Covering RISKS with Interlocked Sensing Elements,

Transcription

1 Covering RISKS with Interlocked Sensing Elements, SIL ensured and other HIPPS

2 Una breve introduzione Dal 1998 distribuiamo su tutto il territorio nazionale strumenti per la misura e controllo dei fluidi, ma non solo

3 Soluzioni

4 Service Assistenza sul campo Start up impianto Noleggio strumentazione Calibrazione e taratura strumenti

5 Alcuni dei nostri marchi: Pressostati, termostati e livellostati Trasmettitori di pressione, temperatura e livello Indicatori di livello magnetici e valvole. Misuratori e regolatori di portata massici termici Misuratori e regolatori di portata a effetto Coriolis Raccorderia e valvole a doppio anello Riduttori di pressione e valvole

6 Ma oggi siamo qui per raccontarvi di: Società olandese, distribuita in esclusiva da Precision Fluid Controls sul territorio italiano, leader mondiale nella realizzazione di sistemi interlocking, cassette di protezione strumenti, valvole e manifold.

7 Workshop Covering RISKS with interlocked sensing elements, SIL ensured 7

8 Workshop: Covering RISKS Workshop title Covering RISKS with Interlocked Sensing Elements, SIL ensured. Abstract When reducing RISK, failures must be excluded during the human operation of instruments. And the integrity of the measured data must be guaranteed. This technical workshop explains how to ensure the safety level (like SIL) during human operation of pressure/temperature instruments, without disturbing the process. Participants End-users, EPC, users, engineers, designers, project-managers, sales-engineers and other people with a Safety & Availability responsibility. Speaker Sjef Hamelynck Functional Safety Engineer & Safety Product Manager sjef@astava.com 8

9 Workshop: Covering RISKS Agenda Introduction Operational Safety 1. The playing field 6. Instrument loops 2. Todays goal: Safety & Availability 7. Measurement integrity 3. RISKS? What RISKS? 8. Practical solutions for Safeguarding 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety 5. Pipe to Pipe Functional Safety Wrap up 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL 15. Are we safe now? 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS 11. Stop the mathematics! 12. Practical solutions 13. Total integrity 14. Lifecycle Guarantee 9

10 Introduction Introduction 10

11 Introduction Astava Our partner Precision Fluid Controls 60 years! Engineering Manufacturing Assembling Instrumentation Solutions 11

12 Introduction 1. The playing field: process industry sector Oil Gas Petrochemical Chemical Pharmaceuticals Power 12

13 Introduction 1. The playing field: Pressure & Temperature Pressure Differential Pressure Flow by DP Level by DP Temperature Transmitters Gauges Switches Threaded Diaphragm seal Remote diaphragm seal T P DP FL L 13

14 Introduction 2. Todays goal: Safety & Availability People Planet Profit Corporate Social Responsibility Reputation (end-user, EPC, industry, country) US Freedom of unaccaptable RISK Money RISK REDUCTION to an ACCEPTABLE LEVEL! 14

15 Introduction 3. RISKS? What RISKS? RISK = Frequency x Consequence Human Failures Equipment Failures Less experienced people (field, design) Standard specifications Contracting Higher stress Harsh conditions Higher pressure Toxic medium Source: TNO RISK = Frequency x Consequence 15

16 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Layers of protection Functional Safety Operational Safety Source: Yokogawa 16

17 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Functional Safety Functions: Functions: - Safety layers with instrumentation - Last layer of defence with instrumentation - Protection against un-necessary process loss - Protection against un-necessary production loss - RISK Reduction - RISK Reduction - Normal process controls - Higher integrity of measurement data - Less Non Conformities, paperwork, audits - Less and easier procedures - Lower cost of ownership, less maintenance - Integer statistics - Less frustrations 17

18 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Impact when failure: Costly Functional Safety Impact when failure: Huge Costs for Safety: Costs for Safety: - Initial investment is higher then standard instrument manifolds - Initial investment is part of total plant investments - Costs of ownership under control - Cost of ownership is known during Lifecycle - Costs after lifetime are lower - Costs after Lifecycle are low Costs for NON-Safety: yes Costs for NON-Safety: huge RISK = Frequency x Consequence: RISK = Frequency x Consequence: - Frequency must be lower - Frequency = must be low - Consequence = lower - Consequence = high 18

19 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Functional Safety When used: When used: - Outcome of HAZOP - Outcome of HAZOP - Continuesly - On demand - As a result of practical (safety) issues Standards: Standards: - Customer specific - IEC61508 / IEC61511 Safety Level: Safety Level: - Customer specific - SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3 or SIL 4 - Not always expressed in a measurable value - Determined by following the standards - A single component can reduce the RISK - RISK reduction not enough? Then redesign the process/plant - Human operation can be secured with procedures - Only the complete loop can reduce the RISK - Human operation cannot be secured with procedures 19

