Process. Summary results. RFA Status

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1 Process RFA Status Open RFA s from prior reviews were assessed to determine possible impacts to VCHP & Radiator The reviews included PDR, Peer reviews and Summary results The majority either have no or very low risk that these designs would be impacted There are 3 potential liens

2 Review X-LAT Peer RFA # Open RFA s with No Lien on MRR Subsyst Request Reason Response Status Rationale for No Lien Conduct proof pressure tests of heat 4 Mechanical 1.5 x MEOP. 9 Mechanical Perform a continuity check of all FEM models against current baseline design (CAD models, etc.). Once subsystem models are integrated into full-up LAT model, perform standard model checks (static equilibrium, free-free, grounding, etc.) and provide descriptions. Include verification that significant modes and shapes from each subsystem are captured. Verify all model translations, whether for unit conversion or software tool. Peer Peer 11 Mechanical Complete ICDs and IDDs between LAT Closure subsystems. For specific items that can not be closed by, present a closure plan w/ associated schedule and risk mitigation plan It was unclear if 1.5 x MEOP requirement was in current documentation. There was mention of a 1.2 x MEOP test. Necessary to insure model integrity to develop flight design loads and margins. LM specs call out 1.5 x MEOP min acceptance test. Need to submit response Verification of subsystem models and model integration into the LAT FEA model is planned. Results of this will be part of the material. Verification tests that are being run on all subsystem models:subsystem model evaluation Review model units, orientation/coordinate system, size, mesh resolution Review delivery report do the report and model agree FEA model check-runsfreefree modal analysis check model for mechanisms Translation check check model for inadvertent grounding Gravity check check that inertial loads are reacted only at boundaries Temperature check check that structure is free to expand/contract Analysis comparison runs Mass compare model mass with subsystem estimate Center of mass compare model center of mass with subsystem estimate Modal analysis check against subsystem detailed model and report The following is a list of ICD s and IDD s within the LAT, and their Not status as of the response date listed, updated status and closure Accepted plan will be provided at : LAT-DS : LAT Envelope released (14 Apr 03) LAT-DS : LAT Instrument Layout first draft being checked (14 Apr 03) LAT-DS : CAL- LAT IDD final check prior to release (14 Apr 03) LAT-SS : CAL-LAT Mech, Therm, Elec ICD released LAT-DS : ACD- LAT IDD final check prior to release (14 Apr 03) LAT-SS : ACD-LAT Mech, Therm, Elec ICD released LAT-DS : TKR- LAT IDD first draft underway (14 Apr 03) LAT-SS : TKR- LAT Mech, Therm ICD released LAT-DS : Electronics-LAT IDD first draft underway (14 Apr 03) LAT-SS : Elec-LAT Mech, Therm ICD first draft underway (14 Apr 03) Complies with RFA Closed at CAL-Grid Peer review with review & acceptance of LAT model Radiator IDD is released. Planned revision to show wiring envelope and connector pin outs does not impact initial manufacturing phases. Peer 21 Mechanical Consider addition of a backup test heater in the radiator survival heater system to prevent possible freezing of the ammonia during T/V testing to mitigate an operational anomaly Test anomaly could damage flight hardware Need for back-up test heater has been mitigated through fail safe T/V environmental control approach. Damage would require primary, redundant anti freeze heaters and chamber environmental control systems to fail simultaneously This is a test issue, not a

