Chapter 3: Quang Trung and Gia Long in DRV and RVN Narratives

Transcription

1 Chapter 3: Quang Trung and Gia Long in DRV and RVN Narratives Nguyễn Ánh (Emperor Gia Long) and Nguyễn Huệ (Emperor Quang Trung) entered the stage of Vietnamese history in the close of the eighteenth century, when the Trịnh and Nguyễn families had control over the divided territory of Đại Việt and the general atmosphere was one of economic and political disorder. In this context of minor uprisings and rebellions, there arose one particularly spectacular movement led by the Tây Sơn brothers, of whom Nguyễn Huệ was the second. The uprising started out as a rebellion against the Nguyễn government in the southern half of Vietnam, but led to the Tây Sơn brothers brief reign as monarchs in the whole of Đại Việt, and in the process launched Nguyễn Ánh as the restorer of the Nguyễn Lords and the eventual founder of a new imperial dynasty. Of importance is how the two historical actors Nguyễn Huệ and Nguyễn Ánh have been portrayed in the northern and southern narratives of Vietnamese history in the period, and the reasons behind the differing portrayals. Historians in the DRV and the RVN conceived of Đại Việt and Đại Nam respectively as representing the precolonial state of Vietnam, and the different conceptions influenced the assessments of Nguyễn Huệ and Nguyễn Ánh. Before launching into the discussion, I offer a general overview of the events surrounding the two historical actors. General overview of the interactions between the Tây Sơn and the Nguyễn Dynasty 59

2 Nguyễn Huệ was the second of the three famous Tây Sơn brothers, Nguyễn Nhạc being the eldest and Nguyễn Lữ the youngest. The brothers were famous for leading what is known today as a popular or peasant rebellion. The movement started around 1771, and was named for having originated in the Tây Sơn village in south-central Vietnam. It originally started out as a rebellion against the Nguyễn government, and the Tây Sơn brothers captured Qui Nhơn in In the meantime, the Trịnh seized the opportunity to invade the south. Nguyễn Nhạc (the eldest of the Tây Sơn brothers) sought a truce with the Trịnh who agreed and bestowed on him titles and regalia. The Tây Sơn brothers could then push down south without fear of a Trịnh offensive, and in the attacks most members of the Nguyễn royal family were killed. One survivor was Nguyễn Ánh, who led the Nguyễn restoration campaigns. Nhạc named himself emperor after successful attacks on Gia Định and from 1775 to 1785 there were struggles between the two for power. In 1785 the tide turned against Nguyễn Ánh when the Tây Sơn defeated a Nguyễn-Siamese assault and he had to flee to Bangkok for two years. Nguyễn Nhạc then turned north to the territories previously occupied by the Nguyễn that was seized by the Trịnh in With the help of a Trịnh defector, Nguyễn Hữu Chỉnh, who devised the path of attack, Nhạc sent his brothers Huệ and Lữ to secure the territories. This was done easily but Chỉnh had his personal agenda and urged the two brothers to continue moving their forces up north past the Gianh river, which had been the Trịnh-Nguyễn border, and Thăng Long fell into the hands of the Tây Sơn. Nguyễn Huệ declared the Trịnh to have been defeated and himself to be the restorer of the Lê emperor, but this was not the intention of Nhạc, who drove his brother and his army back, 60

3 leaving Chỉnh behind. Although there were reports of Nguyễn Huệ expressing remorse at having gone against his brother s wishes, there emerged family disputes that resulted in the Tây Sơn brothers dividing Đai Việt into three portions, where Huệ controlled the north until the Hải Văn pass, Nhạc the center and Lữ the south. Nguyễn Ánh in the meantime had not given up hopes of returning to Đại Việt, and took this opportunity to attack the divided Tây Sơn and targeted Gia Định in the south, driving Lữ out for the last time. Up north, the Lê were organizing their own political comeback and enlisted the help of Nguyễn Hữu Chỉnh, who had been abandoned by the Tây Sơn brothers. This involved demands made of Nguyễn Huệ that caused him to invade the northern territories controlled by the Lê. The Lê then sought Chinese assistance, which failed to stall the momentum of the Tây Sơn movement and instead delivered to Nguyễn Huệ a victory over the Qing army at Đống Đa in He then ruled as Emperor Quang Trung for a brief period until his death in Nguyễn Nhạc suffered a similarly premature death, and their young successors were unable to defend themselves against the advances of Nguyễn Ánh who had been steadily working his way up north after his successful campaign in Gia Định. By 1802, he had reached Thăng Long and the Tây Sơn Dynasty, which had started out as a local peasant rebellion, was finally quelled. The above is a brief outline of the historical interactions between the Tây Sơn brothers and the Nguyễn Dynasty. While the events as presented above were discussed in 61

4 both DRV and RVN historical narratives, the historians assessed the historical actors differently. Đại Việt vs. Đại Nam: Differing post-colonial conceptions of pre-colonial Vietnam and the resultant treatments of the Tây Sơn and the Nguyễn Dynasty Because the DRV government was based in the north, the pre-colonial form of Vietnam resembled the political entity of Đại Việt, where Thăng Long (present day Hà Nội) was the capital and the southern territories although geographically far apart and loosely (if at all) controlled were still considered part of the Đại Việt Empire. In DRV historical narratives, the Lê emperors presided precariously over Đại Việt but were deemed the legitimate rulers of the whole of the Việt territory, even though two powerful families the Trịnh and the Nguyễn were vying for power over Đại Việt under nominal Lê suzerainty. The Lê s authority from the northern capital was maintained in the DRV s perspective of Đại Việt even with the split in the Việt territory, thus firmly situating Thăng Long as the center of Việt power. Also important to the choice of Đại Việt was that the rulers were the Lê emperors and not the southern Nguyễn kings, who were considered separatists by DRV historians. Party historians presented the problems facing the Đại Việt Empire as one where the feuding families of Trịnh and Nguyễn dominated elite politics and built up feudal regimes which divided the country, and presented the larger population as unfragmented 62

