SKIFF PS, BRIGANTINE BG & BR SEAFOX 4

Transcription

1 LM0584 SKIFF PS, BRIGANTINE BG & BR SEAFOX 4 COMBINED OPERATIONS SAFETY CASE SHELL U.K. EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION

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3 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case The Custodian of this document is the Duty Holder, Shell UK. Exploration and Production, 1 Altens Farm Road, Nigg, Aberdeen, AB12 3FY by whom any amendment or alteration must be approved. Distribution is controlled by the Information Management Section, AJS Great Yarmouth, to whom any enquiry relating to this document's currency or distribution should be addressed. This document is edited by the Operations Manager West EP Europe, ans an accountable party for the activity. This document is edited by the Operations Manager, Workfox (UK) Ltd, James Watt Close, Gapton Hall Industrial Estate, Great Yarmouth, NR31 0NX, to whom any enquiry or comment on the Mobile Installation content must be addressed. Rev. 3 i

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5 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case Shell (Offshore) signatories Leman Field Rev. 3 ii

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7 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case Shell (Offshore) signatories Sole Pit Field Rev. 3 iii

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9 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case Shell (Onshore) signatories Rev. 3 iv

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11 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case Seafox 4 signatories Rev. 3 v

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13 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 DISTRIBUTION LIST PAPER COPIES COPY No NAME INDICATOR 1 HSE (Norwich) 2 Interface Engineer EPE-P-ED 3 Leman Field /Supervisor EPE-P-OW 4 Sole Pit Field /Supervisor EPE-P-OW 5 Shell Representative 6 Seafox 4 OIM's 7 Workfox BV 8 Safety Engineer EPE-P-ED 9 Interface Team (Wormald) 10 Marine Supervisor (Assen) EPE-P-LM CD ROMS COPY No NAME INDICATOR 01 HSE (Norwich) 02 HSE (Norwich) 03 HSE (Norwich) 04 Leman Field Safety Reps. EPE-P-OW 05 Sole Pit Field Safety Reps EPE-P-OW 06 Seafox 4 Safety Reps. 07 Workfox (Gt Yarmouth) 08 Seafox 4 Safety Engineer 09 Shell Representatives 19 ESSO 11 G. Horton (Wormald) 12 DNV 13 ABS Rev. 3 vi

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15 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 AMENDMENT RECORD Revision Part Section Name Ref. Ind. Signature Date 1 A1 1 S. Sayer ONG-TJT S. Sayer 15/04/ A1 1 A3 A4 1 S. Sayer ONG-TJT S. Sayer 20/10/03 3 All P. J. Smith P. J. Smith 23/08/04 The person incorporating the amendment must complete the Amendment Record Rev. 3 vii

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17 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case CONTENTS Pages Part 1 Introduction and Summary Section 1 Introduction to Section 2 Summary to Part 2 Description of Installations Section 1 Names, Type and Location of Installations to Section 2 Fixed Installations Description to Section 3 Mobile Installation Description to Section 4 Combined Installation Description to Section 5 Emergency Facilities and Arrangements to Section 6 Helicopter Access to Section 7 Safe Limits of Operation to Part 3 Safety Management System (SMS) Interface Arrangements Appendices Section 1 Fixed Installation SMS Overview to Section 2 Mobile Installation SMS Overview to Section 3 SMS Co-ordination Principles to Section 4 SMS Interface Arrangements to Section 5 SMS Interface Arrangements (Emergency Situations) to Section 6 Investigating and Reporting of Incidents to Section 7 Monitoring, Auditing and Corrective Action Follow-up of the SMS Interface to Operation and Programme Section 1 Operation Summary and Purpose of the Combined Operation A1.1.1 to A1.1.4 Section 2 Personnel On Board Requirements A1.2.1 to A Hazard Assessment Section 1 Fixed Installations Hazards A2.1.1 to A2.1.8 Section 2 Mobile Installation Hazards A2.2.1 to A2.2.4 Section 3 Combined Operation Hazard Identification A2.3.1 to A Section 4 Hazard Assessment A2.4.1 to A Drawings Fig. A3.1 to Fig. A3.9 Skiff PS A3.3 to A3.11 Fig. A3.10 to Fig. A3.18 Brigantine BG A3.12 to A3.20 Fig. A3.19 to Fig. A3.27 Brigantine BR A3.21 to A Simultaneous Operations Section 1 Simultaneous Operations A4.1.1 to A4.1.6 Section 2 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR /Seafox 4 Common Services A4.2.1 to A4.2.2 Rev. 3 viii

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19 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case Preface The work to achieve the objectives described in this Combined Operations Safety Case (COSC) is presented in six parts. The preliminary pages to these parts include the Authority to Issue, amendment record, revision status, contents, accountabilities and abbreviations. This preface describes the COSC structure and accountabilities. Part 1 Introduction and Summary The Introduction states the purpose of the COSC, the names of the installations, their owners or operators and the duration of the combined operation. The Summary provides a brief description of the installations, an outline of the programme, the safety management system (SMS) arrangements, an analysis of the additional hazards and conclusions with respect to the safety of the proposed combined operation. Part 2 Description of Installations Part 2 identifies the location of the fixed installation and the type of mobile installation contracted; additionally it describes the installations separately then, in the combined operations mode. Details of the emergency facilities and arrangements, helicopter access and limits of safe operation are also described. Part 3 Safety Management System (SMS) Interface Arrangements Part 3 describes the SMS arrangements of the individual installations and the SMS arrangements agreed between the owners/operators of those respective installations for the combined operation. It covers the management of routine operations and emergency situations. Appendices 1 Operation and Programme Appendix 1 provides an overview of the programme of activities with descriptions of the combined operation and its objectives. Details of the approach and position of the mobile installation for simultaneous operations. 2 Hazard Assessment Appendix 2 reviews the levels of risk for the fixed and the mobile installations as stand alones. Then the additional hazards and risks to personnel when operating as a combined installation are identified and assessed to reach an ALARP conclusion. 3 Drawings Appendix 3 contains the drawings for each of the interfaces showing the Muster Points and TEMPS Locations, Geophysical Plan and Elevation of each interface, Hazardous Areas Plan and Elevation for each of the combined operations, the Escape Routes on the Fixed Installations and the Restricted Flight Paths to the Mobile Installation. Rev. 3 ix

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21 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Preface (Continued) 4 Simultaneous Operations Appendix 4 contains definitions of the various activities that will be undertaken and lists the rules that will govern the activities that can be performed simultaneously. It is intended as a guide for the onshore planning of activities by, Engineering and Production Programming. In addition it acts as a reference for the personnel offshore for the day-to-day execution and co-ordination of any simultaneous operations. 5 Supplementary Signature Pages Appendix 5 contains the supplementary signature pages, which will be required for subsequent visits by the Mobile Installation to the Fixed Installations for approval of the changes to the initial submission. Note - This appendix will be added at the time of any subsequent visits. Rev. 3 x

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23 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 SAFETY CASE ACCOUNTABILITIES AND REVIEW The Duty Holder Shell UK is the custodian of the Combined Operations Safety Case (COSC). He is responsible for ensuring that any changes to the COSC are agreed and confirmed within Shell UK. and with the mobile installation owner/operator at the appropriate level and that they are formally documented. It is not anticipated that there will be a review cycle. ABBREVIATIONS ALARP CAA CONDAM COSHH COSC DCR EDP EERA EPR ESD ESDV ESSA FAR FEA F&G FRT GA GSG HSE HS&E ICC IRPA LCC LOLER LOS LWC MAPS MAR MRT MTC NRP NUI OIM PA PAPA PFEER PLL POB As Low As Reasonably Practicable Civil Aviation Authority Construction (Design and Management) Regulations Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Combined Operations Safety Case Design and Construction Regulations Emergency Depressurisation Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis Explosion Protection Review Emergency Shut Down Emergency Shut Down Valve Emergency System Survivability Analysis Fatal Accident Rate Fire and Explosion Analysis Fire and Gas Field Response Team General Alarm Gas Supply Group Health and Safety Executive Health, Safety at Work and Protection of the Environment Installation Control Centre Individual Risk Per Annum Local Control Centre Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations Line Of Sight Lost Workday Case Movements and Personnel System Management and Administration Regulations Marine Response Team Medical Treatment Case Nominated Responsible Person Normally Unattended Installation Offshore Installation Manager Public Address Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm Prevention of Fire, Explosion, and Emergency Response Potential for Loss of Life Personnel on Board Rev. 3 xi

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25 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 ABBREVIATIONS (Continued) POPM PTW QRA RWC Platform Operating Procedures Manual Permit to Work Quantitative Risk Assessment Restricted Workday Case SAR Search and Rescue SCA Structural Consequence Analysis SEQOPS Sequential Operations SI Statutory Instruments SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations SIPM Shell International Petroleum Maatschappij B. V. SMS Safety Management System SNAME Society of Naval and Marine Engineers SPS Surface Process Shutdown SSSV Sub Surface Safety Valve SSIV Sub Surface Isolation Valve TEMPSC TPS TR UKOOA UOS UPS WOAD Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft Total Platform Shutdown Temporary Refuge United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association Unplanned Overnight Shelter Uninterruptible Power Supply Worldwide Offshore Accident Data bank Rev. 3 xii

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27 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operation Safety Case Supplementary Signatures This item is included to provide for signatures of key personnel who may change during the progamme of Combined Operations. Position Name Ref. Ind. Signature Date Rev. 3 xiii

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29 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section 1 LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operations Safety Case Part 1 - Introduction and Summary Contents Section 1 Introduction 1. Combined Operations Safety Case Objectives Strategy Hazard Assessment Safety Management System Assessment Implementation of All Reasonably Practicable Upgrades Section 2 Summary 1. Introduction Overview of the Installations Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR (Fixed Installations) Seafox 4 (Mobile Installation) Operations and Sequence Safety Management System Definition Management of Combined Operations SMS Arrangements for the Co-ordination of Emergency Situations Management Organograms Hazard Identification and Assessment Assessment of Additional Hazards Combined Temporary Refuge Impairment Management Assessment and Follow-up Conclusions List of Figures Fig Management Organogram Rev

30 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section 1 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Rev. 3

31 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section 1 LM0584 Section 1 - Introduction This Combined Operations Safety Case (COSC) is a formal assessment of each of the following platforms Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR and the Seafox 4 when operating as a combined installation. This assessment has been conducted by Shell UK. Exploration and Production and Workfox UK Ltd to assure themselves and the external Regulatory Authorities that the design and operation between the combined installations is consistent with the requirement for safe and responsible management. The Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR are satellite wellhead platforms defined as a Normally Unattended Installations (NUI s) that are jointly owned by Shell, UK. Limited 50%, and Esso Exploration and Production UK 50%. The Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR Platforms are all operated by Shell Expro. The purpose of the combined operation is to carryout the work scope as detailed in Appendix 1. During this combined operation the Mobile Installation OIM and the Shell Representative will assume full responsibility for each combined installation. The mobile installation OIM and the Shell Representative are assessed by one of the Nodal management team and are deemed to be competent in basic platform and production knowledge, sufficient to assume responsibility for the operation/monitoring of the fixed installation. This is recorded in Comp-itx, filed and maintained by Shell Expro. Note For any operational activities on the fixed installation, a suitably competent MRT team, including an OIM, will attend the fixed installation. Whilst on the fixed installation, the fixed installation OIM will be responsible for all operational activities only and he will report to the mobile installation OIM regarding these activities on the fixed installation. Seafox 4 is operated and managed by Workfox UK Ltd. It was originally designed as a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit and has been modified and redesigned as an accommodation and maintenance support vessel. The operators of the mobile installation have interfaced with Shell UK fixed installations previously in the Southern North Sea. This combined operation is considered to be a routine interface by Shell Expro. The COSC is effective from the entry of the mobile installation into the appropriate fixed installation s 500m zone. 1 Combined Operations Safety Case Objectives The objectives of the Combined Operations Safety Case are to demonstrate that - The Safety Management System (SMS) is adequate to manage the hazards present and for controlling the effects of minor incidents or accidents during the combined operation. All potential major hazards arising from the combined installation have been identified and the risks evaluated. Each installation has, or will have, a Temporary Refuge (TR) facility as well as adequate facilities for evacuation, which meet the Regulatory Authority criteria for impairment. Each Operator's SMS is adequate and ensures that statutory provisions are complied with on the installations and for activities connected with them. Adequate audit arrangements of the SMS and reporting are established. Measures have been, or will be, taken to reduce the risks to persons to the lowest level that is reasonably practicable. The management of safety on the installations will continue to be reviewed and improved. Rev

32 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section 1 2 Strategy A strategy has been employed to achieve the COSC objectives set out and to demonstrate the case for safety, based on the following key components. 2.1 Hazard Assessment Identification of all major hazards through a formal methodology and recording the same in a hazard register. (See the Fixed Installations and the Mobile Installation's Safety Cases). Identification of all major hazards, which affect the combined operation. Evaluation of these hazards through a combination of professional judgement, consequence analysis and formal Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). Examining the performance of the safety systems under hazard conditions. The assessment of the quantified hazards against corporate and regulatory authority criteria for both Companies. To demonstrate that all necessary remedial actions are taken to reduce the risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). To demonstrate that all personnel are provided with satisfactory Temporary Refuge (TR) facilities. 2.2 Safety Management System Assessment Identification of all the business processes involved with the combined operation. Definition of safety critical activities required to achieve the combined operation. Identification of the staff positions accountable for all of these activities. Analysis of the SMS against the hazards for the effectiveness of hazard controls by prevention, detection, protection/mitigation and escape/evacuation. 2.3 Implementation of All Reasonably Practicable Upgrades Throughout the hazard and SMS assessments the approach used is to identify and evaluate risk reduction upgrades for all procedural and installation design improvements. The implementation of upgrades is undertaken as quickly and as far as is reasonably practicable Rev. 3

33 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section 1 LM0584 Section 2 - Summary 1 Introduction The summary briefly describes An overview of the Fixed installations and the Mobile installation Operation and Sequence The Safety Management System (SMS) The hazard assessment process and results for the combined installations The conclusions drawn as to the safety of the combined installations 2 Overview of the Installations 2.1 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR (Fixed Installations) The Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR are minimum facilities, satellite wellhead platforms, Normally Unattended Installations (NUI s). Wet gas is exported from Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR through Intra Field pipelines via Nodal platforms for processing before being exported to Bacton. The Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR platforms are each designed as a four legged, piled, steel platform with integral well conductors, and slots for six wells. Each of the four legs has one slot located within. The other two slots are centrally enclosed within the jacket envelope. The wellheads are located on the main deck level adjacent to the production manifold, which is located on the North side of the platform. A full description of the installations can be found in Part 2, Section Seafox 4 (Mobile Installation) The Seafox 4 is a self-elevating, towed, offshore accommodation and support jack-up, equipped with 6 electrically powered legs. A full description can be found in Part 2, Section 3. A site-specific survey assessment will be carried out, in accordance with the SNAME 5.5A recommended procedure, for the Seafox 4 at the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and the BR locations. All recommendations included in the report will be complied with. 3 Operations and Sequence The forthcoming sequence of operations and work plan can be seen in Appendix 1 Operations and Programme Figure A Safety Management System 4.1 Definition The Safety Management System (SMS) employed on all installations, governs those activities to be carried out and is an integral part of the total management system. It is defined as the policies, objectives, organisational structure, responsibilities, standards, procedures, processes, controls and resources that are in place to manage safety in relation to those installations and their operation. Rev

34 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section Management of Combined Operations SMS The SMS for the Combined Operation is an extension of the Shell corporate SMS, which has been developed to interface with the corporate SMS of the mobile installation. The combined SMS encompasses all the elements, which must be in place to manage the combined operation to an acceptable level of safety and protection to the environment, additionally to comply with all relevant statutory provisions. The SMS for the fixed installations is described in the GSG Safety Management System Manual Doc. No. DS The SMS for the mobile installations is described in the Seafox 4's Vessel Specific Safety Case. The mobile installation OIM has particular responsibilities under law for the health, welfare and safety of all persons on both installations and for the safe conduct of all activities occurring within the 500m safety zones. The nature of the combined operation creates an overlap area and therefore an overlap of responsibility that could be a potential for conflicting instructions. During the combined operation the mobile installation OIM has the overall responsibility for the execution and co-ordination of any conflicting/interface work programme and to resolve any contentious issues (with assistance from the fixed installation OIM when present). The basic controls required to govern the combined operation are - All non-routine work on the installations will be controlled by the respective installation Permit To Work (PTW) system. - Deviations from the agreed programme will be notified immediately to the mobile installation OIM. - Activities on one installation that may affect the other will be controlled by an interface PTW. 4.3 Arrangements for the Co-ordination of Emergency Situations Any major emergency arising on either the fixed or mobile installation, the mobile installation OIM or his deputy will contact Bacton to make the fixed installation safe by initiating a TPS. The mobile installation OIM or his deputy, will then communicate all relevant information to the relevant Nodal OIM, who will respond as required to the emergency situation. All emergency response activities will be co-ordinated by the mobile installation OIM with assistance from the fixed installation OIM (when present). Communications will be established between the OIM's (as and when necessary) and every assistance provided to control the situation. The mobile installation will apply its own Emergency Procedures supplemented by additional Emergency Response Procedures. The mobile installation OIM is responsible for the safety and integrity of both installations and will therefore ensure that both installations are made safe (with assistance from the fixed installation OIM when present). The mobile installation OIM shall decide on the number and complement of the Emergency Response Team(s) (ERT) and shall determine the frequency for combined emergency drills, in line with the Statutory Regulations (with assistance from the fixed installation OIM when present) Rev. 3

35 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section 1 LM0584 The mobile installation OIM has the authority and responsibility for those vessels and helicopters, which operate to both installations (with assistance from the Fixed installation OIM when present). In the event of an incident within the overlap area (where the 500m safety zones of both installations overlap), the mobile installation OIM shall initiate the incident report in conjunction with the fixed installation OIM (when present). 4.4 Management Organograms Combined management organograms for the fixed and mobile installations can be seen at the end of this section Figure It shows the relationship and the reporting structure between the installations, offshore and onshore personnel. 5 Hazard Identification and Assessment To evaluate the hazards of the combined operation the following steps have been taken - - The identification and recording of all hazards associated with the interface through a qualitative review of the activities involved during the combined operation. - The evaluation of all hazards through a combination of professional judgement, consequence and frequency analysis to determine any additional risks to personnel on the fixed and mobile installations. - To assess those quantified hazards against corporate and regulatory authority criteria. - To provide an analysis of those identified hazards, in determining the effectiveness of hazard control by prevention, detection, mitigation, protection and if necessary evacuation. Each hazard identified has been reviewed against existing hazard analysis studies and QRA's for the fixed and mobile installations. The review has considered the change in operations on the jacket and in particular the differences in personnel distribution inherent with the interface; from this the risk of combined operations has been calculated in terms of Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) Potential Loss of life (PLL) and Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF). 5.1 Assessment of Additional Hazards Additional hazards for the combined operation are identified in Appendix 2. The risks to personnel from these hazards are assessed to demonstrate that they have been considered and that the risk to personnel is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). 5.2 Combined Temporary Refuge Impairment The hazard assessment demonstrates that any additional hazards associated with the combined operation will not significantly affect the TR/EER facilities on the installations. The TR for all personnel is the accommodation block on the mobile installation, alternative TR arrangements are available on the fixed installations should escape route to the TR be impaired. See Figures A3.1, A3.10 and A3.19 Muster Points and TEMPSC Locations in Appendix Management Assessment and Follow-up The nature of the combined operation does not significantly change the pattern or levels of risk to personnel, compared with those when the installations operate independently. It should be noted that there is a hydrocarbon risk; therefore the risks to personnel are high. The Safety Cases for both installations provide a thorough review of the separate facilities and SMS s; they have demonstrated suitable application of the principles of ALARP. 6 Conclusions The overall assessment is that these combined operations have no significant increase in risk to personnel. Rev

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37 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 1 - Introduction and Summary - Section 2 LM0584 MANAGING DIRECTOR ASSET LEADER (Assen) OPERATIONS DIRECTOR FINANCIAL ADJUNCT DIRECTOR OPERATIONS MANAGER WEST (Assen) FIELD SAFETY ADVISOR NODAL PLATFORM OIM QA/SAFETY MANAGER SECRETARY UK SECRETARY NL ACCOUNTS When no Fixed Installation OIM present ASSISTANT OPERATIONS MANAGER RIG MANAGER MATERIALS CO-ORDINATOR SHELL REPRESENTATIVE (OIM) MOBILE INSTALLATION OIM LEGEND- REPORTING INTERFACE FUNCTIONAL REPORTING SURVEY & INSPECTION TEAMS MAINTENANCE CREW SHELL ONSHORE SHELL OFFSHORE WELL MAINTENANCE CREW WORKFOX ONSHORE WORKFOX OFFSHORE Fig Management Organogram Rev

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39 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 1 LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations Contents Section 1 Names, Types and Location of Installations 1. Skiff PS (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BG (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BR (Fixed Installation) Seafox 4 (Mobile Installation) Location of the Combined Operation Section 2 Fixed Installations Description Skiff PS (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BG (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BR (Fixed Installation) Section 3 Mobile Installation Description Section 4 Combined Installation Description 1. Plans & Elevations Common Facilities and Connections Communications Personnel Transfer Bridge Lighting Navaids Station Bills Mobile Installation Approach and Positioning Well Status Sea-bed Surveys Mobile Installation Approach and Positioning Foundation Proximity Mobile Installation Footing Penetration/Stability Section 5 Emergency Facilities and Arrangements 1. Emergency Facilities Emergency Arrangements Alarms ESD Control Firewater Requirements Section 6 Helicopter Access Rev

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41 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 1 LM0584 Contents (Continued) Section 7 Safe Limits of Operation 1. Seafox Positioning Preloading Elevated Operational Elevated Survival Helicopter Operations Crane Operations Production Restrictions Approach and Positioning Locating onto the Fixed Installation Pulling Off Location Jacking/Production Operations References Communications with Bacton List of Figures Fig Location and Shipping Lanes Fig Fixed Installation Skiff PS Fig Subsea Pipeline Orientation PS Fig Fixed Installation Brigantine BG Fig Subsea Pipeline Orientation BG Fig Fixed Installation Brigantine BR Fig Subsea Pipeline Orientation BR Fig Mobile Installation Side Elevation Fig Plan of Tank Top and Main Deck Fig Plan of Levels of 1 to Fig Risk by Activity Graph Rev

42 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 1 Skiff PS Brigantine BG Brigantine BR Figure Location and Shipping Lanes Rev. 3

43 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 1 LM Skiff PS (Fixed Installation) Section 1 - Names, Types and Location of Installations Skiff PS is a minimum facilities, satellite wellhead, Normally Unattended Installation (NUI). The structure is a four leg, piled, steel wellhead platform with slots for six wells. The jacket was installed in April 2000 with production start-up in October The Platform stands in 24 metres of water and is located approximately 107 km North North East of Lowestoft, 72 km from Bacton and approximately 67 km from the nearest point on the Norfolk coast. The location of the fixed installation is 53 26' " North and 01 53' " East in block 48/20a of the UK sector. The orientation is 45 West of True North. The fixed installation has an accepted safety case (Skiff PS Installation PS ). 2 Brigantine BG (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BG is a minimum facilities, satellite wellhead, Normally Unattended Installation (NUI). The structure is a four leg, piled, steel wellhead platform with slots for six wells. The jacket was installed in August 2000 with production start-up in December The Platform stands in 29 metres of water and is located approximately 94 km North East of Gt. Yarmouth and 105 km from Bacton. The location coordinates are 53 24' " North and 02 39' " East and is situated in block 49/19 of the UK sector. The orientation is 45 West of True North. The fixed installation has an accepted safety case (Brigantine BG Project BG ). 3 Brigantine BR (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BR is a minimum facilities, satellite wellhead, Normally Unattended Installation (NUI). The structure is a four leg, piled, steel wellhead platform with slots for six wells. The jacket was installed in August 2000 with production start-up in June The Platform stands in 29 metres of water and is located approximately 98 km North East of Gt. Yarmouth and 109 km from Bacton. The location coordinates are 53 26' " North and 02 41' " East and is situated in block 49/19 of the UK sector. The orientation is 45 West of True North. The fixed installation has an accepted safety case (Brigantine BR Project BR ). 4 Seafox 4 (Mobile Installation) The Seafox 4 is a towed, self-elevating, self-contained offshore accommodation and support vessel. The rig has the classification of an A1 Self Elevating Support Unit from American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) for North Sea operations. A safety case for the mobile installation has been produced and accepted by the HSE. Rev

