A320 TCW OM-B. Thomas Cook Airlines Belgium

Transcription

1 OM-B Thomas Cook Airlines Belgium

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3 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 1 OM-B REV INTRODUCTION 0.00 GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS FILLING INSTRUCTIONS ORGANIZATION OF THE MANUAL - FOREWORD INDEX AND PAGINATION SYSTEM DEFINITIONS LIST OF NORMAL REVISIONS RECORD OF TEMPORARY REVISIONS CROSS REFERENCE TABLE HIGHLIGHTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

4 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 2 OM-B REV SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION 1.00 GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS - SCOPE COMMUNICATIONS EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER - INTRODUCTION REMOTE CONTROL PANEL PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM - INTRODUCTION GENERAL OVERVIEW CDSS SYSTEM COMPONENTS LIMITATIONS SURVEILLANCE AREA COVERAGE MODES OF OPERATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SYSTEM OPERATION COVERS - AIRCRAFT COVERS LOCATION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP - INTRODUCTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS - INTRODUCTION TIRES AND BRAKES LIGHTS SIGNS - INTRODUCTION NON-SMOKING SIGNS IN THE CABIN NAVIGATION TCAS - INTRODUCTION

5 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 3 OM-B REV 05 - CONTROLS AND INDICATORS WATER / WASTE DESCRIPTION - INTRODUCTION POTABLE WATER SHUT-OFF VALVE OF FWD/AFT LAVATORY

6 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 4 OM-B REV FLIGHT PREPARATION 2.00 GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS - SCOPE

7 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 5 OM-B REV FLIGHT OPERATIONS 3.01 OPERATING LIMITATIONS FOREWORD - SCOPE AUTO FLIGHT - GENERAL AUTOMATIC APPROACH, LANDING AND ROLL OUT ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION - SCOPE DEFINITIONS DOCUMENTATION OF PROCEDURES HANDLING A TECHNICAL PROBLEM CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS SEQUENCE TO HANDLE A TYPICAL ABNORMAL ECAM PROCEDURE QRH / NON ECAM PROCEDURE ECAM WARNING INHIBITION DURING TAKE-OFF HANDLING OF ECAM WARNINGS ABNORMAL WORKMETHOD AFTER PROCEDURE COMPLETED EXPLANATION OF LAYOUT USE OF SUMMARIES OPERATING TECHNIQUES - SCOPE REJECTED TAKEOFF ENG FAILURE AFTER V1 CONTINUED TAKEOFF IMMEDIATE VMC LDG FOLLOWING ENG FAILURE ON TO STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE CIRCLING APPROACH WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE GO AROUND ONE ENGINE OUT LANDING WITH SLATS OR FLAPS JAMMED APPROACH WITH FLAPS LOCKED OR HYD G+Y LO PR APPROACH WITH SLATS LOCKED APPROACH WITH HYD G+B LO PR NO FLAPS + NO SLATS LANDING EMERGENCY DESCENT WITH AUTO PILOT DETAILED CABIN/COCKPIT EVAC PROC - SCOPE ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION

8 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 6 OM-B REV STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION - SCOPE GENERAL PF / PNF FLIGHT CONTROLS TAKE-OVER COMMUNICATIONS FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS CHECK EXTERIOR LIGHTS USE SEAT BELTS USE PRINCIPLES OF BASIC PROCEDURES APPLICATION NORMAL CHECKLIST TAKE OFF BRIEFING DESC / APPR BRIEFING FLIGHT MANAGEMENT AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM FMGS - PRINCIPLES OF TASK SHARING FLOW PATTERNS FUEL CHECK PACKS OFF TAKEOFF FUEL SAVING POLICY PERFORMANCE FACTOR RVSM EXPEDITE CLB / DES P-RNAV RAW DATA APPROACHES NON PRECISION APPROACH SPEED TECHNIQUE NORMAL CHECKLIST PLACARD DESCENT PREPARATION - SCOPE FMGS NON PRECISION APPROACH - SCOPE SRE and PAR APPROACH STANDARD CS - COMMUNICATIONS AND STANDARD TERMS CHECKLIST COUTS ACTIONS COMMANDED BY PF FMA ALTITUDE FLAP OR GEAR CONFIGURATION

9 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 7 OM-B REV 05 - FLIGHT PARAMETERS PF/PNF DUTIES TRANSFER SUMMARY OF GROUND COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES SUMMARY FOR EACH PHASE SUPPLEMENTARY TECHNIQUES GENERAL INFORMATION - SCOPE LANDING GEAR - OPERATING ON RUNWAY WITH ARRESTING CABLES

10 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 8 OM-B REV FMGS PILOT S GUIDE 4.00 GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS - SCOPE

11 FILLING 0.00GENERALINFORMATION INTRODUCTION 0CONTENTS INSTRUCTIONS REMOVE INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION FILLING INSTRUCTIONS INSERT P 1 OM-B REV 05 PREVIOUS NEW REV 05

12 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION FILLING INSTRUCTIONS P 2 OM-B REV 02 Left intentionally blank

13 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION ORGANIZATION OF THE MANUAL P 1 OM-B REV ORGANIZATIONOF THE MANUAL - FOREWORD1 FOREWORD The "Operations Manual, Part B" (Aeroplane Operating Matters) is designed to provide the flight crew with readily accessible operational information for a specific airplane type. The OM-B of Thomas Cook Airlines Belgium is composed of the following manuals : 1. Operation Manual Volume B ( OM-B) 2. Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) 3. Minimum Equipment List (MEL) 4. Configuration Deviation List (CDL) 5. Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) / Check List 6. Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) 7. Weight and Balance Manual (WBM) The OM-B contains specific procedures when different from the procedures and data described in the FCOM volumes. Remark: Only OM-B, FCOM, MEL, CDL and QRH are carried on each aircraft. For optimum utilization of the manual, this introduction and the corresponding ORGANIZATION OF THE MANUAL section of each FCOM volume should be read carefully. The purposes of the OM-B are: To provide information regarding operational procedures, performance, and limitations. To standardize terminology and behavioral patterns. To provide rapid access to reference procedures. To provide reference material for selfteaching. To provide information on airplane systems and operation that is controlled and revised. Throughout this manual, the experience of the typical crew has been recognized and, for this reason, basic system principles have been omitted. For example, the text is not intended to teach the crew how to fly an airplane, but to enable an experienced crew to operate the related airplane type safely and proficiently.

14 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION ORGANIZATION OF THE MANUAL P 2 OM-B REV 05 - INDEX AND PAGINATION SYSTEM2 INDEX AND PAGINATION SYSTEM Revisions to this manual will be issued as regular revisions or, in case of time constraints or provisional information, as Temporary Revisions. Both revision categories are distributed when necessary and are numbered consecutively but separately for each section. Each revision should be inserted immediately and entered in the LIST OF NORMAL REVISIONS or RECORD OF TEMPORARY REVISIONS as applicable. On the distribution list, which is issued together with each regular revision, the HIGHLIGHTS of changes are indicated. Significant alterations to pre-revision page contents will be identified by a bold vertical line, except when a whole chapter or section is re-issued, then the reason for revision is given under revision highlights only. A LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES will be issued with each regular revision and includes all regular (white) pages of the manual. This enables a check of the related folder for correct contents. EDITORIAL INFORMATION a) White pages form the regular contents of the OM-B. b) Yellow pages are issued as temporary revisions to the OM-B (RECORD OF TEMPORARY REVISIONS is also printed on yellow paper). - DEFINITIONS2 DEFINITIONS Note: The definitions given here only concern this OM-B volume. The FCOM may have sligthly different definitions. CM1, CM2 Whenever applicable, crew member responsibilities are indicated by a number to the right of the line item, immediately following the response. A figure "1" means CM1 is involved etc., "B" indicates that both crew members are involved. This principle is not followed if a complete procedure is performed by only one crew member. The designations "CM1, CM2" refer to the crew members' physical location. "CM1" is the left pilot, "CM2" the right pilot. When the commander is in a position other than the CM1 position, he will continue to execute his command authority while performing the duties assigned to that crew position. The commander will brief the other crew member to ensure that he understands the duties of his assigned position. "PF" means that the associated action is always performed by the Pilot presently Flying the airplane, no matter if it is CM1 or CM2. "PNF" has the same meaning for the Pilot Not Flying the airplane.

