A Comparison of Rejuvenation Hazards & Compatibility Glen J. Bertini & Richard K. Brinton Novinium, Inc.

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1 A Comparison of Rejuvenation Hazards & Compatibility Glen J. Bertini & Richard K. Brinton Novinium, Inc. Abstract: Over two decades have elapsed since the commercial introduction of the first solid dielectric enhancement technology or chemical rejuvenation. During those years, silane injection has proven itself as an important tool to enhance the reliability of aging infrastructure. There are some risks associated with rejuvenation. Some of those risks are shared with replacement. Some risks are unique to injection. This document examines the risks of chemical rejuvenation utilizing the two most widespread commercial injection methods and materials for URD cables. INTRODUCTION From 1984 through 2010, approximately 100 million feet of medium voltage underground power cable were treated with available injection technologies as shown in Figure 1. As demonstrated by [5], injection is typically a fraction of the cost of replacement, and the economics are almost always in favor of rejuvenation. Undoubtedly, the favorable economics of rejuvenation fueled the rapid growth depicted in Figure 1. The first five years of commercial injections utilized a continuous feed of acetophenone. While no cables treated with acetophenone ever failed in service, this technical success was not matched by commercial acceptance, largely because of the fugitive nature of acetophenone and the safety and economic penalties imposed by the need for an ongoing maintenance requirement to re-supply fluid to an energized cable. In 1989, a silicone fluid phenylmethyldimethoxysilane (PMDMS) invented by Vincent [6] and referred to as CC1 in Figure 1 was introduced. Along with this new fluid a new way of injecting fluid referred to as UPR in Figure 1 or unsustained pressure rejuvenation was also introduced Estimated Annual Injection Rates Acetophenone CC1 & UPR CC2 P011 U732 & SPR CC3 FERC/RUS Improved UPR U733 Figure 1. Annual injection (millions of cable feet) compiled from dozens of industry sources including [1], [2], [3] and [4] demonstrate the growing importance of cable rejuvenation technology. Novinium Engineering Document January 19, 2011 Because of its water reactivity and propensity to condense to a larger molecule, the new CC1 fluid largely eliminated the need for a continual supply of fluid, at least for about 10 years at lower temperatures. The unsustained pressure rejuvenation (UPR) process provide for an injection period and postinjection soak period. The soak period mitigated the undersupply of fluid to URD (URD cables are underground residential distribution cables and are generally less than 4/0 AWG in size) cables by providing additional fluid to the strand interstices over a 60 to 120 period. About 5 years later in 1994, Bertini, Vincent, et al, improved on the CC1 technology when they introduced an additive called trimethylmethoxysilane (TMMS) in [7]. The CC2 advancement solved an uneven radial fluid distribution issue suffered by CC1 as shown by [7]. It was also demonstrated in [7] that 30% w of the TMMS was preferred in the formulation together with 70% w of the CC1 fluid (i.e. PMDMS) to achieve optimum fluid distribution and dielectric performance. This reformulation together with the approval by the FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) and the RUS (Rural Utility Service) of the capital treatment of fluid injection were the foundation for the rapid growth of injection at the turn of the century. This growth faltered after 2002 when it came to light in [3] and [16] that the CC2 technology could cause methanolic corrosion of aluminum strands. In 2005, CC3 was introduced and the concentration of the TMMS was reduced by a factor of 6 to about 5% w, ostensibly to reduce the likelihood of corrosion of aluminum strands outlined in [15] experienced by the CC2 chemistry discussed in [3] and [16]. However, this would also lead to less uniform radial diffusion and slow the post-treatment increase in dielectric performance. A second commercially significant technology, referred to as U732 and described in [22], includes the field-proven short and medium term technology similar to CC, and includes completely new materials, which are designed to be safer to use and provide much longer life extension. The U732 technology was injected for the first time in February Along with the fluid, a new injection paradigm, sustained pressure rejuvenation (SPR), was also introduced. SPR eliminated the soak period and provided a more rapid increase in post-injection dielectric performance. The P011 technology was first offered in P011 utilizes the same PMDMS material as the CC family of fluids, but uses acetophenone in place of the flammable TMMS and introduced an improved catalyst package. These two improvements to the older CC fluid provide superior postinjection reliability, longer life, and a higher flash point (less flammable). A complete history down to the chemical component level for all rejuvenation formulations is in [23].

2 Table 1. Four fluids and three injection paradigms define the universe (12 boxes) of rejuvenation options for medium voltage cables. Warranties between 20 and 40 years supplied by the technology suppliers provide guidance on the long term performance of each choice. Technology combinations with asterisks (boxes 1, 4, 5 & 6) should only be applied in non-demanding applications. Blackened combinations in the CC3 column (boxes 2 & 3) are not available for commercial reasons. Blackened combinations in the U733 column (boxes 10 & 11) are not available for technical reasons. The dark orange squares (boxes 4 & 7) are typically used only in special circumstances. The six combinations with light-colored backgrounds (boxes 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 12) represent commercially significant alternatives. Cable Injection Paradigm UPR with soak UPR without soak SPR (soakless) 1 Fluid CC3 P011 U732 U733 20* 4 20* * * In 2008, an improved method of performing unsustained pressure rejuvenation was introduced that eliminated the need for soak periods. In 2009, an improved fluid designated U733, for use in high temperature feeder cable applications, was introduced. The matrix of four fluids and three injection paradigms is shown in Table 1. The balance of this paper examines the operational risks of the four most commercially important fluid/paradigm combinations, namely Table 1, box 1: CC3 fluid and UPR with soak injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/CC3), Table 1, box 5: P011 fluid and UPR without soak injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/P011) Table 1, box 9: U732 fluid and SPR injection paradigm (hereinafter SPR/U732), and Table 1, box 8: U732 fluid and UPR without soak injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/U732) technologies as commonly applied to URD cables with 19 or fewer strands, excluding uncompressed 4/0 conductors. The P011 fluid choice shares most of the same risks as the U732 fluid. In fact the composition of both CC3 fluid and P011 fluid are between 90 and 95% phenylmethyldimethoxysilane. There are five primary differences between the four approaches, which will be examined in detail. 1. SPR technology is applied with a single visit to the cable, compared to 3 or more visits for the UPR with soak approach and 2 or more visits with the UPR without soak approach. 2. SPR technology is delivered with injection hardware specifically designed to prevent fluid from coming in contact with accessories like terminations and splices. Fluids applied with UPR unavoidably make intimate contact with these components, because of the injection method. 3. CC3 fluid has a flash point lower than jet fuel A. U732 and P011 fluids have much higher flash points making them substantially less prone to ignition. Flash point measurement conditions are not necessarily reflective of normal job site operating conditions. 4. U732 fluids have no known carcinogens or reproductive toxins present in the fluid. P011 fluid includes a small amount of benzene a known carcinogen and reproductive toxin. 5. With SPR injection, fluid is typically introduced at psig ( bar). This pressure quickly decays as fluid diffuses from the strands. There are no reservoirs of flammable or combustible fluid left attached to the cable. UPR with soak sometimes utilizes initial injection pressures up to 500 psig, but is more typically injected at about 15 psig. A reservoir of pressurized (typically about 12 psig) fluid is left attached to the cable for 60 or more days. UPR without soak avoids the multi-month soak period. ASSESEMENT METHOD There are two types of risk, which are considered in this analysis. They are: Risk to equipment and risk to human beings. Risk to equipment is the product of the probability of an event occurring and an assessment of the consequences, should the event occur. This equipment risk is defined by Equation 1. R equipment = P event x C equipment (1) Personnel risk is the product of the probability of an event occurring, the probability that people will be present within an event perimeter when the event occurs, and an assessment of the consequences, should the event occur while people are within the event perimeter. The personnel risk is defined by Equation 2. R personnel = P event x P personnel x C personnel (2) It is often not possible to determine values for equations (1) and (2) with a great deal of precision. Accordingly, ranges for each value are chosen by the risk assessment engineer to provide a semi-quantitative perspective. This exercise is useful, not because the absolute values of risks calculated by equations (1) and (2) have any specific meaning, but rather because the relative values of two or more risks can be compared, so that risk mitigation resources can be applied to the greatest risks first. Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide the values for equipment consequence, personnel consequence, event probability, and personnel-present probability utilized in this analysis. The values in Table 2 and 3 are typical casualty losses in U.S. dollars. While dollars may not adequately represent the 2

3 human loss for catastrophic risks, they do provide a somewhat objective measure that society places on such incidents and allows a comparison between dissimilar risks. The probability values in Table 4 and Table 5 employed by this paper were first used by the author in the 1990s while employed by UTILX Corporation. The factual data for the UPR/CC3 technology are found in [8]. The principal author of [8] is also a co-author of this work. Table 2. Equipment Consequence Value Qualitative Examples 0 None No outages 10 3 Low Blow fuse or trip breaker 2x10 3 Medium Destroy components and fuse 5x10 3 High Destroy transformer 10 4 Very High Destroy circuit owner/customer property Table 3. Personnel Consequence Value Qualitative Examples 0 None No injuries 10 3 Low Cuts, bruises, scrapes 10 4 Medium Sprains, 1st degree burns, MeOH exposure, chemical fumes/irritation 10 5 High Broken bones, 2nd degree burns, 10 6 Life threatening flashes to eye 3rd degree burns, electric shock, toxic exposure Table 4. Event Probability Value Qualitative Examples 0.00% Not possible Does not occur 0.05% Ultra-low Less than 0.1% 0.50% Very low More than 0.1%, less than 1% 5% Low More than 1.0%, less than 10% 50% Medium More than 10%, less than 100% 100% High Virtually every injected cable Table 5. Personnel Present Probability Value Qualitative Examples 0% Not possible Personnel not present 5% Unlikely Less than 10% 35% Quite likely More than 10%, less than 50% 75% Likely More than 50%, less than 80% 90% Very Likely More than 80%, but not certain 100% Certain 100% probability Risk scenarios are arranged in a taxonomy in Addendum A. A summary compilation of all risk assessments is provided in Addendum B. The Addendum B summary includes a table that compares risks for boxes 1, 5, 8, and 9 of Table 1, and a graph which compares boxes 1 and 9 of Table 1. Addendum C is a compilation of the following items for each identified risk scenario: a. Scenario name and scope b. Discussion of circumstances that give rise to the risk c. Experience anecdotes d. Probability that the event will occur and that personnel will be present within the event horizon, if event occurs. e. Consequences to equipment and people, if they suffer an event, in U.S. Dollars. f. Probability mitigation tactics to lower the probability that an event will occur. g. Consequence mitigation tactics to reduce damage to property or people when an event does occur. h. Risk assessment is the multiplication of the values in Equation (1) and Equation (2) to calculate semiquantitative risk values in U.S. Dollars for both equipment and personnel. All anecdotal experiences recounted in the UPR/CC3 column are understood to be as of the publication date of [8], which is August 2001, unless specifically indicated otherwise. All other anecdotal experiences recounted by the authors of this work are understood to be as of the publication date on page 1 of this document unless noted otherwise. DIFFERENCES When UPR/CC3 technology is applied to 7-strand or 19-strand URD cables, at least three visits (items 2, 4 and 5 below) are required to manipulate energized or potentially energized high voltage equipment. Depending upon the circumstances, more visits such as items 1, 3, and 6 below may be required. 1. Utilities sometimes pre-install special injection elbows. 2. Air flow testing and injection set up. 3. If blocked splices are to be replaced, a visit is required on another day to change the splice. 4. Vacuum tank removal, typically a day or two after the injection is initialized. If the fluid takes longer to transit the cable, the vacuum tank is checked on multiple occasions. 5. Soak tank removal and injection cap or plug removal, 60 to 120 days after the vacuum tank removal (if remembered). 6. For many 35kV large interface elbow installations, another outage must be taken to remove the injection plugs from both cable ends. Potentially energized bottles are left connected to terminations for a 60 to 120 day soak period. During that soak period, 3