44 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 1 5 Location of the Combined Operations The combined operations will take place at each of the fixed installations position (See 1, 2 & 3. Fixed Installation). The location of each installation is well clear of established shipping lanes as can be seen on Figure Location and Shipping Lines. The nearest adjacent installations to the PS are the Galleon PN Platform, which is some 2.63km to the North North East, and the Clipper Complex 10.1km to the West North West of the Skiff PS Platform. The nearest adjacent installations to the BR are the BG which is some 5 km to the South West Indefatigable Mike, which is some 10 km to the South West, and the Indefatigable Juliet Platform which is approximately 12 km South South West of the Brigantine BR Platform. The nearest adjacent installations to the BG are the BR which some 5 km to the North East, the Indefatigable Mike, which is some 7km to the South West, and the Indefatigable Juliet Platform which is approximately 8.4km South South West of the Brigantine BG Platform. Subsea pipelines for each platform are shown on Figures 2.2.2, & Subsea Pipeline Orientation illustrations Rev. 3

45 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 LM Skiff PS (Fixed Installation) Section 2 - Fixed Installations Description Skiff PS is a four leg, with a well conductor in each leg, piled, steel wellhead platform. The main deck has a wellhead area for six wells heads located one at the top of each leg and two more centrally enclosed within the jacket envelope, a production manifold is mounted on the North side of the platform adjacent to the wellheads. Produced gas and liquids flow from the producing wells to a production manifold from where they are routed via an ESDV through a 12 inch subsea Intra Field pipeline to Clipper PM platform. Process control of Skiff PS is undertaken by the Control Monitoring System (CMS) from Bacton Control Centre. The 12-inch production riser and a 2-inch MEG line are clamped onto leg B1 (North East corner) of the Skiff PS installation; its orientation is such that it is unlikely to interfere with any combined operation. Power requirements for Skiff PS are normally provided by a sub-sea cable from the Galleon PN Platform via a J tube clamped onto leg A1 (North West corner) the supply voltage is 415/215V 50Hz ac. Safety systems on Skiff PS comprises fire detection by fusible plug, these fusible plugs are located adjacent to each individual wellhead Christmas tree and one adjacent to the ESDV, together with portable fire fighting appliances. A temporary deluge system covering the wellhead area will be installed for the duration of the combined operation. There are no permanent fire or gas detectors located on the fixed installation. The mobile installation's Manual Alarm Call point and the Fire and Gas detection systems will be extended to cover the fixed installation for the duration of the combined operation, together with audible alarms. Gas Detection for the combined operation is a stand-alone system located around the perimeter of the main deck, which will also alarm in the mobile rig radio room. Personal safety equipment comprises life buoys strategically placed around walkways and descender devices (S-Capes). For the duration of the combined operation two 8-man life rafts will be located on the Cellar Deck, together with sufficient lifejackets, immersion suits and descender devices to cover for 16 POB. The primary escape route for all personnel is to the mobile installation via the access bridge. In the event that the route is impaired then the Skiff PS TR/muster point should be used. A full description of the fixed installation can be found in the Skiff PS Safety Case (PS ) and should be referred to if further information is required. Rev

46 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 3" VENT PIPE UP FOG HORN WH. HYD. POWER UNIT (TYPICAL) WELLHEAD (TYPICAL) DOWN SAFETY EQUIPMENT CABINET FUTURE 12" RISER EQUIPMENT CABINET FUTURE DISTRIBUTION PANEL DOWN CONTROL PANEL NAVAID BATTERY & CONTROL PANEL LADDER MAIN DECK HELICOPTER SIGHT POLE DOWN EQUIPMENT LAYDOWN AREA FOR UNDERSLUNG HELICOPTER LOADS ORANGE DECK MARKING LADDER LAYDOWN AREA SAFETY NETTING HELICOPTER SIGHT POLE WEATHER DECK Figure Fixed Installation Skiff PS Rev. 3

47 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 LM0584 CABLE FROM GALLEON PN 12" GAS & 2" MEG LINE TO PM DOWN ORANGE DECK MARKING LADDER Figure Subsea Pipeline Orientation PS Rev

48 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Rev. 3

49 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 LM Brigantine BG (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BG is a minimum facilities four legged, piled, steel gas wellhead platform with one well conductor in each leg. The main deck has a wellhead area with provision for six wellheads. One is located at the top of each leg with two more centrally enclosed within the jacket envelope. A production manifold is mounted on the North side of the platform adjacent to the wellheads. Produced gas and liquids flow from the producing wells to a production manifold from where they are routed via an ESDV through a 20 inch subsea Intra Field pipeline to Corvette platform and on to the Leman A complex. The gas is then processed and routed to the existing 30-inch export pipeline from Leman A to Bacton. Gas production from BG is controlled and monitored from Bacton Installation Control Centre (ICC) via the Control and Monitoring System (CMS). Mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) dosed with corrosion inhibitor is injected into the export pipeline. The MEG is supplied from Leman Alpha via Corvette through a 4-inch diameter line, which is piggybacked to the gas pipeline. The 20-inch production riser and 4-inch MEG line are installed on the inboard side of leg A1. An import riser from the BR Platform to BG is located adjacent to leg B2, together with a piggybacked 4-inch line to supply MEG to BR. Orientation of the risers is such that they are unlikely to interfere with any combined operation. A sub-sea cable provides power requirements for Brigantine BG from the Corvette Platform via a J tube clamped onto leg A1. A 10kW load is available at 6.6kV (3 phase, 50Hz), which is transformed down to the distribution voltage of 415V. The subsea cable is designed with sufficient capacity to enable the future BR platform to be provided with a similar electrical service load. Safety systems on Brigantine BG comprises fire detection by fusible plugs, which are located within each hydraulic power pack and will detect fire in the form of excessive heat adjacent to the particular Christmas tree or valves. A temporary deluge system covering the wellhead area will be installed for the duration of the combined operation. There are no permanent fire or gas detectors located on the fixed installation. The mobile installation's Manual Alarm Call point and PA systems will be extended to cover the fixed installation for the duration of the combined operation together with gas detection. Gas Detection for the combined operation is a stand-alone system located around the perimeter of the main deck, which will also alarm in the mobile rig radio room. Personal safety equipment comprises life buoys strategically placed around walkways and descender devices (S-Capes). For the duration of the combined operation two 8-man life rafts will be located on the Cellar Deck, together with sufficient lifejackets, immersion suits and descender devices to cover for 16 POB. The primary escape route for all personnel is to the mobile installation via the access bridge. In the event that the route is impaired then the Brigantine BG TR/muster point should be used. A full description of the fixed installation can be found in the Brigantine BG Safety Case (BG ) and should be referred to if further information is required. Rev

50 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 PLATFORM NORTH 45 deg TRUE NORTH NAVAID (RED) 4" VENT LINE NAVAID (WHITE) FOG HORN SAFETY EQUIPMENT CABINET WH. HYD. POWER UNIT (TYPICAL) WELLHEAD (TYPICAL) PRODUCTION MANIFOLD 1 HV SWITCHGEAR DOWN 20" EXPORT RISER FUTURE TRANSFORMER FUTURE 20" BR IMPORT RISER 2 EQUIPMENT ENCLOSURE LADDER (UP) MAIN DECK LADDER (DOWN) NAVAID (WHITE) A B NAVAID (RED) DOWN HELICOPTER SIGHT POLE FOLD IN HANDRAILS 1 WEATHER DECK EQUIPMENT LAYDOWN AREA FOR UNDERSLUNG HELICOPTER LOADS LAYDOWN AREA SAFETY NETTING LADDER DOWN 2 HELICOPTER SIGHT POLE Figure Fixed Installation Brigantine BG Rev. 3

51 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 LM0584 PLATFORM NORTH TRUE NORTH 45 deg A B DOW N CABLE FROM CORVETTE 1 20" GAS EXPORT TO AND 4" MEG IMPORT FROM CORVETTE 20" GAS IMPORT FROM AND 4" MEG EXPORT TO BR LADDER DOWN 2 CABLE TO BRIGANTINE BR Figure Subsea Pipeline Orientation BG Rev

52 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Rev. 3

53 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 LM Brigantine BR (Fixed Installation) Brigantine BR is a minimum facilities four legged, piled, steel gas wellhead platform with one well conductor inside each leg. The main deck has a wellhead area with provision for six wellheads. One is located at the top of each leg with two more centrally enclosed within the jacket envelope. A production manifold is mounted on the North side of the platform adjacent to the wellheads. Produced gas and liquids flow from the producing wells to a production manifold from where they are routed through an ESDV and 20 inch subsea Intra Field pipeline to the Leman A complex via the Brigantine BG and Corvette platforms. The gas is processed at Leman A and then routed to the existing 30-inch export pipeline to Bacton. Gas production from BR is controlled and monitored from Bacton Installation Control Centre (ICC) via the Control and Monitoring System (CMS). Mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) dosed with corrosion inhibitor is injected into the export pipeline. The MEG is supplied from Leman Alpha via Corvette and Brigantine BG through a 4-inch diameter line, which is piggybacked to the gas pipeline. The 20-inch production riser and 4-inch MEG line are installed on the inboard side of leg A1. Orientation of the risers is such that they are unlikely to interfere with any combined operation. In stand alone mode Brigantine BR power requirements are provided by a sub-sea cable from the Corvette Platform via Brigantine BG Platform and a J tube clamped onto leg A1. A 10kW load is available at 6.6kV (3 phase, 50Hz), which is transformed down to the distribution voltage of 415V. Safety systems on Brigantine BR comprises fire detection by fusible plugs, which are located within each hydraulic power pack and will detect fire in the form of excessive heat adjacent to the particular Christmas tree or valves. A temporary deluge system covering the wellhead area will be installed for the duration of the combined operation. There are no permanent fire or gas detectors located on the fixed installation. The mobile installation's PA system will be extended to cover the fixed installation for the duration of the combined operation. A separate system of manual alarm call points has been provided on the platform to indicate in the mobile rig radio room. Gas Detection for the combined operation is a stand-alone system located around the perimeter of the main deck, which will also alarm in the mobile rig radio room. Personal safety equipment comprises life buoys strategically placed around walkways and descender devices (S-Capes). For the duration of the combined operation two 8-man life rafts will be located on the Cellar Deck, together with sufficient lifejackets, immersion suits and descender devices to cover for 16 POB. The primary escape route for all personnel is to the mobile installation via the access bridge. In the event that the route is impaired then the Brigantine BR TR/muster point should be used. A full description of the fixed installation can be found in the Brigantine BR Safety Case (BR ) and should be referred to if further information is required. Rev

54 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 PLATFORM NORTH NAVAID (RED) A B 4" VENT LINE 45 deg TRUE NORTH NAVAID (WHITE) FOG HORN SAFETY EQUIPMENT CABINET WH. HYD. POWER UNIT (TYPICAL) WELLHEAD (TYPICAL) PRODUCTION MANIFOLD 1 TRANSFORMER DOWN 20" EXPORT RISER FUTURE HV SWITCHGEAR FUTURE 2 EQUIPMENT ENCLOSURE LADDER LADDER (UP) (DOWN) MAIN DECK NAVAID (WHITE) NAVAID (RED) DOWN 1 HELICOPTER SIGHT POLE FOLD IN HANDRAILS EQUIPMENT LAYDOWN AREA FOR UNDERSLUNG HELICOPTER LOADS WEATHER DECK 2 RADAR REFLECTOR LADDER DOWN LAYDOWN AREA SAFETY NETTING HELICOPTER SIGHT POLE Figure Fixed Installation Brigantine BR Rev. 3

55 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 LM0584 PLATFORM NORTH TRUE NORTH 45 deg A B DOW N CABLE FROM BG 1 20" GAS EXPORT TO AND 4" MEG IMPORT FROM BG LADDER DOWN 2 Figure Subsea Pipeline Orientation BR Rev

56 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 2 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Rev. 3

57 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 3 LM0584 Section 3 - Mobile Installation Description Seafox 4 was built in 1976 in Hamburg, Germany to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) A1 Classification requirements. It is a non-propelled, self-elevating, accommodation and multi-support vessel, built for operation throughout the year in water depths of 45.4 metres (maximum). It was originally designed as a Mobile Offshore drilling unit, and was modified and redesigned in 1989 to give the vessel wide flexibility in its multi-support platform role. The platform essentially consists of a hull, six legs, rack and pinion type jacking systems, accommodation and mooring equipment. Prime movers are provided to supply power. The main lifting facilities comprise two fixed cranes, one port side aft and one starboard side aft. Alternatively a crawler crane with hoisting capacity in 'Superlift Configuration' can be installed for heavy lifts. A helicopter landing deck is fitted at the forward end. In its basic mode, accommodation for up to 139 personnel is provided in single and double cabins. The hull is a rectangular shaped pontoon of welded steel construction, subdivided by bulkheads with overall dimensions of approximately 70m x 40m x 5m. There are two levels within the hull. The bottom level houses the tanks for potable water, fuel oil, cooling water and ballast water. In addition, personnel recreation facilities are provided at this level and include a cinema, fitness room, sauna, games room and lounge. The engine rooms, workshops and boiler room are situated on the main deck level, as are effectively the six tubular legs, each of which is 84.30m long and 3.66m in diameter. The legs are connected to the hull, via the electric jacking systems and leg guides. Operation of the electric jacking systems enables the legs to be lowered to the seabed, after which the hull can be elevated above the sea surface to the required height. The combined deckhouse and accommodation block is of steel construction and is located forward of the centre leg line. They comprise four levels, which include cabins, crew recreation room, control/radio room, sickbay and hospital, offices, changing rooms, mess rooms and galley. The Helideck and supporting structure is situated at the forward end and is designed for the operations of a Sikorsky S61. It can be skidded inboard/outboard over a distance of 8.2m. During platform transit it is moved inboard and for helicopter operations it is extended to the most outboard position. Deck equipment comprises two single drum electric drive anchor mooring winches, each with a Delta Flipper anchor, installed at the aft end, and two electric drive anchor windlasses, each with a Delta Flipper anchor, installed at the forward end. Towing brackets are fitted forward and aft with towing fairleads. The towing arrangement is designed for towing vessels up to 10,000HP. Electrical Power requirements are provided by three diesel generator sets, each capable of supplying 600kW. An emergency 250kW-diesel generator set is available for essential services in the event of a total power outage. For emergency conditions, the mobile installation is equipped with a fire and gas detection system as well as passive and active fire protection equipment. A total of seven pumps are available for fire fighting services. Two fire pumps; a jockey pump and a deck wash pump are situated on the main deck in the Multi Service Area. The helideck fire fighting and accommodation sprinkler pumps are located in the lower deck pump room. In the event of a sprinkler pump failure the sprinkler can be pressurised from the fire main. An emergency fire pump is located in the heavy tool store. Personnel survival craft for the mobile consists of three 28 man, one 50 man and two 80 man TEMPSCs, together with eight 20/25 man liferafts. All TEMPSC and liferaft locations are shown on Figure The mobile also has various safety equipment on board including lifejackets, immersion suits, escape kits, life buoys, personnel baskets, parachute signals and life line equipment. Access between the mobile and the respective fixed installations is by a bridge link as indicated on the Plan and Elevation drawings in Appendix 3, Figures A3.2, A3.3, A3.11, A3.12, A3.20 and A3.21. A full description of the mobile installation can be found in the Workfox U.K. Ltd. Safety Case for Seafox 4 and should be referred to if further information is required. Rev

58 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 3 Figure Mobile Installation Side Elevation Rev. 3

59 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 3 LM0584 Figure Plan of Tank Top and Main Deck Rev

60 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 3 1 st LEVEL 2 nd LEVEL 3 rd LEVEL 4 th LEVEL Figure Plan of Levels 1 to Rev. 3

61 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM Plans & Elevations Section 4 - Combined Installation s Descriptions The combined installations of the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG, BR, and Seafox 4 when connected by a bridge are shown on the plan & elevation figures as follows - Skiff PS Figures - A3.2 & A3.3 Brigantine BG Figures - A3.11 & A3.12 Brigantine BR Figures - A3.20 & A3.21 The interface hazardous areas are shown on the following plan & elevation figures - Skiff PS Figures - A3.4 & A3.5 Brigantine BG Figures - A3.13 & A3.14 Brigantine BR Figures - A3.22 & A3.23 Plan views of each of the combined installation escape routes can be seen on the following - Skiff PS Figures - A3.6, A3.7, A3.8 & A3.9 Brigantine BG Figures - A3.15, A3.16, A3.17 & A3.18 Brigantine BR Figures - A3.24, A3.25, A3.26 & A3.27 The location of the General Alarm Muster Points and Alternative Muster Locations, the Prepare to Abandon positions adjacent to each TEMPSC and the location of the liferafts, for each interface, are shown on Figures A3.1, A3.10 & A3.19. All the above Figures are contained in Appendix 3 of this COSC. 2 Common Facilities and Connections 2.1 Communications The mobile installation will have a Vsat terminal installed onboard. Once Vsat is operational all voice and data connectivity will be connected back to the network in Shell Aberdeen. The mobile installation will have a GID server and GID workstations. All Workstations will be connected to the Shell EP network, along with Direct Dial telephones from the Aberdeen telephone exchange. They will be set-up for direct dial to Assen / Bacton via Shell Sprint dial. A Shell VANTAGE personnel movements terminal is installed in the mobile installation radio room connected to the EP Europe Data network. 2.2 Personnel Transfer The initial manning for the interface hook-up, from the mobile installation to each of the fixed installations will be by Esvagt transfer basket. An access bridge will be used for personnel to transfer between the installations. The bridge will be from the main deck of the mobile installation onto the weather deck of the fixed installation. Note - Only Interface personnel are permitted to use the bridge prior to the Interface Test Schedule being fully signed off. 2.3 Bridge Lighting The access bridge lighting will be supplied from the mobile installation distribution system and shall be of the approved type for the specified area. The fittings supplied will be of the maintained type having either automatic emergency circuit changeover or battery back-up. Rev

62 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section Navaids The mobile installation's navigation lights will be used for the duration of the combined operation. The navigation lights on each of the fixed installations will be switched off for the duration of each combined operation. 2.5 Station Bills The Station Bill diagrams will be overlayed to show the mobile installation for the duration of the combined operation Rev. 3

63 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM Mobile Installation Approach and Positioning 3.1 Well Status It is proposed that during this combined operation that gas production will continue simultaneously with wireline and maintenance operations. Well status records for the Skiff PS, Brigantine BR and BG wells are shown on the following pages. 3.2 Sea-bed Surveys The Project Manager Survey (Operations) co-ordinates the Seabed Surveys and ensures that a seabed survey is carried out at each combined operation location, prior to the arrival of the mobile installation. Each survey includes a bathymetry and debris survey. The extent and scope of these surveys are detailed in the Marine Operations Manual (EP Europe). In general a seabed clearance survey is valid for 6 months. This period may be extended for areas where no history of scouring is known. The validity period must be confirmed with the mobile owner. A separate debris survey is required prior to the mobile's arrival and after any major construction work has taken place in the same area. 3.3 Mobile Installation Approach and Positioning The approach phase is detailed in an addendum to the Marine Operations Manual (Shell Document No's and ). The position of the mobile installation at each fixed installation is as shown on Figures A3.2, A3.11 & A3.20 in Appendix Foundation Proximity The mobile is provided with 6 tubular legs, each of which is 84.30m long and 3.66m in diameter. The overall distance between the leg centres is 36.46m transversely and 27.66m longitudinally. When in position on the fixed installations the approximate distance from the outer edge of the nearest leg to the nearest jacket pile is shown on the respective geophysical plan in Appendix 3. Foundation interference between the mobile and the fixed installation s is not expected. 3.5 Mobile Installation Footing Penetrations/Stability Penetrations and seabed scour surveys will be conducted as per the Marine Operations Manual (EP Europe), Section 5, Chapter 2, Paragraph 4.4. Surveys are carried out prior to the combined operation, within 3 days after the mobile has landed, after a further 7 days or before, depending on observations. Further routine checks will be made at a frequency dependent upon those observations. Rev

64 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD GENERAL DATA WELL DATA WELL GEOMETRY GENERAL DATA DRILLING RIG MAERSK ENDURER REFERENCE DATUM MSL DFE 156 FT AMSL WATER DEPTH 91 FT AMSL SWAB VALVE 95.5 FT BDF SLOT COORDINATES N / E (UTM) N / E DATE SPUDDED DATE SUSPENDED DATE COMPLETED DATE PERFORATED KOP1 FT/INC/AZI MAX DLS TANGENT INC/AZI 800FT/ 2.5 DEG/ 243 DEG 4.0 DEG 55 DEG/ 244 DEG WELL TYPE WELL NAME HSE NO. FIELD SKIFF PS01/02-DH RESERVOIR PRODUCTION LICENCE P008 DRILLERS TD UBD HORIZONTAL DEVELOPMENT PS01/02-DH 48/20a-S1Z SKIFF ROTLIEGEND SAND FT FLUID DATA LOG DATA RESERVOIR MUD TYPE Potassium Formate/Drillwater with 3% KCL Losses 3999 bbls kformate 3674 bbls DW+3%kcl 9750Kg CaC03(LCM) RESERVOIR MUD WEIGHT 445 pptf WEIGHTING MATERIAL None "A" ANNULUS FLUID Brine "A" ANNULUS WEIGHT 510 pptf "A" ANNULUS VOLUME 356 bbls TBG FLUID Produced Gas TBG WEIGHT Up weight 265 klbs prior to entering PBR TBG VOLUME 88 bbls SIZE (IN) WEIGHT (LB / FT) GRADE COUPLING TOP OF CASING AHBDF TOP BOTTOM RUN NO. LOG DATE AHBDF AHBDF 8 1/2" hole MWD- GR /10/00 CASING DATA SHOE DEPTH AHBDF TVDBDF TOP OF CEMENT AHBDF TVDBDF EMMG MAASP X52 XLC-S " hole 1-2 MWD- GR- VPWD /06-01/07/ /8 68# N80 DINO VAM /8 53.5# ST95 VAM TOP SEE NOTE #1 7" 32# L80 VAM TOP HT SEE NOTE #2 6" Open hole " Open hole PERFORATION INTERVALS DEPTHS (AHBDF) TOP BOTTOM SUB-RESERVOIR GUN ID GUN TYPE PHASE (DEG) DATE OPEN HOLE COMPLETION X-MAS TREE SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TREE CAP SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE FLOW WING SIZE KILL WING SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TUBING BONNET SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE WELLHEAD SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER UNIHEAD SIZE CAMERON 13 5/8" TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE 13 5/8" FASTLOCK HUB 13 3/8" ANNULUS SIDE OUTLETS 'A' 2 1/16" 5K 'B' 2 1/16" 5K SUPPORT RING CAMERON 8 1/4" 4 TPI 7 1/16" 5K 7 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K 13 5/8" FASTLOCK SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER CAMERON SIZE 26" NOM TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TYPE TYPE WELLHEAD DATA FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE MAX PRESSURE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FFY 5 1/8" 5K OTIS 6.188" SB RX 46 RX 46 RX 24 CF13 MAX PRESSURE 5K TYPE SSMC NO. OF STAGES 2 TYPE CF 13 TYPE DINO VAM BOX TYPE RX 24 TYPE RX 24 MAX PRESSURE TYPE TYPE COMPLETION PRODUCTION PACKER PACKER SERIAL NO. SSSV SERIAL NO. INFLOW TEST SSSV STRING WEIGHT DOWN STRING WEIGHT UP COMPRESSION WEIGHT ON TUBING HANGER TUBING HGR SERIAL NO. TOTAL TURNS APPLIED TORQUE SET DOWN WEIGHT NUMBER CONTROL LINE CLAMPS 28 HALLIBURTON MHR PSI 100 KLBS 200 KLBS 20 KLBS 80 KLBS ALL WEIGHTS EXCLUDING BLOCK WT TYPE CONTROL LINE CLAMPS 5 1/2" TUBETEC LP X COUPLING PROTECTOR REMARKS Attempt made to impair productivity to allow further footage to be drilled (unsuccessful), volumes of fluid and material listed above. Well acidised and cleaned up after completion run. # pptf mud in annulus. #2. Liner test to 2500psi, 630 mud in hole. Maersk Endurer DFE 156ft drilled to ft, well was then suspended. Santa Fe Britannia DFE ft returned to drill and complete well. ALL DEPTHS RELATE TO ORIGINAL DFE OF 156 FT APPROVED DATE REVISION 0 21/09/01 WSPS0102 PAGE 1 WELL STATUS RECORD PS01/ Rev. 3