15 LIST OF NORMAL REVISIONS INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION LIST OF NORMAL REVISIONS P 1 OM-B REV 05 LIST OF NORMAL REVISIONS The fact of having inserted revised pages shall be confirmed in the list below with the following details: Number and date of revision, name and insertion date. Missing pages of OM-B and FCOM should be requested to Flight Operations Administration. REV ISSUE DATE INSERTED BY DATE FILED OCT JUL MAR OCT JAN JUL 2008

16 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION LIST OF NORMAL REVISIONS P 2 OM-B REV 00 REV ISSUE DATE INSERTED BY DATE FILED RECORD OF TEMPORARY REVISIONS

17 CROSS REFERENCE TABLE INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CROSS REFERENCE TABLE P 1 OM-B REV 05 CROSS REFERENCE TABLE This OM-B is applicable to the following aircraft : Registration Type MSN (Manufacturer Serial Number) OO-TCH 1929 OO-TCI 1975 OO-TCJ 1787 OO-TCN 0425 OO-TCO 1306 OO-TCP 0653

18 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION CROSS REFERENCE TABLE P 2 OM-B REV 00 Left intentionally blank

19 HIGHLIGHTS INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION HIGHLIGHTS P 1 OM-B REV 05 Revision 05 mainly corresponds to: 1. Removal of OO-TCK, OO-TCL and OO-TCM. 2. Effectivity change for CDSS (OO-TCH added). 3. Removal of CY limitation for Operation on Narrow Runways. 4. Call-out adapted for ABN & NORMAL procedures. 5. REJECTED TAKEOFF : rewording of procedure steps to comply with Airbus procedure. 6. Various typo corrections. 7. Use of summaries: summaries may be used during STATUS analysis. 8. V/S PUSH to LEVEL OFF is now used for ENG FAILURE AFTER V1, IMMEDIATE VMC LDG FOLLOWING ENG FAILURE ON TO and GO AROUND ONE ENGINE OUT. 9. DESCENT PREPARATION: FMGS APPR page remark added. 10.TRK/FPA use for SRE & PAR approaches.

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22 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES V C S PAGE REV EFFECTIVITY TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCH(1929) TCO(1306) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) P 2 OM-B REV 05

23 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES V C S PAGE REV EFFECTIVITY TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) TCN(425) P 3 OM-B REV 05

24 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES V C S PAGE REV EFFECTIVITY P 4 OM-B REV 05

25 INTRODUCTION GENERAL INFORMATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES V C S PAGE REV EFFECTIVITY P 5 OM-B REV 05

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27 GENERALINFORMATION 0CONTENTS SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 1 OM-B REV 05 - SCOPE1 SCOPE For information concerning AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION, refer to FCOM volume 1. The only exception concerns : ELT on OO-TCN ( OMB ), Cargo Smoke Detection/Fire Suppression system on OO-TCN ( OMB ), TCAS on OO-TCN ( OMB ), CDSS on OO-TCO ( OMB ), Supplementary system information not provided in the FCOM.

28 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 2 OM-B REV 00 Left intentionally blank

29 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION COMMUNICATIONS EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER P 1 OM-B REV COMMUNICATIONS EMERGENCY LOCATORTRANSMITTER TCN(425) - INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTION The OO-TCN (MSN 0425) is equipped with a KANNAD 406 AF (Automatic Fixed) ELT, which is permanently fixed to the aircraft in a protected location and activated automatically upon impact. The beacon remains attached to the aircraft after impact. Since the ELT Transmitter is located in the tail of the aircraft, a Remote Control Panel (RCP) is located at a position visible by the crew. The ELT Transmitter status may be partially monitored and controlled using this RCP (see below). Once activated, the beacon transmits emergency location signals; burst of digitally encoded 406 MHz signals, received by COSPAS-SARSAT satellite network for alerting Search and Rescue (SAR) teams, and continuous 121.5, 243 MHz signals for closer proximity directional tracking. TCN(425)

30 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION COMMUNICATIONS EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER P 2 OM-B REV 04 - REMOTE CONTROL PANEL2 REMOTE CONTROL PANEL The RCP, installed in the cockpit enables the pilots to control the ELT. The RCP enables remote control of the major functions of the KANNAD ELT (Manual activation, Reset, Test, monitoring). The RCP is composed of : 1. A front plate with illuminated markings, 2. A 3 position toggle switch with 2 locked positions, 3. A red LED annunciator. The RCP enables remote control of the following KANNAD ELTs modes: 1. TEST-RESET (temporary mode) 2. ARMED (standby mode to enable automatic activation by the shock sensor) 3. ON (transmission) The OFF mode is not available on the RCP but directly on the ELT itself by switching it in position OFF (not accessible to the crew). TCN(425)

31 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION COMMUNICATIONS EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER P 3 OM-B REV 04 - PROCEDURE3 PROCEDURE The default setting for the KANNAD ELT system is in the ARMED mode. The system must be placed in this mode at all times with the exception of maintenance checks. When scanning the overhead panel during the COCKPIT PREPARATION, ensure that the ELT is in ARMED position. Important : The RCP operational test using the TEST/RESET position is reserved for maintenance checks. Furthermore, to avoid false alarm situation, the test must be performed in the interval of the first five minutes after every hour start. The nearby control tower must be notified of the test intention before accomplishment. The test must not be operated for more than 50 seconds. TCN(425)

32 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION COMMUNICATIONS EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER P 4 OM-B REV 04 Left intentionally blank TCN(425)

33 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 1 OM-B REV EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM TCH(1929) TCO(1306) - INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTION The OO-TCH (MSN 1929) and OO-TCO (MSN 1306) are equipped with a Cockpit Door Surveillance System (CDSS). This system is not supported by Airbus and its documentation (system description, procedures and limitations) is not provided in the FCOM. As the documentation is provided by the system manufacturer in the form of a Supplement to the Aircraft Flight Manual, document that is not present on board, and not used in this form in operation, the system documentation is incorporated in the OMB. Only system description, controls localization and system limitation are provided in the OMB. The procedures are not affected. does not incorporate the CDSS in the cockpit door operation procedure nor in the communication between the cabin and the flight deck concerning the CABIN CLEAR status. The following point contains the only information and procedures to be applied by : The CDSS monitors MUST be turned off prior to taxi, takeoff, and landing, A CDSS push button on the overhead panel activates/deactivates the system. It MUST be switched ON during the COCKPIT PREPARATION (extinguish all white lights concept), A C/B protects the system and is localized on the secondary circuit breaker panel (122VU), There is no interaction between the CDSS and the FWCs, The monitors, placed behind the sidesticks are touch screens and may be switched ON/OFF just by touching the screen surface, A CABIN READY switch is located at station 1L/1R, above the FAP. When pressed, it displays a CABIN SECURE message on the two monitors placed in the cockpit. This feature is not used by. This system is covered by the MEL item GENERALOVERVIEW1 GENERAL OVERVIEW The Cockpit Door Surveillance System (CDSS) provides a view of the main cabin compartment of the airplane. The LCD monitors provide the Captain and First Officer video images of the areas outside the cockpit door, and throughout the aircraft cabin. The LCD monitors are mounted in the cockpit within the operational and visual field of view of the Captain and the First Officer. The monitors are controlled via touch screen to allow the Captain or First Officer to select the viewing camera, one camera at a time. Selecting a camera to view is performed by touching the monitor screen to activate a selection menu, and then touching the icon for the corresponding camera. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

34 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 2 OM-B REV 05 Additionally, there is a Cabin Ready or Cabin Secure feature which allows the cabin crew to indicate to the cockpit that the cabin has been prepared for takeoff or landing. The Cabin Ready/Secure switch, located adjacent to the cabin attendant panel at door 1L, illuminates green when pressed. This sends a signal to the CDSS Monitors in the cockpit, which then annunciate CABIN SECURE. Touching either monitor cancels the annunciation on the monitors and extinguishes the Cabin Ready/Secure switch in the cabin. The CDSS System installed on the aircraft consists of the following major components: LCD Monitor Displays Cameras One Circuit Breaker One master ON/OFF Power Switch Cabin Ready/Secure Switch One System Control Unit Various Cable Assemblies TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

35 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 3 OM-B REV 05 - CDSS SYSTEMCOMPONENTS3 CDSS SYSTEM COMPONENTS CAMERA The cameras are miniature video cameras with a composite video output powered by 12 DC. The cameras are infrared and are enclosed in aluminum housings. LCD MONITOR DISPLAY Two LCD Monitors with touch screen controls, are installed in the cockpit at the Captain s and First Officer s side panel. The monitors facilitate viewing the images captured by the cameras. The monitors receive digital video signals and data from the System Control Unit. The monitors operate at 12 VDC input voltage from the System Control Unit. The monitor contains a touch sensitive screen and access to camera selection is provided by on-screen menu icons. The Monitor display can be turned on or off by touching the screen. This will only turn off the monitor, not the CDSS System. Other monitor functions are also controlled through the on-screen display menu. CIRCUIT BREAKER The circuit breaker installed for the CDSS System is rated at 4 Amps and is a manual push and pull type. It can be used to isolate the power from the aircraft to the CDSS components. The circuit breaker is installed at the power distribution panel where circuit breakers for other aircraft components are installed. The CDSS System is connected to a 28 VDC bus. A CDSS placard identifies the circuit breaker for the CDSS System and is located above the breaker. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

