BALTIC SEA MARITIME INCIDENT RESPONSE SURVEY FINAL REPORT MAY 2014

Transcription

1 BALTIC SEA MARITIME INCIDENT RESPONSE SURVEY FINAL REPORT MAY 2014 I

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3 BALTIC SEA MARITIME INCIDENT RESPONSE SURVEY FINAL REPORT MAY 2014

4 There are two versions of this report: A printed version of the full report, which includes the sections containing restricted-level material (for authority use only) and a shorter, freely available version that has been published also on the Internet. Baltic Sea Maritime Incident Survey BSMIR Project Team, Finnish Border Guard Headquarters Copyright: All rights reserved. Finnish Border Guard Public version of the BSMIR report ISBN: ISBN (PDF) Print: Kopijyvä, Espoo 2014

5 CONTENTS SUMMARY ABBREVIATIONS FOREWORD PREVIOUS PROJECTS MARNIS MARSUNO BALTIC SEA MARITIME FUNCTIONALITIES JOINT CO-OPERATION ON MASS RESCUE OPERATION (MRO) PLANNING BETWEEN ESTONIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN BALTIC ACO MIRG-RELATED PROJECTS THE HELSINKI CONVENTION AND HELCOM'S RESPONSE MANUALS OPERATIONS RELATING TO LARGE-SCALE MARITIME INCIDENTS WHAT IS A LARGE-SCALE, MULTISECTORAL MARITIME INCIDENT? ON-SHORE OPERATIONS DURING A MULTISECTORAL MARITIME INCIDENT ASSEMBLY POINTS AND THE TREATMENT OF RESCUED PERSONS ESTABLISHING AN ASSEMBLY POINT AND ITS OPERATIONS BACKGROUND TO THE BSMIR PROJECT MARINE TRAFFIC SAFETY IN THE BALTIC SEA AN OVERVIEW OF TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL MARINE TRAFFIC IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION AND THE ASSOCIATED SAFETY RISKS Sea freight handled at Baltic Sea ports The state of safety of commercial seafaring in the Baltic Sea Commercial seafaring safety risks in the Baltic Sea SAVINGS PRESSURES IN PUBLIC FINANCE The Finnish Border Guard's project to analyse the overall situation The BSMIR project and Finland's Baltic Sea policy SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PLANS OPERATIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN MARITIME SAR AUTHORITIES AND OTHER EMERGENCY SERVICES NATIONAL STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO MARITIME CHEMICAL SPILLS THE USE AND COORDINATION OF AIRCRAFT DURING MAJOR MARITIME INCIDENTS SUPPORTING THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES OBJECTIVES AREAS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT

6 7 IMPLEMENTATION MODEL PROJECT PERSONNEL AND EXPERTS PHASES OF THE PROJECT Participating countries Implementation COUNTRY-SPECIFIC REPORTS DENMARK Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care Maritime law enforcement and tactical police operations at sea REMOVED RESTRICTED 8.2 ESTONIA Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care Maritime law enforcement and tactical police operations at sea REMOVED RESTRICTED 8.3 GERMANY Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care Maritime law enforcement and tactical police operations at sea REMOVED RESTRICTED 8.4 ICELAND Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care Maritime law enforcement and tactical police operations at sea REMOVED RESTRICTED 8.5 LATVIA Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care LITHUANIA Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea NORWAY Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care Maritime law enforcement and tactical police operations at sea REMOVED RESTRICTED 8.8 POLAND Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea SWEDEN Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care Maritime law enforcement and tactical police operations at sea REMOVED RESTRICTED 8.10 FINLAND Maritime search and rescue Emergency fire and rescue services at sea MRO and medical care Maritime law enforcement and tactical police operations at sea REMOVED RESTRICTED 4

7 9 SECTOR-SPECIFIC ANALYSES MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE SERVICES Exercises and training Releasing information to the public The Future Conclusions EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTISES IN SAR JOINT OPERATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN FINLAND The 'MoMeVA' concept A Finnish approach to collaboration between different sectors in emergency planning The Baltic ACO model and how it was created MANAGING SHIP FIRES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE BALTIC SEA Harnessing MIRG teams in Baltic Sea States The Northern Baltic Central Baltic Southern Baltic Future challenges and opportunities Sharing the costs of MIRG operations between States Cleaning up hazardous substances The Finnish MIRG and its standard operational procedures as an example MRO AND MEDICAL CARE Emergency medical care and patient classification Assembly point MRO and medical care in the Baltic Sea region MAINTAINING MARITIME SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA REMOVED RESTRICTED 10 AN ANALYSIS OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION'S PREPAREDNESS INCLUDING SUGGESTED ACTION POINTS A RISK ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL SITUATION AND THE MOST CRITICAL AREAS FOR DEVELOPMENT TOTAL CAPACITY FOR PRACTICAL PREPAREDNESS THE REQUIREMENTS OF JOINT PLANNING IN PREPAREDNESS FOR MULTISECTORAL MARITIME INCIDENTS A VISION THE BALTIC SEA SAR FORUM EXISTING MODELS AS A BASIS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT JOINT MIRG SOP AND TRAINING FOR THE BALTIC SEA AS PART OF THE SAR SYSTEM BALTIC AIRCRAFT COORDINATION MODEL CHEMICAL CLEAN-UPS EMERGENCY ANCHORING AFTER THE BSMIR PROJECT APPENDIX BACKGROUND TO THE RISK ANALYSIS PRESENTED IN THE SECTION APPENDIX 2 FIN MIRG SOP 1 16 REMOVED RESTRICTED 5

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9 SUMMARY When it comes to the safety and security of marine traffic in the Baltic Sea, there are many challenges, such as continually increasing traffic volumes that cross at several nodes. The Baltic Sea is a difficult area to traverse and its demanding winter conditions increase the chances of a large-scale maritime incident, the severity of its consequences, and also make it more difficult to conduct a search and rescue mission. The BSMIR project was born when Finland identified a need to develop and analyse the Baltic Sea States' preparedness to respond to a large-scale maritime incident. The Finnish Border Guard (the authority in charge of maritime search and rescue) implemented the BSMIR project as a special project funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for the project, which was implemented by two of its departments, the Department for Rescue Services and the Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard. Eight countries in the Baltic Sea region, as well as Iceland and Norway, participated in the project. The final report describes how participating countries have prepared for major and multisectoral maritime incidents with a particular focus on strategic-level planning and its problematics. The intention was to keep the project's overall view of the Baltic Sea region as up to date as possible, and it is therefore based on empirical material collected between autumn 2013 and spring Due to the multisectoral operating environment associated with a major incident, cross-sectoral cooperation was chosen as the starting point for the project. The report examines the following areas: National preparedness plans and their status; operational cooperation between maritime SAR authorities and other emergency services in coastal Baltic Sea States during accidents involving ships; national standard operational procedures relating to maritime chemical spills; the use and coordination of aircraft during major maritime incidents; and supporting the creation of international standard operational procedures. The report begins by explaining the background to the project, and then presents general theories and concepts. After these come the country-specific reports, which describe each country's preparedness. The final sections of the report focus on an analysis of the factors under examination during the project, first by sector for the entire Baltic Sea region and then from the perspective of multisectoral cooperation. The latter also identifies opportunities and strengths, as well as those factors that hinder or slow the development of international cooperation. The report also describes practical procedures and processes, and successful benchmark projects that participating countries can freely use in their own development efforts. Key observations During the project, it was found that no single coastal state in the Baltic Sea region has the capacity or preparedness to handle a large-scale maritime incident completely alone assistance would be required from neighbouring countries to some extent. All of the participating countries are prepared for maritime incidents in accordance with their own national capacities. All the countries are facing the same challenges and felt they were wrestling with the same problems, which they are primarily attempting to solve nationally. However, in many instances, there would be information about these issues available in neighbouring countries or at least within the Baltic Sea region. The greatest difference between 7

10 participating countries appears to lie in how multisectoral cooperation is approached in their varying operating cultures. All countries have a maritime search and rescue system that complies with international agreements. Some countries also use a standard model for coordinating aeronautical operations (Baltic ACO), and the project concludes that this model should be expanded to other countries. When it comes to chemical spills, there is very little practical preparedness or planning in almost all of the countries examined. With regard to maritime SAR, it was also noted that there is evidently a need for joint education between authorities, but a great deal of coordination would be required to achieve this. All countries have drawn up a national plan for mass rescue operations (MROs) or are in the process of doing so. However, there is considerable variation in the content of these plans. Certain special features of maritime incidents have not always been integrated into these plans, such as the logistics of managing mass evacuations or the human resources that will eventually achieve the desired function. These plans need to be more realistic, and should be based on pre-defined infrastructure that is already used in other routine operations (such as passenger terminals) and not simply on mobile equipment that has been reserved for MROs. The organisations responsible for on-shore operations should make these processes a permanent, fully integrated aspect of their planning. These plans should also be made to contain the principles behind providing and obtaining international assistance, as well as standard operating procedures for critical resource-dependent incidents, such as ship fires. Due to very limited maritime firefighting resources, ship fires in the Baltic Sea are often multinational operations. It is therefore important for the operating procedures used by different countries during ship fires to be as standardised as possible. The small and often undersized resources that are available could then be harnessed more effectively together, thereby achieving sufficient effectiveness and guaranteeing sufficient resources. For example, 8

11 if all states in the Baltic Sea region were to develop MIRG preparedness together, this would solve the problem of small national reserves. Such cooperation would also lead to a significant improvement in occupational safety for rescue personnel. In the Baltic Sea region, very little analysis has been done on dealing with a multisectoral maritime incident resulting from criminal activity. Criminal activity can easily result in a situation that is very difficult to control. Questions of authority alone (in different sea areas and between different flag states) may be difficult to solve unless jurisdictions have been analysed and agreed upon in advance. The project discovered that the planning of operating models for tactical police operations was clearly insufficient in all of the countries examined. The project thinks that planning preparedness for tactical police operations should be carried out in cooperation with the other authorities involved in maritime SAR. General coordination is even more difficult when multisectoral operations are being conducted simultaneously, such as environmental protection and rescuing people from the sea. When examining international cooperation on preparedness throughout the Baltic Sea region as a whole, the thing that is most lacking is a maritime SAR forum covering the entire Baltic Sea region: a forum in which to discuss how to coordinate overall preparedness for multisectoral maritime incidents between all countries in the Baltic Sea region, and to forward sector-specific matters to separate sector-specific cooperation bodies, both nationally and internationally. Alternative ways for creating such a forum have been suggested in the final analysis. All the countries in the Baltic Sea region have comprehensive agreements with neighbouring countries. Although bilateral agreements will no doubt continue to be the most used and the most handy way of cooperating with and obtaining assistance from neighbouring countries, an SAR agreement or protocol covering the entire Baltic region, or at least a Memorandum of Understanding between sectors, should surely be considered. 9

12 1 ABBREVIATIONS ACO AIS ARCC ARSC BSMIR CBRN CBSS CCME DC DEMA DGzRS DSB DV DVI EEZ ERCC EU FIR GMDSS HEED HELCOM HEMS HUET IAMSAR ICAO IMO ISPS JRCC MAS MEDEVAC MIRG MOC MOMEVA MOU MRCC MRO MRSC MSB NGO Aircraft Coordinator Automatic Identification System Aeronautical Search and Rescue Co-ordination Centre Aeronautical Search and Rescue Sub-Centre Baltic Sea Maritime Incidence Response Survey Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Council of the Baltic Sea States Central Command for Maritime Emergencies Damage Control Assistance Team (used in Lithuania) Danish Emergency Management Agency Die Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Rettung Schiffbrüchiger (in Germany) Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection Distress Vessel Disaster Victim Identification Team Exclusive Economic Zone Emergency Response Coordination Centre European Union Flight Information Region Global Maritime Distress and Safety System Helicopter Emergency Egress Device Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission Helsinki Commission Helicopter Emergency Medical Helicopter Underwater Escape Training International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue International Civil Aviation Organization International Maritime Organization International Ship and Port Facility Security Code Joint Search and Rescue Co-ordination Centre Maritime Assistance Service Medical Evacuation Maritime Incidence Response Group Maritime Operations Centre Finnish National Maritime MRO Plan Memorandum of Understanding Maritime Search and Rescue Co-ordination Centre Mass Rescue Operations Maritime Search and Rescue Sub-Centre Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency Non-Governmental Organization 10

13 OSC PLB RITS RSC SAR SMC SOLAS SOP SRR SRU SUA UN UNCLOS VIS VHF On Scene Coordinator Personal Locator Beacon = MIRG Rescue Sub Centre Search and Rescue Search and Rescue Mission Co-ordinator International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea Standard Operating Procedure Search and Rescue Region Search and Rescue Unit Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Visa Information System Very High Frequency Emergency services = Fire and rescue services 11

14 2 FOREWORD A considerable amount of research is being conducted in the Baltic Sea region, and a huge number of different projects are being implemented to improve the safety of marine traffic and protect marine environments. A great deal of effort has been put into one of the most crucial action points the prevention of maritime accidents in recent years. Several accident-prevention projects are currently ongoing and involve both public and private organisations, both companies and NGOs. The focus has been on, for example, monitoring vessels, route planning, advance notification of routes, mechanical inspections of vessels, and enhancing the sharing of situational awareness data between different authorities' information systems. These projects have been made possible by political vision and the allocation of sufficient resources. Considerable financial investments have been made in environmental protection, and in particular oil clean-up and the prevention of oil spills in the Baltic Sea region, both nationally and internationally. In many cases, an oil spill can be assumed to include the need for maritime search and rescue operations to assist people in danger. Unfortunately, this aspect has been largely overlooked. Neither has attention always been paid to actions that could be carried out during emergency operations to reduce the direct consequences of an oil spill. For those of us in coastal nations, history has taught us how ruthless seafaring can be in the worst-case scenario. In recent years, authorities' ability to respond to largescale major incidents in an increasingly more complex operating environment has not received the same level of attention as accident prevention. As yet, there have been very few projects that have focused on operational rescue efforts for such an accident, the associated international and multisectoral cooperation between authorities, and any preparedness plans that this would require. If a large-scale maritime incident were to occur, a great number of different actors would be involved. A major maritime incident would require action both at sea and on shore, and search and rescue operations are rarely handled by a single authority. For example, separate teams to handle rescue and firefighting are often sent to a ship fire. A large-scale maritime incident could also occur as the result of criminal or purposeful action, and in this case the police may take control of the situation. Questions of authority in such situations have not really been examined, largely due to a lack of precedents. A large-scale maritime incident often requires international cooperation. Yet developing and coordinating cooperation at a national level is often challenging enough already, let alone at an international level. Many Baltic Sea States already have clear-cut inter-authority cooperation models, while others are still working on their shared operating principles and plans. One thing is, however, common to all countries: when it comes to how a largescale maritime incident should be handled, the demands placed on authorities are growing all the time. This is a consequence of, among other things, rapid developments in technology and communications. The BSMIR project was born when Finland identified a need to develop and analyse Baltic Sea States' preparedness to respond to a large-scale maritime incident. There was also a desire to work together to develop cooperation on maritime search and rescue in the Baltic Sea region. Due to the multisectoral operating environment associated with a major incident, cross-sectoral cooperation was chosen as the starting point for the project, to ensure that holistic situational awareness could be achieved. This report is the official result of the BSMIR project. It seeks to describe in a clear and easy-to-read manner how the Baltic Sea States, Norway and Iceland are prepared to deal with a major multisectoral incident 12

15 Svalbard Lakselv (Banak) REYKJAVIK ICELA ND Bodø Rovaniemi Faroe Islands Ørland FI N LAN D Umeå SWE DE N Florø N ORWAY Shetland Islands Orkney Islands Outer Hebrides HELSINKI Norrtälje Rygge Stavanger (Sola) Turku Aland Islands OSLO TALLINN STOCKHOLM Hiiumaa ESTON I A RUSS I A Saaremaa Göteborg (Säve) Visby Gotland Ålborg DE N M ARK COPENHAGEN Roskilde Skrydstrup IR ELA N D RIGA Öland DUBLIN Helgoland U NITED K ING D O M LONDON at sea. The focus has been on providing a highly realistic picture of the current situation. It seeks to be as up to date as possible, but does not factor in any new capabilities or preparedness that may arise in the future it is based solely on empirical evidence collected during the early months of However, this report is not a scientific study, but rather a comprehensive review of the situation. For this reason, detailed lists of equipment and other highly detailed information have been avoided where possible. Instead, the report focuses on strategic-level planning and its problematics in participating countries. This report is not an audit of individual states' preparedness or a barometer of their capacity to respond it is an evaluation of the area's preparedness as a whole. On the basis of the data collected, this report seeks to identify strengths and opportunities, as well as the factors that prevent, hinder or slow the development of international cooperation between Baltic Sea States. The report therefore ends with several suggestions on how to develop international cooperation BERLIN Palanga L I THUAN I A Darlowo GE RM AN Y N ETH ERLAN D S L ATVI A Ronneby (Kallinge) Gdynia RUSSI A P OLAN D WARSAW VILNIUS BELARUS SAR SAR EEZ EEZ Territorial waters Territorial waters Helicopter base 300 km complete with visions of several ways in which closer cooperation could be achieved. This report's perspectives are based on a picture formed by a team of Finnish experts on the basis of discussion with, and information provided by, representatives of each participating country. On behalf of the BSMIR project, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to all those who have contributed to the project. Special thanks go to our foreign partners, who organised country visits on short notice; to the numerous people who helped us with their contributions to the final report; and, of course, to our very inspiring and motivated BSMIR team. Let's make the Baltic Sea a safer place for us all, Toni Fohlin Project Manager Finnish Border Guard Headquarters 13

16 3 PREVIOUS PROJECTS The following is a short overview of key projects relating to maritime safety and security or maritime search and rescue that have been implemented in recent years or are still ongoing. 3.1 MARNIS Maritime Navigation and Information Services (MarNIS) sought to improve maritime safety and security with suggestions on how to develop information exchange, service offerings, and infrastructure. This project was partly funded by the EU Sixth Framework Programme. Enhanced communications in particular were held to be vital with regard to both pre-emptive and responsive operations. The results of the project can be seen in three areas 1. The first, Maritime Information Management (MIM), created National Single Windows (NSW), which consolidates data gathered about vessels and enables authorised authorities to access this information 2. It seeks to improve both safety and efficiency while minimising threats to the environment. This would be a good juncture to mention another area, Maritime Operational Services (MOS), which integrates several maritime operative services under one roof, such as Vessel Traffic Management (VTM), SAR, and Oil Pollution Preparedness Response (OPRC). In practice, this means sharing databases and traffic data, and using shared methods to identify risks MARSUNO Maritime Surveillance in the Northern Sea Basins (MARSUNO) was a pilot project launched by the European Commission. Under the leadership of the Swedish Coast 1 Maritime Information Management (MIM), Maritime Operational Services (MOS), Traffic Management in Ports. 2 National Single Windows is connected to the European SafeSeaNet, an online database for data storage. 3 MarNIS Final Report Guard, 24 authorities from ten countries sought to improve compatibility between existing monitoring and tracing systems. MARSUNO sought to develop a common operating environment by identifying administrative and legal (and also cultural) barriers that prevent information exchange. In practice, MARSUNO supported the creation of a parallel process the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) between EU Member States. 4 MARSUNO appointed six working groups that focused on the following themes: Integrated Border Management and Law Enforcement, Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information Systems, Marine Pollution Response, Search and Rescue, Fisheries Control, and Maritime Situational Awareness. Of the recommendations made by these working groups, it is worth mentioning those made by the group handling Search and Rescue, which consisted of five authorities from Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Poland. In conclusion, the group noted that, because economic zones and search and rescue regions were inconsistent in 29 areas of the Baltic Sea, North Sea and Atlantic, the countries and authorities operating in these areas should be aware of their existing responsibilities. Standard operational procedures and joint cooperative plans should be developed as necessary, to ensure that there are no misunderstandings in situations involving both maritime search and rescue and maritime pollution response. The working group also suggested other developments, including the observation that administrations responsible for aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in Member States should be encouraged to use Baltic ACO models as required. It was also noted 4 CISE seeks to act as an exchange network for decentralised information. It will connect existing and forthcoming maritime monitoring and tracing systems across sectors and boundaries throughout the EU, and even to third countries. 14

17 that MROs require additional resources, and Member States were urged to implement local, national and regional MRO plans Baltic Sea Maritime Functionalities Baltic Sea Maritime Functionalities (BSMF) was the 13th flagship project of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). It sought to develop cooperation between maritime actors by defining and conceptualising maritime functionalities and creating target statuses. The development of national and international cooperation was deemed to be necessary in order to provide different authorities with the most comprehensive and up-to-date picture of a situation. 6 This project, which was coordinated by the Finnish Border Guard, focused on official maritime functionalities from the perspective of a single state whilst taking in account the integration of its functionalities into international information exchange. A subtarget was to influence the development of the EU Commission's Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE). The project's concluding recommendations noted that the Baltic Sea region should have its own cooperation structure and language to enable cooperation between all states in the region. A regional cooperation forum would foster trust between regional actors, and facilitate the transfer of best practices and new approaches to information sharing. Information management should be reinforced at a national level with the use of a 5 MARSUNO Final Report The project included two sections: a written report and simulations of functionalities. In addition to national METO partners, others actively involved the project were: the border guard authorities of Russia, Estonia and Poland; maritime safety and security authorities from Poland and Sweden; and the Swedish navy. The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) partly funded the project and also provided support with its practical implementation. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) also provided funding for the project. single contact point (N-CISE) for information flow Joint co-operation on Mass Rescue Operation (MRO) planning between Estonia, Finland and Sweden After the MARSUNO project's Search and Rescue working group had presented its results and made its suggestions, Estonia, Finland and Sweden decided to continue their work by drawing up a joint MRO plan. The goal was to improve the effectiveness of MROs, and to develop and implement standard operational procedures to ensure safe operations and enable search and rescue resources from partner countries to be better utilised. The creation of national MROs was deemed essential, so that countries could obtain information about the roles of foreign authorities and their responsibilities during MROs. The mapping of potential assembly points and the sharing of this information across borders was also deemed necessary, so that an assisting MRCC could direct rescued persons to assembly points. Meetings held in Tallinn during culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) an agreement on joint MRO concepts. This occurred in January 2013, when those responsible for the SAR sector in Estonia, Finland and Sweden signed an international MoU. 3.5 Baltic ACO The coordination of aircraft (ACO operations) began to be actively developed at the turn of the millennium on the basis of experience gained from major incidents, including the sinking of M/S Estonia. The most active development was initially seen in Finland and Sweden. Denmark later developed its own ACO model. At the beginning of the 2010s, three different Aircraft Coordinator (ACO) models were 7 Baltic Sea Maritime Functionalities, Final report

18 in use in the Baltic Sea. As a consequence, Finland invited representatives from Sweden and Denmark to take part in a conference aimed at creating a joint, multinational ACO model. It took just under a year to create the current Baltic model, which has been finetuned since then. After the creation of the Baltic ACO model, Finland, Denmark and Sweden committed (in a separate MoU) to using the new model and training future Baltic ACO trainers/key personnel from other Baltic Sea States. Since signing the memorandum, Finland and Denmark have organised international ACO courses. The model is currently being used by other countries both in the Baltic Sea and elsewhere. There are plans to update the aircraft coordination section of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual on the basis of the Baltic ACO model. The developmental phases of Baltic ACO are presented in more detail in MIRG-related projects Ministers responsible for Nordic security met and signed the Haga Declaration in April The declaration contains agreements on closer Nordic cooperation in matters relating to crisis preparedness, such as search and rescue operations. NORDRED (nordiskt samarbete inom räddningstjänsten) has become one of the key forums, and the task of the NORDRED conference held in Vaasa in 2009 was to establish the Nordisk RITS Forum. Norway had presidency, and so the Bergen emergency services initially led the team. The RITS Forum's goal has been to strengthen cooperation and preparedness in RITS services. The most important tasks include ensuring that information and experiences are exchanged, practical operations are harmonised, training is organised, and exercises can be and are conducted. The Nordisk RITS Forum is also currently cooperating with the MIRG-EU project. The Forum convenes once or twice a year, or when otherwise required. The MIRG-EU project has been aiming to improve response preparedness for maritime incidents that require firefighting, chemical clean-ups, or providing assistance to trapped people in the English Channel, North Sea, and nearby coastal areas. The project resulted in four trained MIRG teams in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK. Their operations are based on standard operational procedures, standardised training, and exercise programmes. 8 During the BSMIR project, it has not been possible to get better acquainted with the MIRG-EU project, but in general, the project values actions that seek to standardise operational procedures between MIRG services in different countries. 3.7 The Helsinki Convention and HELCOM's response manuals HELCOM's Helsinki Convention, which came into force in 2000, commits to protecting the Baltic Sea and undertaking measures aimed at reducing pollution in interior waters and the sea, and on the seabed. HELCOM also has response manuals for oil and chemical spills. The first of these precisely and comprehensively defines the fundamentals of operative cooperation, including communications practices and information about national organisations and their preparedness. 9 The manual on responding to chemical spills focuses on the behaviour of chemical leaks and how to monitor and deal with them. These manuals are not intended to be operative guidelines, 10 and international cooperation cannot be engaged in solely on the basis of HELCOM's manuals. In this respect, the Baltic Sea region still has a way to go. 8 MIRG-EU Homepage. 9 HELCOM also runs the annual Balex Delta exercises, which practise cooperation between clean-up vessels. 10 Response to accidents at sea involving spills of hazardous substances and loss of packaged dangerous goods, HELCOM Manual on Cooperation in Response to Marine Pollution within the framework of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention), Vol 2, 1 December

19 4 OPERATIONS RELATING TO LARGE-SCALE MARITIME INCIDENTS This section will run through the terminology and key operations relating to large-scale maritime incidents. Particular attention will be paid to both search and rescue operations at sea and follow-up operations on land. 4.1 What is a large-scale, multisectoral maritime incident? 11 long as it can be assumed that there are still people that can be rescued. Yet this must not prevent the launch of other measures before search and rescue operations are concluded. The dimensions of a multisectoral maritime incident In a large-scale maritime incident, it is typical for human life, property and the environment to be simultaneously under threat. Such a situation is referred to as a multisectoral incident. A multisectoral incident is usually also a major incident, but differs from a major incident in the fact that a multisectoral incident involves several different interests, while a major incident usually requires the rescue of only one of the above-mentioned values. Sea Air Property Environment People Underwater Shore The risk of a multisectoral incident at sea is always present. One particular risk of seafaring stems from the large differences in speed and size between vessels travelling in the same channel. When evaluating the seriousness of an accident, it is worth noting that one passenger ship can carry almost 10,000 people; even a single freighter or tanker carries cargo of considerable value; and the consequences of oil or other chemical spills are immeasurable. Another feature particular to multisectoral maritime incidents is that operations run by a variety of actors will be conducted simultaneously. In addition to maritime search and rescue, there may also be operations to salvage commercial property or prevent environmental damage. The coordination of a multisectoral operation requires special cooperation between rescue and salvage. Saving human life must always take priority, as 11 This text is by Ilari Hatakka and is based on his thesis on the topic: Hatakka (2014), Establishing an evacuation centre during a major maritime incident, Emergency Services College. Figure 1: The dimensions of a multisectoral maritime incident (Hatakka 2014) All seafarers are obligated to assist in saving human life at sea. Maritime search and rescue operations often make use of other vessels in the area, and large-scale incidents will, almost without exception, require assistance from aircraft and foreign authorities. Those coordinating maritime search and rescue must consider not only surface rescue operations, but also aeronautical and even underwater operations. A multisectoral incident requires a three-dimensional approach to situational awareness. Good situational awareness makes it easier to effectively combine the different approaches and interests of those participating in emergency operations. Emergency operations for a multisectoral incident are governed by rescue priorities and the authority held by maritime rescue officials. In accordance with international conventions, saving human life at sea is unequivocally the task of maritime search 17