20 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Functional Safety Solutions: Solutions: - Standard instrument loops BUT safer components - HIPPS for PT, HIDPPS for DPT - HILPS (DPT) - HITPS (Temperature) - SIS/SIF Applications: Applications: - All process industry applications - Over PRESSURE, DIFFERENTIAL protection - Over LEVEL, FLOW protection - Over TEMPERATURE protection Design: Design: - Common pratice - Strictly according to the standards - Can be part of existing safety layer - Independent and seperate safety layer - More complex - Easier - Safe on paper means safe in the field? 20

21 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe Instrument loop design from Pipe to Pipe Pipe = pipe, tank, heater, pump, compressor, motor, valve, etc Instrument loop design from sensing to computing to actuating Basic design Detailed design 21

22 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Basic design) 22

23 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Basic design) How important is this measurement? What happens if this measurement is not available, is not integer or fails? How do you select materials and components? Do you include lifetime expectations of this three components? Do you include quality and guarantee expectations of this three components? Are you aware of failure rates and proven in use data of the selected components? Can anything go wrong during human operation of the components? Can you answer these questions with 100% confidence? If not what are the RISKS? RISK = Frequency x Consequence 23

24 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Basic design) Any RISKS left? 24

25 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Detailed design) Manifold, Pressure Transmitter, PLC/DCS, Actuator, Components 25

26 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Detailed design) How important is this measurement? What happens if this measurement is not available, is not integer or fails? How do you select materials and components? Do you include lifetime expectations of this components? Do you include quality and guarantee expectations of this components? Are you aware of failure rates and proven in use data of the selected components? Can anything go wrong during human operation of the components? Can you answer these questions with 100% confidence? If not what are the RISKS? RISK = Frequency x Consequence 26

27 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Detailed design) Any RISKS left? 27

28 Operational Safety Operational Safety 28

29 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter?? 29

30 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter?? 30

31 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter?? 31

32 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter?? OPERATING FAILURES! WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION! 32

33 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter?? OPERATING FAILURES! WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION! MAINTENANCE costs PRODUCTION LOSS! POLUTION EMISSION 33

34 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops OPERATING FAILURES! All valves can be operated, opened and closed, in random order The test-plug can be loosened The valve position, open or closed, cannot be seen So what can happen? Bleed can be opened before closing the Block 34

35 Operational Safety Pressure drop, production impact??? Test-plug bullet 6. Instrument loops This can happen due to OPERATING FAILURES! Pollution Emission Valves open or closed? Forgotten??? High pressure exhaust, dirt-bullets Toxic exhaust 35

36 Operational Safety Pressure drop, production stop??? MAINTENANCE costs Test-plug bullet 6. Instrument loops This can happen due to OPERATING FAILURES! PRODUCTION LOSS! Pollution Emission Valves open or closed? Forgotten?? High POLUTION pressure EMISSION exhaust, dirt-bullets Toxic exhaust 36

37 Operational Safety Pressure drop, production stop??? Test-plug bullet 6. Instrument loops This can happen due to OPERATING FAILURES! Pollution Emission RISK = Frequency x Consequence Valves open or closed? Forgotten?? High pressure exhaust, dirt-bullets Toxic exhaust 37

38 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION! Components are selected out of the standard database Flowschematics BLOCK-BLEED or BLOCK-BLEED-BLOCK Material selection Bore size Guarantee, failure rates and proven in use data Standards like NACE and PED Maintenance costs, repair costs, cost of ownership Etc. How about your selection criterea? Can you quarantee that your components are operational safe? How safe is a SIL 2 transmitter? 38

39 Operational Safety Leakage 6. Instrument loops This can happen due to WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION! Components blow out Valves stuck open or closed Loosening components Blockage 39

40 Operational Safety Leakage MAINTENANCE Valves costs stuck open or closed 6. Instrument loops This can happen due to WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION! PRODUCTION LOSS! Components blow out POLUTION EMISSION Loosening components Blockage 40

41 Operational Safety Leakage 6. Instrument loops This can happen due to WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION! Components blow out Valves stuck open or closed RISK = Frequency x Consequence Loosening components Blockage 41

42 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity Normal situation The 80 bar is integer 42

43 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity During operation of the manifold Block valve closed The 80 bar is NOT INTEGER RISK?? 43

44 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity Redundancy for measurement availability The process is running Normal situation The 80 bar is integer 44

45 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity Redundancy for measurement availability The process is running During operation of the manifold Two block valves can be closed HUMAN FAILURE! The 80 bar is NOT INTEGER RISK?? 45

46 Operational Safety PED CAT IV API Practical Solutions for Safeguarding Safety Manifolds Mechanical Interlocked manifolds for Operational Safety Valve position indication for Measurement Integrity Operational safe, operating failures are excluded, human failures are avoided The manifold s valves can only be opened or closed in the right, safe and determined sequence The valve position is clear Proven in use since 40 years (number of operational failures: 0) For personal safety and process availability during operations and maintenance Forced mechanical procedure (sliding key principle) Valve position indication for system-controls Redundancy for continues measurement availability Avoid to Forget bringing back the pressure measurement into the system-controls Sizes up to 2 PED for Safeguarding Assembly cat IV Fire safe API 607 Sizes up to 2 Needle valves, ball valves Needle valves, Ball valves 46

