACECAFT--- THE SI_ TWO FDAIt$ AND THE OSKY, THE FOU DISPLAYS AE DIVEN BY TH_E 50UCE_ OF ATTITUDE INFOMATION--- EITHE BMAG PACKAGE O THE IMU. FAILUES U COMBINATIONS OF FAILUES THAT CAUSE LOSS OF EDUNDANT MEANS TO DEIVE AND DISPLAY ATTITUDE INFOMATION AE CAUSE TO INHIBIT TLI, APOLLO 8 CEW EPOTS AE THAT AN OUT-THE-WINDOW EFEENCE I$ NOT AVAILABLE FU ENTY, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL IZ/15/TO OSM SYSTEMS GUIUANCEG OONTOL _-9

160 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYGTEMS TANSLUNA COAST ONCE TLI HAS BEEN PEFOMEDt THE MINIMUM EOUIEMENT OF THE GGN IS TO POVIDE EDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN A FEE ETUN TAJECTOY AND PASSIVE THEMAL CONTOL, THIS CAPABILITY IS MET BY EQUIING ATE DAMPING AND DIECT CS IN EACH AXIS PLUS A METHOD OF POVIDING A PLUS X MANEUVE FO ULLAGE O TANSLATIOD_, THE ATTITUDE CONTOL EQUIEMENTS ASSUE EDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO POSITION THE SPACECAFT FO MIDCOUBE COECTIONS, DIECT CS IS EQUIED TO POVIDE BACKUP CONTOL IN THE EVENT OF AUTO COIL MALFUNCTIONS, 15-A LOft LUNA OBIT THIS ULE IS WITTEN TO BE APPLIED WHENEVE CITICAL SYSTEMS EDUNDANCY IS EQUIED TO ASSUE SAFE SPACECAFT ETUN, THE EDUNDANCY EQUIED BY THIS ULE {E,G, EDUNDANT SPS CONTOLt EDUNDANT ATTITUDE CONTOLt AND NON-CITICAL BUN CAPABILITY) ASSUES THAT AN ADDITIONAL SINGLE POINT FAILUE WILL NOT COMPOMISE TEl, THE ATTITUDE CONTOL EQUIEMENTS AE THE MINIMUM TO ASSUE POPE GGN THUST VECTO POSITIONING, TWO SEVO LOOPS AND TWO CONTOL MODES FO TVC ASSUE EDUNDANCY. OF COUSE, ULLAGE CAPABILITY WILL BE EQUIED FO THE TEI BUN SINCE THE STOAGE TANKS WILL BE EMPTY AFTE LOI, ULLAGE VIA THE THE O DIECT ULLAGE IS ACCEPTABLE. THE CMC AND ISS AE _UIED FO POPE LOI AND TEl CONTOL, THE CAPABILITY TO ALIGN THE PLATFOM MUST BE AVAILABLE IN ODE TO COMMIT TO LOI,ALIGNING SPECIFICALLY WITH CBM OPTICS IS NOT EQUIEDt AS COAS ALIGNMENTS AND TANSFEED ALIGNMENTS FOM LM AE ACCEPTABLE, ONE FDAI AND ONE DSKY AE E_uIED FO_ CEW MONITOING OF LOI AND TEl BUNS TO VEIFY SYSTEMS PEFOMANCE, LOSS OF THE ABOVE EDUNDAhCY EQUIEMENTS (I,E, SPS CONTOL AND EDUNDANT ATTITUDE CONTOL) IN THE LUNA OBIT phase WILL EQUIE PLANNING FO A DPS TEl MANEUVE, UNDOCKING SHOULD BE INHIBITBD AND LM ETAINED, IF LM DPS IS AVAILABLE AND CHECKED OUTt AN EALY TEl NEED NOT _E ACCOMPLISHED, 15-5 UNDOCKED TO UNDOCK THE GEM MUST POVIDE A STABLE PLATFOM FO EDOCKING puposes, THIS IMPLIES THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM _.UST POVIDE ATE DAMPED ATTITUDE HOLDo IN CASE THE CSM HAS TO PATICIPATE IN THE DOCKINGt THE CONTOL SYSTEM MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO TANSLATE IN ALL THEE AXES, DIECT CSLS AGAIN EQUIED FO ECOVEY FOM AUTO CONTOL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTEM MuST POVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO PEFOM A LM ESCUE PIO TO COMMITTING O CONTINUING THE UNDOCKED AND SuBsEQUENT PHASES, LM ESCUE INVOLVE5 THE C_M TACKINb TH_ LMt COMPUTINO ITS OWN MANEUVES AND EXECUTING THEM, THE CSI AND CDH MANEUVES WILL BE TAGETED FOM THE boud_d. HOWEVEP THE SMALL TIME INTEVAL BETWEEN TPI_ EACH MIDCOUSEP AND THE BAKING MANEUVES EOUIE THE CSM TO OO ITS OWN TACKING_ 8TATE VECTO UPDATEB AND MANEUVE SOLUTIONS, TO TACK THE LM THE CSM SC{ O SXT MUST BE OPEABLE, THE CSM MUST BE ABLE TO TACK LM WITH EITHE AUTO OPTICS_ MANUAL OPTICSP VHF ANGINGP O MINIMUM IMPULSE ATTITUDE CONTOL (O SOME COMBINATION OF THESE), THE OPTICS DATA (SHAFT, TUNNION AND MAK EOUEST)'MUGT BE INPUT TO THE ChIC EITHE AuTOMaTICALLY O MANUALLY, ALTHOUGH CUMBESOME, THE DATA MAY BE INPUT THOUGH THE DSKY IF NECESSAY, USING AN ALTENATE LINE OF SIGHT MAK OUTINE, TO _E OPEATIONAL FO LM ESCUE, THE LM MuST BE VISIBLE IN EITHE THE SCT O THE SCT-- THEY MUST BE ABLE TO TACK THE LM, AND THEE MUSI BE A _AY TO GET THE OPTICS DATA INTO THE CMC, A DSKY IS EOUIED TO OPEATE THE CMC* EITHE DSKY IS ACCEPTABLE SINCE THE CEW HAS SAID THEY CAN O_EATE ANY ACTIVITY FO_ EITHE OBEY, EVEN IN THE ONE MAN ESCUE SITUATION, TANSLA]ION CAPABILITYP ATE DAMPING AND ASSOCIATED HAND CONTOLLES AE NECESSAY FO OBVIOUS EASONS. EITHE HC 15 SATISFACTOY, THE FDAI IS EQUIED SINCE ESCUE MANEUVES MAY NOT HAVE AN EXTENAL ATTITUDE EFEENCE AVAILABLE, THE CMC AND PLATFO_ AE EQUIED FO NAVIGATIGN, PETHUBT TA_GETINGp TPI AND MIDCOUSE ENDEZVOUS SOLUTIONSp AND MANEUVES, THE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL SYSTE_T MUST ALSO POVIDE THE PEVIOUSLY DEFINED MINIMUM BPG NON-CITICAL BUN CAPABILITY, 15-6 ASCENT, DESCENT THE GEM IS A PASSIV_ VEHICLE DUING THE DESCENT AND ASCENT PHASEGo ENDEZVOUS AND LM ESCUE ATIONALE IS COVEED IN PULL _5-5, MISSION EV i DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO L4 FNL.2/L5/70 CEM SYSTEMS GUIDANCE& CONTOL _-_0

161 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS 15-7 LUNA STAY PHASE THIS ULE IS A ELAXATION OF ATTITUDE CONTOL EQUIEMENTS IN THAT TWO AXIS ATTITUDE HOLD AND ATE DAMPING AE SUFFICIENT TO PEMIT CONTINUATION OF THE LUNA STAY PHASE, LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL IN AN AXIS EQUIES MANUAL CONTOL IN THAT AXIS* MANUAL CONTOL OF ONE VICE _ AXIS AUTO CONTOL DOES NOT SEVEELY HAMPE CEW ACTIVITIES AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY TO POSITIUN THE SP5 FO THE TEI BUN, THIS LOSS DOES CONSTITUTE A EDUCTION IN LH ESCUE CAPABILITYt HOWEyE_ TEMINATION OF THE LUNA STAY PHASE WILL NOT ELIEVE THE EOUIEMENT FO ONE AXIS MANUAL CUNTOL FO TEI POS_TIONING. EDUNDANT SP5 CONTOL IS THE ONLY CSM CONSTAINT WHICH EQUIES TENMINATION OF THE LUi_A STAY PHASE. LOSS OF OPTICS AND THE NAv DSKY AE NOT CONSIDEED CITICAL IN THAT VHF ANGING A_D BACKUP ALIGNMENT TECHNIQUES AE AVAILABLE FO PLATFOM ALIGNMENTS AND LH ESCUE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO ZQ FNL 12/lfl/TO CSM SYSTEM5 GUIDANCE& CONTOL 5-11

162 r NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS ATTITUDE CONTOL IF AT ALL AVOIDABLE, THE LM AND CSH SHOULD NEVE BOTH BE IN ACTIVE ATTITUDE CONTOL AT THE SAME TIME, IF ONE IS IN CONTOLt THE OTHE SHOULD BE IN FEE DIFT. THE NON-CONTOLLING VEHICLE MAY O MAY NOT BE POWEED UP, IF IT IS POWEED UPt NO ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO ELECTICALLY ISOLATE ITS CONTOL 5yGTEM-- ATHEJ IT WILL BE KEPT FOM ANY AUTOMATIC CONTOL BY POCEDUE (E.G, CMO/FEE_ WHEN LM IS CONTOLLING}, THE ONLY TIME SIMULTANEOUS ATTITUDE CONTOL BY BOTH VEHICLES IS CONTEMPLATED IS JuST PIO TO LM JETTISON, IN THIS CASE_ THE CSM SHOULD ALWAYS BE IN A TIGHTE DEAOBAND THAN THE LM, THUS INSUING THE MANNED VEHICLE MAINTAINS CONTOL OVE THE COMBINATION. THE LENGTH OF TIME IN THIS CONFIGUATION SHOULD BE MINIMIZED TO AVOID THE CONTOL SYSTEM5 FIGHTING EACH OTHE DUE TO INETIAL EFEENCE DIFTSt ETC, i15-11 UPDATING PIPA/IIG BIAS THE EQUIEMENTFO UPDATING PIPA BIAS WHENEVE THE ACTUAL VALUE DIFFEED FOM THE PELAUNCH VALUE BY MOE THAN +/- 0,003 FT/SEC 2 WAS STATED IN THE GGC DIVISION MEMO DATED 27 JUNE 1969, THIS EQUIEMENT IS STILL VALID WITH THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATIONS (BASED ON APOLLO 1l DATA), P1PA BIAS UPDATE SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED ONLy AFTE THE CBM/LM SEPAATES FOM THE S-IVB AND 15 ON COASTING FLIGHT, SHOULD ANY PIPA EXHIBIT NULL COINCIDENCEt NO UPDATE SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED SINCE THE INDICATED BIAS 15 ZEO AND THE ACTUAL BIAS VALUE IS NOT KNOWN, THE PELAUNCH VALUE WILL BE USED UNTIL A VALID PIPA BIAS DIFT NUMBE IS EMPIICALLY DETEMINED DUING THE MISSION, THIS ACTION IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE PIPAS WILL DIFT AT A CETAIN ATE UNDE 1'Gll LOADS, THE ATIONALE FO COMPENSATING THE IB5 TO ALLOW FO IN FLIGHT IIG DIFTS IS BASED ON THE GGC DIVISION MEND DATED 27 JUNE 1969 WHICH EQUIED AN UPDATE FO ALL I1G_S AT THE SECON_ PBB, DATA COMPILED FO THE APOLLO 11 MISSION INDICATE THAT UPDATES IN ACCONDANCE WITH THIS MEMO poduced A PLATFOM IIG COMPENSATION ACCUATE TO 1,5 M_U AND WITHIN THE./- 3,0 MEU EQUIED, THE PEBENT UPDATE CITEIA WEE ABITATED VIA THE DATA PIOITY PANEL OF 15 septembe 1959, 15-i; DELTA V COUNTE DIFT THE DELTA V COUNTE IS A BACKUP METHOD FO SHUTTING DOWN GGN CONTOLLED BUNS, BOTH METHODS HAVE A THID TOOL FO SHUTOFFt THAT BEING BUN TIME (POVIDING NOMINAL THUSTt BUN IS NOT TOO SHOTt ETC*), THE COUNTE SLIES ON A SINGLE ACCELEOMETEt MOUNTED ALONG THE X-AXIS, THE AOCELEOMETE DIFT WILL BE MEASUED AND USED IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE DELTA VC E_TY TO THE MANEUVE PAD, FO SPS BUNS, THE AGCELEOMETE DIFT IS ONLY APPLICABLE DUINb THE PEIOD AFTE THE EMS MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE NOMAL POSITION AND BEFOE SPS THUST ONt NOMINALLY THITY SECONDS, FO CS BUNSt THE ACCELEOMETE DIFT IS APPLICABLE FO THITY SECONDS PLUS THE BUN TIME, THE physical POPETIES OF THE ACCELEOMETE SUSPENSION AE SUCH THAT UNDE SPS TYPE ACCELEATIONS_ THE BIAS DETEMINED FO NO O LOW ACCELEATIONS IS NOT APPLICABEL (I,E, DIFFEENT POTIONS OF THE BEAING SUFACES AE IN CONTACT AT HIGHE ACCELEATION LEVELS, IN ADDITIONt THE VIBATION ESULTING FOM SP5 THUSTING TEND TO EDUCE THE DIFT). PEFOMANCE CHAACTENISTIC5 Of THE ACCELEOMETE WILL ALSO BE USED TO DEFINE A BOKEN SYSTEM, A MEASUED, EPEATABLEt ZEO-G BIAS OF 0,1 FT/SEC2 IS EPESENTATIVE OF AN INOPEATIVE ACOELEUMET_ (EFEENCE N INTENAL LETTE FT/Ep-b8-ZB?, DATED 12 DEC, 1969), A STANDAD POCEDUE EXISTS FO DETEMINING THE ZEO-G BIAS, SINCE THE ACCELEOM_TE IS ALSO UGEO AS THE BASIC INPUT DEVICE FO THE ENTY MONITOING 5CHEME_ THE SAME BIAS TESTS AE USED TO DETEMINE THE SYSTEMS PEFOMANCE FO ENTY, DAP INITIALIZATION THE COLOSSUS TVC DAP KEEPS MUCH BETTE TACK OF GIMBAL TIMS AND weights THAN ITS PEDECESSO, SUMDISK, O_CE POPELY [NITIALIZEDg PACTOFF AND YACTOFF AE UPDATED EVEY PITCH-OAP/YAW-DAP CYCLE {40 O BO MS), HENCEt AT CUTOFF_ THEY WILL BE CUENT TO WITHIN AO O BO MS OF THE EXACT C,G, LOCATION. WEIGHTS AE ALSO updated EVEY 10 SECONDS DUING A BUNt AN0 AT CUTOFF, CONSEQUENTLYt AS LONG AS THE CMC IS CONTOLLING BUNSt THE ONLY NEED TO update TIMS 5HOULD BE _HEN THE LM 1S UNDOCKED, HOWEVE_ SHOULD AN SOS BUN TAKE PLACEr THE OA WILL HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE TIM CHANGE, AND THE TIMS SHOULD BE OBTAINED FOM TELEMETY JuST PIO TO CUTOFF, THE DATA PIOITY PANELS HAVE SPECIFIED THAT NO ADVESE EFFECTS ON GUIOANCEt CONTOL D MANEUVE ACCUACY WILL BE EXPEIENCED FO TIM EOS UP TO 0,5 DEG*/AXIS AND WEIGHT EOS UP TO _0 PECENT OF ACTUAL WEIGHT, WEIGItTS AND TIMS WILL BE POCEDUALLY PASSED TO THE CEw WITH EACH MANEUVE, SMALL DELTAS BETWEEN GOUND AND ONBOAD (CMC STOED) VALUES NEED NOT BE UPDATED-- ANY TIM O weight EO LAGE THAN O,B DEC, O 10 PECENT ESPECTIVELY MusT BE UPDATED IF THE bsn IS TO PEFOkM THE MANEUVE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS BUIDANCE_ CONTOL b-12

163 ! 1 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS LOSS OF EITHE BMA6 i O 2 IN EITHE PITCH O YAW CHANNEL BAG I IS EQUIED FO SOS AUT_ TVC AND SOS AUTO CS CONTOL, BAG I IS USED AS A BACKUP FO ALL THE ATE FUNCTIONS PEFOMED BY BAG 2, SINCE OTHE MODES OF TVC AND ATTITUDE CONTOL AE AVAILABLEp THIS MALFUNCTION DOES NOT PECLUDE CONTINUING THE MISSION, IF THE LOSS IS IN YAW BAG 2t THE SI 15 USABLE IF ATE _ IS 5ELECTEUi IF THE FAILUE OCCUED AFTE =05 G_ THE SI WOULD HAVE TO BE EALIGNED BECAUSE OF THE OFFSET THAT WOULD EXIST DUE TO AN IMPOPE ATE INPUT FO THE PEIOD OF TIME IT TAKES TO ECOGNIZE THE FAILUE, IF THE YAW BHAG i IS LOSTt THEN THE SOS FOAl OLL ATTITUDE WILL BE EONEOU5 AFTE,05 O 51NCE BOTH OLL AND YAW BAG 1 OUTPUTS AE COSS-COUPLED TO DIVE THE FDAI AFTE,05 G, LOSS OF BOTH BAG i AND 2 IN EITHE PITCH O YAW CHANEL WITH THIS COMBINATION OF FAILUES_ THE ENTIE GGC CAPABILITY IS CONTINGENT UPON SINGLE FAILUES IN THE GGN SYSTEM, SOS ATTITUDE MOLD AND ATE DAMPINGP SOS TVC_ AND THE SOS AS AN ATTITUDE SOUCE FO ENTY AE ALL LOST, ALL PHASES EQUIING EDUNDANT SPS CONTOL AE THEEFOE INHIBITED, MTVC-ACCEL CMD IS THE ONLY CONTOL MODE AVAILABLE FO MODE Ill O IV SPS CONTOLt UECAUSE THE GGN CAN NOT BE TAGETED FO THE LAUNCH CONTINGENCY MANEUVES, IT IS OBVIOUSLY SAFE TO CONTINUE INTO OBIT AND DEDBIT USING THE GGN THAN IT WOULD BE TO ABOT THE LAUNCH PHASE FO THESE FAILUES, (EVEN THOUGH ACCEL CMD IS CONSIDEED A poo CAPABILITY,) IN LUNA OBITt AND LUNA STAY PHASES EALy TEl IS ACCOMPLISHED TO PECLUDE POSSIBLE GGN FAILUES FOM NEGATING THE ABILITY TO CONTOL AND MONITO TEl, EVEN THOUGH EDUNDANT ATTITUDE EFEENCES FO ENTY AE LOSTt THE TANSLUNA COAST PHASE IS CONTINUED, THE ALTENATIVE IS TO ABOT USING THE GGN WITH NO ACCEPTABLE BAQKUP CONTOL MODES, LOSS OF OLL BMAB LOSS OF OLL BMAG i O 2 WOULD EQUIE MANUAL OLL ATTITUDE CONTOL'IN ALL SCS MODES SINCE OLL AUTO CONTOL IS LOST= SOS TVC IS ETAINED WITH OLL ATTITUDE HELD MANUALLY, THESE FAILUES HAVE NO EFFECT ON EDUNDANT SPS CONTOL, AFTE,05 G FO A LOSS OF OLL SNAG ii THE SOS FDAI OLL ATTITUDE WILL BE EONEOUS SINCE BOTH OLL AND yaw BAG i AE EQUIED. THE SI WILL BE VALID SINCE IT IS DIVEN BY BAG 2, LOSS OF OLL BAG 2 MEANS LOSS OF EDUNDANT SOS OLL ATE, 1F THE FAILUES IS A IIHADOVEIIp THE USE OF ATT,/ATE 2 AND LIMIT CYCLE CONFIGUATION IS POSSIBLE IF BAG Z IS POWEED DOWN, THIS WOULD EUUIE ALL THEE AXES TO BE IN A ATE DAMPED {LIMIT CYCLE) ATTITUDE HOLD, IF ANY CS MANEUVES AE EQUIEDt THE LIMIT CYCLE MUST BE EMOVED, IF ATE i IS SELECTED FO THE OLL BMAGt BOTH SI AND SOS FDAI OLL AE USABLE FO ENTY, IF THE FAILUE OCCUED AFTE,OSGo THE SI WOULD HAVE TO BE EALIGNED BECAUSE OF THE OFFSET THAT WILL EXIST DUE TO AN IMPOPE ATE INPUT FO THE PEIOD OF TIME IT TAKES TO ECOGNIZE THE FAILUE, LOSS OF BOTH OLL BMAGS LOGS OF THE INS FO SOS THUST VECTO CONTOL DOES NOT PECLUDE USE OF THE SOS TO CONTOL BUNS, THUST DUATION CAN BE TIMED AND C/O EFFECTED BY MANUALLY PLACING THE DELTA V A AND B THUST SWITCHES TO OFF, THE CM IS PIME FO ALL TVC ANYWAY, FO ENTY CONSIDEATIONS, THEE IS NO _AY TO IMPOVE THE SITUATION, THE CMC IS PIME FO ENTY_ AND THE_ AE THID ODE BACKUP TECHNIQUES (E,G, BANK EVESE BANKt ZEO LIFTt CONSTANT G ETC,) NOT DLPENDENT ON EITHE THE CMC O THE EMS, THE EM5 IS _OT INSTUMENTED VIA T/M BUT DELTA V TESTS AE NOMALLY PEFOMED BEFOE TLI AND SPS MANEUVES TO VEIFY ITS OPEATION, A COMPLETE SET OF EMS TESTS IS MADE PE-ENTY, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL _ CSM SYSTEMS GUIDANCE6 CONTOL 5-13

164 f t NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS L.5-24 LOSS OF EITHE SEVO LOOP IN PITCH O YAW WITH LOSS OF A SEVO LOOPt TVC CAPABILITY IS AVAILABLE USING THE EMAINING GEVO LOOP IN THE FAILED AXIS-- HOWEVE_ EDUNDANCY FO THAT AXIS IS LOST, CS POPELLANTS MUST BE MAINTAINED FO ECOVEY FOM A HADOVE ENGINE SITUATION IN THE AXIS WITHOUT THE EDUNDANCY, THE POPELLANT EQUIED WILL VAY IN THE DOCKED AND UNDOCKED CASES, IF THE LM HAS BEEN CHECKED OUT AND DETEMINED CAPABLE OF SUPPOTING TEIt ONE SEVO LOOP FAILUNE IN LUNA OBIT WOULD NOT EQUIE TEMINATION OF THIS PHASE, THE LUNA STAY PHASE MUST BE TEMINATED FO LOSS OF EDUNDANT SPS CONTOL, DESCENT MUST BE INHIBITED FO CONFIMED LOSS OF EDUNDANT SPS CONTOL, LOSS OF BOTH TVC SEVO LOOPS FO EATH OBIT_ THE MISSION WOULD BE TEMINATED BECAUSE THE PIME DLOBIT CAPABILITY IS LOST (SPS), IN THE LAUNCH PHASE_ THEE IS NO MODE IZ/ O IV CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF NO 5PS CONTNOL CAPABILITY. LIMITED LANDING POINT CONTOL IS AVAILABLE using SM-CS. ALL OTHE MISSION PHASES EQUIE DEPENDENCY ON SN CS O LM SYSTEMS DUE TO LOSS OF ALL SPS CAPABILITY, THEEFOE ALL OTHE PHASES MUST BE TEMINATED O INHIBITED FO LOSS OF ALL SPS CAPABILITY. 15-2( LOSS OF HCtS WITH A LOSS OF EITHE HC POPOTIONAL CONTOLo THEE AE NO MINIMUM EQUIEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN VIOLATED, AND THE EMAINING HC CAN BE USED WHEN POPOTIONAL CONTOL IS EUUIED FO MTVC O C5 CONTOL. WITH A LOSS OF POPOTIONAL CONTOL FOM BOTH HC'SP THE MINIMUM EQUIEMENTS FO SPS AE NOT VIOLATED, THEE IS NO MTVC ATE O MTVC ACCEL COD CAPABILITYt BUT 5CS AUTO TVC IS AVAILABLE AND IS AN ACCEPTABLE BACKUP TO GSN TvC, ATE DAMPING IS A,41NIMUM EQUIEMENT AND IS AVAILABLE, THEE WILL BE NO MTVC ATE O MTVC ACCEL CUD CAPABILITy USING THE FAILED HC BECAUSE I THE POPOTIONAL CONTOL TANSDUCE IN THE HC IS USED TO FUNISH THE NECESSAY COMMAND SIGNALS FO BOTH ATE AND ACCEL CUD MODES OF ;4TVC. MANUAL MANEUVES USING CS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE using ACCEL CMB O DIECT SWITCHES IF ALL POPOTIONAL CONTOL is LOST. THIS CAPABILITY USES THE BEAKOUT SWITCHES AND THE DIECT SWITCHES OF THE HC AND IS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF THE TANSDUCE WHICH IS EQUIED FO POPOTIONAL CONTOL, 15-2' LOSS OF DIECT CS WITH A LOSS OF DIECT CS CONTOL FOM ONE HCt THE EMAINING HC CAN BE INTECHANGED WITH THE LOST HC IF DESIED. THEE AE TWO SETS OF DIECT SWITCHES IN THE HC, IF ONE SET SHOULD FAILt THE EMAINING SET WILL PEMIT MANUAL DIECT CS CONTOLt BUT WITH HALF THE AUTHOITYo BECAUSE EACH SET OF SWITCHES DIVES DIFFEENT JETS, WITH THE LOSS OF OI_C,T CS CONTOL FOM BOTH HCtS THE MINIMUM EQUIEMENT FO ATTITUDE CONTOL HAS BEEN VIOLATED EXCEPT FO_ LUNA STAY. THE DIECT CS CONTOL 1S THE ONLY MEANS OF CONTOL OVE THE CS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT FOM THE AUTO CS SYSTEM, ALL SC5 LOGIC IS BYPASSED IN DIECT_ INCLUDING THE SOLENOID DIVES. THEE IS NO COECTIVE ACTION TO IMPOVE THE SITUATION, FUTHE DEGADATION OF THE DIECT CS SYSTEM SHOULD NOT OCCUo THUS THE STAY PHASE NEED NOT BE TEMINATED. STICT ATTITUDE CONTOL VIA DIECT CS IS NOT EQUIED FO TEl SPS CONTOL AND IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE LUNA STAY PHASE, THIS FAILUE DOES NOT PECLUOE THE use OF AUTO ATTITUDE CONTOL VIA SCS AND GGN SYSTEMS. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/TO CSN SYSTEMS GUIDANCE& CONTOL 5-Z4

165 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS Center ITE_ LOSS OF AUTO ATTITUDE IN PITCH O YAW CHANNELS THIS ULE IS WITTEN TO'COVE A SINGLE POINT FAILUE MODE IN THE JEC WHEEBY PITCH AND YAW AUTO ATTITUDE HOLD IS LOST, POCEDUALLYt FO THESE FA1LUESo CONTOL MIGHT BE EGAINED BY SWITCHING TO CMC CONTOL O OPENING THE EMS CICUIT BEAKES THUS EMOVING powe FOM THE AuTo ATTITUDE CONTOL DISABLE CICUITY, IF CONTOL IS NOT EGAINED BY OPENING THE EMC CB_5 O BY SWITCHING TO CMC_ AN UNCOECTABLE FAILUE(S) IN THE JEC EXISTS, IF CONTOL IS EGAINED BY SWITCHING TO CMC CONTOL_ ALL GGN BUN CAPABILITY AND AUTO CONTOL IN PITCH AND YAW WILL BE AVAILABLE, IF CONTOL IS NOT EGAINED_ AN UNCOECTABLB FAILUE EXISTS IN BOTH CMC AND SCS AND WILL EQUIE TEMINATION OF ALL MISSION PHASES EXCEPT LUNA STAY, DIECT CS AND DIECT ULLAGE WILL E EQUIED FO PITCH AND YAW ATTITUDE CONTOL PIO TO SUBSEQUENT BUNS. IF OPENING THE EM$ CB=5 EGAINB CONTOL_ GGN BUNS WILL EOUIE MANUAL BACKUP ENGINE OFF VICE EMS CUTOFF, 5 S BUN CONTOL CAN ALSO BE ACCOMPLISHED FO THIS FAILUE BY ESETTING THE EM5 BEAKES AT IGNITION AND OPENING THE BEAKES AT ENGINE OFF LOSS OF FDAI WITH LOSS OF ONE FDAIt THE EMAINING FDAI CAN BE USED AND NECONFIGUED FO DISPLAY AS NECESSAY AND THE MISSION CAN BE CONTINUED, WITH THE LOSS OF BOTH FDAIIIt AN ONBOAD ATTITUDE EFEENCE SYSTEM I5 NOT AVAILABLE TO MONITO BUNS, THE EMAINING ATTITUDE EFEENCE SOUCE IDSKY} IS SUBJECT TO SINGLE FAILUES IN THE GSN AND IS NOT CONSIDEED ADEQUATE AS AN ATTITUDE EFEENCE FO MONITOING MANEUVES BECAUSE IT IS USED TO DISPLAY OTHE PAAMETES CITICAL TO MANEUVES (VMtTGO ETC,). AT LEAST ONE FDAI IS EQUIED TO MONITO LOI _ECAUSE LOI IS ESPECIALLY CITICAL IM TEMS OF PITCH ATTITUDE AND OUT-THE-WINDOW EFEENCE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE AS A PIME ATTITUDE SOUCE. THE LUNA HOIZON I5 NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL LATE IN THE MANEUVE AND BOESIGHT STA AVAILABILITY IS A FUNCTION OF LIGHTING AND LAUNCH WINDOW. THE SAME CONSIDEATIONS APPLY TO THE TEI MANEUVE, FO LOSS OF BOTH FDAItSP THE LM DPS SHOULD BE USED FO TEIt IF POSSIBLEt AND TEl SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PECLUDE GGN FAILUES FOM uestoying THE ONLY EMAINING CAPABILITY TO MONITO TEI AND ENTY ATTITUDES, FAILUE OF BOTH FDAI=S DUING THE LUNA STAY PHASE WILL EOUIE USE OF THE DSKY Fo ATTITUDE EADOUT, IN ANY EVENTt TEMINATION OF THE LUNA STAY WOULD NOT IMPOVE THE ONBOAD EADOUT CAPABILITY, THESE FAILUES WOULD EQUIE ETENTION OF TH_ LM ASCENT STAGE TO POVIDE AN ONBOAD ATTITUDE EFEENCE TO INSUE AN ATTITUDE EFEENCE FO TEl (EQUIES A SINGLE GbN FAIL O TWO DSKY FAILS), 15-3C LOSS OF AC1 PHASE A LOSS OF ACl PHI A CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF SOS ATE DAMPINGo ANDt THEEFOEt ELIMINATES THE HYBID DEOB[T CAPABILITY, SPS CONTOL WOULD BE LOST BY A FUTHE SINGLE POINT FAILUE OF AC2 PHI A, THE FOLLOWING SUMMAIZES AVAILABLE CAPABILITY--- A, AUTO ATTITUDE CONTOL USING OAP B. ATE DAMPING USING DAP C. TVC USING DAP D, ATTITUDE EFEENCE WITH FDAI NO, 2 AND CMC SOUCE E, ONLY ONE TVC SEVO LUOP POWE SO_CE F, MTVC FOM HC NO, 2 IN ATE AND ACCEL COMMAND G, MANUAL CONTOL OF CS USING DAPP O DIECT CS FOM BOTH HCIS, H. GPI PITCH-YAw DIVE NO, 2 I, SI MISSION JEV DATE : SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 PNL,2/_5/70 CSM SYSTEMS GUIDANCES CONTOL 5-1_

166 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS CONT THE EATH OBIT phase IS TEMINATED BECAUSE BOTH EMAINING DEOBIT METHODS AE SUBJECT TO THE AC2 PHI A FAILUE* ALL OTHE PHASES AE TEMINATED FO LACK OF SPS CONTOL EDUNDANCY AS THEY AE ALSOt OF COUSEr SUBJECT TO THE AC2 PHI A FAILUE, TANSLUNA COAST IS CONTINUED EVEN THOUGH EDUNDANCY EQUIEMENTS FO AN ENTY ATTITUDE EFEENCE AE VIOLATED BECAUSE IT IS CONSIDEED MOE CONSEVATIVE TO ACHIEVE/MAINTAIN FEE ETUN THAN TO ABOT WITHOUT EDUNDANT SP5 CONTOL, LOSS OF ENTY ATTITUDE EFEENCE EDUNDANCY IS A FUTHE EASON TO NO GO TLI, LOSS OF AC2 PHASE A LOSS OF AC2 PHI A CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF ALL SCS TVC AND SUBJECTS CONTOL OF THE SPS AND CS TO A SINGLE-POINT CMC FAILUES O AC i PHI A FAILUE* EF, M ATIONALE 15-50, COMMENTS THE FOLLOWING SUMMAIZES THE AVAILABLE CAPABILITY--- A, AUTO ATTITUDE CONTOL USING DAP Ba ATE DAMPING USING DAP C, TVC USING DAP D. ATTITUDE EFEENCE WITH FDAI NO* E AND CMC SOUCE E* ONLY ONE TVC SEVO LOOP POWE SOUCE F* MANUAL CONTOL OF CS USING DAP O DIECT CS FOM BOTH HC=S G, GPI PITCH-YAW DIVE NO* Z Ha TVC USING GPI THUMBWHEELS (NOT CONSIDEED AN ACCEPTABLE MODE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF AN AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE EO INPUT AND THE CONSTAINT THAT THE ENGINE MUST BE ALTENATELY STOPPED AND ELIT TO EINITIALIZE THE SCS INTEGATO FO BUNS OVE APPOX. 3 MINUTES), LOSS OF ODEAL THE ODEAL IS A CONVENIENCE TOOL NOT MANDATOY TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ANY MISSION ACTIVITY* THEEFOEt ITS LOSS WAANTS NO SIGNIFICANT MISSION ALTEATIONS, 15-3E LOSS OF ENTY MONITO SYSTEM LOSS OF THE EMS FO SCS THUST VECTO CONTOL DOES NOT PECLUDE USE OF THE SCS TO CONTOL BUNS, THUST DUATION CAN _E TIMED AND C/O EFFECTED BY MANUALLy PLACING THE DELTA V A AND B THUST SWITCHES TO OFF* THE CMC IS PIME FO ALL TVC ANYWAY, FO ENTY CONSIDEATIDNSt THEE IS NO WAY TO IMPOVE THE 51TUATION* THE CMC IS PIME FO ENTYI AND THEE AE THID ODE BACKUP TECHNI_UES(E,G, BANK EVESE BANK_ ZEO LIFTt CONSTANT G ETC,) NOT DEPENDENT ON EITHE THE CMC O THE EMS* ELIMINATING THE 2_-HOU LUNA OBIT ACTIVITIES POST ENDEZVOUS PUVIDE$ THE POSSIBILITY OF EACHING E,I* 24 TO _8 HOUS EALIE IN THE TIME LINEr THUS DECEASING THE TIME IN WHICH THE MISSION IS EXPOSED TO AN ENTY ENTIELY WITHOUT GUIDANCE (SHOULD THE CMC FAIL}, THE EMS IS _OT INSTUMENTED VIA T/M BUT DELTA V TESTS AE NOMALLY PEFOMED BEFOE TLI AND SPS MANEUVES TO VEIFY ITS OPEATION, A COMPLETE SET OF EMS TESTS IS MAUE PE-ENTY, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12115/T0 CSM SYSTEMS GUIDANCE& CONTOL 5-16

167 NASA -Manned Spacecraft Center MiSSiONeULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS GOUND AT EITHE 5PS SOLENOID DIVE THE MAJO CONCEN IS TO POTECT AGAINST INADVETENT FIING OF THE SPS, THEE AE THEE FAILUE MODES WHICH COULD CAUSE INDICATION OF A GOUNDED SOLENOID DIVE, TH_SE AE--- AN ACTUAL SHOT O ON COMMAND AT THE SOLENOID _IVEt A GOUND O SHOT UPSTEAM OF THE POPELLANT CONTOL PILOT VALVE 5ULENOIDSt AND SHOT5 IN THE EMB O G&N LOGIC, GOUNDED SOLENOID DIVES CAN BE IDENT FIED BY MALFUNCTION POCEDUES AND CAN BE HANDLED BY MAN_ALLY OPEATING THE DELTA V THUST SWITCHES PECISELY AT IGNITION TIME, FO THIS CASE, INADVETANT OPEATION OF THE 5PS IS GUADED AGAINST BY OPENING THE SPS PILOT VALVE CICUIT BEAKES, A GOUND UPSTEAM OF THE POPELLANT CONTOL PILOT VALVES WOULD ISOLATE ONE SET OF BALL VALVES AND COULD ONLY BE CONFIMED BY ENGINE OPEATION AND WOULD ESULT IN A SINGLE BANK BuN CAPABILITY, MISSION ule WOULD BE APPLICABLE ONCE SINGLE BANK OPEATION IS CONFIMED, SHOTS TO GOUND IN THE EMS O GGN LOGIC ONCE CONFIMED BY PUPE ENGINE OPEATION AND NOT AFFECTING EDUNDANT 5PS CAPABILITY AE NOT SUFFICIENT EASON TO CUTAIL OTHE MISSION PHASE_, FO THESE CONDITIONS MANUAL ENGINE CUTOFF I$ ACCEPTABLE. SINCE POPE ANALYSIS OF THIS MALFUNCTION EQUIES ENGINE OPEATION, THE FAILUE MODE MAY NOT BE DETEMINED PE TLI O pe LOI, SINCE THE PIME CONCEN IS TO PEVENT PEMATUE IGNITIONP BOTH TLI AND LOI AE NOT INHIBITED, THE WOST CASE SINGLE FAILUE WOULD INHIBIT ONE SET OF BALL VALVES AND SUBJECT CONFIMATION OF THE FAILUE TO LUI-Z IN WHICH CASE MISSION ULE WOULD APPLY, LOSS OF TANSLATION HAND CONTOLLE THE ONLY WAY TO CONTOL THE +X (O -X) TANSLATION MANEUVES USING AUTO COILS (I,E, WITH ATE DAMPED ATTITUDE HOLD) 15 WITH THE THC, THE CAPABILITY TO PEFOM A TANSLATION MANEUVE IS EQUIED FO BOTH BACKUP DEOBIT TECHNIQUES, TDGEp LM ESCUE TEMINAL PHASE, UNDOCKING AND DOCKING, COMMENTS THE THC CONTAINS COMPLETELY EDUNDANT ELAYS (INCLUDING SEPAATE POWE SUPPLIES FO EACH TANSLATION DIECTION IN ALL THEE AXES, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/IE/TO CSM SYSTEMS GUIDANCE& CONTOL 5-17

168 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS Z5-50 LOSS OF COMMAND MODULE COMPUTE THEE AE NUMEOUS SPECIFIC FAILUES THAT CONSTITUTE LOSS OF THE CMC, SOME UP THEM {BOG, POWE LOSS) WILL COMPOMISE THE CMC FO ALL FUNCTIONS-- OTHES (E,G, LOSS OF CHANNEL 5 WILL EBULT IN LOSS OF A SINGLE FUNCTION, IN EACH CASEt THE PATICULA FAILUE MUST UE EVALUATED IN LIGHT OF MISSION DEMANDS AND EMAINING CAPABILITY TO MEET THOSE DEMANDS, ATHE THAN WITE NUMEOUS MISSION ULES COVEING A MULTITUDE OF OEGADED AND FAILED CMC SITUATIONS, ONE ULE WAS witten TO COVE THE PIMAY CMC FUNCTION--- POVIDE GUIDANCE AND CONTOL, THE CMC IS EQUIED TO MONITO PEIGEE ALTITUDE FO THE CM POTION OF THE HYBID DEOBIT-- CONSEQUENTLY, ITS LOSS EQUALS LOSS OF HYBID, THE TWO EMAINING DEOBIT METHODS CAN BOTH BE ADEQUATELy HANDLED BY THE SCSt AND NO SINGLE SC$ FAILUE WILL PECLUDE BOTH OF THEM, THE CMC IS USED TO PEFOM ETUN-TO-EATH NAVIGATION FO THE COASTING PHASES. A COMMUNICATIONS LOSS WOULD 5EVENLY DEGADE ETUN-TO-EATH CAPABILITY WITHOUT THE CMC, THE CMC IS ALSO EQUIED TO EFFECT THE LM ESCUE. ITS LOSS PECLUDES CSM ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS. THE EMS POVIDES A BACKUP TO THE CMC FO ENTY* THE EMS IS FUTHE BACKED UP BY MANUAL EENTY TECHNIQUES. LOSS OF THE CMC IS ALSO CONSIDEED LOSS OF EDUNDANT UPS CONTOLt BECAUSE ALL EMAINING ACCEPTABLE SCS TVC MODES AE SUBJECT TO A SINGLE point FAILUE {AC 2 PHI A}, L055 OF THE CMC AFFECTS EDUNDANT SPS CONTOL AND AS SUCH WOULD EQUIE TEMINATION OF LUNA STAY PHASES, IF FAILUE OCCUED PIO TO DESCENT IN LUNA OBITP AN EALY TEl USING THE DP5 WOULD BE PLANNED, IF NO DPS AVAILABLE_ EALY TEl WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED USIN_ THE SCS TO CONTOL THE SPS. CMC LOSS PIO TO LM JETTISON NECESSITATES ETAINING THE ASCENT STAGE FO COMMUNICATIONS BACKUP SINCE GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTOL DATA MUST BE VOICED UP FOM MCC-_, COMMENTS THE FOLLOWING FAILUES WILL CONSTITUTE LOSS OF THE CMC TO POVIDE ITS PIMAY FUNCTION OF GUIDANCE AND CONTOL FO MANEUVES--- (i) CMC WANING FO--- {AI SCALA FAIL (B) COUNTE FAIL (C) SCALA FEQUENCY {O) PAITY FAIL (E) UPT LOCK (F) TC TAP (G) NIGHT WATCHMAN ALAM I (H) VOLTAGE FAIL (1) OSCILLATO FAIL 12) FAILUE TO CONTOL TVC ENABLE SIGNAL (3) FAILUE TO CONTOL OPTICS EO COUNTE ENABLE SIGNAL {4) FAILUE TO ESPOND TO S/C CONTOL SWITCH (5) FAILUE TO CONTOL 5PC SIMBAL VIA OCDU DACS IN EITHE AXIS, *COULD EPESENT A FAILUE OUTSIDE OF THE CMC (E,G, PIPA FAIL) BUT NONETHELESS, STILL EPESENTS A NO/GO FO THE CMC, 15-5: LOSS OF DSKY LOSS OF A 5INGLE DSKY IS NOT CAUSE FO ANY SIGNIFICANT MISGION ALTEATION, TO COMMUNICATE nith THE CMC, THEE MuST BE 1 ENCODE AND 1 DECODE, EITHE DSKY CAN FUNISH EITHE O BUTH FUNCTIONS. T_E CEWS FEEL THEY CAN OPEATE THE CMC SATISFACTOILY UNDE ANY COMBINATION OF ENCODE/DECODE FAILUES AS LONG AS ONE OF EACH EMAINS OPEABLE, IT IS OBVIOUSLY INCONVENIENT TO PEFUM LM ESCUE _ITHOUT THE NAV DSKY, O SP5 MANEUVES WITHOUT THE MDC DSKY* LOSS OF BOTrl DSKY'S (ENCODE AND DECODE FUNCTIONS) IS EQUIVALENT TO LOSS OF THE CMC SINCE THE CCMPUTE IS ESSENTIALLY USELESS IF THE CEW CANNOT CONTOL IT, THE ATIONALE FO LOSS OF CMC (15-50) APPLIES IN TOTAL HEL, KISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLU 14 FNL Z2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS GUIDANCES CONTOL 5-18