20 and rescue and should be funded by the State. In almost all countries, maritime search and rescue is always led by an authority, and other organisations can be ordered to take part in operations. In the case of an environmental accident, an authority will be in charge of cleanup operations, but the costs will in some way be covered by the perpetrator. Some commercial players also participate in cleaning up environmental damage, but not without compensation they simply engage in these operations commercially. The protection of property at sea does not usually fall under the scope of maritime search and rescue. In accordance with international maritime legal conventions, responsibility for a distress vessel and its cargo lies with the vessel's owner or the owner's representative. An abandoned vessel is the responsibility of the salvager. Authorities may take part in salvage operations if it is deemed beneficial to saving human life or protecting the environment. Such cases can include extinguishing a fire on a passenger ship to ensure successful evacuation, or sealing a leak on a cargo ship to prevent the vessel sinking and its cargo or oil ending up in the water. 4.2 On-shore operations during a multisectoral maritime incident 12 In addition to search and rescue operations at sea, a multisectoral incident requires close cooperation between emergency services and other actors on land. Search and rescue authorities do not have the authorisation or resources to protect and treat rescued persons once they are back on land. Environmental damage resulting from a maritime incident is a dynamic situation that will likely generate work for emergency services on land, too. General emergency services and first aid will be required to ensure an unbroken chain of care for the injured. Assembly and treatment points can be established on the shore, where the status of injured persons can be evaluated before they are taken to hospital. Resources are also required to take care of uninjured people that have been rescued from the sea, but in this the authorities can obtain assistance from, for example, travel operators and the owners of the distress vessel. When it comes to rescue and evacuation operations involving a passenger ship, it is vital to identify the division of authority between rescue officials and the master of the ship. In the context of a maritime accident, evacuation refers to those measures undertaken by the ship's crew, both on deck and below decks; that is, emptying cabins and guiding passengers first to the assembly point and finally off the vessel. This evacuation is led by the master of the vessel. Even if rescue personnel board a vessel to assist with the evacuation, the master of the vessel remains in charge of the evacuation. Once the distress vessel's passengers are in lifeboats, on other vessels, or in the water, authority is transferred from the master of the ship to maritime rescue officials. The distress vessel's lifeboats and crew may take part in, for example, rescuing people from the water, but these operations must be carried out under the leadership of maritime rescue authorities. During a large-scale multisectoral maritime incident, tactical police operations at sea are defined as situations in which one party is a vessel carrying hazardous substances, or the incident was caused by criminal activity. Preparedness for these types of accidents is currently quite weak, and the Baltic Sea region has no real experience of handling such incidents. Authorities face enormous challenges in such situations. 12 This text is by Ilari Hatakka and is based on his thesis on the topic: Hatakka (2014), Establishing an evacuation centre during a major maritime incident, Emergency Services College. 18

21 If any parties involved in an accident have been exposed to hazardous substances, this significantly limits the emergency resources that can be used, and the extent of the contamination can be considerable. Aircraft and surface rescue vessels can rarely operate in polluted areas, nor can they transport contaminated individuals without exposing rescue personnel to contamination. In the event of chemical exposure, decontamination must occur immediately. (Cold) water is available for decontamination at sea, but environmental conditions are otherwise often unsuitable for decontamination. Transporting people to shore for decontamination requires protection for rescue personnel and pressurisation of the vessel. Passenger ships and their passengers are highly vulnerable and easily accessible targets for criminal activity. In the event of a maritime act of terrorism or other criminal activity, the division of authority changes and the safety of the target must be assured before search and rescue operations commence. When conducting search and rescue operations as a consequence of criminal activity, there may also be a need to prepare for the abovementioned hazardous substances. 4.3 Assembly points and the treatment of rescued persons 13 Documents governing international maritime search and rescue do not define how on-shore emergency operations should be organised. The division of authority for maritime search and rescue operations is clear, but the organisation of on-shore operations must be agreed upon separately. There are several methods of organisation, and they involve numerous authorities, other organisations, and also companies. hitting a small municipality or large village. Those rescued may not necessarily be injured, but they will be without belongings and accommodation. A further challenge lies in the fact that rescue personnel may not share a common language with rescued individuals, who may also live a long way from the site of the accident. These challenges are most likely to be realised in incidents involving cruise ships. It is difficult to conduct exercises for mass evacuations. Maritime search and rescue exercises generally focus on rescue operations at sea, while on-shore activities are described either superficially or not at all. On the other hand, the challenges associated with moving large numbers of people can be evaluated using a variety of map and simulation exercises. If a passenger ship is involved in an accident, the situation is by no means over when those involved have been rescued from the distress vessel or transported to the shore. A passenger on a foreign cruise ship may be in a strange country thousands of miles from home, and be soaking wet and without their personnel belongings. Such a situation puts considerable pressure on social and healthcare services in the area. 4.4 Establishing an assembly point and its operations Organisations involved in assembly point operations should plan the organisation of the following tasks regionally, and insert their organisational responsibilities into the preparedness plans of other sectors. An example of the procedure for handling evacuated and rescued persons as well as an example of an assembly point s various tasks are given below. When it comes to the number of people to be rescued, a maritime incident involving a passenger ship is not comparable to an air or train crash it is closer to a natural disaster 13 This text is by Ilari Hatakka and is based on his thesis on the topic: Hatakka (2014), Establishing an evacuation centre during a major maritime incident, Emergency Services College. 19

22 THE PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING EVACUATED AND RESCUED PERSONS DURING A MASS EVACUATION EVACUATED TARGET (ship, aeroplane, train, etc.) DEAD VICTIMS RESCUE AND TRANSPORTATION OF EVACUEES EVACUEE ASSEMBLY POINT DEAD VICTIMS COLLECTION AND IDENTIFICATION POINT (DVI operations) CLASSIFICATION AREA PRIMARY TRIAGE (injured/uninjured) TREATMENT AREA FOR THE INJURED & SECONDARY TRIAGE (injured persons) UNINJURED PERSONS RED TREATMENT YELLOW TREATMENT GREEN TREATMENT TRANSPORTATION AND ITS COORDINATION TRANSPORTATION AND IT S COORDINATION RECEPTION AND SUPPORT AREA HOSPITAL/TREATMENT FACILITY If operations in the reception and support area have already ceased RECEPTION 1) collecting personal details and preliminary interviews (form) 2) identifying immediate healthcare requirements 3) issuing ID and access cards HOME or TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION version 17 March 2014 SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 1) accommodation and feeding 2) first aid, hospital treatment 3) psychosocial support 4) contact with relatives 5) interpretation services 6) consular services 7) further transportation/repatriation Figure 2: The procedure for handling evacuated and rescued persons during a mass evacuation 20

23 An assembly point for evacuees handles the following tasks: 1) Organising premises for handling assembly point tasks 2) Organising contact between the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator and other required organisations 3) Opening contact numbers and answering queries 4) Organising sufficient helicopter landing and waiting areas for aeronautical transport in the vicinity of the assembly point 5) Dead victims and survivors should not be placed in the same premises 6) Maintaining public order, safety, and security The classification area handles the following tasks: 7) Receiving evacuees from vehicles and transferring them to a place of refuge 8) Handling children without guardians 9) Primary triage, separating the injured from the uninjured 10) Transferring injured people to treatment facilities 11) Guiding uninjured people to reception and support areas The reception and support area handles the following tasks: 12) Handling children without guardians 13) Gathering information from evacuees, that is: personal details, addresses, information about potential travelling companions or relatives, and about family members or others who can be contacted concerning the incident. 14) Organising interpretation when necessary 15) Issuing ID and access cards to those in the reception and support area 16) Checking the condition of evacuees, and identifying any health requirements (such as regular medication) 17) Organising psychosocial support 18) Feeding and if necessary clothing evacuees 19) Organising transportation from the assembly point to accommodation or further transportation An assembly point for evacuees often also functions as a maintenance point for personnel, materials and transport, and as a temporary storage area. 21

24 5 BACKGROUND TO THE BSMIR PROJECT Many factors indicate that there is a need for a multisectoral project focusing on maritime preparedness in the Baltic Sea region. This section will go through the background factors that influenced the implementation of the BSMIR project. 5.1 Marine traffic safety in the Baltic Sea Throughout the year, there are about 2,000 commercial vessels traversing the Baltic Sea at any one time. Every year, there are reported accidents involving commercial traffic in the region, and the number of close calls is many times that. This, combined with the increasing amount of traffic in the Baltic Sea, traffic intersecting at several nodes, difficult waters, and the harsh winter conditions in the northern Baltic Sea increase both the chance of a large-scale maritime incident and the difficulty of conducting search and rescue operations. There is growing concern that the risks posed by brisk traffic in the Baltic Sea will be realised, and also concern over the authorities' ability to respond to such a situation. Several developmental areas concerning the overall management of large-scale multisectoral incidents have been identified in previous projects, such as MARSUNO. Risk analyses conducted by a number of different authorities also provide grounds for developing preparedness at a concrete level. The following is a risk analysis of the Baltic Sea region conducted by Finland's traffic safety authority. 5.2 An overview of trends in commercial marine traffic in the Baltic Sea region and the associated safety risks Sea freight handled at Baltic Sea ports Freight volumes by product group In 2012, Baltic Sea ports 15 handled a total of million tons of cargo 16, of which 25% was from Russian ports, 21% from Swedish ports, and 13% from Finnish ports. 17 The major ports at that time were Primorsk, St Petersburg, and Ust Luga. 18 Freight volumes increased by about 6% in Growth has occurred at Russian, Latvian and Lithuanian ports in particular. Individual ports worth mentioning are Ust-Luga, Klaipeida and Riga. The ports of Tallinn, Fredricia and Lubeck have seen the most negative trend in cargo volumes. Of the cargoes handled at Baltic ports in 2012, the clear majority (319 million tons) 14 An analysis by the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi), Itämeren meriliikenne - Yleiskuvaus alueen kaupallisen meriliikenteen kehityksestä ja sen turvallisuusriskeistä, The Baltic Sea extends through the Kattegat strait, which divides Sweden and Denmark, to the farthest reaches of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia. The Baltic Sea s coastal states are Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia and Finland. 16 Trends in Baltic Sea freight volumes, (MKK: Baltic Port List 2013). 17 Baltic Sea freight volumes by coastal State in 2012, compared to trends in coastal States freight volumes in 2011 (MKK: Baltic Port List 2013). 18 Largest Baltic Sea ports by freight volume in 2012 (MKK: Baltic Port List 2013). 22

25 were unfixed liquid cargoes including oil, oil products and a range of chemicals. 19 This product group increased by just under 6% on the previous year. Freight traffic was heavily weighted towards Russian ports, of which Primorsk and Ust-Luga are worthy of mention. Fixed cargoes, such as single-consignment freight and cargo units, were the secondlargest product group in A total of 258 million tons were loaded and unloaded. They reached a peak in 2007, since when trends have varied. The most notable ports for fixed cargoes are St Petersburg, Gothenburg and Lubeck. Unfixed cargoes, that is bulk freight, were the third-largest product group in million tons of cargo was handled. Bulk freight volumes have declined by just over 3% since Ports handling larger bulk products were Riga, Ust-Luga and Klaipeida. As yet, there is no precise data on freight volumes in the Baltic Sea region during 2013, but it seems that traffic increased slightly. 20 The growth outlook for freight volumes Estimates of trends in 2014 freight volumes are overshadowed by the current crisis in the Crimea and its potential effect on global economic policies. A downswing may have long-term effects. 21 The Baltic Transport Outlook survey, which extends to 2030, forecasts that total sea freight volumes in the Baltic Sea will increase by about 30%. The forecast growth is weighted towards container traffic. Regionally, it is believed that growth will focus on the St Petersburg region. According to the survey, unfixed liquid cargoes, such as oil, are expected to decrease by about 7% on The researchers base their estimate on the increased use of replacement fuels, such as LNG and biofuels. 22 There are great variations in the national growth estimates for sea freight until Forecasts are hindered by the previously mentioned questions concerning replacement fuels The state of safety of commercial seafaring in the Baltic Sea Marine traffic and vessel risk categories It is estimated that about 2,000 vessels are sailing through the Baltic Sea at any one time. The region is one of the most highly trafficked sea areas in the world. Statistics were recorded on about 170,000 vessels' Baltic Sea port visits in 2013 (Figure 3). Ro-ro passenger ships made the most port visits, that is, ropax vessels (41%) and dry cargo ships (24%). A significant percentage of the region's vessel traffic runs regular routes between Central European and Baltic Sea ports. Ro-ro ships are a typical choice for this kind of traffic, as they are not only fast, but also easy to load and unload. A different type of general solution for single-consignment freight is a dry cargo ship with either a time charter or voyage charter. When examining the risk profiles of vessels on the basis of the 2013 port visit statistics, the majority of port visits are made by ships with low security risks (52%). This is largely due to the brisk ro-ro passenger traffic in the region these vessels have low risk categories and clearly rack up the most port visits. Mediumrisk vessels were the second largest group (46%). Typical vessels in this category include dry cargo ships and ro-ro cargo ships. Ships with high-risk classification accounted for the smallest number of port visits by far (0.4%). The majority of high-risk vessels were either passenger ships, oil tankers or unfixed cargo 19 Trend in Baltic Sea freight volumes, by cargo type (MKK: Baltic Port List 2013). 20 Finland s sea freight imports grew by 1.2% and exports by 5.7% on the previous year, and the economic situation in the EU zone has recently seen a slight upswing 21 Lloyd s List (2014) 22 Baltic Transport Outlook

26 Figure 3: Baltic Sea port visits by class of ship and by risk profile (EMSA 2013) ships. The remaining port visits were made by ships without a risk profile. 23 In general, it can be said that vessels that have visited Baltic Sea ports met the standards set by international authorities quite well when inspected. These standards mainly govern a vessel's technical condition and equipment, and its crew's size and competence. Maritime incidents and trends According to Lloyd's List Intelligence (hereafter LLI), 1,082 maritime incidents occurred in the Baltic Sea between (Figure 4). That is an average of 180 incidents per year. The worst year was 2008, when a total of 208 incidents were recorded. When studying the trends in incidents, no significant changes can be observed. According to LLI, 49 of the incidents that have occurred in the Baltic Sea can be classed as very serious according to IMO's classification system. An average of 7 such incidents occur every year. A total of 38 people have been killed in incidents, 4 have gone missing, and 47 have been injured. 20 of these incidents led to an actual total loss, and 10 to environmental damage. A serious incident occurred in June 2008, when a fire aboard a Russian dry cargo ship claimed the lives of 10 people, and another two went missing, presumed dead The Port State Control is an international monitoring system consisting of port authority inspections that governs foreign vessels visiting ports or berths in Member States. Port authority inspections are regulated by the criteria defined in the Paris MoU, according to which vessels are divided into three categories: high security risk, medium security risk, and low security risk. Vessel classification is based on a total of seven criteria. A certain weighting has been given to each criterion, and their sum is used to calculate a daily risk profile for vessels. Risk profiles influence the cycle and scope of inspections carried out by port authorities. 24 The United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) divides maritime incidents into two categories: maritime incidents and very serious maritime incidents. Very serious maritime incidents are those which result in the loss of human life or serious injury, significant environmental damage or the actual total loss of a vessel. Global comparison figures are only available for this category of incident. Other consequences of maritime incidents are mainly limited to financial losses. 24

27 Figure 4: Maritime incidents in the Baltic Sea, (LLI: 2014). On the basis of its accident history, the Baltic Sea's security status can currently be classified as moderate in comparison to other key sea regions worldwide. On the basis of IHS Fairplay's 2012 statistics, there was not a single commercial seafaring incident in the Baltic Sea that led to the loss of human life. The number of very serious incidents is also low when compared to, for example, Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean and the North Sea. 25 On the basis of the port visits described in the previous section, these vessels also largely met official standards. In modern safety science, an accident risk is largely viewed as a non-linear and dynamic phenomenon rather than a separate factor in a causal relationship. It has traditionally been believed that future incidents can also be forecast on the basis of trends in incidents. However, trends are often not so straightforward. The risk of a very serious incident is affected by structural factors and their interaction, whose combined impact is hard to evaluate let alone control. On the other hand, a single completely unpredictable case can completely change the situation. The accident involving M/S Estonia in September 1994 is an example of such a 'black swan'. 25 Regional distribution of total losses and the number of people perishing in maritime accidents in 2012 (IHS Fairplay 2013) Commercial seafaring safety risks in the Baltic Sea The safety risks of different ship classes The risks threatening maritime safety in the Baltic Sea can be evaluated in many different ways risk is a subjective concept. 26 The table in Appendix 1 shows maritime incidents in the Baltic Sea from , along with their seriousness, by ship class and incident type. The table also evaluates the risks associated with each combination. The majority of the incidents that occurred in the Baltic Sea from involved dry cargo ships and ro-ro passenger ships. The number of incidents involving these ship classes clearly exceeded the average (63.6). Dry cargo ships were also the ship class most often involved in very serious maritime incidents. Other ship classes that clearly exceeded the average in this category (2.9) were fishing vessels and ro-ro passenger ships. When the seriousness of maritime incidents and the ships involved in them are evaluated as a whole, maritime incidents involving passenger ships, oil tankers and product 26 There are many ways to define risk. Doug Hubbard s is one of the best definitions: A state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, or other undesirable outcome. In this analysis, risk is mainly evaluated in accordance with a general formula: Probability x Seriousness 25

28 tankers can be identified as a particular risk. The number of incidents involving these types of vessels was higher than average in both categories of incident. These vessels also carry a large number of people or considerable amounts of oil and oil refining products, meaning that the consequences of an accident could be disastrous. Major risks The five different ship classes mentioned in the previous section can be considered to pose greater safety risks than other classes. This section will evaluate the risks associated with different combinations of ship classes and incident types. The evaluation was carried out on the basis on the appendix table and the LLI's incident reports for It paid particular attention to the probability of an incident and the seriousness of its consequences. 1) The major risks associated with dry cargo vessels can be assumed to be those involving fires and the sinking of the ship. When discussing the factors involved in the sinking of vessels, it is worth mentioning the shifting of cargo. Fires and sinkings have resulted in both the loss of human life and serious injury. Sinkings have also caused environmental damage, and they are already in principle actual total losses. 2) The major risks associated with ro-ro passenger vessels can be assumed to be those involving machinery and propeller damage, which are the most prolific incidents. In such situations, a vessel cannot be steered, which can have serious consequences. The very serious incidents involving ro-ro passenger ships have mainly been collisions with docks that have occurred during manoeuvres in port, and speeds have been slow. 3) The major risks associated with fishing vessels can be assumed to be sinkings resulting from a variety of causes. These incidents have claimed several victims, and in certain cases events have progressed so quickly that there has not even been time to send a distress signal. 4) It is difficult to evaluate the one single major risk associated with passenger vessels. On the basis of previous accidents, it can be assumed that incidents will continue to involve running aground (M/S Costa Concordia), hull damage resulting in the sinking of the vessel (M/S Estonia), and fires (M/S Scandinavian Star). 26

29 5) The major risk associated with oil tankers and product tankers can be assumed to be running aground. These are the most prolific type of incident, and one case also involved environmental damage albeit quite minor. When ships in this class have run aground, it has resulted in major environmental damage, as has been seen in other countries. Trends in marine traffic and their impact on accident risks Figure 5 shows the percentage of port visits made by different ship classes in 2013 and the percentage of maritime incidents involving those ship classes in When the previously selected ship classes, excluding fishing vessels, are examined, it can be seen that the percentage of port visits made by dry cargo ships, passenger vessels, oil tankers, product tankers, and unfixed cargo ships was less than the percentage of maritime incidents these classes were involved in. In other words, these ships were involved in proportionally more incidents than, for example, ro-ro passenger ships, whose absolute number of accidents (166) was the second highest during the evaluation period. The figure's accident index has been calculated on the basis of the number of port visits and accidents using a weighted average weighted to port visits. The index has been calculated as follows: ship class-specific number of port visits/1,000 x 5.72 x ship class-specific index = number of incidents involving this ship class The index is an approximation. However, it can be said that, on the basis of this index, increases and decreases in the traffic volumes of certain ships have a significant bearing on the number of maritime incidents. The index can also be used to evaluate how changes in traffic volumes in different ship classes affect the number of incidents occurring in the Baltic Sea. If we compare, for example, the most typical distress vessels, that is, dry cargo ships and ro-ro passenger ships, changes in dry cargo ship traffic volumes have had a greater impact on safety. Figure 5: Relative percentage of port visits and maritime incidents by ship class, including ship class-specific accident indexes. 27

30 Figure 6: Shipping Accidents in the Baltic Sea

31 5.3 Savings pressures in public finance Due to the general economic situation, public sector services including operations and investments in emergency and government services are being cut in almost all Baltic Sea States. At best, operational expenditure will remain at existing levels, though even then no additional funding can be expected in the near future. Yet at the same time, the government does not want to cut back on authorities' statutory obligations and responsibilities. This trend will inevitably lead to a need to re-examine preparedness from a new perspective: How to handle a largescale maritime incident both in accordance with current requirements and in the future? Broadly speaking, it seems that no Baltic Sea State currently has the capacity or preparedness to handle a large-scale maritime incident completely independently. In almost every case, assistance of some kind would be required from neighbouring countries. In the worst-case scenario, the success of cooperation between authorities, both internationally and at a national level, could affect hundreds of people's chances of survival. Public finance and political will in coastal nations have a great impact on how nations can prepare for such incidents. The following questions therefore unavoidably arise in relation to preparedness for a large-scale 27 The map shows commercial seafaring accidents in the Baltic Sea, , based on Helcom's data. The accident statistics have been separated into sinkings, fires, collisions and running aground. These have, on the basis of the previous table, been judged as the most serious incident categories. More detailed regional analyses of the Denmark Strait and the Gulf of Finland in particular are available. A few examples are listed here: Aalto University: Comparison of the learning algorithms for evidence-based BBN modeling A case study on ship grounding accidents (2014); Aalto University: Influence of impact scenario models on collision risk analysis (2012); EfficienSea: The Collection of FSA Studies in the Baltic Sea Area (2010); Forsvarsministeriet: Risikoanalyse Olieog kemikalieforurening i danske farvande (2007); RAMBOLL: Navigational safety in the Sound between Denmark and Sweden (2006) maritime incident: To what extent should preparedness for a large-scale maritime incident be organised nationally and to what extent regionally (Baltic Sea region)? What is a suitable level of preparedness in relation to the risk? What is the outlook with regard to the resources required to maintain and develop preparedness? The BSMIR project sought answers to these questions The Finnish Border Guard's project to analyse the overall situation Marine traffic risks and savings pressures in public finance place challenges on preparedness for maritime incidents. Resources, standard operational procedures and international cooperation (and the funding required for these) currently appear to be off balance in relation to what we are preparing for, at least in places. Solutions must therefore be sought elsewhere, and one possibility could be to develop more effective cooperation and concrete preparedness plans throughout the Baltic Sea region. These observations inspired the Finnish Border Guard to launch a special project to promote developmental work between the Baltic Sea States. The BSMIR project objective was to analyse the overall situation in the region, so that follow-up measures could be evaluated and implemented. The BSMIR is the first of its kind: joint preparedness throughout the Baltic Sea region with regard to several different authorities has never been analysed in the same report before The BSMIR project and Finland's Baltic Sea policy During Finland's presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Council's most important objectives related to protecting marine environments and enhancing safety in the Baltic Sea. The BSMIR project, which was funded by Finland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has sought to provide a powerful indication of the need for joint preparedness for maritime incidents throughout the Baltic Sea region. The BSMIR also directly supports efforts 29

32 towards achieving the general objectives of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Priority Area on Maritime Safety and Security (PA SAFE). (Action: 2 (5) Develop a joint macro-regional prevention and preparedness approach towards major hazards and emergencies.) The project also supports Finland's maritime policy (and associated cooperation) in general, and particularly action point 42: Key measures for improving maritime safety and security. According to the description of this action point, it is hoped that ministries will actively participate in, among other things, efforts to improve maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea region. Improving maritime safety and security is naturally also a key part of the Finnish Border Guard's statutory obligations. 30

33 6 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES The BSMIR project's objective is to create a status report on the Baltic Sea States' preparedness for a large-scale maritime incident. 6.2 Operational cooperation between maritime SAR authorities and other emergency services The project will examine the following topics: National preparedness plans and their status; operational cooperation between maritime SAR authorities and other emergency services in coastal Baltic Sea States during accidents involving ships; national standard operational procedures relating to maritime chemical spills; the use and coordination of aircraft during major maritime incidents; and supporting the creation of international standard operational procedures. A brief description of these topics is given below. 6.1 National preparedness plans Examining national preparedness plans and their formative processes will generate an overall picture of preparedness in the Baltic Sea region. By comparing different countries' practices, this report has also been able to consider opportunities for developing cooperation between the various authorities. Studying the preparatory processes for a variety of multisectoral preparedness plans is particularly beneficial, as the greatest challenge faced by most countries still seems to involve bringing together all the relevant authorities in order to further their interests. All key authorities involved in handling largescale maritime incidents will be taken into account when examining the plans, and in particular SAR, fire and rescue, healthcare, and the police. National preparedness plans will be examined both on a general level and on the basis of a subjective evaluation by the national authority in question. Maritime SAR authorities and the emergency services often engage in operational cooperation in the event of accidents involving ships. This project analyses the forms taken by this type of inter-authority cooperation in participating countries. A serious ship fire is an example of an incident that will involve this type of operational cooperation. There are extremely limited resources available to handle ship fires at sea in the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, to effectively get a situation under control, it is vital to have standard operational procedures and seamless cooperation between the teams deployed by neighbouring countries. Mass evacuations at sea also often require cooperation between authorities. The people evacuated during MROs are typically transported to different areas within the accident zone, and often to other coastal states. In these circumstances, great demands are placed on general command and coordination. Without commonly agreed procedures, it is unlikely that operations will progress smoothly and with the fewest number of victims. 6.3 National standard operational procedures relating to maritime chemical spills Several organisations are currently analysing preparedness for, and the ability to respond to, maritime chemical spills, including the EU. Very little is known about maritime chemical clean-ups, as very little practical experience has been gained. HELCOM has published a manual covering chemical clean-ups in the Baltic Sea, but it doesn't cover practical processes and operative problematics. Instead, it mainly focuses on chemical properties and their measurement. 31