3 Open RFA s with No Lien on MRR (Cont) Peer 33 Mechanical The plan is to put the anti-freeze heaters on the front/fosr side of the radiator and have the FOSR cover the heater. I recommend looking at the impact of putting the heater on the backside. At the temperatures the antifreeze heaters will operate, the panel gradients should be small (small qdot = small delta T). Peer 36 Mechanical Define allowable load transfer into LAT (or radiator strut stiffness) at connection of radiator to s/c. Peer 37 Mechanical Limit load tests should qualify the design (1.25 x flight limit loads) FOSR over the heaters may be an unnecessarily complex interface and result in unexpected lifting of the FOSR in the flight configuration Necessary to define interface requirement to insure positive radiator margins of safety. Limit load was specified as test level and did not include the 1.25 qual (or protoflight) level. An analysis was conducted to assess the impact of placing the heat pipe anti-freeze heaters on the backside of the radiators. Results from the study show that survival antifreeze heaters placed on the backside of the radiator result in a minimal impact to the survival heater power required (from 89W to 91W) indicating the feasibility of placing the heaters in this location. We will continue to investigate the potential of moving the anti-freeze heaters to the back side of the radiator panels. Heaters have been moved to the inboard facesheet. An effective stiffness of the spacecraft support strut of at least 200,000 lb/in (strut plus Spacecraft) was used in the Radiator analysis. This should be flowed down to Spectrum Astro in the S/C working group or as a requirement from GSFC to Spectrum. Lockheed Martin concurs with the recommendation to increase the yield factor of safety from 1.1 to This recommendation has been forwarded to SLAC to update the X-LAT Level-IV Specification to reflect this change. The Level IV spec will be revised. ECD: 5/12/03 Spec revised Submitted LAT FEM stiffnesses have been added as an Appendix to the spec. This response will be updated. Peer 38 Mechanical Update yield F.S. to 1.25 Verify that this requirement has been flowed down to all other subcontractors. The yield FS is required to be 1.25 (not 1.1) per GEVS. This also assures consistency with test margin of 1.25, to minimize likelihood of yielding during strength test. Lockheed Martin concurs with the recommendation to increase the yield factor of safety from 1.1 to This recommendation has been forwarded to SLAC to update the X-LAT Level-IV Specification to reflect this change. The Level IV spec will be revised. ECD: 5/12/03 Spec revised Peer 41 Mechanical Verify that the flight data certification packages that accompany hardware delivered by Lockheed to SLAC are consistent with NASA Quality Assurance Requirements. Flight data certification packages are essential to mission quality assurance. They have to be compliant with NASA standards. NASA has not imposed any requirements for data package requirements on LAT (per Darren Marsh). However, Lockheed s data package will be consistent with the LAT s internal requirements (Mechanical to I & T) and their own standards for their Government Customers.

4 Open RFA s with No Lien on MRR (Cont) Peer 46 Mechanical Consider defining a control performance test for each VCHP that verifies ability to entirely block off the condenser, as well as ability to run full open under spec boundary conditions Mitigation for late find of under spec control performance found at panel level. Will add a Qualification (one time-one part) test to the Lockheed Martin Radiator specification and/or SOW. ECD 5/12/03 Has been incorporated PDR 31 Thermal Provide a matrix that shows TCS qualification and acceptance testing from component to subsystem to all-up LAT testing. Include mechanical and thermal environments. 7 Electrical Provide a verification plan for LAT hardware and flight software control of VCHP, including required LAT hardware and fight software support at Lockheed-Martin for VCHP testing. 12 Mechanical Provide comprehensive stress analysis report for LAT primary structure and interfaces. 16 Mechanical The low-level sine sweep test out to 150 Hz for assessment of the MECO high frequency transient event was not presented for any of the LAT subsystems. This testing is required by the MAR, and would be best performed at both the subsystem and LAT levels. Finding issues during subsystem testing reduces risk. Radiator repackaging will effect verification plans. The TCS needs to be qualified and acceptance tested before delivery to the spacecraft vendor. Lockheed will provide algorithm for processing greater than 100 temperature sensors into twelve on times for VCHP heaters. LAT electronics and flight software are responsible for control of the heaters. The plan for verifying electrical/flight software with VCHP was described. Limited detail analyses was presented at the. At a minimum the LAT level test must be performed. This is included into the LAT performance Verification Plan (LAT-MD ) which is available on the LAT website. Thermal test table and matrix are complete. Structural/vibration strategy is finalized, but values are provisional (pending final CLA done by SC contractor). The LAT verification plan is being reviewed by the Project. The verification plan will be available by March 04. Flight-like hardware EGSE of SIU, PDU, and GASU has been identifed and provided for the TCS verification test in May FSW verification is incorporated in the FU Formal test planned for Dec 04 - Feb '05. A comprehensive stress analysis was provided as part of the September 2003 CAL-Grid Peer Review. It was considered thorough and acceptable. Sine sweep testing of the LAT up to 150 Hz is part of the LAT dynamics test baseline. This is described in LAT-MD-01196, the "LAT Dynamics Test Plan." However, sine sweep testing of LAT subsystem up to 150 Hz is NOT required by the MAR, so not all subsystems will perform this. Subsystems with high natural frequencies, such as the TKR and CAL, will by default capture modes up to 150 Hz as part of their normal testing, but a 150 Hz sine sweep is not planned as a discrete test. What range will LM sweep to Submitted This is a test issue, not a Submitted This is a test issue, not a Submitted This is a test issue, not a

