A THEORY OF CRITICAL. v O. Key, Jr. ELECTIONS. v. O. Key, Jf.

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1 v. O. Key, Jf A THEORY OF CRITICAL ELECTIONS v O. Key, Jr. Perhaps the basic differentiating characteristic of democratic order consists in the expression of effective choice by the mass of the people in elections. The electorate occupies, at least in the mystique of such orders, the position of the principal organ of governance; it acts through elections. An election itself is a formal act of collective decision that occurs in a stream of connected antecedent and subsequent behavior. Among democratic orders elections, so broadly defined, differ enormously in their nature, their meaning, and their consequences. Even within a single nation the reality of election differs greatly from time to time. A systematic comparative approach, with a focus on variations in the nature of elections would doubtless be fruitful in advancing the understanding of the democratic governing process. 111 behavior antecedent to voting, elections differ in the proportions of the electorate psychologically involved, in the intensity of attitudes associated with campaign cleavages, in the nature of expectations about the consequences of the voting, in the impact of objective events relevant to individual political choice, in individual sense of effective connection with community decision, and in other ways. These and other antecedent variations affect the act of voting itself as well as subsequent behavior. An understanding of elections and, in turn, of the democratic process as a whole must rest partially on broad differentiations of the complexes of behavior that we call elections. While this is not the occasion to develop a comprehensive typology of elections, the foregoing remarks provide an orientation fol" an attempt to formulate a concept of one type of election-based on American experience-which might be built into a more general theory of elections. Even the most fleeting inspection of American elections suggests the existence of a category of elections in which voters are, at least from impressionistic evidence, unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the preexisting cleavage within the electorate. Moreover, and perhaps this is the truly differentiating characteristic of this sort of election, the realignment made manifest in the voting

2 0 Political Parties and the Electorate in suc h elections seems to persist for several succeeding e lections. All these characteristics cumu late to the conception of an election type in which the depth and intensi ty of electoral involvement are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed. These comments suppose, of course, the existence of other types of complexes of behavior centering about formal elections, the sys tematic isola tion and identification of wnich, fortunately, are not essential for the present discussion. I The presidential election of 1928 in the New England states provides a specific case of the type of critical election that has been described in general terms. In that year Alfred E. Smith, the Democratic presidential candidate, made gains in all the New England states. The rise in Democratic strength was especially notable in Massachuse tts and Rhode Island. When one probes below the surface of the gross election figures it becomes apparent that a sharp and durable rea lignment also occurred within the electorate, a fact renective of the activatio n by the Democratic candidate of low-income, Catholic, urban voters of recent immigrant stock. In New England, at least, the Roosevelt revolution of 1932 was in large measure an AI Smith revolution of 1928, a characterization less applicable to tne remainder of the country.. C entral to our concept of critical elections is realignment within the electorate both sharp and durable. With respect to these basic criteria the election of 1896 fall s within the same category as that of 1928, although it differed in other respects. The persistence of the nell' di vision of 1896 was perhaps not so notable as that of 100, , 80 - somervitle~ 40,,,,... Ashtield~ " _ O~ ~~ ~ L ~ ~ L ~ ~ ~ Figure A Dellloeratic Percelltages of Major-Party Presidential Vote, Somerville and Ashfield, Massachllsetts,

3 v. O. Key, Jr r Mean Democratic percentage of 29 towns and cities with widest Democratic gains, ~ Figure B Persistence of Electoral Cleavage of 1928 in Massachusetts 1928; yet the Democratic defeat was so demoralizing and so thorough that the party could make little headway in regrouping its forces until Perhaps the significant feature of the 1896 contest was that, at least in New England, it did not form a new division in which partisan lines became more nearly congruent with lines separating classes, religions, or other such social groups. Instead, the Republicans succeeded in drawing new support, in about the same degree, from all sorts of economic and social classes. The result was an electoral coalition formidable in mass but which required both good fortune and skill in political manage ment for its maintenance, given its latent internal contradictions r Mean Democratic percentage of 22 towns with least Democratic gain, ~ 40 "' '- -.. _-... Mean Democratic percentage of 25 towns ~ with widest Democratic gains, o 19L16----~~--~----~~----~----~--~~~~~~~~~--719~52 Figure C Impact of Election of 1932 ill New Hampshire