36 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 4 OM-B REV 05 MASTER ON/OFF SWITCH The master ON/OFF switch controls power to the CDSS System. The switch, which is a push button, is installed in the cockpit. When the aircraft is powered up and the switch is in OFF mode, the switch is illuminated. When the switch button is pushed to power the CDSS System OFF switch light will extinguish. SYSTEM CONTROL UNIT The System Control Unit is powered by the 28VDC input and responsible for feeding the power to the CDSS cameras and monitors and the video signal transferring from cameras to monitors. CABIN READY SWITCH The Cabin Ready switch is mounted at the flight attendant station and interfaces to the CDSS System Control Unit. The Cabin Ready Switch function is used by the Flight Attendant to notify the flight crew through the CDSS monitors in the cockpit that the cabin is secure for takeoff. When the Cabin Ready switch is activated by a flight attendant, Cabin Secure is displayed on the CDSS monitors installed in the cockpit, and also causes the Cabin Ready button to illuminate. The Cabin Ready indication on the monitor will extinguish when the monitor screen is touched. The flight attendant s illuminated Cabin Ready switch will also extinguish. - LIMITATIONS4 LIMITATIONS The CDSS monitors must be turned off prior to taxi, takeoff, and landing. - SURVEILLANCE AREA COVERAGE4 SURVEILLANCE AREA COVERAGE The surveillance areas covered include the area outside the Cockpit door. The cameras are installed at locations around the FWD flight attendants station, and have viewing angle of 150 in the horizontal plane, and 90 in the vertical plane. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

37 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 5 OM-B REV 05 - MODES OF OPERATION5 MODES OF OPERATION The CDSS System has two modes of operation; cabin surveillance, and Cabin Ready/Secure. In the surveillance mode, it provides a means for the flight crew to monitor the activity outside the cockpit door, depending on where the cameras are installed. It captures video images of these areas and sends them to the monitors. Each display module can independently display images from its selected camera. If the Captain s monitor is viewing images of the area right outside the cockpit door (COC), the First Officer s monitor can display images from 1L or 1R, or COC. In addition to security mode, the system is designed to indicate to the flight crew members the state of the cabin through a Cabin Ready/Secure switch. The Cabin Ready/Secure switch indicates to the crew station by annunciating CABIN SECURE message on the Captain s and First Officer s monitor. The message is acknowledged when either the Captain or the First Officer clears the message by touching the monitor screen. The Cabin Ready/Secure switch illuminates RED on activation, thus indicating to the flight crew members the cabin status. When acknowledged by flight crew, CABIN SECURE legend light will no longer illuminate. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

38 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 6 OM-B REV 05 - SYSTEM DESCRIPTION6 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The Cockpit Door Surveillance System (CDSS) allows the Captain and First Officer to view images of the area outside the cockpit door on two video monitors installed in the cockpit. The CDSS System cameras are installed in the main cabin, providing a view of the area just outside the cockpit door and/or the exit door(s). The camera views can be switched by touching their correlating icons on either touch screen monitor. There is an Automatic Switcher feature that will cycle through the camera views, as well. Each monitor can display cameras independently from one another, allowing the Captain and the First Officer control of the view on their monitor. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

39 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 7 OM-B REV 05 - SYSTEM OPERATION7 SYSTEM OPERATION POWERING UP Power to the CDSS System is applied via an On-Off push button switch labeled CDSS located on the cockpit overhead panel. When selecting the system off, the top half of the switch illuminates OFF, in white. When selecting the system ON, the off light extinguishes, and the switch is not illuminated. If a system fault exists, FAULT illuminates in amber on the bottom half of the switch. CABIN READY SWITCH The CDSS System Cabin Ready switch is located on the FWD cabin attendant station (above the FAP). A flight attendant can press the Cabin Ready switch, letting the Captain know that the cabin and the passengers are ready for take-off. When pressed, the Cabin Ready switch sends a signal to the Captains and First Officer CDSS monitor, which will then display CABIN SECURE on the LCD screen. The Captain or First Officer will see the signal, and acknowledges it by touching the LCD screen. Touching a monitor screen cancels the annunciation on the monitor(s) and extinguishes the Cabin Ready switch on the Cabin attendant station. TURNING THE MONITOR ON When the CDSS System On-Off switch is pushed, the monitor(s) will automatically turn on. Each monitor can be independently turned off by touching the screen of the monitor. To turn the monitor back ON, touch the screen again. The monitor will turn on and the following menu will appear : As default, the COC camera will be displayed. This camera s view will be displayed until another camera is selected, or until the automatic switcher mode (if selected) switches to another camera. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

40 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 8 OM-B REV 05 SELECTING A CAMERA Camera viewing is performed by touching the monitor in the upper edge of the touch screen. When touched, the following menu will appear : Touch the icon labeled 1L, to display the camera viewing the left exit door. Touch the icon labeled COC to display the camera viewing the cockpit door, and the icon labeled 1R to display the camera viewing the right exit door. AUTO AND MANUAL SWITCHER MODES There are two modes in which the system switcher can work: AUTOMATIC and MANUAL. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

41 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 9 OM-B REV SELECTING THE SWITCHER MODE Touch the MENU icon. The On Screen Display Menu will change as shown below : Touch the SWITCHER icon. The On Screen Display menu will change as shown below. You can choose AUTO or MANUAL. 2. SELECTING AUTO MODE Select how long (in seconds) you want each camera to remain on the screen, by using the plus + or minus - icons. The example below shows that each camera will remain on the screen for four seconds. Now, touch the AUTO icon. The following menu will appear: The number 1L indicates the camera view being shown. The icons will disappear if there is no activity for 20seconds. To make the icons re-appear, touch the LCD along the top edge of the screen, in the area where the icons are usually displayed. To exit AUTO mode, touch the MENU icon to return to the auto/manual menu. Then, to return to the main menu, press BACK. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

42 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 10 OM-B REV SELECTING MANUAL Select the Menu button. This will bring you the menu shown below. Then select the switcher icon. This will bring you the menu shown below. From the auto/manual menu, touch the MANUAL icon. The menu shown below will appear. Touch the number for the camera you want to see. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

43 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 11 OM-B REV 05 LOPA (LAYOUT PASSENGER ARRANGEMENT) You may choose a camera view by selecting the icon labeled LOPA. The following On Screen Display will appear over the current camera view: By selecting the LOPA icon, the viewer can pick a camera by its location in the cabin. Touch the icon desired and that cameras view will be displayed immediately. To return to the main menu and make the LOPA display disappear, press the icon labeled BACK. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

44 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 12 OM-B REV 05 PICTURE CONTROL 1. BRIGHTNESS CONTROL DIRECT ACCESS To adjust the brightness of the picture, touch the plus + or minus - icon, until the desired brightness level is achieved. 2. ADJUSTING THE PICTURE Touch the MENU icon. The On Screen Display will change to the menu shown below: Touch the PICTURE icon. The Screen Display will change to the menu shown below: This menu allows you to choose which camera view display you want to adjust. You can choose an individual camera, or you can select to adjust the display of all of the cameras together. When icon is touched, the following menu will appear: Select the function to be adjusted by touching its icon, then press the plus + or minus - icon repeatedly until the desired level of that function is reached. Press SET to keep the changes to the setting you have made. Below is a description of functions. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

45 TCH(1929) TCO(1306) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COCKPIT DOOR SECURITY SYSTEM P 13 OM-B REV 05 Touching the plus + or minus - icons will adjust the settings of that function. Touch the SET icon to save your settings. To reset the setting to the factory default settings, touch RESET. TCH(1929) TCO(1306)

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47 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COVERS P 1 OM-B REV COVERS AIRCRAFT COVERS LOCATION1 AIRCRAFT COVERS LOCATION The aircraft covers are placed in a suitcase located in the Avionics Compartment, as described below.