5 Open RFA s with No Lien on MRR (Cont) 19 Systems What is the requirement that is used to Engineerin measure the adequacy of the thermal design g in a failure scenario (ie. failed heat pipes)? Is it operating limits or acceptance limits? 20 Thermal a) Investigate the addition of over-temperature thermostats to VCHP reservoir to preclude over-temperature condition identified in failure analysis summary on chart 40. Sugge st Thermal b) Evaluate the use of dual line CCHP (versus baselined single line CCHP) to the X LAT heat pipe panel at GASU location. Consider adding horizontal CCHPs to radiator to increase radiator efficiency, and thereby gain some thermal design margin on Tracker temperature. Current thermal design does not support Tracker hot spot less than or equal to 30 degrees C under failed heat pipe condition 33 degrees C). a) Over-temperature of the VCHP reservoir could result in catastrophic loss of radiator. b) Design needs to be one heat pipe failure tolerant. This design does not meet this requirement. a) Changes to radiator configuration for PDR have decreased radiator efficiency. In addition, instrument dissipation has increased by 12 W. b) Note that in test, the horizontal heat pipe won t operate and this efficiency will only be realized on orbit. Failure scenario requires meeting acceptance limit only. The MAR requires that single point failures not constitute a "Loss of Mission". Components are required to meet performance requirements at acceptance levels. Further, although not currently the case, degradation of mission performance under single point failure is allowed at least to the minimum science requirements specified in the SRD. No further analysis of this scenario is planned by the LAT a) A VCHP over temp thermostat as been baselined b) Redundant heat pipe has been added to the X-LAT plate Analysis shows only a 1.2 deg C temperature reduction on the Tracker if 8 horizontal heat pipes are added. Need to submit response and analysis. Not recommended. Very small benefit for the cost, mass and schedule impacts. 21 Mechanical a) Provide design of MGSE required for installation and removal of radiator panels. b) Provide process/method planned for making a wet joint at radiator heat pipe This information was not provided at the. a) LM has a baseline design. b) SLAC is developing an installation procedure, including performing operation on a mock up. Need to submit response with MGSE design and plan for wet joint testing. This does not impact manufacturing operations.

6 Open RFA s 3 Potential Liens on MRR Peer 12 Mechanical 1) Address the intermetallic layer issue at the friction joint of the bimetallic joint for VCHPs. 2) What does LMC do from a manufacturing process point of view to preclude this layer from forming during the integration welding process, including temperature control during processing? 3) Do LMC CCHPs use a friction weld to cap off CCHPs? Peer 30 Mechanical Provide evidence/reasons why MLI thermal blankets used on the LAT will not fail due to atomic oxygen degradation/erosion at the location of micro-cracks in the Germanium plating on the kapton. NASA GSFC has learned 1st hand of the intermetallic layer formation at the friction joint and associatedprocess requirements Experience on space station and other space hardware in low earth orbit has shown failure of kapton coated with brittle coatings (silicone oxide and vapor deposited aluminum) due to atomic oxygen erosion at the location of micro-cracks in the coating. Isn t this an issue with the LAT blankets? Leakage through intermetallic layers is an issue in pressure vessel design. It can be aggravated by the friction-welding process since these layers can be aligned to result in leak paths. LM has instituted strict controls on material purity to preclude the formation of intermetallic layers which can lead to leakage. Temperatures are controlled during subsequent fusion welding processes to remain below approximately 200 of. Fusion welding is automated, allowing minimum heat input to the parts. Inert gas flow provides sufficient cooling to limit temperatures during and after the welding process. This ensures that material integrity is not compromised due to overheating. LM has had no failures in these joints in over 15 years of flight experience using our material and process controls AO Effects on Germanium Black Kapton have been documented in 28th International SAMPE Technical Conference Nov Pristine Germanium Black Kapton showed no significant effects from AO. LM blanket preliminary design complete. Submitted Potential lien on VCHP fabrication. New response will be presented at MRR. Not Accepted Potential lien on MLI blanket fabrication. No impact on Radiator or VCHP fab Peer 45 Mechanical GSFC (Brad Parker/Materials Board) provide recommendation to SLAC/LM team regarding the use of bimetal element used in heatpipes Ensure LMC manufacturing process is compliant with recent GSFC experience. Leakage through intermetallic layers is an issue in pressure vessel design. It can be aggravated by the friction-welding process since these layers can be aligned to result in leak paths. LM has instituted strict controls on material purity to preclude the formation of intermetallic layers which can lead to leakage. Temperature control is not directly applicable to the friction welding process, however other process controls on weld energy are used in conjunction with weld process certification to carefully regulate weld quality. LM has had no failures in these joints in over 15 years of flight experience using our material and process controls. Not Accepted Potential lien on VCHP fabrication. New response will be presented at MRR. 14 I&T a) No concept or treatment of radiator installation was presented. Design and analysis needs to be completed to ensure radiator handling loads are properly addressed and all interface requirements are captured in the S/C-LAT ICD. b) No presentation of ACD installation MGSE. a) Necessary for. Analysis of handling load cases must be completed prior to radiator fabrication. b) Necessary for. a) Has LM analyzed handling loads b) N/A Handling loads are expected to be less than flight loads.