5 and suffering because of the wars. 1 They generally recognized the territorial split in the country but attributed this only to the elite level, an echo of the imagination of contemporary Vietnam, where the north and south were split because of elite political groups but the people at the local level were still considered a psychologically unified though territorially divided entity. The RVN s idea of the pre-colonial state was Đại Nam, the empire created by Gia Long after he had defeated the Tây Sơn. Before this, the northern half of the Việt territory was administered by the Lê Dynasty and the Trịnh Lords, and the southern territory was administered by the Nguyễn Lords. The Tây Sơn rebellion destroyed this balance of power and defeated both the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families for two decades, but was eventually quelled by Nguyễn Ánh; the Nguyễn could then declare power over the entire territory of Đai Việt. Nguyễn Ánh s power base was initially in Sài Gòn and then the Nguyễn Dynasty ruled from Huế. It was proposed that the name of the united Việt territory be changed to Nam Việt, which was in turn changed to Việt Nam by the Chinese emperor; susequently the word Việt was dropped and the name Đại Nam was used by the Việts to refer to their territory. 2 Đại Nam thus came to represent a precolonial Vietnam where the south had administrative control over the weakened north and was there to inject new blood into a dying empire. 1 See for example, Văn Tân, Về Bài Chung Quanh Vấn Đề: Ai Đã Thống Nhất Nước Việt Nam: Nguyễn Huệ hay Nguyễn Ánh? cửa Nguyễn Phương (Sài-gòn) [About the Article Around the Problem: Who Unified Vietnam: Nguyễn Huệ or Nguyễn Ánh? by Nguyễn Phương (Sài Gòn)], NCLS 70 (January 1965), pp Bửu Cầm, Quốc Hiệu Việt Nam và Đại Nam [The Country s Names Việt Nam and Đại Nam], in SĐ (January-June 1970), pp

6 The southern conception of Đại Nam as the pre-colonial Vietnamese state thus recognized the Trịnh - Nguyễn or the Đàng Trong - Đàng Ngoài split in Vietnam. Nguyễn Toại notes, for example, that when Nguyễn Huệ was in La Sơn (a territory in Bắc Hà, or Đàng Ngoài), he considered it to be a different country from the southern kingdom. 3 Although the southern power center was Sài Gòn, and historically, the power base of the Nguyễn actually shifted from Sài Gòn to Huế, which became the capital of Đại Nam, both cities lay to the south of the seventeenth parallel allowed and in that respect both could be considered southern capitals. Also, both Huế and Sài Gòn were under the power of the Nguyễn family and later the Nguyễn dynasty, whose rulers were integrally connected to the southern Đàng Trong territory. Đại Nam thus represented the historical continuity of the dominance of the southern capital over the traditional northern one. The symbolism of Đại Việt and Đại Nam had the power to provide legitimacy to either the northern or the southern capital in Vietnam in the period. With the DRV s victory in 1975, Vietnam s pre-colonial past took the form of Đại Việt, and Hà Nội was presented as the traditional soul of Vietnam. This image still holds contemporary power. 4 While it is true that Hà Nội was the capital of the Việt people before Huế or Sài Gòn was, and also true that it remained a capital for a longer period of time, the emphasis on Hà Nội as the main symbol of traditional Vietnam misses out on the role that the south played in the formation of the Việt identity. 3 Nguyễn Toại, Tiền Đồng và Niên Hiêu Quang Trung [Copper Coins and the Dynastic Title Quang Trung], Bách Khoa Thời Đại [Encyclopedia of the Times, hereafter BKTĐ] 225 (15 May 1966), p David Lamb, Hanoi: The Soul of Vietnam, National Geographic (May 2004), pp

7 The Tây Sơn uprising can in fact be seen to have started as a southern affair and one that was in direct conflict with the Nguyễn family. It was a consequence of the historic move to the south by the ethnic Việt people which gave the Nguyễn administrative control over the southern regions, and the rebellion was a southern phenomenon and a response to the specific conditions imposed by the Nguyễn administration. Li Tana has argued that contrary to traditional explanations that saw the Tây Sơn uprising as a response to famine, the reported famine occurred only after the rebellion had first broken out, and was in fact a result of the uprising rather than a cause. Using statistical data on the mandatory supply of ships to the rice trade of the region, Li argues that the residents of Qui Nhơn had to bear a considerably heavier burden than the residents of Gia Định. She proposes that the main cause of the uprising lay with the Nguyễn, as they had until then relied too heavily on the people of Qui Nhơn. This increasing burden resulted in the people of the region following the Tây Sơn brothers to rise in revolt. 5 The Tây Sơn brothers were also possibly of mixed blood and were not entirely ethnic Việt. Significantly, when Nguyễn Nhạc was rallying the people to himself he used the symbolism of Cham rather than Việt kingship. For example, he used the color red and not yellow when he declared himself emperor; red was the color of Cham royalty while yellow was the Sinic imperial color. Nguyễn Nhạc also proclaimed himself king in the old Cham capital of Vijaya. Li argues that this gave the Tây Sơn brothers legitimacy in 5 Li Tana, Nguyễn Cochinchina, pp Besides a Southward Expansion towards the Mekong Delta, Li proposes that Nguyễn Lords were also moving towards the Western highland areas, in a form of a Western Expansion. The Tây Sơn rebellion can be seen as a product of the latter, but in this context both Southern and Western Expansions can be taken as part of the historical experience of southern Vietnam, also known as Đàng Trong. 65

8 the southern region, in an ironic imitation of the Nguyễn model of localization that had provided the Nguyễn rulers their own legitimacy in Đàng Trong. 6 Nguyễn Nhạc s conception of political space was likely to have been confined to the Đàng Trong that he had been living in, and his political ambitions were arguably limited to the southern part of the Việt territory. When Nguyễn Huệ invaded Thăng Long without his brother s consent, Nhạc was displeased and hurried him home. It would appear that the Tây Sơn rebellion originally aimed only at wresting control of the southern entity that the Nguyễn had dominated over the past two hundred years. However, historians in the DRV and the RVN did not narrate the idea that the Tây Sơn uprising was probably a southern phenomenon. The northern conceptions of Đại Việt as the form of pre-colonial Vietnam did not acknowledge the division along geographical lines, and recognizing the southern specificity of the Tây Sơn rebellion would not have fit the idea of a homogenous peasantry spanning the border between the two kingdoms and suffering only because of the internecine wars between the feudal elites. The RVN conception of pre-colonial Vietnam as Đại Nam did recognize the geographical split, but featuring the rebellion as a southern phenomenon would have highlighted the inadequacies of the Nguyễn Dynasty. Notwithstanding the similarities, historians in the DRV and the RVN had very different assessments of Quang Trung, representing the Tây Sơn brothers, and Gia Long, representing the Nguyễn Dynasty. Quang Trung, a hero for historians in the DRV 6 Ibid., pp