34 Authorities engaged in on-land operations relating to chemical spills are aware of the challenges involved. In the light of current knowledge, the available alternatives are very limited. This report seeks to provide a realistic picture of the chemical clean-up expertise and capability available in the Baltic Sea region. 6.4 The use and coordination of aircraft during major maritime incidents Typically, over ten helicopters may be operating in the same zone during a largescale maritime incident. This places great demands on aircraft coordination to ensure safe and effective operations. The implementation rate of the Nordic model created for this purpose is examined as one factor in overall preparedness. 6.5 Supporting the creation of international standard operational procedures One of the project's subgoals is networking and opening up discussions on developmental requirements between all authorities involved in handling large-scale maritime incidents. This report has sought to identify factors that hinder and prevent the development of international cooperation. During the project, support has also been offered to countries that wish to develop their own national systems relating to a specific functionality, such as MIRG services. project coordinator, the Finnish Border Guard, will share practices that have proved successful in Finland; that is, joint cooperative practices, planning models and operative guidelines relating to maritime SAR. Some of these practices are easily applicable, or at least adaptable, for pilot use in countries where comparable procedures do not yet exist. A large percentage of the observations made in the final report are universal, which also enables them to be used outside the Baltic Sea region, in areas in which SAR operations are conducted in similar conditions (for example, the Barents Sea and other coastal regions in the EU). One of the project's goals has been to present potential standard operational procedures for certain functionalities in the Baltic Sea region. 6.7 Areas outside the scope of this project Preparedness for cleaning up oil spills was left outside the scope of this project, as HELCOM has covered these issues quite thoroughly in recent years. Cleaning up after oil spills is practised regularly during Balex- Delta exercises, and HELCOM has published a comprehensive manual on the topic. Considerable financial investments have also been made in oil clean-up equipment and exercises in the region. 6.6 Objectives The project seeks to provide a clear picture of how different coastal states are currently prepared to deal with major maritime incidents, in order to enable an evaluation of the overall situation in the region and develop procedures to enhance international cooperation between multiple authorities. The project also seeks to present and share best practices and operating models. The 32

35 7 IMPLEMENTATION MODEL The Finnish Border Guard decided to implement the BSMIR project as a special project funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's cooperation fund for the Baltic Sea, Barents Sea and Arctic region. The project was therefore funded nationally without the need for EU or private funding. Its budget was EUR 249,000. Finland's Ministry of the Interior was responsible for the project, which was coordinated by two of its departments: the Department for Rescue Services and the Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard. The project's steering group consisted of civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 7.1 Project personnel and experts The project employed a full-time project manager and project secretary, both from the Headquarters of the Finnish Border Guard, and four part-time subject matter experts representing the key organisations involved in strategic planning for large-scale maritime incidents. The above-mentioned personnel formed the project team that analysed the topics under study. Everyone took part in almost every foreign visit, and each expert wrote the section of the final report relating to their subject. Project Manager: Toni Fohlin, MIRG Firemaster at the Helsinki City Rescue Department; Member of the national MIRG steering board Project Secretary: Raita Putkonen, M.Sc., University of Tampere For SAR, Maritime and Sea Fare Issues: Pekka Parkkali, SAR Adviser, Border Guard Headquarters, Maritime Safety and SAR Unit For Maritime Firefighting and Chemical response: Marko Rostedt, MIRG Firemaster at the Southwest Finland Emergency Services For MRO planning, Emergency medical response, Evacuation process: Jouni Pousi, Senior Officer, Ministry of the Interior, Department for Rescue Services For Criminal action involved in a Maritime Incident, Jurisdiction at Sea: Jussi Huhtela, Superintendent, National Police Board, Specialist for police tactical operations and special forces 7.2 Phases of the project Participating countries In October 2013, all of the Baltic Sea States, Norway, and Iceland were invited to cooperate within the framework of the BSMIR project. A partnership invitation was sent to the foreign ministries of the above-mentioned countries, so that it could be forwarded to the key national authorities involved in handling maritime incidents. In addition to Finland, nine countries participated in the project: Estonia, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden. In spite of several attempts, it was not possible to meet with representatives from Russia to discuss maritime preparedness relating to the BSMIR project. The project team hopes that, in the future, issues relating to maritime preparedness can be discussed with all of the Baltic Sea States and all of the countries in the neighbouring region, to enable deeper international cooperation on large-scale maritime incidents, and so that preparedness will cover traffic throughout the Baltic Sea Implementation The project was implemented in five stages: Webropol survey, seminar, foreign visits, analysis, as well as report writing and publication (see Figure 7). The first three phases involved data collection, and each phase sought to increase the amount of information and detail available. The data obtained during the first three phases was 33

36 examined in the analysis phase. The basic principle during this phase was not to conduct a scientific study, but to obtain an overall picture of the current situation. Both analysis and report writing were partially begun during the data collection phases. The rest of this section will run through the five phases of the project. Figure 7: Phases of implementation Webropol survey A Webropol survey was conducted in October The survey contained about 70 questions on the following topics: national and international cooperation on maritime SAR; the BSMIR project; national authorities responsible for maritime SAR; Baltic ACO; maritime SAR training; ship fires; chemical spills; emergency medical care and evacuation; and release of information to the public. The survey was sent to the liaisons from participating countries, and responses were requested before the seminar that was to be held at the end of November All of the participating countries responded to the survey, and most sent their responses before the seminar. The purpose of the survey was to provide both an idea of what to expect from the seminar and a preliminary data set that could be supplemented during foreign visits. Seminar The BSMIR project seminar was held in November 2013, in Espoo, Finland. Maritime search and rescue authorities and representatives of other key authorities from Baltic Sea States attended the seminar, with nine out of ten countries being represented at the event. The seminar acted as both an opening ceremony for the BSMIR project and a forum in which project experts and authorities from different countries could update their view of the Baltic Sea region's preparedness for large-scale and multisectoral maritime accidents. Before the seminar, representatives from Baltic Sea States had been asked to prepare presentations on their country's preparedness for maritime incidents. In addition to these presentations, four countries gave presentations on previously agreed special topics: handling chemical spills, preparedness in cold conditions, multisectoral cooperation between authorities during mass evacuations, and the JRCC concept. Country visits Visits were made to all of the participating countries in February March These visits, which lasted one or two days, sought to supplement the data obtained at the seminar and via the Webropol survey. As the project's mission was to create an overall picture of preparedness in the Baltic Sea region, foreign visits were used to find out how each country would handle a large-scale maritime incident with its current actors, plans and resources. The situation was examined with regard to actual preparedness on the day of the visit during a specific period in early This kept the focus as up-to-date and realistic as possible. During each visit, efforts were made to meet with a broad range of authorities involved in 34

37 handling large-scale maritime incidents. In some countries, only one authority handles maritime incidents. These visits required meetings with fewer representatives than in those countries where several authorities are involved in dealing with maritime incidents. The majority of the foreign visits followed a very similar pattern, and participating countries found these discussions to be very beneficial, including the opportunity to reflect on their own operations. Data analysis The analysis phase made use of all of the data collected during the project. As the project's goal was to produce a picture of the current situation throughout the Baltic Sea region, the analysis phase sought to create a separate picture for each country (the country-specific reports contained in this document). After that simple risk analysis was used to evaluate the overall situation in the Baltic Sea the region's greatest threats and opportunities were identified. The project's experts primarily analysed data from their own subject areas, but some analysis was also carried out as a team. The same approach has been used to draw up the country-specific situation reports; however, as the data was collected during foreign visits with varying participants and implementation models, the exact same data has not been obtained from every country. The countryspecific sections may therefore vary slightly. The fact that a certain functionality has not been presented for a country does not mean that the country has no preparedness in this area. Report writing and publication The report was written during spring 2014, and was published on 13 May The publication will be sent to both Finnish and foreign partners, and will also be published on the Internet in electronic format without the appendices (which are intended for official use only). The report has only been published in English. 35

38 8 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC REPORTS 36

39 8.1 Denmark SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Admiral Danish Fleet Headquarters Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Danish Emergency Management Agency Tactical police operations at sea National Police Emergency medical care at sea Danish Administrative Regions Coordination of chemical accident management Danish Emergency Management Agency Aeronautical SAR services Admiral Danish Fleet Headquarters Maritime search and rescue In Denmark, the Admiral Danish Fleet is responsible for maritime SAR. Denmark has one maritime search and rescue coordination centre, which is also the country's aeronautical search and rescue coordination centre: JRCC Denmark, which is located in Aarhus. Currently, Denmark still has two maritime operations centres (MOC) in Frederikshavn and Bornholm, which are able to coordinate smaller-scale maritime SAR operations under the JRCC. These two centres will, however, be closed in the near future. If a maritime SAR operation requires maritime SAR helicopters, they are always alerted through the JRCC. NETHERLANDS Denmark's Search and Rescue Region (SRR) is extremely large compared to that of many other Baltic Sea States. This is because Denmark consists of many islands and has about 4,600 kilometres of coastline in the Baltic Sea and North Sea regions. Denmark is also responsible for Greenland's extensive SRR. SAR operations in Greenland's SRR will be coordinated by the forthcoming JRCC Greenland, which will consolidate MRCC and ARCC operations in the region. Commercial and passenger traffic is very brisk in Denmark's Baltic Sea waters. In addition to maritime SAR operations, the navy also provides MAS, oil spill clean-up, and icebreaker services. As in all other Baltic Sea States, Denmark's maritime SAR system is based on international NORWAY Ålborg DENMARK COPENHAGEN Roskilde Skrydstrup GERMANY SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base SWEDEN Öland POLAND legislation. Denmark also has a separate national act on maritime search and rescue. This act states that all those engaging in maritime SAR operations do so at their own expense. Denmark has signed bilateral agreements with its neighbouring countries (Poland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK). Iceland has also signed agreements with the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which are part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The Faroe Islands are responsible for maritime SAR in their own fishing grounds even though these waters officially lie within the SRRs of Iceland and the UK. Denmark has had good experiences of cooperation with maritime SAR authorities in other countries, and there is smooth cooperation throughout the region. Danish units have been used during SAR operations in, for example, Germany's and Iceland's SRRs. Denmark has also produced both a maritime SAR plan and a description of its SAR arrangements in English these can be read on the Danish Defence Forces' website. 37

40 Denmark organises joint exercises with its neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. For several years, Denmark has been in charge of arranging the Baltic Sarex maritime SAR exercise, which is the Baltic Sea's largest annual maritime SAR exercise. Units from almost every Baltic Sea State participate in this exercise. 28 The following organisations take part in on-shore maritime SAR operations: Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Maritime Administration, Transport Agency, Aeronautical SAR services, Civil aviation authority, Emergency response centre, Navy/Army/Air Force, Voluntary associations, Environment authorities, Vessel traffic service centres, and medical helicopters. The units that engage in maritime SAR are primarily Navy and Air Force units. Three navy vessels continually patrol Denmark's Search and Rescue Region. The following also participate in multisectoral maritime incidents at sea: Emergency fire and rescue services, Aeronautical SAR services, Vessel traffic service centres, other government vessels, and medical helicopters. Denmark's maritime SAR helicopters operate under the Air Force. Denmark always has three helicopters on standby for maritime SAR. There are helicopter bases in Roskilde, Skrydstrup, and Aalborg. When wind speed is forecast to exceed 20 m/s, a helicopter is also placed on standby in Ronne, on the island of Bornholm. Denmark's maritime SAR helicopters are some of the largest in the Baltic Sea region the EH- 101 'Merlin'. Denmark has a total of 12 EH- 101 helicopters, of which eight are available for maritime SAR. Some navy vessels also carry Lynx helicopters, which can also be used in maritime SAR operations if the vessel is close to the scene of the accident. 28 In recent years, it has been debated whether responsibility for organising this exercise should rotate between Baltic Sea States. A system of rotation would enable the exercise to be held in other areas, and different regions could be used to vary the components of the exercise. Due to the upcoming closure of MRSC Bornholm, it will be very challenging to continue running the Baltic Sarex exercise in its current format. Denmark's operating models comply with the Baltic ACO manual. According to the Danish model, ACO operates out of an aircraft near the scene of the accident. The country has been actively involved in creating Baltic ACO operating models with Finland and Sweden. Denmark has also organised several international Baltic ACO courses, and will continue to do so. 29 JRCC personnel attend an annual three-day revision course, which includes exercises on dealing with a major incident. Denmark has no special preparedness for a maritime chemical spill. In addition to GMDSS systems, Denmark has a tetra radio network that is used by all authorities involved in maritime SAR Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Denmark has MIRG teams on continual standby in the event of an accident at sea. The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) is responsible for organising Denmark's MIRG operations. DEMA signs contracts with a MIRG service provider either the emergency services or Falck A/S. The content of agreements signed with different service providers is largely the same, although there may be slight variations. In accordance with the contract, DEMA supports all MIRG teams with exercises, training and the acquisition of equipment on an annual basis. 30 On-scene coordination for MIRG operations is handled by the maritime SAR agency that is, the JRCC. When operating on distress vessels, MIRG teams act in accordance with international agreements and the directions issued by the master of the vessel. MIRG teams are trained in firefighting. 29 Denmark will arrange three international ACO courses in The contracts between DEMA and its service providers also contain a separate mention of DEMA's share in the compensation for any potential damage caused by MIRG teams. DEMA is obliged to pay compensation if a MIRG team accidentally causes damage to a distress vessel's property or personnel. However, attention is always paid to conditions during the accident and exactly how the damage has occurred. 38

41 Denmark has two MIRG teams on 24/7 standby. One team is located in Copenhagen and the other in Aarhus. Both teams are available for deployment throughout Denmark's SRR, irrespective of their station s location. In accordance with agreements, the teams are also available for use in other state's SRRs. The teams mainly travel by helicopter, which limits their strength to a maximum of However, if travelling by surface vessel, the Aarhus team can number The composition of a team may vary depending on the nature of the operations and the distance from the scene of the accident, but the team's basic size is six. A separate contract for 24/7 preparedness has been signed with the DEMA. This guarantees that specially trained rescue teams will always be available to the JRCC to handle any incidents occurring at sea. 31 The teams' standby time is 'immediate', that is, team members will immediately begin transferring personnel and equipment to the designated site. In accordance with the contract signed with DEMA, MIRG teams must be ready for helicopter transportation within an hour of the alert. Emergency services are obligated to handle routine accidents on land in the manner they see most fit irrespective of whether specially trained teams have been alerted to accidents at sea or not. DEMA pays for any overtime costs incurred by the use of MIRG teams, but the emergency services is responsible for getting personnel to work. In accordance with DEMA's contracts, both stations must be able to put a second MIRG team on standby if necessary, which means that Denmark can get a total of four MIRG teams to the scene of an accident. However, there will be a delay before two of these teams arrive. As Danish rescue teams primarily transfer to the scene of an accident on dedicated maritime SAR helicopters (Merlins), they can also transport a great deal of equipment. This is because the Merlin is a medium-lift helicopter with a lift capacity of 1,000 kg. As was previously mentioned, surface vessels 31 Only the JRCC has the authority and opportunity to use MIRG teams. can also be used to travel to the scene of an accident, but only if there are special grounds for doing so. Helicopters are always the first choice for reasons of safety. All MIRG team members are equipped with immersion suits suitable for maritime SAR, automatic life jackets (SOLAS), helmets, personal locator beacons (PLB), and emergency egress devices (HEED). A rescue team's equipment is packed in (fabric) bags designed for helicopter transport and placed in premises that have signed contracts with the emergency services. The bags primarily contain personal equipment, breathing apparatus, hoses, spray pipes, adaptors, etc. equipment that may be required during a ship fire. Contact between the JRCC and MIRG teams is handled in accordance with the situation. In Denmark, tetra radio is the primary mode of communication both from the ship to the JRCC and for internal communications aboard the distress vessel. Danish MIRG teams all carry tetra radio amplifiers, which enable the use of tetra radios even within the bowels of a vessel. Teams also carry Maritime VHF and mobile phones, and possibly also satellite phones in the future. Background factors, such as distances and communication targets, affect which communication devices are used. All team members are professionals in their own fields and carry out a variety of emergency tasks in their daily work. Basic training for rescue units is conducted by organisations that have signed contracts with DEMA, that is, the emergency services or Falck A/S. Team members receive an approximately week-long basic training course for incidents at sea. The length of this training depends on the team member's task (crew/officer). The first days of the basic course are the same for both crew and officers. The basic course includes information and skills for dealing with ship fires; HUET training; winch training; survival at sea; and how to use maritime VHF. Team members take an evaluation test every year, to ascertain the team's preparedness for MIRG operations. A compulsory ship fire exercise is organised every year. An alternating annual exercise is also held one year winch training 39

42 and the following year HUET training MRO and medical care In Denmark, healthcare is a publicly funded function that is implemented by regions and municipalities. The Ministry of Health and Prevention coordinates, steers and advises actors at a national level in cooperation with the National Health Service. The ministry's most important task is to set targets for national health policy. The country's five regions are responsible for providing specialised healthcare and maintaining hospitals, while its 98 municipalities are in charge of basic healthcare. Regions are responsible for emergency medical care, using both the emergency services and private-sector service providers. Authorities' preparedness and standby capabilities are governed by the Danish Preparedness Act, which defines which authority is responsible for maintaining the different functionalities required to deal with major incidents and crises. It also governs what types of plans must be drawn up. Preparedness plans are drawn up at both national and regional levels, and clearly define different actors' roles and ranks. Joint National Operational Staff (NOST) is Denmark's national forum which is responsible for managing and coordinating major incidents and crises. Representatives of different authorities work at NOST, and it also has regional employees who are responsible for coordinating preparedness plans with local authorities. There are no separate national evacuation plans they are contained in existing plans. The locations of evacuation centres have not been determined in advance. The police are responsible for establishing evacuation centres. Local police in cooperation with other authorities, such as healthcare, are responsible for running evacuation centres. If required, healthcare authorities will organise centres for relatives. The police will also arrange telephone support services for victims' relatives if required. 32 In addition to these mandatory exercises, departments also arrange their own exercises, either independently or with other departments. 40

43 8.2 Estonia SERVICE Maritime SAR Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Tactical police operations at sea Emergency medical care at sea RESPONSIBLE PARTY Estonian Police and Border Guard Board Estonian Rescue Board Estonian Police and Border Guard Board Health Board Coordination of chemical accident management Estonian Police and Border Guard Board Aeronautical SAR services Maritime search and rescue Estonia's maritime SAR authority is the Police and Border Guard Board, which operates under the Ministry of the Interior. Estonia has a combined maritime and aeronautical search and rescue coordination centre in Tallinn (JRCC Tallinn) and a subcentre (MRSC) in Kuresaari on the island of Saarenmaa. MRSC Kuresaari coordinates standard maritime SAR operations in and around its own region, but JRCC Tallinn always coordinates more demanding operations. Estonia's maritime Search and Rescue Region is quite large in comparison to that of some other Baltic Sea States. In addition to its sea region, JRCC Tallinn also coordinates search and rescue operations in the Lake Peipsi area in the border zone between Estonia and Russia. Estonia has a total of about 1,400 kilometres of coastline. The briskest commercial and passenger traffic is to be found off the harbours of Tallinn and Paldiski. As in all other Baltic Sea States, Estonia's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. Estonia does not have a separate act on maritime search and rescue. One challenge that Estonia faces is that there is no legislation that clearly states which authority is in charge of organising maritime SAR. Estonia's Emergency Law only states that maritime and aeronautical search and rescue are important aspects of the country's emergency services. It had been clearly Estonian Police and Border Guard Board FINLAND HELSINKI Hiiumaa Saaremaa RIGA TALLINN ESTONIA LATVIA SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base RUSSIA stated in earlier versions of the law, but after the last organisational restructuring, the said clause was omitted from the amended law. Neither is there any legislation governing requirements for personnel or organisations engaging in maritime SAR. Estonia has had good experiences of SAR cooperation with its neighbouring countries, and there is smooth cooperation in the SRR's border zones. One area for development has, however, been identified: to improve information flow between Baltic Sea States during cooperation. Estonia organises annual joint exercises with its neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. Estonia also participates in, for example, the Baltic Sarex and Dynamic Mercy maritime SAR exercises, which are held in the Baltic Sea. Some of the exercises are tripartite exercises involving 41

44 Estonia-Finland-Russia and Estonia-Finland- Sweden. Estonia has made bilateral SAR arrangements with Latvia, Sweden and Finland. An agreement with Russia is currently in the pipeline. Cooperation with authorities involved in maritime SAR has been described in a maritime SAR plan, which was drawn up in The plan is very general in nature and is already outdated in many areas. However, Estonia intends to update its plan sometime during the next few years, and at the same time draw up an official Mass Rescue Operation plan. Estonia has appointed an advisory committee for maritime search and rescue services. Its task is to develop different actors' operations in situations involving multisectoral maritime SAR. The advisory committee includes representatives from all administration levels that engage in maritime SAR. When it comes to evacuation arrangements for major incidents, they are fairly functional in the Tallinn region, but it would be extremely challenging to perform an evacuation to some other harbour. An evacuation centre has been planned, but is still in the early stages of establishment and has not yet been fully equipped. Estonian authorities communicate with each other using tetra radio. JRCC Tallinn also has a tetra radio set with Finnish parameters, which can be used for communications between JRCC Tallinn and Finnish units. Voluntary rescue personnel also operate in the Baltic Sea, and they will receive tetra radios in The units engaging in maritime SAR are primarily Police and Border Guard units or volunteers. Emergency service vessels, pilot boats and tugboats can also be used when necessary. Other organisations working in the sea region are Emergency medical services, Navy, Environment authorities, and Vessel traffic services centres. The following organisations take part in on-shore maritime SAR operations: Police and Border Guard, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Maritime administration, Environment authorities, Navy, Voluntary associations, Environment authorities, and National Defense League. Estonia has at least one maritime SAR helicopter on continual standby. There are helicopter bases in Tallinn and Kuresaari. On the basis of a risk assessment, Kuresaari is only on standby for part of the year (about 40 days per year). Estonia has a total of three AW139 helicopters. Helicopter crews are familiar with the fundamentals of the Baltic ACO model, and surveillance aircraft pilots have also been trained to coordinate aerial operations in accordance with the ACO manual. Surveillance aircraft may be used as aeronautical search units or as an ACO base. JRCC personnel have been trained to coordinate both maritime and aeronautical operations. JRCC also operates in accordance with the Baltic ACO manual when several helicopters have been deployed as rescue units. In the event of an accident, the JRCC's Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC) will initially act as ACO, although the idea is for an ACO to come from the Helicopter Squadron or to coordinate operations from the air in a surveillance aircraft. Some of the JRCC's personnel have already completed Baltic ACO training, but the Estonians are keen to take part in further international ACO courses. Estonia has no separate guidelines or preparedness for chemical spills. The law does not state which authority is responsible for chemical spills at sea, but in maritime areas, the task is handled by the Police and Border Guard Board Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Estonia does not have any MIRG teams at the moment. The country is currently discussing the need for such teams and their potential establishment sometime in the future. 42

45 8.2.3 MRO and medical care Healthcare in Estonia is governed by an act that came into force on 1 January The act states that everyone within the republic of Estonia has the right to receive healthcare. The Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for coordinating emergency medical services. The ministry sets training requirements for those working in emergency medicine, and also defines what medical equipment must be carried in ambulances. In Estonia, healthcare services are provided by privatesector service providers, as is emergency medical care. There is no legislation governing healthcare operations during catastrophes. There are still great regional variations: Arrangements are clear in the Tallinn region, while operations outside Tallinn still require development. No national guidelines have been drawn up for mass evacuation, and the locations of evacuation centres have not been determined in advance. The border police is responsible for establishing evacuation centres. 43

46 8.3 Germany SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR German Maritime Search and Rescue Service (DGzRS) Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) Tactical police operations at sea Bundespolizei Emergency medical care at sea Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) Coordination of chemical accident management Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) Aeronautical SAR services German navy Maritime search and rescue The authority responsible for maritime search and rescue in Germany is DGzRS (Die Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Rettung Schiffbrüchiger). It is a voluntary organization that funds its operations entirely through donations. Due to their independence they don t want any financial support by the State. The organisation has a long history, as the DGzRS was established in NETHER- LANDS DENMARK Helgoland COPENHAGEN GERMANY BERLIN SWEDEN SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base POLAND There is one maritime search and rescue coordination centre in Germany, in Bremen (MRCC Bremen). MRCC Bremen is responsible for maritime SAR throughout Germany's Search and Rescue Region. Responsibility for search and rescue operations along river shipping routes also falls within the MRCC's scope. Germany's SRR is relatively small compared to some other Baltic Sea States, but commercial and passenger traffic is extremely brisk throughout the region. Germany's SRR extends into both the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, and the country has about 700 kilometres of coastline. One special feature of Germany's SRR is the 98-kilometre Kiel Canal, which links the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. In the North Sea, the SRR extends about 400 kilometres from land in a 'sharp spike'. Several large wind farms have also been built in Germany's SRR, and more have been planned. Organising search and rescue operations in these wind farms is extremely challenging. The Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) was established in Germany in The CCME is located in Cuxhaven, where the River Elbe drains into the North Sea. CCME's task is to take command when a larger-scale accident occurs, or at the request of the responsible authority. CCME has taken command of over 50 maritime incidents since its establishment. It also organises about 160 special exercises every year. After a rescue operation, the CCME recoups all of the costs it has incurred from the party responsible for causing the incident. CCME's personnel expenses (about 40 people) are divided between the Federation and the Lands in the area. Aeronautical search and rescue operations in Germany are coordinated by ARCC Glücksburg in Glücksburg. As in all other Baltic Sea States, Germany's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. National legislation (Federal Maritime Responsibilities Act) states that the Federation must organise maritime SAR 44