4 utility trouble-workers and line-workers may encounter unusual and potentially dangerous situations. Unfortunately, each encounter with high voltage runs the risk of accidental electrical contact. SPR/U732 and SPR/P011 technologies require a single visit and a single switching operation. There is no potentially energized equipment left near terminations. The UPR/CC3 technology utilizes injection elbows with ports described in [9], [10], and [11]. These ports create momentary openings to an energized conductor, as permanent shielded caps are substituted for injection caps on energized components. These open ports have been known to flash over and create hazards to employees. Fire and explosion hazards are described in [12] and [13]. There are mitigating technologies described by [12] and [13], which remain unimplemented to date. The open port flashover problem is so acute on 35kV circuits that the ports are no longer operated while the cable is energized. Instead as indicated in visit 6 above, another outage is taken to remove the caps. With SPR/U732 technology, injection is typically completed in minutes on de-energized cable and components. There is no open port to energized components. With UPR/U732 and UPR/P011 technology the soak period is eliminated and the elbow flashover issue is solved with a reticular flash preventer (RFP) described in [31]. In [32] the open port flashover voltage is demonstrated to be 39% higher with an RFP present than the identical injection elbow without an RFP present. Fire and explosion requires three components: fuel, oxygen, and a source of ignition. Unfortunately, in the out-of-soil portion of a medium voltage distribution environment, both oxygen and ignition sources are ubiquitous. Not all fuels are equal when it comes to the ease of ignition. The ease of ignition is measured as a flash point. Flash point measurement conditions are not necessarily reflective of normal job site operating conditions. However, the higher the flash point, the less likely the fluid will ignite. According to the current material safety data sheet (MSDS) of the CC fluid [33], its flash point is 13 C (55 F), well below the flash point of jet fuel A. Materials with these low flash points are rated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) as flammable. U732 fluids have flash points in excess of 61 C (142 F) and are not rated as flammable by the U.S. DOT {49 CFR } or the U.S. OSHA {29 CFR (c)}. P011 fluid (from [34]) includes small amounts of the carcinogen, developmental toxin, and male reproductive toxin benzene. Since August 2008, [14] no longer lists benzene as a contaminant in CC3 fluid. U732 and U733 technologies include no known carcinogens, developmental toxins, or reproductive toxins from [35] and [36] respectively. Many of the risk eliminations and reductions enjoyed by the sustained pressure rejuvenation (SPR) paradigm stem from the consistent use of moderate pressures to inject cables. The use of moderate pressures to inject cables has been in use for over 20 years. In fact a large subset of the cables injected with the UPR/CC3 paradigm has been and continue to be injected at moderate pressure. See for example [26] and [27], which demonstrate that pressures as high as 400 to 500 psig have been routinely utilized. The difference between the two paradigms is whether or not the injection pressure, once introduced, is bled to a soak pressure as in unsustained pressure rejuvenation, or sustained and allowed to decay to zero through permeation in the sustained pressure rejuvenation paradigm. The UPR with soak paradigm leaves the cable under a soak pressure for at least 60 days, and in some cases 120 days or more. The soak pressure is typically about 10 to 20 psig, plus head pressure, plus vapor pressure. The vapor pressure can exceed 50 psig as suggested in [27] for cables operating at emergency overload conditions. Figure 2 provides experimental measurements of typical decay rates for the SPR paradigm. In contrast to CC3 fluid, the vapor pressure of U732 fluid is less than 2 psig even at 130 C. Pressure (psig) Figure 2. Measured pressure decay in 1/0 cable at 25 C. Typical tailored injection pressures utilized by the SPR paradigm typically lie between 100 and 300 psig. SUMMARY Pressure Decay (1/0 cable at 25 C) Elapsed Time (days) 30 psig 240 psig 480 psig Circuit owners have the option of choosing from three very different injection paradigms. Even the riskiest injection paradigm is inherently less risky than replacement. This fact, together with the inherently lower cost of injection compared to replacement, makes injection a safe and capital efficient choice. Choosing between injection paradigms is not a simple subject. This paper considers 40 distinct risks summarized in a hierarchal structure in Addendum A. On average, each risk requires over a page of analysis to make a thorough comparison. The 31 non-trivial risks of Addendum A are tabulated and plotted in Addendum B, so that the relative ranking of the risks and the comparisons between the three paradigms can be quickly compared. Trivial risks are 9 of the 40 identified risks where both the equipment risk values and the personnel risk 4

5 values are less than one dollar. There are at least two significant conclusions from the Addendum B summary. First, utilizing the SPR paradigm and U732 fluid together eliminates entire classes of risks. The 31 non-trivial risks of the unsustained pressure; flammable fluid paradigm are reduced to 19. Utilizing U732 fluid or P011 fluid and the UPR no soak paradigm together also eliminates entire classes of risks, but not as many as are possible with SPR. Second, the 19 remaining non-trivial risks of the SPR/U732 paradigm are reduced by substantial factors over the earlier approach in all but four cases. For those remaining four cases the risks are essentially identical. Using U732 or P011 fluids with the UPR no-soak-paradigm also mitigate risks, but not to the same extent as the SPR/U732 approach. Risk managers now have a tool to make objective assessments of risk, since all comparisons were written by proponents of the respective paradigms utilizing largely the same methods, and in fact, share a common author. The continual reduction of risks of all types remains the goal of the authors. Further improvements in methods and materials will continue to be forthcoming. This analysis facilitates the focusing of engineering and research efforts on those risks, which are greatest, and minimizing expenditure of resources on risks, which are of lesser significance. Addendum D includes a revision history to this Rejuvenation Hazard Analysis. Additional information is available from [39] including a comprehensive bibliography of almost all publically available test data. REFERENCES 1. Tarpey, "Cost Effective Solution to URD Reliability: Cable Rehabilitation, Pennsylvania Electric Association T&D Committee Meeting, May 8, Bertini & Chatterton, Dielectric Enhancement Technology, IEEE Electrical Insulation Magazine, March/April 1994-Vol.10, No.2, pp Bertini, "Failures in Silicone-Treated German Cables Due to an unusual Methanol-Aluminum Reaction", ICC meeting minutes, October, , p Bertini, "Injection Supersaturation in Underground Electrical Cables", U.S. Patent 6,162, Bertini, Advancements in Cable Rejuvenation Technology, IEEE/PES 1999 Summer Meeting, Reliability Centered Maintenance, July 21, Vincent & Meyer, Restoring Stranded Conductor Electrical Cable, U.S. Patent 4,766, Bertini, Vincent et al, "Method for enhancing the dielectrical strength of a cable using a fluid mixture", U.S. Patent 5,372, Bertini, Injection Hazard Analysis, updated August 13, Downloaded from web site on December 30, Borgstrom & Stevens, Separable Connector Access Port and Fittings, U.S. Patent 4,946, Borgstrom, Bertini & Meyer, Removable Media Injection Fitting, U.S. Patent 5,082, Muench, et al, High Voltage Electrical Connector with Access Cavity and Inserts for Use Therewith, U.S. Patent 6,332, Bertini & Stagi, Method and Apparatus of Blocking Pathways Between a Power Cable and the Environment, U.S. Patent 6,517, Bertini & Stagi, Method and Apparatus of Blocking Pathways Between a Power Cable and the Environment, U.S. Patent 6,929, CableCURE/XL MSDS dated 05/14/2005, downloaded by author 01/12/2006 & available from the authors on request. The most current MSDS is available from the supplier s web site at Stagi, The Evolution of Cable Injection Technology, 2004 Fall ICC, Subcommittee A. 16. Brüggemann et al, Influence of Electrochemical Effects on Vented Tree Initiation in Accelerated Tests, Jicable International Conference on Insulated Power Cables, Bertini & Vincent, Cable Rejuvenation Mechanisms, ICC, Sub. A, March 14, Bertini, Improving Post-treatment Reliability: Eliminating Fluid-Component compatibility Issues, ICC DG C26D, Nov. 1, Bertini & Vincent, Rejuvenation Reformulated, ICC SubA, May 8, Bertini & Theimer, High Pressure Power Cable Connector, U.S. Patent 7,195,504, Mar. 27, Bertini & Theimer, High Pressure Power Cable Connector, U.S. Patent App , July 26, Bertini, New Developments in Solid Dielectric Life Extension Technology, IEEE ISEI, Sept Bertini & Vincent, History and Status of Silicone Injection Technology, ECNE 2007 Fall Engineering & Operations Conference, October 4, Cook, Goudie, et al, Electrical Cable Restoration Fluid, International PCT Application WO 2006/ A Bertini & Richardson, Silicone Strand-Fill: A New Material and Process, ICC, spring 1990, Appendix III-B. 26. Jenkins, Submarine Cable Rescued with Silicone-Based Fluid, spring 2000, ICC, p Van Horn, personal correspondence to author, dated November 7, 2005, UTILX has for years treated power cables with pressures sometimes even exceeding 500 psi. The full text of the letter is available from the authors upon request. 28. Logsdan v. Indiana Michigan Power Company (AEP), Court of Appeal of Indiana, Dec. 5,

6 29. CableCURE/SD MSDS dated 01/12/2006, downloaded by author 11/21/2007 & available online at Bertini, Keitges, & Vincent, Considerations for Injecting Cables with High Conductor Temperature, ICC SubA, Nov. 11, Bertini & Brinton, Rehabilitation: The 3R s, ICC SubA, October 28, CTL Test Report , Electrical Tests on Novinium 200 A Load Break Injection Elbows, August 26, This test report is available at: CableCURE/XL fluid MSDS dated 08/06/2008, downloaded by author & available online at Perficio 011 fluid MSDS dated 09/11/2009, at Ultrinium 732 fluid MSDS dated 10/21/2009, at Ultrinium 733 fluid MSDS dated 09/11/2009, at Bertini & Vincent, Advances in Chemical Rejuvenation: Extending Medium Voltage Cable Life 40 Years, Jicable 07, pp Bertini & Vincent, Acid-Catalyzed Dielectric Enhancement Fluid and Cable Restoration Method Employing Same, U.S. Patent Application Publication 2008/ , Jul. 24, Bertini & Vincent, History and Status of Silicone Injection Technology with Bibliography, WEI Spring 2008 Underground/Overhead Electric Distribution Meeting, April 3, Authors Glen J. Bertini is the President, CEO and Chairman of Novinium, Inc. He has spent over two decades working with cable rejuvenation technol-ogy beginning with its development at Dow Corning in 1985 and continuing through its comercialization and growth to over 100 million feet of cable rejuvenated so far. Mr. Bertini was employed by Dow Corning, a silicon chemical manufacturer, as a development engineer, where he focused on the thermodynamics of multi-component systems and was part of a small team that developed and commercialized the first cable rejuvenation products. With over 40 articles published on the subject of cable rejuvenation technology including the very first Injection Hazard Analysis, reference [8], which provides much of the foundation for this updated analysis. Mr. Bertini holds a total of 25 patents on cable rejuvenation and related technologies and has 6 more patents pending. In 1992, he was co-recipient of the prestigious R&D 100 award for cable rejuvenation. In 2006 Mr. Bertini and Novinium won the $100,000 Zino Zillionaire Investment Forum award for the best investment opportunity in the Pacific Northwest. In 2010 Mr. Bertini was awarded the Puget Sound Engineering Council, Engineer of the Year Award. Mr. Bertini holds a B.S. in Chemical Engineering from Michigan Technological University, is a Senior Member of the AIChE, an IEEE Fellow, a voting member of the ICC, and a licensed professional engineer. Richard K. Brinton is the Vice President of Business Development of Novinium. He has been responsible for introducing cable rejuvenation to utilities around the world. Brinton has over 30 years experience in business development in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Australia. He has focused his career on the worldwide introduction of new technologies and has gained worldwide experience in industrial processes, machine tools, robotics, and construction. Mr. Brinton holds a B.S. in Industrial Engineering and a B.A. Liberal Arts from the Pennsylvania State University, is a Senior Member of the IEEE, a voting member of the ICC, and is a licensed professional engineer. 6

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9 $100 Addendum B. Injection Hazard Ranking UPR - CC3 SPR - U Equipment Risk $10 $ (A) Where a hazard exists for both injection paradigms within the plotted space, identical risks are circled and nonidentical risks are linked by a curved line. Those risks associated with the UPR CC3 paradigm, which lack associated circles or curved arrows, do not have corresponding non-trivial risks within the SPR U732 paradigm. Risks that fall on or near the x-axis or the y-axis have values less than or equal to $1. Where data values overlap, data points are arbitrarily nudged to facilitate readability. Only conventional inside-out injection is plotted. $1 $10 $100 $1,000 $10,000 $100,000 Personnel Risk 2.2.3

