PSM/RMP WEBINAR SERIES
|
|
- Anis Coleen Matthews
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 PSM/RMP WEBINAR SERIES Webinar Starts at 08:00 PT Please call (877) if you are having technical issues. The background music may be used to adjust your audio volume.
2 INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN Sara Willman & Jasmin Dhaliwal Risk Management Professionals, Inc. (949) (877)
3 RISK MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS Key Services Process Safety & Risk Management Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) What-If? Studies Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) Studies Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Safeguard Protection Analysis (SPA) Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment & Verification Process Safety Management (PSM) Risk Management Program (RMP) California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program Nevada Chemical Accident Prevention Program (CAPP) Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) Inherently Safer Technology (IST), Hierarchy of Hazard Control Analysis (HCA), Safer Technology & Alternatives Analysis (STAA) Safety & Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) Damage Mechanism Review (DMR) Safety Case Key Services (cont.) ERP Development & Emergency Preparedness Training (NIMS-Compatible) Risk-Graph and Bow-tie Analysis QRA Services FTA & ETA Background Services to Process Industries, Utilities, & Government Since 1995 International w/us Focus Qualifications Extensive Experience Two Decades of Risk-Based Applications Engineering, Safety, Security, and Emergency Response Backgrounds Locations HQ: Irvine, CA Houston Norfolk Walnut Creek Contact U.S. (877)
4 SUMMARY Overview Intensification Substitution Moderation Simplification Examples of Inherently Safer Design implementation Incorporating Inherently Safer Design into HAZOP studies
5 INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN Avoid hazards instead of controlling them Low level of danger even if something goes wrong
6 INTENSIFICATION Minimization Decrease inventory of hazardous substances Benefits Reduce number of process operations Fewer startups/shutdowns Containment of explosion overpressures Downsides High pressures and temperatures Increase process complexity
7 INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLES Storage Use hazardous chemicals as soon as they are produced or delivered Store fewer vessels as full as possible, instead of storing many partially filled vessels
8 INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLES Distillation Prioritize low inventory Combine multiple columns into one Utilize other methods of separation Reduce residence times
9 SUBSTITUTION Use safer materials in place of hazardous ones Safer nonreactive agents Materials that require lower temperatures and pressures Safer refrigerants or heat transfer fluids Downsides Economics Efficiency
10 SUBSTITUTION EXAMPLES Use soap and water for cleaning Less toxic solvents Cyclohexene vs. benzene Ductile materials instead of brittle Dry powder and UV rays/electron-beam radiation for coatings instead of toxic solvents
11 SUBSTITUTION EXAMPLES Ethylene oxide manufacture Catalyst tubes cooled by heat transfer oils Kerosene boiled under pressure Flixborough explosion caused by ignition of boiling hydrocarbons under pressure Water used in newly developed plants
12 MODERATION Attenuation Using hazardous materials under the least hazardous conditions Store chemicals as refrigerated liquids at atmospheric pressure instead of under pressure at ambient temperature Store toxics in diluted solutions
13 MODERATION EXAMPLES Phenol production High risk of runaway reactions Water dump tank in place as safety system Increase in reaction volume could decrease temperature Storage and transport Dilute solutions Less hazardous solution Chlorine as sodium hypochlorite
14 SIMPLIFICATION Decrease process complexity Benefits Plant contains less equipment Provides fewer opportunities for human error Typically cheaper than complex processes Need less complex protective equipment
15 SIMPLIFICATION EXAMPLES Ways to simplify Stronger equipment can replace relief systems Resistant materials of construction can replace protective instruments Relocate equipment Avoid moving parts Examples Equipment strong enough to withstand high pressures Materials that can withstand high or low temperatures
16 OTHER ISD METHODS Limitation of Effects Avoiding the domino effect Making incorrect assembly impossible Making status clear Tolerance of misuse Ease of control Computer control Instructions and other procedures Life-cycle friendliness Passive safety
17 PHILOSOPHY OF ISD ISD is a way of thinking Not every ISD method will be viable for every type of operation Safety culture Benefits, downsides, and trade-offs Mitigate severity of consequences should an accident occur
18 ISD IN HAZOPS HAZOPs identify hazards and mitigate hazards through safeguards ISD eliminates or reduces hazards rather managing or controlling them Methods of incorporating ISD in HAZOPs: ISD Checklists Consider ISD alternatives to replace safeguards
19 ISD CHECKLISTS Stimulate thinking of ISD Promote out of the box thinking Considers possibilities and then determines feasibility Checklists should be reviewed periodically
20 Guide Word Intensify/Minimize Checklist Question Is the storage of all hazardous gases, liquids and solids ISD CHECKLISTS minimized? Can equipment sets be combined to reduce overall system volume? Can pipeline inventories be reduced by feeding hazardous materials as a gas instead of a liquid? Are just-in-time deliveries used when dealing with hazardous materials? Are all hazardous materials removed or properly disposed of when they are no longer needed or not needed in the next X days? Are attempts made to completely eliminate raw materials, process intermediates, or by-products? Can process conditions be changed to reduce production of hazardous wastes or by-products?