47 operations in Germany, but Germany has no separate act on maritime search and rescue. The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure is responsible for making bilateral agreements on maritime SAR. Germany has drawn up bilateral agreements on SAR arrangements with some of its neighbouring countries: the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. Germany has had good experiences of SAR cooperation with its neighbouring countries, and there is smooth cooperation in the SRR's border zones. For example, the Danish Air Force's maritime SAR helicopters have been used for search and rescue operations in Germany's SRR, and there were no failings noted in cooperation. Germany complies with international principles in its SAR operational activities: the IAMSAR manual, which is jointly published by the IMO and ICAO. Germany has not deemed it necessary to create separate procedural guidelines for maritime search and rescue, as the general principles have been considered sufficient. Excessively detailed guidelines could overly constrain coordination. Germany organises annual joint exercises with its neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. Germany also takes part in, for example, the Baltic Sarex and Dynamic Mercy maritime SAR exercises, which are held in the Baltic Sea. Germany and Denmark and Germany and the Netherlands have formed 'quick response' areas on both sides of their border zones. In the event of a maritime incident, maritime SAR units within these zones can operate in the other country's waters without obtaining a separate state vessel permit. The maritime search and rescue coordination centre mainly uses VHF radio for coordination. Germany's coastlines are equipped with a double VHF radio network, so that a disturbance at one base station will not prevent radio traffic in the area. The CCME can only coordinate operations by telephone, which could be considered a challenge. This is why the CCME always sends an OSC to the scene of an accident, to coordinate operations in the area in cooperation with the CCME. In practice, alerts are sent via the MRCC. The MRCC alerts the CCME's on-call official, who then alerts all CCME personnel that are on standby. In Germany, the CCME is also responsible for environmental surveillance using its own fleet of aircraft flown by navy pilots. Cooperation between authorities engaging in maritime search and rescue is considered to be very effective, even though arrangements differ from those of other countries. Germany has drawn up a separate maritime search and rescue plan that covers different authorities' operations during a maritime incident. For example, the emergency services handle search and rescue operations in river areas. Operations during major incidents can be divided into subsections. For example, in the event of a ship fire, MRCC Bremen would be in charge of maritime SAR, while the CCME would be in charge of firefighting. In such situations, the MRCC always sends a liaison officer to the CCME's premises in Cuxhaven. Under the threat of a major incident, the CCME may choose to take command itself. However, another authority will generally ask the CCME to take command. Even when the CCME is in command, the SMC still coordinates maritime SAR from MRCC Bremen. If the MRCC requires a helicopter during a major incident for example, to evacuate people rescued from the water it must request one from the CCME, which legally holds overall responsibility for search and rescue operations. According to law, if the CCME has decided to bring a distress vessel to a port of refuge, harbour authorities cannot refuse to receive the vessel in their harbour. The following German organisations take part in on-shore maritime SAR operations: Border Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Maritime administration, Aeronautical SAR Services, Civil aviation authority, Army, Emergency response centre, Voluntary fire department, Environment authorities, Vessel traffic service centres and medical helicopters. 45

48 The units engaging in maritime SAR are primarily emergency service units or volunteers. The CCME has also signed contracts with various actors concerning the use of rescue units. Examples of these include a contract for the use of a Dutch tugboat near the SRR border, and a contract with a private helicopter company for transferring CCME personnel to a distress vessel. Other maritime actors are: Border Police, medical services, Maritime administration, Aeronautical SAR Services, Civil aviation authority, Navy, Emergency response centre, Voluntary fire department, Tugboats, Environment authorities, Vessel traffic service centres, maritime pilots, buoy tenders, and medical helicopters. Recently, Germany has been experiencing challenges in ensuring that maritime SAR helicopters are on standby in its SRR. In practice, there is only one navy helicopter on standby in Helgoland. If required and if it is available the German Association of the Automotive Industry's helicopter (EC-135) may also be used. Germany has a strong desire to clarify its helicopter operations in the near future. Germany complies with the Baltic ACO manual, and ARSC Glücksburg leads ACO operations. Navy personnel who are familiar with Baltic ACO operating models work at the centre. The maritime search and rescue coordination centre's personnel are also familiar with Baltic ACO operating principles. Previous and forthcoming international courses on Baltic ACO operating models are considered beneficial. Germany does not have separate guidelines for maritime chemical spills. The accident that led to the creation of the CCME was the stranding of the cargo vessel M/V PALLAS on 25 October The ship had caught fire during stormy weather a few days previously, and finally ran aground (was stranded) near the island of Amrum. In addition to a burning cargo of timber, the ship was also carrying fuel oil and diesel oil that eventually reached the nearby shore and the island's beaches, where it caused damage to fauna. Cleaning up the 50 cubic metres of oil that had leaked into the sea posed great difficulty for the German authorities. After the accident, an investigatory committee was appointed to investigate the authorities' operations during the incident. In its "Grobecker Report", the investigatory committee presented recommendations to improve emergency management response. For example, the investigatory committee suggested establishing a separate central command to handle major maritime incidents. The CCME was established on the basis of the report in 2003, as a joint body of the Federal administration and coastal States Emergency fire and rescue services at sea The CCME is responsible for organising MIRG operations 33 in Germany's SRR. The CCME signs agreements on MIRG service provision with the Lands. The Lands then sign agreements with the emergency services. In this way, the CCME does not directly sign contracts with the emergency services or any other authorities associated with MIRG operations. The content of these agreements is largely the same, although there may be slight variations. The CCME and the contractual Lands are responsible for the expenses incurred by their partner authorities (the emergency services) from MIRG-related training and exercises. The emergency services are obligated to handle basic training, such as smoke diving, cleaning up hazardous substances, and communications. The CCME budgets a considerable sum of money for training and exercises every year. The CCME compensates its contractual partners for all of the hours and expenses incurred by responding to alerts. The CCME takes command of MIRG operations when an incident is sufficiently large-scale; at a partner's request (for example, the MRCC); 33 In Germany, maritime fire and rescue services are not referred to as MIRG services, even though they are largely comparable to MIRG services. 46

49 or if the CCME believes that the incident may escalate to a sufficiently great extent. During incidents in which the CCME takes command, its own 24/7 coordination centre, Maritime Reporting and Assessment Centre (MEREC), is responsible for the first 45 minutes of operations. During these 45 minutes, the CCME convenes and begins coordination. When the CCME has been established, command transfers from the MEREC to the CCME. Germany has two types of rescue teams on continual standby in the event of an accident at sea. The first type of rescue team is on standby for a variety of operations requiring emergency medical care, while the other deal with incidents involving hazardous substances, fires, and technical rescues at sea. Germany is also currently training another team that will specialise in incidents occurring on its wind farms. The team is not yet ready for operational duties, but will be in the near future. Germany has a total of 13 stations on standby for rescue operations: Six (6) of these are in the Baltic Sea region (Flensburg, Kiel, Lubeck, Wismar/Schwerin, Rostock, Stralsund) and seven (7) are in the North Sea region (Emden, Wilhemshaven, Bremen, Bremenhaven, Cuxhaven, Hamburg, BrunsButtel). All teams are, however, available in all regions irrespective of their station's location. All stations in the Baltic Sea region have one MIRG unit available, so the Baltic Sea has a total of six teams. Stations in the North Sea region mainly have one MIRG team available, with the exception of Hamburg, which has two. There are therefore a total of seven (7) teams in the North Sea region, and a total of thirteen (13) teams on standby throughout Germany. All of the teams are on 24/7 standby, 34 and a separate 24/7 standby contract has been signed with the CCME. This contract guarantees that, in the event of a accident 34 'Immediate standby' means that team members will immediately begin transferring personnel and equipment to the designated site. However, it always takes time to transfer personnel and equipment, so the real standby time is difficult to evaluate. It depends on a number of factors, such as the location of the incident, the equipment required, and the number of personnel required. at sea, the CCME will always have specially trained rescue teams available primarily for its own use. Emergency services are obligated to handle routine accidents in the manner they see most fit, irrespective of whether specially trained teams have been alerted to accidents at sea or not. In order to ensure that contractual obligations can be fulfilled, approximately 1,000 people have been trained for maritime operations in Germany. This large number of trained personnel enables Germany to maintain 13 teams on standby. A rescue team's size is 1+1+8=10. Each team consists of one (1+0+0) fire officer, one (0+1+0) sub officer, and eight (8) MIRG team members. Germany's rescue teams primarily transfer to the scene of an accident in dedicated SAR surface vessels. Helicopters can also be used, if one can be alerted to SAR operations. Although Germany currently has difficulty in transferring its teams by helicopter, the option is not excluded, but rather evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Germany's specialised SAR vessels can be pressurised, which enables them to sail right up to a wreck, even if hazardous substances may be leaking into the air. Rescue teams are thus able to carry out a reconnaissance mission (measurement) and, if required, also self-directed decontamination. All team members are equipped with immersion suits suitable for maritime SAR, automatic life jackets (SOLAS), helmets, and personal locator beacons (PLB). Rescue teams' equipment is stored in specially designed containers in premises that have signed contracts with the emergency services. The containers hold equipment for fires, technical rescues, and incidents involving hazardous substances. The containers are the size of a small sea container, so it can hold a great deal of specialised equipment. The equipment can also be placed in specially designed helicopter baskets. This enables equipment to be transported by air, either by crane or helicopter. One speciality in Germany is the opportunity to transport a COBRA extinguisher system to the scene of 47

50 an accident. There are a total of three COBRA systems. Two of these have a specially designed extinguisher nozzle that enables them to be used in confined spaces. Contact between rescue teams and the CCME is maintained using Maritime VHF (own, vessel's), mobile phones or satellite phones. Germany has a backup maritime VHF network along its coastlines to support the MRCC. As stated above, basic training for rescue units is conducted by the contracted emergency services. Team members receive hours of basic training for accidents at sea. The length of this training depends on the team member's task (crew/officer). After the basic course, the emergency services organise exercises for team members in cooperation with the CCME. As stated above, the CCME organises an average of about 160 exercises every year, so there is plenty of opportunity to practise. The exercises are either internal (within the team) or joint exercises. There are no obligatory annual exercises, even though they are organised. However, team members must take further training every 3 5 years. The emergency services ensure that all personnel take further training every 3 5 years, in order to guarantee that a sufficient level of expertise in maritime SAR is being maintained MRO and medical care Germany's healthcare is based on cooperation between the Federation, Lands, and independent service providers. The Federation's task is to act as a senior legislator, to define the basic principles of health insurance and patients' rights, and to monitor their implementation. In the event of a major maritime incident, the CCME coordinates emergency medical care. Those in charge of providing medical care are also called to the CCME to coordinate the situation. The emergency medical team's size is It consists of a coordinating emergency medicine physician (1+0+0) (the fire officer), an emergency medicine physician (0+1+0) (the sub officer), and an emergency medical team (0+0+4), at least one of whom is a paramedic. The remaining team members are also specialised in emergency medicine and their task is to follow the emergency medicine physician's instructions. The emergency medical team's tasks are to give life-saving treatment aboard the distress vessel, classify patients, and evacuate the vessel. Four (4) of the stations in the Baltic Sea region have emergency medical teams available (Flensburg, Kiel, Lubeck, Rostock). Each station has one team on standby, that is, a total of four (4) teams. The North Sea region has emergency medical teams available at three (3) stations (Bremen, Cuxhaven, Hamburg). Bremen is able to offer two (2) teams, Cuxhaven one (1), and Hamburg three (3). Therefore there are a total of seven (7) teams in the North Sea region, making a total of eleven (11) emergency medical teams on immediate standby throughout Germany. The emergency medical teams' equipment is placed in specially designed bags, which are stored at the teams' stations. The competence of emergency medical units is governed by separate acts and statutes on healthcare, but every member of the team carries out healthcare tasks during their daily work, thereby ensuring their professional competence. Like rescue team members, emergency medical team members also receive special training for incidents at sea. In the event of a major maritime incident, the CCME is in charge of establishing evacuation centres in cooperation with the local emergency services. Germany has a national plan for mass evacuation, and also has preplanned locations for evacuation centres. An emergency medical team for major maritime incidents works under the CCME. 48

51 8.4 Iceland SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Icelandic Coast Guard Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Icelandic Coast Guard/Capital City Fire Department Tactical police operations at sea Police Emergency medical care at sea Directorate of Health Coordination of chemical accident management Icelandic Coast Guard Aeronautical SAR services Icelandic Coast Guard Maritime search and rescue Iceland's maritime search and rescue authority is the Icelandic Coast Guard, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior. Iceland has one maritime search and rescue coordination centre, which is also an aeronautical search and rescue coordination centre: JRCC Iceland, which is located in Reykjavik. The JRCC is responsible for coordinating all maritime and aeronautical search and rescue operations, while the police are responsible for search and rescue operations on land. REYKJAVIK ICELAND Faroe Islands UNITED KINGDOM SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base NORWAY Iceland has a very extensive maritime Search and Rescue Region. To get an idea of its relative size, the area of Iceland's SRR is 20 times greater than the area of Iceland itself. One challenge for maritime SAR is the fact that Iceland is an island nation whose closest neighbours are a several-hour flight away. Iceland has about 4,900 kilometres of coastline. Commercial and passenger vessel traffic is quite brisk in Iceland's SRR, and many fishing vessels also operate in Iceland's waters. As in the Baltic Sea States, Iceland's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. Iceland does not have a separate act on maritime search and rescue, but the Act on the Icelandic Coast Guard governs the Coast Guard, which is responsible for maritime SAR. When it comes to responsibility, Icelandic law also states that if a distress vessel has run aground (as the Costa Concordia did in Italy), the police are in charge, not the maritime search and rescue authority. Iceland has drawn up bilateral cooperation agreements with Norway and Denmark. The country also cooperates with Canada and the UK, which are also its Search and Rescue Region neighbours. Although the Faroe Islands lie within Iceland's SRR, the Faroe Islands have decided to take responsibility for maritime SAR in their fishing grounds. The Faroe Islands have two private helicopters that can be used for maritime SAR. Iceland has drawn up Memoranda of Cooperation with Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Cooperation with maritime search and rescue authorities in other countries is smooth, although there is still room for development. Due to its remote location, it's probable that, were Iceland to request assistance from neighbouring authorities, units would come from Greenland, the Faroe Islands or Norway. Iceland is also actively involved in cooperation on exercises in the Arctic region. Many national 49

52 exercises between authorities and voluntary organisations are also arranged in Iceland. Inter-authority cooperation is more important in Iceland than in other countries, as external assistance would take time to arrive and Iceland must therefore conduct even the most demanding of search and rescue operations primarily using its national resources. One unusual feature in Iceland is that the same building houses the JRCC, 112 emergency centre, police command centre, Icelandic Maritime Traffic Service, and the National Crisis Centre/Incident Command Post. There is a backup centre for all these organisations in the city of Akureyr in northern Iceland. Iceland has drawn up a national plan that includes, for example, the location of evacuation centres. The plan also covers different authorities' tasks and responsibilities in a variety of search and rescue operations. Iceland has made good provisions for a variety of crisis situations. There is a natural reason for this level of preparedness: Iceland experiences exceptional events on an annual basis. These can be earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, major accidents, or other demanding rescue situations. The JRCC monitors rescue units from the maritime search and rescue coordination centre as AIS targets. In Iceland, all boats and ships must use AIS transmitters when engaging in commercial activities. This is why, for example, fishing vessels must be equipped with AIS transmitters. The following organisations take part in onshore maritime SAR operations: Coast Guard, Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Transport Agency, Aeronautical SAR services, Emergency response centre, Voluntary associations, Environment authorities, and Vessel traffic services. When comparing Icelandic authorities to those in other countries, the greatest difference is that Iceland does not have its own army. The units engaging in maritime SAR are primarily Coast Guard units or volunteers. Volunteers come from ICE-SAR, which coordinates voluntary operations in both maritime and on-land search and rescue operations. Other actors in major incidents at sea are: Police, Emergency Fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, volunteer associations, tugboats, and Environment authorities. In Iceland, maritime SAR helicopters work under the Coast Guard. Iceland has three helicopters, two of which are on continual standby. The helicopter base is in Reykjavik, and the helicopters are Super Pumas. Search operations can also utilise the Coast Guard's Dash 8 surveillance plane, which can drop a life raft to persons in distress. As Iceland has such an extensive SRR, there are usually good grounds to use an aeroplane instead of a helicopter, due to the latter's shorter range (an operating period of about 4.5 hours). Iceland does not adhere to the Baltic ACO manual, and maritime SAR personnel are not familiar with its operating models. The Icelandic Coast Guard is responsible for dealing with chemical spills at sea. However, no separate preparedness guidelines have been drawn up for chemical spills. From Iceland's perspective, cooperation on the use of aircraft in particular could be enhanced in the North Atlantic region; and when it comes to planning, MRO preparedness could also be improved. A browser-based online application should be developed to facilitate coordination, training and information sharing with regard to various maritime SAR resources. The application could be used to find information about helicopters on standby for maritime SAR operations, or a national contact point through which resources could be alerted. A tetra radio network covers the whole of Iceland and is used for communications between all those engaging in search and rescue operations both authorities and volunteers. A GSM network also covers almost all of Iceland's landmass. 50

53 8.4.2 Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Iceland does not currently have any separately appointed rescue teams from fire and rescue services that are specially trained in maritime operations. The emergency services can and wants to deploy firefighters to extinguish, for example, a ship fire, but they will not necessarily have sufficient safety training to undertake the task aboard a distress vessel. Emergency service personnel have received training in maritime safety, and also some training in extinguishing ship fires, but they completely lack, for example, HUET training, which is a vital aspect of working with helicopters. Training emergency service personnel as MIRG team members would not necessarily require much additional training or equipment. However, the problem is that some of the required training cannot currently be organised in Iceland. 35 If the emergency services decide to send rescue personnel to a distress vessel at sea, they have guidelines on how to provide reinforcements for their stations, so that routine incidents can still be handled in accordance with guidelines and norms. Rescue teams can transfer to a distress vessel on Super Puma helicopters equipped for maritime SAR. These helicopters are currently equipped for emergency medical tasks, which could slightly delay the transfer of rescue teams to a distress vessel. 36 Teams can also be sent to a distress vessel using, for example, a Coast Guard surface vessel, but all decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. ICE-SAR's vessels are intended for maritime SAR and can also be used to transport rescue teams to a target. Cooperation and communications between rescue personnel primarily are handled via tetra radio or, if necessary at sea, also Maritime VHF radio. However, everything depends on the location of the distress vessel, the type of incident, and the locations of rescue personnel aboard the ship. When it comes to ship fires, it's worth mentioning ICE-SAR's training vessel, which is designed for holding basic and specialised courses in maritime safety. The ship is moored in Reykjavik. Every year, it is used to train hundreds of people in the correct way to deal with a ship fire. Maritime safety courses are mandatory for all those involved in commercial activities at sea, and a course must be taken at least every five years. Thanks to these courses, Iceland's seafarers probably have better-than-average skills and knowledge on how to deal with a variety of incidents on ships. This type of knowledge and expertise significantly reduces the probability of a larger-scale incident occurring. These courses do not, of course, preclude the occurrence of an incident that would require the expertise of MIRG teams. However, they do help to reduce the costs incurred by accidents and prevent the escalation of incidents, as the ship's crew will have been trained in, for example, the proper way to deal with a ship fire MRO and medical care The State is responsible for providing all social and healthcare services. Emergency medical services are provided by the emergency services, which are state service providers. There are no private service providers operating in healthcare. Reykjavik has two major hospitals providing specialised healthcare. Iceland also has a major hospital in Akureyr, but this does not treat those requiring specialised care. On-land emergency medical care is provided by the emergency services. Iceland has 78 ambulances, of which 14 operate in the 35 As Iceland does not currently have a HUET simulator, personnel would have to take their training abroad, which would prove very expensive. 36 Emergency medical equipment must first be removed from the helicopter to create enough room for the rescue team. 51

54 Reykjavik region. There is also an ambulance plane stationed in Akureyr, and this is used to transfer patients to Reykjavik's hospitals. Voluntary organisations play an important role in supplementing the emergency medical care provided by the emergency services. They act as first response assistants, particularly outside major urban areas. and attempts to keep two of them on 24/7 standby. Helicopter crews consist of two pilots, a wincher, a surface rescuer, and a physician. Helicopters handle SAR, MEDEVAC and HEMS tasks in both land and sea areas. The on-board physician also handles medical consultations from vessels, and decides whether to travel to the scene. Emergency medical care at sea is the responsibility of the Coast Guard. All of the Coast Guard's vessels can treat patients, and their crews are competent first responders. The Coast Guard has three helicopters, 52

55 8.5 Latvia SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Latvian Naval Forces, Coast Guard Service Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Latvian Naval Forces, Coast Guard Service + State Fire and Rescue Service Tactical police operations at sea Latvian Naval Forces, Coast Guard Service Emergency medical care at sea Latvian Naval Forces, Coast Guard Service, Air Forces + Emergency medical service Coordination of chemical accident management Latvian Naval Forces, Coast Guard Service Aeronautical SAR services Civil aviation agency SWEDEN Gotland Saaremaa RIGA ESTONIA LATVIA RUSSIA SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base Maritime search and rescue LITHUANIA In Latvia, the Navy's Coast Guard Service is responsible for maritime SAR and environmental clean ups in sea areas. Latvia's Search and Rescue Region contains one maritime search and rescue coordination centre, which is located in Riga (MRCC Riga). MRCC Riga is responsible for maritime SAR throughout the SRR. Latvia has 531 kilometres of coastline. Latvia's SRR is relatively small in comparison to that of some other Baltic Sea States. However, it should be noted that Baltic Sea traffic sailing from the Denmark Strait to ports in the Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Bothnia pass through Latvia's SRR. The briskest commercial and passenger traffic is to be found in the ports of Riga, Ventspils and Liepaja. The risk of an accident involving a ship is particularly great in the narrow Irbe Strait, which leads to the Gulf of Riga The Bahamian passenger ship 'Mona Lisa' ran aground in the Irbe Strait in The ship was carrying 1,138 passengers, and there were no injuries. BELARUS ARCC Riga, located in Riga, coordinates aeronautical search and rescue operations in Latvia. Latvia is currently debating which authority should be responsible for aeronautical search and rescue operations. It is therefore possible that the authority responsible for aeronautical search and rescue may change in the near future. MRCC Riga is one alternative. As in all other Baltic Sea States, Latvia's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. Maritime SAR in Latvia is governed by both the Law of Maritime Administration and Maritime Safety and the Law of National Armed Forces. Latvia has made bilateral SAR arrangements with its neighbouring countries: Lithuania, Sweden and Estonia. The agreements were signed between 1999 and Bilateral agreements are considered useful and beneficial. Agreements and successful cooperation foster trust in the event of a major incident, assistance will be received from neighbouring countries when required. 53

56 Latvia has had good experiences of SAR cooperation with its neighbouring countries, and there is smooth cooperation in the SRR's border zones. One area for development has, however, been identified: to improve information flow between Baltic Sea States during cooperation. Information about courses and training does not always reach the responsible authority. Even if information is sent to the country in question, it may be sent to the wrong organisation and not passed on. Latvia's maritime SAR authorities organise annual joint exercises with neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. Latvia also takes part in, for example, the Baltic Sarex and Dynamic Mercy maritime SAR exercises, which are held in the Baltic Sea. Latvia complies with international principles in its SAR operational activities: the IAMSAR manual, which is jointly published by the IMO and ICAO. Cooperation between authorities engaging in maritime SAR is based on a maritime SAR plan. This plan has been signed by both ministers and the commanders of various organisations (such as the Border Guard), and covers how different authorities should participate in maritime SAR operations. 38 Latvia also has a separate Civil Protection Plan, which contains arrangements for onshore operations and evacuation centres. The following organisations work in maritime SAR at sea: Navy/Coast Guard, Border Guard, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Maritime administration, Vessel traffic service centres, icebreakers, tugboats, maritime pilots, and other government vessels. The following organisations take part in onshore maritime SAR operations: Navy/Coast Guard, Border Guard, Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Maritime administration, Environment authorities, and Vessel traffic service centres. Latvia can also use tetra radio for interauthority communications. Although Maritime VHF is primarily used in maritime SAR, one talk group (for the MRCC) has been established in the tetra network. The units engaging in maritime SAR are primarily Navy units. Some of the Border Guard's units are also employed, but their use is hindered by limited standby times. Latvia has one Air Force helicopter on continual standby at a base about 40 kilometres southeast of Riga. It takes about 40 minutes to fly to waters off Liepaja (in the Baltic Sea). Latvia's helicopters are MI-8s. Latvia is familiar with the Baltic ACO manual. The country is currently developing ACO operations to cover both helicopter pilots and maritime search and rescue coordination centre personnel. Helicopter crews have taken part in international training in Denmark, and maritime search and rescue coordination centre personnel will be taking a course in The Latvians are interested in taking further international Baltic ACO courses. Latvia is currently drawing up a plan for maritime chemical spills. 38 The maritime SAR plan runs to about 120 pages and, for example, states that tugboats operate for free in maritime search and rescue. 54

57 8.5.2 Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Latvia uses the term 'MIRG' to refer to teams that clean up oil and chemical spills on the coast. The navy has three teams trained for coastal operations. All of the teams are currently based in Riga, but the idea is to spread them out near the country's major ports of Riga, Liepaja and Ventspils in the near future. Each team is equipped with a new, modern truck containing equipment for both oil and chemical clean ups MRO and medical care Riga has an effective, modern emergency medical care service that has been vigorously developed in recent years with EU funding. Due to a lack of time, it has not been possible for this project to get better acquainted with how the above-mentioned service operates during MROs. Latvia does not have any MIRG teams as defined by the IAMSAR manual, but it can use any navy equipment and personnel that are suitable for these kinds of operations. 55

58 8.6 Lithuania SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Lithuanian Navy / MRCC Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Lithuanian Navy / MRCC Tactical police operations at sea Police Emergency medical care at sea Lithuanian Navy / MRCC Coordination of chemical accident management No designated responsible party (Coordination will be made by Lithuanian Navy / MRCC) Aeronautical SAR services Lithuanian Navy / MRCC Palanga LATVIA LITHUANIA RUSSIA VILNIUS POLAND BELARUS SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base Maritime search and rescue Lithuania's general arrangements for maritime SAR last changed at the beginning of 2009, and since then the Lithuanian Navy has been the country's maritime search and rescue authority. Lithuania has one maritime search and rescue coordination centre, which is located in Klaipeda (MRCC Klaipeda). MRCC Klaipeda is responsible for Lithuania's entire Search and Rescue Region. One exception to this is the Curonian lagoon region, where the Border Guard is responsible for search and rescue operations. Port authorities are likewise responsible for any search and rescue operations and oil spill clean-ups in harbour areas. Lithuania's SRR is relatively small in comparison to that of many other Baltic Sea States. Lithuania has only 97 kilometres of coastline. However, its SRR extends 198 kilometres out to sea, so operations on the SRR's perimeter pose challenges for maritime SAR operations and preparedness. The briskest commercial and passenger vessel traffic is to be found on routes leading from the Port of Klaipeda to the Denmark Strait. Aeronautical search and rescue in Lithuania is coordinated from ARCC Vilna, which is located in Vilnius. As in all the other Baltic Sea States, Lithuania's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. The country has no separate act on maritime search and rescue. Lithuania has made bilateral SAR arrangements with its neighbouring countries: Latvia, Russia and Sweden. All these agreements were drawn up in the 2000s. Lithuania has had good experiences of cooperation with, among others, Swedish maritime SAR authorities, and SAR cooperation has been smooth in the SRR's border zones. For example, during one maritime SAR operation, a Swedish patrol boat was used to evacuate a person from a pleasure boat, as adverse weather conditions prevented the Lithuanian helicopter from performing the task. One special feature of Lithuania's SRR is an oil unloading buoy located in the north of the region. This buoy is also shown on nautical charts. It unloads the oil shipped in by tankers, and the oil is then piped back to on-land production 56

