Basic Discussion Points for the Preparatory Meeting. Dr. Michael Hoefer, DEU

Transcription

1 Basic Discussion Points for the Preparatory Meeting Dr. Michael Hoefer, DEU

2 How would you expect the alarm to be raised and the response by authorities in Town X to be initiated? Automatic alarm system On site (acoustic and silent at PD/FD) At storage site (Gas detector) Plant firefighters supported by local first responders

3 Who would be in charge? What protocols would be used to coordinate the different actors and how would leadership be ensured? Head of firefighters, as long as first responder situation Incident commander stays in charge as long as situation not cleared Coordination thru local control center Leadership by same Comm equipment

4 Which national agencies would respond to the incident? What measures do they need to take? What response protocols do they use? What would be their respective role? Acc to principle of subsidiarity Local state federal Emergency respond: BBK (Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance) THW (German Federal Agency for Technical Relief) Red Cross (Bundeswehr) Security respond: Federal police Intelligence respond: Federal intelligence services

5 What could (and should) have been done in advance of this attack to prevent this situation arising? Reduce stored amount of HAZMAT corresponding to estimated threat area, Establish sophisticated security and warning system, Disaster plan for facility and community, Information of local police, plant manager (and security firm) about imminent threat, Raise security measure (police patrolling)

6 What are the national regulations to engage border/regional cooperation or international agencies to mitigate the results of the release? Embedded in EAPC, EU, NATO Bi-/trinational agreements in place UN

7 What are the national regulations /legal and administrative/ and procedures to request and utilize assistance provided by international /border/regional and international organizations/? EAPC (NBG and minimum standards) NATO/EU country: SOFA in place w/ other member states UN-OCHA

8 Back-Up NEWS warning and reporting; Chlorine HPAC plot real weather; Chlorine Clinical picture (Pulmonary edema)

9 First Response (mil.) Simplified CHEM-/ROTA- prediction Concentration on-site Specialized equipment of first responders Haz-Mat specialists Initiate evacuation measures Detailed CHEM-/ROTA- prediction Medical counter measures One Haz-Mat hospital w/ one entrance

10 Warning & Reporting (NBC Analysis) dispersion Results w/ NBC Analysis (ERG 2008) ROTA 3 CHEM ALFA: GE/033/001/RC// CHARLIE: ZSEP2010// FOXTROT:32UNE173096/AA// GOLF: OBS/TPT/1/CON/XLG// INDIA: SURF/1017/NP/OTH/OTH// PAPAR: 600M/16000M// PAPAX: ZSEP2010/32UNE173096// YANKEE: 180DGG/007KPH// ZULU: 7/20C/5/0/-// 16 km dispersion At 24 min Exclusion area 600 m

11 Warning & Reporting (NEWS) dispersion results w/ NEWS (ERG 2004) Exclusion area = 275m Hazard area = 13600m 3 km underline: 24 Min. city outskirts 27 Min. smell 30 Min. wounded 40 Min. death

12 1 st evaluation (HPAC) Assumption: 20 t of liquid chlorine stored in an unsupported container Explosion occurs inside target Worst case situation In that case due to explosion kg of chlorine will be expelled, other 5+ ton of material will stay on ground as a pool (as shown below)

13 1 st evaluation (HPAC)

14 1 st evaluation (HPAC) In 25 minutes the leading edge of toxic cloud can reach Town population could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic 1,9 km nonsensory effects 3,1km 2,7 km

15 1 st evaluation (HPAC) weather and terrain: possible injuries amongst sensitive population in 30 minutes possible 6,9 km 6 km 3,5 km 2,2 km 3,1 km

16 1 st evaluation (HPAC) In 30 minutes concentration from released liquid chlorine (either in vapor or liquid phase) expected to evolve as pictured. 2,9 km 3,7 km 4,1 km Population in the perimeter of town could be affected w/ irreversible or long lasting health effects.

17 1 st evaluation (HPAC) 3,7 km 4,3 km 2,6 km 7,2 km 8,3 km

18 1 st evaluation (HPAC) 1,75 km 5,2 km 7,2 km 8,2 km

19 HPAC Assessment results Worst case assumed: Erruptive explosion) Release of huge chlorine amount into air Casualty estimate: Aggregate state of chlorine, meteorological conditions and distance between town and plant Severe injuries In short term death is unlikely Long term exposure to toxic cloud could result in death

20 Medical: Pulmonary edema Clinical picture: Latency up to 24hrs, Medical conditions may be missing at the beginning, Prefinal: spume at the mouth due to edema bubbles (very stable; phospholipidfilm), Death cause: suffocation. Clinical picture is hard to control as alveolar structure is anatomically damaged. Mortality: high. Therapy: Sedation (e.g. Diazepam 2-10mg) Oxygen (starting w/ 4-8 L/min, after that depending on blood gas analysis) inhalative Glucocorticoids asap (e.g. Dexamethason 5 puffs / 10min) if necessary, Glucocorticoids i.v. (Prednisolon 250mg)