21 Guide Word Substitute Checklist Question Is it possible to substitute less hazardous raw materials? Is it possible to eliminate hazardous raw materials, process intermediates or by-products by using an alternative process or chemistry? Is it possible to use utilities with lower hazards? Is it possible to substitute less hazardous final product solvents? Moderate Can potential releases be reduced via lower temperatures or pressures, or elimination of equipment? Is it possible to make reaction conditions less severe by using a catalyst or a by using a better catalyst? Is it possible to dilute hazardous raw materials? Are all hazardous gases, liquids and solids stored as far away as possible?
22 Guide Word Simplify Checklist Question Are equipment and procedures designed such that they cannot be operated incorrectly or carried out incorrectly? Are machine controls located to prevent unintentional activation while allowing easy access for stopping the machine? Are all manuals, guides, and instructional materials clear and easy to understand, especially those that are used in an emergency situation? Can equipment be eliminated or arranged to simplify material handling? Can DCS modules be simplified?
23 Original Image Source: AcuTech
24 Original Image Source: AcuTech
25 Original Image Source: AcuTech
26 Original Image Source: AcuTech
27 Original Image Source: AcuTech
28 Original Image Source: AcuTech
29 Original Image Source: AcuTech
30 Original Image Source: AcuTech
31 Original Image Source: AcuTech
32 Original Image Source: AcuTech
33 ISD ALTERNATIVES TO REPLACE SAFEGUARDS Original Image Source:
34 Original Image Source: AcuTech
35
36 Original Image Source: AcuTech
37 Original Image Source: AcuTech
38 Original Image Source: AcuTech
39 Original Image Source: AcuTech
40 Original Image Source: AcuTech
41 Original Image Source: AcuTech
42 Original Image Source: AcuTech
43 Original Image Source: AcuTech
44 Original Image Source: AcuTech
45 INCORPORATING ISD AT THE OVERALL PROCESS LEVEL VS. NODE LEVEL Overall Process Level ISD opportunities are limited Stimulating ISD considerations is a challenge Node Level Smaller, more important details are revealed Stimulating ISD considerations is easier
46 CALARP PROGRAM 4 19 CCR Section : Hierarchy of Hazard Control Analysis (HCA) HCA is required for/when: PHA scenarios that identify the potential for a major incident Management of Change (MOC) occurs Incident occurs Design/Review of new processes HCA uses the information provided by PHA/MOC/Incident and documents all inherent safety measures and safeguards related to the process safety hazard identified Recommendations to eliminate hazards using first and second order inherent safety measures are developed
47 REFERENCES Kletz, T. A., & Amyotte, P. (2010). Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design. Boca Raton, Fla: CRC. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Review Board (CSB). (2012). Inherently Safer: The Future of Risk Reduction. Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology, Council, N. R., & Division on Earth and Life Studies. (2012). The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience. National Academies Press. Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2008). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures: Third Edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
48 March 27, 2018 UPCOMING WEBINARS / CONFERENCES Webinar Safeguard Protection Analysis (SPA) for CalARP Program 4 Presented by Steve Maher, CSP PE and John Johnson April 10, 2018 Webinar The Importance of P&IDs and Labeling Presented by Max Oppedahl Mar 18-21, 2018 Exhibitor Presentation by Stephanie Smith, PE 2018 IIAR National Conference and Expo Apr 22-26, 2018 Exhibitor 14 th Global Congress on Process Safety
49 QUESTIONS? Sara Willman Jasmin Dhaliwal Risk Management Professionals, Inc. (949) (877)
RMP/PSM WEBINAR SERIES
RMP/PSM WEBINAR SERIES Webinar Starts at 08:00 PT Please call (877) 532-0806 if you are having technical issues. The background music may be used to adjust your audio volume. IIAR STANDARDS AND HOW THEY
More informationEngineering Safety into the Design
Engineering safety into the design Peter Scantlebury P.Eng Technical Safety Manager Amec Foster Wheeler, Oil & Gas Canada Abstract Safety by design is Amec Foster Wheeler s systematic approach to engineering
More informationInherently Safer Design Analysis Approaches
Inherently Safer Design Analysis Approaches There are a number of ways inherent safety can be analyzed. In any case, the intent is to formalize the consideration of inherent safety rather than to include