59 facilities. Although the buoy is marked on nautical charts, the oil company's tugboat continually patrols the area to increase safety and help tankers to unload their cargoes. The oil company's tugboat is also on continual standby for use as a maritime SAR unit. Lithuania complies with international principles in its SAR operational activities: the IAMSAR manual, which is jointly published by the IMO and ICAO. Lithuania's maritime SAR authorities organise annual joint exercises with neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. Lithuania also takes part in, for example, the Baltic Sarex and Dynamic Mercy maritime SAR exercises, which are held in the Baltic Sea. Cooperation with authorities involved in maritime SAR has been described in a maritime SAR plan that was approved in This plan covers how different authorities should participate in maritime SAR. In 2013, Lithuania conducted an evacuation exercise to practise the evacuation of a passenger ship and search and rescue operations on board a distress vessel. In 2014, the Navy will lead a larger maritime SAR exercise aboard a passenger ship. Exercises will include transferring a team to the distress vessel by helicopter. During the exercise, municipal authorities will be responsible for establishing on-shore evacuation centres. This is the first time that on-shore maritime SAR operations have been practised in Lithuania. The exercise seeks to practise MROs, which have not yet been planned in very great detail. 39 The following organisations take part in on-shore maritime SAR: Navy, Border Guard, Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Transport agency, and Environment authorities. The surface vessel units engaging in maritime SAR are mainly Navy, Border Guard and port authority units, and pilot boats. Several vessels owned by private companies (mainly tugboats) can be used as maritime SAR units when necessary. The Air Force's MI-8 helicopters can be used as aeronautical SAR units. The helicopter base is near the Palanga airport. The base usually has two MI-8 helicopters on standby. The Air Force has a total of six helicopters available for maritime SAR. Helicopter crews also include at least one person trained in emergency medical care. The Border Guard also has helicopters (EC-135 and EC-137) on standby at its own base in Vilnius. However, as they are stationed quite a distance from Lithuania's maritime SRR, it is not really beneficial to use them for maritime SAR. The Lithuanian Air Force has ordered three new Eurocopter AS365 N3 Dauphin maritime SAR helicopters, and they are expected to be available for duty during On their introduction, the older MI-8s will be retired from service. Lithuania is unfamiliar with the Baltic ACO manual. However, Air Force helicopter pilots have taken a brief look at the manual and found the guidelines beneficial. Lithuania's aeronautical search and rescue operations are based on IAMSAR guidelines, which are based on the same principles as the Baltic ACO. Lithuania's representatives were very interested in Baltic ACO operating models, especially as they will most likely become part of the IAMSAR manual. Lithuania does not have any real preparedness for maritime chemical spills. 39 The BSMIR visit to Lithuania was used as a launch meeting for this exercise. 57

60 8.6.2 Emergency fire and rescue services at sea In Lithuania, the Navy's Damage Control (DC) assistance teams can be used during maritime incidents. DC teams are vaguely comparable to MIRG teams. The teams conduct clean-ups, extinguish fires, provide emergency medical care, and take part in evacuations. The teams are on 24/7 standby in one-hour readiness. In 2013, these teams assisted with firefighting on a fishing vessel during the Navy's SAR exercise. These teams will also be transferred to a distress vessel by helicopter during the 2014 exercise. As municipal authorities are responsible for establishing on-shore evacuation centres, practising this is one of the objectives of the 2014 exercise. 58

61 8.7 Norway SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Ministry of Justice and Public Security Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) Tactical police operations at sea Police Emergency medical care at sea Norwegian Directorate of Health Coordination of chemical accident management Coastal Administration Aeronautical SAR services The Ministry of Justice and Public Security Svalbard Lakselv (Banak) SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base RUSSIA Bodø NORWAY Ørland SWEDEN FINLAND Florø OSLO Aland Islands HELSINKI Stavanger (Sola) Rygge STOCKHOLM Hiiumaa Saaremaa TALLINN ESTONIA RUSSIA DENMARK Öland Gotland RIGA LATVIA Maritime search and rescue In Norway, two independent joint search and rescue coordination centres (JRCC) are responsible for maritime SAR under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. These are JRCC South Norway in Sola near Stavanger, and JRCC North Norway in Bodo. The JRCCs operate out of the same buildings as, and in neighbouring premises to, Rogaland Radio and Bodo Radio. In addition to other tasks, these coastal radio stations are responsible for radio traffic in Norway's Search and Rescue Region. The JRCCs are responsible for both maritime and aeronautical search and rescue in their SRRs. They also coordinate on-land rescue, responsibility for which is mainly held by local Rescue Sub Centres (RSC). Norway has 28 of these smaller on-land Rescue Sub Centres. Search and rescue operations are mainly coordinated in one of three ways: by an On-scene Coordinator, RSC, or JRCC. The majority of on-land rescue operations are coordinated from an RSC by 59

62 Planning on-shore operations falls under the scope of the civil contingencies plan. The following organisations take part in onthe local police. RSCs always coordinate on-land rescue operations unless a JRCC decides to take command. Command can be transferred in the event of, for example, a demanding incident, an incident requiring international cooperation, or an incident of long duration. The RSCs always keep the JRCC informed of their operations and whether or not they require any aeronautical units or other assistance from the JRCC. The JRCC is usually always in charge of maritime incidents, aeronautical accidents, and incidents involving oil drilling platforms and comparable structures. A coordinator can be sent to the scene of incidents at sea, usually to take charge of search operations. The On-scene Coordinator is usually a Navy officer or the master of a Coast Guard vessel. Although Norway's coordination methods vary greatly to those used in other countries in the Baltic Sea region, Norway considers its operating models to be the most resourceand cost-effective for maritime, aviation, and on-land accidents for Norway. The JRCCs can also act as backup centres for each other. According to this plan, one JRCC can take command of the entire country while the other JRCC is committed to coordinating a demanding major incident. Norway's national maritime SAR plan includes a clause stating that the JRCCs can act as backups for each other when necessary. All on-call JRCC personnel have been trained to coordinate SAR for both maritime and aeronautical accidents. Norway's SRR is extremely large in comparison to that of other Baltic Sea States. Norway has about 2,650 kilometres of coastline, but it should be noted that Norway's SRR extends all the way to the North Pole and includes the Svalbard region. Norway's SRR is also unusually challenging compared to other SRRs. In addition to great distances, challenging ice conditions in Arctic regions in particular place additional demands on both equipment and search and rescue personnel. Communications are also extremely challenging in northern zones, as satellite cover only extends to the 75th parallel. Marine traffic is quite brisk throughout Norway's coastal regions, and even in Arctic regions there is a lot of cruise ship and fishing industry traffic. Norway's oil and gas industry also employs thousands of people on oil and gas drilling platforms all year round. As in the Baltic Sea States, Norway's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. The police, rescue authorities and JRCCs all work under the auspices of the same ministry. Norway does not have a separate act on maritime search and rescue, but Section 27 of the Police Act states that: when someone is in distress, the police must launch search and rescue operations until another organisation takes charge. This means that, in theory, the police is always in charge. However, this is not always the case in practice, as there is very smooth cooperation between authorities and operations are coordinated by the authority best qualified to handle the task at hand. Norway has signed bilateral agreements on maritime SAR arrangements with some of its neighbouring countries: Iceland, Sweden, Denmark and Russia. Norway has had good experiences of SAR cooperation with its neighbouring countries, and there is smooth cooperation in the SRR's border zones. Cooperation with Russia (MRCC Murmansk) is extremely smooth in northern areas where maritime SAR is often very demanding. Due to demanding weather conditions, Norwegian helicopters have also been used for search and rescue operations in Finland and Sweden's SRRs. Norway complies with international principles in its SAR operational activities: the IAMSAR manual, which is jointly published by the IMO and ICAO. Norway organises annual joint exercises with its neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. The country is also actively involved in the Arctic Council and other cooperation in the Arctic region. 60

63 shore maritime SAR: Police, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Transport agency, Emergency response centre, Voluntary associations, and medical helicopters. JRCC personnel audit all RSCs. The audits seek to ensure that RSCs have internalised standard operational procedures and are able to comply with them. The JRCCs do not, however, have administrative control of the RSCs, as the RSCs are part of the police. The JRCCs are responsible for supervising the RSC's operations. During a major incident, JRCCs use professional journalists to release information to the public. The journalists are called to the centre and are responsible for releasing information in cooperation with the person in charge of external communications. Voluntary organisations play an important role in maritime SAR in Norway's SRR. About half of all maritime SAR operations are handled by volunteer units. Other significant surface units come from the Coast Guard, Navy, and emergency services. The aeronautical units used in maritime SAR are primarily the Air Force s Westland Sea King helicopters. There are permanent on-land helicopter bases in five locations: Rygge, Sola, Ørland, Bodo, and Banak. A sixth helicopter is also regularly on rotating standby in Florø. The Air Force has a total of 12 Sea King helicopters available for maritime SAR. Two maritime SAR helicopters operate in the Svalbard region, one of which is a Dauphin SA 365 and the other a Super Puma. These two helicopters are operated by a private helicopter company. By the end of the decade, the Sea King helicopters will be replaced by new AW-101 maritime SAR helicopters, which are similar to those used by the Danish Air Force. At the same time, the helicopters operating in Svalbard will be replaced by two Super Pumas. In addition to these helicopters, helicopters on the SRR's oil drilling platforms can also be used for search and rescue operations, but an agreed sum must be paid in compensation for their use. JRCC personnel have participated in Baltic ACO training, and Norway intends to introduce Baltic ACO-compliant operations in the future. JRCC South Norway is responsible for planning and coordinating ACO operations. The Norwegians are interested in taking part in further international Baltic ACO courses. Norway is preparing to introduce a tetra radio network during 2015, after which all authorities involved in search and rescue operations will switch to using tetra radio. Norway does not have a separate plan for chemical spills. The emergency services have established chemical teams in Bergen and Oslo, and they can also be used during maritime incidents. To date, Norway has no practical experience of using these teams nor of their effectiveness Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Norway has MIRG teams on continual standby in the event of an incident at sea. The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) is responsible for organising MIRG operations in Norway's SRR. The DSB signs contracts with the emergency services for the provision of MIRG services. The content of these agreements is largely the same, although there may be small variations. In accordance with the contract, the DSB provides annual financial support for MIRG training and the acquisition of MIRG equipment. The emergency services may decide to use these funds however they wish, but they are contractually obliged to provide MIRG services on 24/7 standby. This ensures that the JRCCs always have specially trained rescue teams primarily at their disposal in the event of a maritime incident. 40 The emergency services are legally obliged to launch MIRG operations in their own areas of responsibility (in close proximity to the 40 Emergency services are obligated to handle routine on-land incidents in the manner they see most fit irrespective of whether specially trained teams have been alerted to incidents at sea or not. 61

64 shore). However, not all emergency services have MIRG expertise or on-call teams. MIRG stations that have signed contracts with the DSB will support these stations with specially trained units. On-site responsibility for MIRG operations is held by the maritime SAR agency, that is, the JRCC. When operating on distress vessels, MIRG teams act in accordance with international agreements and the directions issued by the master of the vessel. The MIRG teams' standby time is 'immediate', that is, team members will immediately begin transferring personnel and equipment to the designated site. 41 Norway has a total of seven stations on standby for a variety of search and rescue operations. These are: Oslo, Larvik, Bergen, Salten, Rogaland, Tromso, and Alesund. All teams are available for deployment throughout Norway's SRR, irrespective of their station's location. In accordance with the contracts, the teams are also available for use in other countries' SRRs. The usual size of MIRG teams is The composition of the team may vary depending on the nature of the operations and the distance from the target, but the team's basic size is six. MIRG teams have the skills and knowledge required to deal with maritime incidents. The MIRG teams in Oslo and Bergen are specialised in incidents involving hazardous substances, and so such operations will be given to them. However, chemical clean-up operations in Oslo and Bergen are currently in the test phase. Based on the results of these tests, the DSB will soon decide whether chemical clean-up expertise at sea will be expanded and extended to other MIRG stations or restricted to the Oslo and Bergen stations, or whether chemical clean-up operations will be completely discontinued. 41 Their actual standby time depends on several factors, such as the location of the target, the amount of equipment required, and the number of personnel required. All team members are professionals in their own fields and carry out a variety of emergency tasks in their daily work. The contracted emergency services are responsible for providing rescue units with basic training; the emergency services are responsible for organising basic courses. The emergency services engage in close cooperation on training to ensure that personnel in all services have similar competence. Maritime SAR team members receive an approximately week-long basic training course for incidents at sea. The length of this training depends on the team member's task (crew/officer). Team members must practise incident protocol in its entirety at least once a year. This exercise must include loading the helicopter, transferring to the helicopter, and a special task at the target. This ensures that unit members receive specialised MIRG training at least once a year. In addition to these mandatory exercises, departments naturally arrange their own exercises, either independently or with other departments. Norway's rescue teams primarily use dedicated maritime SAR helicopters (Sea King) to travel to the target. Surface vessels can also be employed if necessary, but there must be sufficient grounds for doing so. Helicopters are always the first choice for reasons of safety. Two MIRG teams (in Bodo and Oslo) are currently located right next to maritime SAR helicopters, which means that these teams can be deployed slightly faster than others. Other MIRG teams are strategically stationed around the country to minimise unnecessary delays in their deployment. All team members are equipped with immersion suits suitable for maritime SAR, automatic life jackets (SOLAS), helmets, and personal locator beacons (PLB). The rescue teams' equipment is packed in aluminium cases suitable for helicopter transport and placed in premises that have signed contracts with the emergency services. These cases are specially labelled, so that every MIRG team member knows what they contain. The cases primarily contain personal equipment, breathing apparatus, hoses, spray pipes, 62

65 adaptors, etc. that is, the equipment that may be required for a ship fire. Other equipment can also be packed in these cases, depending on the nature of the operation. In the outfitting of MIRG teams, particular attention has been paid to both the great size of Norway's SRR and its Arctic waters, which place special demands on the team's survival equipment. Personnel training has also taken survival in Arctic waters into account. Contact between the JRCC and MIRG teams is handled in accordance with the situation. If the distress vessel's Maritime VHF is available, it can be used. UHF radios are used on board the vessel, but satellite phones or mobile phones can also be used when necessary. The choice of communications device depends on the distance from the shore and, because of the great size of Norway's SRR, contact can never be guaranteed MRO and medical care In Norway, municipalities are responsible for basic healthcare, while hospital districts are responsible for specialised healthcare. Municipalities are responsible for operations in their area, including major incidents. If they have insufficient resources, responsibility is transferred to the hospital district. The administrative director of the hospital district is responsible for planning medical preparedness. Representatives from different sectors attend regular directorial meetings in which plans are updated and information is exchanged. The Comprehensive National Social and Healthcare Plan governs operations. This plan does not contain operative guidelines for crisis situations. Instead, it provides strategic guidelines for social and healthcare actors on how to plan their own preparedness and how to operate in a variety of exceptional circumstances. The plan states that the same social and healthcare actors that are responsible for operations under normal circumstances must also be prepared for operations in a variety of exceptional circumstances. Such situations are to be coordinated at the lowest possible operative level, which in Norway is municipal level. The plan also states that the organisation responsible for crises management must employ the same management system as under normal circumstances. This avoids ambiguity and ensures that all actors are better aware of their roles. The law requires basic healthcare, specialised healthcare and emergency medical care services to have up-to-date preparedness plans, and to ensure preparedness for exceptional circumstances. Planning must consider coordination at national and regional level, as well as other any authorities involved in operations. Preparedness plans must be updated at three-year intervals, and they should be sufficiently clear and straightforward to ensure that all actors are clear about their roles and authority. Norway's plans include the implementation of mass evacuations and pre-planned locations for evacuation centres. Preparedness plans must include instructions for CBRN incidents at both national and regional level, and take the relevant technical perspectives into account (patient information systems and issues with their functionality). Norway's preparations for a potential pandemic in 2009 are considered good experience, and helped to clarify preparedness practices. The local police command centre is responsible for establishing evacuations centres, while the municipal social and healthcare agency is responsible for running them. Centres for victims' family members and relatives would be established at pre-arranged hotels. In order to release information to the public, the social and healthcare agency would also set up a website, establish a media centre, and handle external communications in cooperation with other authorities. In addition to official personnel from social services and healthcare authorities, evacuation centres would also make use of civilian crisis management volunteers, who would assist with a variety of tasks, such as organising heating and protection from the elements. 63

66 GERMANY BELARUS 8.8 Poland SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Ministry of Infrastructure and Development, Polish Maritime Search and Rescue service Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Ministry of Infrastructure and Development, Polish Maritime Search and Rescue service Tactical police operations at sea Maritime Unit of the Border Guard Emergency medical care at sea Ministry of Infrastructure and Development, Polish Maritime Search and Rescue Service Coordination of chemical accident management Maritime Office Aeronautical SAR services ARCC Warszawa Maritime search and rescue SWEDEN Poland's maritime search and rescue authority is the Polish Maritime Search and Rescue Service. It is responsible for both SAR and oil spill clean-ups at sea. The organisation is part of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development, which was established in November Poland has two maritime search and rescue coordination centres, which are located in Gdynia (MRCC Gdynia) and Swinoujscie (MRSC Swinoujscie). Poland's maritime Search and Rescue Region is relatively small compared to some of the other Baltic Sea States. Poland has 528 kilometres of coastline in the Baltic Sea. The briskest commercial and passenger vessel traffic is in the ports of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Świnoujście, and Szczeci. However, it should be noted that traffic sailing into the Baltic Sea passes through Poland's SRR on its way to the Central and Northern Baltic. Aeronautical search and rescue operations in Poland are coordinated from ARCC Warszawa, which is located in Warsaw. As in all the other Baltic Sea States, Poland's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. However, when it comes to maritime SAR, Poland's national legislation contains some contradictions. According to Poland's maritime safety and security legislation, all authorities must assist in the event of a maritime incident. Yet according Gdynia Darlowo POLAND RUSSIA WARSAW LITHUANIA SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base VILNIUS to Poland's Rescue Act, the emergency services are not allowed to operate at sea. However, this has not always been the case in practice, as the emergency services have assisted in maritime SAR operations. In spite of this, the law makes it difficult to organise cooperation between organisations. In order to clarify this issue, Poland is discussing a new maritime search and rescue act that would clarify authorities' responsibilities and scope for action at sea. Poland has made bilateral SAR arrangements with Lithuania, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, and Russia. Poland has had good experiences of SAR cooperation with its neighbouring countries, and there is mainly smooth cooperation in the SRR's border zones. Poland organises annual joint exercises with its neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. Poland also takes part in, for example, the Baltic Sarex and 64

67 Dynamic Mercy maritime SAR exercises, which are held in the Baltic Sea. Cooperation between authorities engaging in maritime SAR is based on a maritime SAR plan. Poland has also drawn up a preliminary MRO plan, but this has not yet been approved with regard to on-shore operations. The appropriate ministers have approved the maritime search and rescue plan, but this is already partially out of date. Units from the Navy, Border Guard, and maritime SAR service operate during maritime incidents in Poland's Search and Rescue Region. Poland's SRR contains an oil drilling platform whose units can, alongside their own duties, also be used to support for maritime SAR. The following organisations take part in onshore maritime SAR: Border Guard, Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Social welfare authorities, Maritime administration, Transport agency, Civil aviation authority, Emergency response centre, Environment authorities, and medical helicopters. The following organisations participate in operations at sea: Border Guard, Maritime administration, Navy, Aeronautical SAR services, tugboats, buoy tenders, Vessel traffic service centres, and offshore oil company. The units engaging in maritime SAR come from the Maritime Search and Rescue Service, voluntary organisations, the Navy, and the Border Guard. Poland has eight Coastal Stations that provide watercraft for maritime SAR. About five people are employed by each station. However, these stations are mainly staffed by volunteers, who number depending on the station. There are plenty of volunteers available at all of the stations. The challenge is to find sufficient equipment for personnel and units. Poland has two maritime SAR helicopters on continual standby. There are helicopter bases in Darlovo and Gdynia. The helicopters are MI-14s (Darlovo) and PZL W3RM 'Anacondas' (Gdynia). The Border Guard's helicopters can also be used for maritime SAR, but there are not on continual standby. Poland operates in accordance with the Baltic ACO manual when several helicopters have been deployed as search and rescue units. During incidents, a navy pilot based in the aeronautical search and rescue coordination centre (ARSC Gdynia) acts as ACO. Personnel involved in maritime SAR have taken international Baltic ACO training, and the Poles are interested in taking part in such training in the future. The coordination centre has long been holding coordination exercises, which have included changeovers in the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC). Poland does not have any separate guidelines or preparedness for chemical spills, which is considered a significant failing alongside its lack of MIRG services. Poland's Border Guard has developed an operating model that can create a 3D-model of, for example, a passenger ship. The ship is photographed using the anchor point principle, that is, the entire ship is not photographed, but rather an overall image of the ship is created by logically joining a number of points. This can generate a realistic visualisation of, for example, the ship's restaurant and the access routes leading to it. Photographs are taken of the most significant locations on each deck (with regard to creating an overall image) using pre-planned anchor points. These could be: the car deck, the engine room, the control room, restaurants, stairwells, foyers, the bridge, and working decks. The finished model can be examined using, for example, a smart phone or tablet. Creating such models requires not only careful pre-planning but also profound knowledge of panoramic photography and its associated equipment and editing techniques. Commercial modelling software has been used, and is available to all. The final model creates a good basis on which to plan a rescue or special operations aboard the vessel. When you are able to examine the location of a fire, injured person or armed individual in advance, 65

68 it paves the way for a safer and more effective operation Emergency fire and rescue services at sea According to Polish legislation, specially trained rescue personnel from the emergency services cannot be deployed to an incident at sea, which means that the country's emergency services can only deal with, for example, a ship fire when the vessel is moored at the docks. 42 However, as previously mentioned, the emergency services have on a case-by-case basis participated in search and rescue operations at sea. In these cases, rescue operations have mainly been handled from outside the distress vessel, from vessels assisting in maritime SAR. If specially trained rescue personnel are required, Poland must request help from MIRG teams in neighbouring countries. This will result in long delays in getting help to areas that are a long way from MIRG team stations in neighbouring countries. Poland does, however, have very good relations and agreements with the neighbouring countries from whom it could request assistance in the event of a maritime incident. Poland's closest partners for maritime incidents are Germany and Sweden. As Poland's emergency services have many skilled personnel, it would be easy and cost-effective to train some of them as MIRG teams. This would, however, require an amendment to the law. MIRG training could begin after this amendment. Sufficient personnel would have to be trained in order to ensure 24/7 standby. Maintaining MIRG teams on continual standby generally requires four times the number of trained personnel as are required to be on standby. If the development of MIRG services were to be begun as quickly as possible, Poland would be able to have an active and effective MIRG system in place within a few years Getting assistance to a ship therefore requires the ship to be steerable, and also a place where, for example, a burning ship could be brought and anchored. 43 The BSMIR visit to Poland was used to present MIRG services at ministerial level. 66

69 8.9 Sweden SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Swedish Maritime Administration Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency Tactical police operations at sea Police Emergency medical care at sea The National Board of Health and Welfare Coordination of chemical accident management Swedish Coast Guard Aeronautical SAR services Swedish Maritime Administration Maritime search and rescue Sweden's maritime search and rescue authority is the Swedish Maritime Administration. Sweden has one maritime search and rescue coordination centre, which is also an aeronautical search and rescue coordination centre: JRCC Sweden Rescue, which is located in Gothenburg. The JRCC coordinates not only all maritime and aeronautical search and rescue operations, but also search and rescue operations in Sweden's largest lake areas (Vänern, Vettern, and the Stockholm archipelago.) Sweden's maritime Search and Rescue Region is extensive compared to that of many other Baltic Sea States, and the country has about 3,200 kilometres of coastline. Sweden is the only Baltic Sea State whose SRR has borders with all of the other Baltic Sea States. This places challenges on coordination, as Sweden cooperates with eight countries in the Baltic Sea and with Norway to the west. Commercial and passenger vessel traffic is very brisk throughout Sweden's SRR, and particularly in southern areas and in the Central and Northern Baltic. OSLO NORWAY Göteborg (Säve) SWEDEN Norrtälje STOCKHOLM Umeå Visby Gotland Aland Islands FINLAND ESTONIA Sweden has set and published service level targets for search and rescue operations at sea. Success in achieving service level targets is evaluated every year, and this influences the placement of units and their readiness. As in all the other Baltic Sea States, Sweden's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. Sweden does not have a separate national act on maritime search and rescue, but responsibilities are governed by the Civil Protection Act. Sweden has signed bilateral agreements with all of its nine neighbouring countries (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, DENMARK GERMANY Ronneby (Kallinge) Öland POLAND LATVIA LITHUANIA RUSSIA SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base 67