48 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT COVERS P 2 OM-B REV 04

49 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 1 OM-B REV FIRE CDSCP PROTECTION TCN(425) - INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTION The OO-TCN (MSN 0425) is equipped with a CLASS C CARGO COMPARTMENT SMOKE DETECTION AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM (CDSCP). This system is not supported by Airbus and its documentation (system description, procedures and limitations) is not provided in the FCOM. As the documentation is provided by the system manufacturer (AEA) in the form of a Supplement to the Aircraft Flight Manual, document that is not present on board, and not used in this form in operation, the system documentation is incorporated in the OMB and QRH 6.xx : OVERRIDEN PROCEDURES. - SYSTEM DESCRIPTION1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION OVERVIEW This modification converts the aircraft s Class D cargo compartments to Class C cargo compartments. Both cargo compartments are protected by a fire detection and suppression system. In the event of a cargo fire, the Flight Crew will be alerted by an aural warning (i.e. sonalert), by MASTER WARNING and MASTER CAUTION lights in the glare shield, and by several lights on the Cargo Detection Suppression Control Panel (CDSCP) located on the overhead panel. During Normal operation, the CDSCP LEDs are not illuminated and the aural warning is not sounding. When smoke is detected by both an A & B LOOP Detector in the cargo compartment, the Cargo Smoke Detection system gives a FIRE warning. The PUSH DSCH and AUTO/MAN DSCH switches are not powered until either: 1. Armed automatically by a FIRE warning from the system when the ARM switch is in the AUTO position, or 2. Armed manually by selecting the FWD PIT or AFT PIT position of the ARM switch. The respective FWD or AFT squib of the diverter valve and BTL 1 squib is armed when the ARM switch is placed to either the FWD or AFT position. The applicable green squib LEDs are ON. The aural warning is silenced by pressing either the CDSCPs BELL CUTOUT switch on the overhead panel, or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the ECAM panel on the center console, or either MASTER WARNING switches on the glare shield. Note: Pressing either the CDSCPs BELL CUTOUT switch or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the ECAM will reset the MASTER WARNING switch lights. When the Flight Crew depresses the PUSCH DSCH switch, BTL 1 empties discharging its Halon to the appropriate compartment in approximately 15 seconds. Five minutes later, an automatic circuit in the CDSCP discharging the remain bottle, initiating a 77 minutes (approximate) metered flow of Halon from BTL 2. The Flight Crew must land at the nearest suitable airport and evacuate the aircraft. Total protection time is 82 minutes from the time BTL 1 is discharged. TCN(425)

50 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 2 OM-B REV TCN(425) SYSTEM COMPONENTS FIRE DETECTION The FWD Cargo compartment contains two detector enclosure units, each containing two detectors. The AFT Cargo compartment contains three detector enclosure units, each detector enclosure unit contains two detectors. The status of all LOOP A detectors in the cargo compartment is indicated by one DET A LED and one FAIL A LED (the same is true for the LOOP B detectors) on the CDSCP. When any LOOP A or LOOP B detector senses smoke, the appropriate DET A or B LED on the CDSCP will illuminate and the MASTER CAUTION lights on the glareshield will illuminate. When a detector fails, the appropriate cargo compartment LOOP FAIL A or B LED on the CDSCP will illuminate and the MASTER CAUTION lights on the glare shield will illuminate. When one detector within an enclosure fails, the system automatically operates that enclosure in single loop mode. A cargo fire warning will occur when any LOOP A detector plus any LOOP B detector in the same compartment detect smoke. When operating in single loop mode, a cargo fire warning will occur if the operating detector in the affected enclosure detects smoke. A cargo fire warning consists of the following: Aural warning ON, Glareshield: MASTER CAUTION lights ON Note: When a cargo fire occurs, the MASTER CAUTION lights may illuminate prior to the MASTER WARNING lights, indicating only one LOOP A or LOOP B detector has sensed smoke, MASTER WARNING light ON CDSCP: FIRE warning LED ON, DET A and B LEDs for affected compartment ON, FWD/AFT Squib LED for affected compartment ON, BTL ARMED 1 Squib LED ON. TCN(425)

51 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 3 OM-B REV 04 FIRE SUPPRESSION The FWD cargo compartment contains four agent discharge nozzles. The AFT cargo compartment contains six agent discharge nozzles. The two Halon bottles in the FWD cargo compartment are mounted in the right hand sidewall and are connected with tubing using a two-way diverter valve to each compartment s nozzles. Four squibs (electrically actuated explosive charges which open diaphragm valves) direct flow of Halon to the appropriate cargo compartment. When a FIRE is detected, the CDSCP automatically arms BTL 1 and the proper squib on the diverter valve so that the extinguishant will be directed into the proper cargo compartment. Pressing the CDSCP s PUSH DSCH switch fires two squibs: One to release the Halon from BTL 1, and one of two squibs in the diverter valve to direct the Halon to the compartment with the cargo fire. When the PUSH DSCH switch is released, the CDSCP arms the squibs for BTL 2 and starts the automatic firing sequence [CDSCP s red FIRE LED flashes] for this bottle. BTL 2 will be discharged 5 minutes after BTL 1 is fired. The AUTO/MAN DSCH switch fires the squibs on BTL 2 and releases the Halon, which flows through the diverter valve into the same compartment as the extinguishant from BTL 1. A metering device in the discharge line from BTL 2 sustains the discharge of Halon for approximately 77 minutes. Fire Suppression will last 82 minutes from the activation of BTL 1. SYSTEM CONTROLS A Smoke Detector Fault Panel Assembly (FPA) in the E&E compartment (maintenance use only). A CDSCP located on the cockpit overhead panel. Refer to figure 1. The FPS (Fire Protection System) system gains it s power from two circuit breakers (C/B s) located on the right rear circuit breaker panel. CARGO DET/EXTIG-A (Bus A) is connected to the aircraft s 28VDC BAT BUS (301PP) and CARGO DET/EXTIG-B (Bus B) is connected to the aircraft s DC BUS 2 (204PP). Refer to Figure 3. Power from Bus A and B are routed independently to the FPS Rack located in the E&E compartment. At the FPS Rack, Bus A and Bus B join to create a single Bus AB that powers the CDSCP in the cockpit overhead panel and the FPA in the E&E compartment. Bus A continues from the rack to supply power to all of the LOOP A detectors and Bus B continues from the rack to supply power to all of the LOOP B detectors. Thus, two independent sources of power are provided to the FPS rack and the detection system and provide a single source of power (Bus AB) to the CDSCP and FPA. CARGO DET/EXTIG-A 28VDC BAT BUS (301PP) CARGO DET/EXTIG-B 28VDC DC BUS 2 (204PP) The MASTER WARNING and MASTER CAUTION lights on the glare shield. Refer to figure 2. A BELL CUTOUT switch on the CDSCP. Refer to figure 1. An EMERG CANC switch on the ECAM Panel located on the center console. Refer to figure 2. An OVHD INTEG LT & ANN LT on the INT LT Panel in the cockpit overhead panel. Refer to figure 2. An ANN LT test switch located on the cockpit overhead panel. Refer to figure 2. TCN(425)

52 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 4 OM-B REV 04 Figure 1 : AAE AIRBUS FPS CARGO DETECTION SUPPRESSION CONTROL PANEL (CDSCP) AND AURAL WARNING SONALERT AND THEIR LOCATIONS TCN(425)

53 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 5 OM-B REV 04 TEST button When pressed until the AURAL WARNING sounds and test sequence ends, test integrity of detection and suppression systems. All functions, LED s, and lights on the panel are tested. If a detector has failed, the system will automatically turn off the faulty detector, turn on the respective FAIL LED, and switch the unit (enclosure) to single loop mode. ARM switch Controls the automatic and manual arming of the bottle and diverter valve squibs. AUTO position: A cargo fire warning will automatically arm the diverter valve squib for the appropriate (FWD or AFT) compartment, and arm the BTL ARMED 1 squib. The respective squib LED s will illuminate. FWD PIT or AFT PIT position: Manually arms the diverter valve squib for the selected compartment and the BTL ARMED 1 squib (a cargo fire warning is not required). The respective squib LED s will illuminate. Note: When ARM switch is in FWD or AFT position, pressing the PUSH DSCH switchlight will discharge Halon BTL 1 regardless of cargo fire warning. When the PUSH DSCH switchlight is pressed and released, the CDSCP automatically arms the remaining bottle. BTL 2 is fired by pressing the AUTO/MAN DSCH switchlight or will automatically fire after 5 minutes via a digital timer circuit. BELL CUTOUT Silences the aural warning and resets the MASTER WARNING switchlights. SQUIB LED s Illuminate during a system test, or when the system is armed, to show the status of the squibs. An illuminated squib LED indicates the respective squib has not been fired and is ready. After a squib is fired, its respective squib LED will not illuminate. FWD or AFT: show status of squibs on the diverter valve. BTL ARMED 1 & BTL ARMED 2: show status of squibs for Halon bottles. Note: Whenever squib LEDs are illuminated (even when TEST button is pressed), pressing the PUSH or AUTO/MAN DSCH switches will discharge Halon. TCN(425)