More informationThe Relationship Between Automation Complexity and Operator Error
The Relationship Between Automation Complexity and Operator Error presented by Russell Ogle, Ph.D., P.E., CSP rogle@exponent.com (630) 274-3215 Chemical Plant Control Control physical and chemical processes
More informationIdentification and Screening of Scenarios for LOPA. Ken First Dow Chemical Company Midland, MI
Identification and Screening of Scenarios for LOPA Ken First Dow Chemical Company Midland, MI 1 Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) LOPA is a semi-quantitative tool for analyzing and assessing risk. The
More informationAUSTRALIA ARGENTINA CANADA EGYPT NORTH SEA U.S. CENTRAL U.S. GULF. SEMS HAZARD ANALYSIS TRAINING September 29, 2011
AUSTRALIA ARGENTINA CANADA EGYPT NORTH SEA U.S. CENTRAL U.S. GULF SEMS HAZARD ANALYSIS TRAINING September 29, 2011 Purpose The purpose of this meeting is to provide guidelines for determination of hazard
More informationThe Risk of LOPA and SIL Classification in the process industry
The Risk of LOPA and SIL Classification in the process industry Mary Kay O Connor Process Safety Center International Symposium Beyond Regulatory Compliance, Making Safety Second Nature October 28-29,
More informationUsing LOPA for Other Applications
10 Using LOPA for Other Applications 10.1. Purpose LOPA is a tool used to perform risk assessments. Previous chapters described its use in assessing the risk level of process hazards scenarios and in evaluating
More informationProcess Safety Management Of Highly Hazardous Chemicals OSHA 29 CFR
Process Safety Management Of Highly Hazardous Chemicals OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 PSM - Definition Not all refining hazards are caused by the same factors or involve ve the same degree of potential damage.
More informationPART 1.2 HARDWARE SYSTEM. Dr. AA, Process Control & Safety
PART 1.2 HARDWARE SYSTEM Dr. AA, Process Control & Safety 1 How to Ensure that Process Plant is Safe 1. Preliminary Decision Process Selection, site selection etc 2. Process Design Inherent safety 3. Process
More informationMAHB. INSPECTION Process Hazard Analysis
Number 5 2016 seveso common MAHB INSPECTION s e r i e s criteria Process Hazard Analysis Major Accident Hazards Bureau Security Technology Assessment Unit This publication of the European community on
More informationExpert System for LOPA - Incident Scenario Development -
Expert System for LOPA - Incident Scenario Development - Adam Markowski a, Jaffee Suardin b, and M.Sam Mannan b a Process and Ecological Safety Division, Technical University of Lodz, Poland b Mary Kay
More informationEvery things under control High-Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS)
Every things under control www.adico.co info@adico.co Table Of Contents 1. Introduction... 2 2. Standards... 3 3. HIPPS vs Emergency Shut Down... 4 4. Safety Requirement Specification... 4 5. Device Integrity
More informationPart 2.5 Dispersion Modeling Using ALOHA
Part 2.5 Dispersion Modeling Using ALOHA Dr. Arshad Ahmad Email: arshad@utm.my 1 Software Commonly used for Risk Analysis Software SAFETI SFU CAFTAN ETRA HAZSEC. HAZTRAC. PHAST. WHAZAN EFFECTS. DAMAGE
More informationProcess Safety Value and Learnings Central Valley Chemical Safety Day March 20, 2014
Process Safety Value and Learnings Central Valley Chemical Safety Day March 20, 2014 Randy Bennett Sr. Staff Health & Safety Engineer Process Safety Management Group Aera Energy LLC Key Points Process
More informationIncorrect Relief Valve Material Causes Release
Incorrect Relief Valve Material Causes Release Lessons Learned Volume 04 Issue 18 2004 USW Purpose Incorrect Relief Valve Material Causes Release To conduct a small group lessons learned activity to share
More informationTHE BAKER REPORT HOW FINDINGS HAVE BEEN USED BY JOHNSON MATTHEY TO REVIEW THEIR MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS
THE BAKER REPORT HOW FINDINGS HAVE BEEN USED BY JOHNSON MATTHEY TO REVIEW THEIR MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS Colin P. Lynas, Elizabeth Campbell and Hendrik J. Koornhof Johnson Matthey Catalysts This paper
More informationWorkplace Safety and Health (Major Hazard Installations) Regulations 2017 S 202/2017
Workplace Safety and Health (Major Hazard Installations) Regulations 2017 S 202/2017 THE SCHEDULES FIRST SCHEDULE DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES Regulation 2(1) and Second and Fifth Schedules PART 1 NAME OF DANGEROUS
More informationMitigation Starts With Design! Continues with Safe Operation, Mechanical Integrity and Training!