169 NASA " Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSH SYSTEMS LOSS OF INETIAL SUBSYSTEM THEE AE NUHEOUS SPECIFIC FAILUES THAT CONSTITUTE LOSS OF THE PLATFOM, IN EACH CASEp THE PATICULA FAILUE MUST BE EVALUATED IN LIGHT OF MISSION DEMANDS AND EMAINING CAPABILITY TO MEET THOSE DEMANDS. AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE CMCt ATHE THAN wite NUMEOUS MISSION OLE_ COVEING A MULTITUDE OF DEGADED AND FAILED ISS $1TUATIUNS_ ONE ULE WAS WITTEN TO COVE THE PIMAY ISS FUNCTION--- POVIDE THE CMC WITH VELOCITY MAGNITUDE AND DIECTION IN ODE THAT IT (THE CMC) CAN POVIDE GUIDANCE AND CONTOLo FO MISSION ULE puposest LOSS OF THE PLA[FOMIS ABILITY TO POVIDE THE CMC WITH THE NEEDED DATA IS EQUIVALENT TO LOSS OF THE CMC. THE ATIONALE FO LOSS OF CMC (15-50) APPLIES. 15-fl3 LOSS OF OPTIC SUBSYSTEM THE BASIC CAPABILITY EQUIED TO use THE OPTICS FO NAVIGATION AND ENDEZVOUS IS DESCIBED IN THE ATIONALE FO ULE THE OTHE PIMAY FUNCTION OF THE OPTICS IS PLATFOM ALIOI_MENT, THE SAME ATIONALE APPLIES FO ALIGNNENTt BUT A BACKUP IS AVAILABLE. THE COAS POVIUE5 AN ADEQUATE MEANS FO OBTAINING INETIAL EFEENCES TO ALIGN THE IMU AND IS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF THE OPTICS. LOSS OF OPTICS IS DEFINED AS THE INABILITY TO SEE A STA THOUGH THE OPTICS. ALTHOUGH AUTO DIVE CAPABILITY IS ADMITTEDLY CONVENIENT_ OPTICS POSITIONING CAN BE DONE MANUALLY VIA THE DIVE ASSEMBLY_ THE UNIVESAL TOOL OF O SPACECAFT ATTITUDE CONTOL, 15-5G LOSS OF OPTICS COUPLING DATA UNITS THE OPTICS COUPS (SPECIFICALLYt THE DIGITAL TO ANALOG CONVETE POTION} LINK THE CMC TO THE SEVO LOOPS FO OAP TVC PUPOSES, LOSS OF THIS CAPABILITY IN THE OCDU PECLUDES ALL CMC CONTOL OF THE SOS, THIS FAILUE VIOLATES THE TVC EDUNDANCY EQUIEMENTS FO LOI AND TEI* BECAUSE SCS TVC MODES AE NOT INDEPENDENT OF SINGLE FAILUES, (EF M 15-31), COMMENTS THE GMC MAY STILL BE USED TO MONITO BUNS EITHE IN P#O O P47, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _4 FNL L2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS GUIDANCE& CONTOL _-19

170 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS 16-1 A, SPS poblems HAVE BEEN DIVIDED INTO THEE CATEGOIES--- THOSE WHICH CAUSE THE SPS TO BE UNSAFEt THOSE WHICH POHIBIT THE USE OF THE BPSt AND THOSE WHICH DEGADE THE CAPABILITY OF THE SPS. (1) THEE AE ONLY TWO POBLEMS IN THE FIST CATEGOY--" POPELLANT LEAKS AN0 OVE-PESSUNE POBLEMSo A POPELLANT LEAK INSIDE THE SM (LIquID OH vapop ox O FUEL) SETS UP A HAZADOUS SITUATION DUE TO THE OBVIOUS EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL PLUS THE COOSIVE EFFECTS OF THE POPELLANTS ON OTHE SM COMPONENTS. AN OVEPESSQIZATION SITUATION IS EXTEMELY EMOTE SINCE IT INVOLVES MULTIPLE FAILUES INCLUDING TWO EGS IN 5EIESt A ELIEF VALVEt AND PHOBABLY THE HE VALVE IN SEIES WITH THE EGULATOS= WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TANSLUNA COAST_ THE ACTION FO EITHE CASE is TO TEMINATE THE PHASE ASAP AND ENTE NEXT BEBT PTP, A LUNA FLY-BY IS CONSIDEED SAFE THAN ABOTING THE TANSLUNA COAST PHASE, (2) THE MAJONITY OF SPS POBLEMS FALL INTO THE SECOND CATEGOY, THESE INCLUDE S_CH CONDITIONS AS FLANGE TEMPEATUE GEATE THAN 4_0 DEE F DUING THE PEVIOUS BUNt A FUEL/OX DELTA P GEATE THAN 20 psidt ET CETEA, AND ALL ESULT IN THE SPS BEING INOPEABLEt O AT BEST_ UNSAFE TO OPEATE. FO THESE FAILUESt ALL PHASES EXCEPT TANSLUNA COAST AND LM DESCENT PHASES WILL BE TEMINATED. THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY ENTY INTO THE NEXT BEST PTP, OBVIOUSLYt TLC WILL NOT BE ABOTED USING AN INOPEABLE SPB, SINCE THE POPELLANT TANK LEAK IS THE ONLY CASE WHEE 5PS CAPABILITY 15 DECEASING WITH TIME, THE DESCENT phase WILL NOT BE ABOTED FO THE SECOND CLASS OF FAILUES. A NOMAL LIFTOFF FOM THE LUNA SUFACE IS PEFEABLE TO ABOTING POWEED DESCENT, (3) IN THE THID CATEGOY AE THOSE SPS POBLEMS WHICH CAUSE THE 5PB TO BE CAPABLE UF ONLY ONE MOE STAT {E,G,t NO ULLAGE AFTE THE STOAGE TANKS AE EMPTy) O CAPABLE OF DEGADED PEFOMANCE (E.G,t LOW GN2 PESSUED IN A BLOW-DOWN MODE_ ET CETEA), IN THIS 51TUATIONt THE ENGINE WILL BE USED FO CITICAL BUNS ONLY, NO COMMITMENT WILL BE MADE TO A PHASE EQUIING SP5 BUNS, FO THE SPS HELIUM SOUCE LOSS CASEP THE LUNAE STAY PHASE WILL NOT BE TEMINATED SINCE THE SPS HAS SUFFICIENT BLOWDOWN CAPABILITY FO TEl AND TEC MIDCOUSE COECTIONS. FO ALL OTHE FAILUES IN THIS CATEGOYt ALL PHASES EXCEPT TLC AND LM DESCENT WILL BE TEMINATED, THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY ENTY INTO NEXT BEST PTP, THE ATIONALE FO CONTINUING TLC AND OEGCENT PHASE HAS BEEN STATED ABOVE. B. ULLAGE MANEuvES AE EQUIED PIO TO SPS BUNS WHEN THE STOAGE TANKS AE EMPTY, THE ULLAGE SETTLES THE SP5 POPELLANTS AND EDUCES HELIUM INGESTION INTO THE ENGINE WHICH CAN ESULT IN OUGH COMBUSTION AND/O LOW THUST, LACK OF ULLAGE CAPABILITY IS NOT CAUSE FO INHIBITING CITICAL BUNS_ BUT NO COMMITMENT WILL _E MADE TO A PHASE EQUIING SPS _UNS IF ULLAGE CAPAB LITY DOES NOT EXIST, AS SHOWN ON APOLLO 7-13P TWO'JET O FOU-JET ULLAGE IS A_EOUATE-- TwO-JET IS PEFEED FO PUPOSES OF CS MANAGEMENT, C. THEE AE NO SPS ANOMALIES, CONOITIO_SP O MALFUNCTIONS THAT AE CAUSE FO SHUTTINQ DOWN A CITICAL BUh, 16-2 LAUNCH PHASE THE EqUIEmENT FO AN SPS BUN DUING LAUNCH IS PEDICTED ON A FAILUE OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE, IF AN SP5 FAILUE OCCUS ESULTING IN THE SYSTEM BEING NO-GO FOW A BUN_ THE SM CS WILL _E USE_ FO DEG_BIT-- THIS IS CONSIDEED LESS HAZADOUS THAN A LAUNCH ABOT, COMMENTS THE ONLY SPS FAILUE WHICH COULD BE CONBIDEED A LAUNCH ABOT SITUATIUN IS A SIMULTANEOUS LEAK OF FUEL A_D OXIDIZE IN AN AEA WHEE MIXING OF POPELLANT COULD OCCU, IF popellai_t IGNITION DOES NOT OCCU BY THE TIME A LEAK IS VE FIEOt IGNITION IS IMPOBABLE. MIBSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS SPS 5-20

171 ITE_ i NASA-.Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS is-a NO ATIONALE EQUIED 16-5 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 16-6 NO ATIONALE EQUIED Z6-7 DESCENT PHASE FO THE CASE OF CONFIMED SPS FA1LUESo 1T IS DESIEABLE 70 ENDEZVOUS WIT_ A5 MU_H LM POPELLANT AS POSSIBLEo THUSt PDI SHOULD BE ABOTED ANYTIME FO SPS LEAKS* COMMENTS ASSUMIN_ A NOMINAL MISSION TO THIS POINTP THE SPS HAS BLOWDOWN CAPABILITY TO COMPLETE THE E_TIE MISSION NO ATIONALE EQUIED 16-9 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 16-i0 NO ATIONALE EQUIED NO ATIONALE EQUIED MISSION EV DATE _ECTION GOUP page' APOLLO 1_ FNL 12/_5/70 OSM SYSTEMS ISPS

172 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS 6-12 POPELLANT GAGING FO ALL EPS BUNSP THE 'IMU DELTA V OBTAINED I METHOD WILL BE THE PIME METHOD OF DETEMINII_G SP5 POPELLANT QUANTITIES, THIS METHOD uses THE INITIAL WEIGHT OF THE SPACECAFT PIO TO A BuNt THE DELTA V OBTAINED POM THE IMUt AND THE NOMINAL IBP, THE VALUE OF THE DELTA V OBTAINED IS ACCUATE TO +I- O,Z FPS WHICH CONVETS TO Z LBS OF POPELLANT IN THE WOST CASE, BY VAYING THE ISP BY ITS }-SIGMA OISPESION_ THE VALUE OF THE POPELLANT USED VAIES BY EGO LBS IN THE WOST CASE, THE TOTAL INACCUACY IS +/- 152 LBS O O,A pecent, FO SPS BUNS LESS THAN 25 SECONDS_ THE _FLOW ATE TIMES BUN TIME _ METHOD (ACCUACY +/- PECENT) IS SECONDAY, ON BUNS LESS THAN 5 SECONOSt THE PUGS IS NOT POWEED--- POPELLANT SLOSH PECLUDLS THE USE OF THE PUGS UP TO 25 SECONDS AFTE IGNITION, ACTUATION OF THE PU VALVE AND OFF-NOMINAL INLET PESSUES INTODUCE EO INTO THE CALCULATION OF FLOW ATE TIMES BUN TIME, THE 3 PECE_T ACCUACY FIGUE WAS DEIVED USING 5-SIGMA DISPESION FIGUES FO FLOW ATE, AND ASSUMIN_ BUN TIME CAN BE DETEMINED WITHIN 0,5 SECONDS, THE ACCUACY INCEASES AS THE BUN TIME DECEASES, FO BUNS OVE 25 SECONDS I;_ DUATION_ THE ONBOAD GAGING SYSTEM WILL BE CONSIDEED THE SECONDAY HETHOB OF DETEHINING SPS POPELLANT QUANTITIES, THE 25 SECOND PEIOD IS TIME EQUIED FO THE POPELLANTS TO SETTLE AFTE IGNITION, THE ACCUACY OF THE TOTAL SYSTEM INCLUDING SENSOt PCM CONVESIONt AND TANSMISSION IS I PECENT (EF, N TD GB-OO3 EV A_ DATED , MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL 12/15/7C GEM SYSTEMS SPS 5-22

173 NASA. Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM,SYSTEMS PU VALVE UTILIZATION TWO CONTIBUTING FACTOS ESULT IN AN OXIDIZE UNBALANCE BEFOE SP& COSSOVE-- THESE AE HELIUM ABSOPTION IN THE OXIDIZE TANK AND A BIAS IN THE OXIDIZE SAUCING POBE, THE PHENOMENON OF HELIUM ABSOPTION OCCUS IN THE OXIDIZE TANKS DUE TO THE CHEMICAL STUCTUE OF THE OXIDIZE, THE INTESTICES (SPACE BETWEEN MOLECULES} OF NITOGEN TETOXIDE AE SUCH THAT HELIUM MOLECULES CANt IN EFFECT, GO INTO SOLUTION. THIS IS NOT A CHEMICAL EACTION, BUT Ii_VOLVES HELIUM MOLECULES MOVING INTO THE SPACES BETWEEN OXIDIZE MOLECULES, UDMH (FUEL) HAS A STUCTUE SUCH THAT HELIUM ABSOPTION IS PACTICALLY NILe SINCE THE BUMP TANK CONTAINS MOE OXIDIZE THAN THE STOAGE TANK, MOE HELIUM CAN BE ABSOBED IN THE SUMP TANK= THE NET EFFECT 15 A SEATE DLCEASE IN PESSUE IN THE SUMP TANK-- ABOUT 150 POUNDS OF OXIDIZE TANSFES FOM THE STOAGE TANK TO THE SUMP TANK DUE TO A DELTA PESSUE BETWEEN THE SUMP AND STOASE TANKS. THIS _UANTITY OF OXIDIZE IS ABOVE THE GAUGING STILLWELL AND IS NOT bauged SY THE SYSTEM. AFTE COSSOVEs THE CAPACITANCE POBE IN THE OXIDIZE STOAGE TANK INDICATES A _UANTITY OF OXIDIZE EMAINING {APPOX 0.3 PECENT1, AFTE PAD LOADING, A DIELECTIC COMPENSATO IS SET TO BIAS OUT THE EONEOUS EADING, THE NET EFFECT OF THIS POCEDUE IS A SMALL NEGATIVE PECENT (-O11 PECENT) SUMMED INTO THE STOAGE POSE OUTPUT. SUMMATION OF THE TANSFEED OXIDIZE AND THE GOADING COMPENSATION ESULTS IN A NET BIAS PIO TO COSSOVE (APpOX 200 LBS DECEASE}, THE PU VALVE SHOULD BE OPEATED TO MAINTAIN THE UNBALANCE THAT IS INDICATED AFTE THE SYSTEM SETTLES OUT* AT COSSOVE, THE BIAS COMPENSATION GOES TO ZEO (NO NEGATIVE OUTPUT}-- AFTE THE OXIDIZE LEVEL EACHES THE TOP OF THE OAUGING POBE_ THE UNBLANCE METE WILL HAVE MOVED IN A CLOCKWISE DIECTION (ENGINE PEFOMANCE WILL D_TEMINE WHETHE lh_ NEEDLE MOVES TO ZEO-- IF THE FUEL FLOW ATE IS HIGH, THE UNBALANCE MAY _E SUCH THAT AN INCEASE IN PU VALVE POSITION IS ALWAYS EQUIED), SINCE THE BIASES WILL BE EMOVED AFTE COSSOVE, THE PU VALVE SHOULD BE OPEATED TO DIVE THE UNBALANCE TO EEO, COMMENTS THE 25 SECOND PEIOD I$ A FUNCTION OF POPELLANT SETTLING-- AFTE THIS PEIOD, THE SLUSH SHOULD BE SETTLED OUT AND THE PUGS EADINGS CAN BE USED, DUAL BANK VS SINGLE BANK OPEATION PIO TO THL FIST SPS IGNITION, THE FEEDLINES DOWNSTEAM OF THE BALL VALVES AE UNWETTED. THE AANGEMENT OF INJECTO FEEDLINES IS SUCH THAT A DUAL BANK IGNITION CAN ESULT IN A FUSL LEAD IN THE INJECTO HUB, FUEL VAPO ENTES THE OXIDIZE OIFICES AND CAUSES AN EXPLOSION WITHIN THE INJECTOo THE OXIDIZE POTS MAY BE DEFOMED AS A ESULT, COMMENTS THE FUEL LEAD PHENOMENON SHOULD NOT OCCU WHEN THE LINES HAVE BEEN WETTED, BUT TO PECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY AND TO STANDADIZE IGNITION POCEDUES_ ALL IGNITIONS WILL BE SINGLE BANK. BANK A IS used FO THE FIST STAT-- THAT BANK IS CLOSE TO THE INJECTO, ESULTING IN A SMOOTHE STAT, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL L2/15/TO CSM SYSTEMS SPS 5-23

174 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS I 6-15 POPELLANT MANAGEMENT A, THE POPELLANT EDLINE TO COMMIT TO LUNA OBIT IS BASED ON A NOMINAL MISSION POFILE FO LOIP DUIt TEl (NOMAL ETUN) AND AN ALLOWANCE FO TEC MIDCOUSE COECTIONS 1160 FPSp 3-SIGMA SCS CUTOFF ON TEI)* LM ESCUE IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GO/NO-GO FO LUNA OBIT SINCE AN ALTENATE LUNA MISSION MAY BE SUBSTITUTED. B. THE popellant EDLINE TO COMMIT TO UNDOCKING IS BASED ON NOMINAL CICt LOPC LM ESCUE_ TEl (SLOW ETUN) AND TEC MCCIS, COMMENTS NOMINAL DELTA VELOCITY VALUES WEE USED FO THE SPS MANEUVES, ALTEATIONS MAY BE MADE TO THE FLIGHT PLAN BASED ON BPS DELTA VELOCITY CAPABILITY PIO TO A CIVEN MANEUVE* POPELLANT FEEDLINE TEMPEATUE MANAGEMENT FEEDLINE AND ENGINE VALVE TEMPEATUE MANAGEMENT IS NECESSAY TO PECLUDE POSSIBLE FEEZING O VAPOIZING OF POPELLANTS, THE ENGINE WILL NOT BE OPEATED IF THE TEMPEATUE EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF 25 DEG F O 100 DEG F, EXCEEDING THE LOWE LIMIT COULD ESULT IN FUEL FEEZINe WHICH WOULD CAUSE LINE BLOCKAGE O EXPLOSION DUE TO AN IMPOPE MIXTUE ATIO. EXCEEDING THE UPPE LIMIT COULD ESULT I_ OXIDIZE VAPOIZING WHICH IN TUN WOULD ESULT IN AN IMPOPE MIXTUE ATIO. COMMENTS FUEL FEEZES AT 19 DEC F, OXIDIZE AT iz DEC F* OXIDIZE VAPOIZES AT 150 DEG F* THE LIMITS FO CYCLING THE LINE HEATES AE OBVIOUSLY WELL PADDED WITH ESPECT TO CITICAL LIMITB ON POPELLANT TEMPEATUE* ULLAGE MANAGEMENT TWO-JET ULLABE_ HAVE BEEN POVEN SATISFACTOY ON APOLLO? TMU E} FU PUPOSES OF POPELLANT SETTLING* THE TWO-JET MANEUVE POVIDES MOE LATITUDE FO CS MANAGEMENT* COMMENTS 60DB CUVES AE AVAILABLE SHOWING ULLAGE TIME EQUIED AS A FUNCTION OF SP$ POPELLANT EMAINING AND SPACECAFT WEIGHT, MISSION EV DATE SECTION COUP PAGE APOLLO 1# FNL L2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS SPS 5-24

175 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS _6-20 PEGSUE DECAY IN FUEL O OXIDIZE TANK A PESSUE DECAY IN EITHE POPELLANT TANK INDICATES EITHE HELIUM O LIQUID O VAPOIZED POPELLANT IS LEAKING INTO THE SM, DIFFEENTIATION BETWEEN POPELLANT AND HELIUM CANNOT BE MADE. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF COOSION WITHIN THE SM-- THE POBABILITY OF AN EXPLOSION IS LOW FO THE CASE OF A MONOPOPELLANT LEAK, THE MOST SEIOUS CONSEOUENCES OF SUCH A LEAK WOULD BE INABILITY TO HA1NTAIN PESSUE IN THE TANKS O POPELLANT DEPLETION DUING AN SPS SU_, COHMENTS MANUAL EPES_UIZATION OF THE TANKS MAY BE ATTEMPTEU PIO TO ANY EQUIED SPS _NN, THE POBABILITY OF TANK UPTUE DUE TO EPESSUIZATION IS CONSIDEED LOW (EF MEMO FOM SYSTEMS ENGINEEING DIVISION DATED OCTOBE 8_ SUBJECT--- CONSTAINTS ON MANUAL PESSUIZATION OF SPS POPELLANT TANKS), L6-21 LOSS OF ONE GNZ TANK PESSUE A ON2 TANK PESSUE BELOW 400 PSI WILL ESULT IN SLOWo PATIAL, O NO BALL VALVE OPEATION, BECAUSE OF THE UNPEDICTABLE NATUE OF VALVE OPEATION AT LOW PESSUE, THE AFFECTED BANK WOULD NOT BE USED FO SPS BUNS, THUS, LOSS OF A ON2 TANK CONSTITUTES LOSS OF SPS EDUNDANCY* NO COMMITMENT WILL BE MADE TO A phase EQUIING SPS BUNS, LUNA STAY AND LUNA OBIT (IF LM OPS NOT AVAILABLE FO TEl) WOULD BE TEMINATED SINCE THE MEAN TIME TO FAILUE OF THE EDUNDANT GN2 SOUCE WOULO NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE ISK, COMMENTS THE GN2 PESSUE MEASUEMENT IS A SINGLE POINT OF INSTUMENTATION* LOSS OF GN2 CAN BE CONFIMED ONLY BY ENGINE OPEATION LOSS OF ONE BANK O E BALL VALVES THE SPS NO LONGE HAS EDUNDANT CAPABILITY WITH THE LOSS OF ONE BANK OF BALL VALVES, NO COMMITMENT WOULD BE MADE TO A PHASE EQUIING SPS BUNS* LUNA OBIT (IF UPS NOT AVAILABLE) AND LUNA STAY PHASES WOULD BE TEMINATED DUE TO THE LACK OF EDUNDANCY TO PEFOM TEl* COMMENTS THE LOSS OF A BANK OF BALL VALVES MAY BE DuE TO A FAILUE IN THE GN2 SYSTEM {PEVALVE, SOLENOID CONTOL VALVE, LEAK IN PLUMBING) O A FAILUE IN THE ACK AND PINION 6EASi 16-2Z LOSS OF BOTH GN2 TANK PESSUES THE LOSS OF BOTH GN2 TANKS PECLUDES USE OF THE SPS EXCEPT FO EMEGENCIES, THE SPS MAY BE INCAPABLE OF PEFOMING A BON'' O WOSEp AN EXPLOSION MAY OCCU AT IGNITION DUE TO IMPOPE MIXTUE ATIO, 16-2L POPELLANT FEEDLINE TEMP LESS THAN 40 DEG A TEMPEATUE OF 40 DEG F IS THE LIMIT BELOW WHICH NON-CITICAL MANEUVE& WILL BE INHIBITED, THE TEMPEATUE BELOW WHICH THE SPS IS CONSIDEED LOST IS Z5 DEG F, WHEN THE TEMPEATUKE DOPS BELOW 40 DEG F, NO COMMITMENT WILL BE MADE TO A PHAGE EQUIING SPS BUNS. ADDITIONALLY, A PHASE WILL BE TEMINATED TO PECLUDE EACHING THE CITICAL TEMPEATUE LIMIT (ALL. UNDOCKCO OPEATIONS EXCEPT DESCENT), IF THE LM UPS IS AVAILABLE. AN ALTENATE LUNA OBIT MISSION MAY _E SUBSTITUTED. _TEI WOULD BE PEFOMED PIO TO THE 25 BEG F LIMIT-- THE LM UPS WOULD BE AVAILABLE AS BACKUP IN THE DOCKED CONFIGUATION, COMMENTS EFEENCE ATIONALE FO ULE ZE-Z# {POPELLANT FEEDLINE TEMPEATUE MANAGEMENT), MISGIoN EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAbE APOLLO 14 FNL "L2/1B/7O CSM systems SPS _-25

176 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS FLANGE TEMP GEATE THAN _80 DEG TEMPEATUES IN EXCESS OF _80 DEG F IN THE ENGINE FLANGE AEA MAY ESULT IN FLANGE BUN-THOUGH WHICH CAN ESULT IN THE NOZZLE SEPAATING FOM THE ENGINE CHAMBE, THIS CONSTITUTES LOSS OF THE SPs, COMMENTS THE CEW HAS NO ONBOAD INDICATION OF SPS FLANGE TEMPEATUEo GOUND TELEMETY IS THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE FO DETEMINING THAT THE FLANGE TEMPEATUE CUNSTAINT HAS BEEN VIOLATED CHAMBE PESS LESS THAN TO P$1 ENGINE OPEATION AT A CHAMBE PESSUE BELOW 70 PSl CAN ESULT IN UNSTABLE COMBUSTION WHICH MAY DAMAGE O DESTOY THE ENGINED THE SPS IS CONSIDEED NO-GO FO SUBSE_U'ENT BUNSo COMMENTS ACTUAL TEST DATA HAS SHOWN STABLE COMBUSTION BETWEEN 60 AND TO PSI. THIS AEA IS CONSIDEED MAGINAL AND BHOULD BE AVOIPED LACK OF ULLAGE CAPABILITY LACK OF ULLAGE CAPABILITY WITH EMPTY STOAGE TANKS CAN ESULT IN HELIUM INGESTION INTO THE ZEO-G CAN AND ENGINE FEEDLINES AT IGNITION, THE WOST CASE ESULT OF HELIUM INGESTION WOULD BE THE PESENCL OF A HELIUM _UBBLE AT THE OXIDIZE BALL VALVES. THE POSSIBILITY THEN EXISTS THAT A FUEL LEADt AND CONSEQUENTLY OUGH COMBUSTIONP WOULD OCCU UN A BUBSEWUENT STAT. ONE NO ULLAGE SPS BUN CAN BE PEFOMED, THE SPS IS CAPABLE OF INGESTING SMALL AMOUNTS OF HELIUM THOUGH THE ENGINE WITHOUT ADVESE EFFECTS, COMMENTS NO COMMITMENT WILL BE MADE TO A PHASE EQUIING SPS BUNSo 16-2E DELTA P BETWEEN FUEL AND OXIDIZE GEATE THAN 20 PSI A DIFFEENCE IN POPELLANT TANK PESSUES IN EXCESS OF ZO PSI CAN ESULT IN A MIXTUE ATIO OUTSIDE THE DESIED OPEATING ANGE, OUGH COMBUSTION GOULD ESULT, COMMENTS MANUAL EPESSU_IZATION WOULD BE CONSIDEED PIO TO A BUN TO BING THE DELTA P _ITHIN THE 20 PSI LIMIT, 16-2! LEAK O COMPLETE LOSS OF HELIUM LOSS OF THE HELIUM GOUCE DUE TO A LEAK O MULTIPLE VALVE FAILUE IMPOSES BLOWDOWN OPEATIUN ON THE SPS, THE DELTA V CAPABILITY OF THE $PS WILL BE DETEMINED FOM BLOWDOWN CUVES FUNISHED IN THE SODB, COMMENTS OPEATION OF THE SPS IN A BLOWDOWN MODE IS ACCEPTA_LEt POVIDING ALL OTHE CONSIDEATIONS AE MET {I,E,t INLET PESSUESP DELTA P LESS THAN 2Or ET CETEA), BLOWDOWN CAPABILITY IS A FUNCTIO_ OF POPELLANT _UANTITY AND TANK PESBUE AT IGNITION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL L2/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS SPS 5-@6

177 1 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS 17-1 LAUNCH LOSS OF A SINGLE SN CS QUAD DOES NOT PECLUDE OTATION O TANSLATION CAPABILITY, TANSLATION IN THE Y O Z AXES WILL BE SINGLE JET (IN THE AFFECTED AXIS)-- THE OLL JETS IN THE OTHE AXIS WILL CO,;NTEACT THE OLL TOQUE' OF THE SINGLE TANSLATION JET, THIS is AN EXPENSIVE MEAI_ OF tanslation POM A POPELLANT STANDPOINT, LOSS OF A QUAD EDUCES BY ONE-HALF THE CB DELTA V CAPABILITY, IF CS DEOBIT CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST AT INSETIONt THE SPS IS STILL AVAILABLE FO OEOBIT, DEOBIT POM EATH OBIT IS LEGS HAZADOUB THAN A LAUNCH ABOT, THE POBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILUES LEADINO TO THE LOSS OF TWO O _OE QUADS DUING THE ELATIVELY SHOT SPAN OF LAUNCH IS CONSIDEEO LOW* THEWEFONE, THEE AE N_ SM CS FAILUES WHICH AE CONSIDEED CAUSE FO ABOT, :17-2 EATH OBIT PHASE THE CAPABILITY WITH LOSS OF ONE QUAD IS ELATED IN THE ATIONALE FO ULE Z7-1, THE PIME CONSIDEATION FO THE OBIT SITUATION IS MAINTENANCE OF BACKUP _EO_IT CAPABILITY, SINCE 6M CS OEOBIT DELTA v 15 DECEASED ON THE ODE OF 50 PECENT BY LOSS OF A QUAD, OBIT SHAPING MAY BE NECESSAY TO PESEVE SM CS DEOBIT CAPABILITY, LOSS OF TWO ADJACENT QUADS PECLUDES ALL TANSLATION CAPABILITY, SINCE BOTH SM AND HYBID DEOBITS AE DEPENDENT UPON TANSLATIONBp THE MISSION WILL BE TEMINATED WITH THE ONLY EMAINZNO DEOBIT TECHNIQUE* SPB, LOGS OF TWO OPPOSITE OUAOS PECLUDES PECISE ATTITUDE CONTOL IN EITHE +/- PITCH O./- YAW AND TANSLATION IN EITHE +/- Y O +/- Z. EVEN THOUGH +/- X TANSLATION CAPABILITY EMAINS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PEFOM EXTENDED TANBLATIONB _INCE OTATIONAL MOTION {INDUCED BY CO _IBPLACEMEJ_T FOM THE X AXISI CANNOT BE CONTOLLED IN THE AFFECTED AXIS, MISSION TEMINATION IS EQUIED FO_ THE DAME EASONS STATED ABOVE FO LOSS OF TWO ADJACENT QUADS, lt-s TANBLUNA COAST THE CAPABILITY WITH LOSS OF ONE QUAD IS GIVEN IN THE ATIONALE FO M 17-_, SuBSEOUENT LOSS OF AN ADJACENT OUAD PECLUDES ALL TANSLATION CAPABILITY, THE CS WOULD THEN BE UmAVAILABLE FO MCC'B, TI.MNING AFTE BPS BUNS, AND ULLAGES AFTE THE SP$ STOAGE TANKS WEE EMPTY, LOSS OF THE OPPOSITE _UAD WOULD PECLUOE PECISE ATTITUDE CONTOL IN ONE AXIS AND TANSLATION CAPABILITY IN ONE AXIS (+/- Y, +/- Z), COMMENTS TEMINATION OF THE TANSLUNA COAST PHASE WILL BE DEPENDENT ON CAPABILITY OF THE LM CS TO POVIDE ATTITUDE CONTOL FO A FLY-BY MISSION, 17-4 LUNA OBIT THE LOSS OF A SINGLE QUAD IMPOSES SINGLE JET OTATIONAL CONTOL IN ONE AXIS, THIS IB A NOMAL MODE OF OPEATION IN LUNA OBIT FO POPELLANT MANAGEMENT. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND QUAO FAILUE IS CONSIDEED UNLIKELY-- HOWEVE_ IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A FALLUE_ THE LM ASCENT STA_E WOULD BE ETAINED FO ATTITUDE CONTOL PIO TO AND POST TEI, THUS THE LUNA OBIT AND LUNA STAY PHASES WILL NOT BE TEMINATED FO LOSS OF A SINGLE QUAD, UNDOCKING WILL BE INHIBITED DUE TO LOSS OF THBE-AXIS TANSLATION (WHICH PECLUDES CSM ACTIVE DUCKING), DOI WILL BE INHIBITED SINCE THE G_M EBCUE _APABILITY IS _EATLY DEGADED, U_CE PDI HAS BEEN PEFOMED, COMMITMENT HA5 BEEN _ADE TO A _SCUE SITUATION, THE NOMINAL MlSSIOi_ WIL_ B_ CONTINUED FU _UAO LOSS AFTE DOI. FO LOSS OF TWO OUADS, THE LUNA STAY WILL BE TEMINATEDt EITHE TANBLA110N CAPABILITY O THEE AXIS ATTITUDE CONTOL WILL BE LOST FO LUS$ OF TWO QUADS. THE LN ASCENT STA_E will BE ETAINED FO TEl,, MISSION EV DATE BECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 PNL 1Z115/7O CSM SYSTEMS SM-C5. _-27

178 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS POPELLANT GAGING CS GAGING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED TWO WAYS, OBVIOUSLY, THE MOST ACCUATE OF THE TWO IS PIME, THEE AE SEVEAL HEASONS WHY THE TCC E_UATION IS MOE ACCUATE THAN THE ONBOAD P/T TECHNIUUE, BASIC TO TH_ UNBOAD GAUGE IS THE P/T TANSDUCE AND ASSOCIATED CICUITY WHICH IS NOTHING MOE THAN SOME HADWAE EPESENTING A GAS EQUATION, AT BBST_ IT APPOXIMATES THE EQUATION, GIVING ISE TO A SIGN FICANT EO AT THE OUTSET 15 PECENTI, THE TCC MODELS THE GAS EUUATION EXACI[.Y, AND IN ADDITION COMPENSATES FO HE COMPESSIBILITY IN THE FUEL AND OX TANKS U_IN6 MANIFOLD PtSSUES, IT AL_O COMPENSATES FO EXPULSION EFFICIENCY AND HAS A VAIABLE MIXTUE ATIO, EVE_ THOUGH SOME OF THESE FACTOS AE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE NOMOGAPH TO COECT THE ONBOAO EADING, THE ACCUACY CANNOT BE IMPOVEO TO THAT OF THE GOUND EUUAT_ON, THE PESENT ACCUACY FIOUEE FO THE TWO TECHNIQUES NEE OBTAINED FOM N ANALYTICAL STUDIES OF THE TWO METHODS. THESE _TUOIES AE DOCUMENTED IN SO'68-167, EV AD AUGUST ibt 19bBI SUBJECT--" CETIFICATIUN ANALYSIS - GM _CS POPELLANT _UANTITY GAUGING SYSTEMS. 17-i UAD POPELLANT BALANCE THE DESIED POPELLANT DIFFEENCE BETWEEN _UADS IS ACTUALLY DETEMINED BY EACH _UAD_S ELATIONSHIP TO IT_ VAIOUS EDLINE VALUES. HOWEVE_ BXPEIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT AN UNBALANCE IN EXCESS UF 30 TO 50 POUNDS SHOULD NOT NOMALLY EXIST. ANY UNBALANCE IN EXCESS OF THAT CAN ESULT IN LATE PUBLEMS, ESPECIALLY IF IT IS DESIED TO CHANGE CONTOL TECHNIQUES FO A LAGE MANEUVE_ SUCH AS CHANGING FOM GGN TO SC$, COMMENTS POP ISOLATION VALVES SHOULD NOT BE USED FO QUAD BALANCE TO PECLUDE INADVETANT EVACUATION OF THE POPELLANT LINES. IF THE JETS AE FIED WHILE THE POP VALVES AE CLOSEBP AN OFF=NOMINAL MIXTUE ATIO WILL ESULT, ENGINES MAY THEN BE D_STOYED BY EXPLOGION_ DUE TO UNSTABLE BUNING. IF PUELLANT IS TAPPED BETWEEN THE IsoLATIoN VALVES AND ENGINE VALVES_ THEMAL EXPANSION OF THE TAPPED LIQUID MAY UPTUE THE POPELLANT LINES. PESSUE WILL INCEASE lo0 TO 200 P5I FU EVEY 1 DES F TEMPEATUE INCEASE. BEFOE ELECTICAL ISOLATION OF THE _UAOt THE J_TS SHOULD BE FIED TO DECEASE THE PESSUE OF THE TAPPED popellant. AFTE THE POP ISO VALVE IS EOPENEOt THE FIST JET FIING SHOULD BE AT LEAST 1 SECOND IN DUATION TO BUN OUT THE #_ESIOUE WHICH MAY HAVE PO_ED DUB TO unstable BUNING. TH_ CASE OF TAPPED POPELLANT IS CONSIDEED MOE HAZADOUS THAN FIING THE JETS WITH THE POP 130 VALVE_ CLOSED. NEITHE CASE IS AN ACCEPTABLE MODE OF OPEATION. i 17-1] GECOt,DAY POPELLANT FUEL PESSUE VALVE COSSOVE I=_TO THE SECONDAY CS FUEL TANKS OCCUS AT A UBABLE POPELLANT _ANTITY OF _9 LB, DuE TO THE ACCUACY OF THE TCC PVT POGAMt COSSOVE WOULD OCCU AT 119 +/- 20 LB USABLE POPELLANT. A BIAS OF 20 LB IS INTODUCBD INTO THE CALCULATION TO INSUE THAT THE WUANTITY EMAINIi_G IS NUT LESS THAN THE VALUE CALCULATED BY THE TCC. THUS. COSSOVE OCCUS AT A DISPLAYED VALUE OF 99 +/= 20 LB. ALLOWING THE MANIFOLD PESSUE TO EACH 150 P_IA IS THE PEFEED M_THOD OF DETE_INING COSSOvE_ UNLESS AN UPCOMING PEIOD OF HIGH USAGE IULLAGE_ ETC) WILL DUP THE VALUE OF WPU BELOW i19 LB EMAINING, COMMENTS A ;._ANIFOLD PESSUE OF 150 PSIA WILL TIGGE THE CSW LIGHT FO THE _UA_. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/7C CSM SYSTEMS SM-CS 5-28

179 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYETEMS SUSTAINED LEAK IN HELIUM TANK A HELIUM SOUCE LEAK IMPOSES BLOWDOWN OPEATION IN A QUAD WHEN THE SOUCE PESSUE pops BELOW 400 PSI. THE OUAD 15 CAPABLE OF NOMAL OPEATION ABOVE AO0 PSI-- BLO_DOWN OPEATION ESULTS IN DEGADED PEFOMANCE, FO LOSS OF A SINGLE QUADP COMMITMENT WILL NOT BE MADE TO A SUBSEQUENT PHASE WHICH WOULD EXTEND THE TIME EQUIED FO THE OUAD TO FUNCTION. THE ATIONALE FO THE GENEAL SM CS ULES (lt-i THOUGH 17-_) COVES THE QUAD LOSS CASE FO INDIVIDUAL PHASES, COMMENTS 8LOWDOWN CAPABILITY IS A FUNCTION OF POPELLANT EMAINING AND MANIFOLD PESSUE, A QUAD EMAIN& OPEATIVE UNTIL HE MANIFOLD PESSUE DOPS BELOW 75 PSI. I7-2E SUSTAINED LEAK BELOW HE ISOLATION VALVE PESSUE LOSS BELOW THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES MAY O MAY NOT CAUSE LOSS OF THE QUAD_ DEPENDENT ON LEAK ATE AND LOCATION, IN ANY CASEt THE POBABILITY OF HAVING BOTH A FUEL AND OXIDIZE LEAK_ THUS CEATING A HAZADOUS SITUATION IN THE SM_ IS LOW, IF THE LEAK CAN BE ETOPPED WITH THE POPELLANT ISOLATION VALVESt THE QUAD MAY BE USED IN AN EMEGENCY SITUATION. THEE IS A POSSIBILITY THE LEAK MAY BE AT THE ENGINE VALVE AND ON THE OXIDIZE SIDE, THUS SETTING up A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVh SITUATION IF THE _UAO WEE TO BE USED, IF THE LEAK IS NOT _TOPPED WITH THE POPELLANT ISOLATION VALVESt THEE IS A EPESS POCEDUE WHICH CAN BE USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY WHETHE THE LEAK IS HELIUM O POPELLANT, IF THE LEAK IS POPELLANT_ THE EPESS POCEDUE ITGELF WILL FOCE MOE POPELLANT INTO THE EM WHICH IS NOT A DESIABLE SITUATION, AGAINt THE QUAD MAY BE USABLE IN AN EMEGENCY sltuationt IF THE MANIFOLD PESSUE CAN BE KEPT UP, IF THE LEAK IS HELIUM, THE QUAO IS ALSO USABLE IN AN EMEGENCY SITUATIONt AGAIN AS LONG AS THE MANIFOLD PESSUE IS KEPT UP, THE POINT HEE IG THAT EVEN THOUGH THE WUAD MAY O MAY NOT _E USABLE IN AN EMEGENCY SITUATION, IT SHOULD BE CONEIDEED UNUSABLE FO ANY FUTHE MISSION ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE CUENT ACTIVITY, EF ATIONALE FO ULES _7-i_ Zt 3, 4 FO LOSG Of ONE QUAD, COMMENTS THE ATIONALE FO ULE 17-1B DISCUSSES THE EFFECTS OF CLOEIG POPELLANT ISOLATION VALVES, 17-2; PACKAGE TEMP A PACKAGE TEMPEATUE OF 55 DEC COESPONDS TO A TEMPEATUE OF 30 DEC F ON THE ENGINE NOZZLE BELL NUT, THIS IN TUN COESPONDS TO A TEMPEATUE AT THE INJECTO WHICH COULD ESULT IN OXIDIZE FhEZINO, THIS IS PATICULAY TUE FO A PEIOD OF SHO_T DOATION THOGTE FIINGS-- SHOT IMPULSE FIINGS CAUSE EVAPOATIVE COOLING_ THUS INCEASING THE IEK OF OXIDIZE FEEZING, THE QUAO I_ CONSIDEED UNUSABLE FO A PACKAGE TEMP LESS THAN 55 DEC F, EF ATIONALE FO ULES i7-1t 2_ 3* 4 FO LOSS OF ONE QUAD, COMMENTS OXIDIZE FEEZEB AT 12 DEG F, 17"2: LOSS OF INDIVIDUAL THUSTES INDIVIDUAL THUSTES CAN BE ELECTICALLY ISOLATED, USING THE AUTO CS SELECT SWITCHES, PITCH AND YAW OTATIONAL MOTION IS AVAILABLE THOUGH TWO THUSTES PE AXIS PE DIECTION AND OLL _Y FOU THUSThS PE AXIS PE DIECTION, Y AND Z TANSLATIONS AE AVAILABLE THOUGH ONE THUSTE PAI PE AXIS PE DIECTION AND X TANSLATIONS THOUGH TWO THUSTE PAIS PE. AXIS PE DIECTION, MIESION EV DATE SECTION GouP PAGE APOLLO I FNL 1Z1_5/70 CSM SYSTEMS SM-CS 5"29