54 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 6 OM-B REV 04 DSCH switches These switches are not powered until armed. When the ARM switch is in AUTO position, the PUSH DSCH switch is armed automatically when a Cargo Fire is detected. The AUTO/ MAN DSCH switch is armed when the PUSH DSCH switch is pressed and released. In the FWD or AFT positions the PUSH DSCH switch is armed regardless of a Cargo Fire warning. When armed, pressing the PUSH DSCH switch fires a squib releasing Halon from BTL 1, and also fires the selected squib on the diverter valve directing the Halon to the selected cargo compartment. When the PUSH DSCH switch is released the AUTO/MAN DSCH switch is armed. BTL 2 will automatically fire its squib 5 minutes after the activation of BTL 1. The agent flows from BTL 2 through a metering valve into the same bay as BTL 1. Note: BTL 2 will automatically discharge after 5 minutes of activating BTL 1 through a digital timing circuit. DSCH annunciators (in the DSCH switches) show status of Halon pressure in BTL 1 and BTL 2. The lights in these switches will illuminate when pressure for BTL 1 or BTL 2 is low. These lights are tested using the CDSCP TEST switch. DET A or B LEDs When system TEST switch is pressed: Illuminate to verify the Loop is operational (if LED is OFF during test, Loop is inoperative). When the detectors test is successful the CDSCP turns off the associated FAIL A or B LEDs. When system TEST switch is not pressed: Illuminate when a detector in the respective Loop senses smoke. FAIL A or B LEDs Except as explained above in TEST, illuminate when a detector in the respective Loop has failed. FIRE LED Illuminates steady when a Cargo Fire is detected. Flashes after PUSH DSCH switch is pressed and released. It illuminates steady when BTL 2 is automatically discharged 5 minutes after BTL 1 was discharged. The aural warning may be silenced during a Cargo Fire TEST by pressing the CDSCPs BELL CUTOUT switch in the overhead panel, or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the center console, or either MASTER WARNING switch on the glare shield. Refer to figure 2. Pressing the CDSCPs BELL CUTOUT switch or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the center console resets the MASTER WARNING switch lights on the glare shield. TCN(425)

55 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 7 OM-B REV 04 Figure 2 : AAE AIRBUS FPS INTERFACING WITH EXISTING CONTROL AND INDICATORS TCN(425)

56 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 8 OM-B REV 04 The MASTER WARNING lights located on the glare shield illuminates for any cargo fire warning from the FPS system. The MASTER CAUTION lights located on the glare shield illuminates when any detector senses smoke or any detector fails. The aircraft s AURAL WARNING sounds whenever there is a Cargo Fire. The AURAL WARNING may be silenced by pressing the CDSCP s BELL CUTOUT switch in the overhead panel, or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the center console, or either MASTER WARNING switches on the glare shield. Note: Pressing the CDSCP s BELL CUTOUT switch in the overhead panel or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the center console resets the MASTER WARNING switch lights on the glare shield. The intensity of the integral lights in the CDSCP are adjusted by the OVHD INTEG LT rheostat on the INT LT panel in the cockpit overhead panel. The CDSCP s annunciator lamps & LEDs are tested by the ANN LT switch on the INT LT in the cockpit overhead panel. The system does not give any indication on ECAM. The system has been modified to add an elementary flight phase inhibition during following phases: just before and just after Take-Off just before and just after Touch-Down Trigger Table TCN(425)

57 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 9 OM-B REV 04 Flight Phases TCN(425)

58 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 10 OM-B REV 04 Figure 3 : AAE AIRBUS FPS CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND THEIR LOCATIONS TCN(425)

59 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 11 OM-B REV 04 LIMITATIONS a) The aircraft must land at the nearest suitable airport within 82 minutes after the activation of BTL 1 when accomplishing the CARGO FIRE INFLIGHT procedure. b) Contingencies and procedures for inoperative Cargo Fire Protection System must be applied according MEL. c) If the aircraft is dispatched un-pressurized, then the Cargo Fire Protection System is considered inoperative in both cargo compartments. Both cargo compartments must remain empty. ABNORMAL/EMERGENCY PROCEDURES The ABNORMAL/EMERGENCY procedures related to the Cargo Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression System are incorporated in the QRH in the form of OVERRIDEN PROCEDURES (QRH tab 6). CARGO FIRE INFLIGHT CARGO FIRE ON GROUND ONE CDSCP DET A OR ONE CDSCP DET B LED ON TCN(425)

60 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION FIRE PROTECTION CDSCP P 12 OM-B REV TCN(425) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FIRST FLIGHT OF DAY AND FOR CREW CHANGE CARGO DETECTION SUPPRESSION CONTROL PANEL (CDSCP)...CHECKED Verify the MASTER CAUTION and MASTER WARNING lights on the glare shield are off. Verify the CDSCP s ARM switch is set to AUTO, and that all CDSCP lights and LEDs are out. [If the PUSH DSCH light is on, BTL 1 is empty. If the AUTO/MAN DSCH light is on, BTL 2 is empty.] CDSCP PANEL TEST SWITCH...PRESS & HOLD Press and hold the TEST switch until AURAL WARNING sounds and the test sequence is complete, then release. Observe the following: The PUSH DSCH & AUTO/MAN DSCH switches are ON. All FAIL A and B LEDs ON at first, then OFF as DET LEDs come ON. All DET A and B LEDs are ON. DET LED ON means that loop is operational. DET LED OFF means that loop is inoperative. The FWD PIT and AFT PIT Squib LEDs for the Diverter Valve Illuminate. BTL ARMED 1 Squib LED Illuminates. BTL ARMED 2 Squib LED Illuminates. FIRE LED on the CDSCP is ON and flashing, indicating the timer is operating. AURAL WARNING (Sonalert) is ON. MASTER CAUTION & MASTER WARNING lights on the glareshield are ON. Note; The aural warning can be silenced during the test by pressing either the CDSCP s BELL CUTOUT switch, or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the center console, or either MASTER WARNING switch lights on the glareshield. If the aural warning does not silence contact maintenance. Pressing the CDSCP s BELL CUTOUT switch or the aircraft s EMER CANC switch on the center console will reset the MASTER WARNING switch lights on the glare shield. Manually press either MASTER CAUTION switch light on the glare shield to reset the MASTER CAUTION lights. Release the test switch and verify all lights and LEDs are out. Note; If a test is required in flight accomplish the above procedure. OTHER FLIGHTS Verify the ARM switch on the CDSCP is set to AUTO, and that all panel lights are out. TCN(425)

61 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 1 OM-B REV LANDINGGEAR GEARS DOORS INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTION The following sub-section contains supplementary information not provided in FCOM All other information provided in FCOM 1.32 is not affected and remains valid. - TIRES ANDBRAKES1 TIRES AND BRAKES TIRE SERVICING - AIR/NITROGEN The tires are serviced with nitrogen only. If servicing at outstation is required and no nitrogen is available, servicing with air may be performed if: The oxygen (due to addition of air) volume in the tire does not exceed 5 %, Maintenance personnel removes the air from the tire and inflates them with dry nitrogen before 15 hours time service (usually done at home base). A chemical reaction between the oxygen in the tire and gases from the inner liner can cause tire explosion. TLB entry must be made. VISUAL INSPECTION OF TIRES DEFINITIONS Bead: Helps to maintain the shape of the tire and keeps it securely fitted on the rim. Carcass plies: Layers of rubber coated fabric running from bead to bead and give the tire its strength in the sidewall area. Groove: Indentation in the tread of the tire used for evacuation of water between runway and tire. Protector ply / Aramid protector: Provides cut resistance protection to the carcass plies. Depending on the type of manufacturer they have other names: Bridgestone: aramid protector ply, Michelin: protector ply. Shoulder: The area on the side of the tire between the tread and the sidewall. Sidewall: The side area of the tire between the shoulder and the beads. Tread: A layer of rubber on the outer circumference of a tire. The major function is to protect the casing from cuts, withstand high speed during take off and landing, provide traction, resist wear, provide durability under a wide range of temperatures and to ensure stability.