9 The Tây Sơn period was short and tumultuous, and the brothers left very few records themselves. 7 The Nguyễn Dynasty subsequently also tried to destroy all vestiges of the Tây Sơn and wrote the history of the Tây Sơn brothers largely out of official Vietnamese sources, where they were included only in a way favorable to the Nguyễn family. 8 The Tây Sơn period thus left a relatively clean slate on which historians in the period could insert contemporary symbols. In the DRV, the Tây Sơn rebellion was portrayed as a peasant uprising in a feudal environment, thus showing them not only as a forerunner but also as an eighteenth-century precursor of the twentieth-century Vietnamese Communist Party. 9 The Nguyễn Dynasty, on the other hand, was labeled as feudal and was posed as the enemy of the Tây Sơn, and blamed for causing suffering to the larger population. Besides the obvious benefits a favorable portrayal of the Tây Sơn would have for the Vietnamese Communist Party, George Dutton also proposes that the northern historians of had at their disposal a collection of dã sử or unofficial histories written by original inhabitants of Đàng Ngoài, and that these accounts of the Tây Sơn 7 Quang Trung left at least a collection of edicts, translations of which can be found on George Dutton s website George E. Dutton, The Tây Sơn Uprising: Society and Rebellion in Late Eighteenth-Century Việt Nam, (PhD dissertation, University of Washington, 2001), pp ; David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, p. 23; Văn Tân, Quốc Sử Quán Triều Nguyễn với Khời Nghĩa Tây Sơn [The National History Office of the Nguyễn Dynasty and the Tây Sơn Uprising], NCLS 65 (August 1964), pp ; Hoa Bằng, Chung Cục của Triều Tây Sơn và Những Thủ Đoạn Trả Thù Tàn Bạo của Bọn Phản Động Nhà Nguyễn [The End of the Tây Sơn Dynasty and the Violent and Revengeful Acts of the Nguyễn Reactionaries], NCLS 105 (December 1967), pp Dutton, The Tây Sơn Uprising, p

10 were largely neutral or positive, as the northern population had contact with a Tây Sơn regime that was relatively stable and the experiences that they had were not bad. 10 Regardless of the causes of the portrayal, post-colonial historiography in the DRV depicted the Tây Sơn not only as agents of armed resistance against foreign aggression, but also as leaders of a peasant rebellion. From the 1950s, Quang Trung stopped being studied for himself as a historical actor; rather, he came to represent the Tây Sơn movement that had by this time become infused with the idea of being a peasant revolution. 11 On top of being a symbol of a popular movement in pre-colonial Vietnam, Nguyễn Huệ and the Tây Sơn were also the protectors and unifiers of the Vietnamese territory, firstly by wresting control from the Trịnh and Nguyễn, and secondly by resisting foreign invaders, both Chinese and Siamese, brought in by the feudal elements to try to wrest back power. 12 These characteristics of the Tây Sơn discourse represented salient concerns in the political sphere of the 1950s and 1960s, where Vietnam was divided both along ideological and physical lines. The Tây Sơn brothers were portrayed as a peasant 10 Ibid., pp See, for example, Duy Minh, Vai Trò của Khởi Nghĩa Nông Dân Trong Quá Trình Phát Triển của Dân Tộc [The Role of Peasant Uprisings in the Development of the Nation], NCLS 81 (December 1965), pp. 3-7, 10; Minh Tranh, Khởi Nghĩa Tây Sơn và Sự Hình Thành Dân Tộc Việt Nam [The Tây Sơn Uprising and the Formation of the Vietnamese Nation], VSĐ 24 (January 1957), pp. 6-18; Trần Thanh Tâm, Một Số Tài Liệu Bằng Chữ Viết Mới Tìm Được về Mấy Cuộc Khời Nghĩa ở Miền Núi Nghệ Tính [Newly Discovered Written Documents about Some Uprisings in the Nghệ Tính Mountain Region], NCLS 50 (May 1963), pp ; NCLS 51 (June 1963), pp See, for example, Văn Tân, Ai Đã Thống Nhất Nước Việt Nam: Nguyễn Huệ hay Nguyễn Ánh? (Trả Lời Ông Nguyễn Phương báo Bách Khoa ở Sài-gòn) [Who had Unified Vietnam: Nguyễn Huệ or Nguyễn Ánh? (Answer to Mr Nguyễn Phương, Bách Khoa, Sài Gòn], NCLS 51, (June 1963), pp. 3-11; Trần Huy Liệu, Những Yếu Tố Thắng Lợi của Trận Lịch Sử Đống Đa [Factors Contributing to the Victory Won at the Historic Battle of Đống Đa], VSĐ 38 (March 1958), pp. 1-7; Văn Tân, Quang Trung Nguyễn Huệ và Napoléon, Hai Nhà Quân Sự Thiên Tài [Quang Trung Nguyễn Huệ and Napoleon, Two Military Geniuses], NCLS 58 (January 1964), pp and 59 (February 1964), pp