180 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS ITE_ ib-i LAUNCH LOSS OF ONE CM CS ING IS NOT CAUSE FO ABOT SINCE ENTY O ABOT ATTITUDE CONTOL CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A SINGLE ING, HOWEVE_ LOSS OF ONE ING WILL EQUIE ENTY INTO NEXT BEST PTP SINCE THE SYSTEMS AE NO LONGE EDUNDANTP AND ONE ADDITIONAL FAILUE IN THE EMAINING ING (E,G,* HELIUM LEAK) _OULD EQUIE USING THE ='CONTINGENCY SM CSSPIN'UP I_ METHOD (OIENT S/C IN ENTY ATTITUDE AND ESTABLISH A OLL ATE WITH THE SM CS PIO TO CM/SM SEPT, EVEN THOUGH THIS IS CONSIDEED A MAGINAL METHOD OF SAFE ENTY CONTOL_ IT IS THE ONLY OPTION EMAINING. LOSS OF BOTH CM CG INGS IN THE MODE I ABOT EGION IS JUSTIFICATION FO AN ABOT_ SINCE CM C5 CONTOL IS NOT EWUINED FO MODE I ABOTS, A MODE Z ABOT IS CONSIDEED OPEATIONALLY PEFEABLE TO PEFOMING A CONTINGENCY SM CS SPIN-UP WHICH IS THE ONLY EMAINING TECHNIQUE IF THE G/C IS ALLOWED TO GO INTO OBIT, AFTE TOWE JETTISONP LOSS OF BOTH CM CS INGS IS NOT CAUSE FO ABOT SINCE THE ABILITY TO PEFOM A SAFE ENTY INTO THE ATLANTIC AT THE END OF THE FIST EV STILL EXISTS BY USING THE CONTINGENCY SM CS SPIN-UP PIO TO CM/SM SEPAATION, THIS METHOD OF ENTY IS CONSIDEED OPEATIONALLY PEFEABLE TO PEFOMING A MODE 11 O MODE IIi ABOT_ SINCE BOTH OF THESE MODES EQUIE CM CS ATTITUDE CONTOL TO BitTE SAFELY, ENTY WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.AS SOON AS PACTICAL_ SINCE ADDITIONAL FAILUES COULD PECLUDE PEFOMING THE SM C$ SPIN-UP, COMMENTS HELIUM SUPPLY LOSSES CAN BE CONFIMED BY USING INDEPENDBNT INSTUMENTATION (PESSUE AND TEMPEATUE TANSDUCESt I,E,I LOSS OF PESSUE ESULTS IN COESPONDING TEMPEATUE DOP), HELIUM MANIFOLD LEAKS CAN BE CONFIMED BY EDUNDANT PESSUE TANSDUCES* ONE TANSDUCE IS TELhMETBED, AND THE UTHE IS ON AN ONBOAD METE, IN ADDITION, BOTH TANSDUCES IN EITHE ING WILL TIGGE A C&W LIGHT IF A PESSUE DOP IS GENSED AFTE SYSTEM pessuization, 18-2 LUNA OBIT_ LUNA STAY PHASES_ LM DESCENT PHASE THE ATIONALE FO LOSS OF ONE O BOTH INGS IS STATED IN THB ATIONALE FO MISSION ULE 1E-l, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A ING FAILUE IN OBIT ALSO SEVELY EDUCES THE DELTA V AVAILABLE FO A HYBID DEOBIT (80 FPS-130 LBS), EALY AMING OF THE CM CS CAN ESULT IN TWO POTENTIAL POBLEMS--- 11) AFTE AMING, THE HELIUM SUPPLY IS OPEN TO THE ELIEF VALVES, SMALL VAIATIONS IN THE HELIUM TEMPEATUE (_0 DEGI CAN ESULT I& A PBSSUE I_CEASE GUFFICIENT TO UNSEAT THE ELIEF VALVES (30 PSI INCEASE IN THE LINES CAN CACK THE VALVES), CACKING A ELIEF VALVE ALWAYS AISES THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS NOT ESEATING POPELY_ THUS LOSING TME HELIUM SUPPLY, (2) IF heating OF THE CM CS THUSTES IS B_UIBO_ AN IMPOPELY SEATED POPELLANT ISOLATION VALVE COULD ESULT IN A MONOPOPBLLANT SITUATION ExIsTING DUE TO THE VALVES BEING OPEN DUING THE HEATING AS WELL AS THE ATTENDANT LOSS OF POPELLANT, THE POPELLANT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION INSTUMENTATION DOES NOT GIVE TME CEW A POSITIVE CLOSED INDICATION, FO LOSS OF A SINGLE INGp LUNA OPEATIONS WILL CONTINUE-- ALL OTHE PHASES WILL BE TBMINATBO_ THE MEAN TIME TO FAILUE {AS MUCH AS 56 MS) OF THE SECOND IN@ IS A ISK THAT IS ACCEPTED DUING LUNA OPEATIONS, WITH LOSS OF A SINGLE ING AND DEGADATION IN THE SECOND_ "ALL PHASES EXCEPT LM DESCENT WOULD BE TEMINATED AS THE CM CS CAPABILITY IS DECEASING WITH TIME, THEE IS PESENTLY NO KNOW!, ACCEPTABLE METHOD FO PEFOMING A HIGH SPEED ENTY WITHOUT CM CS CAPABILITY, COMMENTS A SOUCE PESSUE OF 2800 PSl IS SUFFICIENT TO EXPEL ALL THE POPELLANT IN A ING, AN OPINED, UNUSED, STABLE ING HAS ABOUT 8500 PSI SOUCE PESSUE, TO AM THE INGS--- (1) B;T_ THE SE_ AMING BuS AND THE PYO BUS MUST BE POWEED FO MANUAL ACTIVATIO:_ OF THE CM CS PESS S_UIB VALVES 0=_ FU A SHOT ACOSS THE CM CS P;_ESS SWITCH TO CAUGE AMING, 12} THE $E_ AMING I_US* THE SBO LOGIC BUSP AND THE PYO BUS MUST BE PowEED FO ANY INADVETENT AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION OF THE CM CS PESSUIZATION SWUIB VALVES, THESE BUSSES AE ONLY POWEED DUING LAUNCH* SLA SEP_ LM withdawal, LM FINAL SEP, AND ENTY, HENCE, THE POBABILITY OF INADVETENT ANMING IS FAILY EMOTE, ALSO_ THE CM CS PESSUIZATION SWITCH IS GUADED, IT SMOULD ALSO BE POINTED OUT THAT THE INGS CANNOT BE INDIVIDUALLY AMED, ALL HELIUM ISOLATION 5UUIB VALVES AE ACTIVATED IN PAALLEL, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS CM-CS 5-30

181 NASA = Manned SpacecrBft'C'enter MISSION ULES _ECTION 5 - SM SYSTEMS THUETE TENP CONTOL CM CS THUSTES W_LL BE HEATEO WHEN EQUIED TO PECLUOE THE POSSIBILITY OF OXIDIZE FEEZING AT THE ENGINE, COMMENTS OXIDIZE FEEZE8 AT 12 DEG F POPELLANT TEMPEATUE, HEATING I$ ECOMMENOED WHEN ANY INJECTO TEMP IS BELOW 28 DEG F, ONLY SIX THUSTES HAVE TEMPEATUE MEASUEMENTS ON THEM--- NUMBES 12P l_l 16t 21, 24 AND 25o 8-11 HELIUM INTECONNECT INTECONNECTING 80TH INGS WILL ESULT IN THE INTECONNECTIQN OF HELIUMt FUEL= AND OXIDIZENt SINCE ONE GWITCH ACTIVATION SIMULTANEOUSLY FIES ALL $OUIB ISOLATION VALVES_ HENGEP THIS POCEDUE SHOULD ONLY BE USED WHEN BOTH INGS AE INOPEATIVE= OBVIUUELYt WHEN INTECONNECTING= ONE ING MAY BE DUMPED THOUGH THE OTHEIS LEAKt BUT THEE 1_ NO OTHE ALTENATIVEI COMMENTS INTECONNECTING THE INGS EQUIES THAT THE C_W POWE THE SE_ AMING _US_ THE PYO _US AND THE C$ LOGIC BUSt AND THEN DEPESS THE CM PPLNT DUMP SWITCH FO ABOUT 2 SECONDSe r_ssi.on EV DATE S CT ION :GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL t2/15/?o :EM $_STENS CM-CS..., i..., i _,, 5-_1

182 NASA ' Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 5 - CSM SYSTEMS LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY PESS LOSS OF THE HELIUM SUPPLY PESSUE ESULTS IN BLOWDOWN OPEATION IN THE AFFECTED INGe THE TWO INGS CAN BE INTECONNECTED SO THE GOOD SOUCE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FO BOTH INGS. ONE souce CAN EXPEL APPOXIMATELY b_ PECENT OF THE TOTAL POPELLANT (BOTH INGS_ BEFOE BLO_DOWN STATS. TOTAL BLOWDOWN CAPABILITY WOULD EXIST IN BOTH INGS AFTE _OUCE DEPLETION. COMMENTS THE MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILUE OF THE SECOND SOUCE IS A ISK THAT IS NOT CONSIDEED ACCEPTABLE* IF TEMINATION OF A PHASE WILL DECEASE BY 24 HOUS THE TIME THE SECOND SOUCE MusT EMAIN INTACTI THE PHASE WILL BE TEMINATED LOSS OF HELIUM MANIFOLO PESS LOSS OF THE HELIUM MANIFOLD PESSUE CONSTITUTES LOSS OF A ING. FO A SMALL LEAKt THE ING MAY BE USABLE. THE INGS SHOULD NOT BE INTECONNECTED TO PECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DUMPING THE GOOD SOUCE THOUGH the LEAK. COMMENTS A PHASE V;ILL BE TEMINATED IF THE TIME EMUIED FO THE SECOND MANIFOLD TO FUNCTION IS DECEASED BY 24 HOUS CM CS AMED AMING _F THE CM CS EQUIE_ AMING THE SEqUeNTIAL AND LUGIC BUSES AND ACTIVATION OF A GUADED SWITCH, ACTIVATION OTHE THAN BY THE CEW WOULD BE A ESULT OF MULTIPLE ELECTICAL FAILUES, THE ATIONALE FO INADVETENT AMING IS COVEED IN THE ATIONALE FO ULE MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _ FNL 12/15/70 CSM SYSTEMS CM-CS 5-32

183 6 LM SYSTEMS

184 i NASA- Manned Spacecraft Center ulssloim mules SECTIONS - LMSYSTEMS ] EMU/EVA 19-Z TO INITIATE AND CONTINUE LUNA SUFACE EVA* THE EMU MUST POVIDE THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM CAPABILITIES--- A, CITICAL INSTUMENTATION l, DEFINITION {EF M 19-42) CITICAL INSTUMENTATION IS CONSIDEED LOST IF THE FOLLOWING INDICATOS FAIL TO POVIDE CBY GOUND O CEW EADOUTI DATA NECESSAY TO DEFINE SYSTEM OPEATION AND MALFUNCTIONS* (A) PLSS 02 PESS O PLSS 02 OTY INDICATO (B} PGA PESS GAGE O LOW PGA PESS TONE O PGA PESS (C) LOW VENT FLOW TONE O PLSS BATTEY CUENT O SUBLIMATO 02 OuT TEMPEATUE 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF CITIOAL INSTUMENTATION WOULD ESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MONITO LIFE SUPPOT SYSTEMS PEFOMANCE FO CEWMAN SAFETYo THE PLSS.OE PESS O THE PLSS 02 QTY INDICATO IS EQUIED TO SAFELy MONITO AND MANAGE THE PLS5 OXYGEN SUPPLY, THE PGA PESS GAGEt LOW PGA PESS TONE O PGA PESS IS EQUIED TO SAFELY MONITO PGA PESSUE* THE LOW VENT FLOW TONE O PLSS BATTEY CUENT O SUBLIMATO 02 OUT TEMPEATUE IS EQUIED TO DETECT THE LOSS OF OXYGEN CICULATION (PLSS FAN FAILUE), LOW PGA PESS AND LOW VENT FLOW WANING TONES AE CONSIDEED SUFFICIENT FO CITICAL INSTUMENTATION OF THE APPOPIATE SYSTEMS SINCE THE ASSOCIATED FLAGS AE ONLY PASSIVE WANING INDICATIONS TO THE CEWMANo 3* SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 19-ZB! 19-33) B, THEMAL CONTOL (A) NOMINAL EVA (TWO-MAN) LOSS OF THE TM CAPABILITY ALONE WOULD EQUIE THE ONBOAD CITICAL INSTUMENTATION IN ADDITION TO PEIODIC EADOUTS FOM THE CEWMAN IN ODE TO SATISFY THE INSTUMENTATION EQUIEMENT, LOSS OF THE CEWMAN'S INSTUMENTATION WOULD EQUIE PEIODIC CONFIMATION OF SYSTEMS OPEATION BY THE GOUND, THE INABILITY TO VEIFY CITICAL SYSTEMS PEFOMANCE WOULD ESULT IN TEMINATION OF THE EVA AND/O INITIATING A ONE-MAN EVA, (B) ALTENATE EVA (ONE-MAN) AN ALTENATE O ONE-MAN EVA WOULD BE CONSTAINED BY THE SAME CITICAL INSTUMENTATION LIMITATIONS AS FO THE NOMINAL EVA, le DEFINITION (EF M _9-2} THEMAL CONTOL IS CONSIDEED, LOST, ; IF---.,, (A) LOG/LTL CICULATION IS LOST, (8) THE LOG H20 TEMPEATUE AND SUBLIMATO 02 OUTLET TEMPEATUE AE 50 DEC F AND INCEASING AND THE LOG H20 DELTA T IS LESS THAN 5 DEC F AND DEOEASING WITH THE DIVETE VALVE IN timaxll POSITION (THIS CONSTITUTES A FAILED 5UBLIMATO), (C) UNABLE TO SUPPLY HIO TO THE SUBLIMATO, A LOSS OF LCG/LTL COOLING WOULD BE INDICATED BY NON-COELATION OF THE LOG HIO TEMP AND LOG HIO DELTA T AND WOULD BE A ESULT OF EITHE PUMP. DEGADATION O EXCESSIVE COOLANT LEAKAGE= AN LOG M20 TEMPEATUE OF 50 DEG F AND INCEASING IN COMBINATION WITH AN LeG H20 DELTA T OF LESS THAN 5 DEG F AND DECEASING IN ttmaxll DIVETE VALVE POSITION IS A DIECT INDICATION OF A 5UBLIMATO FAILUE, INABILITY TO SUPPLY HIO TO THE SUBLIMATO.WOULD ESULT FOM BLOCKAGE IN EITHE THE FEED HEO SUPPLY LINE O THE GAS SEPAATOt BLADDE UPTUEt H20 SUPPLY LINE LEAK_ O FEED HIO DEPLETION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_+ FNL L2/IE/TO LM SYSTEMS EMU/EVA 6-i

185 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS ITE_ 19-i CONT 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT THE PIME METHOD FO THEMAL CONTOL OF THE EVA CEWMAN IS BY HEAT TANSFE VIA THE LCG/LTLo SHOULD THIS CAPABILITY BE LOSTJ THE BACKUP SYSTEM AVAILABLE WOULD BE THE BSLSS O THE OPS (HI PUGE FLOW MODE) DUE TO LIMITED LIFETIME OF _ITHE THE BSLSS O THE OPSp EVA WILL NOT BE INITIATEDt O IF IN POGESSt WILL BE TEMINATED IF THEMAL CONTOL IS LOSTe 3* SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 19-1BP 19-_ 19-30} NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVA LOSS OF THEMAL CONTOL WOULD PECLUDE COMMITTING TOt O continuation OF THE EVA, IF THE LOSS OCCUS DUING THE EVA_ ACTIVATION OF THE OPS O THE BSLS5 MAY BE NECESSAY TO EDUCE HEAT STOAGE IN THE CEWMAN, IF THE LOSS OF THEMAL CONTOL IS ISOLATED TO SUBLIMATO BEAK-THOUGH_ THE CEWMAN MAY ATTEMPT A WET SUBLIMATO ESTAT* C, PIMAY 02 SUBSYSTEM 1* DEFINITION (EF M 19-2} THE PIMAY OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM I5 CONSIDEED LOST IF--- (A} THE SOUCE PESSUE EADING IS LESS THAN 135 P$IA (TM) O 5 PECENT (GAGE) (B) IT IS UNABLE TO SUPPLY 02 TO THE OXYGEN VENTILATION LOOP {C) EMU PESSUE EGULATION 15 IMPOPE (LESS THAN 2,75 O GEATE THAN 4=05 PSID) THE MINIMUM SOUCE PESSUE CITEION CONSISTS OF THE PLS5 02 PESS INDICATO EADOUT EO (+/- 45 PSIA AND THE MINIMUM UPSTEAM PESGUE (100 PSIA) AT WHICH THE EGULATO IS CAPABLE OF SUPPLYING ADEQUATE MAKEUP OXYGEN TO SUSTAIN THE EXPECTED METABOLIC LOADS= EMU PESSUE EGULATION IS CONSIDEED LOST IF PGA PESSUE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED AT 3*9 +/-,15 PSIA, A SUSTAINED PGA PESSUE, OF LESS THAN 3.75 PSIA AND DECEASING WOULD BE unacceptable AS IT MAY FAIL TO POVIDE ADEQUATE 02 PATIAL PESSUE TO SAFELY SUSTAIN THE CEWMAN, A SUSTAINED PGA PESSUE OF GEATE THAN _,OS PSIA AND INCEASING WILL ESULT IN EDUCED PGA MOBILITY AND EVENTUAL LOSS OF THE PIMAY OXYGEN SUPPLY THOUGH THE PGA ELIEF VALVE. 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M _9-11t Z9-1_) LOSS OF THE PIMAY 02 SUPPLY WOULD NECESSITATE THE USE OF THE OP_ TO SUPPLY OXYGEN FO PESSUIZATION AND METABOLIC CONSUMPTION, EDUNDANCY OF OXYGEN SOUCES IS LOST, LOSS OF EMU PESSUE EGULATION COULD ESULT IN THE USE OF THE OPS (MAKEUP MODE) TO POVIDE POPE PESSUE EGULATION* 3. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 19-lBt 19-2t lg-isp Z9-3L) D, PLSS FAN{S) NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVA LOSS OF THE PLSS 02 PESSUE EGULATO POHIBITS USE OF THAT PLSS FO EVA* SHOULD A plss 02 PESSUE._VL_{_=_OSS O_CU DUING THE EyA_.THE OPS WILL BE ACTIVATED AND THE EVA TE_ NATED,... " LOSS OF A PIMAY 02 SUPPLY DUING CHECKOUT PECLUDE COMMITTING THAT PLSS TO EVA. LOSS OF THE PIMAY 02 SUPPLY DUING EVA WOULD EQUIE ACTIVATION OF THE OPS IN A MAKEUP MODE TO POVIDE 02 FO PESSUIZATION AND METABOLIC CONSUMPTION, EVA WILL BE TEMINATED FO LOSS OF 02 SUPPLY EDUNDANCY, l* DEFINITION THE PL$S FAN IS CONSIDEED LOST IF IT CANNOT MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF 5,3 ACFM 02 FLOW THOUGH THE OXYGEN VENTILATION LOOP AND PGAo AN 02 FLOW OF LESS THAN 5*3 ACFM IS INADEQUATE TO EMOVE C02 FOM THE OAL-NASAL.AEA OF THE CEWMAN FO NOMINAL METABOLIC POFILESo MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70! LM SYSTEMS EMU/EVA 6-2

186 ! NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS I T El' CONT 2a GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF THE PLSS FAN WOULD EQUIE UTILIZATION OF THE OPS (PUGE MODE} TO POVIDE ADEQUATE VENTILATION* 3, SPECIFIC MISSION IMPACT {EF M 19-1B* 19-21{ NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVA LOSS OF A FLSS FAN DUING CHECKOUT WILL POHIBIT USE OF THAT PLSS FO EVAe LOSS OF THE PLSS FAN DUING EVA WOULD EQUIE ACTIVATION OF THE OPS {PUGE MODE) TO POVIDE C02 WASHOUT AND WOULD EQUIE IMMEDIATE TEMINATION OF THE EVA* E, PLSS POWE SUPPLY 1, DEFINITION (EF M 19-2) THE PLSS POWE SUPPLY IS CONSIDEED LOST IF--- {A} THE PLSS BATTEY VOLTAGE IS LESS THAN 1610 VOC AND DECEASING IS) THE PLSS BATTEY CUENT DAIN IS GEATE THAN 3,0 AMPS AND INCEASING {DOES NOT INCLUDE CHECKOUT}o A PLSS BATTEY VOLTAGE OF LESS THAN 16,0 VDC AND DECEASING INDICATES A DEPLETED BATTEY O THE LOSS OF ONE O MOE CELLSt EITHE OF WHICH WILL ESULT IN DEGADED OPEATION OF THE PLSS ELECTONICS= A PLSS BATTEY CUENT DAIN OF GEATE THAN S,O AMPS AND INCEASING IS A DIECT INDICATION OF PLSS ELECTONICS (PUMPt FAN* EVC) DEGADATION O FAILUE AND WILL ESULT IN EALY DEPLETION AND LOSS OF THE PLSB BATTEY, 2, GENEAL MISSION IMPACT (EF M 19-10) LOSS OF THE PLSG BATTEY ENDES THAT PLSS USELESS UNLESS THE BATTEY CAN BE EPLACED= 3= SPECIFIC MISSION IMPACT {EF M 19-1Bt 19-32) NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVA LOSS OF A PLSS BATTEY DUING CHECKOUT POHIBITS USE OF THAT PLSS FO EVA* LOSS OF A PLSS BATTEY DUING EVA WOULD EQUIE ACTIVATION OF THE OPS {HI PUGE FLOW} O BSLSS AND OPS (LOW PUGE FLOW) FO COOLING VENTILATION AND IMMEDIATE TEMINATION OF THE EVA= Fo EMU PESSUE INTEGITY _= D_FINITIDN {EF M 19-E} EMU PESSUE INTEGITY IS CONSIDEED LOST 1F--- i_{t_eemuisunaele T6 MEET ThE LESS'T_N"_I Si}_I EsSUE be_av CITEI6N DUING THE EMU PESSUE INTEGITY CHECK (B) EMU EGULATED PESSUE IS EGUAL TO O LESS THAN 3,75 PSID AND DECEASING ON THE LUNA SUFACE WHICH EPESENTS AN O2 USAGE ATE GEATE THAN 017 LBS/Ho THE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN A LEAK ATE OF GEATE THAN 0o3 PSI/MIN INDICATES AN EXCESSIVE LEAK THAT WOULD ESULT IN EALY TEMINATION OF THE EVA* AN EMU EGULATED PESSUE OF LESS THAN 3*75 PSID AND DECEASING EPESENTS AN 02 USAGE ATE OF GEATE THAN OoT LB/Ho 2_ GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF EMU PESSUE INTEGITY POHIBITS THE EVA ACTIVITIES IF THE LEAK IS IN THE PGA_ IF THE FAILUE CAN BE ISOLATED TO THE PLS_ THEN THAT PLSS CANNOT BE USED FO EVA_ MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 1:>/15/70 LM SYSTEMS EMU/EVA 6-3

187 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS Z9-i 'CONT 3+ SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M zg-ibt 19-Z0) (AI NOMINAL D ALTENATE EVA LOSS OF A SINGLE EMU+S PESSUE INTEGITY DUING THE EMU PESSUE INTEGITY CHECKS WOULD ESULT IN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING--- (1) IF THE FAILUE CAN BE ISOLATED TO THE PLSS. ONE CEWMAN WOULD EMAIN ON THE LM EC5 WHILE THE OTHE CEWMAN WOULD ATTEMPT THE ALTENATE (ONE-MAN) EVA, (2) IF THE VIOLATION OF PESSUE INTEGITY I5 IN THE PGAP IT WOULD peclude THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY DEPESSUIZED CABIN ACTIVITIES= IF THE LOSS OCCUS DUING EITHE THE NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVAP IT WILL EQUIE ACTIVATION OF THE OPS {MAKEUP) AND TEMINATION OF THE EVA. (B) ENDEZVOUS/DOCKING G, OPS 02 BOTTLE(S) 1* DEFINITION LOSS OF EMU PESSUE INTEGITY IN THE PLSS WOULD NOT CONSTAIN A CEVA ASSUMING BOTH OPS UNITS AE GOODQ LOSS OF EHU PESSUE INTEGITY IN THE PGA WOULD ESULT IN A SHOTE OPS LIFETIME AND WOULD PLACE SEIOUS TIME CONSTAINTS ON THE ABILITY TO PEFOM A CEVT, THE OPS 02 BOTTLE{S) IS CONSIDEED LOST IF THE OPS 02 SOUCE PES@UE IS LESS THAN 5380 P51A AND THE OP5 HAS NOT BEEN PEVIOUSLY USED O THE OPS 02 SOUCE PESSUE IS LESS THAN 4900 PSIA IF THE OPS HAS SEEN USED= AN OPS 02 SOUCE PESSUE OF LESS THAN 5360 PSIA WITHOUT PIO USE INDICATES A LEAK ATE IN EXCESS OF THAT WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDEED SAFE FO CEWMAN OPEATION+ AN OPS 02 SOUCE PESSUE OF LESS THAN qgoo PSIA WOULD NOT POVIDE SUFFICIENT 02 FLOW FO THE 30 MINUTES OF PUGE OPEATION EQUIED FO A CEVA= 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF AN OPS 02 BOTTLE ESULTS IN THE LOSS OF AN OXYGEN BACKUP SYSTEM AND CONSTAINS EXTAVEHICULA ACTIVITIES TO A SINGLE EVA CEWMAN= + 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT {EF M 19-1AP 19-1Bt 19-4t 19-14) (A) UNDOCKING LOSS OF AN OP5 02 BOTTLE PIO TO UNDOCKING POHIBITS UNDOCKING UNTIL THE PIMAY 02 SUPPLY PESSUE OF ONE PLSS IS VEIFIED, {B} NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVA LossOF AN ops o_ Bott[_P_ioTO tne EVAwouL_hE_ULTiN THE ALTENATE(ONELHANi EVA. THE FAILED OPS COULD BE UTILIZED AS A BACKUP TO THE PLSS SHOULD THE CEWMAN IN THE LM BE EQUIED TO AID THE EVA CEWMAN, (C) LUNA LIFTOFF LOSS OF AN OPS 02 BOTTLE PIO TO LUNA LIFTOFF WOULD EQUIE OFF-LOADING OF THE FAILED OPT AND ETENTION OF AN OPEATIONAL PLS5 IN ODE TO FULFILL THE EQUIEMENT FO TWO GOOD LIFE SUPPOT SYSTEMS FO A possible CEVT* (D) ENDEZVOUS/DOCKING LOSS OF ONE O BOTH OPS 02 BOTTLES PIO TO ENDEZVOUS/DOCKING WOULD ELIMINATE THE CAPABILITY OF SAFELY PEFOMING A CEVT IN THE EVENT THE CEWMEN WEE UNABLE TO EFFECT A NOMAL TANSFE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL 12/_.5/T0 LM SYSTEMS EMU/EVA 6-4

188 NASA o Manned SFacecraft Canter MISSIOn ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 19-1 ONT Ho OP5 02 PESSUE EGULATION 11 DEFINITION OPS 02 PESSUE EGULATION IS CONSIDEED LOST IF A EGULATED PESSUE BAND OF 3e7 +/- 0o3 PSID CANNOT BE MAINTAINEOe A SUSTAINED OPS EGULATED PESSUE OF LESS THAN 3e PSID WOULD FAIL TO POVIDE ADEQUATE 02 PATIAL PESSUE O PUGE FLOW TO SAFELY SUSTAIN THE CEWMANo A SUSTAINED OPS EGULATED PESSUE OF GEATE THAN 4o0 PSID WOULD ESULT IN A HIGH OPS PUGE FLOW ATE AND A POGSIBLE ELIEVED GuIT CONDITION WHICH WOULD EDUCE THE LIFETIME OF THE OPS AS WELL AS EXPOSING THE CEWMAN TO A POTENTIALLy HAZADOUS SITUATIONo 2o GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOGS OF AN OPS PESSUE EGULATO ESULTS IN THE LOSS OF AN OXYGEN PESSUE BACKUP AND CONSTAINS EXTAVEHICULA ACTIVITIES TO A SINGLE EVA CEWMANo 3o SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT CEF M 19"iAt 19-1Bp _4_ (A) UNDOCKING LOSS OF AN OPS PESSUE EGULATO PIO TO UNDOCKING POHIBITS UNDOCKING UNTIL THE PIMAY 02 SUPPLY PESSUE OF ONE PLSS IS VEIFIED! (B) NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVA LOSG OF AN OP5 PESSUE EGULATO PIO TO THE EVA WOULD ESULT ZN THE ALTENATE (ONE-MAN) EVAo THE FAILED OPG CANNOT BE USED EITHE BY ZTSELF O AS A BACKUP TO _HE PLSS SHOULD THE CEWMAN IN THE LM BE EQUIED TO AID THE EVA CEWMANo {C) LUNA LIFTOFF LOBS OF AN OPS PESSUE EGULATO PIO TO LUNA LIFTOFF WOULD EqUiE OFF-LOADING OF THE FAILED OPB AND ETENTION OF AN opeational PLSS IN ODE TO FULFILL THE EQUIEMENT FO TWO GOOD LIFE SUPPOT SYSTEMS FO A POSSIBLE CEVAo {D) ENDEZVOUS/DOCKING LOSS OF ONE O BOTH OPS PESSUE EGULATOS PIO TO ENDEZVOUS/DOCKING WOULD ELIMINATE THE CAPABILITY OF SAFELY PEFOMING A CEVA IN THE EVENT THE CEWMAN WEE UNABLE TO EFFECT A NOMAL TANSFEm I MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE i APOLLO 1_ FN L L2/l_/?O LM SYSTEMS _EMU/EVA : 6-5

189 NASA -MannedSpice raft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 6 - LH SYSTEMS TEM.9-I _ONT I* BSLSS/OPS TAVESE LIMITATIONS IEF M 19"IB_9"2) I, THE BSLS5 POVIDES LCG COOLING TO THE FAILED PLSS AND CAN EJECT APPOXIMATELY IAO0 BTU'S/H WHEEAS THE OP_ CAN ONLY POVIDE FO HEAT EMOVAL IN THE ANGE OF BTU_S/H, METABOLIC AC*TIVITY ABOVE THIS ATE BECOMES HEAT STOED, ASSUMING A WOSE CASE FAILUE OF THE PLSS (!,E,t POWE SUPPLY FAILUE) THE BACKUP system MuST SUPPLY POPE 02 VENTILATIONt 02 PESSUE_ AND METABOLIC COOLING* THE BSLSS/OP5 COMBINATION CAN POVIDE THIS FUNCTION USING THE QPS LOW FLOW ATE (4,0 LB/H)* FO THIS CASE, AS LONG AS SUFFICIENT WATE IS AVAILABLE TO SUPPOT BOTH CEWMENts ETUN TAVESEp THE OPS 02 AT THE # LB/H ATE BECOMES THE CONSTAINT, AN EXAMINATION OF WALKING ATES FO CONTINGENCY TANSLATION BY THE MOD HAS EVEALED THAT APPOXIMATELY 3,3 KM/H IS THE MOST OPTIMUM ATE. ASSUMING THIS ATE AND USING THE 1.25 H, OPSt DEDUCTING 13 MINUTES INGESS TIME AND 5 MINUTES BSLSS ACTIVATION TIME YIELDS AN APPOXIMATE 3 KM MAXIMUM ADIUS* AS THE FEED WATE SUPPLY OF EACH CEWMAN'S PLSS IS DEPLETEDo THEE IS A TANSITION TIME WHEN THE FEED WATE BECOMES THE CONSTAINT_ THEE MUST BE SUFFICIENT WATE IN EITHE CE WMAN_S PLSS TO SUPPOT BOTH CEWMAN'S ETUN TAVESE, THE ACTUAL WATE EMAINING IS A FUNCTION OF THE METABOLIC ATE IN EAL TIME, 2* FO LIMITED EVA EXCUSIONS_ THE OPS BY ITSELF AT THE 8 LB/H ATEr POVIDES SUFFICIENT METABOLIC COOLINGt POPE OXYGEN VENTILATION AND PESSUE EGULATION, SINCE THE OPS 15 STICTLY A GASEOUS COOLING system, THE TIME CONSTAINT BECOMES NOT STICTLY A FUNCTION OF CONSUMABLES EMAINING_ BUT OF CEWMAN MAXIMUM HEAT STOAGE, THE MOD HAS GIVEN A MAXIMUM CEW HEAT STOAGE CAPABILITY OF 300 BTUIS, BASED ON THIS HEAT STOAGE CONSTAINTP A 3,3 KM/HC WALK ATE, AND DEDUCTING A 13 MINUTE INGESS TIMEr THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE FO OP$ USAGE {HI FLOW ATE) IS i,0 KM, THIS IS BECAUSE OF THE ELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEW HEAT STOAGE AND METABOLIC ATE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE I APOLLO 1_ FNL L2/15/70 LH SYSTEMS EMU/EVA

190 f NASA Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEME ITE_ 19-2 EF ATIONALE FO M EF ATIONALE FO M EF ATIONALE FO M 19-_ 19-5 CEW SAFETY 19-6 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 19-7 EF ATIONAL FO M '10 NO ATIONALE EQUIED NO ATIONALE EQUIED NO ATIONALE EQUIED NO ATIONALE EQUIED 19-14; CEW SAFETY FO A POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY TANSFE EF ATIONALE FO M NO ATIONALE EQUIED 19-2( EF ATIONALE FO M EF ATIONALE FO M ; CONTAMINATION IN THE VENTILATION SYSTEM i, DEFINITION CONTAMINATION IN THE VENTILATION EYSTEM IS DEFINED AG THE PESENCE OF ANY FOEIGN SUBSTANCE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO POVE UNCOMFOTABLE O NOXIOUS TO THE CEWMAN, THE PIMAY SOUCE OF CONTAMINATION IN THE VENTILATION SYSTEM IS LIOH AND/O ITS DEIVATIVES FOM THE CONTAMINANT CONTOL ASGEMBLY LIOH/CHACOAL CATIDGE ESULTING FOM ;HANNE_ _ O _EA_THPUGHf... 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT CONTAMINATION IN THE VENTILATION SYSTEM WOULD PECLUDE USE OF THE PLSG A5 A LIFE SUPPOT SYSTEM AND WOULD ESULT IN THE USE OF AN OP$ IN THE LOW PUGE MODE, 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT {EF M 19-13t NOMINAL O ALTENATE EVA CONTAMINATION IN THE VENTILATION SYSTEM DUING EVA WOULD EQUIE ACTIVATION OF THE GP5 IN A PUGE MODE TO CLEA THE HELMET AEA OF THE CONTAMINATION AND TO POVIDE BEATHABLE UXYGEN, TEMINATION OF THE EVA WILL E EQUIED IF THE OPS 15 ACTIVATED, 19-3= EF ATIONALE FO M ; EF ATIONALE FO M 19-1 M1SEION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS EMU/EVA

191 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MiSSiON ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS EF ATIONALE,:O M 19-i 19-_3 EF ATIONALE FO M 19-i MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 LH SYSTEMS EMU/EVA

192 f NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS LM INSTUMENTATION....B TO BE SUPPLIED 20BAB Ao ALL COMMANDS CAN BE UPLINKED VIA VOICE B, THE MISSION WILL BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE WITH LOSS OF THE CAUTION AND WANING SYSTEM DUE TO THE FACT THAT LOSS OF THAT SYSTEM WILL NOT EMOVE CEW O GOUND CAPABILITY OF MONITOING SYSTEMS PAAMETES, Co NO MISSION IMPACT, Do EF ATIONALE FO M 19-1, E, ESULTS IN LOSS OF TV ONLY-WHICH IS ONLY DESIABLE= F, F DOPPLE IS SUFFICIENT Go EMAINING CAPABILITIES (OPTICS AND ) AE ADEQUATE, LM USB/TM MANAGEMENT A, FO NOMAL LM POWEED UP PHASEBJ THE LM STEEABLE ANTENNA WITH THE POWE AMPLIFIE WILL BE USED, DUING LUNA STAY* IF THE EECTABLE ANTENNA IS USED, THE POWE AMPLIFIE MAY BE TUNEDOFF'IF HB TM AND VOICE CICUIT MAGINS AE ADEQUATE, ATIONALE IN ODE FO BOTH HB TM AND VOICE TO BE ECEIVED FOM LUNA DISTANCEP THE STEEABLE ANTENNA AND POWE AMPLIFIE MUST BE USED, DUING LUNA STAY OPEATION5_ CICUIT MAGINS MAY ALLOW TUNING OFF OF THE POWE AMPLIFIE WHEN THE EECTABLE ANTENNA IS IN USE, FAVOABLE CICUIT MAGINS FOM LAGE GOUND ANTENNAS MAY ALSO ALLOW HB TM FOM THE STEEABLE ANTENNA WITH NO POWE AMPLIFIE, B, DUING PEIODS OF LM OUT OF STATION CONTACT (LUNA FA SIDE)t THE TM BIT ATE WILL BE SWITCHED FOM HB TO LB AND TANSMITTED TO THE CSM OVE VHF B EXCEPT DUING VHF ANGING (WHICH EQUIES VHF A TANSMITTE) AND PEIODS OF CITICAL VOICE COMMUNICATIONS, ATIONALE BY SWITCHING THE BIT ATE TO LOW WHILE BEHIND THE MOON, THE CSM CAN ECOD LM DATA AND PLAY IT BACK WHEN IN LINE OF SIGHT OF EATH, THIS ENABLES GOUND CONTOLLES TO MONITO LM PEFOMANCE WHEN THE LM IS NOT IN SIGHT OF THE MSFNo OTHE MISSION PEIODS EWUIE THAT THE VHF SYSTEM BE used FO VHF ANGING O THAT THE VHF B DATA XHT BE USED AS A VOICE BACKUP TO VMF A, DUE TO THE E_U PMENT CONFIGUATION EQUIED FO THESE FUNCT O_S_ LOW BIT ATE DATA TANSFE I5 PECLUDED DUING THESE OPEATIONS, C? FO ALL LUNA STAy OPEATIONS IN WHICH THE PGNS IS powee_ HB TH WILL BE USED_ ATIONALE WHEN THE PGNS IS POWEED IT IS DESIABLE TO EMAIN IN HB SO THAT ITS STATUS MAY BE CONTINUOUSLY MONITOED, THE LB TELEMETY FOMAT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE LGC DOWNLINK ANO MANY OTHE PGN$ PAAMETES THAT AE ON THE HB FOMAT= MISSION EV IDATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL $2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM INST 6-9