65 WELL STATUS RECORD - SKIFF PS01/02-DH QUARTERNARY ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ DESCRIPTION SEA LEVEL NORTH SEA GROUP RHAETIC GROUP TRITON ANHYDRITIC KEUPER HALITE LOWER KEUPER C.STONE MUSCHELKALK HALITE MID DOWSING C.STONE ROT HALITE BUNTER SANDSTONE ROGENSTEIN BUNTER SHALE ALLER HALITE STASSFURT HALITE BASAL ANHYDRITE HAUPT DOLOMITE WERRA ANYHDRITE ROTLIEGEND ROT CLAYSTONE BROCKLESCHIEFER PEGMATITE ANHYDRITE RED SALT CLAY HAUPT ANHYDRITE PLATTEN DOLOMITE GREY SALT CLAY KUPFERSCHIEFER ZECHSTEINKALK AHBDF 497' AHBDF 497' TVBDF 5661' AHBDF 4153' TVBDF 9869' AHBDF 6609' TVBDF 9950' AHBDF 6661' TVBDF 12757' AHBDF 7868' TVBDF ' AHBDF 8206' TVBDF Seabed 26" Conductor 392 lb/ft X52 XLC-S N80 DINO VAM Top of Cement 9 5/8" 9 5/8" Casing 53.5 lb/ft ST95 VAMTOP 7" Liner 32 lb/ft L80 VAMTOP HT 6" HOLE TD Top of 7"Liner APPROVED DATE DEPTH AHDBSV DEPTH AHDBDF DEPTH TVDBSV INCL DEG CAMERON SSMC 5 1/2" TUBING HANGER WTH AVA PROFILE 4.850" 13% CR. 5" 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON DURASLEEVE SSD 4.000" RPT NO GO 4.090" 13% CR HALLIBURTON PREMIUM SEAL UNIT " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING 6.000" DRIFT HALLIBURTON POLISHED BORE RECEPTACLE 10 FT STROKE 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB PUP JOINT PXP 10FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR BAKER 5 1/2" TR-SSSV TME " 13% CR SELF EQUALISING /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /8" 53.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR XOVER 5 1/2" X 5" NK 3SB 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON SEAL ANCHOR 13% CR HALLIBURTON 7" MHR PACKER 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 3FT 13% CR FLUTED NO-GO SUB 13% CR BAKER AOF NIPPLE 3.437" NO-GO 3.500" 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 3FT 13% CR /2" MULE SHOE TYPE WEG 13% CR REVISION 0 21/09/01 WSPS0102 PAGE 2 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 LITHOLOGY CASING COMPLETION AHBDF TVSS DESCRIPTION OD ID DRIFT LIASSIC GROUP HYDRAULIC LIMESTONE ' AHBDF 13 3/8" Casing 2502' TVBDF 68 lb/ft ^ ^ ^ ^ LEINE HALITE ^ ^ DECK ANHYDRITE ^ ^ BAKER AOF NIPPLE 3.688" NO-GO 3.740" 13% CR TOTAL DEPTH JURASSIC TRIASSIC PERMIAN ZECHSTEIN WELL STATUS RECORD PS01/02 Rev

66 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD SKIFF PS02/03-IF GENERAL DATA WELL DATA WELL GEOMETRY GENERAL DATA DRILLING RIG MAERSK ENDURER REFERENCE DATUM MSL DFE 156 FT AMSL WATER DEPTH 88 FT AMSL SWAB VALVE 93 FT BDF SLOT COORDINATES N / E (UTM) DATE SPUDDED DATE COMPLETED DATE PERFORATED N / E KOP1 FT/INC/AZI MAX DLS TANGENT INC/AZI KOP2 FT/INC/AZI MAX DLS TANGENT INC/AZI KOP3 FT/INC/AZI MAX DLS TANGENT INC/AZI 760FT/ 2 DEG/ DEG 3.74 DEG 17.4 DEG/ DEG 1600FT/ 18 DEG/ 189 DEG 3.61 DEG 49.7 DEG/ DEG 9423FT/ 48.6 DEG/ DEG 10.61DEG 90 DEG/ 157 DEG WELL TYPE UBD HORIZONTAL DEVELOPMENT WELL NAME PS02/03-IF HSE NO. 48/20a-S2 FIELD SKIFF PS RESERVOIR ROTLIEGEND SAND PRODUCTION LICENCE P008 DRILLERS TD FT FLUID DATA LOG DATA RESERVOIR MUD TYPE RESERVOIR MUD WEIGHT WEIGHTING MATERIAL "A" ANNULUS FLUID "A" ANNULUS WEIGHT Potassium Formate 440 pptf Inhibited potassium formate brine 440 pptf TOP BOTTOM RUN NO. LOG DATE AHBDF AHBDF "A" ANNULUS VOLUME TBG FLUID TBG WEIGHT Produced Gas 18 LBS/FT TBG VOLUME SIZE (IN) WEIGHT (LB / FT) GRADE COUPLING TOP OF CASING AHBDF CASING DATA SHOE DEPTH AHBDF TVDBDF TOP OF CEMENT AHBDF TVDBDF EMMG MAASP X52 XLC-S /8 68# N80 DINO VAM SEE NOTE #1 9 5/8 53.5# ST95 VAM TOP " 32# L80 VAM TOP HT " Open hole PERFORATION INTERVALS DEPTHS (AHBDF) TOP BOTTOM SUB-RESERVOIR GUN ID GUN TYPE PHASE (DEG) DATE No perforations - Barefoot completion. WELLHEAD DATA X-MAS TREE SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TREE CAP SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE FLOW WING SIZE KILL WING SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TUBING BONNET SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE CAMERON 8 1/4" 4 TPI 7 1/16" 5K 7 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K 13 5/8" FASTLOCK TYPE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE MAX PRESSURE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FFY 5 1/8" 5K OTIS 6.188" SB RX 46 RX 46 RX 24 CF13 5K COMPLETION PRODUCTION PACKER PACKER SERIAL NO. SSSV SERIAL NO. INFLOW TEST SSSV STRING WEIGHT DOWN STRING WEIGHT UP COMPRESSION WEIGHT ON TUBING HANGER TUBING HGR SERIAL NO. HALLIBURTON 7" MHR PSI 125 KLBS 190 KLBS 18 KLBS 107 KLBS ALL WEIGHTS EXCLUDING BLOCK WT WELLHEAD SERIAL NUMBER MAX PRESSURE 5K MANUFACTURER UNIHEAD SIZE CAMERON 13 5/8" TYPE NO. OF STAGES SSMC 2 TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE 13 5/8" FASTLOCK HUB 13 3/8" DINO VAM TYPE TYPE CF 13 BOX ANNULUS SIDE OUTLETS 'A' 2 1/16" 5K TYPE RX 24 'B' 2 1/16" 5K TYPE RX 24 LANDING RING SERIAL NUMBER --- MANUFACTURER CAMERON SIZE 26" NOM TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE MAX PRESSURE TYPE TYPE TOTAL TURNS APPLIED TORQUE SET DOWN WEIGHT NUMBER CONTROL LINE CLAMPS 30 TYPE CONTROL LINE CLAMPS NCCL 5 1/2" X COUPLING REMARKS #1 SKIFF IS AN UNMANNED INSTALLATION AND ACCESS IS VIA MARINE ACCESS OR J.U. VESSEL ONLY. TO THIS END, 13 3/8" MAASP IS BASED ON MAX FMN FRACTURE OF 1 PSI/FT AND MUD IN THE ANNULUS. APPROVED DATE REVISION 0 27/11/00 WSPS0203 PAGE 1 WELL STATUS RECORD PS02/ Rev. 3

67 WELL STATUS RECORD - SKIFF PS02/03-IF QUARTERNARY ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ DESCRIPTION SEA LEVEL NORTH SEA GROUP RHAETIC GROUP TRITON ANHYDRITIC KEUPER HALITE LOWER KEUPER C.STONE MUSCHELKALK HALITE MID DOWSING C.STONE ROT HALITE BUNTER SANDSTONE ROGENSTEIN BUNTER SHALE ALLER HALITE STASSFURT HALITE BASAL ANHYDRITE HAUPT DOLOMITE WERRA ANYHDRITE ROTLIEGEND ROT CLAYSTONE BROCKLESCHIEFER PEGMATITE ANHYDRITE RED SALT CLAY HAUPT ANHYDRITE PLATTEN DOLOMITE KUPFERSCHIEFER ZECHSTEINKALK ' AHBDF 498' AHBDF 498' TVBDF Seabed 26" Conductor X52 XLC-S 2603' AHBDF 13 3/8" Casing 5205' AHBDF 4118' TVBDF 9082' AHBDF 6555' TVBDF 9192' AHBDF 6628' TVBDF 11129' AHBDF 7820' TVBDF 14300' AHBDF 8246' TVBDF N80 DINO VAM Top of Cement 9 5/8" (estimated) 9 5/8" Casing 53.5 lb/ft ST95 VAMTOP 7" Liner 32 lb/ft L80 VAMTOP HT 6" HOLE TD Top of 7"Liner APPROVED DATE DEPTH AHDBSV DEPTH AHDBDF DEPTH TVDBSV INCL DEG CAMERON SSMC 5 1/2" TUBING HANGER WTH AVA PROFILE 4.850" 13% CR. 5" 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON DURASLEEVE SSD 4.000" RPT NO GO 4.090" 13% CR 7" 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING 6.000" DRIFT HALLIBURTON POLISHED BORE RECEPTACLE 10 FT STROKE 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB PUP JOINT PXP 10FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR BAKER 5 1/2" TR-SSSV TME " 13% CR SELF EQUALISING /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /8" 53.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR XOVER 5 1/2" X 5" NK 3SB 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON PREMIUM SEAL UNIT HALLIBURTON SEAL ANCHOR 13% CR HALLIBURTON 7" MHR PACKER 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR BAKER AOF NIPPLE 3.688" NO-GO 3.740" 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 3FT 13% CR FLUTED NO-GO SUB 13% CR BAKER AOF NIPPLE 3.437" NO-GO 3.500" 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 3FT 13% CR /2" MULE SHOE TYPE WEG 13% CR REVISION 0 27/11/00 WSPS0203 PAGE 2 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 LITHOLOGY CASING COMPLETION AHBDF TVSS DESCRIPTION OD ID DRIFT ' TVBDF 68 lb/ft ^ ^ ^ ^ LEINE HALITE GREY SALT CLAY ^ ^ DECK ANHYDRITE ^ ^ TOTAL DEPTH JURASSIC TRIASSIC PERMIAN ZECHSTEIN WELL STATUS RECORD PS02/03 Rev

68 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD SKIFF PS03/01-KE GENERAL DATA WELL DATA WELL GEOMETRY GENERAL DATA DRILLING RIG REFERENCE DATUM DFE WATER DEPTH SWAB VALVE SLOT COORDINATES 0.5 N / E (UTM) N / E DATE SPUDDED 13/03/02 DATE COMPLETED 23/06/02 DATE PERFORATED GLOBAL SANTA FE BRITANNIA MSL 160 FT AMSL 92 FT AMSL 99 FT BDF MAX DLS 8.22 DEG/ ft ahbdf MAX DEVITAION ft ahbdf WELL TYPE UBD HORIZONTAL DEVELOPMENT WELL NAME PS03/01-KE HSE NO. 48/20a-S3 FIELD SKIFF (PS) RESERVOIR ROTLIEGEND SAND PRODUCTION LICENCE P008 DRILLERS TD FT FLUID DATA LOG DATA RESERVOIR MUD TYPE SODIUM FORMATE BRINE RESERVOIR MUD WEIGHT 440 pptf WEIGHTING MATERIAL SALT "A" ANNULUS FLUID INHIBITED SEAWATER "A" ANNULUS WEIGHT 445 pptf "A" ANNULUS VOLUME BBLS TBG FLUID TBG WEIGHT 23 LBS/FT TOP BOTTOM RUN NO. LOG DATE AHBDF AHBDF /4" PowerPulse GR (real time) + Perform drilling mechanics 6 8 1/2" PowerPulse GR (real time) + Perform drilling mechanics " VPWD +Perform drilling mechanics " IMPulse GR /03-08/04/02 15/04-19/04/02 02/05-25/05/02 02/05-25/05/02 TBG VOLUME SIZE (IN) WEIGHT (LB / FT) 292 BBLS GRADE COUPLING TOP OF CASING AHBDF CASING DATA SHOE DEPTH AHBDF TVDBDF TOP OF CEMENT AHBDF TVDBDF EMMG MAASP X52 XCL-S /8 68 N80 DINO VAM / ST95 VAM TOP " 32 L80 VAM TOP HT ft 7" 32 L80 13% CR VAM TOP HT ft 6" Open hole PERFORATION INTERVALS DEPTHS (AHBDF) TOP BOTTOM SUB-RESERVOIR GUN ID GUN TYPE PHASE (DEG) DATE No perforations - Barefoot completion. WELLHEAD DATA X-MAS TREE SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TREE CAP SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE FLOW WING SIZE KILL WING SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TUBING BONNET SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE CAMERON 8 1/4" 4 TPI 7 1/16" 5K 7 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K 13 5/8" FASTLOCK TYPE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE MAX PRESSURE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FFY 5 1/8" 5K OTIS 6.188" SB RX 46 RX 46 RX 24 CF13 5K COMPLETION PRODUCTION PACKER PACKER SERIAL NO. SSSV SERIAL NO. INFLOW TEST SSSV STRING WEIGHT DOWN STRING WEIGHT UP COMPRESSION WEIGHT ON TUBING HANGER TUBING HGR SERIAL NO. PES 7" HP PSI 95 KLBS 185 KLBS 15 KLBS 80 KLBS ALL WEIGHTS EXCLUDING BLOCK WT WELLHEAD SERIAL NUMBER MAX PRESSURE 5K MANUFACTURER UNIHEAD SIZE CAMERON 13 5/8" TYPE NO. OF STAGES SSMC 2 TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE 13 5/8" FASTLOCK HUB 13 3/8" DINO VAM TYPE TYPE CF 13 BOX ANNULUS SIDE OUTLETS 'A' 2 1/16" 5K TYPE RX 24 'B' 2 1/16" 5K TYPE RX 24 LANDING RING SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER CAMERON SIZE 26" NOM TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE REMARKS MAX PRESSURE TYPE TYPE APPROVED TOTAL TURNS APPLIED TORQUE SET DOWN WEIGHT NUMBER CONTROL LINE CLAMPS 28 TYPE CONTROL LINE CLAMPS TUBETECH 5 1/2" X COUPLING PROTECTOR A DATE REVISION 0 08/07/02 WSPS0301 PAGE 1 WELL STATUS RECORD PS03/ Rev. 3

69 WELL STATUS RECORD - SKIFF PS03/01-KE QUARTERNARY ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ DESCRIPTION SEA LEVEL NORTH SEA GROUP RHAETIC GROUP TRITON ANHYDRITIC KEUPER HALITE LOWER KEUPER C.STONE MUSCHELKALK HALITE MID DOWSING C.STONE ROT HALITE BUNTER SANDSTONE ROGENSTEIN BUNTER SHALE ALLER HALITE STASSFURT HALITE BASAL ANHYDRITE HAUPT DOLOMITE WERRA ANYHDRITE ZECHSTEINKALK ROTLIEGEND ROT CLAYSTONE BROCKLESCHIEFER PEGMATITE ANHYDRITE RED SALT CLAY HAUPT ANHYDRITE PLATTEN DOLOMITE AHBDF 495' AHBDF 495' TVBDF 2757' AHBDF 2406' TVBDF 6324' AHBDF 4294' TVBDF 11779' AHBDF 6617' TVBDF 11835' AHBDF 6637' TVBDF 14625' AHBDF 7873' TVBDF 15537' AHBDF 8255' TVBDF Seabed 26" Conductor 392 lb/ft X52 XLC-S 13 3/8" Casing 68 lb/ft N80 DINO VAM Top of Cement 9 5/8" 9 5/8" Casing 53.5 lb/ft ST95 VAMTOP 7" Liner 32 lb/ft L80 (13% CR) VAMTOP HT 6" HOLE TD Top of 7"Liner APPROVED DATE DEPTH AHDBSV DEPTH AHDBDF DEPTH TVDBSV INCL DEG CAMERON SSMC 5 1/2" TUBING HANGER WTH AVA PROFILE 4.850" 13% CR. 5" 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON DURASLEEVE SSD 4.000" RPT NO GO 4.090" 13% CR X OVER 5" 18 LB/FT NK 3SB BOX X 4 1/2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB PIN L80 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON 5 1/2" TR-SSSV SP 4.437" RPT NO GO 4.520" SELF EQUALISING 13% CR 5 1/2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR XOVER 5 1/2" X 5" NK 3SB 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON RATCH LATCH L80 13% CR - 5" SEALS PES (HALLIBURTON) HP-1 RETRIEVABLE PRODUCTION PACKER 722 HP INCONEL/ 13% CR PIN & BOX CONNECTIONS 4 1/2" 15.1 LB/FT VAM ACE. HYDRAULIC RELEASE 4 1/2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR /2" MULE SHOE TYPE WEG 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING 13% CR FOR 400 FT BACK FROM THE SHOE TRACK " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON RATCH LATCH HEAD - 5" S. BORE C/W 4 1/2" 15.1 LB/FT VAM ACE PIN L80 13% CR X OVER 4 1/2" 15.1 LB/FT VAM ACE BOX X 4 1/2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB PIN L80 13% CR BAKER 3.437" AOF LANDING NIPPLE 3.500" NO-GO 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR " OPEN HOLE SECTION SINGLE LEG REVISION 0 08/07/02 WSPS0301 PAGE 2 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 LITHOLOGY CASING COMPLETION AHBDF TVSS DESCRIPTION OD ID DRIFT /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB PUP JOINT PXP 10FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /8" 53.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING ^ ^ ^ ^ LEINE HALITE GREY SALT CLAY ^ ^ DECK ANHYDRITE ^ ^ TOTAL DEPTH JURASSIC TRIASSIC PERMIAN ZECHSTEIN WELL STATUS RECORD PS03/01 Rev

70 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD PS04/ Rev. 3

71 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 WELL STATUS RECORD PS04/04 Rev

72 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD GENERAL DATA BRIGANTINE BG01/02 49/19-G1 WELL DATA WELL GEOMETRY GENERAL DATA DRILLING RIG MAERSK ENHANCER KOP 1019 ft WELL TYPE Horizontal Producer REFERENCE DATUM MSL DFE (AMSL) 115 FT Max Deviation ft WELL NO. BG01/02 WATER DEPTH SWAB VALVE 101 FT 45 FT BDF Max Dogleg ft HSE NO. FIELD 49/19-G1 Brigantine B SLOT COORD N / 0.2 E RESERVOIR (OBJECTIVE) ROTLIEGEND SANDSTONE (UTM) N / E DATE SPUDDED DATE COMPLETED PRODUCTION LICENCE DRILLERS TD P FT FLUID DATA LOG DATA RESERVOIR MUD TYPE RESERVOIR MUD WEIGHT WEIGHTING MATERIAL A ANNULUS FLUID A ANNULUS WEIGHT A ANNULUS VOLUME TBG FLUID TBG WEIGHT TBG VOLUME Perflow 520 pptf Sodium Formate NaCL BRINE 520 PPFT 231 bbls Produced Gas 367 bbls TOP BOTTOM RUN NO. LOG AHBDF AHBDF DATE 1 CDR / APWD /09/ CDR / APWD /09/00 4 MWD - GR /10/ ADN4 / IMPULSE / AIM /10/00 9 GPIT / GR / EMS /10/00 SIZE (IN) 26 WEIGHT (LB / FT) 392 GRADE X52 COUPLING MERLIN TOP OF CASING AHBDF 55 CASING DATA SHOE DEPTH AHBDF TVDBDF TOP OF CEMENT AHBDF TVDBDF EMMG - MAASP /8 72 ST95 VAM TOP SURF / ST95 VAM TOP (x/o) / Q125 VAM TOP 1298 (x/o) psi 7 32 L80 VAM TOP HT (x/o) L80 13% Cr VAM TOP HT (x/o) PERFORATION INTERVALS DEPTHS (AHBDF) LENGTH TOP BOTTOM GUN TYPE GUN OD PHASE (DEG) DATE ESS - Open hole completion Top of ESS ft AHBDF Bottom of ESS ft AHBDF X-MAS TREE SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TREE CAP SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE FLOW WING SIZE KILL WING SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TUBING BONNET SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE WELLHEAD DATA WELLHEAD SERIAL NUMBER MAX PRESSURE 5 K MANUFACTURER CAMERON TYPE SSMC UNIHEAD SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE ANNULUS SIDE OUTLETS 'A' 'B' LANDING RING SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE REMARKS CAMERON 8 3/4" 4 TPI 7 1/16" 5K 7 1/16" 5K 3 1/8" 5K 13 5/8" FASTLOCK 13 5/8" TYPE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE MAX PRESSURE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE NO. STAGES TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE FFY 6 3/8" 5K OTIS 7.5" SB RX 46 RX 46 RX 35 CF 13 5K 2 CF 13 BOX RX 24 RX MAX PRESSURE CAMERON 13 5/8" FASTLOCK HUB 13 3/8" DINO VAM 2 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K 26 " NOM TYPE TYPE COMPLETION PRODUCTION PACKER PACKER SERIAL NO. SSSV SERIAL NO. INFLOW TEST SSSV STRING WEIGHT DOWN STRING WEIGHT UP COMPRESSION WEIGHT ON TUBING HANGER TUBING HGR SERIAL NO. NUMBER CONTROL LINE CLAMPS TYPE CONTROL LINE CLAMPS APPROVED Halliburton 7" MHR F8 -J PSI ALL WEIGHTS EXCLUDING BLOCK WT NCCL LOW PROFILE X COUPLING PROTECTOR NCCL 1770 LP DATE REVISION 0 15/11/00 WSBG01 PAGE 1 WELL STATUS RECORD BG01/ Rev. 3