10 Addendum B. Injection Hazard Ranking Hazard UPR with soak - CC3 Equipment Personnel Risk Risk UPR without soak - P011 Equipment Risk Personnel Risk UPR without soak - U732 Equipment Risk Personnel Risk Equipment Risk SPR - U732 Personnel Risk 1.1 Electrical contact $ 50 $ 50,000 $ 33 $ 33,333 $ 33 $ 33,333 $ 17 $ 16, Vacuum tank contact/flash $ 1 $ 175 $ 1 $ 175 $ 1 $ 175 $ - $ Feed tank contact/flash $ 50 $ 25 $ 5 $ 3 $ 5 $ 3 $ - $ Injection port flashover $ 3 $ 500 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ HVFI flashover $ - $ - $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ Environmental $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Toxicological - Inhalation $ 1 $ 375 $ 1 $ 375 $ 1 $ 188 $ 1 $ Chemical, Oral $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Chemical, Skin $ 1 $ 5,000 $ 1 $ 500 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ Chemical, Eyes $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ Storage $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Transport $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, DB $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, duct $ 5 $ 1 $ 3 $ 1 $ 3 $ 1 $ 3 $ Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, manhole $ 3 $ 25 $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ Fire/Explosion, inject, splice, DB $ 5 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 1 $ Fire/Explosion, inject, splice, manhole $ 2 $ 25 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., monitored $ 2 $ 375 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ 1 $ Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., low P $ 2 $ 2 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ - $ Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., soak $ 1 $ 2 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Fire/Explosion, inject, term (riser) $ 3 $ 25 $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, mechanical $ 25 $ 250 $ 13 $ 125 $ 13 $ 125 $ 2 $ (A) Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, electrical $ 3 $ 175 $ 1 $ 9 $ 1 $ 88 $ - $ Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, procedural $ 6 $ 500 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 5 $ - $ Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, thermal $ 3 $ 175 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Chemical compatibility, termination (riser) $ 5 $ 25 $ 1 $ 3 $ 1 $ 3 $ 1 $ Chemical compatibility, cold-shrink splice $ 11 $ 1 $ 10 $ 1 $ 10 $ 1 $ - $ Chemical compatibility, dielectric gloves $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Chemical compatibility, EPDM/EPR components $ 6 $ 25 $ 4 $ 1 $ 4 $ 18 $ - $ Chemical compatibility, cable connectivity/ampacity $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Chemical compatibility, cable insulation $ 1 $ 25 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Chemical compatibility, conductor shield $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ Chemical compatibility, insulation shield $ 1 $ 25 $ 1 $ 25 $ 1 $ 25 $ 1 $ Chemical compatibility, jacket $ 1 $ 25 $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ Chemical compatibility, conductor $ 3 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ 1 $ Dig-in $ 5 $ 450 $ 5 $ 450 $ 5 $ 450 $ 5 $ Driving accidents (job site) $ 1 $ 500 $ 1 $ 333 $ 1 $ 333 $ 1 $ Driving accidents (non-job site) $ 1 $ 500 $ 1 $ 500 $ 1 $ 500 $ 1 $ Mechanical injuries (sprains, strains, etc.) $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ Hydraulic failure, cable $ 1 $ 1 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ 1 $ Hydraulic failure, component $ 50 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ 5 $ 1 $ - $ -

11 Addendum C. Analysis of Risk Scenarios CB CC CPM FOSH HVFI Abbreviations used in this Addendum C. CableCURE /CB fluid is a platinum-cure dimethylsiloxane gel. CableCURE is a registered trademark of UTILX Corporation. CableCURE fluid based upon PMDMS. CC1 (A.k.a ) is PMDMS plus about 0.2% TIPT catalyst. CC2 and CC3 are also known as CableCURE/XL are about 70% PMDMS & 30% TMMS and 95% PMDMS & 5% TMMS respectively, in each case, with about 0.2% TIPT catalyst. CableCURE Procedures Manual promulgated by UTILX Corporation. Field Operations Safety Handbook promulgated by UTILX Corporation. High Voltage Fluidic Interface a proprietary device designed to allow fluid flow between energized and grounded devices. IHA Injection Hazard Analysis (Reference [8]) IPA MSDS NRI P011 PMDMS PE PPE psi RCRA RF SCBA SD SPR TIPT TDR TMMS U732 U733 UPR Isopropyl alcohol Material Safety Data Sheet Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions available at Fluid composed of about 92% w PMDMS, 5% w iso-octanol, 2.5% w Tinuvin 123, 0.2% w ferrocene, and 0.1% w dodecylbenzenesulfonic acid (DDBSA). Phenylmethyldimethoxysilane Polyethylene (whether or not cross-linked) Personal Protective Equipment Unit of pressure: pounds force per square inch. psia are absolute pressures and psig are gauge pressures. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Radio Frequency (cable and splice locating equipment) Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Strand desiccant utilized as part of the CableCURE process. SD is approximately 95% w IPA and 5% w TMMS. SD is sometimes referred to as CableCURE/SD. Sustained Pressure Rejuvenation is a patent pending process where injection fluid retains significant residual pressure at the end of the injection to improve reliability. The pressure decays asymptotically to zero. Titanium(IV) isopropoxide or tetraisopropyltitanate, a catalyst used at 0.2% w in all CC formulations. Time Domain Reflectometer (Radar) Trimethylmethoxysilane, a fast diffuse and flammable component of CC2 and CC3 fluid. Fluid composed of about <60% w tolylethylmethyldimethoxysilane, <70% w cyanobutylmethyldimethoxysilane, <12% w isolauryl alcohol, <5% w Tinuvin 123, <3% w Tinuvin 1130, <3% w ferrocene, <3% w geranylacetone, <4% w Irgastab Cable KV10, and ~0.1% w dodecylbenzenesulfonic acid (DDBSA). Fluid composition same as U732, except that methoxysilanes are 2-ethylhexoxy analogs. Unsustained pressure rejuvenation releases pressure to close to zero when injection is complete. UPR is performed with a soak period when CC fluids are used and is generally performed without a soak when U732 fluid is used. 11

12 1 Electrical Electrical Electrical Electrical 1.1 Electrical, Accidental contact Electrical, Accidental contact Electrical, Accidental contact Electrical, Accidental contact 1.1a As in [8], the injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. 1.1b As per [8], the injection equipment interferes with the operations of authorized line personnel, causing equipment such as TDR or RF equipment to come in contact with energized equipment. Line workers error in routine switching or blanketing 1.1c Five incidents were referenced by the service supplier in [8] through There have been multiple incidents since 2001, including a fatality in 2002 documented in [28]. The incidents are: (1) A flinging vacuum cord which contacted a live-front primary voltage termination. Blankets were not installed over the energized equipment. The technician was injured. (2) In 1993, the alligator clip that connected a TDR to a grounded live-front connection swung into an exposed, energized, and uncovered primary bus when it was removed by a non-journeyman-lineman technician. Circuit protection operated and there was no other damage or injury as a result of the incident. (3) A journeymanlineman injector placed a probe wrench onto an energized elbow probe with apparent disregard for established grounding Injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. Injection equipment interferes with the operations of authorized line personnel, causing equipment such as TDR or RF equipment to come in contact with energized equipment. Line workers error in routine switching or blanketing No such incidences have ever been experienced as of the date of this document s publication. Injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. Injection equipment interferes with the operations of authorized line personnel, causing equipment such as TDR or RF equipment to come in contact with energized equipment. Line workers error in routine switching or blanketing No such incidences have ever been experienced as of the date of this document s publication. The injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. There are no injection devices to obstruct line workers during TDR or RF testing. No conductive injection equipment ever comes in the vicinity of energized devices; TDR or RF location equipment is connected to energized equipment; line workers error in routine switching or blanketing. Because of the single-visit single switch injection paradigm the total number of visits to energized equipment is reduced at least 3-fold for 15/25kV and 4-fold for 35kV compared to the other paradigms. No such incidences have ever been experienced as of the date of this document s publication. 12

13 procedures. As a consequence, the injector suffered burns to a hand and a foot. (4) A subcontractor journeymanlineman slipped on wet leaves while attempting to reach for his hot gloves. He made contact with a transformer. (5) A journeyman-lineman injector was injured when one of his teammates reenergized a deenergized line without alerting the victim or anyone else on the crew. 1.1d From [8], ultra-low based upon past experience the probability is 1 in 10,000 cable sections treated. It is certain that personnel will be present when the event occurs. 1.1e From [8], equipment consequences are low. Personnel consequences are life threatening. 1.1f According to [8], the FOSH was changed to exclude nonjourneyman line worker from inside a 4-foot radius of any exposed energized equipment. Other safety improvements implemented after the second incident described above include: Additional training for journeymen line worker, required installation of blankets on exposed energized equipment, and a requirement that all new injection personnel are journeymen line workers. Further, training is centralized under the leadership of a journeyman line worker and all qualifications are confirmed with appropriate due diligence. Routine field auditing is used to enforce switching and other safety procedures. Finally, a warning tag was developed, which warns line personnel of the A minimum of 1/3 fewer visits than the UPR with soak, because only one visit is made to the transformer compared to 3 to 6. Equipment consequences are low. Personnel consequences are life threatening. Elimination of the soak reduces the exposure by 1/3. A minimum of 1/3 fewer visits than the UPR with soak, because only one visit is made to the transformer compared to 3 to 6. Equipment consequences are low. Personnel consequences are life threatening. Elimination of the soak reduces the exposure by 1/3. A minimum of 3 times less than UPR with soak, because only one visit is made to the transformer compared to 3 to 6 visits. Equipment consequences are low. Personnel consequences are life threatening. All injection is performed on deenergized equipment. Novinium procedures, including safety procedures, are available for review on-line. There is no need to warn other utility personnel of special or unusual dangers, because injection equipment is not left on energized cables. 13

14 presence of potentially energized injection equipment. 1.1g From [8], enforce the use of PPE and safe work practices. 1.1h Risk (50,50000) R equipment = =50 R personnel = =50k 1.2 Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash 1.2a As described in [8], vacuum receiving vessels collect water along with ionic contaminants, organic impurities, and solids such as aluminum oxide and carbon black, which are flushed from the cable interstices. The vacuum vessel and attached tubing also accept vapors and gasses from the energized cable. From Paschen s Law, the dielectric strength of low pressure gasses is less than it would be for atmospheric or higher pressure gasses. The gas may become ionized and glows like a florescent light bulb. The vacuum tank, associated tubing, and fittings are potentially energized and represent an electrical contact risk. Additionally, the vacuum tank is necessarily in direct contact, or in close proximity to the ground wires, and hence a flash is possible to ground. 1.2b As described in [8], there are two ways that current may be conducted to ground. Initially, there is some capacitive flow when the vacuum tank is in proximity to a ground, such as the soil, a ground conductor, or a human hand. Over time, tracking, dielectric degradation, Novinium uses rigorous field verification procedures to change unsafe behaviors before they lead to an incident. This behaviorbased safety program is sometimes referred to as a below-zero safety culture. Risk (33,33333) R equipment =0.05 2/ =33 R personnel =0.05 2/ =33k Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash Vacuum receiving vessels collect water along with ionic contaminants, organic impurities, and solids such as aluminum oxide and carbon black, which are flushed from the cable interstices. The vacuum vessel and attached tubing also accept vapors and gasses from the energized cable. From Paschen s Law, the dielectric strength of low pressure gasses is less than it would be for atmospheric or higher pressure gasses. The gas may become ionized and glows like a florescent light bulb. The vacuum tank, associated tubing, and fittings are potentially energized and represent an electrical contact risk. Additionally, the vacuum tank is necessarily in direct contact, or in close proximity to the ground wires, and hence a flash is possible to ground. There are two ways that current may be conducted to ground. Initially, there is some capacitive flow when the vacuum tank is in proximity to a ground, such as the soil, a ground conductor, or a human hand. Over time, tracking, dielectric degradation, or a physical defect may open a 14 Novinium uses rigorous field verification procedures to change unsafe behaviors before they lead to an incident. This behaviorbased safety program is sometimes referred to as a below-zero safety culture. Risk (33,33333) R equipment =0.05 2/ =33 R personnel =0.05 2/ =33k Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash Vacuum receiving vessels collect water along with ionic contaminants, organic impurities, and solids such as aluminum oxide and carbon black, which are flushed from the cable interstices. The vacuum vessel and attached tubing also accept vapors and gasses from the energized cable. From Paschen s Law, the dielectric strength of low pressure gasses is less than it would be for atmospheric or higher pressure gasses. The gas may become ionized and glows like a florescent light bulb. The vacuum tank, associated tubing, and fittings are potentially energized and represent an electrical contact risk. Additionally, the vacuum tank is necessarily in direct contact, or in close proximity to the ground wires, and hence a flash is possible to ground. There are two ways that current may be conducted to ground. Initially, there is some capacitive flow when the vacuum tank is in proximity to a ground, such as the soil, a ground conductor, or a human hand. Over time, tracking, dielectric degradation, or a physical defect may open a Novinium uses rigorous field verification procedures to change unsafe behaviors before they lead to an incident. This behavior-based safety program is sometimes referred to as a below-zero safety culture. Risk (17,16667) R equipment =0.05/ =17 R personnel =0.05/ =17k Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash Vacuum tanks are not connected to energized devices.