11 movement as was fitting to northern ideological leanings, and the portrayal of Nguyễn Huệ as the unifier of the country secured the DRV s vision of Đại Việt as the form of precolonial Vietnam, where the Vietnamese state was fragmented only on the elite political level, and not on the local ground level, and the Tây Sơn brothers were trying to achieve what the people wanted: unification and the peace that would come with it, as they would no longer have to be involved in the internecine fights between the feudal lords. 13 In the process of using the symbolism of the Tây Sơn to their benefit in the DRV, Nguyễn Ánh came to take on the opposite symbolism. He represented the Nguyễn Dynasty, considered reactionary and ideologically anathema to Party historians, and historians in the DRV consistently portrayed him negatively. 14 Party historians cited an elite form of Confucianism as the cause of the failure of the Nguyễn Emperors and the imperial court, which led to its failure to prevent the loss of the country. 15 Văn Tân accused Nguyễn Ánh of being eager to bring the serpent into the chicken coop (lăm le cõng rắn cắn gà nhà) as he sought Siamese help against the Tây Sơn forces. He also blamed Nguyễn Ánh for collaborating with the French by sending his young son to France with Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine, who signed a treaty at Versailles in 1787 on 13 Văn Tân, Về Bài Chung Quanh Vấn Đề, pp Refer to Bruce Lockhart, Reassessing the Nguyễn Dynasty, Crossroads 15,1 (2001) pp for a discussion of the DRV s negative treatment of the Nguyễn Dynasty in the period For examples from the NCLS, see: Nguyễn Phan Quang và Đặng Huy Vận, Tìm Hiểu Chế Độ Lao Dịch và Binh Dịch Dưới Triều Gia Long ( ) [A Study of Labour Servitude and Military Conscription Under Gia Long ( )], NCLS 80 (November 1965), pp ; Văn Tân, Chế Độ Phản Động của Nhà Nguyễn [The Reactionary Regime of the Nguyễn Dynasty], NCLS 95 (February 1967), pp and 97 (April 1967), pp See, for example, Nguyễn Khác Viện, Confucianism and Marxism, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam (Berkeley, California: Indochina Resource Center, 1974) p. 42; Trần Văn Giàu, Tìm Hiểu Thiên Đạo Quan của Triều Đình và của Các Nhà Nho Trong Thời Nguyễn [An Attempt to Understand the Cosmology of the Nguyễn Court and its Confucian Scholars], NCLS 120 (March 1969), pp. 3-22, 48; Trần Văn Giàu, Lịch Sử Quan của Triều Đình và Nho Gia Trong Thời Nguyễn [The Conception of History of the Nguyễn Court and its Confucian Scholars], NCLS 125 (August 1969), pp ,

12 behalf of the Nguyễn that offered trade privileges and ceded Đà Nẵng and Poulo Condore in exchange for French support. Although the French support never came and the territories were never ceded, Văn Tân argued that things would have turned out differently had the French Revolution not happened. 16 Most of all, Nguyễn Ánh had to bear the sins of crushing the Tây Sơn movement, which had been heralded as a true expression of the power of the people. Much of the literature from the DRV emphasized numerous peasant rebellions associated with the Nguyễn Dynasty, among them the Phan Bá Vành, Lê Văn Khôi and Tây Sơn rebellions, inferring from them the people s dissatisfaction with the rulers. 17 Nguyễn Huệ Quang Trung, representing the Tây Sơn movement, was thus presented as a hero by historians in the DRV, and Nguyễn Ánh Gia Long his nemesis. The dilemma of southern historians Historians in the DRV, however, did not have a monopoly in supplying meaning to historical events and actors, and RVN historians also inserted their own judgment into the historical narratives. As was discussed in Chapter One, the RVN could be seen as the successor of the Nguyễn state, and where the northern dã sử were generally kinder to the 16 Văn Tân, Về Bài Chung Quanh Vấn Đề, pp ( eager to bring the serpent, p. 4). 17 See, for example, Chu Thiên, Mấy Nhận Xét Nhỏ về Những Cuộc Nông Dân Khởi Nghĩa Dưới Triều Nguyễn [A Few Small Observations on Peasant Rebellions during the Nguyễn Dynasty], NCLS 19 (October 1960), pp ; Hoa Bằng, Cuộc Khởi Nghĩa ( ) Do Phan Bá Vành Lánh Đạo [The Rebellion ( ) Led by Phan Bá Vành], NCLS 83 (February 1966), pp ; Hoa Bằng, Một Số Cuộc Khởi Nghĩa Lẻ Tẻ Đầu Thời Nguyễn [A Number of Scattered Uprisings at the Beginning of the Nguyễn Era], NCLS 109 (April 1968), pp ; Hương Sơn và Cần Mẫn, Thêm Một Số Tài Liệu về Cuộc Khởi Nghĩa Phan Bá Vành [More Information on the Phan Bá Vành Rebellion], NCLS 153 (November-December 1973), pp ; Minh Tranh, Phong Trào Nông Dân Trong Lịch Sử Xã Hội Phong Kiến Nước Ta [Peasant Movements during the Feudal Period of our Country], VSĐ 3 (October 1954), pp. 6-20; Nguyễn Phan Quang, Thêm Mấy Điểm về Cuộc Bạo Động Lê Văn Khôi ( ) [Some New Points on the Insurrection of Lê Văn Khôi ( )], NCLS 147 (November-December 1972), pp

13 Tây Sơn personages, the Nguyễn Dynasty chroniclers were highly critical of the people who had effectively broken two hundred years of Nguyễn control over Đàng Trong for a period of two decades. Bibliographical dictionaries of historical personages published in Sài Gòn in the period were generally favorable towards the Nguyễn family from Nguyễn Hoàng onwards, focusing on the contributions of each Lord in turn, but neglected the Trịnh family altogether. 18 This focus on the Nguyễn Dynasty was in line with the southern conception of Đại Nam as the representative of the pre-colonial state, and the high profile of the Nguyễn family in southern narratives of Vietnamese history was reflective of the role the family had played in the history of the southern half of Vietnam from the time when Nguyễn Hoàng moved south and initiated the formation of the precolonial entity of Đàng Trong. Historians in the RVN generally portrayed Gia Long the most brilliantly of all the members of the Nguyễn family, for through him contemporary claims to power over the whole of the Vietnamese territory could be made. Nguyễn Phương presented Gia Long as the father of the modern Vietnamese nation who had unified the country from the peripheral southern region. Because his power base had been in the south and Gia Long was considered the father of modern Vietnam, parallels could be drawn to the contemporary situation to emphasize the south as the legitimate historical and modern 18 Trương Bửu Lâm. Review of Nguyễn Huyền Anh, Việt nam danh nhân tự điển [Bibliographical Dictionary of Vietnam], (Hội Văn hóa Bình dân, Sài Gòn, 1961) in VNKCTS 3 (June 1962), p

