Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion. About Face! Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern.

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1 About Face! Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern University of Tübingen, University of Pennsylvania October 5, 2012 Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

2 Goals Apply game-theoretic reasoning to politeness Requests and Proposals Payoffs vs. Preferences Face and Sympathy Norms vs. Conventions Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

3 Talk Outline 1 Introduction 2 Politeness Theory 3 Game Theory 4 Trust and Modals 5 Conclusion Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

4 Consider the following... Questions Will/Would you lend me a dollar? Will/Would you open the door? Will/Would you turn that music down? Will/Would you marry me? Answers Would seems more appropriate for the first three, whereas will is better in the last. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

5 Why be polite? Scarcity Resources are limited, life requires cooperation. Ambiguity Information regarding the intentions of other is not always abundant. Politeness Offers a strategic solution for these two problems and increasing the range of interactions between individuals with other-regarding preferences. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

6 What politeness gets us Humor(/Cruelty) A: Would you marry me? B: I would if you were rich/handsome/x! (A: Well I was just asking hypothetically.) We commit ourselves to actions by our words. The ways in which this plays out reveals the underlying structure of the games being played. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

7 Crucial points for politeness theory Face Face-threatening acts Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

8 Face What is face? Consider your reaction to... Asking a favor of a friend (stranger) Being asked a favor by a friend (stranger). Being Embarrassed. Seeing someone you know (and like) embarrassed. Seeing someone you don t know embarrassed. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

9 Face What is face? Brown and Levinson (1978) Face (Goffman, 1982) consists of an individual s basic needs: Negative face (Autonomy): the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, right to non-distraction, i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition. Positive face (Affiliation): the positive consistent self-image or personality (including the approval by others of this self-image) claimed by interactants. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

10 Face-threatening acts Face-threatening acts When situations call for it... Speakers must commit a face-threatening act (FTA). In order to mitigate the weight of a FTA, speakers may use several strategies. Don t Redress On Record Positive Politeness Intention Do FTA Redress Off Record Negative Politeness Don t do FTA Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

11 Face-threatening acts Threats at Lunch!!! What to do if you forget your wallet at lunch: Don t do FTA: Don t ask for money. Off Record: Oh no! I forgot my wallet in my office! Negative Politeness: You don t have to, but would you mind lending me a bit of money? Positive Politeness: I would sure appreciate if you would lend me some money. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

12 Face-threatening acts Goldilocks Too much Please, if you could, move out of the way of that speeding car, Excuse me Sir/Ma am, if it s not too much trouble could tell me the time. Too little Could you give me a thousand dollars? Tell me the time! Just right (Excuse me,) could you tell me the time? Could you find it in your magnificent heart to loan me a thousand dollars? I d be forever in your debt! Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

13 Crucial points for game theory Sequential Games Cooperation vs. Coordination Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

14 Sequential Games Sequential Games Signaling Game: N,O,A j,u i N is the set of players in the game O is a sequence over N that determines the order of play For j O, A j is the set of actions available to the jth player in the order of play U i is a preference for player i over the set of possible paths of play. The payoffs are represented as numeric values, where higher values are more preferred outcomes. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

15 Sequential Games Cooperation: Prisoner s Dilemma X C D Y Y C D C D (2,2) (0,3) (3,0) (1,1) Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

16 Sequential Games Coordination: Pure Coordination Game X A B Y Y A B A B (1,1) (0,0) (0,0) (1,1) Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

17 Crucial points for our analysis Trust Games Other-regarding preferences Self-enforcing equilibria Mechanisms for enforcing cooperation Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

18 Trust Games Trust Games Consist of... An Investor and a Trustee. Investor begins with an Initial endowment, which he can keep or invest. If he invests the endowment with the Trustee it grows by some amount/ The Trustee must then decide what amount, if any, to return to the Investor. Cooperation Trustee does best when he keeps all money invested. Knowing this, Investor should never invest. Everyone does worse than they could by cooperating. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

19 Trust Games Requests as Trust Games Quinley (2012) Asymmetries in abilities lead to requests. Requests involve a loss of face on the part of the requester, and carry a risk that the request will be denied. X can ask (A) or not ask Y ( A) to grant a request. Y can grant (G) or not grant ( G) the request. Main Results Repetition and observation increase cooperativity (trust). Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

20 Trust Games Requests as Extended Trust Games More Structure X can ask (A) or not ask Y ( A) to grant a request. Y can grant (G) or not grant ( G) the request. X can thank (T) Y for granting the request, or not ( T). Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

21 Trust Games Self-Regard and Self-Preservation How do we process face? 2D4D: Testosterone and Testiness Ultimatum Game and Refusals Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

22 Trust Games Game Structure Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

23 Trust Games Payoff Structure Costs c x is the cost to X to achieve desired outcome. c y is cost to Y. (c y < c x ) b x is the benefit to X of Y granting request. (b x < c x ) Face A requires face payment f r by X. Y receives m r f r from A. (m r > 1) T requires face payment f t by X. Y receives m t f t from T. (m t > 1) Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

