Paddles. monthly BAD SITUATION. October Don t Press a Bad Situation. Discussion of a near mishap following an FRS/TRACOM CQ detachment

Transcription

1 BAD SITUATION LSO SCHOOL LCDR MONKEY PARKS DISCUSSES A NEAR MISHAP FOLLOWING A RECENT CQ DET... October 2013 WRONG SETTING CVW-11 PADDLES LT YOKEL O KELLY DISCUSSES THE DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFYING A HORNET VS A SUPER HORNET... Paddles A D D R E S S I N G T H E N E E D S O F T H E L S O C O M M U N I T Y T H R O U G H S A F E T Y D I S C U S S I O N S, O P E R A T I O N A L U P D A T E S, A N D H I S T O R I C A L R E A D I N G S. BAD SITUATION monthly Don t Press a Bad Situation Discussion of a near mishap following an FRS/TRACOM CQ detachment We ve all been told by our skipper or CAG that cruise isn t over until all the jets are put to bed and everyone has made it home. The same mentality applies to any detachment. Carrier aviation is a dangerous business and tragedy is always lurking nearby. We correctly use ORM and thorough briefing to cover the main evolution. Occasionally, we gloss over a fly-off plan or follow-on ops after the main body has departed the detachment. With fewer personnel and sometimes a loss of focus following a job well done, the administrative portion following a detachment can often be the most dangerous. Following a recent CQ detachment, a COD had a hook-slap that likely would have been avoided if the players involved had slowed down, followed rules that were in place, and didn t try to force a landing that likely could have waited for improved conditions. All but one of the CQ LSOs had departed the carrier, leaving behind a single TRACOM LSO to wave the CODs as the ship made it s way back into port. The gist of the near mishap is as follows: The COD arrived for his scheduled overhead with approximately 45 minutes of loiter time. The carrier was operating Case III due to precipitation that reduced the visibility. The COD pilot reported clear conditions within five miles of the ship s current position. There was one wing qualified LSO acting as the walk-off LSO following the CQ evolution and fly-off of FRS and TRACOM personnel. On approach, the COD experienced a problem with the windshield wipers that compounded an already reduced visibility situation. Following the wave-off call from the LSO, the aircraft s hook struck the ramp, failed to engage a CDP, and returned to the beach uneventfully. (continued on page 2)

2 2 BAD SITUATION (cont) The first point worth discussing is conducting Case III operations if better visibility was in the vicinity. Without being on the pickle, on the bridge, or in the cockpit, there is no way to know how bad the visibility was, the schedule/pim that the carrier was trying to maintain, or the availability of better weather. It is best to not second guess someone s decision when we don t have all the facts. If better weather was close by and loiter time for the carrier was available, conducting flight ops without reduced visibility is preferred. Yes, we conduct flight operations all the time in less than ideal conditions and sometimes in poor conditions, that doesn t mean that we should if another option exists. The next discussion item is from the cockpit. Again, without being in the plane there is no way to know how the lack of windshield wipers in conjunction with already reduced visibility was hampering the pilot s ability to fly the pass. Most of us have the I can hack it mentality, and to some extent that is not a bad thing. Around a carrier, if not managed appropriately, that mentality can be fatal. There is nothing wrong with asking to discontinue an approach to troubleshoot a system to increase one s available visibility. It is unknown if the windshield wiper issue was relayed to the ship or paddles. It absolutely needs to be. That piece of information may change the decision to continue with a recovery, or seek better conditions. Regardless, it will certainly help the LSO on the platform wave more effectively. Last but not least, follow the rules! Two LSOs are required for Case III operations. This isn t a suggestion, this is a requirement listed in Chapter 6 of LSO NATOPS. This requirement exists because LSO workloads during Case III operations increase. Workload during low visibility, from both a pilot and an LSO perspective, increase dramatically. As the sole walk-off LSO, it is our responsibility to ensure that the leadership of the carrier knows that they are limited to Case I/II operations when only a single LSO is left behind. We ve all seen the PLATCAM videos at LSO School covering low visibility recoveries, Paddles must bring their A game and this is not the time to break the rules and roll solo. Additionally, we need to ensure we are working on our waving skills while we are qualifying our students. All Paddles need to rotate through the established positions during these CQ evolutions. As the walk-off LSO, we need to ensure that we wave from both the controlling and back-up position during the det. Many times during TRACOM CQ, the squadron LSO only waves from the controlling position as they focus on their students and monitor their progress. We must also take the time to become comfortable with the back-up position, monitoring the LSODs, assessing the PLAT, and working with SATCC before we are alone and unafraid on the platform following the fly-off. This same point can be made regarding the instructor currency evolution that follows CQ. If we have only controlled for the last few days, our back-up scan might be a bit rusty. This is unacceptable. Aircrews deserve our absolute best each and every pass. Get comfortable and competent while the platform is fully manned with all the skill and experience of the TRAWING and Force Paddles before we (often the junior LSO) are the last one on the platform. As always, it is easy to Monday morning quarterback a near mishap. Anyone can line up the Swiss cheese in the above scenario. The what-ifs are easy to identify. If they had found better weather, or if there had been two LSOs, or if the pilot had cried uncle and came around for a second attempt, this likely would have been avoided. We were lucky this time. We might not be so lucky the next time. Don t press a bad situation. Chances are that there is plenty of time and fuel available to delay. LCDR Monkey Parks 2

