Table 6: Schedule of Operational Commitments

Transcription

1 Page 26 of 46 Table 6: Schedule of s OC OC OC OC OC OC OC OC Close out Requir This restriction was complied with prior to the core offload. Completed see AR No more than TWO pressuriser heater repairs will be undertaken at the same time in Mode 5 RCS Intact (with normal RCS venting with the exclusion of the CETNA being CLOSED) unless otherwise justified via a Safety Submission (EC). Ensure the NSORC is updated within 3 months of return to service from FO43 with a justification to continue with this EC (338561) as a Master, or simply to report back the closure of the EC. Applicable to HWIs Nos. 42 and 70, to provide a justification for ASME fatigue analysis if plugs remain in service beyond. To inspect the fillet sealing welds on HWI Nos. 42 and 70 by visual inspection (VT-2 standard) and RT during and at future outages while they remain in service. To inspect HWI Nos. 42 and 70 for evidence of stress corrosion cracking using UT during and at future outages while they remain in service. Extent of the UT to be confined to HWI outside the Pressuriser. To amend SP10 to specifically cover the visual inspection of the HWI/Pressuriser Shell interface To develop a repair technique for HWIs Nos. 42 and 70 that is suitable for the remainder of station life without an excessive inspection burden, for deployment by including all necessary safety justification. Confirm the operable status of the strain gauges and associated instrumentation no later than two weeks after entry to Mode 2. to RT is no longer applicable as the design of plug has changed from that originally proposed. This only applied to those section of HWI external to the Pressuriser. These sections were removed under EC Rev 007. This OC no longer applies 31 Oct days after Mode 2 entry OC To undertake a fatigue analysis to confirm the design life for the sealing Applies to all plugs other than those in use for / Waiting closure

2 Page 27 of 46 OC OC OC OC OC OC OC Close out Requir weld if plugs are to remain beyond. 42 and 70 Insulation Resistance testing of Pressuriser Backup Heaters to be TS, new SR and relevant STEs will be issued Mode 2 undertaken on a monthly basis under TS once EC is approved Station to develop a strategy for the long term management of heaters, This is partly resolved through QP/435, such strategy to include regular reviews of OEF to ensure the risk of a dealing with failures that might occur whilst repeat event is avoided, before. This must include the the current design of heaters are kept in replacement of heaters once they have failed electrically, at the next service. Longer term there is an ongoing refuelling outage. project to establish revised heaters less susceptible to failures as seen on 42 and 70. To procure and replace all the Pressuriser Heaters by no later than. Such heaters to take account of the root cause of FO43 Safety Relief Valves removed to provide additional access for Section of this EC and Mode 2 ventilation and services may not be set-point tested during RTS under STM-BB-001 (Ref 35), as justified in section of this EC. If a under EC PZR SLSRV is dropped or involved in a significant impact during removal then the valve will be the subject of further assessment and testing prior to start-up. This proposal will not apply loadings on adjacent heaters resulting Section of this EC EC and from the deployment of cutting equipment for cutting operations and therefore if this proposal is used in isolation there is no need to justify under EC loadings applied to adjacent heaters as identified in OC (from Ref 1). Visual inspection of the Spray Nozzle for signs of damage will be undertaken following removal of the shielding from the spray nozzle as part of the back-out activities that will be a requirement under the Implementation QP (Ref 5). Visual inspection of the general state of the Support Plates will be undertaken as part of the back-out activities will be a requirement under the Implementation QP (Ref 5). by Quality Plan SZB/PQP/PD/NA0375/005 (Item4.5) by Quality Plan SZB/PQP/PD/NA0375/005 (Item 4.1) /

3 Page 28 of 46 OC OC OC OC OC OC OC OC Close out Requir / Maintain a log and report any significant collisions to the PSRG for See Section and Attachment 3 to this EC their assessment and consideration of corrective measures by an appropriate SQEP body (i.e. SIP). This safety case considers the thermal hydraulic and structural effects See Section (b) of this EC and EC of additional larger holes to support heater removal, however the RTS case will also considers the totality of the holes remaining in the Can be closed once ref [16] is issued, on support plates from both the removal of mechanically failed heaters approval of this EC and removal of any other heaters during FO43. This proposal will not require significant holes to be cut in the Lower Support Plate to gain access, and therefore on successful completion of this proposal this OC can be closed without any further action. A hold point will be included in the Implementation QP (Ref 5) to ensure that all parties including Industrial Safety are satisfied that any Confined Spaces Safe System of Work (SSOW) is suitable and sufficient for use, specifically the rescue plan and the associated WOCs have undergone review and approval. Fuel Assembly 0D24 will be inspected during for any sign of debris on or inside the Fuelguard bottom nozzle. EC remains valid for a fuel reload up until 22nd November Subsequent to this date, further consideration is required in the reactor physics area; detailed analysis must be performed to confirm that sufficient signal will be receiv the source range detectors. Prior to Mode 6 up in, an inspection/audit of the AREVA manufacturing process for RCCAs is required in order to confirm satisfactory compliance with BEOM 210 (British Energy Operating Memorandum) going forward. Review the cabling and insulation arrangements for the Pressuriser heaters before Cycle 13 to justify that the cables are suitable for No holes other than those justified in Section (b) have been cut in either Support Plate under EC This issue was fully considered and the Hold Point cleared prior to man entry into the Pressuriser. Cover Quality Plan SZB/PQP/PD/NA0375/005 (Item 1.21) OSRC 141 advised and the Plant Manager agreed that Fuel Assembly 0D24 should be reloaded Nov 2010 Not part of this EC

4 Page 29 of 46 OC OC OC OC OC Close out Requir continued use and the insulation does not require modification. This should be done in conjunction with the replacement of the pressuriser heaters as per OC Produce a Revision to EC after return to service to report the following: Completion of the NOP/NOT VT-2 inspections of the HWI welds prior to Mode 2 entry Remaining metallurgical investigations into failed heaters Results of magnesium oxide swelling test programme. Strain Gauge monitoring arrangements post-t&cp and revise SZB/QP/435 as appropriate. The SCC assessment of HWIs 42 and 70 is only sanction the SIP until. Operation beyond this point will require further justification, and consideration of EAG advice. The issue of susceptibility to SCC will be dealt with in the Closeout Section (b) Report, EC , including reference to the deliberations of the Expert Advisory Group on material corrosion. Can be clos this EC The thermal fatigue cycles resulting from the welding of plugs inside the Pressuriser Heater Well Inserts shall be taken into consideration as part of the normal transient assessment Surveillance Programme (TSP-SP-003). This temporary EC is to be upgraded to a (full) permanent EC once the full life analysis is completed and approved, otherwise a suitable alternative position will be required to replace this proposed (temporary) plug option. / Waiting Closure Notes: 1558 series raised in EC series raised in EC series raised in EC

5 Page 30 of series raised in EC series raised in EC raised in this EC 1567 series raised in EC