70 Russia, Poland, Germany, Denmark, and Norway). As it has so many partners, one challenge that Sweden faces is to hold its contractual bilateral meetings and joint exercises every year. This is why Sweden has found tripartite meetings to be beneficial for discussing shared targets. One example of this is the annual tripartite meeting between Sweden, Estonia and Finland. Sweden has had good experiences of cooperation with maritime SAR authorities in other countries, and there is smooth cooperation throughout the region. For example, in one maritime SAR operation, a Swedish patrol boat was used to evacuate a person from a pleasure boat in Lithuania's SRR, as adverse weather conditions prevented the Lithuanian helicopter from performing the task. A Swedish helicopter has also been used in Finland's Kvarken archipelago, as it was the fastest aeronautical unit to reach the scene. In spite of Sweden's great number of partners, its maritime SAR authorities have managed to organise annual joint exercises with neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. Sweden also takes part in, for example, the Baltic Sarex SAR exercises, which are held in the Baltic Sea. It has been questioned whether the various exercises included in Baltic Sarex should be more regionally divided between neighbouring countries (for example, Sarex North, Finland and Sweden). Sweden has otherwise planned to develop its exercises with a more regional approach. These exercises would be attended by the countries and units that would operate in these areas during real incidents. JRCC Sweden Rescue has drawn up a national plan that includes pre-planned locations for evacuation centres. The plan covers how different authorities should participate in maritime SAR. It has largely been drawn up by the JRCC alone, and has not been distributed to all authorities. The JRCC monitors rescue units from the maritime search and rescue coordination centre as AIS targets. One challenge associated with the use of AIS transmitters is that Navy and Coast Guard vessels do not always keep their transmitters switched on when performing other tasks. AIS is also in use in maritime SAR helicopters. The following organisations take part in on-shore maritime SAR: Coast Guard, Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Social welfare authorities, Aeronautical SAR services, Civil aviation authority, Emergency response centre, Army, Voluntary associations, and volunteer fire department. The units engaging in maritime SAR primarily come from the Swedish Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, and voluntary organisations. Pilot boats and emergency services with fleets of watercraft also engage in maritime SAR. The following also participate in multisectoral incidents at sea: Police, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Social welfare authorities, Aeronautical SAR services, Civil aviation authority, Emergency response centre, Navy, volunteer fire department, icebreakers, tugboats, Environment authorities, Vessel traffic service centres, buoy tenders, and medical helicopters. The Swedish Maritime Administration owns Sweden's maritime SAR helicopters. Sweden always has five helicopters on 15-minute standby. There are helicopter bases in Säve, Kallinge, Visby, Norrtälje, and Uumaja. Sweden has also acquired 7 new Agusta Westland 139 helicopters, which will be available for duty by the end of The helicopters are the same ones used for maritime SAR in Estonia. Under certain circumstances, the JRCC can also use medical helicopters to evacuate patients from ships onto which they are able to land. JRCC Sweden Rescue complies with Baltic ACO operating models, and maritime SAR helicopter pilots are able to operate in accordance with the manual. JRCC Sweden Rescue employs 28 maritime and aeronautical Search and Rescue Mission Coordinators, 68

71 and they are all able to coordinate search and rescue operations during maritime and aeronautical accidents. The Swedish Coast Guard is responsible for chemical spills at sea. The Coast Guard has drawn up guidelines for chemical spills. Sweden is the only Baltic Sea State that has a slightly more detailed plan for chemical spills at sea. However, Sweden has only one chemical clean-up vessel to cover its extensive SRR. If a spill occurs far from this vessel's current position, it would take several hours for the vessel to reach the scene Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Sweden has MIRG teams on continual standby in the event of an incident at sea. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible for organising MIRG operations in Sweden's SRR, and it signs contracts with the emergency services for MIRG service provision. In accordance with the contract, the MSB provides annual financial support for MIRG training and the acquisition of MIRG equipment. The emergency services may decide to use these funds however they wish, but they are contractually obliged to provide MIRG services on 24/7 standby. 44 This ensures that the JRCC always has specially trained rescue teams primarily at its disposal in the event of a maritime incident. Not all emergency services have MIRG expertise or on-call teams, so MIRG stations that have signed contracts with the MSB will support these stations with specially trained units when required. The emergency services are legally obliged to launch MIRG operations in their own areas of responsibility (in close proximity to the shore). On-site responsibility for MIRG operations is held by the maritime SAR agency, that is, the JRCC. When operating on distress vessels, MIRG teams act in accordance with international agreements and the directions issued by the master of the vessel. 44 The content of these agreements is largely the same, although there may be small variations. Sweden currently has three MIRG teams on immediate 24/7 standby 45 in the event of a maritime incident. The bases/stations on standby for rescue operations are: Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Karlskrona. All teams are available for deployment throughout Sweden's SRR, irrespective of their station's location. In accordance with contracts, the teams are also available for use in other countries' SRRs. Stockholm's and Sweden's MIRG teams are specialised in incidents involving hazardous substances, so such tasks will be given to them. The usual size of MIRG teams is The composition of the team may vary depending on the nature of the operations and the distance from the target, but the team's basic size is six. All team members are professionals in their own fields and carry out a variety of emergency tasks in their daily work. The teams' emergency services are obligated to handle routine incidents in the manner they see most fit irrespective of whether the teams have been alerted to incidents at sea or not. Basic training for emergency units is conducted by the contracted emergency services. Team members receive an approximately weeklong basic training course for maritime SAR and accidents at sea. The emergency services engage in close cooperation on training to ensure that personnel in all services have similar competence. The officers' basic training course is organised and coordinated by the MSB and lasts one week. Team members must practise a variety of maritime SAR tasks several times per year. Mandatory annual courses include winching/ helicopter training, safety training, survival training, and theoretical training. Larger exercises are also organised annually, but not all MIRG team members have to attend 45 The teams' standby time is 'immediate', that is, team members will immediately begin transferring personnel and equipment to the designated site. Their actual standby time depends on several factors, such as the location of the target, the amount of equipment required, and the number of personnel required. 69

72 these exercises every year. In addition to these mandatory exercises, departments naturally arrange their own exercises, either independently or with other departments. MIRG team members should have 2 3 days of training every year, and those specialised in cleaning up hazardous substances should have a further hours of training in addition to these 2 3 days. Sweden's rescue teams primarily transfer to the target on dedicated maritime SAR helicopters. Surface vessels can also be used if required, but there must be special grounds for doing so. Helicopters are always the first choice for reasons of safety. Sweden's maritime SAR helicopter bases are currently located outside urban areas, which means that it may take some time for MIRG teams to reach the base and take off. However, MIRG teams are strategically located around Sweden, so that the helicopter base used will not be a decisive factor in the time taken to deploy a team. All team members are equipped with immersion suits suitable for maritime SAR, automatic life jackets (SOLAS), helmets, and personal locator beacons (PLB). The rescue teams' equipment is packed in aluminium cases suitable for helicopter transport and placed in premises that have signed contracts with the emergency services. These cases are specially labelled, so that every MIRG team member knows what they contain. The cases primarily contain personal equipment, breathing apparatus, hoses, spray pipes, etc. that is, the equipment that may be required for a ship fire. Other equipment can also be packed in these cases, depending on the nature of the operation. Contact between the JRCC and MIRG teams is handled in accordance with the situation. If the distress vessel's Maritime VHF is available, it can be used. Tetra radio or VHF radio is used on board the distress vessel, and satellite phone and mobile phones can also be used when necessary. The mode of communication depends on the distance from the shore MRO and medical care Sweden's healthcare system is based on municipal healthcare centres that are responsible for all of a patient's health problems. Healthcare is steered by provincial courts, regional administration, and municipalities. Hospitals provide specialised healthcare. The guiding principle is that municipalities and provincial courts have the right to plan and structure their operations with regard to local conditions. Sweden has legislation governing preparedness for major incidents. This act steers municipalities in the tasks required to maintain preparedness, which include risk assessments. Statutes and guidelines define key responsibilities during crises. For example, provincial courts (landstinget) are responsible for coordination during a major incident. Evacuation preparedness is planned at three levels: ministries and centralised agencies (Socialstyrelssen, MSB, Sjöfartsverket) are responsible for national planning; county administrative boards for regional planning; and local administration and municipal emergency services for local planning. A number of actors are jointly responsible for both evacuation and the establishment of evacuation centres. Sweden does not have national guidelines for mass evacuations. The JRCC has determined pre-planned locations for evacuation centres. Although psychosocial support is provided by volunteers, there are no other voluntary organisations involved. Sweden has ongoing development projects aimed at enhancing cooperation between different authorities. There is also an ongoing national project relating to mass evacuation. This project is analysing different authorities' operations with regard to evacuations. It seeks to standardise concepts and operating models, and to clarify responsibilities and the use of resources. Metropolitan Stockholm also has an ongoing project aimed at developing and improving inter-authority cooperation in both routine and exceptional circumstances. 70

73 8.10 Finland SERVICE RESPONSIBLE PARTY Maritime SAR Finnish Border Guard Headquarters Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Ministry of Interior Tactical police operations at sea National Police Board Emergency medical care at sea Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Coordination of chemical accident management The Finnish Enviromental Institute (SYKE) Aeronautical SAR services Finavia Maritime search and rescue The Finnish Border Guard is Finland's maritime search and rescue agency, and is responsible for organising and consolidating maritime SAR. Finland has two maritime search and rescue coordination centres: MRCC Turku and MRSC Helsinki. MRSC Helsinki is responsible for maritime SAR in Finland's Search and Rescue Region in the Gulf of Finland, and MRCC Turku for the Northern Baltic and the western area of Finland's SRR. Finland has about 1,250 kilometres of coastline. Commercial and passenger vessel traffic is very brisk, especially in the Gulf of Finland and the Northern Baltic. During the summer, a considerable number of pleasure boats are also to be found near the shore and in the archipelago. SWEDEN NORWAY Rovaniemi FINLAND RUSSIA Finland complies with international principles in its SAR operational activities: the IAMSAR manual, which is jointly published by the IMO and ICAO. Operational principles can also be found in the Border Guard's maritime search and rescue manual and its internal regulations. Aeronautical search and rescue is coordinated by ARCC Finland, which is located in Tampere. As in all the other Baltic Sea States, Finland's maritime SAR system is based on international legislation. In accordance with the Hamburg Convention, Finland has signed bilateral agreements with its neighbouring countries on maritime SAR cooperation arrangements and maritime SAR in the border zones of SRRs. Finland has bilateral cooperation agreements "Between the competent authorities, providers of aeronautical and maritime search and rescue service" with Russia, Estonia and Sweden. STOCKHOLM Aland Islands Turku HELSINKI Hiiumaa TALLINN ESTONIA SAR EEZ Territorial waters Helicopter base 71

74 Finland's Maritime Search and Rescue Act governs the Border Guard's general authority and its authority over other organisations with regard to maritime SAR. It also names the other maritime SAR authorities that engage in maritime SAR and defines their tasks. The Act provides a foundation for planning and running maritime search and rescues. It also states that all those participating in maritime SAR operations do so at their own expense. The Maritime Search and Rescue Manual 2010, published by the Ministry of the Interior, defines the principles of cooperation between maritime SAR and stakeholders in greater detail. Finland has had good experiences of cooperation with its neighbouring countries. Neighbouring countries' units have been used in Finland's SRR, and Finnish units have been used in neighbouring countries' SRRs several times. Finland keeps in regular contact with maritime search rescue coordination centres in other countries, which has lowered the threshold for requesting help in the event that Finland's own resources have been insufficient for the task at hand. The best aspects of cooperation have been regular meetings between maritime SAR personnel. Finland organises annual joint exercises with its neighbouring countries in accordance with cooperation agreements. Finland also takes part in, for example, the Baltic Sarex SAR exercises, which are held in the Baltic Sea. The Border Guard has worked with the other authorities and voluntary organisations involved in maritime SAR to draw up a preparedness for multisectoral maritime incidents cooperation plan (MoMeVa). More information about this plan will be given in the next subsection. The maritime search and rescue coordination centres have also drawn up regional maritime SAR plans. The maritime search and rescue coordination centres primarily monitor the location of maritime SAR units using units' standby announcements and a location system based on a tetra radio network. All units engaging in maritime SAR, such as helicopters, have tetra radios. The units engaging in maritime SAR are primarily Border Guard units or volunteers. The following also participate in multisectoral incidents at sea: Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Navy, voluntary associations, icebreakers, maritime pilots, Environment authorities, Vessel traffic service centres, and army helicopters. The following organisations take part in onshore maritime SAR: Coast Guard, Police, Emergency fire and rescue services, Emergency medical services, Healthcare authorities, Social welfare authorities, Transport agency, Emergency response centre, Navy/Army, volunteer fire department, Vessel traffic service centres, medical helicopters, Red Cross, Voluntary Rescue Service (VaPePa), and Transport Safety Agency. Finland has maritime SAR helicopters on standby at three stations: Helsinki, Turku, and Rovaniemi. The helicopters are Super Pumas and AB-412s. A maritime SAR helicopter is on continual standby at the Helsinki and Turku stations. Readiness in Rovaniemi is based on a risk analysis. Army helicopters (NH-90) can also be used in maritime SAR. Maritime SAR helicopters have also been used for operations in Estonia, Russia and Sweden's SRRs. Finland uses the Baltic ACO manual's operating models. Maritime search and rescue coordination centre personnel have received training to launch the measures required for coordinating aeronautical operations. Actual ACOs will be sent to the maritime search and rescue coordination centres from the Border Guard's aircrews and Turku and Helsinki's air traffic control. They will form two-person teams in the event of an incident. Finland has arranged international ACO courses and intends to do so again in the future. Finland has also organised an international OSC course. More will be said about Baltic ACO model development in Finland later on. 72

75 Finland does not have a separate plan for chemical spills. Personnel working in maritime SAR positions and at maritime search and rescue coordination centres have been trained in the basics of chemical cleanups, but there are no dedicated personnel on standby. A new offshore patrol boat delivered to the Border Guard in 2014 is classified to work as a chemical clean-up vessel Emergency fire and rescue services at sea Finland has MIRG teams on continual standby in the event of an incident at sea. In accordance with the Rescue Act, the emergency services are obligated to launch MIRG operations in their own area of responsibility, that is, harbours and areas in close proximity to the shore. According to the Maritime Search and Rescue Act, the emergency services also participate in maritime SAR. Not all emergency services have MIRG expertise or on-call teams, so MIRG stations will support these stations with specially trained units when required. Emergency services that participate in MIRG operations are responsible for the costs incurred by their MIRG operations. During joint exercises, each organisation is responsible for its own expenses. On-site responsibility for MIRG operations is held by the maritime SAR agency, which in Finland is the Border Guard (MRCC/MRSC). When operating on distress vessels, MIRG teams act in accordance with international agreements and the directions issued by the master of the vessel. Finland currently has two MIRG teams on continual 24/7 standby in the event of an incident at sea. The teams' standby time is 'immediate'. 46 The MIRG teams' bases/ stations are in Turku and Helsinki. Both teams are available for deployment throughout 46 Immediate standby means that team members will immediately begin transferring personnel and equipment to the designated target. However, it always takes time to transfer personnel and equipment, so the real standby time is difficult to evaluate. It depends on a number of factors, such as the location of the incident, the equipment required, and the number of personnel required. Finland's SRR, irrespective of their base's location. In accordance with contracts, the teams are also available for use in other countries' SRRs. The usual size of a MIRG team is The composition of the team may vary depending on the nature of the operation and the distance from the accident site, but the team's basic size is five. MIRG teams are trained in all of the specialised skills required to deal with maritime incidents. All team members are professionals in their own fields and carry out a variety of rescue tasks in their daily work. Emergency services are obligated to handle routine incidents in the manner they see most fit irrespective of whether specially trained teams have been alerted to incidents at sea or not. The training of MIRG crew and officers is organised and coordinated by the Border Guard in cooperation with the emergency services engaging in MIRG operations. Both courses (for crew and officers) are week-long basic courses. Team members must practise a variety of maritime SAR tasks several times per year. MIRG emergency services do not have a set number of mandatory exercises. However, in general contracts, MIRG emergency services have agreed that every MIRG employee will receive training in maritime incidents at least four (4) times per year. Larger exercises are also organised annually, but not all MIRG personnel have to take part in them every year. In addition to these mandatory exercise, departments also arrange their own exercises to support MIRG operations, either independently or with other departments. Finland's rescue teams primarily use dedicated maritime SAR helicopters to transfer to the target. Surface vessels can also be used if required, but there must be special grounds for doing so. Helicopters are always the first choice for reasons of safety. The maritime SAR helicopters are currently based in the same cities as the MIRG groups, which means that helicopter use is fast and easy. There is also a maritime SAR helicopter in 73

76 Northern Finland (Rovaniemi), but there are no MIRG teams in its immediate vicinity, as a risk analysis of the said area concluded that it would not be worthwhile placing a MIRG team on standby there. All team members are equipped with immersion suits suitable for maritime SAR, automatic life jackets (SOLAS), helmets, and personal locator beacons (PLB). The teams' equipment is stored in premises that have signed contracts with the emergency services. MIRG teams have separate personal bags for carrying personal equipment, as well as special plastic peli cases for carrying teamspecific equipment. Different equipment is packed in the cases depending on the nature of the task. Contact between MIRG teams and the MRCC/MRSC is handled in accordance with the situation, but tetra radio is usually used for communications. If the distress vessel's Maritime VHF is available, this can be used when necessary. When aboard a distress vessel, team members communicate with each other using tetra radio. The team can also use mobile phones and Maritime VHF, and also possibly satellite phones in the future MRO and medical care Healthcare services in Finland are divided into basic healthcare and specialised healthcare. Basic healthcare covers the promotion of health, monitoring the population's health, and a variety of services. Basic healthcare is organised and provided by municipalities. Specialised healthcare covers research and treatment in specialised branches of medicine. Specialised healthcare is organised in hospitals, which are the responsibility of hospital districts and university hospitals. Hospital districts organise emergency medical care in their districts. They can handle the arrangements themselves or in cooperation with the emergency services or another hospital district, or they can purchase services from another service provider, Hospital districts decide on the service level of emergency medical care. They define what emergency medical care includes, so that the service is implemented effectively and appropriately, and is correctly scaled. In order to create a functional service throughout the district, emergency medical care must be implemented and planned in cooperation with on-call healthcare service points. Medical helicopter operations are part of the emergency care package defined in the Health Care Act. They consist of emergency medical care and all of its associated support services, that is, aeronautical services, bases, and terrestrial units. At the beginning of 2012, support services were transferred in their entirety to FinnHEMS Oy, a coalition of university hospital districts, to be funded by the State. Emergency medical care equipment and medications and their costs are the responsibility of university hospitals. The Ministry for Social Affairs and Health is responsible for coordinating, supervising and harmonising preparedness for social services and healthcare during exceptional circumstances. The goal is to safeguard the population's ability to function and make a living under all circumstances. According to the Emergency Powers Act (1552/2011), municipalities and state authorities/organisations must ensure that their operations are disrupted as little as possible by exceptional circumstances. Preparedness is ensured with preparedness plans and advance provisions for exceptional circumstances. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Finnish Red Cross (SPR) have signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on preparedness and emergency medical care. The goal is to promote seamless cooperation between the Red Cross and municipalities' other voluntary organisations during disturbances. The Finnish Red Cross maintains and trains teams of volunteers that support and supplement social services and healthcare authorities. The goal is to ensure sufficient assistance for local authorities in the fields of first aid, emergency medicine, and psychosocial support. The Finnish Red Cross 74

77 coordinates the Voluntary Rescue Service, which consists of volunteers from dozens of organisations. In the Memorandum of Cooperation, it has been agreed that, in the event of a disturbance, the Finnish Red Cross will also coordinate volunteers to assist other social services and healthcare authorities. centre must be chosen with care, to ensure that it provides rescued persons with protection from the elements. Finland has a national plan for evacuation during maritime incidents, and an analysis of potential locations for evacuation centres is currently being conducted. The Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator decides whether to establish an evacuation centre. Evacuation centres are established by actors involved in operations, and the emergency services are in command of the centre. In addition to the emergency services, the police, social services, healthcare authorities, and Border Guard authorities are also involved in the evacuation centre's operations. The previously mentioned authorities are also assisted by voluntary organisations when this has been separately agreed upon. The location of an evacuation 75

78 9 SECTOR-SPECIFIC ANALYSES The previous chapters presented countryspecific reports on the Baltic Sea States, Norway, and Iceland's preparedness for a large-scale maritime incidents. This chapter will approach preparedness from the perspective of different fields of operations, seeking to analyse the current preparedness of the Baltic Sea region as a whole. 9.1 Maritime search and rescue services Maritime search and rescue services are based on international agreements that have been approved by all the countries participating in this project. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) obligates all coastal nations to organise and maintain sufficiently effective search and rescue services in maritime regions. The key norm supplementing UNCLOS with regard to maritime SAR is the Luleå Kemi SAR EEZ Oulu Territorial waters Ørland 300 km Trondheim Umeå Vaasa FINLAND NORWAY Kristiansand Ålborg Rygge DENMARK GERMANY SWEDEN Öland Århus Ronneby (Kallinge) COPENHAGEN Roskilde Malmö Skrydstrup Bornholm Helgoland Rostock Bremen OSLO Hamburg Göteborg (Säve) BERLIN Gävle Norrtälje STOCKHOLM Visby Gotland Aland Islands POLAND Pori Hiiumaa Saaremaa RUSSIA Turku HELSINKI Liepaja Palanga Kaliningrad Gdynia Darlowo Gdansk RIGA ESTONIA Pärnu LATVIA LITHUANIA VILNIUS Kotka TALLINN Vyborg St. Petersburg RUSSIA BELARUS 76

79 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (also known as the 'Hamburg Convention') and its subsequent amendments. Maritime SAR is also governed by the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and its amendments. SOLAS also contains a general obligation to organise maritime SAR. In addition to international legislation, several countries also have national legislation on maritime SAR. National legislation seeks to clarify authorities' obligations and jurisdiction, and cooperation on maritime SAR. Thanks to advancements in commercial and passenger vessels, evacuation is not always required in the event of an accident. With minor assistance, a ship can be stabilised at sea and may potentially be able to make its way to port, albeit in a restricted manner. If a major maritime incident requiring a mass evacuation from, for example, a passenger ship were to occur in the Baltic Sea, every State and its maritime SAR authority would face a considerable challenge. It can also be noted that every country would require, and also expect, assistance from its neighbours. Every State in the region has organised maritime SAR in the manner required by international legislation, but these arrangements may not necessarily be sufficient in the event of a major incident. In order to safeguard operations, every State has made bilateral agreements on maritime SAR with its neighbouring countries. Bilateral agreements guarantee that, if required, countries can request assistance and be assured that assistance will be received. All countries consider bilateral agreements to be useful and beneficial. Agreements and successful cooperation have fostered trust neighbouring countries will provide assistance in the event of a major incident. When it comes to maritime SAR, it is worth noting that it mainly concerns saving only human life. In the majority of countries, salvaging vessels or other material goods is classed as a commercial operation and not included in maritime SAR. However, during a demanding rescue operation, saving the ship may also be the easiest way of both guaranteeing people's safety and preventing the situation from escalating. The mass evacuation of a ship in demanding conditions always increases the risk of another accident. If a small team of specially trained and properly equipped personnel can keep a ship stable or extinguish a fire, preventing further damage is usually the most effective and safest approach. As stated earlier in this report, incidents involving commercial vessels occur in the Baltic Sea every year. Luckily, the majority of these incidents are not serious. Yet this means that, were a major incident to occur, almost no one would have sufficient experience of a similar situation. By studying history, we can say that 'learning by shock has been and will always be a significant way of developing preparedness. An example of this was the sinking of the passenger ship M/S Estonia in Finland's Search and Rescue Region in This serious accident led to definite improvements in the maritime SAR arrangements of not only Finland but also other countries. During major incidents, authorities come under great pressure from the public, and authorities must be able to operate effectively enough to rescue as many of those in distress as possible. The public's axiom is that the authorities will rescue those in danger whatever the situation. Both we and the public cannot sanction the notion that the authorities would announce that rescuers are unable to do anything due to demanding conditions. Search and rescue operations must succeed, and this requires close interauthority cooperation at the preparedness stage, both nationally and internationally. Iceland is a model example of a small nation in which inter-authority cooperation is highly significant. It is very challenging for Iceland to prepare for a major incident, as the worst-case scenarios would require the evacuation of 5,000 6,000 people. This kind of preparedness and MRO planning requires extensive inter-authority cooperation 77

80 and probably support from neighbouring maritime SAR authorities. Major incidents very often involve a risk of environmental damage as well. National maritime Search and Rescue Regions in the Baltic Sea follow the lines of Flight Information Regions (FIR). However, FIRs differ from countries' economic zones. According to international agreements, a State is responsible for environmental protection in its economic zone. This is why an incident that occurs in the middle of the Gulf of Finland or the Baltic Sea could fall under the scope of different countries depending on whether it requires maritime SAR or an oil spill clean-up. When it comes to environmental monitoring, countries engage in a great deal of cooperation in, for example, aerial surveillance. Countries work together to plan monitoring times and areas. The same kind of cooperation could be beneficial with regard to, for example, Finland and Sweden's ability to clean up chemical spills. According to the survey conducted as part of this project, countries have very limited preparedness for chemical incidents. There are only two proper chemical clean-up vessels one in Sweden and (soon) one in Finland. Whenever an incident involves hazardous chemicals, it always poses more challenges for rescue operations. No participating country has any detailed preparedness plans for chemical spills at sea. Sweden's plans may be the most extensive, but the country's resources for concrete action are still very limited. When it comes to preparedness for search and rescue operations, it is important for the maritime search and rescue coordination centre to have, or easily obtain, information about a vessel's cargo. Some coordination centres use CleanSeaNet, which displays information about the hazardous substances vessels have declared in their cargo lists. If a distress vessel cannot be contacted directly, smooth cooperation with marine traffic control authorities facilitates the acquisition of information Exercises and training One excellent way of developing cooperation between maritime search and rescue coordination centres is through exchanges of personnel. Finland and Estonia have had personnel exchanges, and more are planned between Finland and Sweden at least. This type of cooperation has been conducted in some other countries as well, and should be further expanded. Tabletop exercises are very beneficial when several authorities are working together and the objective is to practise cooperation and reconciling operations during an incident requiring the evacuation of thousands of people. Practical exercises on the other hand prepare actual units for the tasks they will be responsible for during a genuine incident. Norway in particular has organised extensive exercises that have represented large numbers of injured people as realistically as possible. Both types of exercises are required, and what's most important is that they are sensible and serve the achievement of objectives. Organising an exercise involving the evacuation of people is already quite challenging and requires considerable extra resources. Even if exercises are organised nationally, representatives from other countries should be offered the opportunity to take part as observers. Observers can give feedback from their own perspective and introduce the exercise's best practices into their own operations. The project highlighted a need for international SMC and OSC training. Finland organised two international OSC courses in 2013 and intends to organise three more international OSC courses in 2014, two of which have been 'purchased' by Frontex. However, no organisations operating in the Baltic Sea region are currently offering/ organising SMC courses. Finland and Denmark have organised, and will continue to organise, Baltic ACO courses. The courses to date have been considered both beneficial and necessary. The Baltic ACO manual is a model example of how a shared need led to 78