62 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 2 OM-B REV 04

63 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 3 OM-B REV GENERAL A general condition check of the tire has to be made, paying attention to deteriorations such as: 1. Under inflation: shoulders wear too much, 2. Worn beyond limits: worn to the reinforcing material, 3. Flat spots or skid burns. Skid burns are usually caused by a wet or icy runway and are oval shaped in the tread, showing signs of rubber burns, 4. Thrown tread, 5. Peeled rib, 6. Cuts, 7. Chevron cuttings: caused by grooves on runway surfaces, 8. Blisters or bulges, 9. Groove cracking: reinforcing material coming through the crack at the bottom of the tread groove, 10.Cuts below the rib. TIRE WEAR DETERIORATION LIMITS Each tire has its own limits for use, related to the type and manufacturer. The internal structure and the rubber thickness of the tire can change with the make. As a consequence, you cannot use the standard requirements for all tire makes. Each manufacturer publishes his respective utilization limits: 1. Dunlop: limits are given in a more general way. 2. Bridgestone and Michelin: limits are more precise (table form). 1. DUNLOP Tires damaged within the following limits can remain in service: Superficial cuts in the tread and / or sidewall rubber that do not go into the breakers or the cords of the casing plies. Cracking or splits in the sidewall if you cannot see the cords of the casing plies. Unevenly worn tires or tires worn on the shoulder can remain in service until worn to the base of the tread pattern or to normal wear limits whichever occurs sooner. Tires that have been subjected to sideways scrubbing can remain in service until fully worn. Tires with skid burns or flat spots can remain in service if the damage does not go into the base of the tread pattern or is not likely to cause serious out of balance. Rubber blisters in the lower sidewall if: The blisters are not more than 2 and none of them is > 25.4 mm in diameter. The blisters are not less than mm apart when measured circumferentially. Within these limits, both blisters can be in the same sidewall.

64 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 4 OM-B REV BRIDGESTONE / GOODYEAR Note: Conditions for removal are stated in the following tables unless otherwise explained. Criteria relative to trend wear: CONDITION BRIDGESTONE MICHELIN NORMAL WEAR Groove depth < 1 mm at any point of the tread surface. OR Aramid protector ply in view. Wear goes to bottom of any groove along more than 1/8 (approx. 24 cm) of the circumference at a given location. OR Protector ply is in view on more than 1/8 (approx. 24 cm) of the circumference at a given location. Note: Direct flight back to home base is allowed. FLAT SPOT ON TREAD SURFACE Flat spot goes to the protector ply. OR Flat spot does not go as far as the protector ply and the tread depth is not in limits (see NORMAL WEAR ) or there is a start of separation. Caution: If vibration felt during taxi: NO GO ASSYMETR. TREAD WEAR Refer to normal wear Refer to normal wear

65 Damage criteria - Tread surface - FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 5 OM-B REV 04 DAMAGE BRIDGESTONE MICHELIN CUTS Remark: remove any imbedded and unwanted objects if present. The aramid protector is visible and damaged and the cut is more than: Note: the cut depth is measured from the bottom of the groove. 1. Nose wheel: cut depth > 7 mm and/or cut length > 40 mm 2. Main wheels: cut depth > 8 mm and/or cut length > 50 mm. The protector ply is visible and damaged and the cut is more than: Note: the cut depth is measured from the bottom of the groove. 1. Nose wheel: cut depth > 6 mm and/or cut length > 20 mm 2. Main wheels: cut depth > 8 mm and/or cut length > 25 mm. Cut severs or goes across a tread rib. CHUNKING Protector ply in view on more than 6 square cm. OR Protector ply damaged. Protector ply in view on more than 6 square cm. OR Protector ply damaged. OPENED TREAD JOINT As soon as you can see the opening

66 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 6 OM-B REV 04 - Tread surface (Continued) - DAMAGE BRIDGESTONE MICHELIN RIB UNDER - CUTTING Cut depth > 6 mm below the rib. Cut depth > 5.5 mm below the rib. GROOVE CRACKING Aramid Chord protector in view and crack length mote than: 1. Nose wheel: 40 mm 2. Main wheels: 50 mm. Protector ply in view on more than 6 mm (continuous). BLISTERS AND BULGES (Deformation) Not allowed CHEVRON CUTTING The aramid protector is visible. If chevron cutting goes to and exposes the protector ply. OR If chevron cutting causes chunking which exposes the protector ply more than 6 square cm.

67 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 7 OM-B REV 04 - Tread surface (Continued) - DAMAGE BRIDGESTONE MICHELIN SKID BURNS (due hydroplanning or ice skidding) Not allowed Protector ply is exposed for more than 160 square cm. OR Airplane vibrations unacceptable during taxi

68 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 8 OM-B REV Sidewalls - DAMAGE BRIDGESTONE MICHELIN CRACKS, SPLITS, CUTS (Radial or inclined) Radial cut: Angle < 30 Inclined cut: Angle > 30 Radial cuts: Depth < 2 mm and with length >= 150 mm and do not go as far as the carcass. Depth >= 2 mm or go as far as the carcass. Inclined cuts: Length >= 150 mm and do not go as far as the carcass. Cuts that go as far as the carcass. Sidewall cords in view. SEPARATION, BLISTERS, BULGES Not allowed

69 Beads - FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 9 OM-B REV 04 DAMAGE BRIDGESTONE MICHELIN EXPOSURE OF BEAD WIRES Not allowed DEFORMATION Not allowed (beads or bead wires deformation) CRACKS In upper part of bead zone with dept > 1 mm WEAR with wear of the tire surface near the upper edge of the rim and depth of the area > 2 mm. with wear of the tire surface near the upper edge of the rim and depth of the area > 1 mm. BLISTER Blister in upper part of the bead zone and length or diameter > 10 mm Blister in upper part of the bead zone BRAKE WEAR LIMITS The relation between the brake wear pin length and the number of landings that can be performed, is for the worst case: 1 mm wear pin length = 19 landings If the wear pin is flush, the brake still contains sufficient wearable lining material to provide an RTO braking capability. Note: The length of the wear pin can only be measured with the PARKING BRAKE SET and with a brake temperature less than 60 C. Note: The brake units usually have 2 wear pins. If you find a brake that does not have 2 wear pins, the brake is serviceable if there is 1 wear pin and that wear pin is within limits. (reference AMM) A brake without a wear pin must be deactivated. (reference AMM) Conclusion: A brake wear pin below flush is not acceptable. A flush brake wear pin can still handle an RTO. The aircraft may return to main base where the brake must be replaced. Taking off from home base with a flush brake wear pin is not allowed.

70 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LANDING GEAR GEARS AND DOORS P 10 OM-B REV 04 Left intentionally blank

71 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LIGHTS SIGNS P 1 OM-B REV LIGHTS SIGNS INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTION The following sub-section contains supplementary information not provided in FCOM All other information provided in FCOM 1.33 are not affected and remain valid. - NON-SMOKING SIGNS INTHE CABIN1 NON-SMOKING SIGNS IN THE CABIN GENERAL Some of the Non-Smoking signs extinguish under certain conditions. There is no need to enter a TLB/WO asking for a reprogrammation of the system if it is operating as described below. SYSTEM OPERATION The Non-Smoking signs are commanded by the CIDS. This CIDS Director will illuminate the Non- Smoking lights in each PSU through a DEU-A. The CIDS uses the NS signs assigned in the CAM layout data. Each NS sign should be mentioned in this layout before the CIDS can recognize a NS sign in each PSU.

72 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LIGHTS SIGNS P 2 OM-B REV Non-Smoking Zones In order to program the aircraft as a Non-Smoking aircraft, the NS zones should be assigned in the PTP. This programming is not protected by an access code, so everybody can modify this programming freely. There are 2 versions depending on the age of the aircraft and the CIDS installed: With an older CIDS, the end of the NS zones should be assigned (as per Maintenance task). With the newer versions of the CIDS, a Non-Smoker A/C can be programmed (as per Maintenance task). This is a much easier way of assigning a Non-Smoking zone as it was before.

73 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LIGHTS SIGNS P 3 OM-B REV Non-Smoking Signs In the older, less sophisticated aircraft, an older CIDS is installed. With this equipment, the non-smoking and exit signs will be switched on under the following conditions: Landing gear down and locked when the flight compartment NS switch is in the AUTO position, Flight compartment NS switch in overhead panel is switched to ON, Excessive aircraft decompression, irrespective of the NS switch position. On those aircraft, as described above, it is only possible to control the signs for the passengers and not for the cabin crew (depending on the CAM programming), so with the switch in armed position, some signs go OFF (attendant station and the signs in the galley). This is a normal behavior and DOES NOT need to be reported in the TLB as a system defect. To illuminate all the NS signs on these aircraft, the pilot could also select the NS switch to ON on the overhead panel. In this way, the NS signs and the EXIT signs will always be illuminated. CAUTION: This is not acceptable. Selecting this switch to ON will prevent the emergency power supply batteries from charging, with a possible empty battery as a consequence (NOGO item). With the newer, more evolved CIDS, some software improvements have been made. Here the NS signs are switched ON in the following conditions: All NS signs are always switched ON. The NS switch in the flight compartment overhead panel has no effect on the NS signs. So as long as the aircraft is programmed in the PTP as a Non-Smoker flight, the lights should be illuminated.