14 power center. 19 Historians in the RVN were also critical of Party historians claims that Gia Long was part of the exploitative class of a feudal society, arguing firstly against applying universalizing terms to Vietnamese history, and secondly that starting from Gia Long s reign, the court officials had in fact been drawn from the ranks of the common people, and no longer had to be of royal blood (người hoàng tộc), nor did they necessarily have to be from the Thanh Hoá region. 20 While the general mood of the publications in Sài Gòn was positive towards the Nguyễn Dynasty and especially Gia Long, there was an undercurrent of another view, which judged the dynasty more negatively. In Chapter Two s discussion of the anticolonial resistance that was taking place at the close of the nineteenth century independently of the central Court s command, there was evidence of anti-monarchical tendencies in some of the writings. Many of these, however, did not deal explicitly with Gia Long and instead concentrated on Tự Đức who was in power at that time, and in so doing did not implicate Gia Long. 21 Among those who did directly target Gia Long were Phạm Văn Sơn and Nguyễn Đăng Thục. Phạm Văn Sơn had accused Gia Long of shamelessly using the slogan of assisting the Lê ( phù Lê ) to take the throne in Vietnam, 22 and Nguyễn Đăng Thục suggested that the Nguyễn family had lost its mandate to rule Đại Việt as Gia Long had brought in a foreign invasion when he had sought Siamese help against the Tây Sơn. Interestingly, both Phạm Văn Sơn and Nguyễn 19 Nguyễn Phương, Ai Đã Nhất Nước Việt Nam: Nguyễn Huệ hay Nguyễn Ánh? [Who Had United Vietnam: Nguyễn Huệ or Nguyễn Ánh?], BK 149 (15 March 1963), p Phan Khoang, Xã Hội Việt Nam Trước Đây Có Phải Là Phong Kiến Không? [Was Vietnamese Society Before This Necessarily Feudal?], SĐ 6 (April-June 1967), pp See, for example, Nguyễn Xuân Thọ, Tình Hình Chính Trị Việt Nam, pp ; Trần Quốc Giám, Thái Độ Của Triều Đình Huế, pp Phạm Văn Sơn, Nguyễn Trung Trực, p

15 Đăng Thục were originally from the north and emigrated to the south in Phạm Văn Sơn s accusation against Gia Long was also inaccurate, for phù Lê was actually Nguyễn Huệ s when he had first captured the northern territories, and Gia Long did not actually come into conflict with the Lê the Tây Sơn brothers had first taken over the Lê/Trịnh territories in the north, and Gia Long effectively conquered the territories from the Tây Sơn heirs and not the Lê. More subtle is Tạ Chí Đại Trường s treatment of the conflict, where he termed the years as a period of civil war. The use of the term civil war constituted a rather revisionist view of the conflict for a southern historian, as it gave the Tây Sơn brothers legitimacy as equal players in the quest for power, rather than viewing them as an over-glorified group of bandits. It also recognized a level of popular support for the Tây Sơn brothers that was not typically acknowledged in the Sài Gòn publications, while falling short of glorifying the peasantry as a part of a popular movement. 23 The use of the term civil war in the context of Vietnam was also interesting, as it was a politically charged term. The DRV had worked to maintain the image that the Vietnamese were not fighting each other but that it was a case of the American puppets against the Vietnamese and hence carefully avoided using the term to describe the conflict. The usage of the term by historians in the RVN could perhaps be indicative of their view of the contemporary conflict Tạ Chí Đại Trường, Lịch Sử Nội Chiến ở Việt Nam: từ 1777 đến 1802 [The History of the Civil War in Vietnam: from 1777 to 1802] (Sài Gòn: Văn Sử Học, 1973). 24 Văn Tân (Hà Nội) and Nguyễn Phương (Sài Gòn) had also briefly used the term civil war, Văn Tân in accusing Nguyễn Ánh of starting one with the bringing in of foreign troops, and Nguyễn Phương in claiming that the Tây Sơn brothers had provoked civil war in rising against the Nguyễn. Refer to Nguyễn Phương, Nguyễn Phương, Ai đã thống nhất nước Việt nam, BK 148, pp

16 The overall mood in publications in the RVN, however, was generous towards the Nguyễn Dynasty, especially Gia Long. Another consideration for the generally positive treatment is that the Nguyễn Dynasty was closely associated historically to the southcentral region as the imperial capital had been in Huế; in the RVN, Huế was considered the center for research on history and hence perpetuated the positive view of the Nguyễn Dynasty. 25 The favorable sentiments towards Gia Long in the central region extended also to oral histories, and overzealous accounts had even credited him with resisting Chinese invaders an act which he never had the opportunity to perform. 26 The general favor shown to the Nguyễn Dynasty would imply a bias against the Tây Sơn regime, as their existence on the historical stage was in direct conflict with the Nguyễn Lords. Southern historians in , however, had to be balanced in their portrayal of the Tây Sơn because the latter were heroes to a segment of the population in the RVN. The brothers were from Qui Nhơn, which lies to the south of the seventeenth parallel and thus within the boundaries of the RVN, and they could not simply be treated as villains in southern narratives of Vietnamese history. Casting them as villains would risk alienating some segments of the population in the RVN, where legends of Nguyễn Huệ and his family had survived and been handed down so that they were still alive in the contemporary period Trần Kỳ Phương, personal communication. 26 Le Ly Hayslip with Jay Wurts, When Heaven and Earth Changed Places (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 30. My thanks to Nola Cooke for pointing out this anecdote. 27 Quách Tấn, Di Tích và Truyền Thuyết về Nhà Tây Sơn [Vestiges and Tradition Concerning the Tây Sơn], SĐ 9-10 (January-June 1968), pp ,