24 Trust Games Payoff Structure Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

25 Trust Games What to expect Rollback Equilibrium X prefers T to T Y prefers G to T X prefers A to G Result No one should ever make requests because they will never be granted. Yet we can, and do, make polite requests of strangers we will never interact with again. Why is this possible? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

26 Other-Regarding Preferences Homo economicus or Homo empathicus Theoretical (Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Levine 1998) Behavioral (Fehr & Schmidt 2003, Camerer 2003) Neurobiological (Fehr 2009) Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

27 Other-Regarding Preferences Sympathy (Sally 2000, 2001) Sympathy Distribution For each agent, there is a distribution, δ i (U), such that j δ i (U j ) = 1, which determines how much that agent cares about her own payoffs and those of others. Homo economicus δ i (U j ) = 0 for all j i. New utility function V i = δ i (U i ) U i + (1 δ i (U i )) U j Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

28 Application in Trust Games When do we thank people? Condition It suffices for X to prefer T to T for V x (T) > V x ( T), which is true when: Interpretation δ x (U y ) > 1 1+m t The greater the benefit to Y for thanking, the less X has to care about Y s payoff to do so. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

29 Application in Trust Games When to grant a request? Condition It suffices for Y to prefer T to G for V y (T) > V y ( G), which is true when: (c y m t f t ) (c y m t f t )+b x +c x f t < δ y (U x ) Interpretation The greater the benefit to X relative to c x and c y determines this threshold. If c x is much greater than c y this becomes very small. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

30 Application in Trust Games Some Examples You see a stranger with arms full of boxes struggling to open a door X: Would you mind opening the door for me? Y: Sure! It would seem unreasonable to not help in this context, suggesting that we have a general expectation of a minimum degree of other-regard You forgot your watch and your phone has died X: Excuse me. Could you tell me the time please? Y: Fuck you! This actually occured (Asher, 2012). What is shocking about this example is that it shows a total lack of other-regard. Took place in New York City, make of that what you will. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

31 Application in Trust Games The main effect of politeness I What happens without face? System without face boils down to a choice on the part of Y, where granting is better if V y ( G) < V y (G), which holds when: c y c y +b x +c x < δ y (U x ) Compared to system with face System with face has lower threshold when δ y (U x ) < δ y (U x ), which is true when: c y b x +c x < m t Given that c x > c y and m t > 1, this is always true. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

32 Application in Trust Games The main effect of politeness II What face buys you A system of requests with polite forms that address face wants requires a lower threshold of other-regarding preferences than one without such means of addressing face wants. This can be thought of in two ways: 1 The same requests can be made between more distant individuals. 2 More requests can be made between individuals with a given relationship. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

33 Credible Signaling Requests vs. Proposals Could ya would ya ain t ya gonna if I asked you// Would ya wanna be my baby tonight? John Michael Montgomery Utilities should be partially (or wholly) aligned. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

34 Credible Signaling Proposals: Will/Would Xavier: Would you marry me? Yvonne: I would...if you were rich. Xavier:*Sigh* (or) Yvonne: Yes!!! Xavier:Woah, I was just asking hypothetically! Xavier: Would you like to see a movie? Yvonne: Yeah, there are a few I d like to see. Xavier: Great! When can I pick you up? Yvonne: Oh! I didn t realize you meant with you. (or) Yvonne:Yeah! When do you want to go? Xavier:Oh! I didn t mean with me, just in general. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

35 Credible Signaling Self-Enforcing Equilibria Aumann (1990) C D C 3,3 0,2 D 2,0 1,1 There are two pure strategy Nash Equilibria (C,C) and (D,D). (C,C) is the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Neither player can be sure of what the other player will do, even if they agree beforehand to play C. Why? Both players want the other to play C regardless of what they do. Thus the agreement to play the payoff-dominant equilibrium is not self-enforcing. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

36 Getting the Mood Right Negative Face and Positive Probabilities Would you like to see a movie? * Will you like to see a movie? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

37 Getting the Mood Right Negative Face and Positive Probabilities Would you like to see a movie? Positive Probability of Rejection * Will you like to see a movie? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

38 Getting the Mood Right Negative Face and Positive Probabilities Would you like to see a movie? Positive Probability of Rejection Information vs. Relationship * Will you like to see a movie? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

39 Getting the Mood Right Negative Face and Positive Probabilities Would you like to see a movie? Positive Probability of Rejection Information vs. Relationship Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics * Will you like to see a movie? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

40 Getting the Mood Right Negative Face and Positive Probabilities Would you like to see a movie? Positive Probability of Rejection Information vs. Relationship Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics * Will you like to see a movie? Only two options Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

41 Getting the Mood Right Negative Face and Positive Probabilities Would you like to see a movie? Positive Probability of Rejection Information vs. Relationship Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics * Will you like to see a movie? Only two options Implies necessity Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

42 Getting the Mood Right Negative Face and Positive Probabilities Would you like to see a movie? Positive Probability of Rejection Information vs. Relationship Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics * Will you like to see a movie? Only two options Implies necessity Implies fatality Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