15 or a physical defect may open a direct path to the interior and allow current to flow directly from the energized conductor and to the ground nearest the breach. Such an arc may damage the eyes of line personnel, or initiate a cascade of failures including fires and/or, in unusual circumstances, an explosion. 1.2c As described in [8], there are sometimes light displays observed in the dielectric tubing. This is caused by the ionization of the vapors and gasses inside the vessel and the flow of capacitive current from the energized conductor to the nearest ground plane. There have been documented cases of tubing failure where the tubing is in intimate contact with a ground wire. In [8], it was also reported that at least 5 failures occurred at Energy s New Orleans unit when vacuum tanks were submerged in water. Two similar failures occurred at PG&E. Finally, [8] indicated that a gloveless subcontractor employee touched a vacuum tank and received a high impedance discharge through his body. 1.2d As described in [8], less than 10% of URD cables have conductive water in the strands. Modern vacuum tanks have predominantly plastic fittings which lower the probability of a direct pathway to ground. The probability of dielectric or mechanical failure is thus ultralow. The probability that personnel will be present when conductive fluid in the tubing is quite likely. Typically the injection time is 18 hours. This time increases, 1) when the run is long, 2) where there is significant water in the strands, direct path to the interior and allow current to flow directly from the energized conductor and to the ground nearest the breach. Such an arc may damage the eyes of line personnel, or initiate a cascade of failures including fires and/or, in very unusual circumstances, an explosion. There have been no observed incidents. Less than 10% of URD cables have conductive water in the strands. The probability of dielectric or mechanical failure is thus ultra-low. The probability that personnel will be present when conductive fluid in the tubing is quite likely. Typically the injection time is 18 hours. This time increases, 1) when the run is long, 2) where there is significant water in the strands, 3) where strands are corroded, or 4) where strands are compressed or compact. Injection personnel typically check the vacuum tank hours after the initiation of 15 direct path to the interior and allow current to flow directly from the energized conductor and to the ground nearest the breach. Such an arc may damage the eyes of line personnel, or initiate a cascade of failures including fires and/or, in very unusual circumstances, an explosion. There have been no observed incidents. Less than 10% of URD cables have conductive water in the strands. The probability of dielectric or mechanical failure is thus ultra-low. The probability that personnel will be present when conductive fluid in the tubing is quite likely. Typically the injection time is 18 hours. This time increases, 1) when the run is long, 2) where there is significant water in the strands, 3) where strands are corroded, or 4) where strands are compressed or compact. Injection personnel typically check the vacuum tank hours after the initiation of

16 3) where strand desiccant is not used, 4) where strands are corroded, or 5) where strands are compressed or compact. Injection personnel typically check the vacuum tank hours after the initiation of fluid flow. 1.2e As described in [8], the typical outcome from a catastrophic failure of a vacuum tank and its associated tubing is a tripped system protection devices and destroyed injection equipment. The equipment consequence is medium. The consequences of line personnel coming into contact with energized devices is life threatening. 1.2f According to [8], the following two steps have been implemented to reduce the probability that current flow as a result of contact with a vacuum tank or its associated tubing will be significant: A layer of dielectric plastic separates the effluent fluids (liquids, gasses, and vapors) from line personnel to prevent any significant electrical current from flowing. Equipment is designed to tolerate full system voltage for at least 24 hours. A strand desiccant, composed of anhydrous isopropyl alcohol (IPA) and water reactive low viscosity silanes (along with titanium(iv) isopropoxide catalyst to facilitate the reaction with water), is used to reduce the conductivity of effluent fluids. These materials solubilize water into the organo-silane phase, where the water, in the presence of the titanium catalyst, rapidly reacts with the silanes. The silanes oligomerize to an alcohol soluble dielectric fluid. Ionic fluid flow. The typical outcome from a catastrophic failure of a vacuum tank and its associated tubing would be a tripped system protection devices and it can destroy injection equipment. The equipment consequence is medium. The consequences of line personnel coming into contact with energized devices is life threatening. The following steps have been implemented to reduce the probability that current flow as a result of contact with a vacuum tank or its associated tubing will be significant: A layer of dielectric plastic separates the effluent fluids (liquids, gasses, and vapors) from line personnel to prevent any significant electrical current from flowing. Equipment is designed to tolerate full system voltage for at least 24 hours. The magnitude of the maximum current flow is limited by the small inside diameter of the tubing. A warning tag is used to alert utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment. The tag provides brief safety instructions. Line personnel should avoid touching injection equipment. fluid flow. The typical outcome from a catastrophic failure of a vacuum tank and its associated tubing would be a tripped system protection devices and it can destroy injection equipment. The equipment consequence is medium. The consequences of line personnel coming into contact with energized devices is life threatening. The following steps have been implemented to reduce the probability that current flow as a result of contact with a vacuum tank or its associated tubing will be significant: A layer of dielectric plastic separates the effluent fluids (liquids, gasses, and vapors) from line personnel to prevent any significant electrical current from flowing. Equipment is designed to tolerate full system voltage for at least 24 hours. The magnitude of the maximum current flow is limited by the small inside diameter of the tubing. A warning tag is used to alert utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment. The tag provides brief safety instructions. Line personnel should avoid touching injection equipment. 16

17 contaminates have a lower solubility in IPA than in the water and thus precipitate. The precipitated ionic contaminates originally present in the water are unable to carry current or transmit electrical potential. The magnitude of the maximum current flow is limited by the small inside diameter of the tubing. Finally, a warning tag is used to alert utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment. The tag provides brief safety instructions. Line personnel should avoid touching injection equipment. 1.2g According to [8], the maximum current flow is limited by the small diameter of the tubing and the use of strand desiccant. It is imperative that line personnel are made aware that all vacuum equipment may be energized up to line potential. Further, they must be trained to use the following tools and PPE when handling vacuum tanks: Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated for system voltage, flame retardant clothing, and tinted safety glasses. 1.2h Risk (1,175) R equipment = x10 3 =1 R personnel = = Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash 1.3a As described in [8], backward flow or diffusion occurs in the tubing from the feed tank used to supply fluid to energized terminations during the soak period. Injection equipment may therefore become energized and create an electrical hazard. 1.3b As explained by [8], a feed tank and its associated tubing are The maximum current flow is limited by the small diameter of the tubing. It is imperative that line personnel are made aware that all vacuum equipment may be energized up to line potential. Further, they must be trained to use the following tools and PPE when handling vacuum tanks: Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated for system voltage, flame retardant clothing, and tinted safety glasses. Risk (1,175) R equipment = x10 3 =1 R personnel = =175 Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash A backward flow or diffusion may occur within the tubing and the feed tank used to supply fluid to the energized terminations. Injection equipment may therefore become energized and create an electrical hazard. A feed tank and its associated tubing are utilized to deliver U732 utilized to deliver PMDMS/TMMS fluid to energized terminations. 17 The maximum current flow is limited by the small diameter of the tubing. It is imperative that line personnel are made aware that all vacuum equipment may be energized up to line potential. Further, they must be trained to use the following tools and PPE when handling vacuum tanks: Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated for system voltage, flame retardant clothing, and tinted safety glasses. Risk (1,175) R equipment = x10 3 =1 R personnel = x10 6 =175 Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash A backward flow or diffusion may occur within the tubing and the feed tank used to supply fluid to the energized terminations. Injection equipment may therefore become energized and create an electrical hazard. A feed tank and its associated tubing are utilized to deliver U732 fluid to energized terminations. Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash No feed tanks are connected to energized devices.

18 and SD to energized terminations. While flow is proceeding rapidly, the dielectric properties of the fluids make the probability of injection equipment becoming energized, low. However, when 1) the flow rate decreases on very long runs, 2) on runs with slow-flowing splices, 3) on runs with excessive water in the strands, and 4) on all runs when the cable is placed into soak mode by the installation of a plug at the outlet of the cable, the flow can come to a virtual halt, or even reverse, as the cable temperature cycles and the feed tank temperature cycles. Such temperature cycles cause fluid pressure changes as the fluids expand and contract and the cable or feed tank physically expand and contract. 1.3c According to [8], feed fittings have failed in about seven cases where submerged transformers flooded after major rainfalls. Approximately 10% of feed tanks failed in these conditions until the injection service supplier introduced improved container dielectrics to separate fluids from the surrounding ground planes. In one case, a failure occurred as a result, when an injection cap was removed and a small amount of contaminated fluid dripped from an unplugged Elastimold injection port. 1.3d According to [8], flooded transformers are encountered on less than 1% of injected cables during the injection or soak phase. The event probability is very low. The probability that personnel will be present when the failure occurs and be exposed to an underwater flash is unlikely. While flow is proceeding rapidly, the dielectric properties of the fluids make the probability of injection equipment becoming energized, low. However, when 1) the flow rate decreases on very long runs, 2) on runs with slow-flowing splices, and 3) on runs with excessive water in the strands, the flow can come to a virtual halt, or even reverse, as the cable temperature cycles and the feed tank temperature cycles. Such temperature cycles cause fluid pressure changes as the fluids expand and contract and the cable or feed tank physically expand and contract. No feed tank failures have occurred. Flooded transformers are encountered on less than 0.1% of injected cables during injection. The event probability is ultra low. The probability that personnel will be present when the failure occurs and be exposed to an underwater flash is unlikely. While flow is proceeding rapidly, the dielectric properties of the fluids make the probability of injection equipment becoming energized, low. However, when 1) the flow rate decreases on very long runs, 2) on runs with slow-flowing splices, and 3) on runs with excessive water in the strands, the flow can come to a virtual halt, or even reverse, as the cable temperature cycles and the feed tank temperature cycles. Such temperature cycles cause fluid pressure changes as the fluids expand and contract and the cable or feed tank physically expand and contract. No feed tank failures have occurred. Flooded transformers are encountered on less than 0.1% of injected cables during injection. The event probability is ultra low. The probability that personnel will be present when the failure occurs and be exposed to an underwater flash is unlikely. 18

19 1.3e According to [8], the consequences to the equipment are low as circuit protection prevents consequential damage. Because the fault occurs submerged in the water and much of the fault energy is absorbed, the consequences to personnel are ranked as medium. 1.3f According to [8], a warning tag was deployed in 1998 to warn utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment and to provide safety instructions. Line personnel are discouraged from touching injection equipment. 1.3g According to [8], line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling potentially energized injection equipment. Additionally to protect from arc flash and possible chemical fires or explosions, line personnel must wear flame retardant clothing and tinted glasses. 1.3h Risk (50,25) R equipment = =50 R personnel = = Electrical, Injection port flashover 1.4a An injection cap (see [9] and [10]) or plug (see [11]) is removed from a dead-front device such as an elbow, while the cable is energized and the conductor flashes to ground as described in [12] and [13]. (Author: While the IHA identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Excerpts of patent document [13] are pasted directly into the discussion where appropriate.) 1.4b Directly from patent [13] at column 1, line 45: The consequences to the equipment are low as circuit protection prevents consequential damage. Because the fault occurs submerged in the water and much of the fault energy is absorbed, the consequences to personnel are ranked as medium. A warning tag is attached to warn utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment and to provide safety instructions. Line personnel are discouraged from touching injection equipment. Line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling potentially energized injection equipment. Additionally to protect from arc flash and possible chemical fires or explosions, line personnel must wear flame retar-dant clothing and tinted glasses. Risk (5,2.5) R equipment = =5 R personnel = =2.5 Electrical, Injection port flashover A Reticular Flash Preventer (RFP) is installed in the injection port to prevent flashover. See [31] for a complete description of the RFP and [32] for test results. The consequences to the equipment are low as circuit protection prevents consequential damage. Because the fault occurs submerged in the water and much of the fault energy is absorbed, the consequences to personnel are ranked as medium. A warning tag is attached to warn utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment and to provide safety instructions. Line personnel are discouraged from touching injection equipment. Line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling potentially energized injection equipment. Additionally to protect from arc flash and possible chemical fires or explosions, line personnel must wear flame retar-dant clothing and tinted glasses. Risk (5,2.5) R equipment = =5 R personnel = =2.5 Electrical, Injection port flashover A Reticular Flash Preventer (RFP) is installed in the injection port to prevent flashover. See [31] for a complete description of the RFP and [32] for test results. Electrical, Injection port flashover This scenario is not possible with this injection paradigm. 19

20 After injection of the remediation fluid is complete, the injection plug is withdrawn from the injection port and is 40 replaced with a sealing plug. Between the time that the injection plug is removed, and the sealing plug is installed, the injection port is open, and the energized conductor of the cable is exposed. Because of the remediation fluid's low viscosity it is likely to empty out of the open injection port. Although there is no direct electrical connection between the conductor and the grounded exterior of the cable elbow, there is the danger of an indirect electrical connection being established between the conductor and the grounded exterior of the elbow. One such indirect pathway may be formed by contaminants that have become entrained in the remediation fluid. Contaminated fluid can be drawn from the injection port as the injection plug is withdrawn or may simply flow out under the force of gravity, thereby creating partial discharging or even a complete conductive pathway to the ground plane. A second indirect pathway is created by source molecules such as those found in low viscosity remediation fluid, water or other contaminants which may be present in the conductor. Source molecules, also referred to as particles, can ionize or form an aerosol, which may become charged in the high-voltage field. These ionized or charged particles may then accelerate towards the ground plane creating a dynamic and conductive aerial pathway. These two known conductive pathways, as well as any other 20

21 conductive pathway established between the conductor and the ground plane, can degrade or destroy the injection elbow. Therefore, a need exists to create a barrier to block the conductive pathway between the conductive portion of the cable and the ground plane to increase the life expectancy of the injection elbow. 1.4c The authors are aware of numerous cases where flash-over has occurred. These cases drove the development of the U.S. Patents 6,517,366 and 6,929,492. The interested reader should contact the injection service supplier for a full accounting of actual incidents. 1.4d The event probability is unacceptably high on 35kV systems, so these systems are no longer operated energized. The event probability on 15 and 25 kv systems is ultra-low. The probability that any personnel will be present when the failure occurs and exposed to a flash is certain. 1.4e The consequences to the equipment are high as transformers and bushing may be damaged or destroyed, and the event could precipitate a fire or explosion. The consequences to personnel are ranked life threatening. 1.4f Energized switching of 35kV systems has been suspended. To the author s knowledge, the inventions of U.S. Patents 6,517,366 and 6,929,492 remain unimplemented by the injection service supplier. The interested reader should inquire with the injection service supplier to determine, if any mitigation steps have been implemented. 21