4 2 Political Parties and the Electorate Mean Democratic percentage of 22 towns 40 '--- with widest Democratic gain, CONNECTICUT Mean Democratic percentage of 22 towns / with widest Democratic losses, ~ -L ~ -4 -L L- ~ ~ ~ ~ , I '--- Mean Democratic percentage of 37 towns,.. with widest Democratic gains, MAINE.. Mean Democratic percentage at 42 towns / with widest Democratic losses, OL- -L ~ ~ +----~--~----J---~L---~ Mean Democratic percentage of 24 towns with widest Democratic gains, ~ 40 Mean Democratic percentage of 29 towns NEW HAMPSHIRE with widest Democratic losses, O~ -L ~ ~ -L l- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -... J \ :7"''--- Mean Democratic percentage 01 6 towns with widest Democratic gains, RHODE ISLAND _r -.- Mean Democratic percentage of 6 towns J wilh widesl Democratic losses, OL- ~ ~ +- ~ ~ -L ~ -J ~ Figure 0 Realigl/llle/lt of 1928 COllllfCliwt, Maille, New Hlllllpshire, al1d RllOde Island

5 v O. Key, Jr. 3 Mean Democratic percentage of 29 towns with teast Democratic losses t===-~ 40r ~--~----~~~~_-~ ~~~~~--~~~ CONNECTICUT "'--- Mean Democratic percentage of 31 towns with widest Democratic decline OL- L ~ L ~ ~ L ~ Mean Democratic percentage of 34 towns 50 f ', with least Democratic losses ~ ~~-'~--~--~~~~~=-_-_--_--_-_~_--~--~~~~~ NEW HAMPSHIRE "'--- Mean Democratic percentage of 34 towns with widest Democratic losses, OL- -L ~ L ~ ~ L ~ Figure E Realignlllellt of 1896 ill COlllleciicllilllld New Hampshire III The discussion points toward the analytical utility of a system for the differentiati on of elections. A concept of critical elections has been developed to cover a type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties, although the techniques employed do not yield any information of consequence abou[ the mechanisms for the maintenance of a new alignment, once it is formed. ObViously any sort of system for the gross characterization of elections presents difficulties in application. The actual election rarely presents in pure form a case fitting completely any particular concept. Especially in a large and diverse electorate a single polling may encompass radically varying types of behavior among different categories of voters; yet a dominant characteristic often makes itself apparent. Despite such difficulties, the attempt to move toward a better understanding of elections in the terms here employed could provide a means for better integrating the study of electoral behavior with the analysis of political systems. In truth, a considerable proportlon of the study of electoral behavior has only a tenuous relation to polities.

6 4 Political Parties and the Electorate The sorts of questions here raised, when applied sufficiently broadly on a com parative basis and carried far enough, could lead to a consideration of basic prob lems of the nature of democra tic orders. A question occurs, for example, about the character of the consequences for the political system of the temporal frequency of critical elections. What are the consequences for public administration, for the leg islative process, for the opera tion of the economy of frequent serious upheavals within the electorate? What are the correlates of that pattern of behavior? And, for those disposed to raise such questions, what underlying changes might alter the situation? Or, when viewed from the contrary position, what consequences flow from an electora te which is disposed, in effect, to remain largely quiescent over considerable periods? Does a state of moving equilibrium reflect a pervasive satis faction with the course of public policy? An indifference about matters political? In any case, what are the consequences for the public order? Further, what are the con sequences when an electorate builds up habits and attachments, or faces situations, that make it impossible for it to render a decisive and clear-cut popular verdict that promises not to be Ilp5et Dr caprice N [he next round of polling? What are the con sequences of a situation that creates recurring, evenly balanced conflict over long periods? On the other hand, what characteristics of an electorate or what condi tions permit sharp and decisive changes in the power structure from time to time? Such directions of speculation are suggested by a single criterion for the differentia tion of elections. Further development of an electora l topology would probably point to useful speculation in a variety of directions. B Pe tel tyl is. of th, ~ \\ } :.1 ~ r :-.. ( Int - -.~

7 QUESTIONS 1. How does Key define a critical election? 2. What do you think Key means when he refers to the consequences for public administration, for the legislative process, for the operation of the economy of frequent serious upheavals within the electorate? 3. Does the persistence of divided government suggest that Key s assessment of elections and parties is less valid now than it was in the past?