3 3 WRONG SETTING Bottom line, we landed a Super on a Hornet weight setting These are the words that every CAG LSO hopes to never write in an to Force Paddles. How did this happen? That question is easy to answer. How to eliminate it from ever happening again is a more difficult question to answer. The incident happened on the last day recovery of the airplan, making the sun angle a challenge. I got up to the flight deck just as the first aircraft was being launched. As I approached the platform, one of my paddles informed me that the IFLOLS was going to be down due to an issue with the stabilization gyros. This is something that has occured multiple times during our deployment. While we do a lot of training on MOVLAS, I usually have my team leads and assistant team leads on the stick, so I hadn t personally waved MOVLAS in awhile. I didn t know how long the lens would be down so I decided to take the stick in order to warm up for the night recoveries. As the last aircraft was launched off the waist, the first section was already in the break. The Air Boss called over the 5MC to rig MOVLAS as dash one arrived at the 180. With the sun on the horizon, the hook spotter did not see the Super Hornet Day ID light and called all down hornet, gear lens set 360 Hornet, foul deck. With our Hornet squadrons assigned 2K in the stack, there is a subconscious expectation that they will be the first in the overhead. Since the first section did a nice job breaking the deck, time compression began to take effect. MOVLAS was rigged and the datums came on as dash one was between the 90 and 45. I looked over my shoulder to check the cut and waveoff lights, but neither worked. The MOVLAS lights did not power up until the aircraft was inside the 45. My back-up s pickle worked, so I yelled for him to give the aircraft cut lights. 17 seconds later, after an uneventful pass, the aircraft trapped. I was unaware we landed the Super Hornet on the wrong weight setting until the Air Boss called down. Like I said earlier, how this happened is an easy question to answer. How do we eliminate this from happening again, is a more difficult question to answer. You would think with the multiple safety layers in place, landing an aircraft on the wrong weight setting would be nearly impossible. As with any mishap, the cause isn t a single mistake but a multitude of failures that align in time and space. In the 45 seconds it took for the first aircraft to get from the 180 to the start, every possible safety layer failed to operate effectively. The following is my thoughts on the different layers that failed. The first and most important layer that failed was me. As CAG paddles, we are the first and last line of defense in preventing dangerous situations from developing in the carrier landing environment. I do not agree with those who say the only person you can trust is yourself. If we don t have trust in the LSOs we train, then we as CAG Paddles have failed. With that said, we must realize that everyone is human and susceptible to mistakes. I had two senior LSOs backing me up and neither recognized the impending situation, likely due to a combination of expectations, environmental conditions, and time compression. But how did I put them in this situation? Once I felt behind, I should have assumed that the less experienced paddles waving with me also felt behind. This is the moment when I should have waved the aircraft off. It may sound cliché, but WAVEOFFS ARE FREE!! We must have the awareness to realize that if CAG paddles is 3 (continued on page 4)