81 cooperation between Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and the creation of a joint manual. There are no doubt other comparable areas in which cooperation in the Baltic Sea region can be harnessed and developed. Joint training targets could be drawn up for the Baltic Sea region, so at least a minimum level of training for everyone could be defined. Content and objectives should be defined together, so that it will be easier for everyone to commit to them. The workload should be divided by sending students on courses in different countries. This would, however, require the training to be in English. All of the countries in the Baltic Sea region have taken part in 'Baltic Sarex', a major maritime SAR exercise held annually in Bornholm, Denmark. The exercise has presented and practised, for example, aeronautical operations compliant with OSC and the Baltic ACO manual. It has also offered many interesting challenges for the maritime SAR units involved. Unfortunately, the exercise's current format is under threat from organisational changes in Denmark. One thing highlighted during the BSMIR project was the importance of exchanges of ideas and free-form discussions about maritime SAR between different countries. An example of this is the seminar held in Finland during the project. It would be good to discuss things realistically; how things are organised in different countries and between different authorities. Presentations should be more than just PowerPoint presentations about how things are in the best-case scenarios. They should also highlight each country's sore points and best practices. These discussions form part of countries' bilateral meetings, but a desire has also arisen for Baltic Sea maritime SAR experts to meet on an annual basis, or at least every other year. Current topics in maritime SAR, such as MIRG operations, could be discussed at these meetings. Although a range of MIRG meetings have already been organised between different countries, they have not occurred throughout the Baltic Sea region. MRO seminars have been organised in Sweden, but a dedicated meeting for maritime SAR authorities in the Baltic Sea region could be organised without too much difficulty. On the basis of the analyses conducted during this project, there is smooth cooperation between participating countries. Cooperation is not engaged in daily or even weekly, but it is regular. No country has found it to be excessive. Sweden does face challenges due to its large number of neighbouring countries, but cooperation has been developed by holding tripartite meetings. As previously stated, every country would face a major challenge if it had to evacuate 5,000 6,000 people from a passenger vessel alone. Luckily, this will never be necessary, as assistance will definitely be provided thanks to successful cooperation. During MROs, coordinating rescued persons is a challenge if they are transported to different countries. As a variety of major incidents have shown, relatives and the media put great pressure on the authorities responsible for search and rescue operations. If sufficient measures are not properly taken beforehand, there is a danger that it will be impossible to manage precautionary measures around rescuers and rescued persons. This also requires good agreements with authorities in neighbouring countries, so that information flow is as smooth as possible throughout all stages of the search and rescue operation. However, cooperation is not just about drawing up agreements. Practical exercises show how neighbouring countries operate and using what units. Directorial meetings are important for launching and developing cooperation, but meetings between experts and those in operative positions are equally important. Discussions and exchanges of ideas can generate new perspectives on your own operations and help you see why organisations elsewhere operate differently. Information flow between countries can always be developed and improved. One particular wish was for information on international courses to be sent directly to the authority responsible for those operations. 79

82 Even when information is sent to a country, it may be sent to the wrong organisation and not forwarded. The responsible authority has not therefore received all of the information about courses and training. This is why details about maritime SAR authorities in participating countries have been included in this report Releasing information to the public The traditional methods of releasing information to the public press releases. press conferences, and interviews still play an important role. Finland has also had good experiences with releasing information through Facebook and Twitter. One good aspect of these applications is their great capacity compared to some websites. The role played by social media in releasing information should not be underestimated. It's worth remembering that, in the event of an accident, the information spread by those involved in the incident may not be completely accurate. Relatives, the media and other interested parties will be continually searching for new information about progress in search and rescue operations. When it comes to releasing information to the public, preparedness partly involves providing relatives and the media with private premises where they can wait for further news on the progress of search and rescue operations. CCN (Crisis Communication Network) is an EU-funded project led by the Swedish Coast Guard that is analysing crisis communications within and between different countries during maritime incidents. Other partners in this project are the Finnish Border Guard and Germany's CCME. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fully prepare for the great pressure exerted by national and international media during a major incident. For example, Norway and Finland use a model in which phone calls are first connected to the maritime search and rescue coordination centre and, if it does not answer, the call is forwarded to another centre. This is a simple way of sharing the responsibility for external communications when a limited number of personnel are available. Public relations officers have an important responsibility to process information. They must have sufficient information to answer queries, but must at the same time gather information from relatives who may be enquiring whether missing persons have been rescued. In order to facilitate the release of information during a major incident, Norway has made agreements with several journalists who will travel to the joint search and rescue coordination centre and take responsibility for releasing information in cooperation with the person in charge of external communications. In Finland, this task is mainly handled by officers from Coast Guard Districts' Headquarters. Communications problems often come to the fore during exercises and actual search and rescue operations. In accordance with the GMDSS system, almost every country's Search and Rescue Region has been divided into different radio service areas. Tetra radio networks have also become more common in several countries in recent years. Digital talk groups are in use at least in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Iceland and, in the near future, also Norway. The network's cover and usage varies from country to country, but in Finland, for example, tetra radio has proved to be excellent when working in close proximity to the shore. A variety of blogs and chat programmes is also in use in some countries. For example, Latvia has a chat programme that can be used to send preliminary data about an operation to all authorities quickly and easily. The chat programme is used and monitored by at least the situation and coordination centres of the rescue services, healthcare services, navy, police, and Air Force. When it comes to ensuring undisrupted communications traffic, Germany, for example, has a double network of VHF radio base stations along the coast, so that a backup base station can be used in case of faults. Finland also has separate Border Guard/VTS radio networks as mutual backups. 80

83 9.1.3 The Future One objective should be for units to be easily available for use in other countries' SRRs, so that anyone in distress will receive assistance from the most suitable professional who can reach the scene in the shortest possible time. This is, of course, already possible to some extent. However, when maritime SAR units are relocated and reconsidered, selecting their new locations should involve international cooperation. Distances are short in the Baltic Sea region. One good example of this is using a maritime SAR helicopter based in Luulaja, Sweden in Finland's SRR, or the use of Finland's helicopter in Rovaniemi in Sweden's SRR. Closer cooperation would require realtime awareness of the maritime SAR units. This could be achieved by, for example, equipping all units with AIS transmitters. In Finland, the locations of maritime SAR units and other authorities' units are sent to the maritime search and rescue coordination centre using both AIS and tetra radio. The increasing number of wind farms in sea areas will pose a challenge in the future. Germany's DGzRS has established a separate company that draws up rescue contracts with wind farm companies. Wind farms will continue to become more prolific throughout the Baltic Sea region. Search and rescue operations occurring on wind farms are not generally classed as maritime SAR, but rather as part of the service provider's occupational safety arrangements. This is not, however, a clear-cut issue. The registration of personal locator beacons (PLBs) is forbidden in, for example, Germany and Denmark. Yet the use of PLBs will no doubt increase in the future, as they are easy and affordable to use. National and international legislation on their use is, however, unclear in many respects. In order to evaluate what help is required and send it maritime SAR authorities need easily available information about the device sending the distress signal, such as whether it was registered abroad Conclusions Every participating country has organised its maritime SAR service in accordance with international agreements. However, clear variations were identified in readiness planning between different countries. It is impossible to draw up a perfect preparedness plan, but simply being prepared to meet any challenges that arise will facilitate the coordination of several authorities during a maritime SAR operation. Simply stated, the most important thing is for all actors to be clear about who is in command and what their own task is. Pre-agreed operating models also boost the efficiency of operations during real incidents. 9.2 Examples of best practises in SAR joint operation development projects in Finland The 'MoMeVA' concept A Finnish approach to collaboration between different sectors in emergency planning The purpose of having a cooperation plan for preparedness for multisectoral maritime incidents is twofold: to clarify different actors' roles during major and multisectoral maritime incidents, and to define national operational procedures for the key operations required by collaboration. A maritime SAR cooperation plan strengthens the foundations for operational preparedness planning, training, and operations. The plan was drawn up under the leadership of the Finnish Border Guard. All actors mentioned in the Maritime Search and Rescue Act, plus several key organisations involved in maritime SAR, were invited to participate. All of the maritime actors (over 20) participated in drawing up the plan on the basis of this invitation. Each actor appointed a contact person for the project. The contact person represented their organisation in the working group and consulted their organisation's other experts as required. Before actual work on the plan began, each actor described how maritime SAR was coordinated 81

84 and developed in their organisation, and how training was provided. After this, the structure of the plan was divided into about 20 different subject areas, called 'themes'. Each actor was allowed to say which themes interested them in particular and choose which themes they would like to participate in. Each theme was led by the authority in charge of the functionality in question. A launch meeting hosted by the Finnish Border Guard was used to launch planning for each theme. These meetings sought to discuss each theme's scope, policies and subject areas. The first four themes to be handled were: Key norms relating to major and multisectoral maritime incidents, A threat analysis of maritime SAR; Incident classifications; and The principles of coordinating maritime SAR and multisectoral incidents. These themes also formed a general foundation and risk assessment for the other themes in the cooperation plan. Small groups worked thematically on the plan, largely via . After the launch meetings, the theme leaders were responsible for work supervision and collating materials. After the launch meetings, there were three joint meetings that involved all of the working groups. The first two were progress meetings, to ensure that work was progressing according to plan. All of the themes were completed during the third joint meeting, which was held just under six months after work began. After this, the cooperation plan was sent to all of the organisations for official comments. The completed plan was introduced at the beginning of It contains about 250 pages of text on 21 different themes, which are: Key norms relating to major and multisectoral maritime incidents A threat analysis of maritime SAR Incident classification The basics of coordinating maritime SAR and multisectoral incidents The operations of the national maritime SAR advisory committee and the management boards of maritime SAR districts The basics of regional cooperation planning The basics of inspecting maritime SAR units The basics of communications Releasing information to the public Evacuations at sea Establishing an evacuation centre Emergency medical care and TRIAGE operations at sea Gathering information about passengers, identifying victims, and informing relatives Weather services How to deal with ship fires The basics of cleaning up oil and chemical spills Refuge Investigating maritime incidents National training systems relating to maritime operations The principles behind using aircraft Using State-owned company vessels for maritime SAR In the future, the cooperation plan should also include 'The basics of conducting operations near a chemical spill'. The cooperation plan will be continually maintained and developed. Updating the plan is the responsibility of the maritime SAR advisory committee, which, according to the Finnish Maritime Search and Rescue Act, is there to provide assistance to the Border Guard in the planning, development and monitoring of maritime search and rescue. As the maritime SAR advisory committee includes representatives from almost every party involved in collaboration, there is no need to create a separate organisation to maintain the plan. Actors who do not belong to the maritime SAR advisory committee may make suggestions to the committee either in writing or by participating in committee meetings as experts in their own fields. The Border Guard is responsible for publishing the cooperation plan. The cooperation plan is a public document that is available in Finnish and Swedish. It will only be published electronically. Up-to-date versions in both 82

85 languages can be downloaded here: www. raja.fi/sar. Each actor is responsible for forwarding the principles and content of the cooperation plan within their own sector/organisation. The national cooperation plan has been very well received in all sectors and at all levels. It is clear that it will take years to mobilise all the operations contained in the plan, but even now it is evident that the plan has already generated closer cooperation between sectors during The plan has also paved the way for harmonising regional common operational procedures and agreements The Baltic ACO model and how it was created 47 The coordination of aeronautical operations during maritime SAR officially began in Finland in 2001 when the Border Guard and the Finnish Civil Aviation Administration launched a joint project to analyse the possibility of implementing ACO preparedness and creating the required work processes and training programmes. A project team was assembled from representatives of the Headquarters of the Border Guard, the Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Centre, the Air Patrol Squadron, and the aeronautical search and rescue coordination centre maintained by the Finnish Civil Aviation Administration. This issue had previously been handled in Finland (after the final report on the M/S Estonia incident) as a joint project between the Air Patrol Squadron and the Border and Coast Guard Academy, and it was decided that an ACO seminar should be held. The materials used as a basis for this seminar were: the need to coordinate rescue units' operations as required by the Hamburg Convention (a general agreement on SAR) and the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) manual's brief description of the Aircraft Coordinator's (ACO) duties. The project team took part in the seminar, during which they gathered feedback from experts. The team then used this feedback to produce basic procedures for ACO operations, and guidelines for the content of an ACO course. The project team's report was completed in spring The first ACO course was held by the Border and Coast Guard Academy in autumn 2002, and was attended by Border Guard pilots, Search and Rescue Mission Coordinators, and air traffic controllers working at the aeronautical search and rescue coordination centre. ACO procedures Baltic ACO procedures are currently based on three basic procedures covering the simultaneous use of several aircraft to implement search operations, evacuation operations in good visibility, and evacuation operations that require aircraft to pass through cloud in the target zone. The latter had been a particular source of concern to aircraft personnel before the creation of the procedure and training programme. The procedures are based on an aircraft's ability to follow the flight path drawn up by the ACO. Air traffic arriving in and departing from the target zone is steered along this flight path through different route points to avoid dangerous situations. If conditions so demand, safety can be increased by using different altitudes for work at the target, and for arriving in and departing from the zone. The route points are input into the aircraft's navigational aids using directions and distances relative to the target's location. ACO collaboration in the Baltic Sea region Sweden was also creating its own national ACO system at the same time, and quite soon after the first ACO course, the two countries' administrative organisations began to discuss the possibility of combining both countries' procedures into a standard Baltic ACO procedure for the Baltic Sea region. Representatives from project teams in both 47 Text by Mika Runsten, Chief, ARCC Finland. 83

86 countries met in Helsinki, but at that time, the differences in their basic approaches were so great that it was impossible to reconcile them. In 2008, the Border Guard organised an international course targeted at ACO trainers in the Baltic Sea States. This course was held at the Border and Coast Guard Academy and was attended by representatives from Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Germany and Norway. The Danish representatives said they had come to acquire another model for their own ACO developments, after already having acquainted themselves with the Swedish model. The Danes thought that aircraft location systems were now sufficiently advanced for the basic procedure to be updated and, at the same time, simplified. This modification also enabled Sweden to adapt its concept in a way that enabled the re-launch of discussions on a joint Baltic ACO model. A joint project to create a Baltic ACO manual was launched in 2009, and the following year (2010) Finland, Sweden and Denmark signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in which they committed to using a standard procedure and organising international ACO courses. Courses have since been organised in 84 Denmark and Finland, and participants have come from almost all of the Baltic Sea States as well as from other countries in Europe. International ACO development work In 2010, representatives from Sweden, Finland and Denmark presented the Baltic ACO manual to a combined team of experts from the ICAO and IMO (JWG SAR) in Bremen, where it piqued great interest. The clarity and scope of the material in particular highlighted the need to update the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) manual: it should provide more information on existing material on aeronautical coordination. The meeting decided to form a separate working group to produce material for IAMSAR on the basis of the Baltic ACO manual. The working group consisted of a chairman appointed by JWG and a three-person Finnish ACO team. During the project, the working group asked for comments on their material, and feedback was given by Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands in particular. The material was completed in autumn 2013, and a new section based on the Baltic ACO model will be added to the next version of the IAMSAR manual in 2016, that is, 'Multiple Aircraft Operations'.

87 9.3 Managing ship fires and opportunities for international cooperation in the Baltic Sea There are states in the Baltic Sea region that have teams vaguely comparable to MIRG teams. These are deployed to extinguish ship fires and in other MIRG-related operations. Although the project was informed about these teams, this analysis will focus solely on observations about MIRG readiness in the Baltic Sea Harnessing MIRG teams in Baltic Sea States When examining MIRG readiness in the Baltic Sea region, states in western, northern and south-western areas evidently have a strong readiness with regard to MIRG services. MIRG operations are currently to be found in Finland, Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Norway. In eastern and south-eastern areas of the Baltic Sea, MIRG operations still require time for development, even though the importance and benefit of MIRG operations has clearly been noted. Several nations already have plans to improve their MIRG readiness in the future. Areas that already have well-established MIRG operations can, if required, supply other nations with MIRG teams, as long as there is a smooth flow of information about the teams' readiness between maritime search and rescue coordination centres in different countries. Effective MIRG operations also require the efficient and cost-effective use of maritime SAR equipment and craft, and their availability for all operations irrespective of what organisation requires them. In some states, cooperation between different organisations is not necessarily as smooth and synchronised as it could be, but the current desire for efficiency and cost-effectiveness will drive states to better harness their resources in the future. 85

88 9.3.2 The Northern Baltic The Northern Baltic has strong readiness with regard to MIRG teams. Strong readiness denotes a team that is able to quickly transfer to a target that is far from the shore. In practice, transferring to such targets requires the use of a helicopter. A total of three MIRG groups are available in Finland. All the groups are on continual standby. The groups are strategically located along Finland's coastline, and response times to incidents in Finland's Search and Rescue Region are short. Sweden has a total of two teams. One team is based in Stockholm and is therefore able to provide rapid assistance for maritime incidents occurring in the Northern Baltic. The other team is based in Karlskrona. Although it has a slightly longer response time, this team can also be used in the Northern Baltic Central Baltic The Central Baltic has slightly lower MIRG readiness/coverage than the Northern Baltic. The area has only one team with a satisfactory response time coming from Sweden. Teams could also potentially come from Stockholm or Finland. Using Finland's units would depend on the location of the distress vessel, as the team travels by helicopter. Transferring a large MIRG team far out to sea would probably require refuelling near the target, which would further delay its response time Southern Baltic There are several MIRG teams located in Southern Baltic States that are prepared to respond to a variety of maritime incidents. Teams are available from Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Germany. 48 Teams travelling by helicopter are available from Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The German teams mainly travel in specially equipped maritime SAR surface vessels. The eastern part of the Southern Baltic is clearly covered by fewer MIRG teams than the western part. The eastern part has only one team available 48 In Germany, maritime fire and rescue services are not referred to as MIRG services, even though they are largely comparable to MIRG services. from Sweden by helicopter. The next closest MIRG teams would arrive by surface vessel, or would be a several-hour flight away. This would impact the continuity of operations during, for example, a ship fire Future challenges and opportunities The outlook for MIRG teams is at once bright and challenging. It is bright because many countries are keen to develop their MIRG operations in a more professional, effective and cost-effective direction. However, costeffectiveness places its own challenges on MIRG operations, as accidents requiring MIRG teams occur very infrequently. Many nations are no doubt wondering whether MIRG operations are even required in certain areas. Yet, luckily, most nations have realised the necessity of MIRG teams during incidents at sea. It is vital to make appropriate investments in MIRG operations, to enable a proper response to incidents. No country need cope alone in the face of a major maritime incident, as international cooperation will provide the required reinforcements. Maintaining sufficient preparedness in certain countries can enable the creation of a comprehensive and effective network of MIRG teams in the Baltic Sea region. In order to make MIRG operations both effective and efficient, Baltic Sea States must organise joint basic training courses (for both officers and crew) that are open to everyone. In Sweden, the MSB is currently organising a MIRG officers training course that can be attended by Swedish-speaking people from any country. However, courses should be organised in English, so that everyone can take part, and also because English is the official language at sea. As MIRG operations in some Baltic Sea States are more advanced than others, the Baltic Sea States should establish a joint forum for sharing information and expertise in order to further develop MIRG operations throughout the Baltic Sea region. For example, Finland currently uses standard operating procedures 86

89 that enable its MIRG teams to operate consistently whatever the situation. A forum would enable such guidelines to be shared with other countries. This would also enable the launch of developmental efforts aimed at providing all Baltic Sea MIRG teams with standard guidelines/regulations on how to operate safely and effectively on board a distress vessel. It is also worth remembering the importance of joint exercises in standardising MIRG operations, developing operations, and promoting safe and effective rescue operations. As all countries have scarce financial resources for organising meetings and exercises, there should be a rotating system of responsibility. It would also be useful for the content of exercises to be changed from year to year, so that teams and inter-team cooperation could be developed as well as possible Sharing the costs of MIRG operations between States Almost every state in the Baltic Sea region has a slightly different way of funding its MIRG teams. There are some government organisations that finance all of the direct expenses incurred by their contracted partners from MIRG operations. On the other hand, there are countries where organisations involved in maritime SAR/MIRG operations must pay all of their own costs. There are also countries where a government organisation makes an annual contribution to the MIRG service provider, with the intention of covering the costs of MIRG operations in accordance with the service provider's budget. In the current European economic climate, all kinds of organisations are carefully considering how to fund their operations, and the marginal nature of MIRG operations will no doubt come to the fore. MIRG service providers are primarily emergency services whose funds are under the spotlight, and so must be channelled to the most important operations. Although operations requiring MIRG teams are quite rare, the prevention of one major incident at sea will pay back all of the costs of MIRG operations with interest. This is why it is vital that states without MIRG teams participate in their funding. This could be achieved with annual contributions or by taking responsibility for the costs of practical arrangements, such as exercises, the acquisition of equipment, or any standard rescue tasks caused by a potential operation Cleaning up hazardous substances A safe and effective clean-up after an incident involving hazardous substances is extremely challenging on land and even more so at sea. Many of the elements that contribute to the challenging nature of such incidents at sea cannot be influenced in the same way as in similar incidents on land. Some Baltic Sea States have MIRG teams that specialise in dealing with hazardous substances, some of which primarily operate using helicopters and others using surface vessels. Helicopters enable teams to reach a target quickly, but they can only carry a limited amount of equipment. Therefore, once at the scene, these teams can only carry out reconnaissance missions or plug the leak. Safety regulations for largerscale incidents also require more equipment or personnel than can be transported by helicopter. For example, in Germany, teams travel to the target by ship, which enables the transportation of considerable amounts of equipment and a large number of personnel. On the other hand, it can take some time to reach the target in a surface vessel, which could lead to the incident escalating to the extent that the hazardous substances unit can no longer deal with it. It is therefore vital for units from different countries to cooperate on larger-scale incidents involving hazardous substances when required. On the other hand, if it is not possible for a helicopter to bring in a suitably trained MIRG team or the other personnel and equipment required to support its operations, the organisation in command must carefully consider its options for dealing with or containing the incident. Saving 87

90 human life is always the first priority, and only then should other measures be considered, depending on the nature of the incident The Finnish MIRG and its standard operational procedures as an example Finland has drawn up Standard Operation Procedures for MIRG operations (FIN MIRG SOP 2014), which are used by the Border Guard and the emergency services when MIRG teams are deployed to a ship accident. 49 The need for operational guidelines was born when MIRG training and coordination was developed at a national level. It was noted that both the Search and Rescue Mission Commander (SMC) and the officer coordinating MIRG operations on the distress vessel must have the same view of how these teams operate. It is vital for the SMC to know what type of team he/she is coordinating, and what its skills are. Safety is another reason for creating standard operational procedures for MIRG operations. Unlike on-land firefighting operations, there are no existing national guidelines on occupational safety for rescue operations at sea. However, as it is clear that maritime rescue operations are dangerous, some sort of guidelines had to be drawn up for legal reasons and to enable post-mission evaluation. 49 English and Swedish versions of these standard operational procedures are available for official use from the Finnish Border Guard. The FIN MIRG SOP collection is a very straightforward set of guidelines on avoiding human error. These operational guidelines seek to act as a memory aid, so that the special know-how required in infrequent operations does not rely solely on training or memory. They include detailed descriptions of all the actions involved in basic operations, and of all personnel roles. A maritime search and rescue coordination centre can make use of the guidelines in a variety of ways. The guidelines start with a flowchart tool that can be used to conduct a risk assessment of a distress vessel. Its goal is to harmonise risk assessment and offer all actors a commensurate and easy-tounderstand picture of the situation. Section 6 of the national MoMeVa preparedness plan (presented in Section 9.2.1), 'How to deal with a ship fire', is used in conjunction with these guidelines. The SOP are also extensively used in national training and in evaluating operations and exercises, and thereby to develop operations as a whole. Particular attention has been paid to the emergencies and exceptional circumstances facing maritime rescue personnel, such as abandoning a vessel. Choices affecting occupational safety have been highlighted at all stages of an operation, as has coordinating the operation with the smallest risk to personnel in relation to the desired benefit. 88

91 9.4 MRO and medical care During a maritime incident, maritime SAR authorities are in command of operations and their execution. Healthcare authorities are responsible for implementing and coordinating medical care to support maritime SAR authorities. Medical care provision depends on the type and location of the incident. The objective is always to ensure the most appropriate medical treatment for patients Emergency medical care and patient classification It is not always possible or even expedient to transport appropriate medical resources to the scene of a maritime incident. If the target is a vessel and there are several patients, they will have to be evacuated either by air or by other surface vessels. An area for treating and classifying patients should be established at the closest medical unit with a road connection to the mainland. This unit's treatment and transportation readiness should be confirmed by the healthcare authorities and emergency medical care service in question. The crews of large passenger vessels usually include a healthcare professional, usually a trained nurse. He/she will be able to evaluate patients within the framework of his/his operating environment, and will have been trained to deal with sudden medical emergencies aboard the ship. Any medical care available aboard commercial vessels is usually provided by a lay officer trained to provide emergency medical care. It is very difficult to predict the nature of a major incident on board a vessel, so patient classification will have to be planned on a case-by-case basis. In extreme circumstances, there are both injured and uninjured people aboard the ship, and the ship is under threat of destruction by fire or sinking. It may not be possible to evacuate all passengers in time. In such circumstances, traditional patient classification may not be workable, and so a classification system may have to be selected on a case-by-case basis. This is why medical personnel must be involved in coordination centre activities as soon as possible in the event of a major incident. When there are many patients and resources are too limited to treat them all at once, the objective is to identify those in most need of treatment and focus on them. Priority is given to patients threatened by loss of life and permanent disablement, or those whose status may rapidly worsen. In cases with many patients, patient classification at the scene is initially carried out by first responders, until medical professionals can be brought in. However, it is probable that the entire classification and evacuation process will occur without the presence of healthcare officials Assembly point During major incidents, rescued persons are taken to assembly points established on the shore. If the distress vessel is a long way from the shore or there are a considerable number of rescued persons, a temporary assembly point may be established near the target, for example, on an island or another vessel. Planning the location of assembly points should be done regionally among all of the actors involved. The most important factor in selecting the location of an assembly point is that the authorities and voluntary organisations must be able to get their required personnel there quickly. Another important factor is that the assembly point should be located both near the distress vessel and also in a place from which it is easy to transport patients to treatment facilities. It should be possible to bring evacuated and rescued persons to the assembly point by either road, aircraft or helicopter. The assembly point should be located in a place where personnel and equipment maintenance can be carried out in close proximity. It should also be possible to seal off the assembly point from outsiders using a small number of personnel. 89