73 DESCRIPTION SEA LEVEL SEA BED NORTH SEA GROUP CHALK CROMER KNOLL BUNTER SHALE BROCKELSCHIEFER ALLER HALITE BASAL ANHYDRITE HAUPT DOLOMITE WERRA ANHYDRITE ZECHSTEINKALK KUPFERSCHIEFER ROTLIEGEND GROUP HAISBOROUGH GROUP BUNTER SANDSTONE TOTAL DEPTH (DRILLERS) AHBDF 390 TVBDF 1298 AHBDF 1297 TVBDF 1708 AHBDF 1700 TVBDF 5906 AHBDF 9230 AHBDF 9315 AHBDF 9808 AHBDF 6860 TVBDF AHBDF AHBDF 7380 TVBDF AHBDF 7446 TVBDF AHBDF 7709 TVBDF AHBDF 7711 TVBDF Seabed 26" Conductor 392 lb/ft X-52 Merlin 13 3/8" Casing 68 lb/ft ST95 VAM TOP 9 5/8" Casing 53.5 lb/ft Q125 VAM TOP 7" Liner 32 lb/ft L80 VAM TOP HT ESS Shoe X-OVER 10 3/4" Casing 55.5 lb/ft ST95 VAM TOP Top of Cement 9 5/8" X-Over 7" TOL / Cement Completion Packer ESS Hanger TD APPROVED DATE DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH AHDBSV AHDBDF TVDBSV INCL. DEG CAMERON 7" SSMC TUBING HANGER NIPPLE WITH AVA PROFILE 6.070" NO GO 6.120" 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR 10 3/4" 55.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON 7" SP-2 TR-SSSV 5.963" NO GO 6.025" SELF EQUALISING 13% CR 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR /4" X 9 5/8" CASING XOVER +/ FT " 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /8" 53.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING " 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING HALLIBURTON DURASLEEVE SSD 4.000" RPT NO GO 4.090" 13% CR (DOWN TO OPEN) " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON RATCH LATCH 13% CR HALLIBURTON MHR PACKER 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR BAKER AOF NIPPLE 3.750" NO GO 3.805" 13% CR FLUTED NO GO SUB 5.875" OD 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" MULE SHOE TYPE WEG 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING 13% CR 8 JNTS SET ACROSS LINER & COMPLETION PACKER AREA WEATHERFORD 15FT PBR EXTENSION SUPER 13% CR WEATHERFORD CPD LINER PACKER SUPER 13% CR /2" 17 LB/FT VAM FJL L80 TUBING 13% CR (SPECIAL DRIFT 4.830") " EXPANDABLE TOP CONNECTOR " EXPANDABLE SAND SCREEN 316L MATERIAL W/ 200 UM PETROWEAVE PACK OFF/SEAL BORE /2" 12.6 LB/FT PUP JOINT 13% CR WASH DOWN SHOE REVISION 0 15/11/00 WSBG01 PAGE 2 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 WELL STATUS RECORD - BRIGANTINE BG01/02 49/19-G1 LITHOLOGY CASING COMPLETION AHBDF TVSS DESCRIPTION OD ID DRIFT XOVER 7" NK 3SB X 5" NK 3SB 13% CR " EXPANDABLE BOTTOM CONNECTOR TRIASSIC PERMIAN M WELL STATUS RECORD BG01/02 Rev

74 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD GENERAL DATA BRIGANTINE BG02/01 49/19-G2 WELL DATA WELL GEOMETRY GENERAL DATA DRILLING RIG REFERENCE DATUM DFE (AMSL) SWAB VALVE SLOT COORD. (UTM) DATE SPUDDED MSL 115 FT WATER DEPTH 101 FT DATE COMPLETED MAERSK ENHANCER 45 FT 0.2 N / E N / E KOP 4120 ft Max Deviation ft Min ID ft ahbsv Max Dogleg ft WELL TYPE WELL NO. HSE NO. FIELD RESERVOIR (OBJECTIVE) PRODUCTION LICENCE DRILLERS TD Horizontal Producer BG02/01 49/19-G2 Brigantine A ROTLIEGEND SANDSTONE P FT FLUID DATA LOG DATA RESERVOIR MUD TYPE RESERVOIR MUD WEIGHT WEIGHTING MATERIAL A ANNULUS FLUID A ANNULUS WEIGHT A ANNULUS VOLUME TBG FLUID TBG WEIGHT TBG VOLUME Perflow 515 pptf Dolomite NaCl/Brine 515 pptf 192 bbls Produced Gas - 260bbls TOP BOTTOM RUN NO. LOG AHBDF AHBDF DATE 1 CDR / APWD /11/ CDR / APWD /11/00 4 MWD-GR /11-2/12/ ADN4/IMPulse/AIM /12/00 7 ACTS/GR/MDT /12/ ADN4/IMPulse/AIM /12/00 SIZE (IN) WEIGHT (LB / FT) GRADE COUPLING TOP OF CASING AHBDF CASING DATA SHOE DEPTH AHBDF TVDBDF TOP OF CEMENT AHBDF TVDBDF EMMG MAASP X52 MERLIN /8 68 N80 DINO VAM / ST95 VAM TOP / ST95 VAM TOP psi (545 pptf) 7 32 L80 13% Cr VAM TOP PERFORATION INTERVALS DEPTHS (AHBDF) LENGTH TOP BOTTOM GUN TYPE GUN OD PHASE (DEG) DATE ESS - Open hole completion Top of ESS ft AHBDF Bottom of ESS ft AHBDF X-MAS TREE SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TREE CAP SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE FLOW WING SIZE KILL WING SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TUBING BONNET WELLHEAD DATA WELLHEAD SERIAL NUMBER MAX PRESSURE 5 K MANUFACTURER CAMERON TYPE SSMC UNIHEAD SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE ANNULUS SIDE OUTLETS 'A' 'B' LANDING RING SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE REMARKS CAMERON 8 3/4" 4 TPI 7 1/16" 5K SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE 13 5/8" 13 5/8" FASTLOCK HUB 13 3/8" DINO VAM 2 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K TYPE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE MAX PRESSURE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE NO. STAGES TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE FFY 6 3/8" 5K OTIS 7.5" SB RX 46 RX 46 RX 35 CF 13 5K 2 CF 13 BOX RX 24 RX 24 MAX PRESSURE CAMERON 7 1/16" 5K 3 1/8" 5K 13 5/8" FASTLOCK 26 " NOM TYPE TYPE COMPLETION PRODUCTION PACKER PACKER SERIAL NO. SSSV SERIAL NO. INFLOW TEST SSSV STRING WEIGHT DOWN STRING WEIGHT UP COMPRESSION WEIGHT ON TUBING HANGER TUBING HGR SERIAL NO. NUMBER CONTROL LINE CLAMPS TYPE CONTROL LINE CLAMPS APPROVED Halliburton 7" MHR PSI ALL WEIGHTS EXCLUDING BLOCK WT NCCL LOW PROFILE X COUPLING PROTECTOR NCCL 1770 LP DATE REVISION 0 06/03/01 WSBG02 PAGE 1 WELL STATUS RECORD BG02/ Rev. 3

75 DESCRIPTION SEA LEVEL SEA BED NORTH SEA GROUP CHALK CROMER KNOLL BUNTER SHALE ALLER HALITE BASAL ANHYDRITE HAUPT DOLOMITE WERRA ANHYDRITE ZECHSTEINKALK KUPFERSCHIEFER LEMAN SANDSTONE INT ROT MUDSTONE MAIN ROT HALITE ROT CLAY TOTAL DEPTH (DRILLERS) AHBDF 390 TVBDF 1270 AHBDF 1270 TVBDF 1719 AHBDF 1719 TVBDF 4107 AHBDF 6640 AHBDF 6234 TVBDF 7140 AHBDF 6611 TVBDF 7564 AHBDF 8634 AHBDF 7364 TVBDF Seabed 26" Conductor 392 lb/ft X-52 Merlin X-OVER 10 3/4" Casing 55.5 lb/ft ST95 VAM TOP 13 3/8" Casing 68 lb/ft N80 DINO VAM Top of Cement 9 5/8" 7" TOL / Cement 9 5/8" Casing 53.5 lb/ft ST95 VAM TOP 7598 AHBDF ESS Hanger PBR AHBDF 7514 TVBDF AHBDF 7463 TVBDF Completion Packer 7" Liner 32 lb/ft L80 13% Cr VAM TOP ESS Shoe TD APPROVED DATE DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH AHDBSV AHDBDF TVDBSV INCL. DEG CAMERON 7" SSMC TUBING HANGER NIPPLE WITH AVA PROFILE 6.070" NO GO 6.120" 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR 10 3/4" 55.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON 7" SP TR-SSSV 5.963" NO GO 6.025" SELF EQUALISING 13% CR 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR /4" X 9 5/8" CASING XOVER +/ FT " 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING 13% CR (DRIFTED TO 6.000") CASING 32 LB/FT WEIGHT, HOWEVER COUPLINGS ARE 29 LB/FT WEIGHT. HALLIBURTON DURASLEEVE SSD 4.000" RPT NO GO 4.090" 13% CR (DOWN TO OPEN) " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON RATCH LATCH 13% CR HALLIBURTON MHR PACKER 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR BAKER AOF NIPPLE 3.750" NO GO 3.805" 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR FLUTED NO GO SUB 5.875" OD 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR /2" MULE SHOE TYPE WEG 13% CR WEATHERFORD 15FT PBR EXTENSION SUPER 13% CR WEATHERFORD CPD LINER PACKER SUPER 13% CR /2" 17 LB/FT VAM FJL L80 TUBING 13% CR (SPECIAL DRIFT 4.830") " EXPANDABLE TOP CONNECTOR " EXPANDABLE SAND SCREEN 316L MATERIAL W/ 200 UM PETROWEAVE " EXPANDABLE BOTTOM CONNECTOR PACK OFF/SEAL BORE 4 1/2" 12.6 LB/FT PUP JOINT 13% CR REVISION 0 06/03/01 WSBG02 PAGE 2 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 WELL STATUS RECORD - BRIGANTINE BG02/01 49/19-G2 LITHOLOGY CASING COMPLETION AHBDF TVSS DESCRIPTION OD ID DRIFT 9 5/8" 53.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING " 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR XOVER 7" NK 3SB X 5" NK 3SB 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR BUNTER SANDSTONE " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR WASH DOWN SHOE Lower TRIASSIC PERMIAN WELL STATUS RECORD BG02/01 Rev

76 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK WELL STATUS RECORD BG03/ Rev. 3

77 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 WELL STATUS RECORD BG03/03 Rev

78 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD GENERAL DATA BRIGANTINE BR01/04 49/19-R1 WELL DATA WELL GEOMETRY GENERAL DATA DRILLING RIG REFERENCE DATUM DFE (AMSL) SWAB VALVE SLOT COORD. (UTM) DATE SPUDDED MSL 115 FT WATER DEPTH 101 FT DATE COMPLETED MAERSK ENHANCER 42 FT BDF 0.2 N / 12.3 E N / E KOP 1050 ft Max Deviation ft Min ID ft Max Dogleg ft WELL TYPE WELL NO. HSE NO. FIELD RESERVOIR (OBJECTIVE) PRODUCTION LICENCE DRILLERS TD Horizontal Producer BR01/04 49/19-R1 Brigantine C ROTLIEGEND SANDSTONE P FT FLUID DATA LOG DATA RESERVOIR MUD TYPE RESERVOIR MUD WEIGHT WEIGHTING MATERIAL A ANNULUS FLUID A ANNULUS WEIGHT A ANNULUS VOLUME TBG FLUID TBG WEIGHT TBG VOLUME Perflow 100 / Formate 520 pptf Dolomite 2% KCI Inhibited Brine 515 pptf 164 bbls Produced Gas bbls TOP BOTTOM RUN NO. LOG AHBDF AHBDF DATE 1 CDR / APWD MWD - GR MWD - GR HLDT / DSI / GR VSP / GR IMPulse PEx / HALS / EMS / GR / CMR SIZE (IN) WEIGHT (LB / FT) GRADE COUPLING TOP OF CASING AHBDF CASING DATA SHOE DEPTH AHBDF TVDBDF TOP OF CEMENT AHBDF TVDBDF EMMG MAASP X52 MERLIN /8 68 N80 DINO VAM / ST110 VAM TOP / ST95 VAM TOP psi (625 pptf) 7 32 SM95 13% Cr VAM ACE PERFORATION INTERVALS DEPTHS (AHBDF) LENGTH TOP BOTTOM GUN TYPE GUN OD PHASE (DEG) DATE ESS - Open hole completion Top of PBR ft AHBDF Top of ESS ft AHBDF Bottom of ESS ft AHBDF X-MAS TREE SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TREE CAP SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE FLOW WING SIZE KILL WING SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TUBING BONNET WELLHEAD DATA WELLHEAD SERIAL NUMBER MAX PRESSURE 5 K MANUFACTURER CAMERON TYPE SSMC UNIHEAD SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE ANNULUS SIDE OUTLETS 'A' 'B' LANDING RING SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE REMARKS CAMERON 8 3/4" 4 TPI 7 1/16" 5K SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE 13 5/8" 13 5/8" FASTLOCK HUB 13 3/8" DINO VAM 2 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K TYPE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE MAX PRESSURE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE NO. STAGES TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE FFY 6 3/8" 5K OTIS 7.5" SB RX 46 RX 46 RX 46 CF 13 5K 2 CF 13 BOX RX 24 RX 24 MAX PRESSURE CAMERON 7 1/16" 5K 7 1/16" 5K 13 5/8" FASTLOCK 26 " NOM TYPE TYPE COMPLETION PRODUCTION PACKER PACKER SERIAL NO. SSSV SERIAL NO. INFLOW TEST SSSV STRING WEIGHT DOWN STRING WEIGHT UP COMPRESSION WEIGHT ON TUBING HANGER TUBING HGR SERIAL NO. NUMBER CONTROL LINE CLAMPS TYPE CONTROL LINE CLAMPS APPROVED Halliburton 7" MHR PSI ALL WEIGHTS EXCLUDING BLOCK WT NCCL LOW PROFILE X COUPLING PROTECTOR NCCL 1770 LP DATE REVISION 0 16/04/01 WSBR0104 PAGE 1 WELL STATUS RECORD BR01/ Rev. 3

79 DESCRIPTION SEA LEVEL SEA BED NORTH SEA GROUP CHALK RED CHALK HAUPT DOLOMITE WERRA ANHYDRITE ZECHSTEINKALK KUPERSCHIEFER LEMAN SANDSTONE SPEETON CLAY SPILSBY SANDSTONE HAUPT ANHYDRITE PLATTEN DOLOMITE STASSFURT HALITE BASAL ANHYDRITE KUPERSCHIEFER LEMAN SANDSTONE TOTAL DEPTH (DRILLERS) AHBDF 501 TVBDF 1281 AHBDF 1280 TVBDF 2141 AHBDF 2117 TVBDF 7619 AHBDF 5992 TVBDF 9471 AHBDF 7213 TVBDF 9977 AHBDF 7545 TVBDF AHBDF AHBDF 8007 TVBDF AHBDF 8138 TVBDF AHBDF 8139 TVBDF Seabed 26" Conductor 392 lb/ft X-52 Merlin X-OVER 10 3/4" Casing 55.5 lb/ft ST110 VAM TOP 13 3/8" Casing 68 lb/ft N80 DINO VAM Top of Cement 9 5/8" 7" TOL / Cement 9 5/8" Casing 53.5 lb/ft ST95 VAM TOP Completion Packer 7" Liner 32 lb/ft SM95 13% Cr VAM ACE ESS Shoe TD APPROVED DATE DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH AHDBSV AHDBDF TVDBSV INCL. DEG CAMERON 7" SSMC TUBING HANGER NIPPLE WITH AVA PROFILE 6.070" NO GO 6.120" 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR 10 3/4" 55.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON 7" SP-2 TR-SSSV 5.963" NO GO 6.025" SELF EQUALISING 13% CR 7" 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR /4" X 9 5/8" CASING XOVER +/ FT " 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /8" 53.5 LB/FT VAM TOP ST95 CASING " 29 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR XOVER 7" NK 3SB X 5" NK 3SB 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING 13% CR (DRIFTED TO 6.000") CASING 32 LB/FT WEIGHT, HOWEVER COUPLINGS ARE 29 LB/FT WEIGHT. HALLIBURTON DURASLEEVE SSD 4.000" RPT NO GO 4.090" 13% CR (DOWN TO OPEN) " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR " 18 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON RATCH LATCH 13% CR HALLIBURTON MHR PACKER 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR BAKER AOF NIPPLE 3.750" NO GO 3.805" 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR FLUTED NO GO SUB 5.875" OD 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR /2" MULE SHOE TYPE WEG 13% CR WEATHERFORD 15FT PBR EXTENSION SUPER 13% CR WEATHERFORD CPD LINER PACKER SUPER 13% CR /2" 17 LB/FT VAM FJL L80 TUBING 13% CR (SPECIAL DRIFT 4.830") " EXPANDABLE TOP CONNECTOR " EXPANDABLE SAND SCREEN 316L MATERIAL W/ 200 UM PETROWEAVE " EXPANDABLE BOTTOM CONNECTOR PACK OFF/SEAL BORE 4 1/2" 12.6 LB/FT PUP JOINT 13% CR WASH DOWN SHOE REVISION 0 16/04/01 WSBR0104 PAGE 2 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 WELL STATUS RECORD - BRIGANTINE BR01/04 49/19 LITHOLOGY CASING COMPLETION AHBDF TVSS DESCRIPTION OD ID DRIFT AHBDF ESS Hanger PBR 4 1/2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR PERMIAN WELL STATUS RECORD BR01/04 Rev

80 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combine Operation Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 4 WELL STATUS RECORD GENERAL DATA BRIGANTINE D BR02/02 (INDE I) 49/19-R2Z WELL DATA WELL GEOMETRY GENERAL DATA DRILLING RIG REFERENCE DATUM DFE (AMSL) SWAB VALVE SLOT COORD. (UTM) DATE SPUDDED MSL 115 FT WATER DEPTH 101 FT DATE COMPLETED MAERSK ENHANCER 44 FT BDF 12.3 N / -0.2 E N / E KOP 800 ft Max Deviation ft Min ID ft Max Dogleg ft WELL TYPE WELL NO. HSE NO. FIELD RESERVOIR (OBJECTIVE) PRODUCTION LICENCE DRILLERS TD Horizontal Producer BR02/02 49/19-R2Z Brigantine D ROTLIEGEND SANDSTONE P.132 Original Hole FT Sidetrack FT FLUID DATA LOG DATA RESERVOIR MUD TYPE RESERVOIR MUD WEIGHT WEIGHTING MATERIAL A ANNULUS FLUID A ANNULUS WEIGHT A ANNULUS VOLUME TBG FLUID TBG WEIGHT TBG VOLUME Perflow pptf Dolomite Inhibited Brine 520 pptf 430 bbls Brine bbls RUN NO. TOP BOTTOM LOG AHBDF AHBDF Original Hole 49/19-R2 17 1/2" MWD/ GR / APWD /4" MWD/ GR / APWD /2" MWD/ GR " ADN4 / Impulse PCL MDT-GR-ACTS ADN4 / Impulse Sidetrack 1 49/19-R2Z 6" MWD / GR DATE SIZE (IN) WEIGHT (LB / FT) GRADE COUPLING TOP OF CASING AHBDF CASING DATA SHOE DEPTH AHBDF TVDBDF TOP OF CEMENT AHBDF TVDBDF EMMG MAASP X52 MERLIN SURFACE /8 68 N80 DINO VAM SURFACE / ST95 VAM TOP SURFACE psi 7 32 SM95 13% CR VAM TOP L ESS PERFORATION INTERVALS DEPTHS (AHBDF) LENGTH TOP BOTTOM GUN TYPE GUN OD PHASE (DEG) DATE ESS - Open hole completion Top of PBR ft AHBDF Top of ESS ft AHBDF Bottom of ESS ft AHBDF X-MAS TREE SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TREE CAP SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE FLOW WING SIZE KILL WING SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE TUBING BONNET SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE WELLHEAD DATA WELLHEAD SERIAL NUMBER MAX PRESSURE 5 K MANUFACTURER CAMERON TYPE SSMC UNIHEAD SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE ANNULUS SIDE OUTLETS 'A' SUPPORT RING SERIAL NUMBER MANUFACTURER REMARKS 'B' SIZE TOP CONNECTOR SIZE BOTTOM CONNECTOR SIZE CAMERON TYPE FFY 5 1/8" 5K 8 1/4" 4 TPI 7 1/16" 5K 7 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K 13 5/8" FASTLOCK TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE OTIS SB RX 46 RX 46 RX 24 CF /8" 13 5/8" FASTLOCK HUB 13 3/8" 2 1/16" 5K 2 1/16" 5K MAX PRESSURE FLANGE TYPE FLANGE TYPE NO. STAGES TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE 2 CF 13 DINO VAM BOX RX 24 RX MAX PRESSURE CAMERON 26 " NOM TYPE TYPE Original hole drilled to ft ahbdf (8623 ft tvbdf) to identify FWL (8575 ft tfbdf). Plugged hole back 300 ft inside 7" liner. Drilled out cement 5 ft past shoe and drilled side track to ft. COMPLETION PRODUCTION PACKER PACKER SERIAL NO. SSSV SERIAL NO. INFLOW TEST SSSV STRING WEIGHT DOWN STRING WEIGHT UP COMPRESSION WEIGHT ON TUBING HANGER TUBING HGR SERIAL NO. NUMBER CONTROL LINE CLAMPS TYPE CONTROL LINE CLAMPS APPROVED DATE Halliburton MHR PSI 80 KLBS 160 KLBS 20 KLBS 60 KLBS ALL WEIGHTS EXCLUDING BLOCK WT. TOTAL TURNS APPLIED TORQUE SET DOWN WEIGHT /2" TUBETEC LP X COUPLING PROTECTOR A REVISION 1 14/05/02 WSBR0202 PAGE 1 WELL STATUS RECORD BR02/ Rev. 3