74 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION LIGHTS SIGNS P 4 OM-B REV 04 Left intentionally blank

75 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION NAVIGATION TCAS P 1 OM-B REV NAVIGATION TCAS TCN(425) - INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTION The OO-TCN (MSN 0425) is equipped with a TCAS II System (version 7.0). This system was not installed by Airbus and its documentation (system description, procedures and limitations) is not provided in the FCOM. As the documentation is provided by the system manufacturer (Rockwell Collins) in the form of a Supplement to the Aircraft Flight Manual, document that is not present on board, and not used in this form in operation, the system documentation is incorporated in the OMB and QRH. The installation is similar to OO-TCI (MSN 1975) and OO-TCJ (MSN 1787). The only differences are : Control panel layout (refer to OM-B for OO-TCN panel), ND indications on OO-TCN is limited to the ranges 10, 20, 40 NM ranges in ROSE and ARC modes (refer to OM-B for OO-TCN ND indications). All other information concerning TCAS system description and procedures (SOP, abnormal and emergency) for OO-TCI and OO-TCJ are applicable to OO-TCN. TCN(425)

76 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION NAVIGATION TCAS P 2 OM-B REV 04 - CONTROLS AND INDICATORS2 CONTROLS AND INDICATORS ATC/TCAS PANEL TCAS mode sel TA/RA : Normal position. The RAs, TAs and proximate intruders are displayed if the ALT RPTG switch is ON and the transponder is not on STBY. TA : The TCAS does not generate any vertical orders. This mode should be used in case of aircraft degraded performance (engine failure, landing gear extended...) or on parallel runways. All RAs are converted into TAs. TAs and proximate intruders are displayed if the ALT RPTG switch is on and the transponder is not on STBY. The TA ONLY white memo is displayed on the NDs. STBY : The TCAS is in standby. TCN(425)

77 TCN(425) FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION NAVIGATION TCAS P 3 OM-B REV 04 ND INDICATIONS The traffic is displayed in all ROSE modes and ARC mode when 10, 20 or 40 NM range is selected. Only the 8 most threatening intruders are displayed. Proximate intruder Indicated by a white filled diamond. TA intruder Indicated by an amber circle. Associated with the TRAFFIC TRAFFIC aural message. RA intruder Indicated by a red square. Associated with vertical orders displayed on the PFD and aural messages. Other intruders Indicated by a white empty diamond. Note: If the range of an intruder is not available, the intruder is not displayed. An intruder may be partially displayed when its range is out of scale. TCN(425)

78 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION NAVIGATION TCAS P 4 OM-B REV TCN(425) Relative altitude Indicated in hundred of feet above or below the symbol depending on the intruder position. Vertical speed arrow Displayed only if the intruder V/S > 500 feet/minute. Relative altitude and vertical speed arrow are displayed in the same color as the associated intruder symbol. Note: If the altitude of an intruder is not available, neither altitude nor vertical speed indications are displayed. No bearing intruder If the bearing of YA or RA intruder is not available the following data is presented in digital form at the bottom of the ND : range, relative altitude and vertical speed arrow if available. Displayed amber or red according to threat level. Range ring A 2.5 NM white range ring is displayed when a 10 or 20 NM range is selected TCN(425)

79 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION WATER / WASTE DESCRIPTION P 1 OM-B REV WATER DESCRIPTION /WASTE INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTION The following sub-section contains supplementary information not provided in FCOM All other information provided in FCOM 1.38 are not affected and remain valid. - POTABLE WATER SHUT-OFF VALVE OF FWD/AFT LAVATORY1 POTABLE WATER SHUT-OFF VALVE OF FWD/AFT LAVATORY GENERAL Description on how to gain access to the potable water shut-off valve of a lavatory (FWD/AFT) when it has to be closed manually. DESCRIPTION The potable water system supplies the galleys and lavatories with water from a tank via a distribution system; visualized in the following figure. The toilet system uses water from the potable water system for the toilet flush. Each lavatory can be isolated from the potable water distribution system through a manual shut-off valve (MAN SOV). Under normal conditions, the valve remains in the OPEN position. When the manual shut-off valve is closed, the water faucet and toilet are isolated from the potable water distribution system. The shut-off valve is installed under the toilet shroud.

80 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION WATER / WASTE DESCRIPTION P 2 OM-B REV 04 ACCESS TO WATER SHUT-OFF VALVE Two different systems may be encountered: SYSTEM 1 The water shut-off valve is opened and closed by use of a control handle, which is attached to the shutoff valve. The control handle is located on the sanitary cabinet wall, under the washbasin just above the lavatory floor. The procedure to gain access to the control handle is: Open the door of the lavatory Open the sanitary cabinet door You are able to closed the shut-off valve

81 FCOM 1 - SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION WATER / WASTE DESCRIPTION P 3 OM-B REV 04 SYSTEM 2 The procedure to gain access to the shut-off valve is: Open the door of the lavatory Open the access panel to the water shut-off valve You are able to close the shut-off valve

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83 GENERALINFORMATION 0CONTENTS FLIGHT PREPARATION FCOM 2 - FLIGHT PREPARATION GENERAL INFORMATION CONTENTS P 1 OM-B REV 05 - SCOPE1 SCOPE For information concerning FLIGHT PREPARATION, refer to FCOM volume 2.

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85 3.01OPERATINGLIMITATIONS FOREWORD FLIGHT OPERATIONS OPERATING LIMITATIONS FOREWORD P 1 OM-B REV 00 - SCOPE1 SCOPE For information concerning OPERATING LIMITATIONS, refer to FCOM volume 3. The company limitations, which are more restrictive than FCOM 3, are included here.

86 OPERATING LIMITATIONS FOREWORD P 2 OM-B REV 00 Left intentionally blank

87 AUTOFLIGHT OPERATING LIMITATIONS AUTO FLIGHT P 1 OM-B REV 05 - GENERAL1 GENERAL USE OF NAV AND FINAL APP MODES FOR NON-PRECISION APPROACH The following information is applicable to fleet and restricts the related limitation. Use of APP NAV and FINAL APP is approved in accordance with the limitation of FCOM and in VMC only. - AUTOMATICAPPROACH,LANDING ANDROLLOUT1 APPROACH, LANDING AND ROLL OUT AUTOMATIC LANDING IN CAT I OR BETTER WEATHER CONDITIONS The following information is applicable to fleet and restricts the related limitation. The airline has NOT checked the ILS CAT I beam quality, and the effect of terrain profile in front of the runway. So, automatic landing on CAT I ground installations and when the sensitive area is not protected is not authorized. However, automatic landing, when sensitive areas are not protected is authorized only : For AUTOLAND SURVEY, and On CAT II or CAT III approved runways.

88 OPERATING LIMITATIONS AUTO FLIGHT P 2 OM-B REV 00 Left intentionally blank

89 3.02ABNORMAL INTRODUCTION ANDEMERGENCY ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 1 OM-B REV 01 - SCOPE1 SCOPE - DEFINITIONS1 The FCOM section is completely replaced by the information provided here ( OM-B ). ABNORMAL PROCEDURE An Abnormal Procedure describes actions which are necessary to cope with an impending or effective failure of any airplane system or component, respectively actions which are necessary to protect the airplane and its occupants from impending harm. ECAM PROCEDURE An Abnormal Procedure, which is generated by the ECAM and must be performed according to the ECAM display, is referred to as "ECAM Procedure". NON ECAM PROCEDURE An Abnormal Procedure, which cannot be generated by the ECAM and which must be performed by reference to written text, is referred to as "Non ECAM Procedure". OVERRIDEN PROCEDURES Some ECAM Cautions / Warnings may be temporarily overridden due to preliminary information by AI. In this case modified procedures are listed in the QRH as "Overridden ECAM Procedures" and may be found under the OEB tab of the QRH. - DOCUMENTATION OF PROCEDURES1 DEFINITIONS DOCUMENTATION OF PROCEDURES FCOM 3.02 In this chapter, all Abnormal Procedures (ECAM or Non ECAM) are presented in an expanded version. The Expanded Procedure consists of the basic procedure with added background information and explanatory text. Flight Procedures are included in the description of Abnormal Procedures only in exceptional cases. OM-B Whenever normal Flight Procedures have to be modified significantly due to a System Fault/Failure, a special Flight Pattern is published in this chapter. QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK (QRH) Non ECAM Procedures are generally depicted in the QRH. ECAM Procedures are repeated in the QRH only in exceptional cases.