193 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS LM TELEMETY A* DEFINITION OF LOSS LM TELEMETY IS CONSIDEED TO BE LOST IN THE EVENT THAT USEABLE TELEMETY CANNOT BE ECEIVED AND ECODED BY THE EMOTED BITE AND TANSMITTED TO HOUSTON FO EAL'TIME FLIGHT CONTOLLE EVALUATION AND THIS TM CAPABILITY CANNOT BE ESTOED WITHIN A EASONABLE PE]OD OF TIME. B, OPEATIONAL IMPACT OF LOSS THE LOSS OF HB TM PECLUDES THE MONITOING, CONTOLLES, OF THE PEFOMANCE OF THE LGC AND AEA. A NUMBE OF GUIDANCE AND CONTOL PAAMETES AE TANSMITTED ONLY ON HB TM AND OTHES AE TANSMITTED AT A HIGH SAMPLE ATE ONLY ON HB, THE LOSS OF ONLY LB TM PECLUDES THE LB DATA TANSFE FOM THE LM TO THE CSM AND WOULD THUS PECLUDE THE EVALUATION OF BEHIND THE MOON ACTIVITY AFFODED BY DATA PLAYBACK. THE LOSS OF ALL TELEMETY ESULTS IN INABILITY OF THE GOUND CONTOLLE TO MONITO ONBOAD SYSTEM PEFOMANCE. C. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M ZO-5_; I, NOMINAL MISSION (A) UNDOCKINGo DESCENT OBIT, POWEED DESCENT - IN ODE TO ADEQUATELY MONITO THE POWEED FLIGHT PHASES OF THE MISSION AND TO INSUE CEW SAFETY AND SYSTEM COGNIZANCE DUING POWEED DESCENT, HB TM IS NECESSAY TO LO GATE. SPECIFICALLYw SUFFICIENT HB DATA TO DETEMINE GO/NO-GO STATUS IS MANDATOY DUING POWEED DESCENT TO DETECT SLOW DIFTING OF PGNS O AGS IN EAL TIME {ONLY THE GOUND CAN DO THIS) AND FO POSTFLIGHT ANALYSIS* AFTE LO GATE_ ABOTING DUE TO LOSS OF MB TM WOULD BE MOE HAZADOUS THAN CONTINUING TO LAND* {B) LUNA STAY - HB O LB TM WILL BE ADEQUATE FO SYSTEMS EVALUATION WHILE ON THE LUNA SUFACE. HB IS HIGHLY DESIABLE FO ASCENT AND ENDEZVOUS BUT THE LM IS COMMITTED TO THESE PHASES EGADLESS OF TM, SHOULD ALL TM BE LOSTt LUNA STAY WILL BE ABBEVIATED DUE TO DEGADED VEHICLE MONITOING CAPABILITIES* FO A LOSS OF ALL TMP ONLY A ONE-MAN EVA MAY BE PEFOMED* (C) ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING - THE LOSS OF TM DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE LM TO ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKJ BUT ONLY POHIBITS GOUND CONTOLLE AID IN THE MONITOING OF SYSTEM PEFOMANCE, IN THIS EVENT_ A LM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS WILL BE PEFOMED SINCE THIS IS THE NOMINAL ENDEZVOUS PLAN, 2, ALTENATE MISSIONS UNDOCKING AND STATION KEEPING WILL BE PEFOMED IF ALL TM IB LOST SIN{E THE LM WOULD NUT BE COMMITTED TO LONG PEIODS INDEPENDENT OF THE CSM, EITHE HB O LB DATA IS ADEQUATE FO A ENDEZVOUS ALTENATE MISSION CITICAL INSTUMENTATION A, DEFINITION OF LOSS CITICAL INSTUMENTATION IS CONSIDEED LOST WHEN INFOMATION POVIDED BY TELEMETY AND/O QNBOAD DISpLAyS I5 NOT ADEQUATE TO..M_NITO= THE, PEFOMANOE.OF, ANy CITICAL ONBOAD FUN_TI6N, ' " ' i 'li'' B, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF CITICAL INSTUMENTATION COULD JEOPADIZE CEW SAFETY IF A CITICAL ONBOAO FUNCTION COULD NOT BE MONITOED EITHE BY THE CEW O THE GOUND, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM INST 6-10

194 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS CONT, MISSION ULE ATIONALE (EF M 20-56) i. NOMINAL MISSION CA) UNDOCKINGP DESCENT OBITt LUNA STAY - THE MONITOING OF ALL CITICAL ONBOAD FUNCTIONS IS NECESSAY TO INITIATE ANY CITICAL MISSION PHASE. LOSS OF THIS CAPABILITY COULD AFFECT CEW SAFETY, (B) POWEEDDESCENT- CEWSAFETY IS JEOPADIZED IF INSTUMENTATION CITICAL TO PEFOMINGA SAFE DESCENT AND LANDING O TO MONITOING SYSTEMS ESSENTIAL FO A SAFE ASCENT AND ENDEZVOUSIS LOST. (C} ENDEZVOUS- CSM ESCUE WILL BE EQUIED ONLy WHENLM INSTUMENTATION ESSENTIAL TO PEFOMINGA LM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUSIS LOST. 2, ALTENATEMISSION THE LOSS OF CITICAL INSTUMENTATION PECLUDES THE CONSIDEATION OF ANY ALTENATE MISSIQNo MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL LM SYSTEMS LM INST 6-11

195 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Canter MISSION ULES SECTION6 - LMSYSTEMS LM SEQUENTIAL AND PYOTECHNIC 21-1 TO INITIATE MANNED LM MISSION PHASES_ THE PYOTECHNIC SYSTEM MuST POVIDE THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM CAPABILITIES (EF LM TELMU GO CITEIA IN SECTION 3 OF M)--- PYOTECHNIC SYSTEM 1, DEFINITION {EF M 21-2) A PYO SYSTEM I5 CONSIDEED LOST IF A PYO BATTEY OPEN CICUIT VOLTAGE LESS THAN $5 VOC O IF THE SYSTEM IS INCAPABLE OF BEING AMED= A PYO BATTEY OPEN CICUIT VOLTAGE IS NOMINALLY 37,2 VDC AND THEE IS NO EASON FO THE VOLTAGE TO EVE FALL BELOW 35 VDC OPEN CICUIT= IF IT SHOULD IT WOULD INDICATE A DEGADING BATTEY O LOSS OF CELLS IloS6 VOLTS PE CELL)= IF THE MASTE AM ELAY= KI_ CANNOT BE CLOSED THEN THE PyU BATTEY CANNOT BE CONNECTED TO THE PyO BUS AND NO PYO FUNCTION CAN BE PEFOMED WITH THIS SYSTEM= 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 21-12) LOSS OF ONE PYO SYSTEM MEANS LOSS OF ALL EDUNDANCY FO PYOTECHNIC FUNCTIONS= THE MOST CITICAL IMPACT IS ON STAGING. IF STAGING IS PEFOMED WITH LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM THEE AE SINGLE POINT FAILUES WHICH COULD ESULT IN THE INABILITY TO STAGS O IN INCOMPLETE STAGINGe 3. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 21-20} (A) NOMINAL MISSION (1) UNDOC_ING THOUGH PDI THE LM MUST HAVE EDUNDANT PYOTECHNIC SYSTEMS TO COMMIT TO MISSION PHASES IN WHICH STAGING IS MANDATOY, IF ONE SYSTEM IS LOST PIO TO PDI+5+3G (AFTE THAT POINTo THE LM MUST STAGE TO ETUN)t THE NOMINAL LM MISSION WILL BE ABOTED= THE LM WILL NOT BE STAGED WITH THE EMAINING PYO SYSTEM UNLESS CEW SAFETY DICTATES {SEE MANAGEMENT ULE Z1-12)= (2) PDI+5+30 TO TOUCHDOWN - THE LM IS NOW COMMITTED TO STAGING FO EITHE AN ABOT O LUNA SUFACE LAUNCH= IF A PYO SYSTEM WEE LOST DUING THIS PEIODP THE km WOULD HAVE TO STAGE WITH ONLY ONE PYO SYSTEM SOONE (ABOT) O LATE (LUNA SUFACE LAUNCH AFTE A ONE-EV STAY)= THEEFOE{ THEE IS NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE TO ABOTINGo (3) LUNA STAY - IF ONE PYO SYSTEM IS LOST ON THE LUNA SUFACE{ THE LM MUST LIFT OFF AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY BECAUSE SUBSEQUENT FAILUE OF THE OTHE SYSTEM WOULD ESULT IN THE INABILITY TO LIFT OFF{ (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS THE LM WILL NOT UNDOCK O IF UNDOCKED POCEED WITH EXTENDED SEPAATED MANEUVES WITH LOSS OF BOTH PYO SYSTEMS BECAUSE THE CAPABILITY TO STAGE {EQUIED FO DPS POPELLANT LEAKS{ ETC=) IS LOST= LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM PECLUDES A ENDEZVOUS MISSION BECAUSE THE LM MUST HAVE THE EDUNDANT CAPABILITy TO STAGE BEFOE COMMITTING TO A LM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL k2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM SEQ AND PYO 6-12

196 NASA - Mannad Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 21-2 EF ATIONALE FO M EF ATIONALE FO M AND NO ATIONALE EHUIEO 21-5 NO ATIONALE EHuIEO Z1-8 THE CONDITIONS EHUIING A NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY LIFT-OFF(LOSS OF A PYO SYSTEM O UNABLE TO DISAM A SYGTEM)AE NOT OF SUFFICIENT TIME CITICALITY TO EQUIE A T1 O T2 LIFT OFF, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70, LN SYSTEMS LM 5EH ' I AND PYO 6-_3

197 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - LM SYSTEMS 21-I0 APS pessuization APS WILL NOMALLY BE PESSUIZED IMMEDIATELY PIO TO STAGING. APS WILL NOT NOMALLY BE PESSUIZED MOE THAN 2A HOUS PIO TO THE LAST AP$ BUN-- HOWEVE. IN A CUNTINGENCYt THE APS MAY BE PESGUIZED UP TO 3-1/2 DAYS PIO TO THE LAST APS BUN. BY WAITING UNTIL IMMEDIATELY PIO TO STAGING TO p_s_unize AP_ THE OPTION TO PESSUIZE ONE O BOTH TANKS EXIGTS IF AN APG HELIUM LEAK HAG DEVELOPED. THE TIME CONSTAINT OF 2A HOUS AND 3-1/2 DAYS IS DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF TIME THE POPELLANTS CAN BE IN CONTACT WITH THE UUAD CHECK VALVES AFTE PESSUIZATION WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THEMe 21-ii LANDING GEA DEPLOY IF UNABLE TO DEPLOY ONE O MOE LANDING GEAt A LANDING WILL NOT BE ATTEMPTED. D_GCENT _NGINE BUNS WILL BE CONTINUED SINCE CONTOL POBLEMS AE NOT EXPECTED TO EXIST AND DAMAGE TU THE LANDING GEA FOM THE BUN WILL NOT AFFECT NON-LANDING MISSIONS. SELF EXPLANATOY. 21-Z2 ONE PYO SYSTEM STAGING UNDOCKED STAGING WITH ONE PyO SYSTEM WILL BE PEFOMED ONLy IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSAY TO MAINTAIN CEW SAFETY. WITH ONLY ONE PYO SYSTEM THEE AE MANY SINGLE POINT FAILUES WHICH COULD CAUSE INCOMPLETE STAGING. 2E-_3 ELAY K_-K6 FAILUE FO A K1 THOUGH K6 FAILUE_ THE,GOOD SYSTEM WILL BE DISABLED AND A PYO FUNCTIONt OTHE THAN GTAGING_ ATTEMPTED TO DETEMINE IF K1 (PYO SYSTEM AM ELAY) HAS FAILED CLOSED. AN EXTA SET OF CONTACTS ON EACH ELAY K1 THOUGH K6 IN BOTH PYO SYSTEMS AE WIED IN SEIES/PAALLEL TO MAKE UP A DAISY CHAIN WHICH IS MONITOED VIA TM AND ONBGAD, AN INADVETENT CLOSUE OF ONE OF THESE ELAYS CAN BE DETECTED. HOWEVE_ THE PATICULA FAILED ELAY CANNOT BE ISOLATED EXCEPT IN THE CAGE OF THE MASTE AM ELAY, IF A ELAY CLOSUE 15 DETECTED, A PYO FUNCTION WILL BE ATTEMPTED WITHOUT AMING EITHE SYSTEM. FAILUE TO PEFOM THE PYO FUNCTION WILL INDICATE THAT THE FAILED ELAY WAS NOT KI. THE ELAYS OF THE CHAIN MAKE UP THE 5TAO Nb SYSTEM AS FOLLOWS-'' K1 - MASTE AM K2 - STAGE ELAY K3 AND K# - INTEGTAGE UMBILICAL GUILLOTINE K5 AND KSA - INTESTAGE BOLTS (SYSTEM A) AND NUTS (5YSTEM B) KS - ELECTICAL CICUIT INTEUPTES AFTE ISOLATING K1 AS NOT BEING THE FAILED ELAYP THIS PyO SYSTEM MUST BE DISABLED BY PULLING THE APPLICABLE LOGIC POWE BEAKE BECAUSE THE FUNCTION CONTOLLED BY THE FAILED ELAY WILL BE PEFOMED SHOULD THIS SYSTEM BECOME AMED, IN THE CASE WHEE K2 MAY HAVE FAILED_ THE SYSTEM WOULD BE IN A CONFIMATION WHEE THE SUBSEUUENT FAILUE OF K_ WOULD CAUSE AN INADVETENT STAGING WHICH WOULD NOMALY _E CAUSE FO ABOT. HOWEVEt A K2 FAILUE CAN NOT BE CONFIMED. IT CAN ONLY BE DETEMINED THAT ONE OF THE ELAYS K2 THU KB HAS FAILED. ON THE BASIS THAT A K2 FAILUE CAN NOT BE CONFIMED THE MISSION SHOULD BE CONTINUED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM SEU AND PYO 6-1A

198 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS AMED PYO SYSTEM AN AMED PyO SYSTEM{S) THAT CANNOT BE DEAMED 15 CONSIDEED UNSAFE FO THE VIBATION/SHOCK ENVIONMENT ASSOCIATED WITH LUNA TOUCHDOWN, SUBSEQUENT CLOSUE OF ANOTHE PYO ELAY WOULD ESULT IN THAT PYO FUNCTION BEING PEFOMED. THE WOST CASE WOULD BE INADVETENT STAGING WHICH COULD BE CATASTOPHIC DUING THE LANDING PHASE* 21-2( EF ATIONALE FO M Z UNABLE TO DISAM 1, DEFINITION (A) pyo SYSTEM CANNOT BE DISAMED IF THE pyo BATTEY CANNOT BE DISCONNECTED FOM THE PYO BUS= THIS WILL BE DETECTED BY ATTEMPTING A PYO FUNCTION OTHE THAN STAGING WITH THE SUSPECT SYSTEHIS) AFTE ALL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO DISAM THE FAILED SYSTEM, IF THE PYO FUNCTION OCCUS, THE SYSTEM(ST IS CONSIDEED AMED, 2. GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT WITH AN AMED PYO SYSTEM(SIp SUBSEQUENT CLOSUE OF ANy OTHE PyO ELAY WILL ESULT IN EXECUTION OF THAT PYO FUNCTION= HOST CITICAL WOULD BE A CLOSUE OF ONE OF THE STAGING ELAYS CAUSING INADVETENT STAGING (PATIAL O COMPLETE}. _, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT {EF M 21-14o 21-5) IA) NOMINAL MISSION (i) UNDOCKING THOUGH TOUCHDOWN - THE NOMINAL MISSION WILL BE ABOTED IF UNABLE TO DISAM EITHE O BOTH PYO SYSTEMS* OF MOST CONCEN IS _NADVETENT STAGING WHICH WOULD BE CATASTOPHIC DUING POWEED DESCENT* ALSO, THE SHOCK AND VIBATION ASSOCIATED WITH LANDING COULD CAUSE A PYO ELAY TO SET AND INITIATE A PYO FUNCTION* (2) LUNA STAY - EVA WILL NOT BE INITIATED WITH EITHE O BOTH PYO SYSTEMS AMED* INADVETENT STAGING WOULD ENDANGE ANY EVA CEWMAN IN THE NEA VICINITY OF THE L_ DuE TO SCHAPNEL FOM THE PYOTECHNIC DEVICES, WITH THE CEW INSIDE INADVETENT STAGING IS NOT SEIOUS SINCE THE LM WOULD EMAIN IN PLACE ON THE DESCENT STAGE EVEN THOUGH ALL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE STAGES MAY BE SEVEED* HOWEVEt A NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY LIFTOFF WILL BE EQUIED TO MINIMIZE THIS POSSIBILITY* (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS DOCKED, UNDOCKED* DESCENT OBIT - THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED WITH AN AMED PYO SYSTEM o SYSTEMS ASSUMING THE CEW CAN ECOVE FOM INADVETENT STAGING. STAGING WILL BE PEFOMED NOMALLY IN OBIT* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL Z2/1E/T0 LM SYSTEMS LM SEW AND PYO b-15

199 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSIONULES SECTIONe - LMSYSTEMS 21-2Z KT-KZ5 CLOSED l, DEFINITION (EF M 21-]B) A PYO SYSTEM IS CONSIDEED UNUSABLE AND WILL BE DISABLED UNTIL AFTE DPS CYOGENIC pessuization AND THE DES FUEL AND OX VENTS AE CLOSED FO AN INADVETENT CLOSUE OF A K7 THOUGH K15 ELAY. 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT AN INADVETENT CLOSUE OF ANY ELAY_ K7 THOUGH Ki5, IN EITHE PYO SYSTEM CAN be DETECTbD VIA TM BUT THE PATICULA ELAY FAILED CANNOT BE ISOLATED. THESE ELAYS PEFOM THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS--- K7 - CS PESS K8 G KBA - LAND GEA OEPLOY K9 - DPS CYO ME PESS KZO & KZI - ASC ME PESS KI2 S KI2A - ASC FUEL AND OX COMP VALVES K13 - DPS FU S OX VENT VALVES K14 - DPS AMBIENT HE VALVES KZB - DPS FU & OX COMP VALVES pematue opeation OF ANY OF THE ELAYS IS NOT SEIOUS EXCEPT FO OPT CYOGENIC HE PESS IKP) AND DPS FU AND OX VENT VALVES (KI_), IF THE DPS CYOGENIC HELIUM VALVE IS OPENED PIO TO FIST IGNITION OF THE DPSt THE FUEL/HELIUM HEAT EXCHANGE WILL FEEZEr CUTTING OFF FUEL FLOW TO THE ENGINE, IF THE OPS FU AND OX VENT VALVES WEE TO OPEN PIO TO TOUCHDOWNo THE FU AND OX WOULD VENT OVEBOAD SINCE THE SOLENOID VENT VALVES AE NOMALLY TO BE LEFT OPEN. 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (A) NOMINAL MISSION INDICATION OF A KT THOUGH K15 ELAY CLOSUE IN EITHE PYO SYSTEM EQUIES OPENING THE COESPONDING LOGIC POWE CICUIT BEAKE TO DISABLE THAT PyO SYSTEM FO ALL SUBSEQUENT PYO FUNCTIONS UNTIL AFTE DPS CYOGENIC HELIUM PESSUIZATION AND THE DES FU SOX SOLENOID VENT VALVES AE CLOSED, THIS WZLL PEVENT INADVETENT FIING {OPENING) OF THE CYOGENIC HELIUM VALVE O THE DES FUG OX _QUIB VENT VALVES, IF BOTH PYO SYSTEMS SHOW INDICATIONS OF A K7 THOUGH K15 CLOSUEP THE DESCENT HE EG VALVES i AND 2 AND THE DES FU S OX SOLENOID VENT VALVES SHOULD BE CLOSED BEFOE AMING THE PYO SYSTEM FO ANY PYO FUNCTIONS PIO TO PDI, (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS SAME ATIONALE AS FO NOMINAL MISSIONS UNABLE TO STAGE (EF M i, DEFINITION THE LM is CONSIDEED UNABLE TO STAGE IF EITHE STAGING CANNOT BE INITIATED DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH PYO SYSTEMS O DOUBLE FAILUES WITHIN THE PYO SYSTEMS ESULT IN INCOMPLETE SEPAATION OF THE ASCENT AND DESCENT STAGES. 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT FAILUE TO STAGE ON THE LUNA SUFACE IS CATASTOPHIC. FAILUE TO STAGE IN OBIT EQUIES THE LM TO ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE A ENDEZVOUS UNTTAGED IF THE DESCENT STAGE IS IGIDLY ATTACHED, IF THE DESCENT STAGE IS NOT IGIDLY ATTACHEDt THE LM MUST BE ESCU_D! 3. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (A) NOMINAL MISSION FO THE NOMINAL MISSION_ KNOWN INABILITY TO STAGEp PIO TO PDI+BD WOULD BE CAUSE TO ABOT THE NOMINAL MISSION. AFTE PDI+St THIS SITUATION IS CATASTOPHIC. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS.M BEG AND PYO 6-16

200 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 2Z-23 CONT {B} ALTENATE MISSION ENDEZVOUS - IF STAGING CANNOT BE INITIATED O IF IT IS AND DOES NOT physically BEPAATEP THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED USING THE CS AND DPS IF AVAILABLE TO COMPLETE THE ENDEZVOUS AB LONG AS THE STAGES AE STILL EGIDLY ATTACHEDD CSM ESCUE WILL BE EQUIED FO THE TEMINAL PHASE O IF _G EDLINES AE VIOLATEDo SHOULD PATIAL STAGING OCCU SUCH THAT THE STAGE5 AE NOT IGIDLY ATTACHEDt MANEUVE CAPABILITY OF THE LM 15 LOSTo THE LM WILL GO TO DIFTINO FLIGHT AND CALL FO A CSM ESCUEe MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO I' FNL 12/15/7( LM SYSTEMS.H SEQ AND PYO 6-17

201 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS LM ELECTICAL POWE 22-i TO INITIATE MANNED LM MISSION PHASES_ THE ELECTICAL POWE SYSTF'M MOST PUVIDE THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM CAPABILITIES {EF LM TELMU GO CITEIA IN SECTION :_ 'JF FM DOCUMENT)--- A, CD/LMP BUS 1, DEFINITION (EF M 22-2) THE CD O Lr4p BUS is CONSIDEED LOST IF T_E BUS VOLTAGE CANNOT WE MAINTAINED GEATE THAN 26,5 VDC O IF THE BUS CUENT IS MEATE THAN 90 AMPS, A BUS VOLTAUE LESS THAN 26o5 VDC WILL PUVIDE OUT uf SPEC VOLTAGES FU SEVEAL CITICAL LM E_UIPMENTS {E,G, COMMt ECSt PGNS, _C_. ETCJ), BUS CUENTS GEATE THAN 90 AMPS INUICATE A _HOT ON THE BUS AND WOULD EXCEED THE SPEC WIE ATING OF THE FEEDE LINES, 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL INPACT LOSS OF EITHE BUS ESULTS IN LOSS OF LM EQUIPMENT ED'UNDANCY AND SEIOUSLY DEGAOED ELECTICAL POWE SUBSYSTEM, SUBSEUU_NT FAILUE UF THE UTHE BUS WOULD ESULT IN THE INABILITY TO POWE ANY SPACECAFT EQUIPraENTS. 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M ZZ-ZO) (A) NOMINAL MISSION (i) UNDOCKING THOUGH LUNA STAY - LOS5 OF A BUS MEANS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO LAND AND LOSS OF EDUNDANCY OF CITICAL SYSTEMS, DDINS POWEED DESCENTt LOSS OF THE CU O LMP BUS WILL CAUSE THE DESCENT EhuINE TO THOTTLE TO 100 PECENT WHICH WILL PEVENT ANY ATTEMPT TO LAND AND CAUSE AN ABOT TO BE INITIATED, IMMEDIATE ETUN TO THE CSM IS NECESSAY TO EDUCE THE TIME I_ WHICH A FAILbE OF A EMAINING CITICAL SYSTEM O THE EMAINING BUS CAN OCCU, (2) LM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS - ONCE COMMITED TU ENOEZVOUSt THE LM SHOULD EMAIN THE ACTIVE VEHICLE BECAUSE IT CAN STILL COMPUTE AND EXECUTE ALL ENDEZVOUS MANEUVES AND IT IS _E_T TO EMAIN WITH THE NOMINAL ENDEZVOUS PLAN, (_} ALTENATE _ISSION(S} NO UNDOCKED MISSION IS ACCEPTABLE IN VIEW OF THE ISK INVOLVED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAaE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EPS

202 NASA - Manned Spacecraft (;enter MISSION ULES SECTION S - LM systems 22-i CONT B* DESCENT FEEDE(SI FIGUE 1- EPS FEEDE CONFIGUATION _TTE_' DESCENT F_EOE ASCENT FEEDEJ _IV ELAY " ir,i 1, DEFINITION (EF M 22-2 AND FIG _) LOSS OF A DESCENT FEEDE IS DEFINED AS THE INABILITY TO use AS A POWE PATH THE ELECTICAL CONNECTIONS FOM THE OUTPUT TEMINAL OF THE DESCENT ECA TO THE DEADFACE ELAY, FOM THE DEADFACE ELAY TO THE BUSt THE DESCENT AND ASCENT BATTEIES use THE SAME MAIN FEED LINES AND THIS POTION OF THE MAIN FEED LINES IS CONSIDEED PAT OF THE ASCENT FEEDE ONLY, 2* GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT AN OPEN DESCENT FEEDE IS NOT A SEIOUS MALFUNCTION AS THE SUBSEQUENT FAILUE OF THE OTHE DESCENT O ONE OF THE ASCENT FEEDES WILL NOT ESULT IN INABILITY TO POWE THE SPACECAFT* THEE AE TWO SINGLE POINT FAILUES THAT CAN CAUSE AN OPEN FEEDE* IA) THE INADVETENT OPENING OF ONE OF THE TWO DEADFACE ELAYS AND (El AN OPEN ECA ONBOAD CONTOL CAPABILITY EXISTS ONLY TO OPEN O CLOSE BOTH OF THE DEADFACE ELAYS SIMULTANEOUSLY* AN OPEN DESCENT FE_DE ESULTS IN THE LOSS OF CONSUMABLE CAPABILITY OF TWO DESCENT BATTEIES, CONSUMABLE CITEIA THEN DICTATE THE EFFECT ON THE MISSION* A SHOTED DESCENT FEEDE CAN ESULT FOM A SINGLE POINT FAILUE (SHOT) ANYWHEE ALONG THE POWE FLOW PATH, ISOLATION OF THE SHOT EQUIES D_ADFACINGAND THUS THE LOS5 OF CONSUMABLE CAPACITY UF ALL D_SCENT BATTE'IES;" TO _iaintain _ PO_EE P _hace_h_t _T_'_E_T _ATTE_{_ WILL BE PLACED ON THEI NOMAL FEEDPATHS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SPECIFIC POCEDUES HoST BE FOLLOWED TO DETEMINE WHEE ALONG THE BATTEY-TO-BUS powe FLOW PATH THE SHOT EXISTS, IF INSUFFICIENT TIME IS AVAILABLE TO TOUBLESMOOTP A SHOT MUST BE ASSUMED TO BE ON THE BUS (WOST CASE) AND THE MISSION ABOTED, 3. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT {EF M 22-21) CA) NOMINAL MISSION (ALL PHASES) THE NOMINAL MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED IF CONSUMABLE EDLINES AE NOT VIOLATED AND SUFFICIENT CONSUMABLES EDUNDANCY EMAINS, FO AN OPENI CONSUMABLE CITEIA NOMINALLY PEMIT CONTINUATION OF THE LUNA LANDING MISSION WITH AN ABBEVIATED LUNA STAYI FO A SHOTt ALL DESCENT ELECTICAL CONSUMABLES AE LOST (SEE 22-1.B.2 ABOVE AND THEE AE INSUFFICIENT ASCENT CONSUMABLES TO COMPLETE THE NOMINAL MISSION* (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS ANY ALTENATE MISSION THAT DOES NOT VIOLATE CONSUMABLES CITEIA IS ACCEPTABLE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/IE/7D LM SYSTEMS LM EPS 6-19

203 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECT]ON 6 - LM SYSTEMS ITE 2-i CONT Co ASCENT FEEDE(S) i, DEFINITION (EF M 22-2 AND FIG L) LUSS OF AN ASCENT FEEDE IS DEFINED AS TNE INABIL]TY TO USE AS A POWE PATH THE ELECTICAL CONNECTIONS FOM THE OUTPUT TEMINALS OF THE ASCENT ECA_S TO THE BAT FEED TIE CICUIT BEAKES. SINCE NO UINGLE OPEN FAILUE CAN ESULT IN LOSS OF AN ASCENT FEEOEI ONLY SHOTED FEEUES AE CONSIDEEU. 2. GENEAL OPENATIONAL IMPACT THE AFFECT_O BUS CAN ONLY BE POWEED VIA THE BUS CNOSSTIE CICUIT BEAKES MAKING CACTI BUS SUSCEPTIBLE TO A SHOT ON THE orme. ]N IHIS CONFIGUATIONJ LOSS OF THH EMAINING FEEDE IS CATASTOPHIC. ALSOt A SHOTED ASCENT FEEDE NESOLTS IN LOSS OF THL COESPONOINM UESCLNT FEEDE (]F UNSFAGEO) AND TwO DESCENT BATTEI=S. THE ASCENT BATTEY THAT PONE!_EO THE LOST BUS VIA ITS NOMAL FEEDPATH CAN BE USED ON ]TS BACKUP FEEUPAFH TO POWE TME EMAINING GI)Ot) BUS, 3, SPECIFIC OPENATIONAL IMPACT (EF MN 22-21) (A) NOMINAL MISSION ALL PNASES" LOSS OF AN ASCENT FEEDE WILL EQUIE AN ABOT AND IMMEDIATE ETUN TO THE CSM BECAUSE THE SUBSE_UENT FAILUE OF THE OTHE ASCENT FEEDE WOULD ESULT IN THE INABILITY TO POWE THE SPACECAFT, DOCKED SYSTEMS EVALUATION CAN BE PEFOMED WITH THE HATCH OPEN AND THE TUmbEL CLEA, THE CEW COULD SAFELY ETUN TO THE CSM ]F ALL POWE WAS LOST DUE TU A SDBSE_UENT SHOT, (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS De DESCENT BATTEYIS) NO UNOCCKED ALTENATE MISSION WILL BE CONS]DEED BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT OF A SUBSEQUENT LPS FAILUE, i. DEFINITION (_F MN 2Z-2) A DESCENT _ATTEY 1S CONSIDEED LOST IF--- CA) THE BAITEY OUTPUT IS EQUAL TO O LESS THAN 2 AMPS WHEN CONNECTED TO A BUS - THIS ]NDICATES THE BATTEY IS INCAPABLE OF DEL]VE]NU POWE AND ]S A EASONABLE L]MIT TO DIPFEENTIATE BETWEEN A NOMAL AND A EVESE CUENT, A LOW OUTPUT SHOULD ALSO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A LOW BATTEY VOLTAGE. (_) BATTEY TEMPEATUE EQUAL TO O GEATE THAN L45 DEC F WITH VOLTAGE AND CUENT HIGHE THAN NUMIklAL - DETECTED BY A BATTEY MALFUNCTIUN ANU WANING LIGHT WITHOUT THE BATTEY AUTO_;ATICALLY BEING TAKEN OFFLI_E, AT TEMPEATUES GEATEN THAN 14B DEB F_ PEMANENT DAMAGE TO THE BATTEY OCCUS, (G) IN_ILITY T() MEET EGO!ED VOLTAGE EGULATION UNDE LOAD I SELF EXPLANATOY, (o) INA_ILIIY TO HE CONNECTED TO A FEEDE OUE TU A MALFUNCTIONED ECA - SELF EXPLANATOY. (E) BATTEY OPEN CICUIT LESS THAN _Z,B VDC STEADY STATE - THE NOMINAL OPEN CICUIT VOLTAGE WHEN UPENATiNG IN THE PEOXIDE NEGIbN (LESS THAN 20 AMP-HOUS EMOVEO) OF THE UlSCHANGE CUVE IS 37V (i,_5 VICELL). THE MINIMUM OPEN CICUIT VOLTAGE WHEN OPEATING IN THE MONONIDE EGION (GEAIE THAN 20 AMP-HOUS EMOVED) OF THE DISCHAGE CUVE IS _L*8 V {&,b9 V/CELL), A LOWE VOLTAGE INDICATES A DEPLETED BATTExY O LL;SS BF CELLS within THE BATTEY (L,Bb VOLTSICELL)* 2* b_neal _PHNAT_UNAL IMPACT LOSS OF ONE Q TwO DESCHNT BATTE]kS WILL HAVE NO EFFECT Om THE MISSION FOM A SYSTEMS STAN_PO]mT, AS DEFINEO ABOVEm TWO DESCENT BATTEieS COULD BE LOST FU COMPLETELY ONELATLD EASONSt AND NOT CAUSE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN TNE, BATTEIES* FO EXAMPLE, ONE BATTEY CUULD BE LOST DUE TO AN INTENAL BATTEY POBLEM AND A._OTHE LOST DUE TO AN ECA MALFUNCTION. IF BOTH #ATTEIES wee LOST DUE TO IDENTICAL MALFUNCTIONS_ SYSTEMS CONFIDENCE WOULD BE W_AKE,\EO BUT TH_ MISSION WOULD BE CONTINLJEU UIxLHSS A DEFINITE POPAGATING FAILUE kle_jent IS FOUND, DESCENT POWE EDU,_DAI_CY STILL HEMAINS AND BOTH ASCENT BATTEIES AE AVAILABLE, LOSS OF THEE O MOE DESCEJ_T BATTEIES ]'_OICATLS A SEIUOSLY DEGADING PLECTICAL SYSTHM EGADLESS OF THE EASON FO THE LOSS AND TNE LM SHOULD ETUN TO THE VICINITY OF THE CSMo MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL,2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EPS 0-20

204 i NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 22-Z CONT 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 22-23) (A) NOMINAL MISSION (1) ALL PHASES EXCEPT LO GATE TO TOUCHDOWN - LOSS OF ONE O TWO DESCENT BATTEIES WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE NOMINAL O ALTENATE MISSIONSP CONSUMABLES PEMITTING, LOSS OF THEE O MOE DESCENT BATTEIES WILL CONSTITUTE. A MISSION ABOT_ ENDEZVOUS, AND DOCKING WITH THE CSM ASAP, SEIOUS ELECTICAL SYSTEM POBLEMS AE SUSPECTED AND EVEN WITH A COMPLETELY NOMINAL ASCENT SYSTEMP THE ELECTICAL SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE ELIED UPON= DOCKED SYSTEMS EVALUATION CAN BE PEFOMED WITH THE CONNECTING HATCHES OPEN AND THE TUNNEL CLEA= E= ASCENT BATTEY{S! (2) LO GATE TO TOUCHDOWN - THE TIME TO ETUN TO DOCK WITH THE CSM IS _ HOUS WHETHE THE MISSION IS ABOTED DUING THIS PHASE O THE LM LANDSt AND THEN LIFTS OFF AT Tl= AFTE LO GATE THE ECOMMENDED POCEDUE IS TO LAND AND LIFTOFF AT TE O T3, THIS POCEDUE IS CONSIDEED SAFE THAN ABOT STAGING AT A LOW ALTITUDE, {B) ALTENATE MISSIONS 1, DEFINITION THE SAME ATIONALE AS FO NOMINAL MISSIONS APPLIES {EF PAA D,3=(A)), SEE ALSO ASCENT BATTEIES - ALTENATE MISSIONS, SAME AS FO DESCENT BATTEY (EF PAA Dol) 2= GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF AN ASCENT BATTEY CONSTITUTES AN ABOT FOM THE NOMINAL MISSION BECAUSE LOSS OF THE EMAINING BATTEY WOULD ESULT IN THE INABILITY TO POWE THE SPACECAFT FO STAGE OPEATIONS, 3= SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT {EF M 22-22J (A) NOMINAL MISSION {1) UNDO KING THOUGHPDI.5+3O " THE NOMINAL MISSION WILL BE ABOTED FO THE LOSS OF ONE ASCENT BATTEY TO AVOID COMMITTING TO STAGED OPEATIONS WITH ONLY ONE ASCENT BATTEY, STAGING SHOULDNOT BE PEFOMEDUNLESS NECESSAY FO CEW SAFETY AND THE LM SHOULD DOCK ASAP, (2) POI.5.90 TO TOUCHDOWN - THE LM SHOULD LAND TO PEVENT A ONE BATTEY/ONE BUS ABOT AND STAGING ON ONE PYO SYSTEM, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LH SYSTEMS LM EP$ 6-2E

205 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION6 - LM SYSTEMS 22-1 CONT SEVEAL OPTIONS AE AVAILABLE--- ONE BATTEY/ONE BUS ABOT STAGING - THIS I$ NOT CONSIDEED TO BE A GOOD SOLUTION SINCE THE LOSS OF A BUS MEANS A LOSS OF EDUNDANCY AND/O LIMITED CAPABILITIES IN PYO $YSTEMt GUIDANCE SYSTEMSP ECSt ETC, ONE BATTEY/TWO BUS ABOT STAGING - THIS IS NOT CONSIDEED TO BE A SOLUTION SINCE THE EMAINING ASCENT BATTEY WOULD NOT BE CONDITIONED TO SUPPOT THE CUENT STEP ASSOCIATED WITH ABOT STAGING_ HENCE IT COULD ESULT IN A LOSS OF GUIDANCE SYSTEMS AND EQUIE A MANUAL ASCENTo ONE BATTEY/TWO BUS MANUAL SEQUENCING OF DESCENT TO ASCENT POWEe STAGING, AND APS ON - THIS IS NOT CONSIDEED TO BE A GOOD SOLUTION SINCE THE EMAINING BATTEY MAY O MAY NOT CONDITIONED FO THIS POCEDUE (S AMP/HOQS MUST HAVE BEEN EMOVED BEFOE THE LAST DESCENT BATTEY IS D]SCONNECTEO), ALSO ADEQUATE TIME MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO COMPLETE THIS POCEDUE, LAND= CONFIGUE FO A ONE BATTEY/TWO BUS TI L/O USING NOMAL L/O POCEDUE5 - THIS IS A EASONABLE SOLUTION SINCE IT ETAINS THE TWO BUS EDUNDANCYP AND THE BEHAINING ASCENT BATTEY SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY CONDITIONED WITH 5 AMP HOUS EMOVED INSUING THAT THE GUIDANCE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE ADVESELY AFFECTED, IT ALSO SHOULD POVIDE ADEQUATE TIME TO POPELY CONFIGUE THE ~ SPACECAFT FO THE L/O, THE ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING TZ_E FO A L/O AT T_ IS 4 HOUS-- WHEEASp THE TOTAL TIME FO LUNA STAY ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING IS 6 HOUS FO A L/O AT T2 O E EV LATE AT T3, THE ADVANTAGE OF A T3 L/O IS THAT DESCENT POWE CAN BE USED FO THE LUNA STAY TIME-- THEEBYP EDUCING THE ASCENT POWE EQUIEMENTS, THE ADVANTAGE OF A TZ L/O IS THAT THE LM 1S IN OBIT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND THE TIME FO THE EMAINING ASCENT BAT TO FAIL ON THE LUNA SUFACE IS EDUCED, THE DISADVANTAGE OF A T2 L/O 1S THAT THE LM MUST BE POWEED DOWN SINCE ONE BATTEY I5 NOT ADEQUATE TO PEMIT A 6 HOU POWEED UP ENDEZVOUS, THE ENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING TIME FO A L/O AT T1 IS 4 HOUS_ WHEEAS THE TOTAL TIME FO LUNA STAYt ENDEZVOUSt AND DOCKING IS 6 HOUS FO L/O AT TZ O ONE EV LATE AT T_, THE ADVANTAGE OF A T3 L/O IS THAT DESCENT POWE CAN BE USED FO THE LUNA STAY TIME-- THEEBY_ EDUCING THE ASCENT POWE EQUIEMENTS, THE ADVANTAGE OF A T2 L/O IS THAT THE LM IS IN OBIT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND THE TIME FO THE EMAINING ASCENT BATTEY TO'FAIL ON THE LUNA SUFACE IS EDUCED, THEDISADVANTAGE OF A T2 L/O IS THAT THE LM MUST BE POWEED DOWN SINCE ONE BATTEY IS NOT ADEQUATE TO PEHIT A S HOU POWEED UP ENDEZVOUSo 13) LUNA STAY - LOSS OF AN ASCENT BATTEY WHILE ON THE LUNA SUFACE EQUIES A LIFTOFF AT THE FIST OPPOTUNITY BECAUSE FAILUE OF THE EMAINING ASCENT BATTEY WOULD ESULT IN THE INABILITY TO POWE THE SPACECAFT AFTE STAGING* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO I# FNL 12/15/7C LM SYSTEMS LM EPS 6-22

206 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION B - LM SYSTEMS 22-1 CONT (&) ENDEZVOUS - LM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS WILL BE PEFOMED A_ LONG AS SUFFICIENT ELECTICAL'POWE TO SUPPOT ENDEZVOUS EoUIPMENT EMAINS. IH) ALTENATE MISSIONS ONDOGKING AND TH_ DESCENT OBIT PHASES MAY BE INITIATED WITH LOSS OF ONE AS_NT BATTEY BUT NOT POWEED DESCENT, ANY ALTENATE MISSION MAY BE PEFOMED WHICH WILL NOT NOMINALLY COMMIT THE LM TO STAGING, _. LOSS OF BOTH ASCENT BATTEIES ALL PHASES - CONSTITUTES AN ABOT AND ENDEZVOUS WITH THE CSM ASAP, IF OOCKED_ THE LM WILL NOT UNDOCK BECAUSE ANY FAILUE WHICH COULD FOCE THE LM TO STAGE WOULD ESULT IN THE INABILITY TO POWE THE SPACECAFT.,,SSION [EV. _ATE SECTION[ GOOP PAGE APOLLO '"ifnl,2t,_n0:msystemsl"eps 6-23

207 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 22-i CONT F+ INVETES 1, DEFINITION (EF M 22-2 AN INVETE IS CONSIDEED LOST IF THE AC BUS VOLTAGE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED S_UAL TO O GEATE THAN VAE AND LESS THAN 120 VAC O THE AC BUS FEQUENCY CANNOT BE MAINTAINED EQUAL TO O GEATE THAN 390 HZ AND EQUAL TO O LESS THAN _I0 HZ, A FUNCTIONAL INVETE SHOULD OPEATE well WITHIN THESE ANGES. AN OUT OF SPEC CONDITION EXISTS FO ALL AC EOUIPMENT AT O BEYOND THESE LIMITS, 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF EITHE OF BOTH INVETES DOES NOT PESENT ANY CEW SAFETY POBLEM. LOSS OF ALL AC POWE ODES+ HOWEVE_ SEIOUSLY HANDICAP MISSION PHASES WHEE LOSS OF E_UIPMENT LISTED IN THE AC BUS LOADS/E_LJIPMENT TABLE AFFECTS LM CAPABILITY. 3. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 22-2A) {A) ALL PHASES - FO LOSS OF ONE INVETE THE MISSION will BE LONTINUED, (B) DOCKED, UNDOCKED - WITH BOTH INVETES LOST, CICULAI_ATION WILL NOT BE PEFOMED BECAUSE THE LM WILL NOT BE COMMITTED TO A ENDEZVOUS WITHOUT THE ENDEZVOUS ADA, (C) CIC TO TOUCHDOWN - WITH BOTH INVETES LUSTy THE LM _ILL NOT BE COMMITTED TO POWEED DESCENT Ot IF PDI HAS ALEADY OCCUSDt WILL ABOT IF pio TO LO GATE, LOSS OF ALL AC EDUCES TOTAL SPACECAFT CAPABILITY TO THE EXTENT THAT FUTHE POGESS BECOMES HAZADOUS, FUNCTIONS LOST INCLUDE--- ENUZ D, NG/ALT METE, BOTH FDAI'S, THE S-BAND STEEABLE ANTENNA_ DEOA ONBOAD EADOUTSt NUMEIC AND INTEGAL LIGHTING_ UPS EADOUTS AND THE TIMES, AFTE LO GATE, HOWEVE, IT IS PEFEABLE TO ATTEMPT TO LAND, (D) LUNA STAY - THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED WITH LOBS OF BOTH INVETES SINCE THE SITUATION CANNOT _OSEN INSOFA AS AC IS CONCENED AND IT IS NOT CITICAL TO THESE PHASES, 6,4K_z. V_o,"... -+_,. I,,"''''''"_',... -' -_-' l, 6,4 KHZ i. - l _ ; L I -za l-... I '.:oa:l, I,:,, L.. + i 4CB_SS I TO i I _ AOT r _''''"! +NO I I I --., i 1 o_f _ L..., VLMP 4 Bl1 J 4CB18_ AC"B" MIBSION EV DATE SECTION GOUp PAGE APOLLO i_ FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EPS 6-_A