22 1.4g Line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling injection caps and plugs. Additionally to protect from arc flash, line personnel must wear flame retardant clothing and tinted glasses. The interested reader should inquire with the injection service supplier to determine, if any other consequence mitigation steps have been implemented. 1.4h Risk (2.5,500) R equipment = x10 3 =2.5 R personnel = = HVFI flashover HVFI flashover HVFI flashover HVFI flashover 1.5a HVFI are proprietary devices unavailable to users of CC3 fluid HVFI are proprietary devices available to for use whenever live-front devices are to be connected to feed or vacuum tanks for extended periods. 1.5b Since the late 1980s it has been standard practice in fluid rejuvenation to connect dielectric tubing, typically nylon or polyethylene, to energized cables with the unsustained pressure rejuvenation (UPR) paradigm. In fact, over 100 million feet have been injected in this way. In typical underground residential distribution UPR applications, tubing is connected to a feed end of a cable and an outlet end. These two tubes are connected to a feed bottle and receiving bottle respectively. Both bottles are primarily plastic dielectric with some metal fittings. The tubing and connected bottles are termed potentially energized, as it is at least theoretically possible that they are not at ground potential. In practice they would almost always be very close to ground potential. On the inlet side, dielectric fluid flows into a dielectric tube and the possibility that the tubing/fluid system will conduct electricity is generally small. The exception is when a feed bottle is left connected for a long period of time in what is called a soak period. During the soak period the flow of fluid into the cable is very close to zero and may flow backwards as the connected cable cycles in temperature from a cycling load. More problematic is the outlet side that begins the injection process as a course vacuum. Typically within 24 hours the vacuum decays and the gas phase transitions to a liquid. In the worst case the liquid could be water displaced from the strand interstices, but is more likely dielectric enhancement fluid or a desiccant fluid. The outlet fluids also transport conductive particles such as carbon black and ions. The tubing and the connected tanks are allowed to float electrically and for the sake of safety are handled by line personnel as though they are energized. Occasionally it is desirable to operate injection equipment over extended time periods and the HVFI was introduced to add an additional layer of safety. The illustration nearby shows a typical arrangement of an HVFI on a pole excluding mechanical support hardware. The top portion of the HVFI is connected by a conductive metal tube to the cable injection adapter and is at system voltage. The bottom portion of the HVFI is connected to the system ground and to a feed or receiving tank located within a metallic enclosure. The enclosure is bonded to the system neutral. External stress control on the HVFI is analogous to that of a live-front termination. A high voltage fluidic interface or HVFI is a component which electrically isolates the necessarily high voltage injection devices utilized with live-front terminations such as an injection adaptor, which must be in contact with the conductor, from those injection tanks and tubes which must be hydraulically connected. In other words the HVFI allows hydraulic communication, but interrupts electrical 22

23 communication between the cable s injection interface and the bottles to which they are connected. Up-to-date instructions for the installation and operation of HVFI devices are available online at: NRI 69. The Figure 2 provides HVFI design details. The external design is a 35kV life-front cable termination (3M QT-III-7686-S-8 skirted termination), which meets or exceeds the IEEE standards. The internal components begin with 6.7 meters (22 ft) of 1/8 OD nylon tubing and a ID with a total volume of about 18.1 ml. The tubing enters the top of the HVFI, is wound in a descending outer helix, then an ascending inner helix, and finally down the axis to the bottom where it exits. The tubing is positioned on a polyethylene board with over 120 tube positioning cutouts alternating between the inner helix and the outer helix. The board is secured to the two aluminum end pieces and within a high density polyethylene tube. The volume outside of the 1/8 tubing and inside of the 2.5 body tube is filled with degassed dimethyl silicone RTV liquid, which sets to a permanent non-flowing gel. The aluminum end caps include dedicated electrical connections to the system voltage at the top and to the system ground at the bottom. The end caps include securing hardware so that the HVFI may be installed in a manner similar to a post insulator. Unlike a post insulator, the hardware needs only to support the HVFI. Hydraulic-pneumatic swage-type connections are also on each end cap and mate with ¼ aluminum or copper tubing. The tube at the top of the HVFI is connected to the 23

24 injection adaptor. The tube at the bottom of the HVFI is attached to a feed bottle on the inlet cable end and to a receiving bottle on the outlet cable end. On the outlet cable end a three-way ball valve is attached to the top of the HVFI as shown in the Typical Installation Arrangement, so that a side stream of fluid can be introduced into the HVFI. During operation on the inlet cable end the fluid flow is initiated prior to the cable being re-energized. On the inlet side the tubing is filled with dielectric fluid 100% of the time. On the outlet cable end there are two stages of operation with the cable energized. Prior to the cable being energized a course vacuum (about 25 in Hg) is applied to the receiving tank, which is connected to the HVFI, associated tubing, and the cable. The majority of the air is removed from the system. At least 50 ml of low volatility, low viscosity, low surface energy, dielectric fluid (Ultrinium 732 fluid) is introduced into the top of the HVFI at the three-way valve. The fluid flushes through the 6.7 meters of tubing. The majority of the 50 ml of fluid introduced flushes through the entire HVFI as the total volume within the tubing is about 18 ml. The HVFI traps several ml of the fluid in the tubing coils with two mechanisms. First, because of the low surface energy of the fluid it coats the tubing walls. Second, in the ascending inner coil fluid is drawn upward by weak shear forces as the low pressure air slowly flows toward the vacuum source, but gravity exerts a downward force on the fluid. An equilibrium is established where fluid flows upward in the coil near the tube axis, but flows downward in the coil near the inside diameter of the tube. The perpetual presence of the dielectric fluid blocks the path of any electrical field resisting ionization and repairs any microscopic damage that might occur if there were partial discharges. The shear length of tubing and thickness of the insulation layers including both the thickness of the nylon tubing and the surrounding dimethyl silicone gel make the HVFI tolerant of partial discharge. The cable can now be energized and Stage I begins. In this stage the tubing is filled with a mixture of air at 25 in Hg vacuum and dielectric fluid. Stage II begins when dielectric fluid reaches the HVFI and the tubing becomes filled with dielectric fluid. Standards There are no industry standards for high voltage fluidic interfaces. Some guidance on qualification testing can be found by reviewing appropriate standards for devices that include similar functions as the HVFI. Appropriate engineering judgment is required for the application of these other standards as many dimensions of those standards will not be relevant to the design and operation of a HVFI. IEEE 48 IEEE Standard for Test procedures and Requirements for Alternating-Current Cable Terminations Used on Shielded Cables Having Extruded Insulation Rated 2.5kV through 500 kv As implied by the title, the scope of IEEE 48 includes only cable terminations and hence does not apply to an HVFI, which does not terminate a cable. However, the performance of the exterior of the HVFI is analogous to the exterior of a termination. In fact, the exterior of the HVFI is an IEEE 48 complaint terminator. It is a 3M QT-III-7686-S-8 and has passed all of the IEEE 48 requirements as per 3M s product data sheet, 3M Cold Shrink Silicone Rubber Termination Kit QT-III, 7620-S, 7680-S and 7690-S Series kv. Test requirements include dielectric (7.1.1) and pressure leak tests (7.1.2). 24

25 Testing In addition to the design testing performed for IEEE 48 of the HVFI external components, additional testing was undertaken at Powertech Laboratories by John Vandermaar (Manger, High Voltage Laboratory) and Kal Abdolall (Senior Research Physicist) at the behest of BC Hydro and in cooperation with Novinium on the HVFI assembly. The researchers concluded (Oct. 12, 2007), In our opinion this unit is suitable for this application. The measurements and tests undertaken were done in accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std for 25 kv insulation class equipment are outlined below: The HVFI passed the AC dry withstand test at 65 kv for one minute. The HVFI passed the AC wet withstand test at 60 kv for 10 seconds. The HVFI passed the impulse withstand test at 150 kv (3 positive and 3 negative impulse waveforms). The HVFI was energized at 14.4 kv for 6.75 hours. There was no measurable increase in temperature above ambient on the surface of the HVFI. The HVFI tan delta is 3.75 and does not seem to affect the performance of the unit, as reflected by the low leakage current (see figure nearby) and no measurable rise of temperature after 6.75 hrs at 14.4 kv was observed. 1.5c Two HVFI units were placed in service on a crossing of Desolation Sound in British Columbia on October 15, Both terminations are within 100 meters of an ocean sound subject to high winds and salt spray. The Pollution Severity Level is Heavy. (i.e. Areas generally close to the coast and exposed to coastal spray or to strong winds carrying sand and salt, and subjected to regular condensation.) It took approximately 100 days for fluid to flow from the inlet side HVFI to the outlet side HVFI. The HVFI units have remained in continuous use to the day of this writing, January 19, 2011, which is over three years with perfect performance. The Desolation Sound crossing is a worst case scenario in that typical deployments of the HVFI would be of much shorter duration. 1.5d The event probability is ultra-low. The probability that any personnel will be present if a HVFI were to fail is unlikely. 1.5e The consequences to the equipment are low as circuit protection will likely operate if a flashover were to occur. The consequences to personnel if present are ranked low as the HVFI is at the pole top and fully grounded. 1.5f The HVFI is a probability mitigation device which is designed to reduce the risk of flashover. 1.5g The HVFI is a consequence mitigation device which is designed to carry all fault current to ground so that normal circuit protection will operate in the event of a flashover. 1.5h Risk (2.5,500) R equipment = =0.5 R personnel = = Chemical Chemical Chemical Chemical 2a The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore 25

26 dielectric performance. dielectric performance. dielectric performance. dielectric performance. 2.1 Chemical, Environmental Chemical, Environmental Chemical, Environmental Chemical, Environmental 2.1a Fluid is spilled into the environment. 2.1b While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 focuses upon the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Effluent samples have been analyzed by Dow Corning and Phillips Environmental and may be classified RCRA hazardous wastes. The injection supplier has always cleaned up spills of fluid whether or not they include contamination. 2.1c As described in [8], the maximum size of a fluid spill is limited to the size of the feed tank. For 7-strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is available. Drop size spills are not unusual during dayto-day injection operations. Spills involving the entire contents of a feed tank have not been reported, except when a catastrophic failure of an injection device occurs. See d As outlined in [8], small, dropsize spills occur frequently. Spills of up to one gallon occur several times each year. The event probability is medium. Typically, injection personnel are Fluid is spilled into the environment. While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 considers the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Injection equipment utilized by this paradigm is generally not left unattended. Both the probability of a leak and the magnitude of a leak are mitigated in comparison to unattended operation. By policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up and the contaminated soil and cleanup materials are disposed of as required by local and national law. The maximum fluid spill is the size of the feed tank. For 7- strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is generally available. Drop size spills are possible occurrences in the day-to-day operations of injection. A spill of a large portion of fluid in a feed tank occurred on a single occasion when a hydraulic fitting failed. The event probability overall is very low. Typically, injection personnel are quite likely to be present when a spill occurs. 26 Fluid is spilled into the environment. While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 considers the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Injection equipment utilized by this paradigm is generally not left unattended. Both the probability of a leak and the magnitude of a leak are mitigated in comparison to unattended operation. By policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up and the contaminated soil and cleanup materials are disposed of as required by local and national law. The maximum fluid spill is the size of the feed tank. For 7- strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is generally available. Drop size spills are possible occurrences in the day-to-day operations of injection. A spill of a large portion of fluid in a feed tank occurred on a single occasion when a hydraulic fitting failed. The event probability overall is very low. Typically, injection personnel are quite likely to be present when a spill occurs. Fluid is spilled into the environment. While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 considers the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Injection equipment utilized by this paradigm is generally not left unattended. Both the probability of a leak and the magnitude of a leak are mitigated in comparison to unattended operation. By policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up and the contaminated soil and cleanup materials are disposed of as required by local and national law. The maximum fluid spill is the size of the feed tank. For 7- strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is generally available. Drop size spills are possible occurrences in the day-to-day operations of injection. A spill of a large portion of fluid in a feed tank occurred on a single occasion when a hydraulic fitting failed. The event probability overall is very low. Typically, injection personnel are likely to be present when a spill occurs.