17 Social bandits have been elevated to the status of heroes in many cultures. Stories of heroes that sound like Robin Hood appear in many cultures, and in some these social bandits even become kings. 28 For a segment of the population, Vietnam had its own bandit king in the stories of the Tây Sơn brothers. Nguyễn Nhạc, the eldest brother, was described as a great king of the bandits (đại vương của bọn thảo khấu) after he fled into the mountains. 29 Nhạc (was) the Biện lại (an administrative position) in Vân Đồn pass, and was known as Biện Nhạc. He was a generous person and had a passion for gambling. After losing all the money belonging to the community he ran into the forest and assembled a few hundred people, who usually looted in the surrounding areas. Officers of the regions avoided them, thus creating a force that grew larger everyday, and Nhạc was left alone to be a king in the mountain area. 30 Bandits, however, come into or rather go out of society largely because of power changes, as power is more subject to sudden changes than economic or social structures. 31 The ability of a bandit to stage a social disturbance of this scale usually suggested that the legitimate government, in this case the Nguyễn Lord, was either unable to extend his control to the entire territory, or else the yoke of the overlord was too heavy to bear. The Tây Sơn revolt came about in a period of social tension, as the Trịnh and the Nguyễn were unable to manage the difficulties that the society as a whole was facing. 28 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits, rev. ed. (reprint ed., London: Abacus, 2001), pp Tô Nam Nguyễn Đình Điệm, Nguyên Nhân của Ngày Giỗ Trận và Lý Do Hưng Vong của Nhà Tây Sơn [Factors of the Battle Anniversary and the Reason for the Fall of the Tây Sơn], SĐ 9-10 (January-June 1968), p Ibid., pp The author cites the information as coming from sources such as the Hoàng Lê Nhất Thống Chí (The Unification Records of the Imperial Lê, hereafter HLNTC) and the Hậu Lê Toản Yếu. Dutton, The Tây Sơn Uprising, p. 40 has a translation of a similar passage which he cites from the HLNTC vol. 1, p Hobsbawm, Bandits, p

18 Their revolt, being staged in such circumstances, presumed to speak for society in general and hence they were no longer mere bandits but social bandits. Social bandits can be seen as local heroes, or heroes of the people, and sometimes their status gets elevated to national heroes. The Tây Sơn case is one such example, and Phạm Văn Sơn claimed that they liberated their fellow countrymen in the southern region from the yoke of Trương Phúc Loan, an official of the Nguyễn, and were and are still considered national heroes of Vietnam. 32 The problem of the inherent conflict in discussions of Nguyễn Ánh and Nguyễn Huệ did not stop southern historians from writing about the Tây Sơn, in particular Nguyễn Huệ, who eventually ruled under the name Quang Trung. Where Nguyễn Nhạc was used to epitomize the banditry of the early Tây Sơn years, Quang Trung came to be discussed in more positive light, and an issue of the Sử Địa was dedicated to him, and another to his victory at the battle of Đống Đa. 33 At first glance, Quang Trung seemed to be unproblematically part of the Southern pantheon of heroes, as he was called a symbol of a heroic person, 34 and although heavily criticized by the Nguyễn Dynasty, king Quang Trung is still a hero of the Việt people. 35 Yet on other occasions Quang Trung was portrayed as a divisive force in Vietnamese history, especially when he is discussed together with Nguyễn Ánh Gia Long. 32 Phạm Văn Sơn, Những Điểm Đặc Biệt về Nguyễn Huệ [Special Characteristics of Nguyễn Huệ], SĐ 13 (January-March 1969), p The two issues are: Đặc Khảo về Quang Trung (SĐ 9-10) and Đặc Biệt về Đống Đa (SĐ 13) 34 Lá Thư Tòa Soạn [Introduction], SĐ 9-10 (January-June 1968), p Tạ Quang Phát, Vưa Quang Trung Qua Chính Sử Triều Nguyễn [King Quang Trung Through the Annal of the Nguyễn Dynasty], SĐ 9-10 (January-June 1968), p

19 To be able to reconcile the conflicting images of Quang Trung and to fit them into the southern narrative of Vietnamese history, historians in the RVN took a multi-faceted approach in dealing with him. This was done by discussing Quang Trung in two separate contexts: firstly, the issue of whether he or Nguyễn Ánh had unified the country, a debate where Nguyễn Ánh would usually take center-stage; and secondly the battle of Đống Đa, where Quang Trung could be venerated. This next segment will look at these two issues in turn, and through it show how RVN historians cast Quang Trung as both a hero and a villain in their plots of Vietnamese history. Unification of Vietnam: Nguyễn Huệ vs. Nguyễn Ánh The glowing portrayal of Nguyễn Ánh Gia Long at the expense of Nguyễn Huệ Quang Trung is best seen in the debate Who unified Vietnam: Nguyễn Huệ or Nguyễn Ánh? ( Ai đã thống nhất nước Việt nam: Nguyễn Huệ hay Nguyễn Ánh? ). This was a hotly contested issue and became full-blown in a battle of words between Nguyễn Phương from Sài Gòn, and Văn Tân from Hà Nội in the 1960s. The debate first started with an article by Văn Tân in 1959, where he had argued for Nguyễn Huệ as the rightful unifier of Vietnam. 36 Nguyễn Phương then pitted one against the other in Bách Khoa, and argued the case for Nguyễn Ánh to be honoured as the person who had unified Vietnam Văn Tân, Mấy Ý Kiến Đối Với Quyển Nước Việt Nam, Lịch Sử và Văn Minh cửa Ông Lê Thành Khôi [Some Opinions about the Book Việt Nam: History and Culture by Mr. Lê Thành Khôi], NCLS 7 (September 1959), p. 20. Văn Tân had criticized Lê Thành Khôi s presentation of Gia Long as the unifier of Vietnam in Lê Thành Khôi, Le Việt Nam, Histoire et Civilisation (France: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1955) 37 Nguyễn Phương, Ai Đã Nhất Nước Việt Nam, BK 148 (1 March 1963), pp and 149 (15 March 1963), pp