208 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - LM SYSTEMS ZZ-1 CONT G, AC BUS(ES) 1. DEFINITION (EF M 22-2) AN AC BUS 1$ CONSIDEED LOST IF POWE CANNOT BE SUPPLIED TO ITP IF THE BUS VOLTAGE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED EQUAL TO O LESS THAN _20 AND E_UAL TO O GEATE THAN _10o5 VACt O THE BUS FEOUENCY EQUAL TO O LESS THAN 410 AND EQUAL TO O GEATE THAN 390 Hie 21 GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF AC BUS A WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF THE DESCENT ENGINE UIMBALING AND A SEVEELY HANDICAPPED ENDEZVOUS BECAUSE OF LOSS OF THE ENDEZVOUS ADAP NO/NG T ALT/ALT T METEt GASTAt AND INTEGAL LIGHTING= THE MAJO IMPACT OF LOSS OF AC BUS B WOULD BE LOSS OF THE HB TM IF A 210 FOOT ANTENNA IS NOT AVAILABLE-- THUS HANDICAPPING SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND CAUSING LOSS OF TAJECTOY INFOMATION= LOSS OF BOTH AC BUSES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL OF THE ABOVE_ PLUS BOTH FDAIIS AND THE AOT, 9. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 22-25) (A) NOMINAL MISSION (l) DOCKEDt UNDOCKED - LOSS OF AC BUS A O BOTH BusES WiLL PEVENT INITIATING CICULAIZATION DUE TO LOBS OF THE DESCENT ENGINE GIMBALS AND ENDEZVOUS ADA. LOSS OF ONLY AC BUS B WILL NOT INHIBIT CICULAIZATION SINCE NO CITICAL FUNCTIONS AE LOST, 12) PDI THOUGH TOUCHDOWN - WITH THE LOGS OF EITHE BUS A O BUS B THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED SINCE TOTAL SPACECAFT CAPABILITY IS NOT SEVEELY HANDICAPPED WITH LOSS OF ONE AC BUS. SHOULD BOTH BUSES BE LOSTp ALL AC IS LOST AND POWEED DEGCENTt UNTIL LO GATE_ WILL BE ABOTED {SEE PAA F,3,(C))* (9} LUNA STAY - AFTE TOUCHDOWNt LOSS OF AC POWEED EQUIPMENT IS NOT CITICAL. ALSOo IF ONE AC BUS IS LOSTp EALY LIFTOFF WILL NOT COMPENSATE FO THE LOSS* MOEOVEt THEE IS NO EASON TO EXPECT FAILUE OF ONE BUS TO AFFECT ELIABILITY OF THE EMAINING BUS* 22-2 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 22-3 NO ATIONALE EQUIED MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL 2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EPS 6-25

209 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES r SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS -.w OVECUENT POTECTION THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED WITH LOSS OF OVECUENT POTECTION-- IF THIS POTECTION IS LOST PIO TO EATH LIFTOFFt A HOLD WILL BE CALLED, ECA CICUITY_ ASSOCIATED WITH CUENT MEATUING_ DETECTS AN OVECUENT CONDITION )GEATE THAN 150 AMPS/ AN_ APPLIES POWE TO THE tesetzt COILS OF THE ELAY CONNECTING THE BATTEY TO THE FEEDE. ECA OVECUENT POTECTION IS DEFINITELY LOST IF BOTH CICUIT BEAKES POWEING THE DESCENT O ABCENT ECAtG FAIL OPEN_ O IF AN ASCENT BATTEY NOMAL FEED CONTACTO 1S LOSTe OVECUENT POTECTION IS POBABLY LOBT IF A BATTEY CUENT CANNOT BE MEAGUED O A BATTEY CANNOT BE SWITCHEO OFFLINE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IF CUENT CANNOT BE MEASUEDt THE POBLEM COULD BE IN THE CUENT MEASUING CICUITY O IN THE INSTUMENTATION, LIKEWISE IF THE BATTEY CANNOT BE SWITCHED OFFLINE MANUALLY_ THE POBLEM CAN BE IN THE ECA O IN THE MANUAL SWITCH AND ASSOCIATED CONTOL LINES EXTENAL TO THE ECA. SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE A FAULT EXTENAL TO THE ECA {OVECUENT POTECTION EMAINS) FOM CETAIN FAULTS IN THE ECA (OVECUENT POTECTION LOST)_ IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT IF THESE ANOMALIES OCCU IN FLIGHT THAT OVECUENT POTECTION HAD BEEN LOST, A, IF OvECUENT POTECTION IS LOST ON AN INDIVIDUAL DESCENT BATTEYt THE BATTEY WILL BE LEFT ONLINE IF EQUIED, THE OTHE DESCENT BATTEY CUENTS AND VOLTAGES POVIDE THE NECESSAY INDICATIONS AS TO THE STATUS OF THE BATTEY)S) WITHOUT OVECUENT POTECTION, THE BATTEY(S) WILL BE IDIVIDUALLY TAKEN OFFLINE MANUALLY IF AN OVECUENT CONDITION IS INOICATEDo IN THE EVENT THAT THE BATTEy)S) CANNOT BE SWITCHED OFFLINE MANUALLYt ALL DESCENT BATTEIEB WILL BE DEADFACED IF AN OVECUENT CONDITION OCCUS ON THE BATTEY{B) WHICH CANNOT BE SWITCHED MANUALLY, B, IF ALL DESCENT OVECUENT POTECTION IS LOBTP BOTH ASCENT BATTEIES WILL BE PAALLELED WITH THE DESCENT BATTEIES ONLINE PEIODICALLY TO MONITO CUENT AND OBTAIN A CONSUMABLE TEND, THE TOTAL CUENT OF THE LM CAN BE EBTIMATED BY THE CUENT BEING DELIVEED BY THE ASCENT BATTEIES AND A CONSUMABLE TEND DEVELOPED* THIS WILL ALLOW COMPLETION OF THE NOMINAL MISSION EXCEPT FO THE TWO MAN EVAo A ONE MAN EVA IS CONSIDEED ADVISABLE TO ENABLE ONE CEWMAN TO EMAIN IN THE LM'TO MONITO THE EPGI IF THE TEND DATA IS" INADEQUATE AND THE BATTEIES DEPLETE SOONE THAN EXPECTEDt SUFFICIENT CONSUMABLES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE ASCENT BATTEIES FO A SAFE ETUN TO THE CSM= C, 1F ONE O BOTH ABCENT BATTEY NOMAL FEED CONTACTOS FAIL OPENt THE SPACECAFT CONFIGUATION FO ASCENT STAGE ONLY OPEATIONS WILL USE BACKUP F_EDS ON BOTH ASCENT BATTEIES WITH OPEN BUS COSSTIES* BOTH BUSES WILL BE INDEPENDENTLY POWEED AND ISOLATED FOM EACH OTHE SO THAT A SHOT ON ONE BUS O FEEDE WILL NOT AFFECT THE OTHE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EPB B-26

210 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS!22-11 THE ASCENT BATTEIES WILL BE PECONDITIONED FO--- A. ABOT STAGING WITH TWO ASCENT BATTEIES/SPLIT BUS OPEATION = BY EMOVING A MINIMUM OF 2o5 AMP HOUS FOM THE BATTEY ON THE LMP BUSS (NOMALLY BATTEY 5) AND A MINIMUM OF 5 AMP FLOUS FOM THE BATTEY ON.THE CD BUS (NOMALLY BATTEY 6) IMMEDIATELY PIO TO PDI, TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT WITH THE CUENT STEPS ACCOSICATED WITH THE CD AND LMP BUSES AT ABOT STAGING, THE ABOVE PECONDITIONING 15 EQUIED TO PEVENT THE VOLTAGE AT THE AEA FOM FALLING BELOW 2Z,5 VDC FO GEATE THAN O,5 SECONDS {LOSS OF AEA MEMOY O THE VOLTAGE AT THE pgns FOM FALLING BELOW /- O,_ VDC FO GEATE THAN 0,5 SECONDS (LGC ESTAT), THE CUENT STEP IN THIS CASE IS ESSENTIALLY ONE LAGE STEP ON EACH BUS, B LUNA L/O O STAGING DUING COASTING FLIGHT WITH TWO ASCENT BATTEIES/SPLIT BUS OPEATION - BY EMOVING A MINIMUM OF 2,5 AMP HOUS FOM EACH ASCENT BATTEY IMMEDIATELY PIO TO DISCONNECTING THE LAST DESCENT BATTEY FOM EACH BUS, THIS POCEDUE IS EQUIED TO AVOID UNDBVOLTAGES AT THE GUIDANCE EQUIPMENT (AEA AND LOG) WHEN THE LM IS NOT IN POWEED FLIGHT, THE CUENT STEP IN THIS CASE IS SMALLE SINCE IT IS A SUCCESSION OF STEPS WHEN NOMINAL LIFTOFF/STAGING POCEDUES AE USED. SEQUENTIALLY EMOVING THE TWO DESCENT BATTEIES ON EACH BUS ESULTS IN TWO SMALLE STEPS, AND SUBSEQUENT STAGING_ APS ONt AND CS JETS FIING CONSTITUTES THE EMAINING STEPS, C, LUNA L/O O STAGING DUING COASTING FLIGHT WITH ONE ASCENT BATTEY/TWO BUS OPEATION - BY EMOVING A MINIMUM OF 5 AMP HOUS FOM THE EMAINING ASCENT BATTEY IMMEDIATELY PIO TO DISCONNECTING THE LAST DESCENT BATTEY FOM THE BUS, THIS pat OF THIS MISSION ULE COVES THE CAPABILITY TO SWITCH TO ASCENT POWE AND STAGE DUING COASTING FLIGHT O DUING LUNA STAY AT ANY TIME POVIDED A MINIMUM OF 5 AMP HOUS HAVE BEEN EMOVED IMMEDIATELY PIO TO DISCONNECTING THE LAST DESCENT BATTEY, IF THE EMAINING ASCENT BATTEY HAS A MINIMUM OF 5 AMP HOUS EMOVED AT TOUCHDOWNP IT WOULD BE THEMALLy AND CHEMICALLY CONDITIONED TO SUPPOT A TI O T2 L/U WITHOUT ADVESELY AFFECTING THE GUIDANCE SYSTEMS. IN THIS CASE THE CUENT STEPS WOULD BE A SucCESSION OF STEPS AS EACH DESCENT BATTEY I5 DISCONNECTED FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL STEPS AS A ESULT OF STAGING AND POWEED FLIGHT, HOWEVEt A ONE BATTEY/TWO BUS ABOT STAGING DUING POWEED DESCENT IS PECLUDED SINCE THE EMAINING ASCENT BATTEY WOULD NOT BE CONDITIONED TO SUPPOT THE HIGH CUENT STEP INVOLVED WITH ABOT STAGING, WHICH IS CAUSED BY NEA SIMULTANEOUS SWITCHDVE FOM DESCENT TO ASCENT POWE_ STAGING, APS ONt AND CS JET FIINGS, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EPS 6-27

211 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center J j MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS BUS TIE CICUIT BEAKES AT LEAST ONE OF THE BAL LOAD COSSTIE (3OA) CICUIT BEAKES WILL BE OPEN FO MAIN POPULSION BUNGt 5TAGINBP AND WHENEVE BOTH IIAEA=I CICUIT BEAKES AE CLOSED, THIS PEVENTS LOSS OF_ O VOLTAGE TANSIENTS ONo BOTH BUSES DUING CITICAL MISSION PHASEB SHOULD A SHOT OCCU ON A BUS, THE AGS IB POWEED EDUNDANTLY VIA DIODES FOM BOTH BUSES AND WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. AT LEAST ONE OF THE BUS COSSTIES {ZOOA) WILL NOMINALLY NEVE BE CLOTEOe WITH BOTH THESE BEAKES CLOSED, A SHOT ON ONE BUS WOULD DEFINITELY INDUCE TANSIENTS ON THE OTHE BUS WHICH WOULD BE DETIMENTAL TO THE AEAe SHOT ISOLATION" ELECTICAL POWE WILL NEVE BE INTENTIONALLY APPLIED TO A SHOT TO HELP DETEMINE ITS LOCATION UNLESS THE FEEDE FAULT LIGHT HAS FAILEDQ A GOOD BUS WILL NEVE BE CGSST_EO INTO A SHOT O POSSIBLE SHOT= FO LM-6 AND SUBSE_UENTt THE BUS FAULT LIGHT HAS BEEN CONNECTED TO THE FEEDES ENABLING A APID DETEMINATION OF FEEDE VS BUS SHOTS AND ELIMINATING THE NEED TO INTENTIONALLY FEED A GHOT, THE BUSES WILL NEVE BE COSGTIED TO DETECT THE LOCATION OF A SHOT WHICH ELIMINATES THE POSSIBILITY OF INDUCING VOLTAGE TANSIENTS ON THE EMAINING BUS, \ INVETE SWITCHING THE INVETE5 WILL BE SWITCHED FO A VOLTAGE EQUAL TO O LESS THAN ll2vac O A FEQUENCY EQUAL TO O GEATE THAN 402 HZ O EQUAL TO O LESS THAN 39B HZ. SHOULD THE INVETE OPEATE OUTSIDE THESE LIMITSt A MASTE ALAM WILL BE TIGGEED INDICATING DEGADED INVETE OPEATION. SWITCHING INVETEB WILL CLEA THE MASTE" ALAM AND INDICATE WHETHE THE FAILUE WAS THE FAULT OF THE INVETE, THE AC DISTIBUTION SYSTEM, O INSTUMENTATION, 22-1_ BATTEY MANAGEMENT BATTEIES WILL BE MANAGED DUING LUNA STAY TO MAINTAIN EQUAL DISSIPATION OF AVAILABLE ENEGY WITHIN TBD AMP-HOUS BETWEEN ALL BATTEIES ONLINE, BATTEIES HAVING THE SAME CHAACTEISTICS SUCH AS INTENAL ESITTANCE_ TEMPEATUE_ STATE OF CHAGEr AND CHEMICAL MAKEUP SHOULD DISCHAGE FAILY EVENLY WHEN PAALLELLED, DUE TO THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE BATTEIES ON THE COOLANT LOOPS THEE WILL BE A DELTA IN TEMPEATUES CAUSING SOME DIFFEENCE IN THE DISCHAGE ATES OF THE BATTEIES* HOWEVEP AT SOME POINT THE DELTA AMP-HOUS BETWEEN THEM WILL INDICATE THAT THE DIFFEENCE IN THEI PHYSICAL MAKEUP PEVENTS EVEN DISCHAGING AND THEEFOE BATTEY MANAGEMENT WILL BE EXECIGED IF EQUIED TO MEET MISSION OBJECTIVES O TO _A_NTAIN _OMINAL CEW POCEDUES, AT _LL TINGS THE CAPABILITY OF _PLITTING THE BusEs with NOMINAL ASCENT/DEscENT s_ain IO T_'LUNA LIFT_Fff'WILL'BE _AINf_i_b:_ " MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/1B/70 LM SYBTEM5 LH EP$ 6-2B

212 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center IdlSSlOII IIULIr S SECTION_ - LMSYSTEMS ITE_ SHOTED DESCENT FEEDE FO A SHOTED DESCENT FEEDEt THE ASCENT BATTEIES WILL BE PLACED ON NOMAL FEED WITH THE SHOT ISOLATED VIA THE DEADFACE ELAY, OPEATIONALLY THIS ESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ALL EMAINING DESCENT ELECTICAL ENEGY FO CONSUMABLE CONSIDEATIONS, THE TWO DESCENT BATTEIES THAT STILL HAVE AN OPEABLE FEEDPATH WILL BE USED ONLY IF NECESSAY TO MAINTAIN CEW SAFETY, IF THE DESCENT BATTEIES AE NOT DEAOFACED FO A SHOT ON A DESCENT FEEDEt A SUBSEQUENT SHOT ON THE OTHE FEEDE SYSTEM O BUS WOULD EMOVE ALL POWE FOM THE LM, POWE CANNOT BE ESTOED using THE ASCENT BATTEIES AND FEEDES BECAUSE THE SHOT MUST BE ISOLATED FOM THE BUS AND ASCENT FEEDES VIA THE DEADFACE ELAY WHICH EQUIES POWE TO BE OPEATED, BY ISOLATING A DESCENT FEEDE SHOTt ALL DESCENT ELECTICAL POWE IS LOST, HOWEVE IN A CONTINGENCY SUCH AS SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF ALL ASCENT BATTEIES THE TWO DESCENT BATTEIES NOT ON THE SHOTED FEEDE COULD BE USED AGAIN BY CONNECTING THE DEADFACE ELAY, THE CONSUMABLES IN ALL DESCENT BATTEIES WILL BE OONSIDEED UNAVAILABLE FO MISSION PLANNING SUBSEQUENT TO A FEEDE SHOT, LOSS OF ONE ASCENT BATTEY WITH THE LOSS OF ONE ASCENT BATTEYt THE EMAINING ASCENT BATTEY WILL BE PLACED ON BOTH NOMAL AND BACKUP FEEDS WITH THE COSSTIES OPEN* THIS POCEDUE POWES BOTH BUEES WITH A MINIMUM VOLTAGE DOP, IT ALSO POVIDES AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF A SHOT ON EITHE BUSt SINCE THE BUS TIE (C/BtS) WOULD BE OPENP THEE WOULD BE NO POTECTION FO A SHOT ON EITHE FEEDE SINCE THE VOLTAGE ON BOTH BUSES WOULD DOP TOO LOW TO OPEATE THE ECA ELAYS, :MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO Z4 FNL Z2115/7( LM SYSTEMS LM EPB 6-29

213 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 8 - LM SYSTEMS ITE 2-18 OPEN DESCENT FEEDE O LOSS OF TWO DESCENT BATTEIES ON SAME BUS FO AN OPEN DESCENT FEEDE O FO THE LOSS OF TWO DESCENT BATTEIES ON THE SAME BUS THE COSST E BAL LOAD CICUIT BEAKES WILL BE CLOSED ON THE LUNA SUFACE AND THE MISSION CONTINUED WITHIN THE CONSUMABLES BUDGET, IF ONLY ONE FEEDE IS BEING utilized TO FEED POWE TO THE BUSES AND A SHOT OCCUED ON THIS FEEDE_ THEE WOULD BE NO WAY TO CLEA THE SHOT AUTOMATICALLY _INCE THE VOLTAGE WOULD BE TOO LOW TO OPEATE THE ECA ELAYS, THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHOT IN A STATIC SITUATION ON THE LUNA SUFACE IS CONSIDEED EMOTE ENOUGH TO ACCEPT THIS ISK* IF A SHOT DID OCCU, A CONNECTO O WIE WOULD POBABLY MELT TO OPEN THE CICUIT WITH NO CATASTOPHIC CONSEQUENCE, SHOTED ASCENT FEEDE ON LUNA SUFACE FO A SHOTED ASCENT FEEDE ON THE LUNA SUFACEr THE ASCENT BATTEIES WILL NOT BE CONNECTED UNTIL THE NOMINAL TIME TO MEET PECONDITIONING EQUIEMENTS, DUING LUNA SUFACE OPEATIONS_ THE ASCENT baiteies AE NOT PLACED ON LINE UNTIL THE NOMINAL TIME TO CONSEVE ASCENT ELECTICAL POWE* PLACING THE ASCENT BATTEIES ON LINE DOES NOT POVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL POTECTION IN THE EVENT OF A SHOT ON THE GOOD BUS, THE LOAD EQUIEMENTS AE WITHIN THE CUENT HANDLING CAPABILITY OF THE TWO EMAINING DESCENT BATTEIES, EF ATIONALE FO M 22-i EF ATIONALE FO M 22-i EF ATIONALE FO M 22-i 22-2} EF ATIONALE FO M EF ATIONALE FO M 22-1!2-25 EF ATIONALE FO M 22-1 MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EPS b-30

214 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTIONe - LMSYSTEMS _M ENVIONMENTAL CONTOL 23-1 LM GO/NO-GO CITEIA CHAT AND ASSOCIATED SPECIFIC MITBION ULES TO INITIATE THE FOLLOWING MISSION PHASES_ THE ECS SYSTEM MUST POVIDE THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM CAPABILITIES (EF LM TELMU GO CITEIA IN SECTION 3 OF M)--- A, LOSS OF SUIT LOOP INTEGITY 1, DEFINITION (EF M 23-2) TOTAL PGA/BUIT LOOP LEAKAGE E_UAL TO O GEATE THAN 0,3 PSI/MIN (.Go6 LB/H) DUING SUIT LOOP PESSUE CHECK O A VISIBLE TEA IN THE PGA, THIS UBAGE ATE WILL ALLOW UNPESGUIZED CABIN OPEATIONS INCLUDING A TOTAL METABOLIC 02 USE ATE OF 0,17 LB/H FO A MINIMUM OF S HOUS FOM THE ASCENT 02 TANKS 2e GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT THE LOSS OF BUIT LOOP INTEGITY EQUIES THAT CABIN PESSUE INTEGITY BE MAINTAINED FO CEW GAFETY, SHOULD THE CABIN PESSUE SHELL FAILI THE CEW WOULD BE LOST_ SINCE THEE IS A MAGINAL SUPPLY OF ASCENT 02 (2,06 LBG) IN EACH OF TWO TANKS TO MAINTAIN SUIT PESSUE DUING THE ENDEZVOUS, 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 23-20) CA) NOMINAL MISSION (1) DOCKED - LM SYSTEMS EVALUATION MAY BE PEFOMED SINCE THE LM AUTOMATIC CABIN EPESSUIZATION CICUITY WILL BE ACTIVATED-- IN THE EVENT OF A CABIN FAILUEt THEE IS APPOXIMATELY 48 LBG OF 02 IN THE DESCENT TANK WHICH MAY BE USED TO MAINTAIN CABIN PESSUE WHILE THE CEW IS INGESSING THE CSM, {2) UNDOCKING THOUGH PDI IN ODE TO ETAIN THE DESCENT 02 PUGE CAPABILITYt STAGING SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED, IT IS NECESSAY TO DOCK ASAP IN ODE TO EDUCE THE CHANCES OF A CABIN PUNCTUE THAT WOULD DEPLETE THE ONBOAD 02 SUPPLY, (3) PDI TO TOUCHDOWN - THE LM MUST BE 5TAGED [O EACH OBIT, IF CABIN PESSUE INTEGITY SHOULD BE LOST ALGOl THE SUPPLY OF ASCENT 02 COULD NOT MAINTAIN SUIT pessue UNTIL DOCKING HAS BEEN COMPLETED, THE MISSION SHOULD THEEFOE BE ABOTED IN ODE TO AVOID POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO THE CABIN SHELL AT _ouc_ow_ (4) LUNA STAY - A LOSS OF SUIT LOOP INTEGITY PIO TO EVA PECLUDE5 EVA AND EQUIES TEMINATION OF LUNA STAY AT NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY TO MINIMIZE THE TIME TO CSM ETUN, (5) ENDEZVOUS " SINCE A CSM ESCUE WOULD NOT SAVE TIME, LOSS OF SUIT INTEGITY DUING THIS PHASE IS NOT CAUSE FO A CSM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS, OPS UNITS AE AVAILABLE SHOULD A CONTINGENCY SUCH AS LOSS OF CABIN INTEGITY AISE DUING THIS PHASE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-31

215 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES i SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 23-I :ONT (B) ALTENATE MISSION B= CABIN PESSUE INTEGITY DUE TO THE ISKS INVOLVED, NO UNDOCKED ALTENATE MISSION WILL BE CONSIDEED AND THE DOCKED ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE VEY LIMITED. l, DEFINITION IEP M 23-2) LM PESSUE VESSEL LEAKAGE SUCH THAT CABIN PESSUE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED E_UAL TO O GEATE THAN #.6 PSIA WITH AN 02 FLOW ATE OF 0,6 LB/H* THIS FLOW ATE WILL ALLOW A TOTAL METABOLIC 02 USE ATE OF 0,17 LB/H FO A MINIMUM OF 6 HOUS FOM THE ASCENT 02 TANKS* FO DOCKED ACTIVITIES, THIS WILL BE ELAXED TO A FLOW ATE OF 6 LB/H, THIS FLOW ATE ALLOWS EITHE THE CGM EGULATOS O A SINGLE LM DEMAND EGULATO TO MAINTAIN CABIN PEBSUE GEATE THAN 4.6 PSIA WITHIN CONSUMABLE LIMITATIONS* 2* GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT THE LOSS OF CABIN PESSUE INTEGITY EQUIES THAT SUIT LOOP INTEGITY BE MAINTAINED FO CEW SAFETY* SHOULD THE SUIT LOOP INTEGITY BE LOSTP THE CEW WOULD BE LO$Tt SINCE THEE IS A MAGINAL SUPPLY OF ASCENT O6 LB5) IN EACH OF TWO TANKS TO MAINTAIN CABIN O SUIT PESSUE DUING THE ENDEZVOUS, _= SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 23-21) {A) NOMINAL MISSION {1) DOCKED - THE DOCKED PHASE WILL BE INITIATED AND/O CONTINUED WITH A CABIN LEAK ATE LESS THAN S LB/M* EACH DEMAND EGULATO CAN SUPPLY AN ADEUUATE 02 FLOW UP TO 6o75 LB/H AT 95O PSIA. AT THIS POINT IN THE TIMELINEP THEE IG APPOXIMATELY #8 LBS OF 02 IN THE DESCENT TANK, POVIDING NOMAL LM PESSUIZATION FO AT LEAST 8 HOUS. THE DOCKED PHASE CAN BE INITIATED WITH ONE CEW MEMBE ON THE TANSFE UMBILICALt WITH A CABIN LEAK GEATE THAN 6,0 LB/H, HOWEVEt IF THE LEAK ATE CANNOT BE EDUCEDp THE LM MIGGION WILL BE TEMINATED. THE INFOMATION TO BE OBTAINED FOM A SYSTEMS EVALUATION WOULD NOT WAANT CONTINUED EXPOSUE OF THE CEW MEMBE TO THIS POTENTIALLY HAZADOUS CONDITION. (2) UNDOCKING TO PDI IN ODE TO MAINTAIN THE DESCENT 02 SUPPLYP THE LM SHOULD NOT BE COMMITTED TO STAGING, THE LM SHOULD ABOT AND DOCK ASAP TO EDUCE THE CHANCE THAT A GOSS LOSG OF SUIT PESSUE INTEGITY MAY DEPLETE THE ONBOAD 02, (3) PDI TO LO GATE - THE MISSION SHOULD BE ABOTED TO AVOID ISKS OF LANDING AND TO MINIMIZE THE ETUN TIME TO THE CSM. (#) LO GATE TO TOUCHDOWN - THE MIGSION SHOULD BE CONTINUED WITH AN APPAENT CABIN LEAK ATE GEATE THAN 0.6 LB/H BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE DEFINITELY ATTIBUTED TO.A.LPS_.OF CAB! H_L INTEGIT ELIE_ VALVE POSSIBLY.CBACKIN_.). PIO TO TOUCHDOWNJ hue TO THE _HOT_Ih_"_E_OB' _O ToO_LE_dGT_N_I'_PO?E_; POSBIBILITY OF DAMAGING THE SUIT LOOP AT TOUCHDOWN IS MINIMAL WHEN COMPAED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGING THE CABIN BTUCTUE. LIFTOFF SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY. T_E (51 LUNA STAY - A LOGS OF CABIN PESSUE INTEGITY PIO TO THE EVA WILL CANCEL THE EVA PIMAILY BECAUSE ECS/PLSS/ECS TANSFE WOULD BE PEFOMED IN A VACUUM AND EVA ACTIVITIES CAUSE CONSIDEABLE DELAY IN ETUN TO THE CSM, THE LUNA STAY WILL _E TEMINATED AT THE NEXT BEBT OPPOTUNITY TO MINIMIZE THE TIME TO SM ETUN* 16) ENDEZVOUS - SINCE THE ASCENT 02 WILL PEMIT AT LEAST 8 HS OF CLOSED SUIT LOOP OPEATION (SPEC SUIT LEAK PLUB CEW CONSUMPTION 0.25 LB/HIt AND THE CEW CAN PEFOM ALL NECESSAY FUNCTIONS IN A HADSUIT_ LOSS OF CABIN INTEGITY DUING THIS PHASE WOULD NOT BE CAUSE FO CSM ESCUE, OPS UNITS AE AVAILABLE SHOULD AN 02 CONTINGENCY AISE DUING THIS PHASE* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO i# FNL.2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-32

216 1 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 23-i CONT Co SUIT FAN{S) lm DEFINITION A SUIT FAN I5 CONSIDEED LOST IF IT CANNOT BE TUNED ON O IF THE DELTA P ACOSS THE FAN IS LOW ENOUGH (6 IN HZO) TO ACTIVATE THE CAUTION AND WANNING SYSTEM, 2* GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT FAILUE OF A SINGLE SUIT FAN IS NOT HAZADOUS SINCE THE TWO LH SUIT FANS AE EDUNDANT. FAILUE OF BOTH SUIT FANS MEANS LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO EMOVE C02 AND HUMIDITY FOM THE CABIN/SUIT ATMOSPHEEo THE C02 BUILDUP IN THE HELMET IS CITICAL* CAUSING UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS WITHIN 1 TO 3 HINUTESP THEEFOE THE HELMET SHOULD BE EMOVED IMMEDIATELY* C02 BUILDUP IN THE CABIN, WHILE CITICALp PEMITS APPNOXIMATELY 4 HOUS OF OPEATION WITHOUT CEW DEGADATION, 3, SPECIF C OPEATIONAL IMPACT _EF M Z3-22) {A) NOMINAL MISSION (1) DOCKED - FAILUE OF A SINGLE FAN DOES NOT AFFECT THIS PHASE AS THE EDUNDANT FAN CAN MEET PHYSIOLOGICAL EQUIEMENTS, THE LOSS OF BOTH FANS EQUIES UNE CEWMAN TO IVT INTO THE CSM WHILE THE OTHE CONTINUES DOCKED OPEATIONS ON THE CSM TANSFE UMBILICAL* SINCE THE TANSFE UMBILICAL MUST BE USED* LOSS OF SUIT CICULATION PECLUDES UNDOCKED OPEATIONS, (2) UNDOCKING TO PDI FAILUE OF ONE SUIT FAN DOES NOT AFFECT THIS PHASE SINCE THE EMAINING FAN IS CONSIDEED ELIABLE AND AN ACCEPTABLE BACKUP POCEDUE IS AVAILABLE FO ENDEZVOUS IF IT SHOULD FAIL, IF THE EMAINING SUIT FAN FAILSP AN ABOT WILL BE EQUIED AND CABIN MODE OF OPEATION O* EGESS MODE WITH DESCENT 02 PUGE USED TO PEVENT CO2 BUILDUP* {3) PDI TO LO GATE - AFTE POX +5+30t THE DESCENT TAN_ CANNOT BE ETAINED FO PUGING PUPOSES AND FO A LO GATE TO TOUCHDOWN ABOT* THE TIME TO DOCK 15 # HOUS, THEEFOE* IF BOTH SUIT FANS FAIL* LM WILL ABOT TO AVOID POSGIBILITY OF CABIN UPTUE UPON LANDING (CEW LOSS)* (4) LO GATE TO TOUCHDOWN - THE MISSION WILL NOT BE ABOTED FO L055 OF BOTH SUIT FANS 5INCE ISK OF LANDING IS LESS THAN ISK OF ABOTING AT THIS POINT, (5) LUNA STAY - THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED WITH THE LOSS OF ONE SUIT FAN SINCE AN ACCEPTABLE WOKAOUND IS AVAILABLE SHOULD THE EMAINING FAN BE LOST, (6) ENDEZVOUS - WITH THE LOSS OF BOTH FANS_ NOMINAL ENDEZVOUS POCEDUES SHOULQ BE _OLLQW_D W!TH DOCKING OCCUING A_P_... (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS UNDOCKING AND ENDEZVOUS " FAILUE OF ONE FAN DOES NOT PECLUDE ANY ALTENATE MISSION WHICH ALLOWS ETENTION OF THE DESCENT OZ TANK (THOUGH DOCKING IF NECESSAY) FO 02 PUGE CAPABILITY* ALSO* A LOSS OF CABIN INTEGITY IS LESS LIKELY FO ALTENATES WHICH DO NOT SUBJECT THE LM STUCTUE TO LANDING AND FITH* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO i_ FNL 12/lfi/7O LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-3_

217 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS ITEF 23-I CONT De 02 DEMAND EGULATOS i. DEFINITION A EGULATOB WILL BE CONSIDEED FAILED IF IT CANNOT MAINTAIN THE DESIED PESSUE LEVEL IN EITHE AUTOMATIC (CABIN - 4,8 +/-.2 psia O EGESS = B,B./-.2 PSIA) MODE. THIS FAILUE DOES NOT PECLUDE MANUAL OPEATION {DIECT O CLOSED) OF THE AFFECTED EGULATO(S), 2o GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT THE PIME FUNCTION OF THE TWO PAALLEL DEMAND EGULATOS IS TO AUTOMATICALLY POVIDE 02 TO THE CEW AT SPECIFIED pessues AND FLOW ATES. AN OPEN FAILUE OF A SINGLE EGULATO (6,75 LB/H AT 950 PSIA} MAY BE COMPENSATED FO BY MANUALLY CLOSING THE EGULATO. MOWEVEp A FAILED CLOSED EGULATO MAY NOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT DUING SCHEDULED IICABINII EGULATO CHECKS SINCE THE PAALLEL EGULATO WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY 02 AT THE SPECIFIED PESSUE, SHOULD BOTH EGULATOS FAIL CLOSED WHILE OPEATING IN THE CABIN MODE WITH HELMETS OFFt THE CABIN MAY BE IIBEATHE D DOWN It FOM 5,0 TO 4GO PSIA AND THEN EPESSED TO 5,0 PSIA BY MANUALLY CYCLING EITHE Of THE DEMAND EGULATOS O THE CABIN EPESSUIZATION VALVE. WITH NOMAL USAGE ATES (0,25 LB/H)_ THIS MANUAL OPEATION IS NECESSAY EVEY 5,3 HOUS. WHEN OPEATING IN THE EGESS MODE, FAILUE OF BOTH DEMAND EGULATOS (OPEN O CLOSED) WILL EQUIE THE CEW TO tibeathe DOWN _i THE SUITS FOM A*O TO _*3 PSIA AND MANUALLY EPESS TO 4,0 PSIA USING A DEMAND EGULATO, WITH NOMAL USAGE ATESt THIS DECAY IN PESSUE WILL TAKE APPOXIMATELY 6 MINUTES. 3. SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 23-23) (A) NOMINAL MISSION (1) DOCKED - A SINGLE EGULATO CAN MEET ALL THE EQUIEMENTS FO DOCKED OPEATIONS, A LOSS OF BOTH EGULATOS SHOULD NOT ESTICT OPEATIONS WITH HELMET AND GLOVES OFF. LM DESCENT 02 AND CSM MAKEUP AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT CABIN INTEGITY IS LOST. (2) UNDOCKING/THOUGH PDI - A FAILUE OF ONE EGULATO WILL NOT CONSTITUTE AND ABOT BECAUSE THE EDUNDANT EGULATO AND CABIN PESSUE INTEGITY AE AVAILABLE. FAILUE OF BOTH EGULATOSt THUS EQUIING MANUAL CYCLING I$ AN INEFFICIENT MEANS OF SUPPLYING 02, WHICH COULD INTEFEE WITH CEW OPEATIONS AND THUS THE MISSION SHOULD NOT BE CONTINUED, (3) POWEED DESCENT - AFTE PDI IT BECOMES DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIM A DOUBLE EGULATO CLOSED FAILUE BEFOE LANDING AS THE EGULATOS AE IN EGESS AND THE CABIN PESSUE DECAY WOULD BE INSIGNIFICANT. AN OPEN FAILUE COULD BE DETECTED BECAUSE OF THE HIGH 02 FLOW ATE (APPOX= EQUAL TO T LBS/H), WITH EITHE O BOTH EGULATOS FAILED CLOSED O OPENt MANUAL ECYCLING OF THE VALVES IS EQUIED. AT THIS TIME_ HUWEVE_ IT IS CONSIDEED OPTIMUM TO FOLLOW THE NOMINAL _EW TIMEL!NE AND C_C_E.THEVALVES AS EQU!ED_ (4) LUNA STAY - ONCE LM HAS LANOEDt THE EGULATOS MAY BE CYCLED BETWEEN CEW TASKS IN ODE TO MAINTAIN CABIN PESSUEi EVAIS WILL NOT BE PEFOMED SINCE A FAILUE TO EPESS FOCES THE CEW TO CYCLE A DEMAND EGULATO EVEY 2 TO 6 MINUTES FO THE DUATION OF THE LM MISSION, (B) ENDEZVOUS - THE CEW TASK ASSOCIATED WITH CYCLING A VALVE TO COMPENSATE FO LOSS OF BOTH DEMAND EGULATOS WILL NOT PEVENT THE CEW FOM PEFOMING ALL TASKS EQUIED FO LM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS, (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS LOSS OF ONE EGULATO WILL NOT POHIBIT UNDOCKED/ENDEZVOUS ALTENATE MISSIONS* HOWEVE, FAILUE OF BOTH EGULATOS POHIBITS UNDOCKEO MISSIONS DUE TO HIGH CEW WOKLOADS, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAOE APOLLO i FNL 12/15/7C LM SYSTEMS LM EC5 6-34

218 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 23-1 CONT E, H20 SEPAATO{S) l* DEFINITION A H20 SEPAATO WILL BE CONSIDEED LOST IF--- IT CANNOT BE STATED {APPOX* I MIN WHEN DYJ, ATE FALLS BELOW BOO PM WHICH WILL TIGGE THE CAUTION AND WANING 5YSTEMt O BOTH SUIT FANS FAILt THEEBY TEMINATING THE 02 FLOW TO THE TUBINE-OPEATED SEPAATOS, 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT OF LOSS(ES) THE TWO M20 SEPAATOS AE EDUNDANT--- ONE H20 SEPAATO WILL MAINTAIN COMFOTABL_ TEMPEATUE/HUMIDITY CONDITIONS FO THE CEw INDEFINITELY. THE LCO, OPEATING INDEPENDENTLY OF H20 5EPAATOSo CAN MAINTAIN A SAFE CONDITION FO THE CEW FO AT LEAST 6 HOUS, NOMALLY, ONE H20 SEPAATO AND THE LCG OPEATE SIMULTANEOUSLY, IF BOTH H20 SEPAATOS PLUS THE LCG FAIL, THE ONLY COOLING FO THE CEW is BY 02 PUGE FLOW OF ABOUT 3,5 LB/H/MAN, THUS, THE DESCENT TANK COULD POVIDE UP TO S HOUS, BUT ASCENT 02 HAS ESSENTIALLY NO PUGE CAPABILITY, WITHOUT ACTIVE COOLING, THE CEWIS physiological CONDITION DETEIOATES TO A CITICAL LEVEL IN APPOXIMATELY TO 1-1/2 HOUS IN THE PGA=S* 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 23-24} (A) NOMINAL MISSION (i) DOCKED - A LOSS OF BOTH SEPAATOS AND THE LCG LOOP WILL NOT PEVENT DOCKED OPEATIONS AS THE CEW NOMINALLY WILL BE PEFOMING TASKS IN THEI CONSTANT WEA GAMENTS, ALSO, THE TEMPEATUE/HUMIDITY EFFECT ON THE INDIVIDUAL GADUALLY INCEASES AND ALLOWS SUFFICIENT NOTICE FO THE CEW TO TANSFE TO THE CSM UMBILICAL, {2} UNDOCKING TO PDI ONE H20 SEPAATO 15 EWUIED TO BE ABLE TO MEET THE CEW COOLING EQUIEMENTS FO A NOMINAL LUNA SUFACE MISSION, SHOULD BOTH SEPAATOS BE LOST, THE MISSION SHOULD BE ABOTED SUCH THAT THE DESCENT 02 TANK CAN BE ETAINED_ IN THE EVENT OF AN ABOT, FO 02 PUGE BACKUP CAPABILITY, (3) PDI TO TOUCHDOWN - EVEN IF BOTH H20 SEPAATOS AND THE LCG AE LOST, LM WILL NOT ABOT POWEED DESCENT, SINCE THE DESCENT STAGE CANNOT BE ETAINED IF LM ABOTS, THE CEW WOULD BE WITHOUT ACTIVE COOLING FO 4 HOUS (NO 02 PUGE CAPABILITY), 1F THE LM LANDED, THE MAXIMUM THE CEW COULD BE WITHOUT COOLING WOULD ALSO BE 4 HOUS SINCE THE DESCENT 02 WILL POVIDE PUGE COOLING WHILE ON THE SUFACE, THEEFOE_ THEE IS NO ADVANTAGE TO ABOTING FO FAILUES OF WATE SEPAATOS AND/O THE LCG, (4) LUNA STAY " FO CONTINUED LUNA STAY_ I SEPAATO IS EQUIED IN ODE THAT THE HEAT EJECTION CAPACITY Of THE SYSTEM IS MOT LOST, IN THE EVENT BOTH UNITS FAILt THE CEW SHOULD PUGE AS EQUIED WITH DESCENT 02 AND IF NECESSAYt EPLENISH THE CABIN WITH DY O2 JUST PIO TO LIFTOFF AT THE NEXT BEST QPPQT_N1T_, TH_ IS _ONSIDE_D TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE WOKAO_NO FO CONTIMUIN_ THE HISSION _IT_THE _ING[E _oint _LU ONbIT_oN O_ A SiNgLE&kP_ATO, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO i_ FNL.2/15/7G LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-35