27 likely to be present when a spill occurs. 2.1e As explained in [8], there are not substantive environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of uncontaminated PMDMS and TMMS, or of IPA with silanes. From [8], Worst case simulated spills were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute. Spills of contaminated fluid onto soil are cleaned up and disposed of properly. 2.1f As described in [8], the quick disconnect fitting with automatic shut-off valves were introduced to reduce drop-size spills. The service supplier's CPM requires injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Even at low concentrations, the silane mixture and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have objectionable odors. The service supplier s hazard communication program, including the on-site availability of MSDS sheets along with the easily recognized odor, results in recognition by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. 2.1g According to [8], bacteria in the soil metabolize mixtures of PMDMS and TMMS to water, carbon dioxide, and silicon dioxide (sand). Contaminated fluid and soil with contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted facilities. There are no significant environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of pure Ultrinium fluid. Worst case simulated spills of similar materials were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an independent environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute. As a matter of Novinium policy, spills of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are cleaned up Novinium rejuvenation instructions require injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have distinctive odors even at low vapor concentrations. Novinium s hazard communication program, including the availability of the MSDS sheets both online and on the job site, and the distinctive sweet odor of the Novinium fluids, result in cognizance by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. Novinium fluids are metabolized by bacteria in the soil or decompose abiotically to water, carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide (sand), iron oxide, and other harmless compounds. Soil contaminated with fluid and contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted There are no significant environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of pure Ultrinium fluid. Worst case simulated spills of similar materials were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an independent environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute. As a matter of Novinium policy, spills of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are cleaned up Novinium rejuvenation instructions require injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have distinctive odors even at low vapor concentrations. Novinium s hazard communication program, including the availability of the MSDS sheets both online and on the job site, and the distinctive sweet odor of the Novinium fluids, result in cognizance by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. Novinium fluids are metabolized by bacteria in the soil or decompose abiotically to water, carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide (sand), iron oxide, and other harmless compounds. Soil contaminated with fluid and contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted There are no significant environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of pure Ultrinium fluid. Worst case simulated spills of similar materials were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an independent environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute. As a matter of Novinium policy, spills of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are cleaned up and disposed of properly. Novinium rejuvenation instructions require injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have distinctive odors even at low vapor concentrations. Novinium s hazard communication program, including the availability of the MSDS sheets both online and on the job site, and the distinctive sweet odor of the Novinium fluids, result in cognizance by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. Novinium fluids are metabolized by bacteria in the soil or decompose abiotically to water, carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide (sand), iron oxide, and other harmless compounds. Soil contaminated with fluid and contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted 27

28 2.1h Risk (0, 0) (Note: Following CPM procedures, the risks of environmental contamination are virtually zero. As discussed in (b), there are potential environmental consequences, if contaminated fluids spills are not cleaned up. facilities as per Novinium policy. facilities as per Novinium policy. facilities as per Novinium policy. Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of environmental contamination are very close to zero when the Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions are followed.) Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of environmental contamination are very close to zero when the Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions are followed.) Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of environmental contamination are very close to zero when the Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions are followed.) 2.2 Chemical, Toxicological Chemical, Toxicological Chemical, Toxicological Chemical, Toxicological 2.2a Accidental contact with CC3 fluid. Accidental contact with P011 fluids. 2.2b It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. 2.2c There are no carcinogens listed in the most current version of the CC3 fluid MSDS. It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. P011 includes less than 0.01% w of the carcinogen and male reproductive toxin benzene [34]. Long term exposure to benzene by inhalation or skin contact may cause cancer, damage male reproductive organs, or be a developmental toxin to a developing fetus. Accidental contact with U732 fluids. It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. There are no known carcinogens, male reproductive toxins, or developmental toxins in U732 fluids. Accidental contact with U732 fluid. It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. There are no known carcinogens, male reproductive toxins, or developmental toxins in U732 fluids Chemical, Inhalation Chemical, Inhalation Chemical, Inhalation Chemical, Inhalation 2.2.1a 2.2.1b During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from the CC3 mixture composed primarily of PMDMS and TMMS. In [8], it is explained that delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid and its vapors inside the container. If an accidental spill were to occur, the fluid reacts with moisture in the environment and liberates methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has a During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from the P011 mixture composed primarily of PMDMS and isolauryl alcohol. Fluid delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid, and its vapors, within the container. If an accidental spill does occur, the fluid will react with moisture in the environment. The result of that reaction is the formation of methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has a 28 During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from U732 fluid. Fluid delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid, and its vapors, within the container. If an accidental spill does occur, the fluid will react with moisture in the environment. The result of that reaction is the formation of methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has a During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from U732 fluid. Fluid delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid, and its vapors, within the container. If an accidental spill does occur, the fluid will react with moisture in the environment. The result of that reaction is the formation of methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has

29 2.2.1c 2.2.1d 2.2.1e 2.2.1f similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce or more of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require prolonged exposure. As described in [8], methyl alcohol concentrations were measured in a confined space in a mock spill. The experiment demonstrated SCBA is required for clean up. As outlined in [8], spills greater than a few drops have been uncommon. Two instances were reported in confined spaces and SCBA was required. The event ranking is ultra-low and the personnel present ranking is likely. As recounted in [8], no damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methyl alcohol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening. From [8], equipment is designed to limit the maximum flow rate of fluid. This reduces the size of spills during attended portions of operations. Flow-restricting orifices and very small diameter tubing restrict fluid flow. similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require prolonged exposure. On a unit weight basis, P011 fluids produce about 5% less methanol than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. From [34], PMDMS includes less than 0.01% w of the carcinogen and male reproductive toxin benzene. Long term exposure to benzene by inhalation or skin contact may cause cancer or damage male reproductive organs. The vapor pressure of P011 fluid is lower than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. SCBA is required for spill cleanup in confined spaces. Spills of any size have been uncommon at Novinium. The event ranking is ultra-low and the personnel present ranking is likely. No damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methanol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible. From [34], prolonged exposure to benzene by inhalation may cause cancer or damage to male reproductive organs. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening. All Novinium injection equipment is designed with flow rate restricting features. Injection adaptors and injection tools are typically operated at one-third of their design pressures. All injection adaptors seal fluid inside similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require a prolonged exposure. On a unit weight basis, U732 fluids produce about 30% less methanol than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. No known carcinogens or male reproductive toxins are present. The vapor pressure of U732 fluid is at least an order of magnitude less than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. SCBA is required for spill cleanup in confined spaces. Spills of any size have been uncommon at Novinium. The event ranking is ultra-low and the personnel present ranking is likely. No damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methanol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible. Because there is 30% less methanol, the vapor pressure is lower and there is no known carcinogen or male reproductive toxins present. The personnel ranking is ½ that of the other paradigm. All Novinium injection equipment is designed with flow rate restricting features. Injection adaptors and injection tools are typically operated at one-third of their design pressures. All injection adaptors seal fluid inside a similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require a prolonged exposure. On a unit weight basis, U732 fluids produce about 30% less methanol than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. No known carcinogens or male reproductive toxins are present. The vapor pressure of U732 fluid is at least an order of magnitude less than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. SCBA is required for spill cleanup in confined spaces. Spills of any size have been uncommon at Novinium. The event ranking is ultra-low and the personnel present ranking is likely. No damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methanol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible. Because there is 30% less methanol, the vapor pressure is lower and there is no known carcinogen or male reproductive toxins present. The personnel ranking is ½ that of the other paradigm. All Novinium injection equipment is designed with flow rate restricting features. Injection adaptors and injection tools are typically operated at one-third of their design pressures. All injection adaptors seal fluid 29

30 Injection tanks are over-designed to make leaks less likely g Use SCBA and aggressive ventilation in confined spaces h Risk (0,375) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =375 of the cable and are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows or splices. Use SCBA and ample ventilation in confined spaces. Risk (0,375) R equipment = =0 R personnel = = 375 to be suicidal and masochistic to have to be suicidal and 30 of the cable and are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows or splices. Use SCBA and ample ventilation in confined spaces. Risk (0,188) R equipment = =0 R personnel = /2=188 inside of the cable and are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows or splices. Use SCBA and ample ventilation in confined spaces Chemical, Oral Chemical, Oral Chemical, Oral Chemical, Oral 2.2.2a Ingestion or CC3 fluid (PMDMS- TMMS mixture). While the IHA [8] identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document b If CC3 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 3 ounces of the PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol c There has very likely never been an incident of ingestion as the fluid has an extremely bitter taste d The event ranking is not possible with personnel present being not possible e Ingestion of approximately 3 ounces of PMDMS/TMMS mixture may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening f Because of the extremely bitter taste of silanes, one would have Risk (0,188) R equipment = =0 R personnel = /2=188 Ingestion of P011 fluid. Ingestion of U732 fluid. Ingestion of U732 fluid. If P011 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 3 ounces of Perficio fluid, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol. There has never been an incident of ingestion, because the fluid has an extremely bitter taste. The event ranking is not possible with personnel present being not possible. Ingestion of approximately 3 ounces of Perficio fluid may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening. Because of the extremely bitter taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would If U732 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol. There has never been an incident of ingestion, because the fluid has an extremely bitter taste. The event ranking is not possible with personnel present being not possible. Ingestion of approximately 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening. Because of the extremely bitter taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would have to be suicidal and If U732 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol. There has never been an incident of ingestion, because the fluid has an extremely bitter taste. The event ranking is not possible with personnel present being not possible. Ingestion of approximately 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening. Because of the extremely bitter taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would have to be suicidal and

31 choose this method of ending one s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option g If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water h Risk (0,0) R equipment =0.0 0=0 R personnel = =0 masochistic to choose this method of ending one s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option. If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water. Risk (0,0) R equipment =0.0 0=0 R personnel = =0 31 masochistic to choose this method of ending one s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option. If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water. Risk (0,0) R equipment =0.0 0=0 R personnel = =0 masochistic to choose this method of ending one s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option. If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water. Risk (0,0) R equipment =0.0 0=0 R personnel = = Chemical, Skin Chemical, Skin Chemical, Skin Chemical, Skin 2.2.3a 2.2.3b 2.2.3c 2.2.3d Contact of CC3 fluid (PMDMS/TMMS mixture) with skin. While the IHA [8] identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. If PMDMS/TMMS mixture is in contact with skin the fluid will remove water and extract natural oils from the skin, which may cause irritation and some redness. The author is not aware of any documented cases of cancer or male infertility, which have been directly linked to dermal exposure of PMDMS/TMMS. To the author s knowledge, all cases of skin irritation have been temporary. The interested reader should inquire directly with the injection service supplier. The event ranking is very low with personnel present being certain. Contact of P011 fluid with skin. Contact of U732 fluid with skin. Contact of U732 fluid with skin. If PMDMS mixture is in contact with skin, some small amount of benzene will diffuse into the body. Benzene is a carcinogen and male reproductive toxin. The fluid will also remove water and extract natural oils from the skin, which may cause irritation and some redness. All injection equipment is of low drip design to minimize the possibility of contact. The author is not aware of any documented cases of cancer or male infertility, which have been directly linked to dermal exposure of PMDMS. There have not been any incidences of irritated skin. The event ranking is ultra-low because of the elimination of the soak period; personnel present being certain. If U732 fluid is in contact with skin, water and natural oils will be extracted from the skin, which will likely cause irritation and some redness. All injection equipment is of low drip design to minimize the possibility of contact. There have not been any incidences of irritated skin. The event ranking is ultra-low because of the elimination of the soak period; personnel present being certain. If U732 fluid is in contact with skin, water and natural oils will be extracted from the skin, which will likely cause irritation and some redness. All injection equipment is of low drip design to minimize the possibility of contact. There have not been any incidences of irritated skin. The event ranking is ultra-low with personnel present being certain e Consequences range from minor Consequences range from minor Minor skin irritation is possible. Minor skin irritation is possible.