81 DESCRIPTION SEA LEVEL SEA BED NORTH SEA GROUP CHALK BROCKELSCHIEFER HAUPT DOLOMITE WERRA ANHYDRITE ZECHSTEINKALK KUPERSCHIEFER LEMAN SANDSTONE CROMER KNOLL ALLER HALITE TOTAL DEPTH (DRILLERS) AHBDF 501 TVBDF 2192 AHBDF 2092 TVBDF 5660 AHBDF 4091 TVBDF 7600 AHBDF 5732 TVBDF 7722 AHBDF 5840 TVBDF AHBDF AHBDF 8442 TVBDF AHBDF 8526 TVBDF Seabed 26" Conductor 392 lb/ft X-52 Merlin 13 3/8" Casing 68 lb/ft N80 DINO VAM Top of Cement 9 5/8" 7" TOL / Cement 9 5/8" Casing 53.5 lb/ft ST95 VAM TOP Completion Packer 7" Liner 32 lb/ft SM95 VAM TOP 13% CR ESS Shoe TD APPROVED DATE DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH AHDBSV AHDBDF TVDBSV INCL. DEG CAMERON SSMC 5 1/2" TUBING HANGER WITH AVA PROFILE 4.850" 13% CR. 5 1/2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB PUP JOINT PXP 10 FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON 5 1/2" SP TR-SSSV 4.437" RPT NO GO 4.540" SELF EQUALISING 13% CR 5 1/2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR /2" 23 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR X OVER 5 1/2" X 4 1/2" NK 3SB 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK3SB L80 TUBING 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON DURASLEEVE SSD 3.688" NO GO 3.770" (DOWN TO OPEN) 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK3SB L80 PUP JOINT 20FT 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK3SB L80 PUP JOINT 5FT 13% CR X OVER 4 1/2" NK3SB BOX UP X 5" NK3SB PIN 13% CR HALLIBURTON RATCH LATCH 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR HALLIBURTON RPT NIPPLE 3.562" NO GO 3.650" 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10FT 13% CR FLUTED NO GO SUB 5.875" OD 13% CR /2" 13.5 LB/FT NK 3SB L80 PUP JOINT 10 FT 13% CR /2" MULE SHOE TYPE WEG 13% CR " 32 LB/FT VAM TOP HT L80 CASING 13% CR WEATHERFORD 15FT PBR EXTENSION SUPER 13% CR WEATHERFORD CPD LINER PACKER SUPER 13% CR /2" 17 LB/FT VAM FJL L80 TUBING 13% CR (SPECIAL DRIFT 4.830") " EXPANDABLE TOP CONNECTOR " EXPANDABLE SAND SCREEN 316L MATERIAL W/ 200 UM PETROWEAVE " EXPANDABLE BOTTOM CONNECTOR PACK OFF/SEAL BORE HALLIBURTON MHR PACKER 13% CR /2" 12.6 LB/FT PUP JOINT 13% CR WASH DOWN SHOE REVISION 1 14/05/02 WSBR0202 PAGE 2 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 Description of Installations - Section 4 LM0584 WELL STATUS RECORD - BRIGANTINE D BR02/02 (INDE I) 49/19-R2Z LITHOLOGY CASING COMPLETION AHBDF TVSS DESCRIPTION OD ID DRIFT BUNTER SHALE BASAL ANHYDRITE AHBDF ESS Hanger PBR PERMIAN WELL STATUS RECORD BR02/02 Rev

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83 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 5 LM Emergency Facilities Section 5 - Emergency Facilities and Arrangements The general alarm muster points (TRs), and alternative muster locations, TEMPSCs and liferafts can be seen on Figures A3.1, A3.10 & A3.19 however the primary escape route, in each case, is to the mobile installation, the fixed installations muster point should only be used if the bridge is impaired. Escape and evacuation routes have been modified for the duration of the combined operation and are indicated by signs that are visible from all working areas; additionally they are posted on the combined installation Station Bills. An advantage of a combined operation in this case is that the mobile, in comparison to the fixed installation has a no hydrocarbon inventory and is therefore less likely to suffer major fire and/or explosions. The use of emergency facilities is in general not compromised by the close proximity of the installations. The mobile therefore provides a generally safe location and evacuation route for personnel in the event of a major incident, assuming that the bridge can be used. 2 Emergency Arrangements 2.1 Alarms The mobile installation P.A. system and audible alarm system through the P.A. will be extended from the mobile to the fixed installation. A separate system of manual alarm call points has been provided on the fixed installation to indicate in the mobile installation radio room. No additional fire detection will be provided. Gas Detection for the fixed installation, during the combined operation, comprises a stand-alone acoustic system. This will also alarm in the mobile rig radio room. All operations on both installations are to cease immediately and made safe/secure on sounding of a GA. Personnel should respond in accordance with the Station Bill instructions. Wireline Personnel should respond in accordance with Well Services Procedures. Communications systems will be as described under Part 2 Section ESD Control For the duration of the repair operation, well PS02 will be isolated and under the control of the Well Services Department, all other wells will remain under the control of Bacton. Each well in turn will be subjected to maintenance (Intervention Wirelining, Bi-annual Leak Testing and Tracer Testing) during these operations the well being maintained will be under the control of the Well Services Department, all other wells will remain under the control of Bacton at all times. 2.3 Firewater Requirements Firewater Protection for the Wellhead Area and the Interface Bridge will be provided to satisfy the requirements of PFEER Regulations 2 and 13. Rev

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85 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2- Description of Installations - Section 6 LM0584 Section 6 - Helicopter Access There are no helidecks on the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG or the BR platforms therefore all helicopter operations will be routed to the mobile installation's Helideck. Prior to any helicopter operations communications must be established between the Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) and the helicopter. During any air traffic movements, the HLO will contact the crane driver(s), to ensure that crane operations are suspended and the cranes moved to a safe orientation or to the stowed position, in accordance with the Civil Aviation Authority publication CAP 437. Rev

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87 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 7 LM0584 Section 7 - Safe Limits of Operation 1. Seafox Positioning The maximum weather conditions under which a location approach and final positioning will be attempted are limited to those at which the Seafox 4 can be pinned/jacked. Limitations are as follows - Maximum significant wave height Maximum significant wave period Tz Maximum wind speed Maximum surface current speed 1.5 metres 5.0 seconds 8.0 metres/second (18 knots) 1.0m/s 1.2 Preloading Preloading is preparation of the seabed to support the weight of the mobile before it is applied to the legs. Those limitations are - Maximum elevated weight (jacking) Maximum elevated weight (preloading) Wind speed Significant wave height Significant wave period Tz Surface current speed Level 7066 tonnes 7066 tonnes 8.0 metres/second (18 knots) 1.5 metres 5 seconds 1.0 metres/second Even Keel The centre of gravity of the elevated weight is to be within 0.25 metres of the hull centre line and between 0.5m fore and 0.5m aft from the centre of the leg pattern. 1.3 Elevated Operational Normal operating limitations when jacked-up are as follows Water depth (LAT) Airgap above wave crest height Wave height/period Surface current speed Wind speed (1 minute sustained) Elevated weight 45.7 metres 13 metres 13.0 metres/11 seconds 0.5 metres/second 30.0 metres/second 7266 tonnes 1.4 Elevated Survival Environmental conditions that are more severe than for normal operating are as follows Wave Height/period Surface current speed Wind velocity (1 minute sustained) 18 metres/11.34 seconds 0.5 metres/second 45.0 metres/second The centre of gravity of the elevated weight is to be within 0.1 metres of the hull centre line and between 0.1 metres fore and 0.1 metres aft from the centre of the leg pattern. Oceanographic values in paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4 are taken from the vessel classification and are for water depths of 45.7 metres. The maximum water depth at BR, BG and PS does not exceed 30 metres. Rev

88 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 7 Risk (Fatalities/hr) 6.00E-04 G4 5.00E E E-04 G3 2.00E-04 C4 1.00E-04 G2 G5 G6 C1 C3 C2 G1 0 C5 0.00E+00 Activity LEGEND STOP Production Production START Production No Production G1 Manoeuvering rig to Stand off position G2 Anchors run G3 Warping of rig to final position G4 Lowering of legs & predriving to zero air gap G5 Jacking up from zero air gap to final position G6 Removal of main tugs 0 Normal activities C1 Attachment of tugs C2 Check that legs can be raised C3 Freeing of legs C4 Raising of legs C5 Removal of rig Figure Risk by Activity Graph Rev. 3

89 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 7 LM Helicopter Operations Helicopter operations on the mobile installation will normally cease - - In winds of more than 60 knots but, in an emergency the pilot may use his discretion. - During any jacking or preloading operations. - During venting - as indicated by the flashing red lights at the top of the vent stack. 3. Crane Operations Crane operations on the fixed and mobile installations will cease - - During any helicopter operations. - In adverse weather conditions. 4 Production Restrictions 4.1 Approach and Positioning In the event that the fixed installation is live then there are production restrictions in force when a mobile installation is in the process of locating into position. A Jack-Up Positioning Risk Study carried out by DNV Technica, (June 1994) concludes that production should be shutdown during high risk operations e.g. the raising or lowering of the legs of the mobile installation. A risk/activity graph has been included and should be referred to for restrictions pertaining to production when a mobile is locating onto or pulling off a fixed installation (See Figure Risk by Activity Graph). The Shell definition of shutdown for a Trident type platform is a Production Hold which means that all the Flow Wing Valves are Shut and no gas is flowing Locating onto the Fixed Installation Prior to the mobile manoeuvring into its final position from the stand-off position, production is to be shutdown at the end of G2 and is to discontinue throughout the G3 and G4 periods. Production cannot then recommence until, the legs have been lowered onto the seabed, preloading is complete and zero air gap has been achieved (during the G5 period) and then only with the agreement of the OIM s of the respective installations. Rev

90 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section Pulling Off Location A pre-move meeting will be conducted on the mobile prior to pulling off location. The pull off will not commence until The weather conditions are favourable. The pull off equipment is checked and in place. All procedures are agreed. Mobile and fixed installations are down-manned to essential crews only. Whilst freeing and raising the legs, production is to be shutdown e.g. at the end of C2 and to discontinue throughout C3 and C4 periods. For clarity, the shutdown is to take place when the mobile hull touches the water. The legs, relative to the seabed will be monitored to ensure that they are raised at the same time; additionally tugs hold the mobile stationary while all the legs are being finally released. Discontinuing production during the period that the mobile floats free and leaves the safety zone reduces any potential hazards. Production can be restarted once the mobile installation has left the 500-metre safety zone, and/or the OIM is satisfied that it is safe to do so Jacking/Production Operations 5 References In the event that jacking operations are suspended for an extended period of time, production may restart subject to the following criteria - Minimum air gap established. Legs pinned/chocked. All marine operations completed. A Risk Assessment to be carried out to ensure that all the above criteria have been met. Production must cease and the platform shutdown at least 30 minutes prior to jacking operations recommencing. For specific rig move procedures refer to the Seafox 4 Rig Move Procedure Document. Further information regarding operational limitations can be found in the Safety Case for the fixed installations (Shell Document Nos. PS , BG and BR ) and in the mobile installations Operations Manual and Safety Case. The Adverse Weather Working Policy Document (Shell Document No ) provides guidelines of the limits for safe operations under adverse weather conditions for, but not limited to helicopter operations, supply boats, gangways and crane operations. These also relate to a mobile installation when in a combined operation mode. Helicopter Landing Officer's Manual (Shell Document No ). Marine Operations Manual (Shell Document No's and ). 6 Communications with Bacton The Risk by Activity Graph illustrates the PS, BG and BR production status during various phases of combined operations. The control arrangements for PS, BG and BR during these phases are indicated in the table below Rev. 3

91 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 2 - Description of Installations - Section 7 LM0584 PHASE SKIFF PS, BRIGANTINE BG or BR PRODUCING SKIFF PS, BRIGANTINE BG or BR CONTROL POINT 1 SKIFF PS, BRIGANTINE BG or BR PROCESS CONTROL STATUS 2 Mobile moves in Yes Bacton Bacton Mobile warping into No Bacton Bacton location Interfacing No Bacton Bacton Mobile departs No Bacton Bacton Mobile moves away Yes Bacton Bacton Notes - 1 The Control Point refers to the actual point of control for Skiff PS, Brigantine BR or BG, which is Bacton. 2 Process Control is a sub-element of the control functions and controls production rates There will be a Shell Operations OIM and crew placed on the mobile installation (as and when required for operational purposes) during combined operations. Consequently decisions governing the combined operation will be the responsibility of the mobile installation OIM with assistance from the fixed installation OIM (when present). The mobile installation OIM, where appropriate, will liaise with Bacton. The Mobile Installation will be connected to the respective Fixed Installation via a cable interconnection. Due to the minimal communications facilities on the Fixed Installation, the primary communication system will be that of the satellite or radio LOS system to the Shell Assen network, installed on the Mobile Installation. The Skiff PS will be connected to the Shell network services via a fibre optic link at the Galleon PN platform. Brigantine BR and BG will be connected to the Shell network services via a fibre optic link at the Corvette platform. The satellite/radio LOS system will be supplemented by the Seafox 4 GMDSS system or V-SAT system. Rev

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93 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 1 LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 Safety Management System (SMS) Interface Arrangements Contents Section 1 Fixed Installations SMS Overview 1. Safety Management System Definition Statement of Shell Expro Health, Safety Environmental Policy Section 2 Mobile Installation SMS Overview 1. Safety Management System Section 3 SMS Co-ordination Principles 1. General SMS Interface Methodology Interface Issues/Requirements Interface Areas for Combined Operations Section 4 SMS Interface Arrangements 1. Statement of Intent Management Management Structure (Offshore) Management Structure (Onshore) Legal Boundaries between Fixed Installation and Mobile Installation Communications Personnel Manning Levels Selection and Control of Contractors and Sub Contractors Competency Requirements Workforce Involvement and Awareness Control of Operations Affecting Both Installations Interface Activity Control Procedural Controls Permit to Work Standby Vessel Unplanned Events/Programme Changes Safety Signs and Notices Relationship with Bacton Movement of Personnel Between Installations Activity Controls Accountabilities Heavy Lift Procedure Well Suspension Procedure Verification Rev

94 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 1 CONTENTS (continued) Section 5 SMS Interface Arrangements (Emergency Situations) 1. Management Emergency Procedures Personnel Tracking, Alarms and Mustering Personnel Tracking Procedures Alarms and Mustering Temporary Refuge and Evacuation Management Command Structure Combined Emergency Training / Drills / Exercises Section 6 Investigating and Reporting of Incidents 1. Incident Reporting Section 7 Monitoring, Auditing and Corrective Action Follow-up of the SMS Interface 1. Monitoring and Auditing Corrective Action Follow-up List of Figures Fig Onshore Emergency Response Organisation Rev. 3

95 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 1 LM Safety Management System 1.1 Definition Section 1 - Fixed Installations SMS Overview The Safety Management System (SMS) is an integral part of the Shell Expro total management system. These are the policies, objectives, organisational structure, responsibilities, standards, procedures, processes, controls and resources that are in place to manage safety in relation to the installation and its operation. This section provides only an overview of the SMS. For more in-depth details of the system, the GSG Safety Management System (DS ) should be consulted. The SMS used on the installations is itself compatible with the Corporate SMS as set out in the Safety Management and Environmental Management System Manual ( ). 1.2 Statement of Shell Expro Health, Safety and Environment Policy Principles Health, Safety and Protection of the Environment - Is of prime importance to Shell Expro, which seeks to conduct its operations in such a way as to avoid harm to employees, contractors and all others who may be affected directly or indirectly by its activities. Has equal status with other primary business objectives. Safe working practices and due consideration of environmental impact are vital to the overall efficiency and success of the business. Is the responsibility of all personnel and consequently therefore forms an integral part of the duties of all staff. Shell Expro is committed to obtaining the highest practicably achievable standards of occupational health, safety and environmental protection and to comply with all relevant statutory provisions. Aims To prevent all injuries at the workplace. To provide a safe and healthy workplace. To eliminate emissions, effluents and discharges that are known to have a negative effect on the environment. For further details of the above, reference should be made to the Shell Expro Health, Safety and Environmental Codes of Practice ( ). Rev

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97 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3- Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 2 LM Safety Management System Section 2 - Mobile Installation SMS Overview A long established tradition of effective management strategy that recognises the integration of safety into all aspects of operations has been a key component of the Company's success, both internally and since 1991 in the North Sea. The incorporation and evolution of an SMS into overall strategy have been fundamental to success and have prompted the formulation of a Vision Statement with the objective of confirming the Company as a safe supplier of support/accommodation vessels. The development of a formal SMS is regarded as a natural evolution of long-term strategy. An effective strategy for the implementation of a successful SMS is dependent upon three key areas of control - - The commitment of senior management - The allocation of sufficient resources, and - The involvement and support of employees. Management commitment is at the highest level through the formulation, review and updating of Health, Safety and Environmental Policy Statements and the direct involvement of the Managing Director in all aspects of safety. The objective of these policies has been through the development of related management strategies by the Managing Director and General Manager participating by providing personal leadership, supported by formal mechanisms for reporting, assessments, including meetings and work site visits. Responsibilities for achieving the objectives of Company policies are cascaded through a formal organisation structure that recognises line management responsibilities and the relevance of support. Line management can use the resources provided by support departments, including Safety, Training, Personnel, Materials, etc. The function of a robust and well-developed organisation and associated structure is to achieve the overall Company objective through the implementation of the appropriate strategy. The overall objective must have purpose (quality) and direction (improvement). The strategy includes the planning and implementation of health safety and environmental policies, monitoring performance against standards and the verification of effectiveness in achieving the intended standards and subsequent goal encapsulated in the Company's objective. All employees have a role to play and those appropriate levels of knowledge and understanding achieved and put into practice throughout the Company. This is, perhaps the most fundamental of the performance indicators for implementation of strategy and recognised within the SMS. This section provides only an outline of the SMS. For more in-depth details of the system, the mobile installation Safety Case should be consulted. Rev

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99 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 3 LM0584 Section 3 - SMS Co-ordination Principles 1 General To determine the interfacing of the SMS the following principles have been agreed between Shell NL. Exploration and Production, Assen, hereinafter referred to as Shell and the Workfox (UK) Ltd., hereinafter referred to as Workfox. - That it is the policy of both Shell and Workfox to ensure that adequate arrangements, so far as are reasonably practicable, for the health, safety and welfare at work of all employees, and any sub contracted personnel are provided for as required by the Health and Safety at Work Act. - That all Shell and Workfox employees and sub contracted personnel involved in the combined operation adhere to the Shell and Workfox statements of policy on health, safety and protection of the environment. - That safety applied to the combined operation will be an efficient drive for continued high safety standards considering that Safety is of prime importance to both Companies so that - - They are fully committed to providing their employees with a safe and healthy work place. - They conduct their operations in a safe, responsible and efficient manner. - They expect, from their employee's full co-operation in implementing the Company safe working procedures and safety plans. - All Shell and Workfox personnel and any sub contractors working on or visiting either installation shall comply with the safety procedures developed by both Companies and implemented on their respective offshore installation. 2 SMS Interface Methodology Following the principles defined above, the SMS of both Companies have been interfaced to cover the following activities required for this operation. Policy and programme objectives Organisation, responsibilities and resources The management of interface activities Special requirements for the combined operation Methods of operation Permit to work arrangements Personnel on board control Emergency response to alarms Rev

100 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 3 3 Interface Issues / Requirements The following interface issues and requirements are identified and have been resolved. Both SMSs are compatible for the combined operation and for any work to be carried out within the interface overlap area. The interface overlap area has been identified (see Part 1, Section 2, paragraph 4.3 Arrangements for the Co-ordination of Emergency Situations) and Shell staff experienced in fixed installation operations will provide the input to the mobile installation on the interface overlap area(s). The Shell permit to work system will be implemented for any work activities on the fixed installation, which are outside the interface overlap area, (see Part 3, Section 4, Paragraph 4. 2 Procedural Controls). That the competence requirements for all personnel have been established and are complied with. Data from the mobile incident reporting system will be made available to the Shell Representative as required for input into the Shell system. Emergency response procedures on the mobile installation will be compatible with the fixed installation emergency response procedures. Change control procedures will be formulated and implemented as required 4 Interface Areas for Combined Operations The interface areas of the combined operation were identified as follows Connection / disconnection of the bridge Marine operations Helicopter operations Crane operations Personnel movement and tracking Communications Emergency procedures Incident reporting Discharges Well Clean-up Safety Critical System and Element Identification with Performance Standards Rev. 3

101 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 LM0584 Section 4 - SMS Interface Arrangements 1 Statement of Intent Shell NL. Exploration and Production will execute the tasks detailed in Appendix 1 on the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR Platforms, using experienced personnel, guided by specific procedures to ensure that the work is carried out in a safe and efficient manner. 2 Management Described below is the management structure within the EP Europe, which will co-ordinate and manage the requirements for combined operations for both offshore and onshore. Each installation in the field (when manned) will have an appointed Offshore Installation Manager (OIM). As a number of installations can be involved, possibly two or more OIMs are within the sphere of the combined operation. Responsibilities as required by law are not affected. 2.1 Management Structure (Offshore) The following defines the responsible and accountable parties for each aspect of operations from the execution of the individual tasks offshore, the interface with the Assen Base and the line reporting to the Duty Holder, EP Europe. The responsibility for all activities lies with the Duty Holder, EP Europe. Mobile Installation OIM The mobile installation OIM is appointed by the Contractor and is responsible for health, safety and welfare for all personnel on his installation and solely responsible for the safe execution of all activities taking place on the mobile installation in accordance with its SMS. He shall ensure that all activities are carried out in accordance with the current work programme and is solely responsible for all operational activities onboard. Although the fixed installation Platform OIM is accountable overall for the combined operation, it does not remove the responsibility from the mobile installation OIM for the safety and integrity of his own installation. If, for any reason, the mobile installation OIM is incapacitated, the position of mobile installation OIM will be assumed by the appointed deputy. The mobile installation OIM will liaise with the Shell Representative on a daily basis regarding safety related matters. Fixed Installation OIM/Shell Representative - Shell (when present) The fixed installation OIM/Shell Representative (when present) has the responsibility for the safe execution of all activities taking place on his installation in accordance with the Health Safety and Environment Management System (HS&EMS). The fixed installation OIM (when present and in consultation with the mobile installation OIM) also has the additional responsibility for ensuring the co-ordination of any work that may encroach on the interface area between the installations involved. Where two or more operations conflict, work will be rescheduled so that overall safety, operational efficiency and integrity of the combined installations is preserved. The fixed installation OIM reports to the appropriate Nodal Platform OIM, who in turn reports to the Operations Manager West. As the Shell Representative he will be in charge of particular operations as identified on the operational plan and shall have the day to day responsibility for safety within those areas of operation. He shall ensure that personnel under his supervision are adequately trained and competent in the use of the equipment that they will be expected to use and are fully aware of any associated potential hazards. Rev

102 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 As the Shell representative on the mobile installation he demonstrably verifies through regular audits, general compliance with the mobile installation's SMS and Shell's safety related Policies and Procedures. He will hold meetings to an agreed timetable with minutes kept, ensuring that the Supervision set safety agenda is carried out. Any contentious matters that are not resolved at the safety meetings will be brought to the attention of the appropriate Nodal OIM. He shall collate and transmit via the Safety Officer relevant safety documents to the Shell Office to maintain an adequate and auditable trail. Additionally he will ensure that the appropriate Shell/Workfox PTW systems are adhered to and review job cards to identify any safety implications. He will advise the Operations Manager West of the progress of the work schedule. If, for any reason the fixed installation OIM is incapacitated, the position of OIM will be assumed by the appointed deputy OIM. Communication Operators/Controllers (Radio Operators) Communication links between the fixed installation (when manned) and mobile installation are through VHF radio and telephone links via the Communication Operator/Controllers (Radio Operators) who, provide an effective installation communications service. The mobile installation Radio Operator co-ordinates the movement of personnel and freight by air and sea in a safe, timely manner in accordance with current legislation and the mobile installation safety case. He is responsible for several administrative duties in connection with the personnel and freight movements; additionally he assists the OIM with other routine administrative duties. The mobile installation Radio Operator is directly responsible for notifying all installations of any changes in the Standby boat, prevailing weather forecast or any hazardous navigational situations, which may affect them. He reports directly to the mobile installation OIM. 2.2 Management Structure (Onshore) The responsible parties within the Leman and Sole Pit Field Teams, Maintenance Crews and the Mobile Installation Operator are shown at the end of Part 1 Section 2 (Management Organogram) together with the reporting relationship between offshore and onshore. A more detailed explanation of the onshore individual responsibilities is presented below. Operations Manager ONEgas Asset West The Operations Manager West is the fixed installation asset owner, he manages the overall business of his assets, he establishes the financial and technical business plans. He has the responsibility as the Focal Point for reporting the progress of the production operations to the Duty Holder EP Europe. He reports and is accountable to the Duty Holder. He also has the responsibility for the safe and efficient planning and execution of all fixed installation related activities, which include Ensuring the timely acquisition of all fixed installation related equipment and personnel and performance of the same. The day-to-day operational requirements as defined by schedules, nominations. Providing technical and logistical support to the fixed installation OIM. He will discuss planning in the short term and liaise with all other members of the Field Team. Additionally, on an as required basis he will hold discussions with the Shell Representative, Logistics and Support Supervisors Rev. 3