92 The assembly point must be large enough to temporarily house hundreds of people in an appropriate manner, even though the intention is to transport these people to either treatment facilities or other accommodation. This means that assembly points must organise and maintain sufficient maintenance operations, toilet facilities, sewers, showers, waste collection, heating, ventilation, and cleaning. When rescued persons arrive at the assembly point, injured and uninjured persons are immediately placed in separate areas, as their requirements differ. Injured passengers are placed in treatment areas where, after standard patient classification, they will be transported to hospitals for further treatment. Uninjured passengers will be gathered together in their own area, where they will receive psychosocial support if required. Trained volunteers can be used to support the authorities at assembly points for patients and uninjured passengers. Volunteers can be trained in, for example, psychosocial support and first-aid tasks, and teams can also be used to support the authorities in a variety of tasks relating to the registration, transportation, protection and treatment of evacuated persons. Treatment and reception areas for injured and uninjured people may, depending on the circumstances, be in the same building or completely separate. Evacuation centres or points are not established for smaller incidents. In such cases, transportation should be organised using public transport vehicles MRO and medical care in the Baltic Sea region In the Baltic Sea States, national legislation states that medical preparedness and planning is the task of healthcare. A variety of different national plans based on this legislation are in use. The plans are not primarily operational guidelines for crisis situations, but rather act as strategic guidelines on which healthcare authorities can plan their own preparedness and operations in a variety of exceptional circumstances. Healthcare plans do not contain separate arrangements for maritime incidents they are included in existing sections dealing with major incidents. Mass evacuations pose challenges for a variety of authorities. No country has the routine resources required to maintain operations at a scale that would enable daily preparedness for mass evacuations. A mass evacuation will overload the healthcare system if there is a great deal of patients requiring medical care. In such instances, authorities will have to evaluate whether the resources at nearby hospitals will be sufficient, or whether support must be sought nationally from other hospitals. In the Baltic Sea region, healthcare authorities cooperate with maritime search and rescue authorities in planning for major maritime incidents. The varying practices different countries in the Baltic Sea region have for dealing with major maritime incidents affect participation in planning. The role played by healthcare in a major incident is only highlighted once rescued persons have been transported to an assembly point, or directly to hospital, and their treatment has begun. Rescue operations and emergency medical care are initially carried out by, or in cooperation with, maritime SAR authorities. According to a multinational framework agreement on joint Nordic healthcare (2002), the Nordic countries are obliged to heed a request for help, keep each other informed about their preparedness systems, and cooperate on the development of healthcare preparedness. Within this framework, a standard operating model was also developed for mass evacuations. The model is based on the common use of resources to aid all citizens of the Nordic countries. The joint Nordic healthcare framework agreement also enables healthcare actors to develop their own preparedness for major maritime incidents. However, as the agreement was made between the healthcare authorities of different countries, other authorities are not involved, which poses a challenge. Many 90

93 different authorities, led by the maritime SAR authority, take part in operations relating to major maritime incidents. It would therefore be beneficial if cooperation agreements were drawn up among different types of authorities. One such agreement could act as a good basis for developing more extensive agreements covering the Baltic Sea region, or for enhancing cooperation on MROs and medical care. During a major maritime incident and its associated mass evacuation, circumstances may arise in which national resources are insufficient to deal with the situation. This sort of MRO planning must take the EU's Civil Protection Mechanism into account. An amended version of the EU's Civil Protection Mechanism came into force at the beginning of 2014, after a joint decision by the European Parliament and Member States. The Civil Protection Mechanism will be used to improve the provision of assistance, and boost the efficiency of preparedness and prevention for both natural disasters and major incidents caused by human activity. The EU's Civil Protection Mechanism is based on resources provided by Member States. These resources are collected and delivered to the scenes of disasters to be used in the country's relief operation. The Civil Protection Mechanism's coordination structures are also used in serious crises in which the Lisbon Treaty's solidarity clause is applied. On the basis of this solidarity clause, the European Union and its Member States will work together in the spirit of cooperation if a Member State is the target of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or major incident caused by human activity. within the Union is a key factor in improving the effectiveness of the Civil Protection Mechanism. Member States must be aware of the importance of host nation support during national and EU disaster management. 50 Summary The Baltic Sea region has a good level of preparedness for medical care during major maritime incidents. Plans are up to date, both nationally and regionally. However, a major incident requiring the evacuation of large numbers of people at sea is challenging, and thought should be given to whether national planning should pay greater attention to situations in which the country's own resources are insufficient. What to do when international help arrives, and what to do if there is a need to evacuate people to other countries? Where possible, bilateral agreements between authorities should also state how other authorities will take part in operations. For example, both maritime incidents and preparations for maritime incidents also require other authorities to be taken into consideration in addition to maritime SAR authorities. Healthcare professionals and actors are not always included in SAR planning processes. This operating culture has to change if improvements are to be achieved. All participating organisations must be genuinely involved at all stages. Host nation support A 2010 resolution of the Council of the European Union approved host nation support. Host nation support means the receipt of international assistance in circumstances when national resources are insufficient to deal with the situation. According to the Council of the European Union, making it easier to receive aid from 50 EU Commission staff working document. EU Host Nation Support Guidelines. 1 June 2012 SWD (2012) 169 final. 91

94 10 AN ANALYSIS OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION'S PREPAREDNESS INCLUDING SUGGESTED ACTION POINTS There are many organisations responsible for maritime SAR in the Baltic Sea region. The responsible organisation may be a state civil authority, a military authority, or a voluntary organisation. However, it appears that this does not greatly affect operations. All of the countries and organisations examined during this project work on the basis of very similar structures and cooperation models, with similar objectives. Every country bases its operations on an international SAR agreement (the Hamburg Convention) and the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) manual, which is jointly published by the IMO and ICAO. The greatest differences are to be found in the authority that coordinates operations on a practical level and this authority's role; other participants; and the funding and compensation mechanisms for those providing services and performing operations. Although there are several different models, they all have their positive aspects. All of the Baltic Sea States, Iceland, and Norway have made preparations for maritime incidents to the extent of their national capacities. They all face the same challenges, and they all feel they are wrestling with the same problems. The greatest difference appears to be in the national operating cultures of multiauthority collaborations. For example, in some cases, legislation can prevent effective inter-authority cooperation: for example, when firefighting and rescue personnel cannot be used at sea. In other countries, authorities are not used to working together or have not had to work together each has handled its own sector and that has been sufficient. This has often led to overlapping management structures, and coordination centres that have unclear jurisdictions and roles during incidents. In these cases, it is often difficult for different actors to exchange information. In other countries, different actors have been consolidated in one centre to achieve closer cooperation and better situational awareness. Command structures and cooperation arrangements have a great impact on situational awareness, and it is always difficult to create a commensurate picture of the situation. In some countries, all decisive questions concerning cooperation revolve around divisions of costs: who pays what and to whom. Such countries are typically often lacking a rescue act or maritime search and rescue act, and largescale maritime incidents are considered to fall under the scope of a 'crisis act', which does not necessarily provide answers to all of the critical questions concerning maritime operations. However, the majority of these problems would be fairly easy to solve if national decision-makers were made aware of the challenges involved in dealing with large-scale maritime incidents. Usually, administrative decisions and changes are not always tied to financial interests only, but rather to political will and a practical need that must be nationally justified. The greatest challenge in promoting these types of developmental efforts appears to be the lack of a maritime SAR forum covering the entire Baltic Sea region. This forum could discuss the coordination of preparedness for multisectoral maritime incidents as a whole, between all of the countries in the Baltic Sea region, and forward sector-specific matters to separate sector-specific cooperation bodies, both nationally and internationally. 92

95 10.1 A risk analysis of the overall situation and the most critical areas for development When examining the preparedness and planning of all key actors in the Baltic Sea region, the need for standard operational procedures is clearly underlined. Herein, many key and critical components in the development of cooperation can be identified. Developmental measures have been launched in a number of functionalities, and these may have been under development for a long time. Several functionalities, such as operating models for police-led maritime operations and practical planning for cleaning up chemical spills, have been practically nonexistent in all of the countries examined. The following diagram has been used to highlight certain critical areas for development on the basis of the material examined during this project. These critical areas have been subjectively evaluated on the basis of which stage they are at and how likely they will be developed, and how great an impact the said functionality has on the success of cooperation. The values have been used to calculate a risk value whose magnitude indicates how critical each functionality is to the success of search and rescue operations. 51 A small risk does not mean that the said functionality is already being developed or that it does not require development. 51 The risk value in the diagram has been calculated on a subjective basis by assigning a value (0 3) to the developmental outlook with regard to maritime SAR. That is, how probable is it that the aspect in question will be developed, or whether it is already under development. The values used were as follows: 0=will not be developed; 1=unlikely; 2=quite likely; 3=probable. In addition, another set of values (also 0 3) have been calculated to show the consequences of an incident if cooperation on the subject areas in question is not developed. The key to these values is: 0=no impact; 1=minor impact; 2=significant impact; 3=critical impact. The risk value has been calculated by multiplying the developmental outlook value by the consequence value. 93

96 Figure 8: Risk value A joint ACO model has not been introduced/implemented 9 Jurisdiction guiding authority action is unclear during incidents involving criminal activity 9 MIRG teams are not able to engage in effective cooperation 7,5 No joint model for evaluating the status of an incident 7,5 The development of maritime chemical clean-ups is not coordinated 6,25 Lack of experience in international cooperation 6 No joint maritime MRO plan for the Baltic Sea 6 Not all countries will engage in cooperation 6 No joint multisectoral maritime forum 6 No real time common situation picture of the incident to be shared 6 MROs have not been practised among Baltic Sea States 4 Sectors make internal developments without dialogue 4 No common codes or language 4 An insufficient number of MIRG teams 4 No national maritime MRO plan 3 The standard of MIRG teams is low or cannot be maintained 3 The management of maritime terrorism and other tactical police operations is not being developed Total capacity for practical preparedness Preparedness in relation to risk What is a sufficient amount of material and immaterial preparedness? This is naturally a very difficult question to answer. For example, in the Baltic Sea region, the number of MIRG teams has become fixed in those countries with such operations. This usually means one team per 400 kilometres of coastline. A comparable ratio also describes the number of larger patrol boats and maritime SAR helicopters. Smaller vessels are usually to be found at intervals of tens of kilometres. In practice, these quantities also appear to be what can be maintained with current financial and other resources. When it comes to MIRG teams, the quantitative capacity of these small teams 94

97 matches the requirements of marine traffic relatively well. In this form of preparedness, the key idea is that MIRG teams do not exist only for maritime operations, but rather the service is provided 'alongside' other routine on-land operations. This is appropriate, cost-effective and qualitatively beneficial, as the service is provided by professional rescue personnel who extinguish fires as part of their primary employment. When comparing this type of operating model to, for example, a vessel's own firefighting team (which will usually not have any experience of extinguishing a real fire, except for exercises) the difference with regard to occupational safety and ability is quite clear. Preparedness for ship fires Preparedness for rare situations should be realistic in relation to the desired function. For example, the difficulty of extinguishing a ship fire and the experiences gained from it, such as the Lisco Gloria incident in In general, it can be said that once a fire on a passenger vessel has reached a certain stage, it is practically impossible to extinguish it at sea. The same is also true of many other types of vessels. The decisive factor appears to be an early and fast response while the situation can be still brought under control. This requires a relatively agile, rapid response team travelling by helicopter. This will usually involve cooperation between national maritime SAR authorities. In such a model, the maritime actor provides air transport and the on-shore actor, often the emergency services, provides firefighters. Success requires wellplanned, effective and seamless cooperation. Due to the long distances involved, heavy equipment transported by surface vessels often automatically arrives too late, when the situation can no longer be brought under control even with a considerable amount of equipment and a large crew. Maintaining several light, effective and well-trained teams is always notably cheaper, and may well be sufficient in relation to the desired function, as long as the overall package is carefully considered. Monitoring the training and expertise of a smaller team is also significantly cheaper and easier. The result is often a better-trained, more effective team, but the challenge is a relatively small reserve. To ensure the continuity of operations, a reserve is one of the key requirements for successful firefighting operations. By developing MIRG readiness in the Baltic Sea region among all its states, it is possible to solve the problem of a small national reserve. If three to four smallish national reserves could produce a major reserve, the continuity of operations would be assured. It would also be easier to support comparable units in neighbouring countries if operating models were developed and agreed on together. By following these general principles, other specialised services that are either too expensive, or even unnecessary, for individual countries to produce alone could be produced in the Baltic Sea region as a whole. An example of such a specialised service could be a mobile team experienced in chemical cleanups at sea, which could be used throughout the Baltic Sea region. A division of costs could even be considered for this type of operation. Preparedness and cooperation plans for MROs All countries have drawn up a national plan for MROs or are in the process of doing so. However, there are variations in the content of national plans for mass evacuations and major incidents. Certain special features of maritime incidents have not always been integrated into these plans, such as the logistics of managing mass evacuations or the human resources that will eventually achieve the desired function. If all key actors are not working together, then an examination of overall readiness planning may show that the planned resources, for example human resources, may not necessarily be available. Often, these plans need to be more realistic, and should not be planned based on the best possible scenarios alone. If planning is based on both minimum and maximum readiness, the plan's viability will be more firmly assured. The evacuation of large numbers of people and preparedness for on-shore operations 95

98 should be based on existing structures and resources that are used in some other routine operations. For example, passenger terminals and sports halls, rather than temporary equipment brought to the scene. It is easier to transport 1,500 people 20 kilometres than it is to build shelters for this number of people 'in the field'. When it comes to passenger traffic, one of the most natural solutions is to get the distress vessel to port or obtain assistance from another passenger vessel in the vicinity. This type of approach and readiness planning does not generate any fixed costs, but rather is based on coordination, advance planning, and the use of existing opportunities. It mainly requires work from personnel, and advance agreements with, for example, properties. It would be extremely beneficial if all of the Baltic Sea States were to have a national MRO plan based on their local operating culture and resources, and for this plan to account for the multisectoral work required by authorities in the event of a large-scale maritime incident. These plans should include principles and operating models for giving and receiving international assistance. 96

99 11 THE REQUIREMENTS OF JOINT PLANNING IN PREPAREDNESS FOR MULTISECTORAL MARITIME INCIDENTS Successful planning for multisectoral incidents begins with national-level cooperation between different sectors. It can clearly be seen that this cooperation still poses a major challenge in all countries. It is therefore not particularly surprising that building up international multisectoral cooperation between these actors is only in the early stages. This is why one key objective should be to open up discussion channels between Baltic Sea States. Several key actors, such as rescue authorities and the police, currently have Nordic or Baltic region forums for developing international cooperation in their own sectors. Dialogue between existing international forums is also completely lacking. Several Nordic cooperation bodies are described below: NOFOPS The Nordic Seminar of the Police on Public Order and Safety Affairs is a cooperation body for Nordic police forces. Police commissioners meet to prepare policies on public order, and safety and security issues. The representatives sent to NOFOPS are police commissioners from the Nordic countries. NOFOPS usually convenes several times per year. Issues relating to maritime law enforcement and security are things that NOFOPS could prepare as part of joint Nordic readiness planning. When it comes to police operations, NOFOPS is the highest form of cooperation through meetings of police commissioners. NORDRED and the Nordic MIRG Forum The NORDRED agreement covers crossborder search and rescue operations and the provision of aid in the event of accident. Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark signed the agreement in 1989, and Iceland joined in Nordred Kontaktgrupp is a permanent working group that monitors the implementation of this agreement and ensures that it is kept up to date. The working group also seeks to coordinate and develop cooperation between Nordic rescue organisations. It convenes about twice a year. Each Nordic country takes presidency of the working group in turn for a term of three years. Each term usually culminates in a conference. In the NORDRED working group, Denmark is represented by Rigspolitichefen and Beredskabsstyrelsen, Finland by the Ministry of the Interior, Iceland by Rigspolitichefen, Norway by Hovedredningssentralen i Sør- Norge (HRS-SN) supported by the DSB (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap), and Sweden by the MSB (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap). NORDRED represents only one aspect of the Nordic cooperation undertaken in this sector. Established forms of Nordic cooperation in the rescue sector are: annual meetings between ministers responsible for preparedness; a permanent civil servant working group that prepares for ministerial meetings (ämbetsmannamöte); the Nordiskt Mötesforum, which consists of ministries' EU and NATO representatives; a meeting of department heads responsible for rescue operations (Departementsmöte); a meeting of Nordic rescue commissioners; the NORDRED 97

100 working group; and cooperation on fire prevention, statistics, location information, and research. In addition to these forms of cooperation, there are several ongoing projects that have been agreed upon in Nordic rescue minister meetings. 52 The Nordic MIRG Forum (Nordisk RITS) is a Nordic cooperation forum for MIRG services that operates under NORDRED. It is described in more detail in Section 5.6. This body currently cooperates with, for example, the EU-MIRG project. The Forum convenes once or twice a year, or when otherwise required. However, authorities responsible for maritime search and rescue are not permanently represented in this forum, which is a clear failing. SAR and medical care It is surprising that, although maritime SAR is coordinated globally, the Baltic Sea does not have its own regular forum for handling maritime SAR issues. Cooperation mainly occurs as bilateral or tripartite negotiations. When it comes to SAR operations, international cooperation and its development are mainly served by bilateral agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. Medical care also lacks a joint body that could meet regularly to discuss comparable issues throughout the Baltic Sea region. However, Nordiskt hälsoberedskapsavtal is a healthcare agreement made by the Nordic Council of Ministers that involves regular meetings of a body known as the 'Svalbards gruppen'. The chairperson of this body is always a representative of the country that currently has presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers. The group meets 3 4 times per year. When it comes to planning preparedness and field operations in emergency medical care, the development of international cooperation is mainly based on European or global medical conferences (such as the European Resuscitation Council's 52 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of FInland (2012) Annual Report on Nordic Cooperation congresses) and a variety of ad hoc or round table meetings on special themes A vision the Baltic Sea SAR Forum If the goal is international dialogue between sectors in the Baltic Sea region, these forums should also conduct multisectoral discussions at this level. A suitable international forum must be found without building onerous new organisations or working groups, as there are already too many of these in the administrative sector. With current resources, a single civil servant no longer has the time to meet current demands with regard to developing operations and keeping up with general advancements. This is largely due to the need for drastic cuts in the public sector in many countries. Another factor is the relatively small size of maritime safety and security and SAR organisations in comparison with many other actors, and there are very few officials handling these matters in the countries examined during this project. Often, these same people are responsible for almost all of the national development and maintenance in their sector, as well as for international cooperation. As so many different projects being implemented in the Baltic Sea region concern maritime search and rescue in some way, a single civil servant simply does not have the time to put considerable effort into all of these projects. The way forward? One solution would be to integrate the development of multisectoral maritime incidents into an existing international cooperation body. However, it is difficult to see how it could be directly linked to, for example, any of the existing Nordic cooperation bodies. This is because Nordic cooperation strongly focuses on Nordic issues. Nordic cooperation also has a long history complete with its own important and justified approaches that should not be scrapped. 98

101 In any case, the Nordic countries have a major impact on the entire Baltic Sea region and a shared interest in promoting cooperation and development with neighbouring regions. One way forward could be to form an expert team consisting of civil servants from these Nordic bodies, a sort of general secretariat, with representatives of other Baltic Sea countries. This team could work under the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and coordinate cross-sectoral cooperation and development in the Baltic Sea region. The CBSS and its secretariat is therefore a worthy candidate, as it is one of the rare cooperation bodies in which Russia also fully participates. It is crucial to get Russia involved in this cooperation, and also justified, not only in the interests of neighbours, but in the interests of marine traffic throughout the Baltic Sea, which impacts all countries in the region to some extent. The CBSS's long-term priorities are currently being revised. Three priority areas will replace the existing five: Regional Identity, Sustainable and Prosperous Region, and Safe and Secure Region. Collaboration on preparedness for maritime incidents could surely be placed under the latter with relative ease. When examining the CBSS's priority areas, it appears as if this complex set of issues could be best developed under the Civil Protection Network. Since 2002, the Civil Protection Network has convened annually at the level of Directors-General to exchange views on ongoing activities and to coordinate joint measures in the field of civil protection, critical infrastructure protection and other emergency preparedness issues in the Baltic Sea Region. Additionally the network meets annually at senior expert level and on ad hoc basis in different constellations in order to discuss particular issues or prepare joint projects. The network's chairmanship follows the CBSS Presidency rotation. The 7th Baltic Sea States Civil Protection Directors- General meeting was held in Copenhagen on March 2009, hosted by the Danish Emergency Management Agency. The 8th Baltic Sea States Civil Protection Directors-General meeting was held in Vilnius in March/April 2010, hosted by the Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania. The XII CBSS Civil Protection Network Directors-General meeting was held in Helsinki on April 2014, hosted by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, under the auspices of the CBSS Finnish Presidency Examples of permanent bodies include: Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) and Expert Group on Maritime Policy. The BSRBCC focuses on security-related issues concerning border control in the Baltic Sea Region. Among the most important issues on its agenda are: developing practical forms of cooperation and simplifying communication routines between the parties. The focus is on border services, in the area of security controls at sea ports, marinas and sea areas; counteracting terrorism; and exchanging experiences and evaluations of existing standards of security controls. The Expert Group on Maritime Policy intended to contribute to sustainable growth and employment in the maritime sector, to combine and better coordinate all sea-related activities and tasks, as well as to strike an appropriate balance between economic, social and ecological aspects. The Expert Group is crosssectoral and will coordinate its work mainly between the priority areas of Economic Development and the Environment CBSS Homepage. 99

102 Towards deeper cooperation on SAR in the Baltic Sea region Through a functional cooperation body, we could move towards joint readiness planning for overall preparedness and maintaining effective operations throughout the Baltic Sea region. The most significant factors currently affecting planning and readiness are SAR conventions and bilateral agreements between SAR authorities from Baltic Sea States. They often define the form of international cooperation in greater detail and serve as the basis of other international maritime agreements. All of the countries in the Baltic Sea region are covered by bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries. An example of this is Sweden, whose central location in the Baltic Sea requires agreements with nine different countries. In Sweden's case, it is clear that managing and maintaining this number of agreements is in itself quite challenging and time-consuming. Although bilateral agreements will no doubt continue to be the most used and the most handy way of cooperating with and obtaining assistance from neighbouring countries, an SAR agreement, protocol or Memorandum of Cooperation covering the entire Baltic region should surely be considered. Multilateral agreements between countries could act as a temporary solution. These agreements could be Memoranda of Understanding and could steer the implementation of preparedness throughout the Baltic Sea region from a joint perspective. This could mean, for example, that neighbouring countries' resources and their locations would be taken into account on a more concrete level alongside national preparedness plans. Preparedness in certain expensive operations could even be rotated as one way of maintaining satisfactory readiness in spite of a downswing in the economic outlook. 100

103 12 EXISTING MODELS AS A BASIS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT This section will go through several of the most vital areas for development that could be relatively easily and affordably implemented as part of national systems Joint MIRG SOP and training for the Baltic Sea as part of the SAR system Several factors are involved in bringing ship fires under control. Due to very limited maritime firefighting resources, ship fires in the Baltic Sea are often multinational operations. It is therefore important for the operating models used by different countries during ship fires to be as standardised as possible. By using standard operational procedures, the small and often undersized resources available could be harnessed more effectively together, thereby achieving sufficient effectiveness. This would also lead to a significant improvement in occupational safety for rescue personnel. All of the Nordic countries currently use a MIRG system to spearhead ship fire operations. MIRG operations are very similar in all of the Nordic countries, and are mostly based on similar principles. The Baltic Sea should move from Nordic MIRG cooperation to cooperation that encompasses the entire region, and standard operational procedures should be developed. Standard operational procedures are a key component of successful cooperation between the various teams in the incident zone. Finland's MIRG SOP system has been presented in more detail in Section of this report. Translated version in English of these guidelines is available as appendices to this report, and can be also separately requested for official use. (SAR@raja.fi) The guidelines can also be used to develop a country's own operations, and for 'trial use' to evaluate the possibility of introducing them officially Baltic aircraft coordination model As previously stated, one key factor in the successful handling of major incidents is the safe and effective use of helicopters. During maritime incidents, aviation safety issues must be taken into account not only in the incident zone but also throughout the entire search and rescue operation, wherever and at whatever time of the day. The resources required for this are not usually immediately available. Not all actors will necessarily have the expertise required to coordinate helicopters as part of the overall logistics of a search and rescue operations. Effective cooperation requires an Aeronautical Coordinator (ACO), or even a two-person ACO team, to support the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator. The key criteria for a successful aeronautical operation (such as helicopter queuing and stacking; approaching the target; close search; classifying patients for transportation, etc.) are largely tied to the ACO, and to successful cooperation with the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator. A good example of this is the Baltic ACO model that was developed in the Baltic region. The Baltic ACO model is ready to implement in other countries as is, and its standard operational procedures will be used as the basis for the aeronautical coordination section of the international IAMSAR manual. This ACO model is described in greater detail in the section 9.2.2, and it is freely available (SAR@raja.fi). Currently, the model is in operational use only in Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Several other countries will also be introducing it, and have already trained key personnel at ACO courses arranged by Finland or Denmark. ACOs and pilots that have used the model have been satisfied, and consider it a very 101

104 important aspect of assisting neighbouring countries and ensuring aviation safety in joint operations. To ensure the safe and effective use of helicopters, it is vital for the Baltic ACO model to be introduced in all other Baltic Sea States Chemical clean-ups The Swedish Coast Guard (KBV) has drawn up some good chemical clean-up guidelines and, as has been previously stated, no comparable guidelines are currently to be found in the Baltic Sea region. The guidelines highlight, for example, the challenges and requirements associated with approaching the target and boarding the distress vessel, as well as protective equipment. It is worth using Sweden's guidelines as a basis for drawing up national operating procedures for chemical clean-ups if none yet exist. It is also worth considering drawing up a joint plan for chemical clean-ups in the Baltic Sea region. In order to draw up a joint plan, every country must have the desire to take responsibility for implementing the project. The development of maritime chemical clean-up activities is still in the early stages, and at this juncture it is worth considering what a suitable level of preparedness would be in relation to the risk. Although the consequences of a chemical spill can be serious, spills are very rare. It is also known that, in practice, clean-up operations both on land and at sea are very challenging and difficult to implement. Therefore, there are good grounds to approach the entire issue from the perspective of what is both costeffective and achievable Emergency anchoring During the Lisco Gloria ship fire, German maritime SAR authorities made effective use of a 'boarding team', which played a key role in bringing the situation under control and preventing further damage. The Lisco Gloria was listing and had drifted as a result of the fire. The ship's crew and passengers were evacuated. To stabilise the situation, prevent the ship from sinking, and get it under tow, the ship had to be anchored. A specially trained team was taken to the ship by helicopter. This team was skilled in triggering the ship's emergency anchoring system. The team succeeded in its mission and was able to get the ship under tow. This prevented both the ship from sinking and a serious oil spill. It would be good to have a highly mobile team skilled in emergency anchoring in all of the Baltic Sea States. This simple skill may be the decisive factor in preventing the escalation of an accident into a larger-scale incident. Germany deployed a six-person team with expertise in the emergency use of the ship's systems in a black-out. 102

105 13 AFTER THE BSMIR PROJECT This final report has highlighted several suggestions for developing SAR cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Some of these measures are quite extensive and require commitment from several countries in order to progress. Other things could be developed under the 'leadership' of a single country. The Finnish Border Guard is keen to develop joint preparedness in the Baltic Sea, and to play its part in implementing these suggested measures. The Finnish Border Guard is considering launching several of these suggested measures in the near future if sufficient support can be found from other actors. We welcome all the countries that have participated in this project to come up with, and further, future joint development projects relating to multisectoral maritime incidents. 103