20 Vietnam can be considered to have been unified in either 1786 or 1802, depending on whether one attributes this feat to Quang Trung or Gia Long. Nguyễn Phương, taking the side of Gia Long, contended that in 1786 the year Nguyễn Huệ had seized control from the Nguyễn in the south and had defeated the Trịnh in the north Vietnam was not yet a unified territory. Phương proposed that unification should mean that the entire territory of Vietnam was governed by one power or authority, but in the year 1786 the Lê king was still in control of Bắc Hà, essentially resulting in Vietnam being ruled by two kings, the Lê in the small northern territory and Nguyễn Nhạc elsewhere. 38 Nguyễn Phương argued further that in 1786 there were actually four countries on the Việt territory. One portion was still under the Lê king, and the three Tây Sơn brothers each had one separate part of the territory. In 1787, Nguyễn Huệ had tried to capture Bắc Hà from the Lê at about the same time as when Nguyễn Ánh had tried to recapture Gia Định. Unfortunately for the Tây Sơn brothers, Nguyễn Lữ lost Gia Định to Nguyễn Ánh before Nguyễn Huệ could capture Bắc Hà from the Lê, and hence even if one considered the Tây Sơn brothers as a collective unit, Nguyễn Phương argued that the entire Việt territory had never fully been under their control. He thus concluded that the unification of Vietnam was only really achieved with the comeback of Nguyễn Ánh in 1802, when one supreme power ruled the entire territory, and there were no divisions 38 Nguyễn Phương, Ai Đã Nhất Nước Việt Nam, BK 148, pp

21 such as that which existed in the Lê/Trịnh-Nguyễn period when Vietnam had one king and two lords, or in the time of the Tây Sơn, which saw several kings on the territory. 39 Historians in the RVN also had to address the Party historians criticisms that Nguyễn Ánh practically invited foreigners to invade Vietnam by appealing for Siamese help and using French mercenaries to restore his power. Nguyễn Phương argued that the Tây Sơn were also against unification since they had first provoked civil war by rising against the Nguyễn Lords. He also pointed out that the practice of using foreign forces was not confined to Nguyễn Ánh alone, but had been prevalent worldwide. 40 Tạ Chí Ðại Trường also addressed the issue of appealing for foreign help, and he presented the case that Nguyễn Ánh had been wary of the Siamese, for even though Siam-Việt relations showed signs of improvement, it was not good enough for Nguyễn Ánh to believe that Siam had forgotten past feuds. He argued that other countries had also been forming alliances and this finally pushed Nguyễn Ánh to request reinforcements from Siam, even though he had initially been cautious about doing so. 41 According to Trường, Siam had to choose between supporting Nguyễn Ánh or the Tây Sơn, and he suggested that their support for the former gave him international legitimacy over Nguyễn Huệ. Trường thus achieves two aims: first to argue that Nguyễn Ánh was not the only one trying to get foreign help, and second to emphasize that it was the 39 Ibid., pp Ibid. 41 Tạ Chí Ðại Trường. Chiến Thắng Nguyễn Huệ Trước Viện Binh Xiêm-la [Nguyễn Huệ s Victory Over the Siamese Expedition], SĐ 9-10 (January-June 1968), pp ; (past feuds with Siam) p. 52, (alliance with Siam) p

22 Siamese who sought an alliance with him and the not other way around. 42 Eventually, it was the weakness and excesses of the Siamese army that caused the fall of the southern region to the Tây Sơn rather than any brilliant strategy that could be attributed to the latter, but Nguyễn Ánh was not one to lose hope and continued to wait for the opportunity to defeat the Tây Sơn. The debate was not, however, solely concerned with supplying an accurate historical account of events surrounding the conflict between the Tây Sơn and the Nguyễn; it also was a reflection of the projection of contemporary motivations onto historical events. Referring to the political leanings of Văn Tân, Nguyễn Phương alleged that he had used the Tây Sơn to legitimize the communist regime, so that everything the Tây Sơn, in particular Nguyễn Huệ, did was good and everything good had to be done by Nguyễn Huệ. He charged that although Văn Tân assumed the Tây Sơn to be the leaders of a peasant uprising, historically there was no record that class-consciousness was already present amongst the peasants at the time. He also questioned the motives of the Tây Sơn brothers in their uprising, challenging that they were only trying to take over as kings and hence perpetuate feudalism. In short, Nguyễn Phương accused Văn Tân of projecting a twentieth-century ideology (tư tưởng) and facts (sự việc) onto the eighteenth century. 43 In response, Văn Tân counter-argued that Nguyễn Phương s arguments were as politically motivated as his own, aiming to legitimize the contemporary Sài Gòn regime 42 Ibid., p Nguyễn Phương, Ai Đã Nhất Nước Việt Nam, BK 148, pp

23 and to justify their use of American aid to kill their fellow countrymen. He noted that historical study is a discipline that is intimately linked with politics, hence the question of who unified Vietnam was not only a problem of history, but also a political problem and a problem of current events. 44 So far the case has been presented for a preference in the RVN for Nguyễn Ánh, but as established earlier in the chapter, Nguyễn Huệ could not be dismissed as a villain for he represented a hero for a segment of the population that lay in the territory of the RVN. The battle of Đống Đa is one event that has typically been discussed to showcase Nguyễn Huệ s military feats. The next segment explores how some historians in the RVN used this battle to portray him as a national hero without placing him in conflict with Nguyễn Ánh, while others have maintained his heroic status but have tempered the veneration through discussions of other historical actors who contributed to this victory. Quang Trung and the Battle of Đống Đa The battle of Đống Đa took place in 1789 between the troops of the Tây Sơn led by Nguyễn Huệ, and Qing troops that were on Vietnamese soil at the request of the Lê king, Lê Chiêu Thống. Quang Trung, who managed to repel the Qing troops from Vietnamese territory, is typically glorified in narratives of this event, but this battle is in fact contentious. The enemy was not only an invading Chinese army, but was one that was in Đại Việt for Lê Chiêu Thống s aid. Although the Lê Dynasty had already been on the decline for some time and the Trịnh and Nguyễn Lords had effectively been 44 Văn Tân, Ai Đã Nhất Nước Việt Nam, p