103 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 LM0584 Operations Manager (Workfox) The Operations Manager is responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the Workfox (UK) Base (Great Yarmouth). This includes monitoring of offshore operations, which will include the safe, efficient and environmentally acceptable operation of the mobile installation and compliance with the Safety Management System (SMS), Safety Case and Client liaison. 2.3 Legal Boundaries between Fixed Installation and Mobile Installation Under The Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration) Regulations act 1995 No. 738; the OIM has specific legal responsibilities regarding the personnel on the installation he is appointed to. The OIM of the mobile installation shall be responsible for all aspects of the operations on the combined installations. 2.4 Communications Telecommunication facilities between installations and Onshore Support are provided via the fixed installation equipment through the Rig Present switch and standard interface cabling, supplemented by the mobile installations dedicated satellite system and radio link. A telephone extension for the mobile installation is connected through fixed installation's telephone system; this has access to the Bacton Gas Terminal with connections to access the UK network. For all PTW activities, refer to Part 1 Section 2. The mobile installation OIM and the fixed installation OIM (when present) will maintain communications at all times. A daily meeting, chaired and minuted by the mobile installation OIM, to discuss ongoing operations and if required discuss them with the fixed installation OIM (when present) to identify and resolve any potential overlaps of responsibility. Both OIM's shall also inform each other immediately of any change from the current programme or in the case of an unplanned event e.g. any changes in the planned programme that might affect the fixed installation's integrity/operations. Rev

104 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 3 Personnel 3.1 Manning Levels Manning levels for both the mobile installation will at no time exceed the sum total of the POB as stated in their Safety Case POB Limitations. Manning levels on each of the fixed installations will be restricted to a maximum of 16 POB for the duration of the combined operation. 3.2 Selection and Control of Contractors and Sub Contractors Selection and control of Contractors and Sub Contractors is defined in the EP Europe SMS, Part 1, Section 3. Additional information can be found in the Health, Safety and Environmental Management of Contractors, Shell Document Number Selection and control of Contractors and Sub Contractors is defined in the mobile installation Safety Case Chapter 2, Section 8 Health and Safety Arrangements, Sub Section Competency Requirements Competency requirements for Safety Critical Roles are defined in the fixed installation SMS, Part 1, Section 3. Competency and Training is defined in the Mobile installation Safety Case, Chapter 2, Section 8 Health and Safety Arrangements, Sub Sections and Work force Involvement and Awareness Personnel are aware of the existence and content of their individual installation Safety Cases. The COSC will be distributed to both Companies for comments and discussed at the safety meetings as described in each Safety Case, where any increase in risk, if appropriate, will be highlighted and discussed Rev. 3

105 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 LM Control of Operations Affecting Both Installations 4.1 Interface Activity Control An EP Europe Standard Interface Design Pack is produced by the Interface Engineer for each interface. It contains information regarding the following, which are initially raised by Change Proposal (CP) Design Standards Personnel Structural Design Requirements Firepump and Firewater Requirements (Vendor) Permit to Work Arrangements Scaffolding Requirements Navaids and Communications Commissioning and Decommissioning Examples of Certificates and Manuals Final Acceptance Instrument Test Electrical Test Combined Operations Safety Case (COSC) Interface Project Organogram E & I Interface Design Requirements CAD and Illustrating Facilities Lighting Design and Procurement SMS / Revised Escape Routes Offshore Planning - 90 day Plan Verification Approvals Deliverables Various items within this design pack are submitted to the relevant authorities for approval prior to the combined operation. 4.2 Procedural Controls Permit to Work The Permit to Work (PTW) ensures that, all persons responsible for work site safety are aware of the work activities to be carried out, and have given their written approval for the execution of that work. Also, the PTW makes it clear to the person carrying out the work, of the conditions under which work may be started and completed. The PTW is a control procedure that is the end result of a fully considered work plan undertaken at a compulsory pre-job planning meeting involving all staff associated with that work. The mobile installation OIM in conjunction with the Shell Representative is responsible for all operations on the combined installation; therefore all non-routine mobile installation operations will be covered by the mobile installations PTW. When a fixed installation OIM is present a Shell PTW will be used for non-routine production/maintenance activities on the fixed installation. An interface PTW will be used whenever the mobile and fixed installations have activities to be carried out on or by either installation that could affect the other. The interface permit is to be signed by both the mobile installation OIM and the Shell Representative before work can commence. Within this document the term fixed installation applies to all Shell offshore production facilitates. The objectives of the Interface Permit are - To identify all preparations and precautions required to be taken on the fixed installation to safeguard the fixed and interfacing installation and its personnel. To identify all preparations and precautions required to be taken on the interfacing installation to safeguard the interfacing and fixed installation and its personnel. To provide authorisation from the fixed installation for an interfacing installation to carry out an activity in the defined interface area which may affect the fixed installation. Control of the Shell PTW can only be exercised by the Fixed Installation OIM (when present) via the Shell Permit Co-ordinator (PC). Control of the Mobile Contractor PTW shall be exercised by the mobile installation OIM. Rev

106 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 The OIMs shall communicate with each other regarding these permits and exchange relevant information e.g. type of work, work method, area where activity takes place, interfaces/interactions with other permits and/or activities on their respective schematics. On both installations, no work activities that require a permit can start in a location where work is already ongoing unless an additional permit is drawn up, this includes pre-work activities. The mobile installation management will ensure that appropriate personnel are notified to Shell and subsequently trained in the Shell (PTW) System. Reference Managers Information Manual, Volume 3, Permit to Work System. NON-PERMIT ACTIVITIES - SHELL ONLY Certain activities can be carried out under a Work Order system. Each item of work will be determined according to MIM's, Volume 3A as to whether a PTW is required. Those items not requiring a PTW will be carried out under the Work Order System. All Work Orders must be approved for work to proceed. Allowable signatories are the fixed installation OIM, or the Operations Supervisor. Once completed, Work Orders must be returned to the Permit Control Facility (PCF). The PCF keeps copies of all active permits and Work Orders. Commissioning work is not permitted without an authorised Work Order or PTW and the subsequent approval for that work to proceed. ACTIVITY PLANNING - SHELL ONLY Accurate and continually updated planning is the key to successful combined operations. Planning takes place in 4 distinct phases. i ii. iii. iv. Broad picture - 90 day plan - initial clashes removed. Resourcing started. Detailed view - short interval work management programme - conflicts resolved in more detail. Work scope developed in detail and interfaces resolved. Resources allocated. Step-by-step analysis - pre-job planning meeting - precise interfaces developed and understood. Scope of work agreed, and responsibilities allocated and accepted. Permit requirements agreed and permits generated. Precise work instructions - "Tool box talks" - all staff executing the work to discuss and fully understand the requirements. Finalisation of the work plan. Step (i) has considerable involvement from shore-based management in providing advisory support to Steps (ii) & (iii). Steps (i) & (ii) are minuted and circulated to all parties. Step (iii) will be minuted for complex jobs only. The seniority or management approval will also devolve, as the plan becomes more detailed. Step (i) Step (ii) Step (iii) Step (iv) 90 day plan will be approved by the Operations Manager West and the Shell Representative. approved by the nodal installation OIMs. approved by the mobile installation OIM, the nodal installation OIMs and the Offshore Team. approved by offshore first line supervisor. Through the structured and timely planning of each job, and as experience is gained, job requirements should be thoroughly met. The interactions between activities will be clearly defined in the pre-job plan Rev. 3

107 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 LM Standby Vessel Each combined installation will be covered by the Standby Vessel located within the Sole Pit Field or the Sean/Indefatigable Field for the duration of each combined operation. This vessel will be operated under Shell's Offshore Installations Policy for the Recovery and Rescue of Persons from the Sea UESE/11/P/95/006. In the event that the standby vessel is required to serve other installations then the respective OIM s shall communicate with each other and the appropriate Field Superintendent to discuss their standby vessel requirements and to resolve any potential conflict. Agreement shall be reached and endorsement gained from the Operations Manager West at least 24 hours before a co-ordinated standby vessel move procedure is implemented Unplanned Events/Programme Changes It is the personal responsibility of anyone causing or witnessing an unplanned event, receiving or requiring to implement a programme change, to advise their line supervisor and the mobile installation OIM immediately. Should an unplanned event result in a loss of containment or damage to equipment, the job must be stopped immediately and the procedures laid down in the mobile installation's Emergency Procedures Manual activated. Unplanned events will be treated as an incident within the Shell Expro Incident Reporting and Investigation Procedures System. This formal procedure ensures that adequate corrective actions will take place to avoid recurrence. The job will not be restarted until the mobile installation OIM is satisfied that the original conditions have been restored. If these conditions cannot be met, a pre-job planning meeting must be reconvened and the job re-assessed. In the event of a programme change, the mobile installation OIM will decide whether any material changes to the original job has occurred. This will be based on discussions with the offshore supervisory team and onshore. If the changes are minor the job may proceed but only after all staff involved have been advised of the change and the job plans updated and amended at the worksite. If a material change is proposed, the existing job will stop and the pre-job planning meeting be reconvened to re-assess the implications of that change. The current work permit will be studied, withdrawn and rewritten as necessary. A new job programme will be issued to all parties, and the toolbox talks reconvened. Rev

108 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section Safety Signs and Notices Signs and notices are required to provide adequate information to personnel of the hazards in a specific area. For specific circumstances as well as the signs and notices it may be required that announcements are made. For example Noise hazard Grating removed (fixed barrier required) Radiation hazard (announcement and a fixed barrier required) Nitrogen purging (announcement and a fixed barrier required) Safety signs must be large enough to be clearly visible and legible. They should be displayed logically and intelligibly and kept to the minimum necessary to provide the required information. All signs and notices should be maintained properly by replacement or cleaning as required. Signs and notices no longer valid must be removed without delay so as to avoid devaluation of the system. The provision and positioning of safety signs and notices is the responsibility of both installations Relationship with Bacton During the SIMOPS activity, (mobile in place and interface complete). Bacton, (the control point) shall continue to control NUI s export mass flow. They will continue to have OPEN/SHUT control of the FWV for all wells simultaneously and have the remote TPS. Any changes from the above shall be notified to Bacton shift supervisor (by FAX) by the mobile installation OIM. Where planned operations will affect platform production the Shell Representative or the fixed installation OIM (when present) shall inform the Bacton of the planned activities for that day. Subject to being advised otherwise the Bacton shall treat any initiated alarms as genuine and inform the mobile installation OIM on receipt. 4.3 Movement of Personnel between Installations For the movement of personnel between the mobile and fixed installation procedures have been developed. The T-card system utilises either a rack control system whereby personnel leave the T-card in different racks to indicate their presence on a particular installation. The racks are located at the bridge between the mobile and fixed installations. New arrivals as part of their induction will have the T-card system explained. If a GPA occurs while visiting an installation, visitors will report to the muster point allocated to them on arrival. A daily reconciliation audit will be carried out to ensure that only valid T-cards are in racks and that system is being used correctly. This is to ensure that T-cards have not been left in the wrong racks. The T-card system will be fully tested during evacuation drills. 4.4 Activity Controls The Interface areas of the combined operation have been identified in Part 3, Section 3, Paragraph 4. Interface Areas for the Combined Operation. Controls are in place to control discharges of materials into the sea or air. The intent to discharge e.g. venting will be relayed through normal communication channels to the other installation to allow them time to change or cease their operations as appropriate Rev. 3

109 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 4 LM Accountabilities The following represents the accountabilities for the interface and combined operation ACTIVITY Overall Work Operations Bridge Connection Bridge Disconnection Marine Operations Crane Operations Shell Permit to Work Personnel Movement Discharges Emergency Procedures Incident Reporting ACCOUNTABLE POSITION Mobile Installation OIM Mobile Installation OIM Mobile Installation OIM Shell Expro Marine Supervisor Shell Representative / Mobile Installation OIM Shell Representative / Permit Co-ordinator (when present) Shell Representative / Mobile Installation OIM Shell Representative / Mobile Installation OIM Mobile Installation OIM Mobile Installation OIM 4.6 Heavy Lift Procedure The Shell definition of a heavy lift is when using a crane or another lifting device as required to move equipment weighing over one (1) ton or half a ton for tubular items. It is anticipated that most lifts would be over the main deck area. Any lifts made over live process plant or pipework will be controlled under the Permit To Work system. To ensure the safety of operations the following rules will apply - - No lifts to be carried out over the choke manifolds or flow-lines while pressurised. - Any well, whose Christmas tree or flow-line is traversed by a heavy lift, will be closed in and depressurised for the duration of the heavy lift. - Lifts shall be authorised by written PTW following the completion of a lifting plan and risk assessment. 4.7 Well Suspension Procedure - Relevant SSSV's closed and inflow tested. - All relevant Christmas tree valves CLOSED. - Relevant flow-lines depressurised. - Any pressure on the annuli must be bled down to zero prior to lift. Pressure gauges installed on Christmas trees, A and B annuli will remain in place and be observed periodically by Operations personnel or via Bacton. Rev

110 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section Verification In the case of the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR the Shell Verification Scheme applies. The Seafox 4 operates under the verification scheme of the duty holder Workfox UK Ltd. Verification and examination for the Combined Installation is carried out by the Independent Certifying Body in accordance with the Shell Verification Scheme for Combined Operations, LM Rev. 3

111 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 5 LM Management Section 5 - SMS Interface Arrangements (Emergency Situations) 1.1 Emergency Procedures In the event of an emergency condition, the mobile installation OIM will be responsible for initiating response procedures to control that condition. Emergency Procedures have been produced for initial response to an emergency situation and should be used in conjunction with the mobile installation Emergency Procedures Manual The Emergency Response Procedures Manual for the mobile installation provides a list of procedures relating to main emergencies, response teams, incident callout, primary contacts and responsible person roles for emergency situations. The procedures used for initial contact, call out co-ordination and response to offshore/onshore emergencies are contained in the Emergency Response Procedure, Shell Document Number, LM0015. The information relating to the response to emergencies, on mustering, emergency equipment, emergency procedures and onshore support services for the fixed installation (when manned) are contained in the Manager's Information Manual Volume 1, Platform Emergency Procedures, Shell Document Number, Appendix Personnel Tracking, Alarms and Mustering Personnel Tracking Procedures Procedures have been developed for the tracking and control of Personnel On Board (POB) transferring between the mobile and the fixed installations. A T-card system will operate between the two installations. All personnel with a requirement to transfer between installations will use the T-card system provided by the mobile installation administration. The T-card is used as a token to indicated presence on a particular installation. Each installation is assigned a specific T-card rack at the control point. As transfers occur between installations T-cards are put into the T-rack provided and are moved from rack to rack. The T-card racks are located at the bridge between the mobile and the fixed installations. Use of the System i. Remove your T-card from the mobile installation rack and replace it in the fixed installation control point rack at the access to the fixed installation. ii. iii On completion of work, proceed back to the control point and remove your T-card from the fixed installation rack and replace it in the mobile installation rack. The maximum POB of the fixed installation is controlled by the number of T-cards i.e.16 POB = 16 T-cards. Do not exceed the maximum POB of the fixed installation if a card is not available - DO NOT CROSS A daily reconciliation audit will be carried out to ensure that only valid T-cards are in racks and the system is being used correctly. This ensures that T-cards have not been left in the wrong racks. The T-card system will be fully tested during evacuation drills Alarms and Mustering In the event of a GPA being initiated on either installation, the actions to be taken are shown on the Station Bill for each installation. Where the cause of the GPA affects the other installation or where there is doubt as to the cause/effect of the condition, a GPA will be initiated and annunciated on both installations. Rev

112 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 5 TECHNICAL SUPPORT TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ADVICE OFFSHORE EMERGENCY PRIMARY CONTACT PRIMARY CONTACT EMERGENCY CO-ORDINATOR OPERATIONS SAFETY & LOGISTICS PERSONNEL MANAGING DIRECTOR OPERATIONS DIRECTOR QA / SAFETY MANAGER INITIAL RESPONSE TEAM CRISIS RESPONSE TEAM AS REQUIRED H.S.E. POLICE COASTGUARD NORTH SEA MEDICAL CENTRE DEPT. OF TRADE & INDUSTRY MANAGEMENT SUPPORT PRESS / PA BACKUP TEAM PERSONNEL BACKUP TEAM WORKFOX BACK-UP ENQUIRES FROM PRESS/MEDIA ENQUIRES ABOUT PERSONNEL SHELL EXPRO WORKFOX Figure Onshore Emergency Response Organisation Rev. 3

113 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Part 3 - Safety Management System Interface Arrangements - Section 5 LM0584 On hearing GPA, personnel are to make safe the job, secured their workplace and escape immediately to the TR/General alarm muster point (mobile installation). In the event that the route to the General Alarm Muster Point is impaired then they should report to the General Alarm Muster Point (Alternative Muster Location) on fixed installation. It is the responsibility of the person in charge to ensure that work is stopped in a safe manner, the work site left safe (e.g. gas bottles isolated, diesel engines shut down). Personnel with emergency duties report to their emergency station. During Wireline Operations on hearing a GPA, the wireline equipment is to be shutdown and made safe. Contact to be made with the Seafox 4 Radio Room for further instructions in accordance with Well Services Procedures. The mobile installation OIM will complete a muster at the General Alarm Muster Point, should it be incomplete, a T-card rack check will be made and any differences reported. After correlation with the Alternative Muster Location and it has been established that persons are missing, emergency response procedures will be initiated to account for them. Each installation has mustering philosophies, these are contained in their individual safety cases. 1.3 Temporary Refuge and Evacuation Escape routes will be kept clear at all times. Arrows giving indication to the escape routes will be clearly visible from working areas on the fixed installation. Encapsulated temporary Escape Routes and Station bill diagrams will be promulgated for use during the combined operation. The location of the General Alarm Muster Points and Alternative Muster Location can be seen in Appendix 3, Figures A3.1, A3.10 and A3.19 and the respective installations individual Station Bills. The methods of evacuation are, dependent on the current situation by helicopter via the mobile installation by TEMPSC (mobile installation) by Liferaft (fixed or mobile installation) by access to the sea (fixed installation) 2. Management Command Structure The mobile installation will apply its own Emergency Procedures supplemented by additional Emergency Response Procedures. The OIMs (when the fixed installation OIM is present) will discuss and agree actions to be taken in response to emergencies on fixed/mobile installations and the manner in which they will be co-ordinated. Emergency condition activities will be co-ordinated by the mobile installation OIM with assistance from the fixed installation OIM (when present). Communications will be established between the OIMs (as and when required) and every assistance provided to control the situation. The mobile installation OIM is responsible for the safety and integrity of both installations, and will therefore ensure that both installations are made safe (with assistance from the fixed installation OIM when present). 3 Combined Emergency Training /Drills/Exercises Regular emergency drills and exercises in accordance with individual safety cases will be carried out to test the effectiveness of the emergency arrangements and to train the emergency response team personnel. Any shortcomings will be noted and measures implemented to prevent re-occurrence. Rev

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115 Shell UK Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM Incident Reporting Section 6 - Investigating and Reporting of Incidents The mobile installation parent Company have established incident investigation and reporting procedures, which are defined within their Safety Case. The mobile installation OIM will carry out incident investigations and reporting in accordance with the procedures in the SMS. In addition to this, the following have been agreed for the duration of this combined operation - In the event of an incident, the installation on which the incident occurs will be designated an identifying number prefixed by the installation's name/identifier. - All incidents, including low category classified first aid treatment cases, will be reported through the mobile installation Reporting System. - Any incident within the overlap area (where the 500m safety zones of both installations overlap). The mobile installation OIM has the responsibility for incident reporting and investigation aided by the fixed installation OIM (when present). - A copy of form number OIR 9B, Notice of Casualty or other Accident Involving Loss of Life or Danger to Life on or near an Offshore Installation, if raised on the mobile installation will be made available to the Leman or Clipper OIM if requested. Whilst on contract to Shell Expro, any incident that occurs on the mobile installation which - - Results in an injury to any person (first aid, MTC, RWC and LWC). - Causes damage to plant, equipment, the Mobile Installation or attendant vessels. - Causes environmental pollution. Must be reported to the Shell Representative who will follow the Shell Expro procedures for Reporting of Incidents. Further information regarding the Shell procedures for investigation and reporting of incidents can be found in the Shell Document Number Rev

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117 Shell UK Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Section 7 Monitoring, Auditing and Corrective Action Follow-up of the SMS Interface 1 Monitoring and Auditing Both Companies will conduct active monitoring, to ensure that safety is an integral part of any operation and that safety is a line management function. SMS audits are conducted as part of the overall Integrated Audit Plan that provides for periodic auditing of all facilities and activities as well as containing data on the safety management performance. Depending upon the combined operation scale, complexity, risks and performance requirements, audits will be conducted in accordance with the individual Safety Cases. 2 Corrective Action Follow-up Corrective actions are a feature of the safety systems monitoring and auditing review process and are used to identify areas of the individual installation or the combined operation installation SMS that require improvement. Where recommended actions for the improvement of the SMS are advised and agreement is reached, they will be incorporated into the COSC in accordance with the corrective action procedures in the EP Europe Safety Management System, Shell Document Number DS Rev

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119 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 1 - Operations and Programmes - Section 1 LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 1 - Operation and Programme CONTENTS Section 1 Operation Summary and Purpose of the Combined Operation 1. Purpose of the Combined Operation A Programme Overview A Fixed Installation Preworks A1.1.3 Section 2 Personnel On Board Requirements 1. Fixed Installation POB A Mobile Installation POB A POB Movements A POB Prior to Interface A1.2.1 List of Figures Fig. A1.1.1 Programme Overview A1.1.2 Rev.3 A1.1.1

120 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 1 - Operations and Programmes - Section 1 ID Task Name Duration Start 1 Interface at Skiff PS 2 Days Fri 22/10/04 2 PS Well Services Activities, New PS2 Wellhead Valve, Wirelining, Leak Testing and Tracer Testing on all 4 wells (24 hr Working Day) 10 Days Sun 24/10/04 3 PS Survey and Inspection 1 Day Wed 03/11/04 4 PS Maintenance Activities 1 Day Thu 04/11/04 5 De-interface PS 1 Day Fri 05/11/ Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Note Co-ordinated platform shutdown should be clearly defined 7 days prior to the arrival of Seafox 4. Notification (by ) to the Bacton Gas Schedulars and Assen Gas Sales will be co-ordinated by the Shell UK Interface Engineer and the attending Shell OIM. Figure A Programme Overview A1.1.2 Rev. 3

121 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 1 - Operations and Programmes - Section 1 LM0584 Section 1 Operation Summary and Purpose of the Combined Operation All design requirements for this combined operation are contained within Change Proposals numbers, CP-6644-PS, CP-6645-BG and CP-6643-BR. 1 Purpose of the Combined Operation The purpose of the combined operation is the carryout the workscope as shown in Figure A Programme Overview The Mobile installation will interface with the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR Platform s main deck by a bridge link for the duration of each combined operation. All safety and life support systems on the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR will be maintained. The mobile installation will provide accommodation and workshop facilities throughout the combined operation. The combined operations have been planned to run in accordance with Figure A1.1.1 Programme Overview. The detailed Well Services Activities will be undertaken in accordance with the Authorised Well Services Programme for the respective fixed installation. 3 Fixed Installation Pre-works For the duration of the combined operation temporary lighting will be installed in the bridge landing area as part of the Fixed Installation pre-works. These lights will be supplied from the mobile installation distribution system. Rev.3 A1.1.3

122 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 1 - Operations and Programmes - Section 1 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A1.1.4 Rev. 3