P.S.I.G. Mitigation Starts With Design! Continues with Safe Operation, Mechanical Integrity and Training! Last Unfortunately is When It Goes Wrong! The Failure! The Release! Loss of Product or Production
More informationHazardous Materials Management Guidelines
Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines Hazardous Materials Management Guidelines Applicability These guidelines apply to facilities and activities involving the transportation, production, handling,
More informationBefore You Fix the Relief Valve Problem
Before You Fix the Relief Valve Problem Careful considerations when mitigating inadequate relief systems designs Jason Spearow, P.E Presenter Biography Jason Spearow, P.E. Smith & Burgess LLC Senior Process
More information3.0 Manage. hazardous substances. risks IN THIS SECTION:
3.0 Manage hazardous substances risks IN THIS SECTION: 3.1 Hazardous substances can damage your health 3.2 Applying substance controls 3.3 Prepare an inventory of your hazardous substances 3.4 Find and
More informationSAFETY SEMINAR Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - August 3-7, Authors: Francisco Carlos da Costa Barros Edson Romano Marins
SAFETY SEINAR Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - August 3-7, 2009 Using HAZOP and LOPA ethodologies to Improve Safety in the Coke Drums Cycles Authors: Gilsa Pacheco onteiro Francisco Carlos da Costa Barros Edson
More information3 rd Year Design Module Scope
LOSS PREVENTION & Process Safety PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS -3 rd Year Design Module - 3 rd Year Design Module Scope Hazard Identification In the Process 1. Identify the major hazards that are present 2.
More informationDow s New Practice for Locating Temporary Portable Buildings. P. Partridge 9/29/05 UNRESTRICTED - May be shared with anyone Slide 1
Dow s New Practice for Locating Temporary Portable Buildings P. Partridge 9/29/05 UNRESTRICTED - May be shared with anyone Slide 1 Dow guidelines issued following the explosion at BP s Texas City facility
More informationHazard Operability Analysis
Hazard Operability Analysis Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia HAZOP Qualitative Deductive (search for causes) Inductive (consequence analysis) AIM: Identification of possible process anomalies
More informationLearning from Dangerous Occurrences in the Chemical Industries
Learning from Dangerous Occurrences in the Chemical Industries John A. Hare, Richard J. Goff and Justin Holroyd Health and Safety Laboratory, Buxton, UK 1. Introduction It is important to learn lessons
More informationSEMS II: BSEE should focus on eliminating human error
SEMS II: BSEE should focus on eliminating human error How US companies can prevent accidents on start-ups and shut-downs by using valve interlocks The proposed changes to BSEE s SEMS (Safety and Environmental
More informationIntroduction to Emergency Response & Contingency Planning
& Contingency Planning Rationale Why is it important for you to learn this material? Designed for those who may witness a release, this is an introductory course designed to help ensure those who are likely
More informationQUANTIFYING THE TOLERABILITY OF POTENTIAL IGNITION SOURCES FROM UNCERTIFIED MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN HAZARDOUS AREAS
QUANTIFYING THE TOLERABILITY OF POTENTIAL IGNITION SOURCES FROM UNCERTIFIED MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN HAZARDOUS AREAS Steve Sherwen Senior Consultant, ABB Engineering Services, Daresbury Park,
More informationPSM TRAINING COURSES. Courses can be conducted in multi-languages
Courses can be conducted in multi-languages One set of hardcopy course notes will be sent to client for printing and distribution to course participants. The courses will be held at the client s training
More informationHazard Communication Program. San José State University
San José State University One Washington Square San José, California Facilities Development and Operations Department July 11, 2012 Page intentionally left blank SJSU_Hazard Communication Program_2012-0711.docx
More informationLessons Learned from the Texas City Refinery Explosion Mike Broadribb
Lessons Learned from the Texas City Refinery Explosion Mike Broadribb Mary Kay O Connor Process Safety Center Symposium, College Station, Texas October 24, 2006 Texas City Refinery Texas City refinery
More informationSAFETY PLAN REVIEW. FirstElement Safety Plan Review Submission for the California Energy Commission General Funding Opportunity GFO
FirstElement Safety Plan Review Submission for the California Energy Commission General Funding Opportunity GFO-15-605 Background At the request of the California Energy Commission, members of the Hydrogen
More informationAPI th Edition Ballot Item 7.8 Work Item 4 Gas Breakthrough