47 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding Valve position indication 47

48 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding Valve position indication Data integer 48

49 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 49

50 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 50

51 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 51

52 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 52

53 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 53

54 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 54

55 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 55

56 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 56

57 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 57

58 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding Sampling 58

59 Operational Safety MAINTENANCE costs PRODUCTION LOSS! POLUTION EMISSION Operational Safety Low cost of ownership No loss RISK reduced RISK reduced No polution 59

60 Functional Safety Functional Safety 60

61 Functional Safety 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL IEC61508 / IEC PFD - SIL - Redundancy - Logic Solver - SIF/SIS - HFT - HAZOP - FSM - Voting - Sensing Elements - Actuating Elements - Risk - Risk Reduction - Lifecycle - Common Cause Safety Availability Safety Competence Training (on request) Training in line with the competence expectations of the IEC61511/IEC61508 Functional Safety Standards. Focus on pressure instrumentation solutions and HIMB used in Safety Instrumented Systems and HIPPS. Safety Competence Training On request 61

62 Functional Safety 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL Functional Safety Management Structural Elimination of Failures Functional Safety = Functional Safety Management 62

63 Functional Safety 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL Functional Safety Management Structural Elimination of Failures Functional Safety = Functional Safety Management Last Layer of Defence! 63

64 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops Basic SIF design (Safety Instrumented Function) Like HIPPS, HIDPPS, HILPS, HITPS, PPS and other SIS, SIF s PIPE TO PIPE SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3, SIL 4 64

65 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS Basic HIPPS design (High Integrity Pressure Protection System) 65

66 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS Basic HIPPS design (High Integrity Pressure Protection System) 66

67 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS HIPPS design PIPE TO PIPE 67

68 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS Detailed HIPPS design 68

69 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS Detailed HIPPS design Last Layer of Defence! 69

70 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS Detailed HIPPS design 70

71 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! Testing/calibrating Pressure Transmitters Any RISK for human failures? 71

72 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! Testing/calibrating Pressure Transmitters RISK for human failures! SIL cannot be guaranteed! No integer Functional Safety Management All Transmitters can be isolated: No SIL Trip 72

73 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! SIL cannot be guaranteed! No integer Functional Safety Management 73

74 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! SIL cannot be guaranteed! No integer Functional Safety Management 74

75 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! SIL 2 (or SIL 1) required Human Failure Solution: 2 e Transmitter 75

76 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! SIL 2 (or SIL 1) required Human Failure Solution: Interlocking! 76

77 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! SIL 3 required Solution: 3 e Transmitter 77

78 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! SIL 3 required Human Failure Solution: Interlocking! 78

79 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Functional Safety Management PIPE TO PIPE Structural Eliminaton of Failures SIL ensured! 79

80 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Functional Safety Management PIPE TO PIPE Structural Eliminaton of Failures SIL ensured! Last Layer of Defence! 80

81 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Interlocking Manifold, SIL certified HIMB (High Integrity Manifold Block) One transmitter can be isolated at a time SIL Certificate Official Safety Function of Interlocking Manifold = "Operating Steps and availability" for maintenance of pressure sensors whose failure could have an effect on the safety of people and/or environment. Ensure the SIL! 81

82 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Seperate process tapping SIL Certificate 82

83 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Seperate process tapping SIL Certificate 83

84 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Common process tapping SIL Certificate 84

85 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Common process tapping SIL Certificate 85

86 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Common process tapping 86

87 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Seperate process tapping 87

88 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Diaphragm seal transmitters Flushing 88

89 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Diaphragm seal transmitters Flushing 89

90 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions HILPS 90

91 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions HIDPPS 91

92 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions HITPS 92

93 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions, others Procedures / Workpermits (high cost of ownership, audit costs, FSM?, assesment?) Other locking system (NO PED CAT IV, new to design, No SIL certificate) 93

94 Functional Safety 13. Total integrity Proximity Switches for 2oo3 1oo2 Protection enclosures High/Low temperature alarms Heating Needle valve Ball valves Bores up to 2! 94

95 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee Astava offers Lifecycle Guarantee Quality = 40 years without failure Cost of ownership Lifecycle Guarantee 95

96 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle PIPE TO PIPE Lifecycle Guarantee 96

97 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle PIPE TO PIPE Last Layer of Defence! Lifecycle Guarantee 97

98 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle Alternatives Lifecycle Guarantee 98

99 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle Alternatives Lifecycle Guarantee Who will take this decision and responsibility? 99

100 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee Costs during the Lifecycle PIPE TO PIPE Lifecycle Guarantee 100

101 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee Costs during the Lifecycle Alternatives Lifecycle Guarantee 101

102 Wrap up Wrap up 102

103 Wrap up 15. Are we safe now? Is it dangerous beeing a human? Your questions please? Presentation available on request at sjef@astava.com Thank you very much! 103