123 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 1 - Operations and Programmes - Section 2 LM Fixed Installation POB Section 2 Personnel On Board Requirements The Personnel On Board (POB) requirements for the Fixed Installation (Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR) will not exceed 16 POB Maximum for the duration of the combined operation. The total number of working personnel on the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR platforms will be strictly administered. Access, for Seafox 4 personnel, will be restricted to employees (including supervisory staff) who need to visit the fixed installation for the purpose of safety and to carry out predetermined tasks as detailed in the scope of work. 2. Mobile Installation POB The number of personnel on the Mobile Installation will not exceed that stated in the Safety Case. Seafox 4 personnel have no right of access to other areas of the fixed installation other than the area of work except, in an emergency or as directed by the OIM. 3. POB Movements Personnel requiring to visit either installation should follow the relevant procedures as laid down in Part 3, Section 5, Paragraph Personnel Tracking Procedures. 4. POB Prior to Interface Only Interface Personnel are permitted on the platform prior to the interface connections being completed and accepted for combined operations purposes. Rev.3 A1.2.1

124 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 1 - Operations and Programmes - Section 2 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A1.2.2 Rev. 3

125 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment Contents Section 1 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR (Fixed Installations) Hazards 1. Introduction and Objectives A Hazard Assessment Process A Integrity Review A Hazard Identification and Analysis A Performance of Safety System A ALARP Assessment Process A Results A Discussion of Results A Transportation A Hydrocarbon Risk A Occupational Risk A Ship Collision A Dropped Object Risk A2.1.8 Section 2 Seafox 4 (Mobile Installation) Hazards 1. Assessment Methodology A Hazard Identification and Assessment A Fire and Explosion A Loss of Stability A Mooring Incident A Towing Incident A Structural Failure A Dropped Objects A Major Equipment Failure A Seaborne Collision A Airborne Collision A Occupational Risk A Risk Summary A2.2.3 Section 3 Combined Operation Identification of Hazards 1. Hazard Identification A Combined Operation Hazards A2.3.1 Section 4 Hazard Assessment 1. Introduction A Hazard Assessment A Unignited and Ignited Releases from Fixed Installations A Non- Hydrocarbon Risk Analysis A Helicopter Travel A Collision During Approach and Departure A Helicopter Collision A Scour A Dropped Objects A Vent Pipe A Conclusions A Audit/Review Plan A2.4.3 Rev. 3 A2.1.1

126 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 Contents (Continued) List of Figures Fig. A2.1.1 Hazard Assessment Process A2.1.4 List of Tables Table A2.1.1 Safety Critical Elements A2.1.5 Table A2.3.1 Structural Failure A2.3.2/3 Table A2.3.2 Equipment Failure A2.3.4/5 Table A2.3.3 Dropped Objects A2.3.6/7 Table A2.3.4 Containment Failure A2.3.8/9 Table A2.3.5 Helicopter Crash A Table A2.3.6 Control System Failure A Table A2.3.7 Non Process Fire or Explosion A Table A2.3.8 Ship Collision A Table A2.3.9 Occupational Incident A Table A Loss of Stability A Table A Mooring Failure A Table A Well Services Activities A2.3.17/18/19 A2.1.2 Rev. 3

127 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 LM0584 Section 1 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR (Fixed Installations) Hazards 1 Introduction and Objectives The hazard assessment demonstrated that All hazards with the potential to cause a major accident were identified and recorded in a Hazard Register. Measures have been taken to reduce the risks to persons to the lowest level that is reasonably practicable. The installation has Temporary Refuge (TR) and evacuation facilities that meet the regulatory authority criteria for impairment. More details of the assessment are available in Part 3 of each Fixed Installation s Safety Case (document PS , BG and BR ). It was undertaken in two parts The hazard assessment process. The ALARP assessment. 2 Hazard Assessment Process The methods that were used to assess the adequacy of facilities on the installation are shown in Figure A They utilised An integrity review Hazard identification and analysis Examination of the performance of safety systems The analyses investigated the consequence of potential incidents on personnel, the Temporary Refuge (TR) and the escape and evacuation facilities. They also assessed the ability of safety systems to control or reduce the effects of a potential incident. Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR are each Normally Unattended Installation s (NUI s). They are new generation facilities known generically as Trident type installations. The simplified Trident design philosophy dispenses with the need for both a helideck and unplanned overnight shelter. Skiff PS is connected directly to the Sole Pit Clipper Nodal Complex. It is serviced from the Clipper Complex by members of the Marine Response Team (MRT), which is made up of personnel from Campaign Maintenance Team. Brigantine BG and BR are part of the Leman Field group of Assets. The gas evacuation route is BR to BG in series to Corvette, which in turn is connected to the Leman Alpha Nodal Complex. However, BG and BR are serviced from the Sean P, the nearest manned installation, by the respective MRT. Planned maintenance and/or Well Service Activities will be carried out on a campaign visit basis using a jack-up rig or support vessel. Unplanned interventions may be required for production or safety critical failures, using a marine access system comprising a workboat and ladders. The base case for such visits is for personnel to assemble and undertake the marine journey from the respective Nodal Complex. Further details on this system and its separate risks are available in each Installation s Safety Case. The purpose of this summary of the hazard assessment process is to consider the risks associated with planned maintenance visits by a gangway-connected jack-up rig or similar support vessel. Rev. 3 A2.1.3

128 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 Safety Management System Procedural methods Hazard Register Structural Analysis Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis TR/Evacuation Escape and Rescue Analysis Quantitive Risk Analysis Non Hydrocarbon Hazard Assessment Hydrocarbon Hazard Assessment Summary of Results Summary of Results Risk Summary Major Hazards ALARP Assessment External Studies Mitigating Actions Procedural methods Remedial Actions Safety Case Sections KEY Figure A Hazard Assessment Process A2.1.4 Rev. 3

129 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 LM Integrity Review As new-build installations, Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR have been designed to the current international, national, industry and company codes, guidance notes and standards. Where these have been challenged, the results have been recorded and agreed with the custodian. There are no exemptions from current legislation. One of the key methods of ensuring installation integrity was to identify the safety critical elements and subsequently implement a verification scheme that ensures the required performance standards have been met. The identified Safety Critical Elements (SCE s) and related Performance Standards were tabulated as follows Safety Critical Element Performance Standard Subsea Riser systems Pipelines DCR 009 DCR 009 Process Process hydrocarbon piping system Process control/scada Venting system DCR Utilities MEG/Corrosion Inhibitor injection system Hydraulic System Electrical power supplies Certified electrical equipment DCR 005 Safety - Fire and Explosion Systems Riser ESDV system ESD system Reservoir isolation Explosion Protection Fire Detection (fusible links in Xmas trees & RESDVs) F5 F6 F7 F12 F13 Safety - Escape and Evacuation Systems Structures Access/evacuation routes Temporary Refuge Communications Personal safety equipment Helicopter (SAR only) Standby Vessel/FRC Navigation aids Jacket structure Topsides structure E1 E2 E4 E6 E7 E11 DCR 007 DCR 007 Table A Safety Critical Elements Rev. 3 A2.1.5

130 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 The EP Europe written scheme of examination required by Regulation 19 of PFEER is compiled in LM0304. This specifies the process of compliance, examination frequency and Performance Standards applicable to each installation (the latter being included as appendices). Independent, competent persons implement the scheme (typically, certification societies such as Lloyds, DNV etc). The EP Europe written scheme for compliance with PFEER Regulation 18 is compiled within LM0323. Implementation of this scheme is by competent Shell Expro persons. The Pipeline Major Accident Prevention Document for the pipelines associated with Skiff PS is available in document PS-U-0003 and in document for Brigantine BG and BR. Sound integrity management of all EP Europe offshore installations is assured by generically utilising the Expro Verification Unit as the second party verifiers of all SCE s on all EP Europe installations. Details are available in document Volume 3 Section 1, which holds specific SCE s for individual installations in a series of appendices. 2.2 Hazard Identification and Analysis The generic Hazard List utilised by all Shell Expro locations was modified for Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR to take account of the marine access system. The hazards that were identified are recorded in hazard sheets. They were ranked between very low and high to give an indication of the level of risk they pose. Only high-risk hazards were then subjected to a quantified risk assessment. Lower risk hazards did not always have their risk quantified, with full reliance placed on managerial controls to minimise their occurrence. Further details are provided in the discussion of results (see paragraph 4 Results). 2.3 Performance of Safety Systems Three analyses provided significant contributions to this aspect of hazard assessment Fire and Explosion Analysis (FEA), which examined the effects of fire and explosions on the structure. TR/EER Analysis (TR/EERA), which assessed the suitability of arrangements to control or mitigate the effects of, and the provision for evacuation and escape from, major accidents. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA), which modelled all hydrocarbon inventories for the installation and predicted the risk to personnel on a scenario basis. Major hazards were identified by ranking the various hazard scenarios on a relative risk basis, and then assessing the likelihood and consequence of those events, which could cause a major accident. Specific analyses were conducted for Skiff PS and that work can be related to the BG design. Topsides fires on Skiff PS, Brigantine BG or the BR would be very limited in duration following an ESD because the gas inventory on these installations is very low. The analysis showed that TR impairment was unlikely in the time taken for escape/evacuation. A2.1.6 Rev. 3

131 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 LM0584 Evacuation routes such as walkways or staircases may be impaired permanently or temporarily by the effects of fire. Permanent impairment will occur as a result of physical damage to the route, so rendering it impassable. The FEA includes examples of the times to failure due to jet fire for typical materials used in these routes. Temporary impairment will occur if the heat flux at any point along the route is above the limit of human endurance. If this flux reduces with time, the route will become passable again, as long as no physical damage has been caused. A criterion of 5 kw/m² is used to define whether an evacuation or escape route is impassable. The explosion protection reviews concluded that the predicted maximum overpressure on the Fixed Installation s would be in the region of 150 mbar for PS and 200 mbar for BG and BR. Using a conservative approach to assessment and the worst case being modelled, and that was adopted as the design overpressure. The TR analysis was based on the stand-alone mode of operating the installation, where the TR is an open area muster point on the spider deck. The QRA assessed the hydrocarbon risk, which is comprised of process risks, pipeline incidents, blowouts, riser failures and other hydrocarbon events. These risks were ranked to ascertain their relationship to each other and the risk to personnel was quantified in terms of Potential Loss of Life (PLL), which is the product of the outcome frequency of each scenario and the number of fatalities it causes. From this, the risk to individuals was calculated in terms of Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA). 3 ALARP Assessment Process Major hazards were identified by the hazard assessment process, which considered the following for each hazard Possible means of prevention. Possible means of detection. Possible means of reducing the consequences. Possible means of escape and evacuation. Possible options to mitigate any shortcomings identified were then examined to see if they were reasonably practicable. Any reasonably practicable options have been implemented. Although the details are extensive (see the Platform Safety Case), the process was concluded with the findings that the installation and overall field risks are As Low As Reasonably Practicable The risks to personnel while on the Fixed Installation s have been substantially reduced by ensuring that only safety or production-critical equipment is located on the Fixed Installation s. This reduces the need to visit for planned maintenance to a nominally annual programme (and reduces the need for unplanned interventions to as low as reasonably practicable). No cost effective risk reduction measures were identified in the ALARP assessment. However, as part of the EP Europe continuous improvement loop, the Fixed Installation s will be monitored for performance against design and Safety Case assumptions. Any areas that are identified for improvement will be implemented under control of the EP Europe Change Proposal system. 4 Results The results from risk assessments undertaken for the Fixed Installation s in the operational and stand-alone mode can be found in the respective Safety Cases. Rev. 3 A2.1.7

132 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 1 5 Discussion of Results 5.1 Transportation Unplanned interventions to the Fixed Installation s will require marine access. The individual risks associated with this have two components that due to embarkation/disembarkation and that due to the transit time. The total risks associated with the activity are of a similar order to that posed by the more frequently used method of helicopter shuttling. Planned campaign maintenance or Combined Operations will utilise helicopters. Helicopter risk is primarily dependent upon exposure and flying time. 5.2 Hydrocarbon Risk The hydrocarbon risk is built up from process risks, pipeline incidents, blowouts, riser failures and other hydrocarbon events. The major risk is concentrated in the process area due to immediate fatalities from explosions and jet fires. The TR/muster point has been designed and located to mitigate risks of topsides fires and explosions, resulting in a low impairment frequency. An explosion is unlikely, due to natural ventilation through the process area. The major hydrocarbon hazards to personnel on the installation are topsides process fires, which are capable of causing impairment of the TR/EER facilities. Riser fires are infrequent events and provide a marginal contribution to total hydrocarbon risk. 5.3 Occupational Risk Occupational accidents are defined as those with no potential to cause fatalities outside the immediate area of the incident, including a wide variety of events such as falls, falling overboard, mechanical impacts, burns, electrocution, asphyxiation etc. In the majority of cases they cause only single fatalities. There are so many possible causes that a risk analysis using modelled failure scenarios was not appropriate, so risks were estimated directly from historical accident data. 5.4 Ship Collision A collision assessment of the shipping risks in the area was carried out in order to determine the potential locations for the platform. Discussions with the DTI resulted in a recommendation to locate the Fixed Installation s in the set locations. The consequences of a ship collision could range from superficial damage to complete destruction of the installation. Damage is dependent on the size and speed of the colliding vessel. 5.5 Dropped Object Risk The risk from a dropped object was implicitly included within those for hydrocarbon releases and occupational risks. A2.1.8 Rev. 3

133 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 2 LM Assessment Methodology Section 2 - Seafox 4 (Mobile Installation) Hazards The demonstration of ALARP is fundamental to the case being made by Workfox; the seven basic steps in the methodology are as follows - identification of major accident hazards - identification of associated failure scenarios - qualitative assessments of protection levels - consequence modelling - qualitative risk analysis - evaluation - test against ALARP The first five steps relate to the quantification of risk, the first three being undertaken in-house using Company personnel, the next two being carried out using a combination of Company personnel and independent risk analysis specialists. The assessment against the performance standards set by the Company and the testing against ALARP are the sole responsibility of the Company's management. 2. Hazard Identification and Assessment Hazard identification was carried out as a rig based exercise, the following hazards were identified - Blowout - Towing Incident - Explosion - Structural Failure - Fire - Dropped Objects - Toxic Release - Major Equipment Failure - Loss of Stability - Seaborne Collision - Mooring Failure - Airborne Collision - Diving Incident - Other Potential Major Hazards A qualitative assessment was carried out for each of the identified hazards during which a number of the credible accidents considered were deemed insignificant in terms of their consequences. The following major hazards were identified as initiating events for the quantitative assessment Fire and Explosion Loss of Stability Mooring Incident Towing Incident Structural Failure Dropped Object Major Equipment Failure Seabourne Collision Airborne Collision Relevant information from the above assessments has been extracted which may have some bearing on the installations in the combined operations mode. Further details can be found in the Seafox 4 Vessel Specific Safety Case. Rev. 3 A2.2.1

134 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section Fire and Explosion The following scenarios that may result in fire or explosion have been identified Equipment failure Incorrect work procedure Oil/gas leak and spill Helicopter crash Blowout from adjacent platform Fire/explosion from adjacent platform Terrorist action Blowouts from the adjacent platform are not as important during this Combined Operation as the mobile will not be used for drilling activities and the Combined Operation does not involve well intervention or servicing. The effect of production blowouts and fire/explosions from the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR platforms are considered in the assessment of Combined Operation hazards (see Appendix 2, Section 4). The frequency of occurrence of fires and explosions for the standalone case is 3.0 x 10-3 per year and 4.0 x 10-6 per year respectively. The largest individual contributor to the frequency of fires is a fire in the engine room. Escalation from this event is considered to be unlikely. 2.2 Loss of Stability Loss of Stability relates to the situation where the mobile is afloat, under-tow, and suffers a loss of reserve buoyancy, resulting from erroneous loading or compartment flooding, which is significant enough to capsize or sink the mobile. The most dominating event likely to cause an escalation is a serious list, frequency of 5.5 x 10-4 per year, which may prevent the use of the Helideck and the TEMPSCs. The total frequency of loss of stability is 7.8 x 10-4 per year. This hazard will not be relevant to the Combined Operations. 2.3 Mooring Incident A Mooring Incident comprises system failure and design exceedance due to severe weather. Mooring component failure is predicted to occur with a frequency of 4 x 10-4 per year. The Combined Operations will take place during the summer; therefore the risk of design exceedance due to severe weather will be low 2.4 Towing Incident A towing incident has been defined as a failure of the towing arrangements together with being unable to restore the towline to the extent that the ability to hold the mobile on station is lost. A towing incident is seen as an initiating event for loss of reserve stability due to downflooding in heavy seas, collision as a result of drifting and then possible grounding in sheltered or shallow waters. Escalation for this particular hazard, is in essence, identical to loss of stability where the event most likely to dominate, is the impact that the loss of control would have on the ability to use the evacuation arrangements. For towing incident hazards the frequency of occurrence is 7 x 10-4 per year. Towing incidents are not relevant to the Combined Operations. 2.5 Structural Failure Structural Failure is defined as the failure of any of the primary load bearing paths of the structure to the extent that the mobile loses its ability to carry the loads it is designed to operate with. This applies to both elevated and floating modes of operation. The escalation of the particular hazard is likely to be dominated by the effect of a structural failure on the evacuation arrangements. The frequency of occurrence when elevated is estimated from the Seafox 4 Safety Case as 1.1 x A2.2.2 Rev. 3

135 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 2 LM Dropped Objects This hazard is defined as the dropping of an object during its handling by lifting equipment as a consequence of the failure of the equipment itself or the associated lifting gear such that the dropping of the object results in or initiates a short chain of events leading to a major accident. Swinging loads have also been considered in this section. The dominating event regarding escalation involves a dropped load on hazardous inventories on the tank top level, which may affect escape routes. The overall frequency for a dropped object incident is 5.7 x 10-3 per year and is mainly associated with dropped objects on the accommodation and helideck. Dropped objects are assessed for the Combined Operations in Section Major Equipment Failure Major equipment failure is defined as the failure of a major piece of the mobile s operating equipment such that the equipment on failure releases energy, which in itself results in or initiates a short chain of events leading to a major accident. All non-hydrocarbon explosions are considered to be of sufficient strength to impair the adjacent structure and cause injury/death to personnel in the vicinity. These mechanical explosions occur instantaneously with no prior warning and have an overall failure frequency of 2.1 x Seaborne Collision A seaborne collision is defined as the impact caused by any seaborne vessel in an accidental collision with the mobile in the elevated or floating modes. A seaborne collision is unlikely to escalate in a manner that would lead to a fire or explosion unless it was combined with the accidental release and then ignition of hydrocarbons. The most dominating event regarding escalation revolves around the impact of collision on the evacuation arrangements. The probability of occurrence while elevated is 8.6 x 10-3 based on statistical data. During the Combined Operations the collision frequency will be Alpha location specific. 2.9 Airborne Collision An airborne collision is defined as the impact caused by an accidental collision between the mobile installation and an airborne vehicle. These collisions are considered to be of sufficient strength to cause structural impairment. The frequency for this hazard is 2.5 x Occupational Risk Occupational risks as defined in the mobile installation Safety Case include general day-to-day risks, occupational slips trips and falls and helicopter travel Risk Summary The average societal risk estimated for the Seafox 4 when in standalone mode is 3.3 x 10-2 per year. The average individual risk is 1.3 x 10-4 per year. The major contribution to the overall risk is from occupational hazards, which also include helicopter travel to, and from the installation. Rev. 3 A2.2.3

136 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 2 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A2.2.4 Rev. 3

137 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM Hazard Identification Section 3 - Combined Operation Identification of Hazards The analysis for those hazards that have been identified for the fixed and mobile installations in the combined operations mode can be considered as follows Identification of hazards on or near the fixed installation, which are likely to - affect the mobile installation - change as a result of the combined operation Identification of hazards on or near the mobile installation, which are likely to - affect the fixed installation - change as a result of the combined operation Identification of new hazards, which affect both installations as a result of the combined operation. The hazard identification process has been carried out by a Safety Engineer using relevant data from the Installation Safety Cases, associated QRA, Safety Studies, Hazard Registers and knowledge of the work plan. The draft COSC is then reviewed by all relevant parties including the Installation OIM's, SI 971 Representatives, Project Team, Operations and the mobile installation's management prior to signature for approval. Only major hazards have been identified. These are subjectively screened in the following tables by identifying whether the hazards and consequences, which cannot be screened out in this section, are given further discussion in Section 4, Combined Operation Hazard Assessment. 2 Combined Operations Hazards The major hazards identified in the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG, BR, and Seafox 4 Safety Cases and Combined Operations are defined in Tables A2.3.1 to A Rev. 3 A2.3.1

138 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Cause Scour and foundation failure Weight control Jack up mechanism failure STRUCTURAL FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Physical damage to Seafox 4 No scour is expected to occur. Not considered to be a significant risk. None Collapse of the fixed installation with potential for loss of life and loss of containment (hydrocarbons and MEG. Typical preventative measures include - Monitoring and alarm system for, leg penetration always watched/seafox 4 movement monitored Extremely low risk relating to foundation failure, deterioration in structural strength, clamping and interaction with other installation Experience at Skiff will also be taken into account. None Physical damage to Seafox 4 A strict weight control regime will be in place for the platforms Modifications can affect the structural stability of the installation but these will be controlled via Shell's change control procedures. None Collapse of the fixed installation with potential for loss of life and loss of containment (hydrocarbons and MEG). Weight control is monitored by the Chief Engineer and the OIM (Seafox 4 has 6 legs) Extremely low risk. None Collapse of the fixed installation with potential for loss of life and loss of containment (hydrocarbons and MEG). Once the legs are in final position they are physically locked to prevent accidental movement as a result of mechanical failure or human error. Extremely low risk None Table A2.3.1a - Structural Failure A2.3.2 Rev. 3

139 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 Cause Design Modification / alteration failure Corrosion, defect and fatigue Earthquake STRUCTURAL FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Physical damage to SeaFox IV. Installations are designed as NUI's and managed by Bacton. The design is known generically as the Trident Type. BR/BG/PS design has been developed with the objective of providing the minimum of valves, instruments and controls for safe operation. High reliability has also been a key consideration. None. Collapse of the fixed installation with potential for loss of life and loss of containment (hydrocarbon and MEG) The design has been independently verified during classification by ABS Extremely low risk None. Physical damage to SeaFox IV. Shell Change Control Procedures. Modifications can affect the structural stability of the installation(s) but these will be controlled via Shell's change control procedures None Collapse of the fixed installation with potential for loss of life and loss of containment (hydrocarbons and MEG). During the interface, work on the Seafox 4 will be subject to the SeaFox IV safety management system that includes procedures for change control Extremely low risk. None Physical damage to SeaFox IV. As described in the installation safety case BR/BG/PS are new installations and therefore the potential for corrosion, defect and fatigue to occur with the time that the SeaFox 4 is alongside is considered to be extremely low. None Collapse of fixed installation. As described in Safety Case. Adequate safeguards in place. Class/Flag and Verification arrangements in place None. Total loss of platform and Seafox 4. Engineering design does not take into account seismic loads rejected on the grounds of low probability. The Shell Generic Database estimates earthquake frequencies as 0.3g causing severe damage 7.00 x 10-5 per year 0.6g causing collapse as 1.00 x 10-5 per year None See Brigantine BG analysis. See Brigantine BG analysis. Engineering does not take into account seismic loads rejected on the grounds of low probability. None. Table A2.3.1b - Structural Failure Rev. 3 A2.3.3