24 administering Đại Việt, Lê Chiêu Thống had still been maintained as a symbol of the head of the country. Nguyễn Huệ, in attacking the Chinese troops, was effectively attacking the emperor of Vietnam and not just the Nguyễn and Trịnh Lords. For historians in the RVN, however, the protagonists of this battle, Quang Trung and Lê Chiêu Thống, did not present a contradiction. They did not have a special place for the Lê Dynasty in their narratives of Vietnamese history, and the narration of the battle of Đống Đa provided some historians in the RVN with the opportunity to show Nguyễn Huệ as a national hero of the Việt people. Nguyễn Đăng Thục described Nguyễn Huệ s entry into the battle of Đống Đa as a fight against the invaders for the national cause as a hero of the nation. He argued that Quang Trung gained victory because he managed to reach the spirit and traditional beliefs of the peasants and of the nation (dân tộc), and that the mandate of justice was with him because the hearts of the people were with him. 45 Praise for Quang Trung extended to comparing his military genius to Napoleon; Nguyễn Ngu Í noted that the people were very happy for he had thrown off the foreign invaders, and the Việt army of Quang Trung could happily return to celebrate Tết in Thăng Long. 46 Lê Chiêu Thống, on the other hand, had inherited the mandate that had been with the Lê family for over three hundred years, but had lost it because he sought help from 45 Nguyễn Đăng Thục, Trận Đống Đa với Chính Nghĩa Quốc Gia [The Battle of Đống Đa and the National Cause], SĐ 9-10 (January-June 1968), pp , ( fight against invaders, p. 10 and spirit and traditional beliefs, p. 11.) 46 Nguyễn Ngu Í, Nguyễn Huệ, hay là Giấc Mộng Lớn Chưa Thành [Nguyễn Huệ, or the Unsuccessful Dream], BK 28 (1 March 1958), p

25 China and brought foreign troops into Đại Việt. 47 He was even described as a boot-licker (người liếm gót) who presented the Qing army with the opportunity to use the excuse of saving the Lê Dynasty in order to invade Thăng Long. 48 There were, however, historians in the RVN who maintained sympathy for the Lê, at the expense not of Quang Trung but of the Trịnh Lords. To express sympathy for the Lê, Nguyễn Đình Điệm pitted Lê Chiêu Thống not against Nguyễn Huệ but against the Trịnh Lords, emphasizing the emperor s young age and the oppression and tyranny (áp bức) he experienced at the hands of the Trịnh. 49 The author was thus able to retain Quang Trung s position in southern narratives of the battle of Đống Đa while still expressing his sympathy for Lê Chiêu Thống. Nguyễn Đình Điệm also published a very interesting article on the battle of Đống Đa which diluted the usual veneration of Quang Trung. While the battle has generally been used to glorify Quang Trung and his troops, this article argues that Nguyễn Nhạc, the eldest of the Tây Sơn brothers, and Nguyễn Hữu Chỉnh, who made trouble for them, should also be considered for a share of the glory. Điệm credited Nhạc with maneuvering the political situation by convincing the invading Trịnh armies that he would serve the Trịnh and so was able to consolidate his own forces and await a better time to take control of power. He was then able to lead his brothers and men to conquer the southern territories, was successful in holding off suspicions from the north, and eventually created the opportunity for Nguyễn Huệ to attack and win the northern territories Nguyễn Đăng Thục, Trận Đống Đa, pp Nguyễn Ngu Í, Nguyễn Huệ,, BK 30 (1 April 1958), p Tô Nam Nguyễn Đình Điệm, Trái Tim Bất Tử Lê Chiêu Thống [The Immortal Heart of Lê Chiêu Thống], SĐ 13 (January-March 1969), pp Tô Nam Nguyễn Đình Điệm, Nguyên Nhân của Ngày Giỗ Trận, pp

26 In assigning Nguyễn Nhạc a share of the glory, Điệm was emphasizing the nature of banditry in the Tây Sơn rebellion, as he had come to epitomize that aspect of the Tây Sơn. It can be argued that Điệm was merely portraying the Tây Sơn as a group, which was not out of the ordinary, for by the 1950s and 1960s the brothers had come to be associated in historiography as a movement and a group rather than as individuals. He went on, however, to also glorify Nguyễn Hữu Chỉnh, often portrayed as a Tây Sơn betrayer, for discovering the route to victory in the north. Điệm described Chỉnh as a dragon that rose from Nghệ An ; a man of military and literary genius who had acquired a reputation even in the mountains where the Tây Sơn had their base. He had been in the services of the Trịnh, but when there rose unrest among the soldiers and a fellow official and his family was killed, Chỉnh fled to the Tây Sơn district and was recruited into the Tây Sơn troops. Nguyễn Nhạc had been interested in extending his power to conquer the northern territories previously belonging to the Nguyễn Lords but had been unable to find a suitable way, and Chỉnh outlined a way for him. Nguyễn Nhạc then sent Chỉnh to conquer the territory in the north that was still under the Lê ruler, but Chỉnh instead made use of the Tây Sơn to try to gain power for himself. He was eventually captured, and even though the act was one of betrayal, he had effectively opened the road to victory for the Tây Sơn. 51 Điệm thus proposed that the anniversary of the battle of Đống Đa should see the commemoration not only of the people who had a direct hand in the battle, i.e. Quang Trung and his troops, but also the people who indirectly shaped the course of the battle 51 Ibid., pp

27 and the final victory. 52 In introducing both Nguyễn Nhạc and Nguyễn Hữu Chỉnh, he diluted the usual veneration given to Nguyễn Huệ, typically praising his military genius and his work in repelling the foreign invasion. The Tây Sơn Dynasty was short-lived and eventually collapsed within twenty-one years, because of the good and bad feelings between the Tây Sơn brothers. 53 In placing the cause of the fall of the Tây Sơn on the shoulders of the brothers themselves, Điệm effectively moved blame away from Nguyễn Ánh, who would eventually crush the Tây Sơn and became the emperor Gia Long. Conclusion Different perceptions of the past resulted in different conceptions of the precolonial form of the Vietnamese state, and hence Nguyễn Ánh Gia Long and Nguyễn Huệ Quang Trung came to be associated with opposing symbolisms in narratives of Vietnamese history published in the DRV and the RVN. While the situation was not complex in the DRV, and Quang Trung could be a hero representing the power of the peasantry while Gia Long was the villain representing the exploitative feudal class, there were more complications in the RVN. Historians in the RVN had much to gain from portraying Gia Long favorably, as the Nguyễn Dynasty s fortunes were closely linked to the southern region and represented the dominance of the southern half of Vietnam. The historical conflict that the Nguyễn family had with the Tây Sơn brothers dictated that the latter had to play the 52 Ibid., p Ibid., p