219 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 23-i CONT F, 02 TANKS 151 ENDEZVOUS - THE LM WILL EMAIN ACTIVE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE FO THE ENDEZVOUS SINCE THE CEW TAINING IS OIENTED TOWAD THOSE POCEDUES, (B) ALTENATE MISSIONS NO UNDOCKED MISSION WILL BE CONSIDEED WITHOUT 1 OF 2 HZO SEPAATOS OPEABLE, i, DEFINITION {EF M 23-2) 02 TANKS AE CONSIDEED LOST IF--- (A) DESCENT 02 TANK INABILITY TO TANSFE 02 FOM DESCENT TANK O HSFN CONFIMATION OF INADEQUATE DESCENT TANK PESSUE WITH 02 MANIFOLD PESSUE, (B) ASCENT 02 TANK 11) MSFN 'CONFIMATION OF LOSS OF ASCENT TANK PESSUE WITH 02 MANIFOLD PESSUE-- O 12) IF UNSTAGED AND DESCENT TANK GEATE THAN B5 PECENT_ CEW CONFIM LOSS BY BALANCING ONE TANK AGAINST THE OTHE-- O 13) IF [1) AND 12) CANNOT BE PEFOMED( TANK IS ASSUMED LOST FO LOSS OF ONBOAD AND MSFN EADOUT, 2. GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT A LOSS OF THE DESCENT TANK (48 LBS OF 02) PEVENTS EVA SINCE THE AMOUNT EQUIED FO THE TWO EPESGUIZATIONS (6,5B LB5 EACH) CANNOT BE SUPPLIED FOM THE ASCENT TANKS, SECONDLY_ DESCENT TANK LOSS ELIMINATES THE AVAILABILITY OF 02 FO PUGING OPEATIONS (BoB LBS/H AT BOO BTU/MAN-HOU). AN ABCENT TANK LOSE OEPLETE5 BY 50 PECENT THE AMOUNT OF AVAILABLE 02 IN THE ASCENT STAGE TANKS (4,12 FO BOTH TANKS), SINCE THE NOMAL ENDEZVOUS MAY BE COMPLETED ON ONE ASCENT 02 TANK AND THE CABIN 02 MAY BE CONSIDEED FO CONSUMABLE USAGEt A LOSS OF ONE TANK WILL NOT PEVENT A LUNA LANDING, 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 23-25) (A) NOMINAL MISSION (1,} OOCKED/UNDOCKED/PE-POI/POWEED DESCENT " THE MISSION WILL BE ABOTED AT ANYTIME PIO TO PDI IF THE DESCENT 02 TANK I5 LOST SINCE THE EVA MAYNOT be PEFOMED AND THEE I5 LITTLE TO GAIN FOM LANDING AND LIFTIN_ OFF COMPAED TO THE INHEENT ISKS, AFTE POI, THE POWEED BUN WILL NOT BE ABOTED FO LOSS OF THE DESCENT TANK* THE MISSION MAY BE CONTINUED WITH THE LOSS OF ANY SINGLE ASCENT 02 TAN_ SINCE..THE T_M_ TO _OCKING IS WITHIN TH_ AMOUNT OF CONSUMABLES THAT CouLD _E CONTXINED WITHIN T_E _EMAiN_NG"A_ENT _2 TANK ANb _HE _A_iN 'Is AVAILABLE AS A BACKUP= SHOULD THEE BE A SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF AN 02 TANK PIO TO LO GATEp THE EMAINING PESSUE VESSEL (TANK O CABIN) WOULD ONLY BE ABLE TO SUPPOT A #-HOU ENDEZVOUS AND THE MISSION SHOULD BE ABOTED= AT LO GATE, THE LANDING WILL BE CONTINUED IF NO 02 TANKS AE AVAILIABLE SINCE THE HAZADS INVOLVED WITH AN ABOT AT THAT POINT MAKE IT IMPACTICALe ADDITIONALLY_ THE CABIN MAY BE USED FO A MAXIMUM OF 9 HOUS tat 0o25 LB/M) TO POVIDE METABOLIC AND CABIN LEAK EQUIEMENTS BEFOE THE CABIN DECEASES TO 3,3 PSIA, ALL OF THE ATIONALE AE BASED ON SPECIFICATION LEAK AND USAGE ATES, 12,) LUNA STAY/ENDEZVOUS - LUNA STAY SHOULD BE TEMINATED AT THE NLXT BEST OPPOTUNITY SHOULD THE DESCENT 02 TANK BE LOST= LOSS OF THE DESCENT TANK DUING EVA WILL ESULT IN EITHE CLOSED SUIT LOOP LIFTOFF/ENDEZVOU5 OPEATIONS OF THE USE OF THE OP5 TO PESSUIZE THE CABIN. A LOSS OF EITHE ASCENT 02 TANK AFTE LANDING WOULD NOT AFFECT LUNA STAY OPEATIONS, IF SUBSEQUENTLY THE SECOND A5CENT TANK WEE LOSTp THE DESCENT TANK COULD SUPPLY METABOLIC AND LEAKAUE EQUIEMENTS UNTIL LIFTOFFo HOWEVEI THEE WILL BE NO FUTHE CABIN OEPESSUIZATIONS SINCE A FAILUE TO EPESSUIZE WOULD LEAVE NO LM SOUCE OF 02 TO SUPPOT CLOSED SUIT LOOP OPEATIONSp AND PLS5 OPEATIONS FO ENDEZVOUS AE HIGHLY UNDESIABLE= DUING ENDEZVOUSP THE CABIN COULD BE BEA_HED DOWND O IF ETAINED AND ECHAGED* THE PLSS UNITS COULD BE USED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM EC5 _-36

220 r NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS ITEF_ 23-E CONT Go COOLANT LOOP S) i, DEFINITION (EF M 23-2) SUSTAINED GLYCOL TEMPEATUE EQUAL TO O GEATE THAN 50 peg F AND ISING EXCEPT DUING COOLANT LOOP STATUP AND DYOUT {SUBLIMATO LOST) O GLYCOL PUMP DELTA P EQUAL TO O LESS THAN 6 PBID (CICULATION LOST) O KNOWN LOSS OF H20 FEED CAPABILITY TO THE SUBLIMATO(S), 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT LOSS OF THE PIMAY LOOP IS MOE SEIOUS THAN LOSS OF THE SECONDAY SINCE IT COOLS MOE EQUIPMENT (E,G,P PNGSI AND 18 DESIGNED WITH MOE BUILT-IN EDUNDANCY, PNGS IB USUALLY CONSIDEED UNELIABLE AFTE OPEATING ABOUT AN HOU WITHOUT COOLINGt AS WOULD BE THE CAGE FO A FAILUE OF THE PIMAY LOOP, LOSS OF EITHE LOOP IS CONSIDEED LOBS OF THEMAL CONTOL EDUNDANCY, LOSS OF CEW COOLING IS THE MOST BEIOUS IMPACT OF LOSS OF BOTH LQUPS, CEW PHYSIOLOGICAL CONDITION DETEIOATES TO A CITICAL LEVEL IN APPOXIMATELY E TO I-E/2 HOUB IN PGAIB, FO LOSS OF BOTH LOOPSI LM EUUIPMENT WILL BE CYCLED AS EQUIED FO LIFE SUPPOT_ OMMUNICATION_ AND GUIDANCE AND CONTOL IN ODE TO PEFOM A LM ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS, THE CEW MAY BE EQUIED TO DOFF PeA'S. 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 2B-26) (A) NOMINAL MISSION (E,) DOCKED - OPEATIONS DUING THIS PHASE PEMIT SUFFICIENT TIME FO CEW INGESS SHOULD THE SECOND LOOP FAIL, (Z,) UNDOCKING TO PDI - IF THE PIMAY COOLANT LOOP IS LOST_ THE NOMINAL MISSION WILL BE ABOTED SINCE PGNB IS EQUIED FO POWEED DESCENT, (_,) PDI TO LO GATE AND LUNA STAY - SINCE THE TIME TO C&M DOCKING IS NOT SHOTENED BY ABOTING DUING THEBE PHASESP AN ABOT IS NO T WAANTED JUST BY THE LOGS OF EDUNDANCY6 LOSS OF BOTH LOOPS DOES NOT JUSTIFY AN. ABOT PIO TO LO GATE SINCE ENDEZVOUS TIME IS A MINIMUM AT THIS TIME, WE WILL NOT ABOT FOM LO GATE SINCE IT IS MOE HAZADOUS TO ABOT THAN TO LANQ, HOWEVEP A T O T2 ABOT WILL BE EQUIED TO MINIMIZE HEATING TIME ON THE PGN&, LOSS OF BOTH LOOPS ON THE LUNA SUFACE EQUIES A NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY LIFTOFF TO M_NIMI&E THE THEMAL EFFECTS. GINGLE LOOP OPEATION IS ACCEPTABLE IF THE BACKUP POCEDUE IS AVAILABLE, (4,) ENDEZVOUS - {B) ALTENATE MISSION DOCKED OPEATIONS AND UNDOCKED MISSIONS WHICH NOMALLY EQUIE NO MOE THAN A Z-HOU MAXIMUM ETUN TO THE CSM MAY BE CONSIDEED FO THE LOSS OF A _IN@LE COOLANT LOOP, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.@/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-37

221 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 23-1 CONT HI H20 FEEDPATHS 11 DEFINITION AN H20 FEEDPATH IS CONSIDEED LOST IF IT CANNOT SUPPLY ENOUGH H20 TO MEET THE HEAT EJECTION DEMANDS OF THE BUBLIMATO O THE H20 EGULATO{5) FAIL OPENt CAUSING SUBLIMATO BEAKTHOUGH, THE NOMINAL FAILUE MODE OF THE WATE EGULATOS IS FAIL OPEN, 2, GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT SINCE THE TWO PIMAY H20 EGULATOS AE SEIES EDUNDANTP FAILUE OF BOTH EGULATOS IN THE OPEN POSITION WILL ESULT IN HIGH PESSUE DOWNSTEAM OF THE EGULATOS_ CAUSING SUBLINATO BEAKTHOUGH, FAILUE OF EITHE EGULATO IN THE CLOSED POSITION WILL STOP THE FLOW OF WATE IN THE PIMAY WATE FEEDPATH. IF UNCOECTED EITHE CONDITION WILL EVENTUALLY ESULT IN LOSS OF COOLING FO THE CEW AND CITICAL ELECTONICS* CLOSING THE PIM EVAP FLOW NO 1 VALVE AND OPENING THE PIM EVAP FLOW NO 2 VALVE BYPASSES THE FAILUE BY DIECTING WATE FLOW FOM THE ASCENT TANKS {DESCENT WATE IS AVAILABLE IF N CESGAY)t THOUGH THE SECONDAY WATE EGULATO TO THE PIMAY LOOP SUBLIMATO. ONCE THIS ACTION IS TAKEN* T_E MISSION MAY BE CONTINUED ALTHOUGH THIS EGULATO IN THIS FEEOPATH IS A SIMPLE POINT FAILUE ICLOBED) FO LOSS OF BOTH THE PIMAY AND SECONDAY COOLANT LOOPS, A FAILED OPEN SECONDAY EGULATO WILL ESULT IN LOSS OF ONLY PIMAY COOLANT LUuP BECAUSE A SECOND H20 EGULATO HAS BEEN ADDED DOWNSTEAM OF SEC EVAP FLOW VALVE ON LM-5 AND SUBSEQUENT, 3, SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT IEF M 23-27} I, H20 TANKS {A) NOMINAL MISSION (111 DOCKED - OPEATIONS DUING THIS PHASE PEMIT SUFFICIENT TIME FO CEW INGESS SHOULD THE SECOND FEEDPATH FAIL, (2,) UNDOCKINO TO'PDI - THE IMPACT AND MISSION ACTION FO LOSS OF THE PIMAY H2D FEEDPATH IS THE SAME AS FO LOSS OF THE PIMAY COOLANT LOOP, SEE COOLANT LOOPS, (3,) POT TO LO GATE AND LUNA STAY " LOSS OF EDUNDANCY DOES NOT JUSTIFY AN ABOT AT THIS POINT NO IS A LIFTOFF IMMEDIATELY AFTE TOUCHDOWN WAANTED. THE MISSION WILL BE CONTINUED IF ONE OF TWO FEEDPATH$ IS AVAILABLE WITHIN THE CONSUMABLE CONSTAINTS, SEE COOLANT LOOPS FO ATIONALE SINCE LOSS OF BOTH H20 FEEOPATH_ CONSTITUTES LOSS OF COOLING. (4o) ENDEZVOUS - LM HAS ALL ENDEZVOUS EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE BECAUSE BOTH THE PIMAY AND SECONDAY LOOPS AE OPEABLE WITH EITHE THE PIMAY O SECONDAY FEEDPATH, SEE COOLANT LOOPS FO ATIONALE FO LOSS OF BOTH H20 FEEDPATHS, (B) ALTENATE MISSION(S) ANY MISSION WITH MOE THAN A 2 HOU ETUN TIME TO THE CSM IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. i. be#initi0n IEF M 2_'_I H_O TANKS AE CONSIDEED LOST IF-'- (A) DESCENT H20 TANK MBFN CONFIMATION OF LOSS OF DESCENT TANK PESSUE WITH DES H20 P AND M20 DELTA P, O INABILITY TO SUPPLY H20 TO W/B ESULTING IN ISING GLYCOL AND 'SUIT LOOP TEMPEATUE (CEW AND MSFN) AND DOP IN H20 DELTA P (MSFN ONLY), (B) ASCENT H20 TANK LOSS OF MEASUEMENT AND EMAINING TANK FEEDING AT TWICE NOMAL ATE O ONE TANK FEEDING TWICE NOMAL ATE AND NO CMANOE IN MEASUEMENT ON OTHE TANK. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-38

222 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 = LM SYSTEMS 23-1 CONT 2* GENEAL OPEATIONAL IMPACT A LOSS OF THE DESCENT TANK PIO TO PDI WILL ABOT THE LUNA LANDING, THE DESCENT TANK HAS 234 LBS USABLE H20 AND EACH ASCENT TANK CONTAINS 40 LBS USABLE* AT THIS TIME_ AN APPOXIMATE AVEAGE USE ATE OF 6 LBS/H MAY BE ASSUMED FO POWEED UP PHASES AND 4 LBS/H FO POWEED DOWN {LUNA SUFACEI PHASESe ONE ASCENT TANK IS EOUIED TO CONTINUE THE MISSION THOUGH ALL PHASES= HOWEVE* IN ODE TO OBTAIN A 6 HOU LIFETIME ON A 51NOLE ASCENT TANK* IT 15 QUITE POBABLE THAT IT WILL BE NECESSAY TO POWE DOWN SOME EQUIPMENT IN THE LATE PAT OF THE LM-ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS, SHOULD THE H20 TANK BECOME DEPLETED* THE GLYCOL TEMPEATUE INCEASE WOULD APPOXIMATELY FOLLOW A DYOUT CUVE, IT 15 ESTIMATED THAT THE GLYCOL TEMP INTO THE LOW TEMP ELECTONICS AEA {PGNS) WOULD EACH 70 DEG F (PEDICTED EQUIPMENT LOSS) IN 60 MINUTESo THE SUIT INLET 02 TEMP WOULD EACH 85 DEe F (PEFOMANCE DEGAOATION_ IN 60 _IMUTES, IT IS AGVI_ABLE TO DOFF THE _OIT TO INCNEA_E THE TIME TO PEFOMANCE DEGADATION BY ABOUT 180 MINUTES= 3* SPECIFIC OPEATIONAL IMPACT (EF M 23-28) (A) NOMINAL MISSION {i,} UNDOCKING/CICULAIZATION/PE-PDI - LOSS OF THE DESCENT TANK PIO TO POI ABOTS THE LANDING MISSION, THEE IS INSUFFICIENT H2Q TO PEFOM AN EVA AND ENDEZVOUS FOM THE ASCENT TANKS, LOSS OF AN ASCENT TANK DOES NOT ABOT THE LANDING SINCE FAILUE OF THE EMAINING ASCENT TANK MAY BE CICUMVENTED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL COOLING POCEDUE {SEE COOLANT LOOPS POCEDUE), (2=) PDI TO LO GATE - LM SHOULD NOT ABOT FO LOSS OF ANY SINGLE H20 TANK, HOWEVE* THE LM MUST HAVE 2 OF 3 H20 TANKS TO CONTINUE TO LAND TO POVIDE EDUNDANCY, THUS, WITH FAILUE OF A SECOND ASCENT TANKP THE DESCENT TANK CAN KEEP THE _PACECAFT AND CEW COOLED UNTIL AN IN-PHASE LIFTOFF, THE CEW THEN HAS AN EVEN CHANCE FO SUVIVAL FO THE 4 HOUS ENDEZVOUS WITHOUT H20. WITH FAILUE OF THE DESCENT TANK* THE FULL EMAINING ASCENT TANK HAS A 6-HOU CAPABILITY TO PEMIT LUNA STAY TO ALLOW AN IN-PHASE LIFTOFF AND A 4-HOU ENDEZVOUS. (3,) LO GATE TO TOUCHDOWN - THE LM WILL NOT BE ABOTED DUING THIS PHASE FO LOSS OF ALL H20 TANKS, HOWEVE_ IF ALL H20 TANKS AE LOST* LM SHOULD LIFTOFF IMMEDIATELY AFTE TOUCHDOWN TO HAVE PGNS AND AGS FO ASCENT, (4.) LUNA STAY - OBVIOUSLYJ THE DESCENT TANK IS EQUIED TO CONTINUE LUNA _TAY BEYOND THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY LIFTOFF* FAILUE OF BOTH ASCENT H20 TANKS EQUIES LIFTOFF AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY SINCE CONTINUING THE MISSION INCEASES THE POSSIBILITY OF LOSING THE DESCENT TANK FOCING ASCENT PEPAATION* AS WELL AS THE ENDEZVOUS* WITHOUT ANY COOLING, {5.1 ENDEZVOUS - LM WILL EMAIN ACTIVE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, THE CEW MAY BE EQUIED TO DOFF THEI PGAIS IF THE THEMAL CONDITIONS BECOME UNACCEPTABLE. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-39

223 NASA - Manned Spzce_raft MISSION ULES Center SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS NO ATIONALE EQUIED 23-3 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 23-4 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 23-5 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 23-6 NO ATIONALE EQUIED MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO i_ FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-40

224 m NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center msslom ULES SECTION b - LM SYSTEMS DELETED ASCENT 02 TANK ECHAGE IF EITHE ASCENT 02 TANK IS EQUAL TO O LESS THAN 95 PECENTP IT WILL BE EPLENISHED FOM THE DESCENT 02 WHEN THE DESCENT TANK QUANTITY IS EQUAL TO O GEATE THAN 35 PECENT AND AS CLOSE TO STAGING AS POSSIBLE* FULL LOADINGS IN THE 02 TANKS AE AS FOLLOWS--- DESCENT 2730 PSIA {100 PECENT) AND BACH ASCEN1 TANK IS 854 PSIA 1100 PECENT)e AN ONBOAD DESCENT 02 EADING OF 35 PECENT (920 PSIA) WILL INDICATE SUFFICIENT DESCENT 02 TANK PESSUE TO FILL THE ASCENT 02 TANKS, THE TANSFE SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED CLOSE TO STAGING IN ODE TO AVOID WASTING DESCENT 02 BY HAVING TO EPLENISH THE ASCENT TANKS MOE THAN ONCE AND TO MAXIMIZE THE QUANTITY IN THE ASCENT TANKS FOLLOWING STAGING, PLSS FILL VALVE MANAGEMENT THE PLSS FILL VALVE WILL BE CLOSED EXCEPT FO EPESSUIZING THE PL$S AND FO MSFN EQUESTED EADOUTS OF THE 02 MANIFOLD PESSUED THE PLSS FILL VALVE WILL NOMINALLY BE KEPT CLOSED SINCE THIS VALVE IS A BACKUP TO THE QUICK DISCONNECT ON THE END OF THE PLSS FILL HOSE (MINIMIZES THE CHANCE OF AN 02 LEAK INTO THE CABIN), USAGE MANAGEMENT CEW WILL GO TO EGESS MODE IF INSUFFICIENT 02 IS AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN CABIN PESSUE FO THE EQUIED TIME, ADDITIONALLY9 A MISSION PHASE WILL NOT BE INITIATED IF THIS CONDITION CAN BE ANTICIPATED. MAINTAINING CABIN PESSUE DOUBLES THE 02 USAGE ATE. IF THE 02 SUPPLY IS LOW O IF IT IS PEDICTED TO BE LOWP THE CEW WILL GO TO THE EGESS MODE BEATHING THE CABI'N DOWN TO 3.8 +/- 0*2 PSIA WHEN THE SUIT LOOP IS AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATED FOM THE CABIN* THIS MAXIMIZES THE 02 LIFETIME* 23"20 EFEENCE ATIONALE FO M 23"i 23"21 EFEENCE ATIONALE FO M 23-i 23"22 EFEENCE ATIONALE FO M 2_'1 23"23 EFEENCE ATIONALE FO M "2_ EFEENCE ATIONALE FO M EFEENCE ATIONALE FOM2_-Z 23"27 EFEENCE ATIONALE FO M 23-i 23-28! EFEENCE ATIONALE FO M 23-I MISSION EV DATE _ECT1ON GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 rnl.2/1e/to.m SYSTEMS LM ECS 6-41

225 NASA - Manned Spacecraft (;enter MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS FIE O SMOKE IN CABIN O SUIT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO COMBAT THE FIE AND ATTEMPT TO DETEMINE ITS OIGIN= TIME OF TANSFE TO THE CSM IS DEPENDENT ON THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE= ANY possible DEGADATION IN SPACECAFT CAPABILITY WOULD BE CAUSE TO ABOT THE LUNA LANDING MISSIUNe CONTAMINATION IN CABIN ALL ATTEMPTS SHOULD BE MADE TO CLEA THE CONTAMINATION INCLOOING DECOMPESSING THE CABIN, IF UNABLE TO CLEA THE CONTAMINATION AND IT AFFECTS CONTINUED SAFE CEW OPEATIONS, THE MISSION MAY BE TEMINATED EALY GLYCOL COOLANT LEAK OBSEVED FLUID IN CABIN CONFIMED BY TASTE O PESENCE OF GLYCOL LOW INDICATION CONFIMED BY STATE PESSUE POPo WHETHE IN THE SUIT O CABIN_ ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TD TANSFE TO THE CSM ASAP= IF IN THE CABINt THE SUIT LOOP SHOULD BE CONFIGUED TO THE EGESS MODE AND ISDLATEO FOM THE CABIN, IF ZN THE SUITt THE CEW EHOULD DISCONNECT FOM THE SUIT LOOP AND OPEATE STICTLY ON THE CABIN, MISSION EVI DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1= FNL 12/1_/7C LM SYSTEMS LM ECB 6-42

226 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS Center ITEF LM GUIDANCE AND CONTOL 2A-2 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 24-3 IMU A. IIG BAIS UPDATES WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED WHEN GYPO DIFT IS GEATE THAN O _QUAL TO +/-,075 DEG/H (5 MEU)* FIVE MEU EPESENTS A CUTOFF POINT BELOW WHICH THE BAI5 CALCULATION IS AFFECTED BY ALIGNMENT INACCUACIES TO THE POINT WHEE AN UPDATE MAY ACTUALLY INCEASE [IG DIFT= B, THE PGNS WILL BE CONSIDEED NO-GO WITH A GYO DIFT GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO +I- 1,5 OEGIH ( 100 MEU), THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE VALUE WITHIN THE LGC IS +/- I=9_ DEG/H 1128 MEUI. A GYO DIFT OF'to5 DEG/H 15 CONSIDEED NO-GO SINCE A DIFT ATE THIS HIGH EPESENTS 5BIOUS HADWAE POBLEMS WITHIN THE IMU= EFEENCE MIT/IL GTG MEMO 1256= i C* PIPA BIAS UPDATES WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AS FOLLOWS--" l, NO BIAS UPDATES WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED PIO TO 30 MIN OF IMU OPEATION_ THITY MINUTES IS ALLOWED FO PIPA TEMPEATUE STABLIZATION, EFEENCE MIT/IL STG MEMO 1347= 2J INITIAL BIAS UPDATES WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IF THE DELTA BIAS IS GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO +/- ODD3 CM/SEC/SEC_ AND SUBSEQUENT UPDATES WILL B_ ACCOMPLISHE0 IF THE DELTA BIAS IS GEATE THAN O E_UAL TO +/- Ool CM/SEC/SEC, BOTH MIT AND GGC DIVISION AGEED IN DATA PIOITY MEETINGS TO UPDATE THE PIPA BIAS EGADLESS OF HOW SMALL THE CALCULATED VALUE MIGHT HAVE BE_N= DUE TO THE METHOD OF CALCULATION AND THE GANULAITY TO THE PIPA _EAOOUT (+/- ODE CMISEC/SEC)P A DELTA BIAS OF 0=03 CM/SEC/SEC WAS CHOSEN FO AN INITIAL UPDATE VALUEI AND Ool CM/SEC/SEC FO SUBSEQUENT UPDATES* 3= PIPA BIAS WILL NOT BE UPDATED WHILE THE LM IS ON THE LUNA SUFACE= NO ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO UPDATE PIPA BIAS WHILE ON THE LUNA SUFACE DUE TO THE UNCETAINTY OF BIAS DETEMINATION IN A GAVITY ENVIONMENT= HOWEVEp THE CALCULATED BIAS WILL BE EXTAPOLATED FOM THE TIME OF LIFTOFF TO INSETION TO DETEMINE IF GUIDANCE SWITCH-OVE LIMITS WILL BE VIOLATED* D* THE PGNS WILL BE CONSIDEED NO-GO IF THE PIPA BIAS EXCEEDS +I- 5,05 CM/SEC/SECL,_b8 FT/SEC/SEC), THE MAXIMUM LOAD VALUE WITHIN THE LGC is +/- 12,5 CM/SEC/SEC, THE NIT ECOMNENDE_ VALUE FO A FAILED PIPA IS +1" 5,06 CM/SEC/SEC* EFEENCE MIT/IL _TG MEMO MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM G&C b-k_

227 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 8 - LM SYSTEMS LGC A, A MASS UPDATE IS EQUIED IF THE DIFFEENCE BETWEEN GOUND CALCULATION AND LGC VALUE I5 MOE THAN 200 LBS, IF THE LGC CALCULATED MASS IS GEATE THAN THE ACTUAL VALUE* THE DAP WILL ASSUME CONTOL EFFECTIVENESS OF A HEAVY VEHICLE* THIS ASSUMPTION WILL ESULT IN OVECONTOL OF THE VEHICLE WITH A ESULTANT LOSS OF CS FUEL* CONVESELY IF LGC HAG5 IS LESS THAN THE ACTUAL MASEr THE VEHICLE BEHAVE5 SLUGGIGHLY SINCE THE DAP ASSUMES IT HA5 A LIGHT VEHICLEe IF THE EO IS NOT TOO GEATt NO FUEL PENALTY ESULTS* HOWEVEI IF THE EO IS LAGE ENOUGH THE DAP WILL ESPONO WITH NUMEOUS JET FIINGG IN ATTEMPTING TO OVECOME THE SLUGGISHNESS OF THE VEHICLE. IN THIS CASE A FUEL PENALTY MAY BE EALIZED. B* ALL +/" {U-V) JETS WILL BE INHIBITED VIA V85 DUING DOCKED OP$ BUNS, DUE TO CS PLUME IMPINGEMENT CONSTAINTS ON 80TH THE C$M AND LM (EF H 27-25)t THE LM VETICAL FIING JETS (+/-X) HOST BE INHIBITED VIA V65 DUING DOCKED DPS BUNS* V65 INHIBITS ONLY THOSE FIINGS CAUSING OTATION5 ONCE THE BUN BEGINS. ULLAGE IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS VEB AND WILL BE HONOED NOMINALLY* NOHAL DAP ATTITUDE CONTOL WILL ESUME AT THE TIME AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN HAS BEEN COMMANDED BY THE LGC, C. DUING DOCKED MANEUVES* DPS G1MBAL TIMMING MUST BE DONE AT GEATE THAN 35 PECENT THOTTLE IN THE AUTO THOTTLE MODE* THE ECOMMENDED SETTING IS 40 PECENT* IN THE DOCKED DP5 BUNt AT lo PECENT THOTTLE_ THE DAP CANNOT CALCULATE SMALL OFFSET ACCELEATIONS NEEDED TO DIVE THE ENGINE THUST VECTO THOUGH THE COMBINED CG OF THE TWO VEHICLES* BECAUSE OF THE LAGE INETIA OF THE DOCKED COMB_NATIONt A MUCH GEATE THUST IS HEEDED TO INCEASE THE DAPIS SENSITIVITY TO OFFSET ACCELEATIONS, FO THIS PUPOGEt A 40 PECENF THOTTL_ SETTING IS ECOMNENDED, THOTTLE SETTINGS OF GLATE THAN _5 PECENT HAVE POVIDED SATISFACTOY THUST VECTO ALIGNMENT, THE THOTTLE INCEASE SHOULD BE APPLIED MANUALLY VIA THE CEW TTCA WITH THE THOTTLE CONTOL IN THE AUTO THOTTLE MODE* THE AUTO THOTTLE MODE MUST BE USED SUCH ThAT THE LGC CAN COMMAND ZOO PECENT THOTTLE AT TIG PLUS 26 SECONDS, IF THE MANUAL THOTTLE POSITION WEE USED IN THIS POCEDUEp THE CEW WOULD HAVE TO APPLY THE ZOO PECENT THUST COMMAND MANUALLY FO THE EQUIED TIME, SWITCHING THE THOTTLE CONTOL BACK TO AUTO WILL ESULT IN A 10 PECENT THOTTLE SETTING AFTE THE LGC HAS ISSUED THE Z00 PECENT COHMANDS SINCE THESE COMMANDS AE ISSUED ONLY ONCE BY THE LGC, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LH G&C 6-44

228 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION E - LM SYSTEMS Z24-5 ENDEZVOUS ADA A, THE MUST NOT BE USED TO TACK CSM TANSPONDE UNTIL 2,5 HOUS AFTE OPEATE HEATE ACTIVATION AND ANTENNA TEMPEATUE (HPM) IS GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO ZO DEG F AND THE GYO PACKAGE IS ESTIMATED TO BE GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO 15 DEG F. OPEATING THE AT TEMPEATUES LESS THAN THOSE LISTED IN THE ABOVE ULE MAY ESULT IM DEGADED PEFOMANCE AND POSSIBLE UNECOVEABLE DAMAGE, BASED ON THE VALUE OF THE ANTENNA TEMPP IT IS POSSIBLE TO DETEMINE THE APPOXIMATE TIME NEEDED FO WAMUP TO MEET THE ABOVE CONSTAINTS, IT I$ ESTIMATED THAT WOST CASE CONDITIONS WOULD EQUIE A 2,9 HOU WAMUP PEIOD, (EF SODB 2,5 - GNC-12), B, THE SHOULD NOT BE OPEATED AT AN ANTENNA TEMPEATUE GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO 145 DIG F AND/O A GYO PACKAGE TEMP (ESTIMATED) OF GEATE THAN O EQUAL TO 290 DEG F* OPEATING THE AT TEMPEATUES EXCEEDING THOSE LISTED ABOVE MAY ESULT IN DEGADED PEFOMANCE AND UNECOVEABLE DAMAGE TO THE HPM AND GYD PACKAGE, EXTEME CAE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO EXTAPOLATE PESENT TEMPEATUES TO FINAL VALUES BASED ON THE EXPECTED USAGE ATE OF THE TO AVOID EACHING AND EXCEEDING THE TEMPEATUE CONSTAINTS, C. IF IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE GYO PACKAGE WILL EXCEED 200 DEC F (MPM APPOX, 135 DEG F) PIO TO COMPLETION OF THE BAKING PHASEP THE SHOULD BE TUNED OFF UNTIL EQUIED FO TPI AND BAKING= TPI AND BAKING AE THE MOGT CITICAL PHASES OF THE ENDEZVOUS, OPEATION IS MANDATOY DUING THIS PEIOD. THEEFOE_ OPEATION PIO TO CSI AND CDH WILL BE DELETED IN ODE TO ASSUE TEMPEATUES LOW ENOUGH TO SUPPOT TPI AND BAKING. D. IF THE ESTIMATED GYO PACKAGE TEMP SHOULD EXCEED 200 DEG F (HPM APPOX, 1_5 OEG F) ANYTIME DUING THE ENDEZVOUS PHASE, THE AC POWE TO THE SHOULD NOT BE TUNED OFF, TESTS ON THE GYO PACKAGE INDICATE THAT IF THE AC POWE IS EMOVED WHEN THE GYO PACKAGE EXCEEDS 200 OEG F* GYO FAILUE O DEGADED OPEATION MAY OCCU UPON SUBSEQUENT POWEUP. E. IF THE ANTENNA TEMP EXCEEDS THE NOMINAL TEMPEATUE POFILE BY 15 OEG F THE SHOULD BE TUNED OFF IF IT IS NOT NEEDED. EXCEEDING THE NOMINAL TEMPEATUE POFILE BY 15 DEC F INDICATES OVEHEATING THAT MAY CAUSE ADA EDLINEG ON THE GYO PACKAGE TO BE EXCEEDED AT A LATE TIME, THE Z5 DIG ULE IS CONSIDEED A TEMPEATUE MANAGEMENT ULE HELPFUL AS AN INDICATO THAT THE SHOULD BE TUNED OFF WHEN NOT NEEDED. F, IF THE OVEN HEATES AE TUNED OFF (BOTH THE PGNS--- NDZ D AND HEATES--- NDZ D OP OPEN) ANGE DATA MUST NOT BE USED until 17 MIN AFTE E-ENEGIZINGI AssUMING THE OVEN TEMP HAS DOPPED TO THE COLD AIL TEMP, TESTS INDICATE THAT it MIN IS EQUIED TO ALLOW THE OVEN TO EACH ZBO DIG F FOM WOSE CASE COLD AIL OF APPOX, 95 DEG F, 2A-E LANDING ADA A, THE L SHOULD NOT NOMALLY BE OPEATED AT AN ANTENNA TEMP LESS THAN + 50 DIG F. HOWEVE, THE LUNA LANDING MISSION WILL BE ATTEMPTED IF THE ANTENNA TEMP IS ABOVE THE CITICAL LIMIT 9F -i_ DEG F.IHA_D_ AE pamag_.)_... PDI will BE INITIATED BELOW THE 5O DEC F VALUE IN THE HOPE THAT AT ALTITUDES WHEE L DATA IS EQUIED THE ANTENNA WILL BE UP TO OPEATING TEMPEATUE, B, L ACTIVATION WILL BE DELAYED IF THE L TEMP IS PEDICTED TO BE GEATE THAN Z_ OEG F AT PDI+8._O (HIGATE), BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE L MUST BE LOCKED ON AND CONVEGED BY 10,000 FT (THAT IGI NOT MANDATOY AFTE HIGATE)_ THE PEDICTED O ACTUAL TEMP ISE ATE CAN BE USED TO DETEMINE HOW LONG BEFOE PDI.8+30 THE L CAN BE TUNED ON SO AS NOT TO EXCEED 14E DIG F BY HIGATE, BEYOND ZA5 OEG Ft L OPEATION IS _UESTIONABLE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _# FNL 12/15/7Q LM SYSTEMS LM G&C 8-45

229 Y NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTIONe - LMSYSTEMS ITE_ 24-7 AG5 Ao THE A@B IS DECLAED NO-GO DUING A GYO AND ACCELEOMETE CALIBATION IF THE GYO DIFT CHANGE IS GEATE THAN 2*DO DEG/H AND IF THE ACCELEOMETE BIAS CHANGE IS GEATE THAN FT/SEC2 FOM THE VALUE AT THE STAT OF THE CALIBATION* THE ACCEPTABLE BOUNDS DIFT AND ACCELEOMETE BIAS SHIFTBp WHICH CAN OCCU BETWEEN TWO SUCCESSIVE CALIBATIONSt AE GIVEN IN TABLE 1T.i OF LM/AGB OPEATING MANUAL. B. THE AG$ CAN BE USED TO PEFOM DOCKED ATTITUDE HOLD CONTOL* 51MULATIONG HAVE POVEN THAT THE AGS CAN CONTOL THE DOCKED MASS IN AN ATTITUDE HOLD CONFIGUATION AND MAINTAIN THE POPE DEADBAND WITH A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF CS POPELLANT USAGE* C. THE AGS IN pulse MODE USING ONLY TTCA CONTOL CAN BE USED TO PEFOM A DOCKED BUN. SIMULATION uns HAVE SHOWN THAT THE DOCKED DPS BUN CAN BE PEFOMED WITH THE LOSS OF THUST VECTO CONTOL WITHOUT EXCEEDING THE CB IMPINGEMENT CONSTAINTS BY SWITCHING TO AGS PULSE MODE OF OPEATION AND CONTOLLING THE VEHICLE VIA THE TTCAa ECENT TESTS PEFOMED ON A LN DOCKED TO A CSM HAVE SHOWN THAT THE NATUAL BENDING FEQUENCY OF THE DOCKING CONE IS BETWEEN TWO AND THEE CYCLES PE SECOND. THESE TESTS HAVE ALSO SHOWN THAT THE DOCKING CONE CAN WITHSTAND THE FOCES ESULTING FOM TANSLATION MANEUVES AS LONG AS THE TANSLATIONS AE NOT PULSED AT THE NATUAL BENDING FEQUENCY. THE LM CEW HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THIS AND SAID THAT POCEDUALLY THEY WOULD NEVE HIT THAT FEQUENCYI IF THE LM IS YAWED TO ALIGN THE VEHICLES C.O. ms IN THE DOCKED APS CONFIGUATION_ ATTITUDE CONTOL VIA TTCA HAS POVED I_ SIMULATIONS TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE MODE* NISSIO EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM GSC 6-46

230 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS ITEF -.o LOSS OF GUIDANCE STEEING A, OPEATIONAL AGS AGS GUIDANCE STEEING IS NOT EQUIED FO ALL PHASES OF THIS MISSlON BECAUSE IT CANNOT STEE THE LM ALONG THE EQUIED POWEED DESCENT TAJECTOY, B, OPEATIONAL PGNS DOCKED/UNDOCKEDt PE-PDIt POWEED DESCENT PIO TO HIGATE PGNS GUIDANCE STEEING UTILIZING AN OPEATIONAL PGNS IS EQUIED TO HIGATE TO STEE THE LM EITHE AUTOMATICALLY IPGNS AUTO) O MANUALLY (PGNS ATE COMMAND1 ALONG THE DESCENT TAJECTOY, POWEED DESCENT AFTE MIGATE AFTE.HIGATE OUT-THE-WINDOW ANU ONBOAD CUES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT FO THE CEW TO MANUALLY STEE THE LM TO TOUCMOOWN AND THEEFOE GUIDANCE STEEING 15 NOT EQUIED, LANOING ENABLES THE CEW TO USE STANDAD POCEDUES AND ALLOWS ADDITIONAL TIME TO ESOLVE THE POSLEM, LUNA STAY ON THE LUNA SUFACE A LOSS OF PGNS GUIDANCE STEEING THAT DOES NOT AFFECT EDUNDANT 3-AXIB ATTITUDE CONTOL IS NOT CAUSE FO AN ASCENT SINCE AGS GUIDANCE STEEING 15 STILL AVAILABLE, ENDEZVOUS SINCE THE MAJOITY OF CEW TAINING IS WITH A LM ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS AND TO CONSEVE CSM CONSUMABLES THE AGS WILL BE USED TO PEFOM A LM ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS IF THE PGNS FAILG LOSS OF FOAl FUNCTIONS ( ATTt ATESo EOS) THE FDAI IS A CEW METHOD FO MONITOING ATTITODES_ ATES, AND ATTITUDE EOS DUING CITICAL PHASES OF THE MISSION-- THEEFOE', CONTINUATION OF THE MISSION IS A CEW OPTION, AFTE HIGATEP OUT-THE-WINDOW CuES AE ACCEPTABLE FO LANDING, AFTE LANDING9 NOTHING IS._AINED BY AN EALY LIFTOFF, THE LM ACTIVE ENDEZVOUS IS POSSIBLE USING THE DSKY ATTITUDE EADDUTG, LOSS OF AOT SINCE ACCEPTABLE METHODS (0.05 DEG ALIGNMENT ACCUACY) HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO FINE ALIGN AND ALSO DETEMINE THE DIFT OF THE LM IMU WHILE DOCKED WITH THE CSM (SIMULTANEUUS SETS OF LM/CSM COO ANGLES)t THE AOT IS NO LONGE EQUIED TO OBTAIN THE MANDATOY FINE ALIGNMENT PIO TO PDI. ON THE LUNA GUFACE A GAVITY ALIGNMENT IS ADEQUATE FO LIFTUFFt AND A ENDEZVOUS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH AN ADEQUATE DEGEE OF ACCUACY USING THE FOLLOWING A LUNA SUFACE ALIGNMENT, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _4 FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM GGC 6-47