4 4 WRONG SETTING (CONT) behind, everyone else is way behind. Every CAG paddles has battled the feeling of should I wave this aircraft off, or should I try to catch it. Resist the temptation of thinking you are invincible. I promise we are all fallible and it can be a painful lesson to learn. When the sun angle creates challenging conditions, we think about clara line-up and clara ship calls. We get ourselves mentally prepared for this every time we have a late afternoon recovery. What about the day ID light? With the sun on the horizon and positioned right at the 180, no one on the platform or in the tower saw the day ID light. Was it on? I am not sure. Does it matter though? Train your back-ups to visually identify Supers Hornets and legacy Hornets as they come around the approach turn. Discuss the intakes and LEX which are easy to ID once the aircraft is in the groove. Do not rely on what the hook spotter is saying. As the back-up, you need to visually confirm what the hook spotter is calling. They are looking for one thing, and that is the day ID light. If they don t see a day ID light, they will call all down Hornet. Speaking of hook spotters, as paddles, we own their training. We must ensure that they are not just going through the motions. They must be incorporated as integral members of the team. Teach them about the different aircraft and what to look for. One key feature about the Super Hornet that landed on the wrong gear setting was that it was a two seat cockpit; an easily identifiable feature with a pair of binoculars. The peanut gallery can be a huge asset. Most of the peanut gallery noticed that Super Hornets were the first aircraft in the break but failed to comprehend the fact the hook spotter called all down Hornet. We must train and force the peanut gallery to stay engaged. They often have the greatest perspective with what is going on. They have the opportunity to scan the entire platform, pattern, and landing area at their own pace, potentially picking up on things no one else notices. (LSO School: The hook spotter s call and the backup s reply must be loud enough for the entire platform, including the peanut gallery, to hear.) The tower did not see the day ID light. I am not going to speak on the Air Boss s behalf, but he still questions if the light was even on. Like I said before, the ID light is only one layer. Another layer was a wing qualified LSO in the tower who came to me afterward claiming he saw that it was a Rhino in the groove with the wrong weight setting set. As you can imagine I was a little baffled as to why he did not say anything to the Air Boss. Should I even expect a tower representative to be a safety layer? I will let you come to your own conclusion regarding that. As LSOs, we are vulnerable to a disruption in habit patterns when waving MOVLAS. Make sure when you brief MOVLAS, you brief the risk associated with the change in habit pattern on the platform. The controlling LSO does not have his hand above his head when the deck is foul. This is when the LSO team needs to be at the top of their game. (LSO School Note: If using MOVLAS station 2 or 3, the only pickle that works is the controlling LSO.) Talking to multiple CAG paddles after this event, they mentioned the dangers of landing planes on a foul deck and the pressure to press the wave-off window. Don t fall victim to pressure, either real or perceived. It would have taken only one person to stop this serious event from occurring. At the end of the day, it lies on us, as LSOs, to recover aircraft safely. After the recovery the only thing I wanted to do was sit down, drink a beer, and put a dip in. But the airplan must be executed and there is still waving to be done. We have to live by the mantra, SAFE RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT!! Nothing else matters. LT YOKEL O KELLY 4

5 W h a t s a h e a d IFGT: December (almost full) February TFGT: December AFGT: January Call us to schedule Air Boss: November December January All classes begin at 0900 on the convening date, building 150, NAS Oceana. Orders should be handled through squadron or CAG admin. Contact YN1 Gates with any administrative questions. 5 The 90 s called they want their sunglasses back. P o i n t s o f C o n t a c t LSO School OIC CDR Matt Potzo Pothier DSN: Comm: matthew.pothier@navy.mil LSO School Safety / NATOPS LT Dave BEKE Frank david.m.frank@navy.mil LSO School Admin LCDR Aaron Monkey Parks aaron.parks@navy.mil LSO School Operations LCDR Jason Doofus Duffie jason.duffie@navy.mil CNAL Force LSO (AIRLANT) LCDR Brooks Finch Cleveland Comm: brooks.cleveland@navy.mil CNAP Force LSO (AIRPAC) LCDR Thomas Beater Conklin Comm: thomas.r.conklin1@navy.mil CNATRA Force LSO LCDR James Notso Breitenfeld Comm: james.breitenfeld@navy.mil LSO School Senior Enlisted Advisor ABEC Christopher Hinson DSN: Comm: christopher.b.hinson@navy.mil LSO School Admin YN1 Tamika Gates DSN: Comm: tamika.gates@navy.mil LSO School Facility Manager ABE1 Keith Hogan DSN: Comm: keith.hogan@navy.mil Visit us online at comnavairfor/lso Happy Halloween!!! Comments or questions? LCDR Aaron Monkey Parks at aaron.parks@navy.mil with ideas or suggestions F Avenue Building 150 NAS Oceana Virginia Beach, VA 23460