BERING SEA ALEUTIAN ISLANDS CRAB RATIONALIZATION: A LOOK AT EFFECTIVENESS IN TERMS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS. Alexandra Bateman May 5, 2014

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1 BERING SEA ALEUTIAN ISLANDS CRAB RATIONALIZATION: A LOOK AT EFFECTIVENESS IN TERMS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS Alexandra Bateman May 5, 2014

2 THE AREA

3 BSAI CRAB FISHERIES Nine separate stocks comprised of five different species: red king crab blue king crab golden king crab tanner crab snow crab Current management: BSAI crab rationalization was implemented January 1, 2005

4 1990s HISTORY OF WESTERN AK CRAB FISHERIES Overcapitalization of fishery wide spread Dangerous fishing practices because of race to fish 80 fatalities between 1991 and 2005 (Fina et al. 2008) 1997 Creation of Limited License Program (LLP) Eligibility based on historic involvement in fishery Implementation of seasons lengths to limit harvest Actually perpetuated and magnified issues from early 1990s Quality of processing declined because of flood of crab to industry

5 HISTORY OF WESTERN AK CRAB FISHERIES CONT. Case: 2002 Bristol Bay red king crab License holders fished for only 68 hours Harvested more than 8.5 million pounds of crab 2002 prices: $6.80/pound, average gross revenue per vessel was more than $200,000. (Fina 2003) Implications: sudden and massive influx of landings brought to processors prior to rationalization

6 CURRENT SYSTEM: RATIONALIZATION Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) based fishery program Program goals: enhance resource conservation, improve economic efficiency, increase safety for fishermen, and create regional sustainability and equity (Federal Register 2005). Three-pie system Harvester quota shares to eligible vessel owners Harvesting quota shares to eligible crew Processing quota shares to eligible processors Community Development Quota assigned to eligible communities for development opportunities

7 SHARE ALLOCATIONS Harvester Quota Shares Individual Fishing Quotas 10% 10% 3% 90% 87% Class A Class B Class A: Caught by IFQ holders, but must be delivered to PQS holding processors. Class B: Caught by IFQ holders, and can be delivered to any processing facility CDQ Communities IFQ for Eligible Crew IFQ for Elibile Vessel Owners

8 THE CASE: DECREASE IN LOCAL OWNERSHIP/ STAKEHOLDERS Vessel buyback program also implemented on January 1, Downsized fleet by 25 vessels (Fina 2005). Implications: fewer stakeholders in fishery Only captains received harvest quote share for eligible crew. Fewer number of deckhands needed because fewer number of boats Roughly 900 jobs in Bristol Bay red king crab fishery and 450 jobs in Bering Sea snow crab fishery lost (Knapp 2006).

9 THE CASE: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMUNITY IMPACTS Positive: CDQ allocations Negatives: King Cove case decreased # of boats in harbor = decrease in harbor and dock fees King Cove rates: $50/day for boats, $60/day for boats, $1.05/ crab pot loaded and unloaded using their dock (Knapp and Lowe 2007) King Cove saw decline of roughly 45 boats (Knapp and Lowe 2007) Large decrease in revenue

10 THE CASE: OPINIONS LOCAL COMMUNITIES 6 major concerns: job loss, fewer fishing options, lack of opportunities for younger generations, over complication of program details/ lack of transparency, processor allocations, future rationalization of other fisheries. DECKHANDS Overwhelming displeasure with program

11 THE CASE: OPINIONS CONT. PROCESSORS In favor: Allows for increased efficiency, improved quality of delivered fish, less deadloss GOVERNMENT In favor: economic drivers, safety Against: reduction of market competition because of processor quotas

12 ANALYSIS Fishermen and managers don t fall into traditional environmentalist v.s. cornucopian dichotomy Economic incentive highly used to sell fishermen on idea of rationalization pre Processor quota shares actually decrease economic drive and market competition. Less competition = lower ex-vessel price

13 WHAT WENT WRONG I believe: Communication By fostering open and respectful lines of communication, could rationalization have been implemented differently and received by local communities better? Was there a time where the collective minds of local communities were made up? If there had been more consideration about local input in the planning stage, could rationalization have been more effective?

14 SOURCES Federal Register Rules and Regulations. Vol. 70, No. 40. March 2. Retrieved from Fina, Mark Development of Rationalization Programs in the North PaciJic GroundJish and Crab Fisheries. National Fishery Law Symposium, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle Washington. Fina et al Three- year Review of Crab Rationalization Program for BSAI crab Jisheries. National Marine Fisheries Service. Retrieved from PDFdocuments/cathc_shares/Crab/3yearreview1208.pdf. Fina, Mark Rationalization of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab Jisheries. Marine Policy, 29: Knapp, Gunnar Selected economic impacts of BSAI Crab rationalization on Kodiak Jishing employment and earnings and Kodiak businesses: a preliminary analysis. Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Anchorage Alaska, Anchorage, Alaska. Knapp, Gunnar and Lowe, Marie Economic and Social Impacts of BSAI Crab Rationalization on the Communities of King Cove, Akutan, and False Pass. Aleutians East Borough, City of King Cove.