231 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 4-23 LOSS OF ENOEZVOUS ADA/VHF ANGING/OPTICAL TACKING AI LOSS OF ANY ONE ALL PHASES TWO LM-CSH TACKING SYSTEMS AE CONSIDEED SUFFICIENT TO ASSUE A SAFE ENDEZVOUS* B, LOSS OF ANY TWO DOCKED/UNDOCKED/PE PDI-A SINGLE POINT FAILUE COULD CAUSE A LOSS OF THE EMAINING QNBOAD TACKING SYSTEM_ SEIOUSLY JEOPAOIZING THE SUCCESS OF THE ENDEZVOUS PHASE. ALSO GOUND TACKING CAN BE USED TO BACKUP THE NOMAL ENDEZVOUS WHEEAS NO _OUND HELP IS AVAILIABLE FO THE SHOT ENDEZVOUS* ALL OTHES AFTE PDI THE LH IS COMMITTED TO A ENDEZVOUSP THEEFOE THE SUFACE PHASE I5 CONTINUEU_ ELYING ON GOUND TACKING AS A BACKUP TO THE EMAINING TACKING SYSTEM* 24-28; LOSS OF LANDING ADA DOCKED/UNDOCKEDt PE ~PDI PIO TO INITIATING THE POWEED OESCEHTt THE MISSION WOULD NOT BE CONTINUED WITH THE LOSS OF THE L SINCE L DATA IS ESSENTIAL FO STATE VECTO UPDATING, THE LOSS IN THIS CASE IS ASSUMED TO BE SOME CLEA CUT TOTAL LOSS SUCH AS CICUIT BEAKE FAILUE TO STAY IN, POWEED DESCENT PIO TO ADEQUATE ALTITUDE UPDATING OF LM STATE VECTOS THE CUENT MISSION ULE ASSUMES A EQUIEMENT FO MAINTAING 3 SIGMA PGNS PEFOMANCE WITH A MAXIMUM ALTITUDE DISPESIONS BEING COECTED BY L UPDATES, IN THIS CASE PGNS DELTA H CONVEGENCE PIO TO SOME MINIMUM ALTITUDE IS EQUIED TO PEVENT PGNS TAJECTOY DISPESION5 FOM CAUSING IMPACT WITH THE MOON, POWEED DESCENT AFTE ADEQUATE ALTITUDE UPDATING OF LM STATE VECTOS " UPON THE DECISION BY GUIDO THAT ADEQUATE UPDATING OF THE LM STATE vecto5 HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHEO_ THE EMAINDE OF THE LUNA DESCENT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ON STATE VECTO DATA ALONE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15170 LM SYSTEMS LM GSC B-#B

232 t NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - LN SYSTEMS I-"-I,EN 24-2B LOSS OF EDUNDANT }-AXIS ATTITUDE CONTOL DocxEo/uNDOCKEDt PE-PDI_ PowEED DESCENT PIO TO HIGH GATE SINCE PGNS AUTO/ATE CMD AND AGE ATE CMD AE THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE CONTOL MODES FO PDtt LOSS OF EITHE CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF EDUNDANCY, EDUNDANCY IS MANDATOY SINCE THEE AE MANY SINGLE FAILUES THAT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF EITHE MODE, POWEED DESCENT FOM HIGH GATE TO TOUCHDOWN AFTE HIGH GATE THE DECISION TO CONTINUE IS CEW OPTION, LANDING ENABLES THE CEW TO USE STANDAD POCEDUES AND ALLOWS ADDITIONAL TIME TO ESOLVE THE POBLEM, LUNA STAY AND ENDEZVOUS ON THE LUNA SUFACE THE LOSS OF EITHE PGN5 AUTO/ATE CMD O AGE AUTO/ATE CMD WILL BE CAUSE FO AN ASCENT AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY SINCE FUTHE SYSTEMS DEGADATION CAN CAUSE LOSS OF ALL ATTITUDE CONTOL ECOMMENDED FO ASCENT, DUING ENDEZVOUS OTHE NODES OF ATTITUDE CONTOL BECOME ACCEPTABLE AND THE MISSION CAN BE CONTINUED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOgP AGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/Z5/70 LM SYSTEMS LM G&C 6-_9

233 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS LOSS OF TANSLATION CAPABILITY A, AUTOMATIC ULLAGE (+X} AUTOMATIC ULLAGE IS CAUSED BY THE LGC ISSUING APPOPIATE JET-ON COMMANDS TO THE PGNS ASSOCIATED CES HADWAE= A FAILUE OF AUTOMATIC ULLAGE COULD THEEFOE BE CAUSED BY EITHE AN LGC/LGC INTEFACE O A GEE MALFUNCTION= IF AN AUTOMATIC ULLAGE FAILUE OCCUSt THE CEW WILL MANUALLY ULLAGE WITH THE +X TANSL P,B= TO SATISFY THE CONSTAINT OF HAVING ULLAGE TO STAT A DPS BUN, SINCE THE USE OF THE P,B= DOES NUT ENTAIL USING ANY AUTOMATIC ULLAGE CICUITS_ A SINGLE FAILUE IN AUTOMATIC ULLAGE WILL NOT INHIBIT O AFFECT THE MANUAL ULLAGE, THUS THE ULLAGE EQUIEMENT WILL BE SATISFIED= BECAUSE THE NOMALLY SHOT ULLAGE TIME (8 SECOND_) OOESNfT ALLOW FO A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF TOUBLESMOOTINGp A SECONDAY INDICATION OF FAULT IS NECESSAY TO ISOLATE THE MALFUNCTION= THAT SECONDAY INDICATION IS THE AUTOMATIC STAT OF THE DPS, IF THE OPS STATS AUTOMATICALLYt THE LGC IS ASSUMED TO BE OPEATING NOMIALLY SINCE THE POBABILITY OF CHANNEL BITS (I=E,o ULLAGFLG O A.X JET-ON COMMAND) FAILINO IS EXTEMELY LOWo HDWEVEp A TEST OF EDUNDANT 3-AXIS ATTITUDE CONTOL MAY BE MADE DUING THE PTP POTION OF PDI TO INSUE PGNS 3-AXIS ATTITUDE CONTOL, THUS_ IF NECESSAYpA PGNS ASSOCIATED CES HADWAE FAILUE WILL BE DETECTEDo IF THE AUTOMATIC STAT DOES NOT OCCU_ A WOST CASE ASSUMPTION IS MADE {I=E,t THE LGC HAS LOST ITS ABILITY TO CONTOL MAJO FLIGHT FUNCTIONS)* THUSo THIS SECONDAY FAILUE CONSTITUTES A NO-GO FO PDI ON THE _ASIS OF LGC CONTOL FAILUES= B, 3-AXIS TANSLATION THEE AXIS TANSLATION IS EQUIED PIO TO CIO TO MAINTAIN SYSTEMS INTEGITY BECAUSE A DOUBLE FAILUE IN NECESSAY TO VIOLATE THE LMtS BASIC 3-AXIS TANSLATION EDUNDANCY= AFTE CIC, THE VEHICLE IS IN A SITUATION WHEE IT MUST PEFOM A ENDEZVOUS--- THEEFOE_ IT IS NO EAIEE TO PEFOM A ENDEZVOUS FOM THE CUENT OBIT THAN FOM THE LUNA SUFACE, THUSD AFTE CICt CONTINUE MISSION IS THE APPOPIATE ACTION, AFTE INSETIONt THE LM CAN PEFOM THE DIECT ENDEZVOUS AS LONG AS IT CAN PEFOM THE TWEAK BUN AND TPI= TO DO THIEf THE LM MUST HAVE X TANSLATION CAPABILITY, FO TPFt IT IS NECESSAY THAT THE CEW EVALUATE THE LOSS OF TANSLATION IN EAL TIMEr TMUSt THE ACTION IS TO CONTINUE MISSION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO Z4 FNL 2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM GGC 6-50

234 r NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - LM SYSTEMS i LOSS OF PITCH O OLL GDA THE LOSS OF PITCH O OLL GDA (THUST VECTO CONTOL WOULD CAUSE AN ABOT ONLY IF EXCESSIVE IMPINGEMENT O LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL COULD EBULTe LOSS OF EDUNDANT ASCENT ENGINE ON CAPABILITY A EDUNDANT METHOD OF MAINTAINING THE ASCENT ENGINE ON IS NECESSAY TO INSUE CEW SAFETY, THE TWO METHODS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE NECESSAY EDUNDANCY AE AUTO STAT AND ENGINE STAT OVEIDE, IF A FAILUE OCCUS AFFECTING EITHE METHOD AND IF THEE IS AVAILABLE TIMEr TOUBLE SHOOTING POCEDUES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED TO DETEMINE AP$ STAT EDUNDANCY* PIO TO PDI THE CONFIMED LOSS OF EITHE METHOD IS SUFFICIENT TO NO-GO PDI, IF THE LOSS OF EDUNDANT ASCENT ENGINE ON OCCUS DUING PDIP DIPFEENT.ACTIONG AE EQUIED DEPENDING ON WHETHE O NOT DECENT INSETION CAPABILITY EXISTS (EFEENCE M 25-21e WHEN DESCENT INSETION CAPABILITY EXIGTS_ THE boss OF EITHE METHOD W_LL BE CAUSE FO AN ABOT. IF EITHE IS LOST AFTE DESCENT INSETION CAPABILITY_ THE ACTION WILL BE TO CONTINUE THE MISSION BECAUSE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT COECTIVE POCEDUES DUING THIS TIME OF HIGH CEW ACTIVITYo IF THE LOSS OF EITHE IS CONFIMED AFTE LANDING_ THE LM WILL BE NO-GO FO AN EXTENDED LUNA STAY* LIFTOFF AT NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY IS THEN THE DESIED ACTION, LOSS OF DPS AUTO ON CAPABILITY IF DPS AUTO ON CAPABILITY I5 LOST_ THE EQUIED ACTION IS DEPENDENT UPON WHETHE O NOT AUTOMATIC ULLAGE HAS OCCUED= THIS CONSTAINT AGAINST THE DPS AUTO ON WAS LEVIED TO ALLOW A SECONDAY INDICATION OF THE LGC=5 ABILITY TO CONTOL MAJO FLIGHT FUNCTIONS, IF ULLAGE HAD OCCUED AUTOMATICALLY AND THE DPS AUTO ON CAPABILITY WAS LOSTt THE USE OF THE ENGINE STAT P.B, WOULD BECOME MANDATOY, THIS IS BECAUSE IT IS NECESBAY TO FIE THE SUPECITICAL HELIUM SQUIBS WHICH WHEN BLOWN WILL ALLOW FO NOMINAL MIGSION COMPLETIONeIF IGNITION NOW OCCUSP THE DESCENT ENGINE COMMAND OVEIDE SWITCH SHOULD BE PLACED ON BECAUSE OF SINGLE POINT FAILUES IN THE STAT PUSH BUTTON CICUITY, IF IGNITION DOBSNIT OCCU WITH STAT P.B, DEPESSION_ THEN THE SHE SQUIBS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN BLOWN, IF THE DPS WEE TO BE SUBSEQUENTLY STATED (VIA THE DSC END CMD OVD) WITH THE LOSS OF SHEt PDI WOULD BE ABOTED. THUS A PEIOD OF TOUBLESHOOTING {_ EV} IS NECESSAY TO DETEMINE WHETHE O NOT THE CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SUCCESSFULLY BLOW SHE SQUIBS AND IGNITE THE DPB. HOWEVE_ IF ULLAGE HAD NOT OCCUED AUTOMATICALLYt AND THE OPS AUTO ON CAPABILITY WAS LOSTe THE ACTION WOULD BE TO INHIBIT POl SINCE TWO MAJO PLIGHT FUNCTIONS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN PEFOMED BY THE LGC, THU5_ PDI IS NO-GO BECAUSE OF A SUSPECTED LGC FAILUE, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO l_ FNL 12/Z5/70 LH SYSTEMS LM G&C 6-51

235 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 24"34 LOSS OF AUTO/MANUAL THOTTLE CONTOL A, EITHE B, BOTH THE LOSS OF AUTO THOTTLE WILL NOT NO-GO PDI SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE TO MONITO VIA DSKY EADOUT GUIDANCE THUST COMMANDS, SIMULATIONS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE CEW CAN FOLLOW WITH MANUAL THOTTLE CONTOL THE APPOPIATE THOTTLE SCHEDULE DISPLAYED ON THE DSKY, NOMINALLYt MANUAL THOTTLE IS USED TO SUPPLEMENT/BACKUP AUTO THOTTLED DPS MAX THUST CAN BE ACHIEVED BY EITHE A PULL SCALE OUTPUT OF AUTO THOTTLE AND A PECENTAGE OUTPUT OF MANUAL THOTTLE O A FULL SCALE OUTPUT OF MANUAL THOTTLE, SINCE MAX THUST FOM THE DPS IS A NECESSAY EQUIEMENT FO BOTH THE NOMINAL POI TAJECTOY AND NEA LUNA SUFACE ABOTSJ A MEANS OF ACHIEVING MAX THUST 15 MANDATOY, THE LOSS OF MANUAL THOTTLE EQUIES A CONTINUE MISSION ULING BECAUSE A WOK-AOUND POCEDUE EXISTS TO FOCE THE OPS TO MAX THUST EGADLESS OF THE MANUAL THOTTLE OUTPUT, THUS THE NECESSITY OF EQUIING MANUAL THOTTLE HA5 BEEN EMOVED_ AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE POCEDUE IS IMPLEMENTED WILL CLAIFY ITS USE, IF MANUAL THOTTLE IS LOST PIO TO O DUING PDIt THE DECA POWE OB ON PANEL 11 WILL BE PULLED WHEN MAX THUST IS NECESSAY, WHEN GTC I$ BELOW 57 peoent_ THE CB WILL BE ESET TO ALLOW THE LGC TO CONTOL THE THOTTLE, WITH THE CB PULLEDP GOUND MONITOING OF CETAIN PAAMETES IS LOST BUT THE LOSS DOES NOT COMPIMIZE FAILUE DETECTION TECHNIQUES IN THIS TIME FAME, THUS* THE LOSS OF EITHE THOTTLE CONSTITUTES A CONTINUE MISSION ULING ON THE BASIS THAT BACKUP TECHNIQUES FO EACH AE AVAILABLE, THE LOSS OF BOTH THOTTLES WILL BE CAUSE FO AN ABOT DUING PDI SINCE THE PDI TAJECTOY EQUIES THAT THE DPS BE THOTTLED TO MEET ALTITUDE AND ALTITUDE ATE CONSTAINTS* IF THE CONFIMED LOSS OF BOTH IS DETECTED ANYTIME PIO TO PDI_ THE ACTION WILL BE TO ETUN TO THE CSM SI,NCE A LUNA LANDING CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED, LOSS OF LUNA COKTACT LIGHTS THE FUNCTION OF THE LUNA CONTACT LIGHT 15 TO CUE THE CEW WHEN TO H1T THE STOP PUSH BUTTON PIO TO TOWCHDOWN, IF THE LUNA CONTACT LIGHTS WEE LOSTP THE CEW WOULD CONTINUE THE MISSION USING VISUAL EFEENCE AS THE PIMAY SHUTDOWN CUE AND THE OTHE ONBOAD CEW DISPLAYS AS SECONDAY CUES, MI@SION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM GGC 6-52

236 i r NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS LM POPULSION-DP5 THE FOLLOWING LM DPS POPULSION MISSION ULES ATIONALE ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE BACKGOUND BEHIND EACH MISSION WULE. SINCE THE FIST ULE 1N EACH SECTION IS k EPETITION OF THE LM contol GO/NO-GO=S IN SECTION 3 {EF PAGE _-23). THE ATIONALES BELOW ALSO COVE THE GO/NO-GOIG* IN GENEAL THE OVEALL PHILOSOPHY IS TO IDENTIFY THE EQUIPMENT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO COMPLETE THE NOMAL LUNA MISSION AND AT EACH PHASE SPECIFY THAT EQUIPMENT EWUIED FOM THAT POINT THOUGH EDOCKING, IN ADDITIONP OTHE EQUIPMENT IS ALSO EQUIED TO POVIDE EDUNDANCY FO CEW SAFETY PUPOSES. THIS IS PIMAILY ASSOCIATED WITH EDUNDANT CAPABILITY FO MAINTAINING DPS IGNITION. DUING THE END OF THE POWE DESCENT PHASE AT SOME PEIOD JUST PIO TO TOUCHDOWN IT BECOMES MOE DANGEOUS TO ABOT THAN TO MANUALLY LANDt AND THEN DO A NOMINAL LIFTDFF* THIS IS BECAUSE THE NOMINAL LIFTDFF IS MOE THOOUGHLY EXECISED DUING PEMISSION SIMULATIONS AND INVOLVES LESS UNKNOWNS BOTH FOM A STANDPOINT OF SOFTWAE CHECKOUT AND CEW POCEDUES, DUING THE LUNA STAYt THEE AE OPTIMUM TIMES FO L1FTOFF WHEE THE SM POSITION IS ALIGNED FO EASY ENDEZVOUS= ABOTS DUING LUNA STAY WILL BE DELAYED TO LIFTOFF AT THESE OPTIMUM TIMBSp EXCEPT IN CASES WHEE CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE ASCENT IS JEOPADIZED= 25-2 DEFINITIONS A, OPEATIONAL DPS I, THIS MINIMUM INLET PESSUE ASSUES THAT SYSTEM PESSUIZATION VIA THE SHE WILL OCCU QUICKLY ENOUGH TO OPEN POPELLANT BALL VALVES AND ALLOW POPELLANT FLOW PIO TO THE SHE FLOW FEEZING THE FUEL IN THE FUEL'HELIUM HEAT EXCHANGE. 2. IF ENGINE INLET LOWE PESSUE LIMITS AE VIOLATEDt EXTEME COMBUSTION OUGHNESS CAN ESULT, OUGH COMBUSTION GIVES ISE TO SEVEE CHAMBE PESSUE SPIKESt HIGH TANSIENT ACCELEATIONSt AND ABNOMAL ENGINE STESSES WHICH COULD CAUSE ENGINE DAMAGE. _. THE ENGINE SHOULD NOT BE STATED AND OPEATED AT POPELLANT BULK TEMPEATUES OUTSIDE THE 50 DEC F TO 90 DEG F ANGE, A BULK TEMP GEATE THAN 50 DEC F IN THE POPELLANT TANKS INSUES THAT POPELLANT IN THE LINES DOWNSTEAM OF THE TANKS EMAINS ABOVE #O DEG F. THE TEMP OF 40 DEG F EPESENTS THE LOWE LIMIT OF THE ENGINE INJECTO QUALIFICATION ENVELOPE. AND EFFECTS OF OPEATION OUTSIDE THIS ENVELOPE AE UNKNOWN, FO BULK TEMPS GEATE THAN 90 DEC F PEFOMANCE DEGADATION AND HIGH EOSION WITH POSSIBLE ENGINE BUN-THOUGH MAY OCCU. 4, DELTA TEMPEATUE GEATE THAN 10 DEC F CAUSES DEGADED PEFOMANCE WHICH ESULTS IN OFF-NOMINAL MIXTUE ATIO AND LOWE SPECIFIC IMPULSE WHICH COULD CAUSE popellant DEPLETION PIO TO LANDING. IN ADDITIONJ A DELTA T GEATE THAN 25 DEC F MAY PODUCE HIGH EOSION ATES AND A POSSIBLE PEMATUE CHAMBE BUN-THOUGH= THE TEMPEATUE LIMITS AE ONLY TO INITIATE A BUN BECAUSE IT IS NOT EASONABLE FO BULK TEMPEATUES TO CHANGE DUING A BUN-- THEEFOE_ ANY SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN TEMPEATUES DUING A BUN WILL BE CONSIDEED A TM FAILUE* 5.{A}DELTA PESSUE BETWEEN FUEL AND QXID ENGINE INLET PESSUES CEATES. OF -NOMINAL PBOPELLA_T FLO H ATES. OXI_-HIGH PLOW ATES EOSION ATES AND POSsiBLE PEMATUE _HAH_E BU_-YH_GH* fu_l'high _Lb_ A_ CAUSE OUGH COMBUSTION, IN BOTH CASES DEGADED PEFOMANCE AND IMPOPE POPELLANT UTILIZATION ESULTS, (B)IF THE DELTA PESSUE AT THE STAT OF ANY BUN IG GEATE THAN 50 PSID (FUEL HIGH}, THE FUEL LEAD INTO THE COMBUSTION CHAMBE MAY BE LAGE ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE FUEL TO ENTE INTO THE OXID OIFICES AND CAUSE DETONATION OF POPELLANTS IN THE INJECTO WHICH COULD DAMAGE THE INJECTO. B* SUFFICIENT GUPECITICAL HELIUM MUST EXIST TO ALLOW POPELLANT DEPLETION WITHOUT EXCEEDING THE MINIMUM FTP INLET PESSUE LIMIT. B, LOW THOTTLE POINT THE EXACT LOW THOTTLE POINT IS DEFINED FO INFOMATION PUPOSES AS IT CHANGES SLIGHTLY FOM VEHICLE TO VEHICLE= {EFEENCE SODB VOL II APPENDIX) C, DPS INSETION CAPABILITY - NO ATIONALE EQUIED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE i APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM DPS 6-53

237 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS MINIMUM DPS ENGINE BUN TIME AND ESTAT CAPABILITY A MINIMUM BUN OF 3*5 SECONDS IS EQUIED TO ASSUE THAT COMBUSTION CHAMBE HEATING is ENOUGH TO PEVENT FEEZING OF POPELLANTS IN INJECTO MANIFOLDS WHICH COULD CAUSE UNPEDICATABLE AND UNEPEATABLE SYSTEM OPEATION* AFTE A MINIMUM BUN_ A COAST PEIOD OF 2 SECONDS 15 THEN EQUIED TO ASSUE THAT SOAK-BACK EFFECTS HAVE CAUSED COMPLETE SUBLIMATION OF POPELLANTS IN THE INJECTO* SUPECITICAL HELIUM BUST DISC UPTUE DUING MANNED OPEATION IS AN ALLOWABLE EVENT THE SUPEC1TICAL HELIUM PESSUE ELIEF ASSEMBLY IS DESIGNED TO ELIEVE THE SHE TANK TO ZEO IF THE STOAGE TANK PESSUE BECOMES EXCESSIVE WITHOUT CAUSING STUCTUAL DAMAGE TO THE SPACECAFTt PODUCING TOO LAGE A MOMENT UNBALANCEt O ENDANGEING THE CEW, 2fi-15 POPELLANT GAGING THE PQGS IS THE MOST ACCUATE METHOD OF GAGING DPS POPELLANT WHICH IS AVAILABLE TO THE CEW* A, THE PQGG ONBOAD EO IS DEFINED AS 1,3 PECENT FOM 95 PECENT TO 23 PECENT* 1 PECENT FOM 25 PECENT TO 8 PECENTi AND 1,G PECENT FOM 8 PECENT TO 0 PECENT* SINCE THE GEATEST ANGE OF THE PQGS _S WELL AS THE MOST CITICAL (8 PECENT -0) HAS AN EO OF 1,3 PECENTt THIS IS THE EO ESTABLISHED FO MISSION ULE USE* B* THE BACKUP METHOD UTILIZES THE LGC MASS IN ITS CALCULATION, THIS METHOD CAN DETEMINE TOTAL POPELLANT EMAINING VEY ACCUATELY (1 PECENT) A NOMINAL MIXTUE ATIO IS ASSUMED WHEN CALCULATING THE OXIDIZE AND THE FUEL INDIVIDUALLYt WHICH ESULTS IN A LAGE EO (3 PECENT)* FACTUE MECHANICS WHEN DESCENT STAGE ETENTION IS DEGIABLE AFTE A LONe BUN_ THE FACTUE MECHANICS EQUIEMENTS ON THE DESCENT POPELLANT TANKS MUST BE SATISFIED, A BUN THAT LEAVES GEATE THAN 29 PECENT OF THE POPELLANT PODUCES NO FACTUE MECHANICS POBLEMS* FO LONGE BUNG PLACING THE ENGINE IN A BLOWDOWN MODE AT 29 PECENT INSUES THAT FACTUE MECHANICS LIMITS WILL NOT BE VIOLATED* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM DPS 6-54

238 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION B - LM SYSTEMS ITEF 25-3C LOSS OF OPEATIONAL DPS _FEENCE MISSION ULE ATIONALE 25-2 FO LOSS OF OPEATIONAL DPS= AFTE LO GATE THE CEW 1S TOO BUSY TO OBSEVE ANYTHING OTHE THAN ULLAGE PESSUESt AND IF A FAILUE DID OCCU THAT VIOLATED OTHE OPEATIONAL PAAMETES BUT NOT ULLAGE PESSUE5_ THE ENGINE COULD BE SAFELY OPEATED IN THAT MODE FO THE SHOT TIME UNTIL LANDING GTAT TANK LEAK A. INLET PESSUE EQUAL TO O GEATE THAN 30 PSIA THE DPS STAT TANK CANNOT BE ISOLATED FOM THE DPS PESSUIZATION SYSTEM AFTE ITS EXPLOSIVE VALVE IS OPENED, HELIUM FOM THE SHE TANK WILL FLOW BACK THOUGH THE SECONDAY EGULATO AND LEAK OVEBOAD THOUGH THE STAT TANK WHEN THE &HE EXPLOSIVE VALVE IS OPENED AUTOMATICALLY 1.3 BECOND$ AFTE ENGINE IGNITION. THE ENGINE CAN BE SAFELY STATED AND OPEATED FO 1=3 SECONDS WITHOUT PESSUIZING FOM THE STAT TANK IF THE INLET PESSUES AE E_UAL TO O GEATE THAN 30 PSIA. THIG WILL AVOID LOGG OF HELIUM FOM THE SHE TANK. B* INLET PESSUE LESS THAN 30 P$IA WITH ENGINE INLET PESSUES BELOW SPECIFIED LIMITS_ THE ENGINE CANNOT BE BAFELY STATED'- THEEFOEP THE STAT TANK MUBT BE USED. IF A STAT TANK LEAK EXISTS AND THE S_UIB IS BLOWN AND THEE IS SUFFICIENT HELIUM TO BING THE ULLAGE PESSUE TO EgUAL TO O GEATE THAN 30 PSIA= IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE LEAK I5 GMALL BECAUSE ENOUGH PESSUE IN THE 5TAT TANK EMAINED TO PATIALLY PESSUIZE THE DPGe AND POWEED DESCENT WILL BE ATTEMPTED (EF M 26-33), LOGS OF SuPECITICAL PESSUE DUING POWEED DESCENT IF SUPECITICAL HELIUM PESSUE IS LOST PIO TO 31 PECENT POPELLANT EMAINING THE DPS ENGINE WILL BE BELOW ITS MINIMUM FTP INLET PESSUE PIO TO POPELLANT DEPLETION= IF THE DPS GOES INTO BLOWDOWN BELOW 31 PECENT POPELLANT EMAINING_ THE CAPABILITY TO GO TO FTP AT ANY POINT AND DEPLETE POPELLANTS EXISTS, THIS ASSUES AN FTP ABOT AY ANY TIME DUING THE LUNA LANDING* MIBBION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM DPS 6-35

239 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION b - LM SYBTEMS 25-3A DPS HELIUM LEAK A DPS HELIUM LEAK PIO TO PD1 WILL BE EVALUATED BY THE GOUND, IF THE HELIUM LEAK ALLOWS A LOS5 OF LEGS THAN 12 LBS, THEN PDI CAN BE COMPLETED WITHOUT VIOLATING M 25-2 FO AN OPEATIONAL DPS. IF MOE THAN 12 LBS OF HELIUM WILL BE LOST THEN PDI WILL NOT BE ATTEMPTED, SECONDS AFTE LO LEVEL AT LO LEVEL ACTIVATIONf THE GOUND ASSUMES THAT 117 SECONDS AT 25,4 PECENT THUST EMAINS, THE ll3 SECONDS IS DEIVED FOM S$1NG THE 3 SIGMA LOW LEVEL POINT FO EACH TANK WITH THE OTHE FUEL TANK, THE SAME IS DONE FO THE OXIDIZE TANKer AND THE LOWEST OF THE FUEL AND OK SSED NUMBE IS USED* THIS ASSUMES THAT IT IS HIGHLY IMPOBABLE THAT BOTH FUEL LOW LEVELS O OX LOW LEVELS WOULD BE AT THEI 3 SIGMA MINIMUM, AT LEAST ONE LOW LEVEL OUT OF EACH PAI SHOULD BE AT THEI SSED LOW LEVEL POINT. NINETY-SEVEN SECONDS AFTE A LOW LEVEL_ APPOXIMATELY 20 SECONDS OF HOVE TIME O FIVE SECONDS OF FTP EMAIN. THEEFOEt AT 97 SECONDS_ THE CEW FACES AN ABOT/NO ABOT DECISION, THEY MUST HAVE EITHE THE CAPABILITY TO LAND WITHIN 20 SECONDS O THEY MUST ABOT_ IN WHICH CASE THEY HAVE FIVE SECONDS AT FTP TO COVE ANY ABOT SITUATION SUFFICIENTLY LOW LEVEL CONFIMS INSUFFICIENT POPELLANT TO LAND IF IN THE CEW'S ESTIMATION INSUFFICIENT POPELLANT EMAINS TO LAND WHEN THE LOW LEVEL INDICATION IS OBTAINED_ THEN AN ABOT WITH AN ABOT SECONDS LATE SHOULD BE INITIATED, THIS WILL ALLOW MAXIMUM USE OF THE DESCENT ENGINE WHILE AVOIDING AN FTP BUN TO DEPLETION WHICH COULD PODUCE HAZADOUS THUST OSCILLATIONS. AT THE LOW LEVEL INOICATION_ APPOXIMATELY 32 SECONDS OF BUN TIME EMAIN AT FTP, IN ADDITION_ IF A LAGE DELTA SHOULD AISE BETWEEN OXIDIZE AND FUEL PQG$ EADINGS* THIS INDICATES THAT ABNOMINAL POPELLANT USAGE O A POPELLANT LEAK MAY EXIST, WHEN THE DELTA BETWEEN EADINGS EACHES GEATE THAN _3 PECENTp THE NOMINAL OXIDIZE O FUEL POPELLANT MAGIN pedicted AT LANDING HAS BEEN CONSUMED_ AND THE CAPABILITY TO LAND DOES NOT EXIST EVEN CONSIDEING WOST CASE PUGS EO, PUGS EADING 2 PECENT AND NO VALID TIME ESTIMATE FOM LOW LEVEL IF THE THOTTLE IS TAKEN OVE MANUALLY O NO VALID TIME ESTIMATE FOM LOW LEVEL IS OBTAINEDp THEN THE CEW MUST ABOT WHEN POPELLANTS GET SO LOW THAT THEY COULD UN OUT PIO TO GETTING OUT OF THE APS ABOT CUVE IF AN ABOT WAS EQUIED, UNDE THESE CICUMSTANCES THE PQGSt WHICH IS THE CEWI5 ONLY POPELLANT GAGING SYSTEMt BECOMES THE PIMAY CUE OF POPELLANT EMAINING AFTE LOW LEVEL, WHEN THE PQGS FLIPS TO 2 PECENT* AN ABOT/NO ABOT DECISION POINT IS FACED BY THE CEW, THE PUGS EADING OF 2 PECENT MEANS THE GAGE IS EGISTEING A POPELLANT QUANTITY BETWEEN E*5 AND 2,5 PECENT DEPENDING ON HOW SOON THE CEW SEES THE EADING AFTE THE FLIP TO 2 PECENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PUGS EO IN THE LOWE ANGE OF I PECENT. THE CEW CAN HAVE AN ASSUED ABOT PAD OF 0,5 TO 1,5 PECENT WHICH COESPONDS TO BETWEEN 10 AND 30 SECONDS OF BUN TIME AT 25.4 PECENT THUST AND POVIDES SUFFICIENT FTP BUN TIME FO ABOT SITUATIONS, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL.2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM DPS S-E6

240 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S - LM SYSTEMS!5-39 EXCESSIVE POPELLANT USAGE POWEED DESCENT SHOULD BE ABOTED WHENEVE IT BECOMES CLEA THAT SUFFICIENT POPELLANT DOES NOT EXIST TO LANDQ pio TO P641 SUFFICIENT DATA DOES NOT EXIST TO DETEMINE WHETHE EXCESSIVE POPELLANT IS BEING USED= DUI.NG PS4J THE GOUND CAN ANALYSE LGC DATA AND DESCENT UUANTITIE5 TO DETEMINE WHETHE SUFFICIENT POPELLANT EMAINS TO LAND, THIS ANALYSIS ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ANY EDESIGNATION, EXCESSIVE POPELLANT USAGE PEDICTED BY GOUND ANALYSIS WILL BE VEIFIED BY SECONDAY CUES SUCH AS THOTTLE DOWN TIME, THUST LEVEL TCPo AND SYSTEM PESSUES WHICH WOULD INDICATE OFF-NOMINAL DPS PEFOMANCE, A MINIMUM PECENTAGE OF POPELLANT IS EQUIEO AT ALL TINES FO AN FTP ABOT. WHEN APPLIED TO THE POPULSION PE CENT MAGIN PLOTS, A MINIMUM PEDICTED MAGIN NUMBE AT TOUCHDOWN IS OBTAINED BY SUBTACTING BOTH PUGS EO AND MAGIN PLOT _O FOM THE MINIMUM PUGS NUMBES EQUIED FO ALL ABOT SITUATIONS= EQUIED FO FTP ABOTS +1 PECENT PUGS EO IN Z5 PECENT TO S PECENT EGION -1 PECENT MAGIN PLOT EO -,2 PECENT LOWEST ACCEPTABLE MAGIN -,Z PECENT FAILUE TO VENT DPS VIOLATION OF THE FACTUE MECHANICS LIMITS ON THE DPS POPELLANT TANKS COULD CAUSE A UPTUE OF THE TANKS CEATING A HAZADOUS CONDITION FO THE CEW, FACTUE MECHANICS LIMITS AE ESTABLISHED ON A PESSUE-TEMPEATUE ELATIONSHIP, THE POPELLANT TANK TEMPEATUE WILL CHANGE ACCODING TO THE ENGINE BUN TIME AND THE QUANTITY OF POPELLANT EMAINING IN EACH TANK, THE POPELLANT TANK PESSUE WILL BE EFFECTED BY THE HEAT SOAK BACK AFTE THE BUN, IF THE OXIDIZE TANKS AE NOT VENTED AFTE THE BUNt A HIGH TANK PESSUE WILL ESULT AS A FUNCTION OF HEAT SOAK BACK. AS LONG AS THEE IS AT LEAST 150 LBS IN EACH OK TANKP THE TANK TEMPEATUE INCEASE WOULD NOT BE LAGE ENOUGH TO VIOLATE THE FACTUE MECHANICS PESSUE TEMPEATUE ELATIONSHIP. THE PESSUE NEEDED FO THE TEMPEATUE ISE TO VIOLATE THE FACTUE MECHANICS LIMITS CAN NEVE BE OBTAINED, THE PESSUE WOULD BE ELIEVED THU THE BUST DISC BEFOE IT C_ULO EACH ITS LIMITS= IF THE POPELLANT EMAINING IN EACH OX TANK IS LESS THAN 150 LBS_ IN EXCESS OF TWO HOUS IS EQUIED FO TEMPEATUES TO INCEASE TO A POINT SUCH THAT FACTUE MECHANICS LIMITS MAY BE VIOLATED, THEEFOE, IT 15 SAFE TO CONTINUE TO T-3* AND EAL TIME EVALUATION WILL BE MADE FO CONTINUING AFTE T-3, IN THE EVENT OF FAILUE OF THE FUEL TANKS TO VENT THEE IS NO POBLEM IN VIOLATING FACTUE MECHANICS LIMITS, NO MATTE WHAT QUANTITY OF FUEL EMAINEDt THE BUST DISC WOULD BE BLOWN BEFOE ANY PESSUE COULD SATISFY THE FACTUE MECHANICS LIMITS, EOSION EFFECTS DUING DESCENT ENGINE OPEATION_ THE ABLATIVE LINE OF THE ENGINE IS BEING CONSTANTLY WON AWAY CAUSING AN INCEASE IN ENGINE THOAT AEA* THOAT AEA INCEASE BEYOND A PEDETEMINED PECENTAGE MAY EXCEED THE ENGINE THUST CHAMBE HEATING AND EUSION LIMITS AND ESULT IN AN ENGINE BUN-THOUGH=..THE AMOUNT QE THO_J_ABEA INCEASE ChN BE,GAUGE_ BYENGINE TOP. THIS IS IMPLEMENTEb!ON GAPH OF DPS CHAMBE PESSUE VS _E_EN_ THhUST _'IfN A _E_IES _ OVE$" WHI_ SHOW DIFFEENT STAGES OF EOSION, THUS, FO A CETAIN THUST LEVEL A PATICULA TCP CAN BE OBTAINEDp ANDt WHEN PLOTTED ON THE GAPH_ GIVES THE STAGE OF EOSION THE ENGINE HAS OBTAINED, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/Zfi/70 LM SYSTEMS LM DPS b-57

241 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS LM POPULSI ON-APS THE FOLLOWING LM POPULSION APS MISSION ULE ATIONALE ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE BACKGOUND BEHIND EACH MISSION ULE. SINCE THE FIST ULE IN EACH SECTION IS A EPETITION OF THE LM CONTOL GO/NO-GODS IN SECTION _ (EF PAGE 3-23)t THE ATIONALE BELOW ALSO COVE THE GO/NO "GOIS, IN GENEAL THE OVEALL PHILOSOPHY I5 TO IDENTIFY THE EQUIPMENT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO COMPLETE THE NOMAL LUNA MISSION AND AT EACH PHASE SPECIFY THAT EQUIPMENT EQUIED FOM THAT POINT THOUGH EDOCKING, IN ADOITION.t OTHE EQUIPMENT I5 ALSO EQUIED TO POVIDE EDUNDANCY FO CEW SAFETY PUPOSES= THIS IS PIMAILY ASSOCIATED WITH EDUNDANT CAPABILITY FO SAFE ASCENT, DUING THE LUNA STAYP THEE AE OPTIMUM TIMES FO LIFTOFF WHEE THE CSM POSITION IS ALGINED FO EASY ENDEZVOUS= ABOTS DUING LUNA STAY WILL BE DELAYED TO LIFTOFF AT THESE OPTIMUM TIMES9 EXCEPT IN CASES WHEE CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE ASCENT IS JEOPADIZED, 26-2 DEFINITIONS A, OPEATIONAL APS (PE-PESSUIZATION) 1, THIS PE-PESSUIZATION DELTA PESSUE BETWEEN OXID AND FUEL ENGINE INLET PESSUE IS THAT HAXIMUM PESSUE THAT WILL ALLOW ABOT STAT PESSUIZATION AND SAFE ENGINE STAT, THIS DELTA PESSUE IS THE LIMIT OF TESTING AND MUST NOT BE EXCEEDED, DELTA PESSUES.GEATE THAN THIS PODUCE SLOW ENGINE STATS= DUING AN ABOT STAGE SEQUENCE9 WITH A LIGHT UPS STAGEP A SLOW AP5 ENGINE STAT COULD ESULT IN THE TWO STAGES ECONTACTING, 2, DELTA TEMPEATUE GEATE THAN 10 DEG F CAUSES DEGADED PEFOMANCE WHICH ESULTS IF OFF-NOMINAL MIXTUE POPELLANT DEPLETION PIO TO INSETION* THE TEMPEATUE ATIO AND LOWE SPECIFIC IMPULSE WHICH COULD CAUSE LIMITS AE ONLY TO INITIATE A BUN BECAUSE IT IS NOT EASONABLE FO BULK TEMPEATUES TO CHANGE APPECIABLY DUING A BUN-- THEEFOEt ANY SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN TEMPEATUES DUING A BUN WILL BE CONSIDEED A TM FAILUE, 3= ENGINE OPEATION WITH POPELLANT BULK TEMPEATUES OUTSIDE THESE LIMITS ESULTS IN PEFOMANCE'DEGADATION, TEMPEATUES GEATE THAN" 50 DEG F PEVENT POPELLANT LINE AND ENGINE INJECTO TEMPEATUES FOM DECEASING BELOW #0 DEe F WHICH IS THE LIMIT OF TESTING= AT POPELLANT TEMPEATUES BELOW 50 DEG F_ THUST CHAMBE EOSION INCEASES GEATLY AND COULD EsuLT IN CHAMBE BUrN-THOUGH, POPELLANT TEMPEATUES GEATE THAN 90 DEG F ESULT IN PEFOMANCE DEGADATION, 4, IF UPPE ENGINE INLET PESSUE LIMITS AE VIOLATED_ EXTEME COMBUSTION OUGHNESS CAN ESULT, OUGH COMBUSTION GIVES ISE TO SEVEE CHAMBE PESSUE SPIKEB_ HIGH TANSIENT ACCELEATIONSI AND ABNOMAL ENGINE STESSES WHICH COULD ESULT IN ENGINE DAMAGE, POPELLANT TANK PESSUES LESS THAT 62 PSIAt DUING PEIODS OF ACCELEATIONo COULD ESULT IN TANK BUCKLING AND SUBSEQUENT FAILUE, 5. EDUOANT PESSUIZATION PATHS AE EQUIED TO PEVENT A SITUATION WHEE A SUBSEQUENT FAILUE COULD CAUSE AN INABILITY TO PESSUIZE THE APS, ANY HELIUM LEAK MAY ESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO POPELY PESSUIZE THE APS SYSTEM. THIS WOULD EDUCE THE APS PESSUIZATION EUUNDANCY AND GOULD EDUCE THE _PS TOTAL DELTA y _APABIL TY_ MIS$10N EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _4 FNL 2/15/7O LM SYSTEMS LM APS S-SB

242 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 26-2 CONT B* OPEATIONAL APS (POST-PESSUIZATION) 1, SUFFICIENT HELI_UM SOUCE PESSUE, INCLUDING BLOWDOWN CAPABILITYt MUST BE AVAILABLE TO EXPEL ALL THE POPELLANTS TO OBTAIN TME EQUIED DELTA V, 2. APS ENGINE TESTING WITH POPELLANT BULK DELTA TEMPS OF GEATE THAN 60 DEG F FO BUNS OF LESS THAN ZOO SECONDS IS BEYOND THE LIMIT OF TESTING EXPEIENCE, TESTING HAS POVEN THAT BUNS OF GEATE THAN 10O SECONDS with MOE THAN 10 DEG F DELTA TEMPEATUE ESULTS IN SIGNFICANTLY DEGADED PEFOMANCE AND PEMATUE POPELLANT DEPLETION, 9, FO SHOT APS BUNS (OF LESS THAN 100 SECONDS} THE POPELLANT BUL_ TEM WILL NOT CHANGE APPECIABLY, ENGINE OPEATION OUTSIDE THESE TEMPEATUE LIMITS bsults IN OFF-NOMINAL MIXTUE ATIOt SPECIFIC IMPULSEp AND THUST CHAMBE EOSION. THE ENGINE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TESTED FO SHOT DUATION BUNS AT 120 PEG F, BUNS OF GEATE THAN _00 SECONDS WILL PODUCE SIGNZFIOANT EXCUSIONS IN MIXTUE ATIOI SPECIFIC IMPULSE_ AND THUST CHAMBE EOSION. THESE EXCUSIONS COULD ESULT IN POPELLANT DEPLETION PIO TO THE QESIEO TIME O ESULT IN THUST CHAMBE FAILUE* 4, THE MINIMUM INLET PESSUE (ULLAGE PESSUE) INSUES THAT THE TOP EMAINS ABOVE 80 PSIA, PESSUES BELOW THIS LEVEL ESULT IN TCP THAT PODUCES OUGH COMBUSTIONP HIGH TANSIENT ACCELEATIONSI AND ENGINE STESSES, 5, DELTA PESSUE BETWEEN FUEL AND OXIDIZE ENGINE INLET PESSUES CEATE OFF-NOMINAL POPELLANT FLOW ATES, OXIDIZE HIGH FLOW ATES CAUSE HIG_ EOSION ATES AND POSSIBLE pematue CHAMBE BUN-THOUGH, FUEL HIGH FLOW ATES CAUSE OUGH COMBUSTION. IN BOTH CASESt DEGADED PEFOMANCE AND IMPOPE POPELLANT UTILIZATION ESULTSP WHICH COULD CAUSE PEMATUE POPELLANT DEPLETION, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO Z# FNL 12/ZS/?O LM systems LM APS b-59