43 Getting the Mood Right I gotta know right now! Would you marry me? Will you marry me? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

44 Getting the Mood Right I gotta know right now! Would you marry me? Possible Worlds Will you marry me? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

45 Getting the Mood Right I gotta know right now! Would you marry me? Possible Worlds I would, if... or I would, but... Will you marry me? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

46 Getting the Mood Right I gotta know right now! Would you marry me? Possible Worlds I would, if... or I would, but... Will you marry me? Only two options Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

47 Getting the Mood Right I gotta know right now! Would you marry me? Possible Worlds I would, if... or I would, but... Will you marry me? Only two options Implies necessity Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

48 Getting the Mood Right I gotta know right now! Would you marry me? Possible Worlds I would, if... or I would, but... Will you marry me? Only two options Implies necessity Information > Relationship Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

49 Getting the Mood Right I gotta know right now! Would you marry me? Possible Worlds I would, if... or I would, but... Will you marry me? Only two options Implies necessity Information > Relationship CKG φ sufficient for collective action Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

50 Getting the Mood Right Marriage Game Set-up Play: Sam makes a request of Robin by choosing a message based on his belief of success. Utility is a function of the payoffs in the Marriage Game (the value v of coordination and the time investment t) and the certainty c imposed by the request. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

51 Getting the Mood Right Communality, Coordination, and Conjugation A A A v;v 0;0 A 0;0 0;0 M M M v t;v t t;0 M 0; t 0;0 Table: Degenerate Coordination Game vs. Marriage Game: (Both) U Sam is listed first. (Right)Players have a stronger dispreference for unaligned actions; cf. Stag Hunt Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

52 Getting the Mood Right Wouldn t it be nice if we were married... M M M v t;v t t;0 M 0; t 0;0 M M WillM v t;v t t;0 WouldM r(v t);r(v t) rt;0 M 0; t 0;0 Table: Marriage Game vs. Marriage Game with Would Utilities are U Sam, U ( Robin) For would, c = r, 0 < r < 1 For will, c = 1 Similar to Pinker et al. (2008) with game expansion Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

53 Getting the Mood Right Main Results: For Sam Subjunctive Mood is rational for S under uncertainty or low value interactions For a c value of 1, we obtain the same EU S for both questions For Pr(Yes) v < t, would is rational will amplifies this negativity; would minimizes losses Indicative indicates certainty Pr(Yes) v > t means no incentive to use subjunctive Hearer knows this This works for high p or v or low t. Diversity of relationships begets diversity of requests Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

54 Getting the Mood Right Main Results: For Robin Subjunctive Mood is rational for R under low value interactions or long time For a c value of 1, we obtain the same EUR for both questions For v < t, would is felicitous Indicative indicates certainty v > t means no incentive to use subjunctive Hearer knows this This works for high v or low t. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

55 Getting the Mood Right Claim I Just as Reciprocity gives way to Coordination in repeated economic interactions, so does our language favor reducing semantic ambiguity among long-term associates when information is valuable. Claim II In a one-shot scenario with no time investment, direct proposals emerge as a rational strategy. Claim III In contrast to Pinker et al., a request allowing the listener autonomy is not always a rational strategy. Claim IV Face payment in proposals are not rational. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

56 Getting the Mood Right Why proposals need a will Using the modal will ignores the listener s negative face, but renders the request self-enforcing. This aligns perfectly with our intuition that one cannot back out after asking Will you marry me?. Moreover, this reasoning about face provides a rationale for why commissive speech acts are possible, and the form they take. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

57 Conclusions Politeness strategies that address face, along with other-regarding preferences, allow requests and trust between a wider range of individuals and relationship types. There is a necessary amount of sympathy between two individuals that suffices to transform a game of cooperation into one of coordination. Face lowers this threshold. would and will differ fundamentally in terms of illocutionary force, and the underlying structure of the interaction. would allows for disavowal and is not necessarily self-enforcing, whereas will as a commissive speech act commits the speaker to a course of action. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

58 Questions Politeness is a norm, but polite language is highly conventionalized. How do we untease the two? How do modal frames (Kripke models) enter the picture? Do want and will share a special relationship if we consider self-enforcement of revealed preferences? How are social contracts like Stag Hunts? What about Battles of the Sexes? How to model schadenfreude? Reverse of sympathy? Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

59 Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

60 Thanks! Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47

61 References Asher (2012) The Non Cooperative Basis of Implicatures Aumann (1990) Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing Brown & Levinson (1978) Politeness Camerer (2003) Behavioral Game Theory Fehr (2009) Social Preferences and the Brain Fehr & Schmidt (1999) A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation Fehr & Schmidt (2003) Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications Goffman (1967) Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior Levine (1998) Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments Quinley(2012) Trust Games as a Model for Requests Rabin (1993) Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics Sally (2000) A General Theory of Sympathy, Mind-Reading, and Social Interaction, with an Application to the Prisoners Dilemma. Sally (2001) On Sympathy and Games Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, / 47