API 521 7 th Edition Ballot Item 7.8 Work Item 4 Gas Breakthrough NOTE: This is a reballot of previously approved API 521 7 th Edition Ballot Item 6.3 which was modified based on comments. Comments should
More informationProcess Safety Journey
Process Safety Journey Agenda The Status in early 2000s The Journey to improvement in Process Safety management Managing risks and barriers How has this impacted Kwinana? The Status in early 2000s Focus
More informationSafety Engineering - Hazard Identification Techniques - M. Jahoda
Safety Engineering - Hazard Identification Techniques - M. Jahoda Hazard identification The risk management of a plant 2 Identification of the hazards involved in the operation of the plant, due to the
More informationMaterial Safety Data Sheet
Material Safety Data Sheet Section I General Information Manufacturer: HMIS Rating KAL-GARD HEALTH: 1 1347 Poole Street FLAMMABILITY: 1 Mojave, CA 93501 REACTIVITY: 0 (661) 824-8101 Emergency Telephone:
More informationUnattended Bleeder Valve Thaws, Causing Fire
Unattended Bleeder Valve Thaws, Causing Fire Lessons Learned Volume 03 Issue 12 2004 USW Purpose Unattended Bleeder Valve Thaws, Causing Fire To conduct a small group lessons learned activity to share
More informationOperator Exposed to Chlorine Gas
Operator Exposed to Chlorine Gas Lessons Learned Volume 04 Issue 29 2004 USW Operator Exposed to Chlorine Gas Purpose To conduct a small group lessons learned activity to share information gained from
More informationKnowledge, Certification, Networking
www.iacpe.com Knowledge, Certification, Networking Page :1 of 71 Rev 01 Sept 2016 IACPE No 19, Jalan Bilal Mahmood 80100 Johor Bahru Malaysia The International of is providing the introduction to the Training
More informationRisk reducing outcomes from the use of LOPA in plant design and operation
Risk reducing outcomes from the use of LOPA in plant design and operation Paul Feltoe Safety Solutions Ltd Background Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has been traditionally applied to assess scenario
More informationRaw Material Spill. Lessons Learned. Volume 05 Issue USW
Raw Material Spill Lessons Learned Volume 05 Issue 14 2005 USW Raw Material Spill Purpose To conduct a small group lessons learned activity to share information gained from incident investigations. To
More informationDrain Splash Back Burns Operator
Purpose To share lessons learned gained from incident investigations through a small group discussion method format. To understand lessons learned through a Systems of Safety viewpoint. This material was
More informationUsing Consequence Modeling to Help Make Emergency Decisions
Using Consequence Modeling to Help Make Emergency Decisions Della Wong / Nova Chemicals & Robert B. Gerow / SAFER-ERMC CSChE 2002 Conference October 20-23, 23, 2002 Vancouver B.C. If auto safety was like
More informationPredicted Dispense Volume vs. Gravimetric Measurement for the MICROLAB 600. November 2010
Predicted Dispense Volume vs. Gravimetric Measurement for the MICROLAB 600 November 2010 Table of Contents ``Abstract...3 ``Introduction...4 ``Methods & Results...6 ``Data Analysis...9 ``Conclusion...12
More informationAbsorption - The process of contacting a vapor and gas stream with an absorbing liquid to remove specific materials from the gas stream.
Sufe Design and Optvation ofpi-oc.ess Vents and Emission Contid $wteins by Center for Chemical Process Safety Copyright 0 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Tnc. APPENDIX B GLOSSARY Absorption - The process of contacting
More informationSIL Allocation. - Deterministic vs. risk-based approach - Layer Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) overview
SIL Allocation - Deterministic vs. risk-based approach - Layer Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) overview Origin and causes of accidents involving control system failure 44% Specification 20% Changes after
More informationUnderstanding IPL Boundaries
Understanding IPL Boundaries A.M. (Art) Dowell, III Principal Engineer Process Improvement Institute, Inc. 16430 Locke Haven Dr. Houston, TX 77059 USA adowell@piii.com Copyright 2018, all rights reserved,
More informationDesigning to proposed API WHB tube failure document
Designing to proposed API WHB tube failure document Dennis H. Martens Consultant and Technical Advisor (martensdh@pm-engr.com) Porter McGuffie Inc. Lon Stern Consultant (lhstern@earthlink.net) Stern Treating
More informationProposed Abstract for the 2011 Texas A&M Instrumentation Symposium for the Process Industries
Proposed Abstract for the 2011 Texas A&M Instrumentation Symposium for the Process Industries Focus Area: Automation HMI Title: Author: Shared Field Instruments in SIS: Incidents Caused by Poor Design
More informationAre Your Credits Worthy?