243 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION B - LM SYSTEMG w h!6-13 MINIMUM IMPULSE THE MINIMUM IMPULSE 1S THE MINIMUM ON TIME THAT PODUCES A EPEATABLE MINIMUM THUST WITHOUT ESULTING IN DETIMENTAL FEEZING OF POPELLANT IN THE INJECTO, BEEZING UF THE POPELLANTS IN THE INJECTO COULD ESULT IN SUBSEQUENT HAD STATS. H_D STATS ESULT IN SEVEE THUST CHAMBE PESSUE SPIKES AND TAmSIENT ACCELEATIONB WHICH COULD CAUSE ENDINE DAMAGE, MULTIPLE BUN POFILES THE POBLEM OF CETIFYING AN APB MULTIPLE BUN PUFILE IS VEY COMPLEX, THE P_IMAY ONTIBUTING FACTOS THAT MUST BE CONSIDEED AE THUST CHAMBE CHAING_ BACKWALL TEMPEATUEt AND popellant FEEZING WITHIN THE INJECTO, THESE FACTOS AE IMPOSED BY ENGINE DESIGN CHAACTEISTICS, DUING A BUNt THE THUST CHAMBE LINE MATEIAL IS CONSUMED BY ABLATION, THE ATE OF ABLATION IS GEATEST DUING A BUN STAT AND DUING LONG BUNS AND IS DEPENDENT UPON PEVIOUS BUNS, EXCESSIVE ABLATION EDUCES THE ENGINE LIFE TO THE POINT THAT CONTINUED ENGINE OPEATION MAY ESULT IN ENGINE FAILUE. HIGH BACKWALL TEMPEATUE IS THE ESULT OF THE ENGINE BUNING A;_D TEMPEATUE TANSFE THOUGH THE CHAMBE WALL, THIS TEMPEATUE IS GEATLY AFFECTED BY PEVIOUS BUNS AND THE COAST TIME BETWEEN BUN8. EXCESSIVE TEMPEATUE ESULTS IN INCEASED ABLATION ATE_ WHICH COULD ESULT IN PEMATUE ENGINE FAILUE. POPELLANT FEEZING WITHIN THE ENGINE INJECTO OCCUS AT THE END OF A BUN, THE POPELLANT TAPPED IN THE INJECTO FEEZES ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AT BHUTDDWN_ THBN SUBLIMATES, THE ATE OF SUBLIMATION i_ DEPENDENT ON INJECTO TEMPEATUBP WHICH IS A FUNCTION OF PEVIOUS BUN POFILE, LACK OF A COMPLETE SUBLIMATION ESULTS IN FOZEN popella,_ts IN THE INJECTOo THESE FOZEN PATICLES MAY CAUSE SUBSkOUENT ENGINE STATS TO BE OUGH AND EATIC, SUCH STATS MAY EXPEIE_CE BEVEE THUBT CHAMBE PESSUE SPIKES AND HIGH TANSIENT ACCELEATIONS WHICH COULD CAUSE ENGINE DAMAGE, IN ODE THAT MAXI_U,_ SAFE APB ENGINE OPEATION CAPABILITIES BE OBTAINED, ONLY PEMISS ON APS MULTIPLE BUN POFILES MUST BE USED, 26-_5 popellant GA()ING THEE IS NO ONBOAD APS POPELLANT GAGINGj BUT THE GOUND HAS TWO METHODS OF MONITOING APS POPELLANTG, THE GOUND MASS CALCULATION METHOO IS PIME BECAUSE IT IS MOE ACCUATE THAN THE FLOW-ATE-TIMES-TIME GOUND POGAM, THE GOUND MASS CALCULATION USES THE LGC MASS TO DECEMENT APS POPELLANT. THE THEE PECENT GOUND MASS CALCULATION EO COMES FOM A ONE PECENT MABS EO AND A TWO PECENT MIXTUE ATIO UNCETAINTY, MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO ik FNL 12115/70 LM SYSTEMS LM AP$ 6-60

244 J NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS " JI_L 26-2O LOSS OF AN OPEATIONAL APS EFEENCE MISSION ule ATIONALE 26-2 FO THE DEFINITION OF AN OPEATIONAL APE= PIO TO O DUING DESCENT, THE LOSS OF AM OPEATIONAL SYSTEM EQUIED AN IMMEDIATE ABOT AND ETUN TO THE CSM, CONTINUATION OF THE DESCENT WITHOUT A GOOD APS SYSTEM WOULD EDULT IN THE INABILITY TO ASCEND FOM THE LUNA SUFACE, IF THE SYSTEM BEGINS TO DEGADE AFTE LANDINGt THE ASCENT MUST BE INITIATED AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY, THIS WILL INSUE MAXIMUM PEFOMANCE FOM THE APG SYSTEM, AP5 HE SOUCE PESSUE A SAFE ASCENT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ON ONE HELIUM BOTTLE BUT A GUBSEGUENT LEAK IN THE SECOND SOUCE BOTTLE MAY PEVENT INSETION, WHENEVE THE MISSION 15 ABOTED FO A LEAK IN ONE HELIUM BOTTLE AND THE ASCENT ENGINE IS EQUIEDt THE FOLLOWING POCEDUE SHOULD BE USED TO MOE EFFICIENTLY OPTIMIZE THE UDE OF THE APS HELIUM--- SELECT AND PESSUIZE THE APS WITH THE GOOD BOTTLE, UTILIZE THE APS WITH THE ONE BOTTLE UNTIL THE SYSTEM GOES IN BLOWDOWN WHICH OCCUS WHEN THE ULLAGE PESSUE EACHES 180 PSIA* THE SECOND BOTTLE (THE LEAKING DOTTLE) SHOULD BE SELECTED AT THIS TIME IF IT CONTAINS SUFFICIENT PESSUE TO AID IN PESSUIZING THE SYSTEM WHICH 15 DEFINED AS HAVING A PEGSUE GEATE THAN T_E PESSUE EMAINING IN THE FIST BOTTLE* THIS POCEDUE IS UTILIZED TO PEVENT EXPOSING THE GOOD HELIUM TANK TO THE LEAKING TANK UNTIL ALL APPECIABLE HELIUM ID USED OUT OF THE GOOD HELIUM TANK, THE SECOND (LEAKING) BOTTLE SHOULD BE USED IF ANY HELIUM IS EMAINING* TO KEEP THE OPEATION AS CLOSE TO NOMINAL AS POBSIBLE SINCE ONLY LIMITED TESTING HAS BEEN DONE IN ONE BOTTLE BLOWDOWN, AFTE PESSUIZATION* THE HELIUM TANKS AE MANIFOLDED TOGETHE AND A LEAK IN EITHE TANK JEOPADIZES SAFE ASCENT, BECAUSE OF THIS_ ASCENT MUST BE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY, WHENEVE THE APS CAPABILITY HAS BEEN EDUCED BY LOSS OF HELIUM PESSUIZATION_ THE ADO FEEL VALVES MUBT NOT BE OPENED, THIS IS TO POVIDE ADDITIONAL APE POPELLANT NOMALLY used BY THE CS TO INCEABE THE INDETION DELTA V CAPABILITY, THE APD USED THIS ADDITIONAL POPELLANT MOE EFFICIENTLY THAN THE CS TO POVIDE ADDITIONAL DELTA V CAPABILITY, 2B-22 APS HE BETWEEN QUAD CHECK VALVEG AND ACS HE EG Z AND 2 SHUTOFF VALVES A LEAK IN THIS PAT OF THE PLUMBING COULD PEVENT FULL APS DELTA V CAPABILITY IF THE LEAK ATE IS SUFFICIENT TO PEVENT COMPLETE EXPULSION OF THE POPELLANTS, PIO TO POWEED DESCENT* THE MISSION SHOULD BE ABOTED SO THAT CEW SAFETY IS NOT JEOPADIZED, ONCE POWEED DESCENT HAS BEEN INITIATED* THE BAFEST APPOACH IS TO ADOT ON THE DPS AD LONG AG PODBIBLE, DHOULO THIS FAILUE OCCU ON THE LUNA SUFACE_ A GUBSSQUENT FAILUE COULD PEVENT A SAFE INSETION, ASCENT DHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY. DUING BNDEZVOUSt THE APD HAD SUFFICIENT BLOWDOWN CAPABILITY TO CONTINUE THE MISSION, WHENEVE THIS FAILUE OCCUD_ THE APS HELIUM SHOULD BE OPTIMIZED TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF THE LEAK, THE APE HELIUM OPTIMIZATION POCEDUE IS FOUND IN THE AOH VOL If, THID POCEDUE UTILIZES THE FACT THAT HELIUM IG CONTINUOUSLY LODT ONLY WHILE THE LEAK IS BEING DUPPLIED WITH HELIUM* BY MINIMIZING THE TIME THE LEAK IS BEING SUPPLIED, THE AMOUNT OF HELIUM LOST CAN BE MINIMIZED. THIS IS ACHIEVED BY CYCLING THE EGULATOS SBUT-OFEIVAWyESTO PUT THEAP5 IN PEIODS OF B_OW_ DOWN OPEATION, NO HBLiU_ IS LOST DUING T_ESE _LOWOOWN heio_s BECAbsE THE PB"PELLAN? _AN_2 AE ISOLATED BY QUAD CHECK VALVES, WHENEVE THE APS CAPABILITY HAD BEEN EDUCED BY LOSD OF HELIUM PEDDUIZATION_ THE ASC FEED VALVES MUST NOT BE OPENED= THIS IS TO POVIDE ADDITIONAL APS POPELLANT NOMALLY USED BY THE k_$ TO INCEABE THE INSETION DELTA V CAPABILITY, THE APS USES THIS ADDITIONAL POPELLANT MOE EFFICIENTLY THAN THE CS TO POVIDE AODITIONAL DELTA V CAPABILITY, MISBION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS i LM APD 6-61

245 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION B - LM SYSTEMS POPELLANT LEAKS ANY LOSS OF popellant EDUCES THE TOTAL DELTA V CAPABILITY OF THE APS-- THEEFOE, WHEN A LEAK EXISTSt THE MISSION SHOULD BE ABOTED IMMEDIATELY, PIO TO CICP THE LM MUST ETUN TO THE CSM, DUING THE DESCENT PHASE_ THE DP5 SHOULD BE USED FO AN IMMEDIATE ABOT AND SHOULD BE USEU AS LONG AS POSSIBLE (BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE LOSS OF APS DELTA V CAPABILITY), DUING LUNA STAY, AN ASCENT 5HOULD BE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE A popellant LEAK DECEASES DELTA V CAPABILITY AND ENDANGES SAFE ASCENT. THE ABC FEED VALVES MUBT NOT BE OPENED. THIS POVIDES ADDITIONAL APS POPELLANTt NOMALLY used BY THE CBt TO INCEASE THE INSETION DELTA V CAPABILITY. DUING ENDEZVOUSt THE APS SHOULD NOT BE USED FO TPI BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE POPELLANT EMAINING APS POP VALVE MISMATCH THEE AE TWO SETS OF POPELLANT SHUTOFF VALVESt A AND B, IN A PAALLEL SEIES AANGEMENT, THIS INSUES THE CAPABILITY TO SHUT OFF POPELLANT TO THE ENGINE, AN INDICATION OF A MISMATCH DUING COAST PIO TO THE FIST APS BUN WOULD BE CONSIDEED AS A TM FAILUE DUE TO THE MECHANICAL LINKAGE AND HIGH ELIABILITY OF THE ACTUATO SYSTEM. A MISMATCH AT THE END OF AN APS BUN WOULD BE AN INDICATION OF AN ACTUAL FAILUE OF PAALLEL PAI OF VALVES TO CLOSE. THE ENGINE SHOULD NOT BE ESTATED IN THIS SITUATION SINCE FAILUE OF THE EMAINING PAI TO CLOSE WOULD ESULT IN FAILUE TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGINE* APS FU AND/O OXID LOW LEVEL A VALID LOW LEVEL INDICATES THAT APPOXIMATELY B SECONDS OF BUN TIME EMAINS WITH THE AP5 ENGINE, ASCENT FEED OPEATION SHOULDP THEEFOEt BE TEMINATED DUING ASCENT BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE HELIUM INGESTION INTO THE CS JETSt WHICH COULD CAUSE JET FAILUE= IF A VALID APS LOW LEVEL CONFIMS INSUFFICIENT POPELLANT FO AN APB TPIt CS SHOULD BE USED FO TPI, IT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO KNOWINGLY STAT AN AP5 TPI BUN WHICH WILL BUN TO DEPLETION. MI_ ION Ev DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO IA FNL 12/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM APS 6-62

246 NASA - Manned Spacecraft MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS Center I _ i w LM EACTION CONTOL THE FOLLOWING LM CS MISSION ULES ATIONALE ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE BACKGOUND BEHIND EACH MIGSION ULED SINCE THE FIST ULE IN EACH _ECTION I5 A EPETITION OF THE _M CONTOL GO/NO-GOt5 IN SECTION _ (EF PAGE 3-23)t THE ATIONALE BELOW ALSO COVE THE GO/NO-GO ts* IN GENEAL THE OVEALL PHILOSOPHY IS TO IDENTIFY THE EOUIPMENT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO COMPLETE THE NOMAL LUNA MISSION AND AT EACH PHASE SPECIFY THAT EQUIPMENT EUUIED FOM THAT POINT THOUGH EOOCKING, IN ADDITIONt OTHE EQUIPMENT IS ALSO EUUIED TO POVIDE EDUNDANCY FO CEW SAFETY PUPOSES_ THIS IS PIMAILY ASSOCIATED WITH EDUNDANT CAPABILITY FO ASCENT= DUING THE _NO OF THE POWE DESCENT PHASE AT SOME PEIOD JUST PIO TO TOUCHDOWN_ IT BECOMES MOE DANGEOUS TO ABOT THAN TO LAND_ AND THEN DO A NOMINAL LIFTOFF, THIS IS BECAUSE THE NOMINAL LIFTOFF IS MOE THOOUGHLY EXECISED DUING PEMISSION SIMULATIONS AND INVOLVES LESS UNKNOWNS BOTH FOM A STANDPOINT OF SOFTWAE CHECKOUT AND CEW POCEDUES* DUING THE LUNA 5TAYt THEE AE OPTIMUM TIMES FO LIFTOFF WHEE THE CSM POSITION IS ALIGNED FO EASY ENDEZVOUS* ABOTS DUING LUNA STAY W1LL BE DELAYED TO LIFTOFF AT THESE OPTIMUM TIMES EXCEPT IN CASES WHEE CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE ASCENT IS JEOPADIZED= 27-2 DEFINITIONS A* OPEATIONAL CS SYSTEM 1= THIS DEFINITION DEFINES THE PLUMBING OF AN OB SYSTEM FO USE AS A MISSION ULE EFEENCE* 2, IF ENGINE INLET LOWE PESSUE LIMITS AE VIOLATEU= EXTEME COMBUSTION OUGHNESS AND MIXTUE ATIO SHIFTS CAN ESULT. OUGH COMBUSTION GIVES ISE TO SEVEE CHAMBE PESSUE SPIKES_ HIGH TANSIENT ACCELEATIONS, AND ABNOMAL ENGINE STESSES WHICH COULD CAUSE ENGINE DAMAGE. MIXTUE ATIO SHIFTS ESULT IN IMPOPE POPELLANT UTILIZATION, _, ENGINE PEFOMANCE OUTSIDE POPELLANT TEMPEATUE LIMITS SPECIFIED IS UNKNOWN DUE TO LIMITS OF TESTING, #. PULSE FIING OF THE CS JETS WITHOUT POPELY HEATING UP OF THE CS QUADS CAN ESULT IN POPELLANT FEEZING WHICH CAN CAUSE A THUSTE FAILUE* ONCE HEATED UPP IF THE _UAD TEMPEATUE DOPS BELOW ITS PESCIBED LIMIT A ESIDUE CAN FOM ISIDE THE THUSTE= IF THE CS JET IS THEN FIED AT A PATICULA DUTY CYCLE WITH THIS ESIDUE PESENT THEN DETONATION OF THE ESIDUE CAN OCCU. MISSION EVlDATE SECTION GOUP PA_E APOLLO I FNL 12/19/70 LM SYSTEMS LM C$ 6-6_

247 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 27-I1 USABLE C$ POPELLANT I5 548,9 LBS O 86*7 PECENT OF TOTAL LOADED USABLE CS POPELLANT IS DEFINED AS THAT POPELLANT WHICH CAN BE GUAANTEED TO PODUCE IMPULSE, THIS USABLE NUMBE IS OBTAINEO BY SUBTACTING TAPPED POP_LLANTt LEADING EOt AND POGAM EO FOM TOTAL CS POPELLANT LOADED, TAPPED POPELLANT AND LOADING EO AE FOUND IN THE SODBo AND POGAM EO IS BASED ON THE CS GOUND PV POGAM WHICH HAS AN ACCUACY OF b PECENT OF TOTAL LOADED* POPELLANT GAGING THE PIME GAGING METHOD FO THE CS SYSTEM IS THE GOUND CS POGAM WHICH HAS AN ACCUACY OF b PECENT, THE BACKUP METHOD IS THE GOUND EADOUT OF THE PQMD WITH AN ACCUACY OF 10 PECENT, BOTH POGAMS AE SIMILAo BUT THE CS GOUND POGAM TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SUCH ADDITIONAL PAAMETES AS OFF-NOMINAL HELIUM O POPELLANT LOADING AND MIXTUE ATIO CHANGES WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE POND TO BE IN EO. MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO Z4 FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM CS 6-6_

248 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center Id SSIOE ULIS SECTION 6 - LM SYSTEMS 27-2C LOSS OF CS SYSTEM A O B DUING ALL PHASES OF THE MISSION BOTH CS SYSTEMS A AND B AE EQUIED TO POVIDE ATTITUDE CONTOL AND TANSLATION ABILITY* IF ONE SYSTEM IS LOST THEN EDUNDANCY IS LOSTt AND ANY OF A MULTITUDE OF SYSTEM FAILUES CAN ESULT IN THE LOSE OF THE OTHE SYSTEM= FAILUE OF BOTH SYSTEMS WILL ESULT IN THE TOTAL LOSS OF ATTITUDE CONTOL AND TANSLATION CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD BE CATASTOPHIC TO THE SPACECAFT, IF THE POBLEM DEVELOPS ON THE LUNA SUFACED ASCENT $HOULD COME AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY IN ODE TO GUAANTEE A SAFE ENDEZVOUS, CS THUSTE PAI IN ODE TO HAVE AN CS THUSTE PAI ISOLATED A POPELLANT LEAK DOWNSTEAM OF THE TCA ISOLATION VALVES MUST HAVE OCCUED* FAILED-ON JETS AND FAILED-OFF JETS AE ISOLATED ELECTICALLY AND WOULD NOT EQUIE ISOLATING A PAI VIA A TCA ISOLATION VALVE= ONCE POWEED DESCENT IS INITIATED THE HISEIDN WILL CONTINUE EVEN IF A THUSTE PAI I5 ISOLATED= AFTE ONE PAI HAS BEEN ISOLATEDt THE POBABILITY OF A SUBSEQUENT POPELLANT LEAK DOWNSTEAM OF ANOTHE TCA ISOLATION VALVE IS VEY EMOTE, AND THE POBABILITY OF A SUBSEQUENT PATICULA FAILUE WHICH CAUSES LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTOL IS EXTEMELY EMOTE, IN ADDITION_ THE POBABILITY OF THE SUESEUUENT FAILUE 1S LESS THAN THE ISK OF ABOTING DUING POWEED DESCENT* LUNA STAY CAN BE PEMITTED FO THE SAME ATIONALE USED DUING POWEED DESCENT= DECEASINS O LOSS OF CS HE PESSUE WHENEVE THEE 1S A LOSS OF HELIUM SOUCE PESSUE THEE EXISTS SOME CAPABILITY TO USE THAT SYSTEM IN A BLOWDOWN MODE, IN ODE TO MAINTAIN AN OPEATIONAL CS SYSTEM (M 27-2) WITH A LEAKING SOUCE PESSUE_ THE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL A GIVEN WEIGHT OF POPELLANT FOM THE LEAKING SYETEM MUST EXIST= PIO TO POWEED DESCENT THE CAPABILITY IS TOO SMALL TO POVIDE EDUNDANT SYSTEM FO THE 'TOTAL MISSION, ONCE POWEED DESCENT IS INITIATEDP THE CAPABILITY MAY _ MAY NOT EXIST DEPENDING ON THE TIME INTO POWEED DESCENT WHEN THE LEAK OCCUS, IF POJECTION AHEAD EVEALS THAT THIS CAPABILITY CAN NOT BE GAINED PIO TO TOTAL SOUCE PESSUE LOSS O TOUCHDOWN THEN AN ABOT WILL BE EQUESTED* HOWEVE_ AFTE HIGH GATE LANDING IS EMINENT AND THE CEW POCEDUES SO TIGHT THAT TOUBLESHOOTING A LEAK IS IMPOSSIBLE O IMPMACTICALt AND A LANDING WILL BE ATTEMPTED= IF THE LANDING IS ACCOMPLISHEDt BUT THE PESCIBED BLOWDOWN 'CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXISTt THEN TWO OPEATIONAL CS SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE WHICH VIOLATES M AND EQUIES ASCENT AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY= CS POPELLANT LEAK BETWEEN MAINS AND ISOLATION VALVES POPELLANT LEAKS AE NOT HAZADOUS TO THE CEW-- HOWEVEP A POPELLANT LEAK CAN ESULT IN THE COMPLETE LOSS OF AN CS POPELLANT SYSTEM, SHOULD A POPELLANT LEAK BETWEEN THE MAINS AND ISOLATION VALVES DEVELOP PIO TO HIGH GATEt AN ABOT WILL BE EQUESTED* THE ABOT IS EQUESTED BECAusE THE LEAKING SYSTEM CANNOT BE COUNTED ON FO POPELLANT ESULT NG IN ITS LOSS AS A_ OPEATIONAL CS SYSTEM= THIS VIOLATES M WHICH EQUIES AN ABOT AT ANY TIME DUING POWEED DESCENT* HOWEVE AFTE HIGH GATE_ LANDING IS EMINENT AND THE CEW POCEDUES SO TIGHT THAT TOUBLE SHOOTING A LEAK IS IMPOSSIBLE O IMPACTICAL-- THEEFOEI A LANDING WILL BE ATTEMPTED= IF THE LANDING IS ACCOMPLISHED_ THE LEAK WILL STILL CAUSE LOSS OF AN OPEATIONAL SYSTEM AND EDUNDANCY WHICH violates M 27_20 AND EQUIES ASCENT AT THE NEXT BEST OPPOTUNITY* DUING ENDEZVOUS PHASES THE FUNCTIONING CS SYSTEM SHOULD BE USED AS LONG AS THE CS POPELLANT EDLINE IS NOT VIOLATED= 27-2_ IMPINGEMENT CONSTAINTS VIOLATED IMPINGEMENT CONETAINTS AS DEFINED IN VOLUME IT OF THE SODS SHOULD NEVE BE VIOLATED= IF THEY AE ExCEEDEDt THEN FUTHE OPEATION WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO VIOLATE THESE CONSTAINTS MUST BE INHIBITED, IF NOT INHIBITED_ THE PLUME DEFLECTO_CAN FACTUE INTO TWO PATS AT THE' POINT OF MAXIMUM HEATING (APPOXIMATELY TEN INCHES FOM THE TOP OF THE DEFLECTO}= THE CAN THEN DAMAGE THE SPACECAFT BY EITHE PUNCTUING O DESTOYING ASCENT STAGE PANELS AND INSULATION, THE NET EFFECT OF IMPINGEMENT CONSTAINT VIOLATION IS THEN TO ABOT THE MISSION PIO TO TOUCHDOWN, THE POCEDUE WILL BE TO ABOT AND THEN ABOT STAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IF LANDING DID OCCU EVEN THOUGH IMPINGEMENT CONSTAINTS WEEVIOLATEDp NOTHING CAN BE DONE TO COECT THE POBLEM AND INSETION COULD COME AT THE NOMINAL TIME= DUING ENDEZVOUS IF IMPINGEMENT CONTAINTS AE VIOLATED THEN./-X CS BUNS AE POHIBITED TO POTECT THE ASCENT STAGE* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE LAPOLLOZ_ FNL L2/15/70 LM SYSTEMS LM C$ 6-6S

249 7 SPACE ENVIONMENT

250 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSlOII ULES SECTION 7 - SPACE ENVIONMENT ITEI_.n I _ NO ATIONALE EQUIED Z8"2 NO ATIONALE EQUIED Z8-3 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 28-4 NO ATIONALE EQUIED 28-1C THE DATA SOUCES THAT WILL BE USED CONSIST OF THE LIMA IOMETE SITED NASA HEADQUATES SOUCES= AND APOLLO S/Co THE NASA HEADQUATES SOUCES EPESENT THE BEST EAL-TIMEP PELAUNCH SOUCE OF DATA ON THE ESULTS OF A HIGH ALTITUDE NUCLEA DETONATIONo THE DATA IS A ESULT OF A COMPILATION OF VAIOUS SOUCES WITHIN THE DEPATMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE STATE DEPATMENT MADE BY THE JOINT ATOMIC ENEGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND ELAYED THOUGH SPECIAL DATA CHANNELSt SET UP FO THAT PUPOSEt TO THE MISSION DIECTO_ AND THE SPACE ENVIONMENT CONSOLED BECAUSE OF THE NATUE OF THE ADIATION POBLEM IN THIS AEA AND THE UNKNOWNS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INDIECT MONITOING THAT IS AVAILABLEt NO DECISION SHOULD BE MADE UNTIL ALL AVAILABLE DATA HAS BEEN ANALYZED AND THEE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE ESULTANT ADIATION WILL CONSTITUTE A HAZAD TO THE PLIGHT CEW* 28-1: DEFINITE EVENT 15 DEFINED AS A NUCLEA DETONATION AT SUCH AN ALTITUDE AND LOCATION AND OF SUCH A GIZE TO PODUCE AN ENHANCEMENT OF THE APOLLO ADIATION ENVIONMENT* NASA HEADQUATES SOUCES WILL POVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFOMATION--- l* NOTIFICATION OF AN EVENT WHICH SHOULD COMPLIMENT THE IOMETE DATA* 2* TIME OF EVENT TO WHICH DECAY ATES CAN BE APPLIED* 3* ALTITUOEt LATITUDEt LQNGITUOE_ AND SIZE FOM WHICH THE DISTIBUTION AND EXTENT OF THE ELECTON CLOUD CAN BE DETEMINED* IF A DEFINITE EVENT IS CONFIMED THEN THE COUNTDOWN WILL BE HELD UNTIL THE APPLICATION OF ALL AVAILABLE INFOMATION INDICATES THAT THE ADIATION WILL NOT EXCEED THE MISSION OPEATIONAL DOSEi (A TOTAL SKIN DOSE OF 400 ADS AND/O A TOTAL DEPTH DOSE OF 50 ADS TO ANY MEMBE OF THE FLIGHT CEWo) ; IFt DUING THIS PHASEP A DEFINITE EVENT OCCUS AND THE TOTAL DOSE POJECTED THOUGH THE MISSION B*l DUATION INDICATE5 THE DOSE WILL EXCEED THE MOOt TLI WILL STILL BE GO, A NO-GO FO TLI WILL NOT BE GIVEN IN THIS PHASE UNLESS THE ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE TOTAL MISSION DOSE WILL EXCEED THE HOD BY A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTt THE EXTENT ALLOWED WILL BE DETEMINED IN EAL-TIME= AFTE A SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH AND EATH OBIT INSETION WE AE WILLING TO ISK HIGHE DOSE ATE TO TY FO A LUNA TYPE MISSION* SELF-EXPLANATOY B C WHEN A DEFINITE EVENT HAS OCCUED AND THE SIC IS ABOVE THE VAN ALLEN BELT5_ WE WILL CONTINUE THE MISSION BECAUSE THE FLIGHT CEW WILL NOT BE EXPOSED TO ADIATION FOM SUCH AN EVENT* MISSION EV DATE GECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL i12/15/7 SPACE SPECIFIC I ENVIONMENT" 7-I

251 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION 7 - SPACE ENVIONMENT ITE_ 28-1; THE MOO IS THE CUT OFF POINT WHEE THE VALUE OF THE MISSION IS INSUFF;CIENT TO EXPOSE FLIGHT CEW MEMBES TO ADDITIONAL ADZATIONo NOTE--- TOTAL MISSION SKIN DOSE 400 ADS AND/O TOTAL MISSION DEPTH DOSE 5 ON) 50 ADS TO ANY CEW MEMBE PIO TO SCHEDULED END OF MISSION* 28-Z_ SOLA FLAE ACTIVITY CANNOT BE PEDICTED WITH ANY DEGEE OF ELIABILITY, PEDICTION6 THAT AE MADE AE GENEALLY EXPESSED AS A PECENT OF POBABILITY AND CANNOT BE ELATED TO A ESULTANT DOSE WITHOUT MAKING A NUMBE OF ASSUMPTIONSo THE MAJOITY OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS COULD BE UNFOUNDED IN THE ACTUAL SITUATION THUS IT IS NECESSAY TO TAKE A WAIT AND Sd_IE WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ATTITUDE* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/70 SPACE SPECIFIC ENVIONMENT 7-2

252 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION MULES SECTION? - SPACE ENVIONMENT 28"14 A MAJO SOLA FLAE WILL PODUCE HAMFUL ADIATION TO THE CEW ONLY BY MEANS OF THE PATICLES EMITTED WITH THE FLAE* NOT ALL FLAES WILL EMIT THE HIGH ENEGY PATICLES NECE_T_SAY TO CAUSE THE ADIATION HAZAD* IF THEE AE NO PATICLES THEE WILL BE NO ADIATION DOSE ECEIVED BY THE CEW* THE TIME DELAY BETWEEN OBSEVING O DETECTING THE FLAE AND DETECTING THE PATICLESt IF ANYt CAN VAY FOM MINUTES TO HOUSI THE LONGE IT TAKES TO DETECT PATICLESt WHEN THEY AE PEBENT_ THE LESS INTENSE WILL BE THE ADIATION DOSEe THEE IS NO BASIS FO TAKING ANY ACTION OTHE THAN CONTINUING WITH THE NOMINAL MISSION UNLESS THEE I6 DEFINITE CONFIMATION OF PATICLES IN THE VICINITY OF THE SPACECAFT* ESTIMATES OF THE ADIATION DOSE WILL BE MADE ASSUMING THAT THEE WILL BE PATICLES* BUT UNTIL THE PATICLES AE ACTUALLY MEASUED THIS ESTIMATE IS INVALID* IF ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA INDICATES THAT THE HOD (400 AD$ SKIN DOSE AND/O BO ADS BeX DEPTH DOSE) WILL BE EXCEEDED PIO TO MISSION COMPLETION THEN THE COUNTDOWNSHOULD BE HELD AT SOME CONVENIENT POINT UNTIL FOLLOWON ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE ESULTANT ADIATION DOSE WILL HAVE DOPPEDTO,WITHIN ACCEPTABLELIMITS* 28-1_ IF* DUING THIS PHASEP A CONFIMED PATICLE EVENT IS ANALYZED AND THE TOTAL DOSE POJECTED B*2 THOUGH THE MISSION DUATION INDICATED THE DOSE WILL EXCEED THE MODt TLI WILL STILL BE GO* A NO-GO FO TLI WILL NOT BE GIVEN IN THIS PHASE UNLESS THE ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE TOTAL MISSION DOSE WILL EXCEED THE HOD BY A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT--- THE EXTENT ALLOWED WILL BE DETEMINED IN EAL-TIME* AFTE A SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH AND EATH OBIT INSETION WE AE WILLING TO ISK A HIGHE DOSE ATE TO TY FO A LUNA TYPE MISSIONe 2B'14 AFTE A GOOD TLI THE CEW WILL BE MOE O LESS COMMITTED TO A CETAIN AMOUNT OF ADIATION THAT B,_ WILL ESULT IF _ SOLA PATICLE EVENT OCCUS* THEE AE ONLY A FEW CASES WHEE A SITUATION COULD DEVELOP THAT IS TIME CITICAL TO THE EXTENT THAT A DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE BASED ON POJECTIONS FOM DATA NOT DIECTLY MEASUED BY THE CSM INSTUMENTATIONe THESE CASES AE WHEE THE CEW IS PEPAING TO TANSFE INTO THE LMo O JUST PIO TO TEI, DUING THESE SITUATIONS IT MAY BE DESIABLE TO INHIBIT O DELAY THESE ACTIVITIES UNTIL A BETTE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENVIONMENT IS OBTAINED BY ONBOAD MONITOS* 28-_Z UNbE_ THIS _ITU_TIO_ THE _EWwiLLBE SUB_E_T TO DOSES THAT WILL EXCEED THE HOD SHOULD THE CZ-4 NOMINAL MISSION pofile BE CONTINUED, THEE MAY BE WAYSTO EDUCE THE TOTAL ADIATION ECEIVED BY ADJUSTMENTS IN THE MISSION TIMELINE, THEE SHOULD* HOWEVE_BE NO DECISIONS MADE EGADING CHANGING THE MISSION POFILE UNLESS THE ESULTS WOULDHAKE A SIGNIFICANT EDUCTION IN THE DOSE TO THE CEW* THE ACTION THAT CAN BE TAKEN WILL BE GOVENEDBY THE PHASE OF THE MISSION AND THE EXTENT OF DOSE EDUCTION WILL HAVE TO BE DETEMINED BASED ON OCCUINGADIATIONs THE MISSION ULES EFLECT POSSIBLE ALTENATIVES THAT HAY BE AVAILABLE DUING THE MISSION= DECISIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE EOUIEHENTS WILL HAVE TO BE BASED ON THE ACTUAL SITUATION OCCUING* MISSION EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO _4 FNL L2/15/70 SPACE SPECIFIC :NVIONMENT 7-3

253 1! ECOVEY 8 LANDING AND I

254 J NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES SECTION S- LANDING ANDECOVEY ITEH 29-1 THEE 15 THE POSSIBILITY O A SPACECAFT LAND LANDING IN THE LAUNCH SITE AEA* THE POSSIBILITY OF CEW INJUY FOLLOWING A LAND LANDING IS SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO MAKE IT MANDATOY TO BE ABLE TO EFFECT THEI ECOVEY WITHOUT A DELAY CAUSED BY WEATHE THESE AEAS CONTAIN ALL THE LANDING POINTS THAT WOULDFOLLOW ABOTS INITIATED PIO TO EALY S-IVB STAGING CAPABILITY DUING THE LAUNCH PHASEt AND THE LANDING POINTS THAT WOULD FOLLOW DEOBITS FOM EATH PAKING OBIT INTO EITHE THE WEST ATLANTIC O MID-PACIFIC ECOVEY ZONES DUING THE FIST FOU EVOLUTIONS EGADLESSOF LAUNCHAZIHUTH* 29-3 FOTY HOUS IS THE NECEGSAYTIME EQUIED TO LOCATE THE CM AFTE A LANDING ANYWHEE IN THE WOLDBETWEEN_0 DEQ, NOTH AND 40 DEG, SOUTH LATITUDE, E9-4 EIGHTEEN HOUS IS THE NECESSAYTIHE EQUIED TO LOCATE THE CM AFTE ANY LANDING TAGETED TO A PTP O THE MPL, 29-5 IT IS HIGHLY DESIABLE BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLEMENT WEATHE CONDITIONS IN THE PLANNED END OF MISSION ECOVEY AEA, THIS CAPABILITY WILL INSUE THAT THE TAGET POINT CAN BE MOVED TO AN AEA WITH ACCEPTABLE WEATHE CONDITIONS UNTIL ENTY -24 HOUS* AFTE THIS TIME TAGET POINT ELOCATION WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY CHANGING THE ENTY ANGED 29-6 THESE ELLIPSE CONTAIN THE HIGH POBABILITY LANDING POINTS FO A DEOBIT FOH EATH PAKING OBIT FLYING A GUIDED O A HALF LIFT ENTY, THE POBABILITY OF ACTUALLY LANDING IN ONE OF THESE ELLIPSES IS SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO HAKE IT MANDATOY THAT THEE BE NO LAND MASSES IN THE AEA, 29.7 THESE ELLIPSES CONTAIN THE LANDING POINTS FO THE GACKUPMODES OF ENTY, THE POBABILITY OF ''i ACTUALLY;LAN_IN N ONE O HE_E _LL PSE $"_UFFI_ENT_YhH_GH T A_E _T MANDATOY'-THA_ +*THEE BE NO LAND MASSES IN THE AEA, 29-8 THESE ELLIPSES CONTAIN THE HIGH pobability LANDING POINTS FO THE PIMAY AND FIST BACKUP MODES OF HIGH SPEED ENTY+ THE POBABILITY OF A LANDING WITHIN EITHE OF THESE ELLIPSES IS SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO MAKE IT MANDATOY THAT THEE BE NO LAND IN THE AEA, 29-9 THE POBABILITY OF ACTUALLY LANDING IN THESE AEAS IS SUFFICIENTLY HIGH THAT IT IS HIGHLY DESIABLE TO HAVE THEM CLEA OF ALL LAGE LAND MASSESo MISSION. EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL _E/1_/7 LANDING AND SPECIFIC ECOVEY 8-_

255 1!

256 NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center ulsslom mults SECTION 9 - AEOMEDICAL i AEOMEDICAL MISSION ULE ATIONALE NOT SUBMITTED HISSZON. EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO 1_ FNL AEOMEDICAL 9-1

257 ! 1" SUFACE 10 LUNA I

258 r NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center utsstol ",ULES SECTION 10" LUNA 6UFACE LUNA SUFACE MZSSION ULE ATIONALE NOT SUBMITTED MISSION EV DATE SECTXON GOUP PAGE APOLLO 14 FNL 12/15/TO LUNA SUFACE lo-1

259 I PPENDIX A DISTIBUTION LIST

260 NASA - Manned Spacecraft (:enter msslom ULES APPENDIX A - DI6TIBUTION LIST DIFECTO O_EATIONS FA, BJOBE Gt S. A. OSE_. G. FL: GHT C{ FC, KANZ E, F. (5) OACH J* W* FL GHT C(, P A FC; /HAL_,NI. Se (11) _1 SYSTINS BANCH FC: /ALD CH_ A, D* (18) _M SYSTEJI_ BANCH FC,'/HANN GAN_ J. E* (25) EDEL N_ F* (4) E._ GHT D 'NAMICB BANCHH FC,/BOST CK_ J, C, (20) 'HO0_I.A. (8) E SO'_N_ A_DTEG_B_OLOGY BBANOH FOlrB]_LT_ Y, O. B. (2) FC_/SAUL'Zp J, E, (5) c FLI PM MO-F/IAMNEI * S, 12) GHT SJPP-._O.EG.--PJ-_L_ F5 DUNSE[THo I., C$ FLGHTS_ FS /STOK S, J. D, t2) _ SZON NALYS FN MAYE J* P. HUBS, C. TINDA L_ H, W, E.LGHTA F_ /ALLE,_ C, C, (2} H PH'Y FlY /MCPF SON_ J, C* PII 51ON F_ /BE _, B.E DEZVC 5 AN I BAN H Ffv,/LINE ;EY_ E, C, MISSION _EV DATE SECTION GOUP PAGE APOLLO i_ :NL 2/15170 APPENDIX A DICT. LIST A-I

261 ( NASA - Manned Spacecraft Center MISSION ULES APPENDIX A - DISTIBUTION LIST GU DANCE & PE OMANCE AN H FM /EASS_TIo Me De A9 LLO T AJ_T Y UPPOT OFF _ FM 3/PA EN_, _A DING ND ECOVEY DIVISION FL HAMMA:K_ J, Be AS ONA_ OFFICE CB STAFF Dt Te P, {T) FL GHT C PP T DIV ION CF /WA Nt De K* OgNE L&P J* W. (2) CF 2A/P. KAME DI ECTO OF M ICAL ESEACH,NO OF ATIO_L_. DA ZIEGL,CHMIDt J, F,t Me De _F _LLO 'ACECAFT POGAM OFFIC_ PA 2/MCC VITT* JJ A, KLE NKNECHTt K* Co MOF :ISt 0, $1F.INSONP S. PC KUBI( It ole PC 2/ MI,SION STAFF ENGINEE (2) PC /KOH.t i H, PC IG_L_,_ H. t5} PE COCC IANt DeN, 13) PF COHE6 A, DI IECTOF OF ENGI EVELC 'MENIT E_ 'FAGEI M, A, (4) E[,/DEA_ it P, Me J( IN f.,ennedy SPACE CENTE NAGA-M@OB uc 'KAP_,N, W, J, &{,OPN/[ )NNELLYt Pe LC 'PLN-; 'KNIGHTe Ge We P /MO e Ao E, QF rice " N D SP CE FLI T N{ _TH AF " L N Y FO NI PC 'TS_. AB7O B( ilng DATA MANAGEMENT HI HA-( 1_) FL GHT _FETY BANCH SF 'LIND_!Y_ MISSION EV DATE SECTION 8OUP PAGE APOLLO Z4 FNL il2/15/70 IAPPENDI'X A DISTe LIST A-2

262 APOLLO FMD FLIGHT MISSION ULE ATIONALE DOCUMENT APOLLO 14 (AS-509 /110 / LM.8) DECEMBE 15, 1970 r_ FCD MSC NASA