32 2.2.3f 2.2.3g skin irritation to male infertility to contributory death by cancer. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening. Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying h Risk (0,5000) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =5000 skin irritation to male infertility to contributory death by cancer. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is life threatening. Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying. Risk (0,500) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =500 The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is low. Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying. Risk (0,5) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =5 The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is low. Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying. Risk (0,5) R equipment = =0 R personnel = = Chemical, Eyes Chemical, Eyes Chemical, Eyes Chemical, Eyes 2.2.4a 2.2.4b 2.2.4c 2.2.4d 2.2.4e 2.2.4f 2.2.4g Contact of CC3 fluid with the eyes. While the IHA [8] identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. When CC3 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel, it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. The author is not aware of any cases where fluid contact injured the eyes of injection personnel. The interested reader should inquire directly with the injection service supplier. The event ranking is ultra-low with personnel present being certain. Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is low. Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs. Contact of P011 fluid with the eyes. When P011 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. There have not been any incidences of fluid in eyes. The event ranking is ultra-low with personnel present being certain. Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is low. Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs. Contact of U732 fluid with the eyes. When U732 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. There have not been any incidences of fluid in eyes. The event ranking is ultra-low with personnel present being certain. Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is low. Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs h Risk (0,0.5) Risk (0,0.5) Risk (0,0.5) Risk (0,0.5) Contact of U732 fluid with the eyes. When U732 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. There have not been any incidences of fluid in eyes. The event ranking is ultra-low with personnel present being certain. Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is not possible, the personnel ranking is low. Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs. 32

33 R equipment = =0 R personnel = =0.5 R equipment = =0 R personnel = = R equipment = =0 R personnel = =0.5 R equipment = =0 R personnel = = Chemical, Fire/Explosion Chemical, Fire/Explosion Chemical, Fire/Explosion Chemical, Fire/Explosion 2.3a Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. 2.3b There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. As described in [8], PMDMS/TMMS mixtures may be a source of fuel. Injection equipment is pressurized with helium, so there is no oxygen present. Injected cables are flushed with nitrogen, so there is no oxygen present. For a fire to be possible, either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out. Flash points from referenced MSDSs of several materials are listed in the table below: Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. P011 fluids may be a source of fuel. Within the injection equipment and cables being injected there is only carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert and does not support combustion. Either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out to create a potentially flammable mixture. After the injection is complete, the fluid is sealed inside the cable in an equipotential zone and no electrical discharge is possible. If fluid leaks from an injected cable, the spilled Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. U732 fluids may be a source of fuel. Within the injection equipment and cables being injected there is only carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert and does not support combustion. Either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out to create a potentially flammable mixture. After the injection is complete, the fluid is sealed inside the cable in an equipotential zone and no electrical discharge is possible. If fluid leaks from an injected cable, the spilled Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. U732 fluids may be a source of fuel. Within the injection equipment and cables being injected there is only carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert and does not support combustion. Either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out to create a potentially flammable mixture. The Novinium SPR process is applied to deenergized devices

34 Material Unleaded Gasoline CC/SD CC3 Jet Fuel A P011 fluid PMDMS U732 fluids Hydrolyzed U732 fluids CC3 hydrolyzate U733 fluid Flash -49 F (-45 C) 32 F (0 C) 55 F (13 C) 100 F (38 C) >142 F (61 C) 142 F (61 C) >144 F (62 C) >212 F (100 C) >212 F (100 C) >248 F (120 C) CC/SD (strand desiccant) does not have a significant impact on the potential post-failure scenarios discussed in this section, since it is flushed from the cable during the injection phase of the process. The CC3 fluid is made up primarily of two components, PMDMS and TMMS. TMMS is more volatile and causes the initially low flash point of CC3 fluid. PMDMS has a flash point of 142 F. The more volatile TMMS fluid diffuses quickly into the insulation. The flash point of the mixture in the strand interstices increases to about the flash point of PMDMS after a year or two within typical cables. After the TMMS has essentially exuded from the cable, the flash point continues to increase and approaches 212 F as the PMDMS monomer oligomerizes (reacts with water and condenses in the presence of a catalyst). In the flash point table nearby, the material, which is the end result of this condensation process, is referred to as CC3 hydrolyzate. In cables, both PMDMS and fluid may be exposed to sources of ignition. Flash points of various materials are listed in the table below: Material Flash Unleaded -49 F (-45 C) Gasoline CC/SD CC3 Jet Fuel A P011 fluid PMDMS U732 fluids Hydrolyzed U732 fluids CC3 hydrolyzate U733 fluid 32 F (0 C) 55 F (13 C) 100 F (38 C) >142 F (61 C) 142 F (61 C) >144 F (62 C) >212 F (100 C) >212 F (100 C) >248 F (120 C) The flash point of Perficio fluid increases toward that of CC3 hydrolyzate as the silane monomer oligomerize in power cables. fluid may be exposed to sources of ignition. Flash points of various materials are listed in the table below: Material Flash Unleaded -49 F (-45 C) Gasoline CC/SD CC3 Jet Fuel A P011 fluid PMDMS U732 fluids Hydrolyzed U732 fluids CC3 hydrolyzate U733 fluid 32 F (0 C) 55 F (13 C) 100 F (38 C) >142 F (61 C) 142 F (61 C) >144 F (62 C) >212 F (100 C) >212 F (100 C) >248 F (120 C) The flash point of Ultrinium fluids increases toward that of hydrolyzed Ultrinium fluids as the silane monomers oligomerize in power cables. and hence there is generally not a source of ignition. After the injection is complete, the fluid is sealed inside the cable in an equipotential zone and no electrical discharge is possible. If fluid leaks from an injected cable, the spilled fluid may be exposed to sources of ignition. Flash points of various materials are listed in the table below: Material Flash Unleaded -49 F (-45 C) Gasoline CC/SD CC3 Jet Fuel A P011 fluid PMDMS U732 fluids Hydrolyzed U732 fluids CC3 hydrolyzate U733 fluid 32 F (0 C) 55 F (13 C) 100 F (38 C) >142 F (61 C) 142 F (61 C) >144 F (62 C) >212 F (100 C) >212 F (100 C) >248 F (120 C) The flash point of Ultrinium fluids increases toward that of hydrolyzed Ultrinium fluids as the silane monomers oligomerize in power cables. 34

35 mixtures of PMDMS and TMMS end up as the same mixture of condensed PMDMS oligomers. The resulting mixture of PMDMS oligomers is realized about five to twelve years after treatment. The actual time depends upon the cable geometry, the operating temperature of the cable, and the amount of water available inside the cable Storage 2.3.1a All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities Transportation 2.3.2a 2.3.2a All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. According to [8], cables or cable accessories may fail during the injection, soak, or post-soak. URD circuits are typically injected at 20 psig or less and soaked at about 10 psig. After a soak period of days, the delivery pressure is zero. The quantity of fluid, which can leak and the flow rate at which it leaks, is related to 1) the feed or soak pressure, 2) head pressure from a change in elevation, 3) the distance from a pressurized feed tank, and 4) the vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands. Head pressure due to elevation changes could be a problem because of the pressure limits on the elbow seal and the splice seal. The distance from the feed tank has a large impact, because significant sustained flow is unlikely on the vacuum end of typical cable lengths. This slow flow is a result of the resistance to flow through the cable. The total fluid available also varies depending on the injection status Storage All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities. Transportation All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. Cables or cable accessories may fail during the injection or postinjection periods. URD circuits are typically injected at 20 psig or less. The quantity of fluid, which can leak and the flow rate at which it leaks, is related to 1) the feed pressure, 2) head pressure from a change in elevation, 3) the distance from a pressurized feed tank, and 4) the vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands. Head pressure due to elevation changes could be a problem because of the pressure limits on elbow and splice seals. The distance from the feed tank has a large impact, because significant sustained flow is unlikely on the vacuum end of typical cable lengths. This slow flow is a result of the resistance to flow through the cable. The total fluid available also varies depending on the injection status and the length and geometry of the cable. During the injection, a reservoir of up to one-gallon of 35 Storage All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities. Transportation All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. Cables or cable accessories may fail during the injection or postinjection periods. URD circuits are typically injected at 20 psig or less. The quantity of fluid, which can leak and the flow rate at which it leaks, is related to 1) the feed pressure, 2) head pressure from a change in elevation, 3) the distance from a pressurized feed tank, and 4) the vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands. Head pressure due to elevation changes could be a problem because of the pressure limits on elbow and splice seals. The distance from the feed tank has a large impact, because significant sustained flow is unlikely on the vacuum end of typical cable lengths. This slow flow is a result of the resistance to flow through the cable. The total fluid available also varies depending on the injection status and the length and geometry of the cable. During the injection, a reservoir of up to one-gallon of Storage All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities. Transportation All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. With the SPR injection paradigm, fluid is not injected into energized cables and hence the injection, soak, and post-soak periods do not apply. Fluid is sealed inside the cable with metallic pins. All pins are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows and splices. Any head pressure due to elevation will be contained by the injection adaptors. Pressure in the post injection period decays exponentially as generally suggested by the graph below. The actual decay rate is faster at higher temperatures. The maximum leak size is a fraction of the injected fluid. NRI 99 available at provides guidance on maximum spill sizes.

36 and the length and geometry of the cable. During the injection and soak phases, a reservoir of up to one-gallon of fluid (more typically half that amount) can provide fluid for a leak. After the feed or soak bottle is removed (post-injection), there is typically less than 1 gallon in the strand interstices for every 1000 feet of cable. The fluid reservoir in the strands decreases continuously after the injection soak bottles are removed. In addition to the injection pressure and head pressure, the other source of pressure is the fluid vapor pressure. All materials exhibit vapor pressure. As an example, water has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100 C (212 F). According to [8], CC3 fluid has a vapor pressure of 6.4 psia at 30 C, 9.5 psia at 60 C, and about 21.7 psia at 90 C. The TMMS component of CC3, however, diffuses quite rapidly out of the cable strands, and once it is gone (6 to 30 months depending upon temperature and geometry); the vapor pressure of the remaining fluid is less than that of water. Note that all pressures are in psia (pounds per square inch, absolute) and hence in the closed environment inside a cable, there is effectively no pressure until the vapor pressure exceeds 14.7 psia, which is typical atmospheric pressure at sea level Post-Injection 2.3.3a Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. fluid (more typically half that amount) can provide fluid for a leak. After the feed bottle is removed (post-injection), there is typically less than 1 gallon in the strand interstices for every 1000 feet of cable. The fluid reservoir in the strands decreases continuously after the injection bottles are removed. In addition to the injection pressure and head pressure, the other source of pressure is the fluid vapor pressure. All materials exhibit vapor pressure. As an example, water has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100 C (212 F). P011 fluid has a vapor pressure below 2 psia at 130 C. Post-Injection Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. fluid (more typically half that amount) can provide fluid for a leak. After the feed bottle is removed (post-injection), there is typically less than 1 gallon in the strand interstices for every 1000 feet of cable. The fluid reservoir in the strands decreases continuously after the injection bottles are removed. In addition to the injection pressure and head pressure, the other source of pressure is the fluid vapor pressure. All materials exhibit vapor pressure. As an example, water has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100 C (212 F). U732 fluid has a vapor pressure below 2 psia at 130 C. Post-Injection Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. Pressure (psig) Pressure Decay (1/0 cable at 25 C) Elapsed Time (days) 30 psig 240 psig 480 psig Besides the injection pressure and pressure from hydrostatic head changes, there is one other source of pressure, which affects the leak rate and leak characteristics. Every liquid has a characteristic vapor pressure. Water, for example, has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 bar or 1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100 C (212 F). U732 fluid has a vapor pressure below 2 psia at 130 C. Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. 36

37 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure a When a cable or component fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid remains present in the cable or cable component, some will leak Post-Injection, Catastrophic a b c d Electrical Failure, Cable When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. During the period encompassing 1985 to 2000, approximately 0.6% of over 7 million feet of cables treated have failed for any reason. Approximately 0.4% (2/3 of the total failures) are cable failures. Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure When a cable fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid is present in the cable, some will leak. Post-Injection, Catastrophic Electrical Failure, Cable When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a failure and its accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. The failure rate for this paradigm is currently zero. It is anticipated that the cable failure rate will be superior to UPR with soak CC3. Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure When a cable fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid is present in the cable, some will leak. Post-Injection, Catastrophic Electrical Failure, Cable When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a failure and its accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. The failure rate for this paradigm is currently zero. It is anticipated that the cable failure rate will be superior to UPR with soak CC3. Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure When a cable fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid is present in the cable, some will leak. Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Electrical Failure, Cable When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a failure and its accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. The total SPR U732 failure rate is about half that for UPR CC e See subcategory detail below. See subcategory detail below. See subcategory detail below. See subcategory detail below f CC3 imparts more rapid improvement in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: TMMS, which imparted the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 as per the supplier s MSDS [14] and [24]. Current PMDMS/TMMS P011 fluids delivered with UPR should enjoy superior postinjection reliability because of improvements to the catalysis. U732 fluids delivered with UPR should enjoy superior postinjection reliability because of improvements to the catalysis and the presence of organic functionality to add voltage, UV and PD stabilizers. U732 fluids delivered with SPR increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than the pre-2005 PMDMS/TMMS mixture that is no longer in use, greatly reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. 37

38 mixture will not enjoy the same rate of dielectric improvement as its predecessor fluid.) Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried a Treated direct buried cable fails. Treated direct buried cable fails. Treated direct buried cable fails. Treated direct buried cable fails b Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion. Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion. Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion. Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion c N/A N/A N/A N/A d Approximately 60 cables failed during the period from 1985 to The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible. The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible. The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible. The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible e System protection will trip when a cable faults f CC2 (PMDMS/TMMS) fluid provides a more rapid improvement in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: The TMMS ingredient, which imparted the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 as per [14] and [24]. Post-2005 PMDMS/TMMS fluid will suffer a slower rate of dielectric improvement.) g No data available on repeat failures. The interested reader should inquire directly with the injection service supplier h Risk (0,0) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =0 System protection will trip when a cable faults. P011 fluid provides a rapid improvement in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. There have been zero occurrences of second faults with this technology. Risk (0,0) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =0 System protection will trip when a cable faults. U732 fluid provides a rapid improvement in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. There have been zero occurrences of second faults with this technology. Risk (0,0) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =0 System protection will trip when a cable faults. U732 fluids delivered by SPR increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than the CC2 fluid that is no longer in use, greatly reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. There have been zero occurrences of second faults with this technology. Risk (0,0) R equipment = =0 R personnel = =0 38