Are Your Credits Worthy? James R. Lay, P.E. Lisa A. Long Michael L. Marshall, P.E. Jeffrey J. Wanko, P.E., C.S.P. U.S. DOL OSHA 200 Constitution Ave, NW Washington, DC 20210 Lay.Jim@dol.gov Long.Lisa@dol.gov
More informationSafe Work Practices and Permit-to-Work System
CHAPTER 24 Safe Work Practices and Permit-to-Work System 24.1 INTRODUCTION OSHA s Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard (OSHA, 1992) requires employers to develop and implement safe work practices (SWPs)
More informationSafety in Petroleum Industry
Chemical ( Industrial ) Disaster Management Conference, Bangalore 30 January 2014 Safety in Petroleum Industry Refineries and Petrochemical plants are highly energyintensive Handle highly inflammable and
More informationInternational 17/10/14 WORKING PAPER. Rio de NITRIC OXIDE. SUMMARY The DGP. is requested. Oxide Quantities. (5 pages)
International Civil Aviation Organization DGP-WG/14-IP/4 17/10/14 WORKING PAPER DANGEROUS GOODS PANEL (DGP) MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP OF THE WHOLE Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20 to 244 October 2014 Agenda
More informationPressure Gauge Failure Causes Release
Pressure Gauge Failure Causes Release Lessons Learned Volume 04 Issue 02 2004 USW Pressure Gauge Failure Causes Release Purpose To conduct a small group lessons learned activity to share information gained
More informationinnova-ve entrepreneurial global 1
www.utm.my innova-ve entrepreneurial global Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined as: Relative level of risk-reduction provided by a safety function to specify a target level of risk reduction. SIL is
More informationCodex Seven HACCP Principles. (Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment & Management)
Codex Seven HACCP Principles (Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment & Management) Logic sequence for application of HACCP Assemble the HACCP team Describe product Identify intended use Construct a flow
More informationChallenges in Relief Design for Pilot Plants
Challenges in Relief Design for Pilot Plants Published on July 5, 2017 Michael Trainor Relief system design at the pilot scale presents unique challenges that don t always apply at the commercial scale.
More informationHazard Identification
Hazard Identification Most important stage of Risk Assessment Process 35+ Techniques Quantitative / Qualitative Failure Modes and Effects Analysis FMEA Energy Analysis Hazard and Operability Studies HAZOP
More informationFaculty/School: Pharmacy Initial Issue Date: Oct 2016
Use this form to assist you to complete risk assessments for hazardous activities and processes. Any serious or ongoing hazards should be reported via RiskWare to ensure that appropriate corrective actions
More information11/7/2011. Chemical Hazards and Controls for Rehabilitation Professionals. What is a chemical hazard? Toxicology. Module 3
Chemical Hazards and Controls for Rehabilitation Professionals Module 3 What is a chemical hazard? A chemical hazard is a chemical that, because of its characteristics and effects, may cause harm to an
More informationDIGITAL SOLUTIONS TRAINING CATALOGUE. QRA and CFD simulation. Phast, Safeti and KFX SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
DIGITAL SOLUTIONS TRAINING CATALOGUE QRA and CFD simulation Phast, Safeti and KFX SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER 02 PHAST, SAFETI AND KFX Training catalogue Global training Our increased focus on global training,
More informationFires and Explosions: What You Need to Know to Prevent Them
Fires and Explosions: What You Need to Know to Prevent Them CSChE PSM Symposium Edmonton, Alberta 2007 Gerry Phillips, GC Phillips Consulting Ltd. Norman Nibber, Independent Risk Control Objectives Understand
More informationA large Layer of Protection Analysis for a Gas terminal scenarios/ cause consequence pairs
A large Layer of Protection Analysis for a Gas terminal 2000+ scenarios/ cause consequence pairs Richard Gowland European process Safety Centre The scope of the study was a large gas terminal handling
More informationDrum / cylinder handling
Page 1 of 8 Drum / cylinder handling This Technical Measures Document covers the storage and handling of toxic and flammable substances in drums and cylinders and refers to relevant codes of practice and
More informationVALIDATE LOPA ASSUMPTIONS WITH DATA FROM YOUR OWN PROCESS
Honeywell Advanced Materials new Low-Global-Warming Refrigerant Plant in Geismar, LA Tony Downes Sept 2018 VALIDATE LOPA ASSUMPTIONS WITH DATA FROM YOUR OWN PROCESS A little about the presenter 1 Led over
More informationUnderstanding safety life cycles
Understanding safety life cycles IEC/EN 61508 is the basis for the specification, design, and operation of safety instrumented systems (SIS) Fast Forward: IEC/EN 61508 standards need to be implemented
More informationCutting Oils Used With Metal Cutting Machines Are Biological Hazards