140 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Fire Pump Failure Crane failure Gas detection EQUIPMENT FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Unable to meet firewater demand. Two fire pumps each capable of meeting 100% firewater demand on the fixed installation. In the event of one fire pump failure maintenance will continue since the remaining pump is suitably rated and Seafox 4 will provide firewater cover to the BR, BG or PS that will not adversely impact its own fire fighting capability. None. See Dropped Objects below.. None. Unable to detect gas release event. None During combined operations the Seafox 4 system will be extended to afford protection/detection to the fixed installation Gas system. None Unable to detect gas release event. System has redundancy via emergency power supplies. In the event of a complete loss of Gas detection, hot work operations would be shutdown. None Table A2.3.2a - Equipment Failure A2.3.4 Rev. 3

141 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 Human error EQUIPMENT FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Incorrect operation of the process The equipment installed on the installations is minimal, other than that to open and close wells etc. Operators require training to assure competency. The equipment installed on the installations is minimal, other than that to open and close wells etc. Consequently the potential for human error is considered to be low. None Undertakes incorrect operation etc. as a result of combined operations. SeaFox IV has produced, in conjunction with Shell, an SMS Interface document and also ensures the competency of personnel through a prescribed training policy and programme. The potential for human error is considered to be low. None. Table A2.3.2b - Equipment Failure Rev. 3 A2.3.5

142 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Equipment Failure DROPPED OBJECTS FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action None. None. Loss of containment. Platform comprises Xmas Trees, process manifold and pipeline. The installations have minimal equipment and high reliability. The risk of any equipment failure resulting in a major event is extremely low. None This covers the following safety critical software F&G detection; active fire protection; weight control and jacking control. Control systems and procedures exist. Items are covered within unit PMS System None Table A2.3.3a - Dropped Objects A2.3.6 Rev. 3

143 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 Pedestal Failure Boom failure DROPPED OBJECTS FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Fatality and/or Injury and possible loss of containment Class inspections verification arrangements Fatality and/or Injury and possible loss of containment Class inspections verification arrangements Table A2.3.3b - Dropped Objects Rev. 3 A2.3.7

144 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Installation Maintenance Vents Brigantine process Brigantine Process (MEG Injection) CONTAINMENT FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Release of natural gas leading to a jet fire or explosion. Maintenance vents on the installations are controlled manually. Unlikely to cause a problem given that it is a manual operation and the size of the vent will limit the volume and rate of release. Venting will be controlled by the PTW system. None. Release of natural gas leading to a jet fire or explosion. Design standards and Manual ESD, Limited pipework and inventory. The scope for a major release of inventory from the installation(s) is limited given lack of any process system; relatively short pipe runs from the trees to the manifold to the pipeline. The TPS/ESD system will be operational when producing hydrocarbons. None. Release of MEG leading to personnel exposure. Design standards. The Tridents have an open structure therefore the potential for accumulation of MEG is low. The impact of a release affecting the people is also considered to be extremely low. None Table A2.3.4a Containment Failure A2.3.8 Rev. 3

145 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 High Pressure Riser Failure Blockage of explosion venting CONTAINMENT FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action.. Release of natural gas leading to a jet fire or explosion. See Approach and Departure HAZID Extremely low risk. None The SeaFox IV is positioned alongside the installations. Therefore it is not anticipated that this will significantly increase the impact of any explosion on the installations. F&G detection. People will frequently be on the installations. Limited equipment and pipework to rupture or leak. Limited operations to cause a release ESD. Given the distance between the installations and the open nature of designs the potential for an explosion to cause damage to the SeaFox IV is extremely low. None Explosion is covered in the Safety Case. Explosion is covered in the Safety Case. Given the open design of the PS, BG & BR and their proximity in relation to the Seafox 4, the impact of an explosion is expected to be minor. None Rev. 3 Table A2.3.4b - Containment Failure A2.3.9

146 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Helicopter Operations HELICOPTER CRASH FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action As per Safety Case. As per Safety Case. As per Safety Case. As per Safety Case. Table A Helicopter Crash A Rev. 3

147 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 Trips and alarm failure Installation control centre failure Electrical failure on installation(s) CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Loss of production. TPS ESD, fusible links close in flowing wells and SSSV. The pipelines between the installations are rated for full CITHP. Loss of production no impact on SeaFox IV or combined operations. None Loss of production. Bacton is the ICC. SPS and TPS available locally. No impact on combined operations envisaged. See also Part 2 Section 7 Paragraph 6. Confirm that the procedures exist and are understood by all relevant personnel, covering the hand over of control during the various phases of installation, construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance. Loss of F&G detection. System is backed up with emergency power supply. Hot work will be shut down in the unlikely event of a complete ICC failure. Ensure that the interface procedure requires that production from PS, BG & BR be also shut down. Loss of production. No impact on SeaFox IV. NA/ Table A Control System Failure Rev. 3 A2.3.11

148 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Fire NON PROCESS FIRE OR EXPLOSION FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action No significant combustible materials identified on the installations. Localise fire with potential to escalate if undetected. Seafox 4 has a comprehensive fire detection system. The majority of the Seafox 4 is compartmentalised and can therefore contain local events. Unlikely to escalate to the PS, BG or BR. If this occurred then it would be as a result of a major incident on the Seafox 4 and therefore the Seafox 4 emergency procedures etc. would have been invoked. Limited Hydrocarbons onboard Seafox 4 None Table A Non-Process Fire or A Rev. 3

149 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 Merchant Shipping Seafox 4 Arrival/Departure SHIP COLLISION FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Collapse of the installation. Installation position and navigation lights etc. Shipping patterns were assessed using COAST database provided by Dovre Safetec. This concluded that the shipping collision risk is ALARP for the PS, BG & BR. The collision risk in this case is not affected by combined operations. Installation damage. The Safety Case identifies vessels that could collide with the Seafox 4 Passing vessels (merchant shipping) etc. Issue covered by unit Safety Case See Brigantine collision analysis. None. See Approach and Departure HAZID Collapse or significant structural damage to the installation. See Interface Activity Chart See Interface Activity Chart Confirm status of installation during Seafox 4 approach and departure to ensure risk to personnel is ALARP. Table A Ship Collision Rev. 3 A2.3.13

150 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Localised incident OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENT FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Fatality(s), but escalation to the SeaFox IV unlikely. The Shell Representative using the SeaFox 4 and Shell Interface Permitry will control work on the installations and therefore SeaFox's safety management system will apply to activities on the installation. The platforms are relatively small and therefore the number of people on the installation(s) at any one time is limited. However, there may by occasions when simultaneous operations are required such as well hook-up and production etc. Review the SIMOPS requirements to ensure that a) SIMOPs can be justified. b) Controls are in place to achieve ALARP during SIMOPs. c) All key personnel are involved in producing the SIMOPs plan. Fatality(s), but escalation to PS, BG or BR unlikely. As for the PS/BG/BR. As for the PS/BG/BR. As for the PS/BG/BR. Table A Occupational Incident A Rev. 3

151 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 Weakness in hull LOSS OF STABILITY FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action. Rupture of Live Pipeline. Covered in Safety Case. The route for Seafox 4 departure will take the vessel away from the routing of the pipeline. None Table A Loss of Stability Rev. 3 A2.3.15

152 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Extreme weather MOORING FAILURE FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action. As Seafox 4 Safety Case. As Seafox 4 Safety Case. Location approval regime, suitable air gap established. As Seafox 4 Safety Case. None. Table A Mooring Failure A Rev. 3

153 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 WELL SERVICES ACTIVITIES FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Loss of containment unignited or ignited. Actuated wireline valve that can cut wireline. Boom generally only used for rig up/rig down when lubricator depressurised (may need to use for fishing on live well). Operation continuously manned and well can also be isolated with SSSV. Probability of a release is considered to be low. Consequences need to be assessed. Assess impact of an unignited and ignited release on the Seafox Undetected release may accumulate and cause increased hazard and increase risk of finding ignition source. Operation is continuously manned. Acoustic gas detection will be provided. Well services provide portable gas detection. Probability of a release not being quickly detected id considered to be low. Need to assess any impact on the acoustic detection system while venting the wireline lubricator. Crane failure boom drops on lubricator. Gas detection Gas release from lubricator Dropped object Lubricator or work valve.... Loss of containment unignited or ignited. Operation is continuously manned. Actuated wireline valve that can cut wireline. PTW and LOLER. Risk is considered to be low given the control measures in place and tat the operation is standard. Table A3.2.12a Well Services Activities Rev. 3 A2.3.17

154 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 Lubricator failure Venting gas from lubricator via flexible pipe. Helicopter operations use of mobile crane to support lubricator. WELL SERVICES ACTIVITIES FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Loss of containment unignited or ignited. Lubricator is hydrostatically pressure tested. Risk is considered to be low given the control measures in place and tat the operation is standard.... Localised gas cloud with potential to ignite in on contact with ignition source. Venting is a manual operation only. The lubricator inventory is relatively small and each vent should take no longer than 5 minutes (rate is adjusted to give adequate dispersion). The vent will be positioned in an area, which is open and well ventilated and away from safe areas. Risk is considered to be low given the control measures in place..... No hazards identified... Table A3.2.12b Well Services Activities A Rev. 3

155 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 LM0584 Trip and Alarm Issue Well services take control of well during intervention, etc. Operations. Seafox 4 arrival/departure loose well services equipment onboard. WELL SERVICES ACTIVITIES FIXED INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON MOBILE INSTALLATION MOBILE INSTALLATION - IMPACT ON FIXED INSTALLATION Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action Consequence Safeguards Evaluation Action On a platform shutdown (re; Cause and Effects0 the well service s well will remain live. Well services can shut-in well remotely from control cabin placed on the mobile next to the wireline unit... The emergency response procedures should identify what actions need to be taken in the event of a mobile or platform emergency. In the COSC identify what actions need to be taken in the event of a mobile or platform emergency with respect to the well service s well if they have it under their control.... Moving objects and risk of injury to personnel while the mobiles in transit. Equipment will be sea fastened. Risk is considered to be low given the control measures in place..... Table A3.2.12c Well Services Activities Rev. 3 A2.3.19

156 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 3 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A Rev. 3

157 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 4 LM0584 Section 4 - Hazard Assessment 1 Introduction This section describes the hazard assessment carried out for those hazards identified during combined operation and demonstrates that measures are in place which will reduce risk to as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP). 2 Hazard Assessment 2.1 Unignited and Ignited Releases from Fixed Installations. No quantitative risk assessment has been carried out for the following scenarios, therefore the worst case, or most pessimistic view has been adopted (e.g. wind speed and direction) in terms of the impact of releases from the Fixed Installations and the Mobile Installation. 2.2 Non-Hydrocarbon Risk Analysis Ship collision, environmental and structural risk has not been calculated here as it is considered that the risk is the same for both SIMOPS and SEQOPS operating modes. Similarly occupational PLL's have not been calculated as these are considered to be identical for SIMOPS and SEQOPS modes. Helicopter crashes can only occur on the mobile installation. The fatality risk to crew associated with such accidents is therefore expected to be the same as stated in the mobile installation Safety Case. Dropped object risks are considered in Appendix 2.3 (HAZID) and control measures increased to reflect the design of the Fixed Installations. Specific heavy lift items will necessitate the shutdown of production. 3 Helicopter Travel The mobile Installation crew involved during combined operation will work a two weeks on, two off pattern, flying from shore. In this case, the travel risks will be consistent with those presented in Seafox 4 Safety Case. All flights will be managed by the EP Europe Safety Management System. Additional visits by personnel from the nodal installation during the interface are incorporated in the worst case individual risk values shown in the nodal installation safety case. 4 Collision During Arrival and Departure The safety case for the mobile installation considers loss of stability and towing incidents for the standalone mode. The major hazards to personnel from a collision during the vessel arrival/departure are structural failure and loss of stability. A generic quantitative study of jack-up positioning risk has been undertaken by DNV Technica based on WOAD data. The results of this study indicate that the major contributors to risk during a combined operation are warping into position, lowering and raising of legs. Positioning of the mobile will be carried out in accordance with Shell rig move procedures. Towing and anchor arrangements provide sufficient redundancy and procedures are in place which will reduce the chance of collision to as low as is reasonably practicable. On completion of the combined operation, the mobile will be moved off using three tugs during slack water and suitable weather conditions. Towing and anchor arrangements provide sufficient redundancy and procedures are in place which will reduce the risk of collision to as low as is reasonably practicable. Rev. 3 A2.4.1

158 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 4 5 Helicopter Collision The helideck on the mobile is located so as to avoid the hazards involved with support activities. The pilots are aware of the hazards involved with support activities and would in any case avoid the forward legs on approach to the mobile installation. The risk to installation personnel from helicopter collision is therefore considered to be negligible and is not considered further. 6 Scour Due to the fine, sandy nature of the seabed and strong Omni-directional sea currents in the areas, scour/subsidence does not occur. There will be no significant seabed erosion below the installations. However, an ROV survey shall be carried out form the mobile installation, to establish a local datum (seabed to mobile installation legs). Further surveys shall be carried out at intervals to monitor seabed conditions. 7 Dropped Objects The mobile installation safety case describes the main preventative measures related to maintenance of lifting equipment. The risk to personnel from dropped objects is considered to be very low and reduced to ALARP by the maintenance arrangements described in the mobile installation safety case. All lifting operations are subject to LOLER. 8 Vent Pipe Gas dispersion effects have been modelled for the Skiff PS, Brigantine BG and BR vent pipes, including radiated heat levels in the event of ignition of the vented gas during emergency blowdown of the installation. These confirm that a safe venting solution needs to be established. However, due to the small inventory, the requirement to vent the Fixed Installations is not anticipated. 9 Conclusions A comprehensive review of the proposed work programme has been carried out together with assessments for any additional potential major hazards identified during the combined operation. These hazards are specific to a fixed and mobile installation operating as a combined installation for a specific operation. Both installation's SMS's have been reviewed to assess their adequacy for the control of hazards during combined operations. The following conclusions are Operations within the terms of this COSC will be consistent with the requirement for safe and responsible management of both installations involved All relevant work will be carried out under a Permit to Work The SMS of the installations involved will be integrated to the degree necessary to ensure effective control and management of the combined operation. The combined operation SMS includes adequate procedures for the recognition, review and control of any additional hazards resulting from the work. The interface arrangements, including emergency response, have been agreed between the operators of the installations and have been documented. Sufficient and suitable escape, evacuation and rescue arrangements have been provided for the period of the combined operation The combined operation will not significantly change the pattern and levels of risk to personnel compared with those of the installations operating independently. A2.4.2 Rev. 3

159 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 4 LM0584 It demonstrates that Risks to personnel in the individual safety cases are ALARP All identified hazards during combined operations have been assessed; arrangements have been implemented to control risks to personnel, resulting in risk levels, which are ALARP All risks to personnel have been considered for the combined operations safety case and they are ALARP The present safety case made for the health and safety of personnel during combined operations is acceptable. The Hazard Identification and Assessment has demonstrated that all major hazards introduced by this operation are either negligible or managed sufficiently to demonstrate ALARP 10 Audit/Review Plan Due to the limited period of the combined operation it is anticipated that an audit/review will not be carried out, in line with the overall Audit Plan. Rev. 3 A2.4.3

160 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 2 - Hazard Assessment - Section 4 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A2.4.4 Rev. 3

161 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 3 - Drawings LM0584 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 3 - Drawings Contents List of Figures Fig. A3.1 Muster Points and TEMPSC Locations Skiff PS A3.3 Fig. A3.2 Seafox 4 at Skiff PS (Plan) A3.4 Fig. A3.3 Seafox 4 at Skiff PS (Elevation) A3.5 Fig. A3.4 Hazardous Areas (Plan) PS A3.6 Fig. A3.5 Hazardous Areas (Elevation) PS A3.7 Fig. A3.6 Escape Routes (Spider Deck) PS A3.8 Fig. A3.7 Escape Routes (Cellar Deck) PS A3.9 Fig. A3.8 Escape Routes (Main Deck) PS A3.10 Fig. A3.9 Escape Routes (Weather Deck) PS A3.11 Fig. A3.10 Muster Points and TEMPSC Locations Brigantine BG A3.12 Fig. A3.11 Seafox 4 at Brigantine BG (Plan) A3.13 Fig. A3.12 Seafox 4 at Brigantine BG (Elevation) A3.14 Fig. A3.13 Hazardous Areas (Plan) BG A3.15 Fig. A3.14 Hazardous Areas (Elevation) BG A3.16 Fig. A3.15 Escape Routes (Spider Deck) BG A3.17 Fig. A3.16 Escape Routes (Cellar Deck) BG A3.18 Fig. A3.17 Escape Routes (Main Deck) BG A3.19 Fig. A3.18 Escape Routes (Weather Deck) BG A3.20 Fig. A3.19 Muster Points and TEMPSC Locations Brigantine BR A3.21 Fig. A3.20 Seafox 4 at Brigantine BR (Plan) A3.22 Fig. A3.21 Seafox 4 at Brigantine BR (Elevation) A3.23 Fig. A3.22 Hazardous Areas (Plan) BR A3.24 Fig. A3.23 Hazardous Areas (Elevation) BR A3.25 Fig. A3.24 Escape Routes (Spider Deck) BR A3.26 Fig. A3.25 Escape Routes (Cellar Deck) BR A3.27 Fig. A3.26 Escape Routes (Main Deck) BR A3.28 Fig. A3.27 Escape Routes (Weather Deck) BR A3.29 Rev. 3 A3.1

162 LM0584 Shell U.K. Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 3 - Drawings INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A3.2 Rev. 3

163 Shell UK Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 3 Drawings LM0584 Figure A3.1 Muster Points and TEMPSC Locations Skiff PS Rev. 3 A3.3

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181 Shell UK Exploration and Production Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 3 Drawings LM0584 Figure A Muster Points and TEMPSC Locations Brigantine BG Rev. 3 A3.12

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217 Shell UK Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 4 - Simultaneous Operations - Section 1 LM0584 Section 1 Simultaneous Operations Skiff, PS Brigantine BG & BR / Seafox 4 Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 4 - Simultaneous Operations Contents 1 General A Statement of Intent A Definition of Terms A Justification A Logistics A Interface Integrity A Activity Matrix A4.1.5 Section 2 Skiff PS, Brigantine BG & BR /Seafox 4 Common Services 1 Fire and Gas System A Venting A Fire Protection A Personnel Transfer A Abandonment A4.2.1 List of Figures Fig. A4.1 SIMOPS Matrix A4.1.4 Rev. 3 A4.1.1

218 Shell UK Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 4 - Simultaneous Operations - Section 1 INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A4.1.2 Rev. 3

219 Shell UK Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case Appendix 4 - Simultaneous Operations - Section 1 LM0584 Section 1 - Simultaneous Operations 1 General Simultaneous Operations on the Skiff PS, Brigantine BR and BG are in principle limited to those activities associated with the tasks detailed in Appendix 1 and production. The philosophy underlying the rules for simultaneous operations is that the interactions between operations must remain manageable (and can be demonstrated to be so) under all conditions that can be realistically foreseen. The proposed simultaneous operations are planned to be executed in accordance with Appendix 1, Fig A1.1.1, Programme Overview. This section contains definitions of the various activities that will be undertaken and lists the rules that will govern the activities that can be performed simultaneously. It is intended as a guide for the onshore planning of activities by, Engineering and Production Programming. In addition it acts as a reference for the personnel offshore for the day-to-day execution and co-ordination of any simultaneous operations. Additionally the mobile installation will provide accommodation and workshop facilities during these combined operations. Incorporated in this operation are the experience and practices established during previous operations with Workfox UK Ltd. 2 Statement of Intent Shell UK. Exploration and Production will execute simultaneous operations, using experienced personnel guided by specific procedures to ensure that the work is performed in a safe and efficient manner. 3 Definition of Terms Well hook-up Maintenance Production Commissioning Connecting a new well into the platform facilities. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance of the platform and its equipment. Conveyance of processed hydrocarbons to Bacton Gas Terminal and related monitoring of equipment and collection of data. Checking for correct installation and first pressurisation of topsides facilities 4 Justification The adoption of simultaneous operations is fundamental to meeting the contractual gas requirements and the timely execution of any further development opportunities in the area. 5 Logistics The mobile installation OIM shall have authority and responsibility for those vessels and helicopters servicing the combined installation In the event of an unrelated incident to the vessels and helicopters in the above paragraphs, but within the overlap area, the Mobile Installation OIM shall initiate an incident report in conjunction with the fixed installation OIM (when present). Co-ordination of all helicopter flights will be via the mobile installation Radio Room with the helicopter log being co-ordinated by the Shell Air Traffic Controller based at Norwich. Rev. 3 A4.1.3

220 Shell UK Exploration and Production - Combined Operations Safety Case LM0584 Appendix 4 - Simultaneous Operations - Section 1 Seafox 4 on PS, BG & BR Matrix for Simultaneous Operations OPERATION 1 OPERATION CAT 1 HOTWORK ON PLATFORM CAT 2 HOTWORK ON PLATFORM PLATFORM WELLS IN PRODUCTION ULTRASONIC NDT ON PLATFORM MAINT. OF EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY MAINT. OF F & G SYSTEM ON RIG / PLATFORM MAINT. OF FIREMAIN ON RIG / PLATFORM JACK-UP JACKING UP OR DOWN PRESSURE TESTING ON PLATFORM CAT 1 HOTWORK ON JACK-UP CAT 2 HOTWORK ON JACK-UP N2 TOPSIDES REINSTATEMENT TEST HEAVY LIFT > 1 TON BY JACK-UP CRANE(S) STRUCT/MECH/INST/ELEC CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES OVERSIDE WORKING WELL SERVICES INTERVENTION WELL SERVICES WELLHEAD MAINTENANCE WELL SERVICES TRACER TESTING 1 CAT 1 HOTWORK ON PLATFORM Y N Y N N N Y O Y Y Y Y O O N N N 2 CAT 2 HOTWORK ON PLATFORM Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y O Y N N O 3 PLATFORM WELLS IN PRODUCTION N Y Y Y O O O Y O Y N O O Y Y Y Y 4 ULTRASONIC NDT ON PLATFORM Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y O Y Y Y Y 5 MAINT. OF EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY N Y Y Y N N O Y O Y Y Y O Y Y Y Y 6 MAINT. OF F&G SYSTEM ON RIG / PLATFORM N N O Y N N O Y O Y O Y O Y N N N 7 MAINT. OF FIREMAIN ON RIG / PLATFORM N N O Y N N N Y O Y Y Y O O N N N 8 JACK-UP JACKING UP OR DOWN Y Y O Y O O N Y Y Y O N O O * * * 9 PRESSURE TESTING ON PLATFORM O Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y O O Y Y Y 10 CAT 1 HOTWORK ON JACK-UP Y Y O Y O O O Y Y * O Y O Y Y Y Y 11 CAT 2 HOT WORK ON JACK-UP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y * O Y O Y Y Y Y 12 N2 TOPSIDES REINSTATEMENT TESTING Y Y N N Y O Y O N O O O O N * * * 13 HEAVY LIFT > 1 TON BY JACK-UP CRANE(S) Y Y O Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y O O O O O Y 14 STRUCT/MECH/INST/ELEC/CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O * * * 15 OVERSIDE WORKING O Y Y Y Y Y O O O Y Y N O O Y Y Y 16 WELL SERVICES INTERVENTION N N Y Y Y N N * Y Y Y * O * Y O O 17 WELL SERVICES WELLHEAD MAINTENANCE N N Y Y Y N N * Y Y Y * O * Y O O 18 WELL SERVICES TRACER TESTING N O Y Y Y N N * Y Y Y * Y * Y O O KEY Y = Operation 1 and 2 allowed concurrently. N = Operation 1 and 2 not allowed concurrently. O = OIM decision. * = Not applicable. Fig. - A4.1 SIMOPS Matrix A4.1.4 Rev. 3