39 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct 39 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct a Treated cable in duct fails. Treated cable in duct fails. Treated cable in duct fails. Treated cable in duct fails b c A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. (See ) There are no known failures with this scenario d The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See (d).) The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible e System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is medium. The personnel ranking is none f PMDMS/TMMS mixtures impart more rapid improvement in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: The TMMS ingredient in PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which imparted the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 as per the supplier s MSDS.) g The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned h Risk (5,0) R equipment = =5 R personnel = =0 A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. The higher flashpoints of P011 fluid reduce the probability of ignition. (See ) There have been no failures with this scenario. The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See (d).) The event ranking is very low divided by 2; the personnel present ranking is not possible. System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is medium. The personnel ranking is none. P011 fluid has performance advantages over the CC3 fluid. Higher reliability reduces the likelihood of a fluid leak. The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned. Risk (2.5,0) R equipment =0.005/ =5 R personnel =0.005/ =0 A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. The higher flashpoints of U732 fluids reduce the probability of ignition. (See ) There have been no failures with this scenario. The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See (d).) The event ranking is very low divided by 2; the personnel present ranking is not possible. System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is medium. The personnel ranking is none. U732 fluid has many performance advantages over the CC3 fluid. Higher reliability reduces the likelihood of a fluid leak. The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned. Risk (2.5,0) R equipment =0.005/ =5 R personnel =0.005/ =0 A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. The higher flashpoints of U732 fluids reduce the probability of ignition. (See ) There have been no failures with this scenario. The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See (d).) The event ranking is very low divided by 2; the personnel present ranking is not possible. System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is medium. The personnel ranking is none. U732 fluids delivered with SPR increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than the pre-2005 CC2 fluid that is no longer in use. Current CC3 fluid will suffer a slower rate of dielectric improvement. The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned. Risk (2.5,0) R equipment =0.005/ =5 R personnel =0.005/ =0

40 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole a b c d e f Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). There are no known failures with this scenario. The event ranking is ultra-low ; the personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. PMDMS/TMMS mixtures provide a faster increase in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: The TMMS ingredient in PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which imparts the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 per the supplier s MSDS.) Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (8.9 liters). The high flash point of P011 fluid makes ignition less likely than with CC3 fluid mixtures. There are no known failures with this scenario. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2- times lower than that of flammable fluid. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. Ultrinium fluid provides a rapid increase in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (8.9 liters). The high flash point of U732 fluids makes ignition less likely than with CC3 fluid mixtures. There are no known failures with this scenario. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2- times lower than that of flammable fluid. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. Ultrinium fluid provides a rapid increase in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure g None. None. None. None. Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (8.9 liters). The high flash point of U732 fluids makes ignition less likely than with CC3 fluid mixtures. There are no known failures with this scenario. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2-times lower than that of flammable fluid. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. Ultrinium fluids increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than CC2 fluid that is no longer in use. The current PMDMS/TMMS mixture, CC3, has a slower rate of dielectric improvement. 40

41 h Risk (2.5,25) R equipment = x10 3 =2.5 R personnel = = Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice a b c d When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if no damming compound was used, some may leak. Damming compound is a cure-in-place silicone gel, which is sometimes used to block the strands and keep the PMDMS/TMMS fluid from coming in contact with splices, particularly on larger conductor sizes. This practice was largely suspended in the late 1990 s. If the leak occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a failure and a leak occur within an enclosure, the fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no reported failures of splices, which have led directly to a fire. During the period encompassing 1985 to 2000, approximately 0.6% of over 7 million feet of cables treated have failed for any reason. Approximately 0.1% (or 1/6 of the total failures) represent splice failures. (Author: The service supplier in March 2008 claimed that 80 million feet of cables have been treated.) Risk (1.2,12.5) R equipment =0.0005/2 5x10 3 =1.2 R personnel =.0005/ =12.5 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if the compression connector and injection adaptor assembly are also breached, fluid may leak. If the leak occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a failure and a leak occur within an enclosure, the fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no failures or breaches with this scenario. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2- times lower than that of flammable CC3 fluid. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. Risk (1.2,12.5) R equipment =0.0005/2 5x10 3 =1.2 R personnel =.0005/ =12.5 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if the compression connector and injection adaptor assembly are also breached, fluid may leak. If the leak occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a failure and a leak occur within an enclosure, the fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no failures or breaches with this scenario. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2- times lower than that of flammable CC3 fluid. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. Risk (1.2,12.5) R equipment =0.0005/2 5x10 3 =1.2 R personnel =.0005/ =12.5 Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if the compression connector and injection adaptor assembly are also breached, fluid may leak. For a leak to occur, the splice, the steel injection adaptor, and aluminum or copper compression connector must be breached. If such a breach occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a breach occurs within an enclosure, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See ) If a breach occurs on a riser pole fluid may be released into an unconfined space. (See ) There have been no failures or breaches with this scenario. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2-times lower than that of flammable CC3 fluid. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. 41

42 e See below. See below. See below. See below f Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the CPM reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. Note: FPL and the provider of UPR CC3 to FPL employed a practice, which intentionally contaminated splice/cable interface and directly contradicted the CPM. This practice was terminated in the fall of (Author: Some users of this injection paradigm report 50% splice failure rates.) Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried a Direct buried, treated splice fails with no damming compound b Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible. Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the NRIs reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the NRIs reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried SPR utilizes resilient, robust, and redundant seals designed for pressures up to 1000 psig (69 bars) to assure that fluid in the cable interstices never come in contact with the splice body. Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried Direct buried, treated splice fails. Direct buried, treated splice fails. Direct buried, treated splice fails and injection adapter is breached. Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible. Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible. Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible c N/A N/A N/A N/A d The probability that the failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible. The probability that the failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible. The probability that the failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is very low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible. Because both the splice and injection adaptor must fail, the event ranking is ultra-low ; the personnel present ranking is not possible e f System protection should trip when a cable fails. Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the CPM reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. (Author: Some users of this injection paradigm report 50% splice failure rates.) System protection should trip when a cable fails. Pressure testing procedures reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. System protection should trip when a cable fails. Pressure testing procedures reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. System protection should trip when a cable fails. The sustained pressure paradigm utilizes resilient, robust, and redundant seals designed for pressures up to 1000 psig to assure that fluid in the cable interstices never comes in contact with the splice body. NRIs provide multiple quality assurance checks to minimize the chance of craft error. 42

43 g A failed splice must be replaced. A failed splice must be replaced. A failed splice must be replaced. A failed splice must be replaced h Risk (5,0) R equipment = =5 R personnel =0.005 X0.0 0= Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole a b A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. No damming compound was used, or the dam failed and fluid flows to the failed splice. A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). Risk (5,0) R equipment = =5 R personnel =0.005 X0.0 0=0 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters) c Two failures have been reported There have been no incidents. with this scenario through NRIs provide multiple quality In no case were there fires assurance checks to minimize the created directly by the failure. In chance of craft error. P011 fluid the first case at AEP s has a flashpoint above the range Appalachian Power (circa 1993) of materials defined by the U.S. unit in Charleston, West Virginia, DOT as flammable. no fire initiated. Line personnel used appropriate ventilation and did not introduce spurious ignition sources until after the fluid spill was terminated and the spill was eliminated. In the second case, at Detroit Edison (summer 1997), Detroit Edison line personnel cut out a failed splice and two adjacent splices in a three phase feeder circuit. Fluid spilled from all open ends onto the floor of the manhole. To arrest the fluid flow, the DTE line personnel applied heat shrink end caps to the severed cables with a 43 Risk (5,0) R equipment = =5 R personnel =0.005 X0.0 0=0 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). There have been no incidents. NRIs provide multiple quality assurance checks to minimize the chance of craft error. U732 fluids have flashpoints above the range of materials defined by the U.S. DOT as flammable. Risk (5,0) R equipment = =5 R personnel =0.005 X0.0 0=0 Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). There have been no incidents. The sustained pressure paradigm utilizes resilient, robust, and redundant seals designed for pressures up to 1000 psig (69 bars) to assure that fluid in the cable interstices never come in contact with the splice body. NRIs provide multiple quality assurance checks to minimize the chance of craft error. U732 fluids have flashpoints above the range of materials defined by the U.S. DOT as flammable.

44 d e f g propane torch. The torch ignited the dripping fluid, which then ignited the fluid on the floor. The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See (d).) The event ranking is ultra-low ; the personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. Heat-shrink polyethylene sleeves are utilized to make a leak-proof injectable splice. According to [8], The injection technique (injection with no damming) used at Detroit Edison was an experimental approach, which was used only once and will never be used again. Utility line personnel require training in the proper methods associated with cable injection. The service supplier may provide a procedure, which covers the circumstances where a spill occurs in a confined space. Provisions should be made to prevent fluid from dripping to the floor when a circuit owner must cut into a treated cable in a vault. Reference [8] suggests that the fluid, which pours from such a cut, should be collected by a vacuum funnel, which is placed below the cut. The vacuum immediately removes the dripping fluid through a tube out to the surface. All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. Because of the leak-resistant design and non-flammable fluid, the event ranking is 5X lower than with the UPR CC3 paradigm. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. P011 fluid and the delivery devices and methods were designed from the beginning to minimize potential fires. A Novinium Rejuvenation Instruction (NRI-99) provides detailed instructions to mitigate the risk of fluid leakage and fire. All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. Because of the leak-resistant design and non-flammable fluid, the event ranking is 5X lower than with the UPR CC3 paradigm. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. U732 fluids and the delivery devices and methods were designed from the beginning to minimize potential fires. A Novinium Rejuvenation Instruction (NRI-99) provides detailed instructions to mitigate the risk of fluid leakage and fire. All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. Because of the leak-resistant design and non-flammable fluid, the event ranking is 10X lower than with the UPR-CC3 paradigm. The personnel present ranking is unlikely. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is high. The personnel ranking is life threatening. U732 fluid and the delivery devices and methods were designed from the beginning to minimize potential fires. A Novinium Rejuvenation Instruction (NRI-99) provides detailed instructions to mitigate the risk of fluid leakage and fire. All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. 44

45 h Risk (2.5,25) R equipment = x10 3 =2.5 R personnel = = Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) a b A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. Because there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within equipment enclosures, the chances of ignition are quite high. As described in [8], the most important variables, which will affect whether or not there is a fire or explosion, are the amount of fluid spilled, the flow rate and spray characteristics of the leak, and the nature of the floor below the leak. For example, slow leaks onto dirt floors are unlikely to lead to conditions, which support combustion. High pressure, high flow rate leaks, which spray fluid into the air creating a good fuelair mixture are more likely to ignite and may even explode. According to [8], with over 7 million feet of injection experience at this paradigms service supplier through about 1998, there had been only a single incident of fire and explosion on a live-front transformer at FPL. A leak developed in an Elastimold livefront adapter and fluid was sprayed into the enclosure. An unapproved injection tank without a flow restricting orifice and without an automatic shut-off valve contributed to fluid being sprayed into the pad-mount Risk (0.5,5) R equipment =0.0005/5 5x10 3 =0.5 R personnel =0.0005/ =5 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. While there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within transformers and switchgear the chances of ignition are quite low, because the flash point of the fluid is above the temperature typically found in a transformer or similar enclosure. There have been no incidents of fire and explosion on a live-front transformer. Risk (0.5,5) R equipment =0.0005/5 5x10 3 =0.5 R personnel =0.0005/ =5 Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. While there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within transformers and switchgear the chances of ignition are quite low, because the flash point of the fluid is above the temperature typically found in a transformer or similar enclosure. There have been no incidents of fire and explosion on a live-front transformer. Risk (0.25,2.5) R equipment =.0005/5 5x10 3 =0.25 R personnel =.0005/ =2.5 Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. While there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within transformers and switchgear the chances of ignition are quite low, because the flash point of the fluid is above the temperature typically found in a transformer or similar enclosure. Furthermore, because the injection is performed on deenergized cables the enclosure is generally open during the injection process, which largely eliminates the buildup of flammable vapors and temperatures above 40 C. Novinium injection adapters are specifically designed to operate leak-free in even the most demanding of circumstances. Injection adapters typically operate at one-third or less of their design pressure. 45

46 transformer. service supplier approved designs would have a lower fluid flow rate. (Author: The author is aware of at least several other fire and explosion incidents, since the last update of b. See for example the images below from a Midwestern U.S. circuit owner in 2007.) A 35kV Cooper elbow failed and resulted in the loss of the transformer Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized a Leaks in a termination with feed or soak pressure still applied b The pressure impacts the characteristics of a leak and the resulting consequences Post-Injection, Catastrophic Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized Leaks in a termination with feed pressure still applied. The pressure impacts the characteristics of a leak and the resulting consequences. Post-Injection, Catastrophic Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized Leaks in a termination with feed pressure still applied. The pressure impacts the characteristics of a leak and the resulting consequences. Post-Injection, Catastrophic Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized Leaks in a termination while injection is proceeding. Leaks are unlikely, but are generally mitigated by an attending injection technician. Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, 46