Cutting Oils Used With Metal Cutting Machines Are Biological Hazards Lessons Learned Volume 01 Issue 02 2004 USW Cutting Oils Used With Metal Cutting Machines Are Biological Hazards Purpose To conduct
More informationSAFETY AND HEALTH IN THE USE OF CHEMICALS AT WORK
THEME nº44: RESPONSIBLE: Basics Principles of Prevention FOUR PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL The general objective in the control of hazards relating to chemicals in the workplace is to eliminate or
More informationPRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSION RISKS TO THE CONTROL ROOM BUILDING OF A VINYL CHLORIDE PLANT
PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSION RISKS TO THE CONTROL ROOM BUILDING OF A VINYL CHLORIDE PLANT L.P. Sluijs 1, B.J. Haitsma 1 and P. Beaufort 2 1 Vectra Group Ltd. 2 Shin-Etsu (contact details: Vectra Group
More informationMATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
Page { PAGE1} of 6 COMPANY: SIGNET PTY LTD ADDRESS: 56 INGLESTON ROAD, WAKERLEY, QLD, 4154 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE: (07) 3364 2100 (8AM to 5PM) MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET Product Name T Solvent Trade Names
More informationTemporary Equipment Fails After 20 Years of Use Worker Gets Sandblasted
Temporary Equipment Fails After 20 Years of Use Worker Gets Sandblasted Lessons Learned Volume 03 Issue 46 2004 USW Temporary Equipment Fails After 20 Years of Use Worker Gets Sandblasted Purpose To conduct
More informationFUNCTIONAL SAFETY: SIL DETERMINATION AND BEYOND A CASE STUDY FROM A CHEMICAL MANUFACTURING SITE
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY: SIL DETERMINATION AND BEYOND A CASE STUDY FROM A CHEMICAL MANUFACTURING SITE Jasjeet Singh and Neil Croft, HFL Risk Services Ltd, Manchester, UK Industrial chemical processes increasingly
More informationReliability Assessment of the Whistler Propane Vaporizers
Reliability Assessment of the Whistler Propane Vaporizers Prepared for: Terasen & Fransen Engineering Prepared by: ClearSky Risk Management Inc. 815 23 rd Ave East Vancouver, BC V6B 5Z3 Phone: 604.899.1470
More informationWHMIS 1988 & WHMIS 2015
WHMIS 2015 Awareness AN AWARENESS PROGRAM ON THE UPDATED Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System WHMIS 1988 & WHMIS 2015 WHMIS Overview 2 WHMIS Overview WHMIS first came into effect on October
More informationSelection of Hazard Evaluation Techniques
Selection of Hazard Evaluation Techniques William Bridges Process Improvement Institute, Inc. (PII) 1938 Riversound Drive Knoxville, TN 37922 USA +1-865-675-3458 wbridges@p-i-i-i.com www.p-i-i-i.com The
More informationOPERATING PROCEDURES
OPERATING PROCEDURES 1.0 Purpose This element identifies Petsec s Operating Procedures for its Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) Program; it applies to all Petsec operations. Petsec is
More informationUSING HAZOP TO IDENTIFY AND MINIMISE HUMAN ERRORS IN OPERATING PROCESS PLANT
USING HAZOP TO IDENTIFY AND MINIMISE HUMAN ERRORS IN OPERATING PROCESS PLANT Chris Lyth, Tracerco, Billingham, Cleveland, UK Ian Bradby, ABB Engineering Services, Billingham Cleveland, UK This joint paper
More informationINSPECTIONS OF THE LPG ESTABLISHMENTS IN PORTUGAL. Graça Bravo. 26th September 2017
INSPECTIONS OF THE LPG ESTABLISHMENTS IN PORTUGAL Graça Bravo 26th September 2017 SUMMARY 1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LPG ESTABLISHMENTS 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LPG ESTABLISHMENT 3. INSPECTION SUPPORTING
More informationPressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC Page 033 of 124
Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC Page 033 of 124 13.7 Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC 1 The Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC applies to the design, manufacturing and conformity
More informationSavard Labor & Marine Staffing, Inc. Compressed Gas Safety Program Rev3/14
Compressed Gas Safety Program Purpose: The purpose of this safety policy and procedure is to establish guidelines for the protection and safety of this company s employees who handle and use compressed
More informationMaterial Safety Data Sheet acc. to ISO/DIS 11014
Page 1/5 1 Identification of substance: Catalog number: 222020 Manufacturer/Supplier: BD Diagnostic Systems 7 Loveton Circle Sparks, MD 21152 Tel: (410) 771-0100 or (800) 638-8663 Information department:
More informationGeneral Duty Clause. Section 112(r)(1) of CAA. Chris Rascher, EPA Region 1
General Duty Clause Section 112(r)(1) of CAA Chris Rascher, EPA Region 1 Background on the General Duty Clause General Duty Clause 112(r)(1) of CAA Prevention of Accidental Releases Purpose and General
More informationPreventive Maintenance
A Health and Safety Guideline for Your Workplace Why? Preventive maintenance is predetermined work performed to a schedule with the aim of preventing the wear and tear or sudden failure of equipment components.
More informationMajor Hazard Facilities. Major Accident Identification and Risk Assessment
Major Hazard Facilities Major Accident Identification and Risk Assessment Overview This seminar has been developed in the context of the MHF regulations to provide: An overview of MA identification and
More information4/26/16. Section 1 Understanding Solutions. Solutions and Suspensions. Solutions and Suspensions. Solutions and Suspensions. Solvents and Solutes
Section 1 Understanding Solutions On a hot day, you may think that a cool glass of plain water would be refreshing. However, if the glass were actually filled with plain water, it would taste stale. This
More informationZUERCHER TANK REGULATORS PRINCIPLES OF TANK VENTILATION
Why Inertisation (blanketing) of Tanks? General Tank inertisation or blanketing is required in many applications where products or liquids stored in the tank are processed and/or filled into and emptied
More informationKnowledge, Certification, Networking. SAFETY IN PROCESS EQUIPMENT DESIGN INHERENT SAFER DESIGN CPE I FUNDAMENTALS TABLE OF CONTENT
Knowledge, Certification, Networking www.iacpe.com Page : 1 of 135 Rev 01- Aug 2014 Rev 02 - Dec 2014 TABLE OF CONTENT INTRODUCTION 5 Scope 5 General Design Considerations 6 A. Safety Requirements 11 B.
More informationHazard Communication Standard Safety Data Sheet Nature's Way Sweeping Compound, Red Oil-based
Supersedes Date 1/1/10 Issuing Date 6/5/15 Product Name: Nature's Way Sweeping Compound, Red Oil-based Product Category: Oil-base Floor Sweeping Compound Information on Manufacturer: GRO-WELL Brands 2807
More informationThree Approaches to Safety Engineering. Civil Aviation Nuclear Power Defense
Three Approaches to Safety Engineering Civil Aviation Nuclear Power Defense Civil Aviation Fly-fix-fly: analysis of accidents and feedback of experience to design and operation Fault Hazard Analysis: Trace
More informationMaterial Safety Data Sheet SANTOLUBES LLC SANTOTRAC, SANTOVAC, SANTOLUBES, AND SYNERGY P.O. Box 960 St. Charles, MO
Material Safety Data Sheet SANTOLUBES LLC SANTOTRAC, SANTOVAC, SANTOLUBES, AND SYNERGY P.O. Box 960 St. Charles, MO 63302-0960 Page 1 of 5 1. CHEMICAL PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION PRODUCT NAME: Chemical
More informationMaterial Safety Data Sheet SECTION 1: PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION SECTION 2: INGREDIENTS SECTION 3: HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Material Safety Data Sheet Copyright, 2009, 3M Company. All rights reserved. Copying and/or downloading of this information for the purpose of properly utilizing 3M products is allowed provided that: (1)
More informationChapter 13 Selection and Safe usage of cleaning solvents
Selection and Safe usage of cleaning solvents NO MORE ODS Application of R-141b Class II ozone-depleting substance (ODS) Characteristics of R-141b Non-flammable High solvency power Easy to store and handle
More informationMajor Hazard Facilities. Control Measures and Adequacy
Major Hazard Facilities Control Measures and Adequacy Overview The seminar has been developed to provide: Context with MHF Regulations An overview of what is required An overview of the steps required
More informationPURPOSE OF THE POLICY
Title: Safe Storage, Handling, Use and Disposal Procedures of Compressed Gas Cylinders Effective Date: November 2005 Revision Date: March 1, 2017 Issuing Authority: Responsible Officer: VP, Capital Projects
More informationMATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
Lyden Oil ProGuard EDM Fluid MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET 1. CHEMICAL PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION Product Identification Product Name: ProGuard EDM Fluid Synonyms: Petroleum Lubricating Oil, Petroleum
More informationMaterial Safety Data Sheet acc. to ISO/DIS 11014
Page 1/7 1 Identification of the substance/mixture and of the company/undertaking Product Identifier Catalog Number: 268820 Details of the supplier of the safety data sheet Manufacturer/Supplier: BD Diagnostic
More informationCen-Pe-Co Hy-Torque Gear Lube Red With Temp Tac Page 1 of 5 05/01/08 MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
Cen-Pe-Co Hy-Torque Gear Lube Red With Temp Tac Page 1 of 5 Section 1: PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION Central Petroleum Company Phone Number: 563-284-6221 201 East Lincoln Street Monday-Friday, 8:00
More informationSAFEsystem. Safety Apparatus Filter Enhancement. Filtration Systems. Now you can safely control your filtering process
Now you can safely control your filtering process BROCHURE C1 SAFEsystem TM Safety Apparatus Filter Enhancement Available on Individual, Duplex or Multi-Housing ASME Code filter systems. Filtration Systems
More information