90 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 2 OM-B REV HANDLING A TECHNICALPROBLEM2 HANDLING A TECHNICAL PROBLEM NOTIFICATION Any CM detecting an impending or existing system fault, system failure or abnormal behaviour of a system shall immediately inform the other CM(s). In case of cautions / warnings generated by the FWS preferably the PNF: silences an associated aural warning reads the system title line from E/WD (e.g. HYD B SYS LO PR) if applicable. ACTION Primary objective of the flight crew is airplane control. Simply keep it flying. The crew shall generally not deal with technical problems, unless: a safe flight path is established a safe airspeed is established and, after take off or go around: The LDG Lever is selected up Note: The Commander may consider to leave the landing gear extended, if performance permits, in cases of hydraulic, brake overheat or tyre problems or in cases of structural damage. The aircraft is 400ft AGL or above TASK SHARING Whenever the situation and A/C status permits, the PF and PNF should initially remain with their designated duties. The PF primarily concentrates on A/C control. When the workload for the PIC is increased due to "non routine" duties, such as abnormal management, decision making, communication with cabin crew, information to passengers etc. and when the PIC would not be able to concentrate on PF duties, he should consider to designate CM2 as PF for such phases of flight. USE OF AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEM The autopilot should be engaged prior dealing with a technical problem or prior starting an Abnormal Procedure. The autopilot may be used in most failure cases, when available : in case of engine failure, including autoland or CAT II/CAT III ILS. When performing an engine-out non precision approach, the use of autopilot is not permitted in the following modes : FINAL APP, NAV V/S, NAV FPA. in case of other failures, down to 500 ft AGL in all modes. However, the AP has not been certified in all configurations and its performance cannot be guaranted. If the pilot chooses to use the AP in such circumstances, extra vigilance is required and the AP must be disconnected if the aircraft deviates from the desired or safe flight path.

91 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 3 OM-B REV 01 VERIFICATION OF CONDITION Confirm system status by checking system display, system functions and local warnings. Recheck affected system controls for normal set up. Note: In flight, a tripped CB shall not be pushed in again. Only in case of an emergency, one reset may be considered, if the system is absolutely needed for safe conduct of flight. This procedure should be adopted only as a last resort, and only one re-engagement should be attempted. On ground, do not re-engage any wing tank fuel pump circuit breaker. For all other circuit breakers, if the flight crew coordinates the action with maintenance, they may re-engage a tripped CB, provided the cause of the tripped CB is identified. USE OF OXYGEN Oxygen masks shall be donned and communications established when their use is required. This includes, but is not limited to loss of cabin pressure, use of fire extinguishing agents, contamination of air (such as smoke), or concentration of fumes or odours, either present or anticipated on the flight deck or in the passenger cabin. Emergency oxygen should be utilised when necessary to provide positive pressure in the masks to prevent the entry of or evacuate contaminants. When positive pressure is not required, but contamination of cockpit air exists, 100 % oxygen must be used. If prolonged use is required and the situation permits, oxygen availability should be extended by selecting normal flow. Avoid the continuous use of interphone position to minimise the interference from oxygen mask breathing noise. For description of oxygen masks, refer to OM-B 3.03, FCOM 1.35 and/or SEP. - CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS3 CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS The actions contained in abnormal procedures are classified according to their mode of application. MEMORY ACTIONS Actions which must be performed as soon as the situation permits. The delay involved when referring to written documentation is not acceptable. Therefore, all CM's must be able to perform these actions by memory. "Memory Actions" are part of some Non ECAM Procedures. The following procedures are to be applied without referring to paper : Windshear, windshear ahead, TCAS, EGPWS, beginning of ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION, loss of braking, beginning of EMER DESCENT, beginning of ENG ST. beginning of UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION,

92 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 4 OM-B REV 01 MEMORY ACTIONS (EXPANDED) Description of the actions to be performed by heart, the crew coordination and the standard calls for each affected checklist. Caution: As a general rule, all abnormal checklists, as described if the FCOM, are of application. The following expanded MEMORY ACTIONS give only the way to apply the related checklists. WINDSHEAR. PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR WARNING (RED) : WINDSHEAR AHEAD - WINDSHEAR AHEAD PF PNF Note: The message W/S AHEAD is displayed on each PFD. The color of the message depends on the severity and location of the windshear. Aligned for takeoff: TAKEOFF... DELAY Delay the takeoff roll until the warning is no longer active or select the most favourable runway. During takeoff run: TAKEOFF... REJECT Predictive windshear alerts are inhibited above 100 kts until 50 ft. After lift-off: THR LEVERS... TOGA As usual, the slat/flap configuration can be changed, provided the windshear is not entered. SRS ORDERS... FOLLOW If actual windshear conditions are encountered: Apply WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER procedure. PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR WARNING (RED) : GO AROUND - WINDSHEAR AHEAD PF PNF Note: If a positive verification is made that no hazard exists, the warning may be considered cautionary. Approach: GO AROUND... PERFORM Commence a normal go-around maneuver (including FLAPS retraction by one step and L/G UP selection). If actual windshear conditions are encountered: Apply WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER procedure.

93 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 5 OM-B REV 05 WINDSHEAR (CONT D). WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER : WINDSHEAR - WINDSHEAR PF Simultaneously: WINDSHEAR TOGA... ANNOUNCE THRUST LEVERS... TOGA Aggressively apply TOGA power. A/P disengagement will occur when alpha is above alpha prot. SPEED BRAKES... RETRACT AUTOPILOT... MONITOR Leave autopilot ON and monitor system performance. PNF TOGA POWER SET... ANNOUNCE Check that TOGA power is set. SPEED BRAKES... CHECK Check that speedbrakes are retracted. Note: Severe windshear may exceed the performance capability of the AFS. If necessary, to avoid ground contact, the PF must be prepared to disconnect the A/P and fly manually. If AP is disengaged: FD SRS COMMAND... FOLLOW Use full back stick if commanded. If necessary, maintain speed at alpha max. Note: If SRS not available, initially use pitch attitude up to Pitch can be increased by using up to full back stick if necessary to minimize loss of height. If in alternate or direct law, respect stall warning. BANK... WING LEVEL Wings level to increase rate of climb. Maintain or increase bank if necessary to avoid obstacle. FLAP / GEAR CONFIG... MAINTAIN Do not change flap / gear position, and do not regain lost IAS. until WINDSHEAR warning has ceased and / or ground contact is no longer a threat. RA and V/S... C OUT Continuously call out radio altitude and vertical speed indication. If in alternate or direct law, call out any significant IAS or altitude deviation.

94 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 6 OM-B REV 05 TCAS TCAS TA (Traffic Advisory) : TRAFFIC - TRAFFIC CM1 designates PF by: TCAS, I have control or TCAS, You have control PF PNF Do not maneuver based on a TA alone. INTRUDER... IDENTIFY Adjust range on ND. Consider ROSE mode for traffic from behind. Caution: The traffic in sight must not necessarily be the intruder. ATC... INFORM TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory) : CLIMB - CLIMB, DESCEND, DESCEND, MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED MAINTAIN OR ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED ADJUST PF PNF AUTOPILOT... DISENGAGE The TCAS orders may require an incremental load factor, which is greater than that achieved by the autopilot. BOTH FDs OFF... ANNOUNCE BOTH FD... OFF TCAS COMMAND... FOLLOW MANEUVER... MONITOR Promptly and smoothly adjust vertical speed to avoid the red V/S Monitor vertical speed. area. Monitor intruder. ATC... INFORM Report: xxx TCAS climb (descent) When clear of conflict: FLIGHT PATH... REESTABLISH Return to assigned ALT or FL. Track proceed according to ATC clearance. AP reengage. ATC... INFORM Report: xxx clear of conflict Note: A go-around must be performed when a RA CLIMB or INCREASE CLIMB is triggered on final approach (after FAF or below 1000 ft).

95 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 7 OM-B REV 05 EGPWS EGPWS ENCOUNTER : TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP, TERRAIN AHEAD PULL UP OR PULL UP PF PNF Simultaneously: PULL UP TOGA... ANNOUNCE AUTOPILOT... DISENGAGE SIDESTICK... FULL BACK AND HOLD Disregard FD SRS command. If necessary, maintain speed at alpha max. When in alternate or direct law, respect stall warning. If one engine out, reduce speed with care below VLS. With flaps extended and at light weight, VMCA may be reached before V alpha max. If in pitch alternate law or direct law, the pitch attitude that results in intermittent stall warning or initial buffet is the upper limit. This may be at unpredictable pitch values due to various circumstances (downdraft, g-load, etc). Always respect the stall warning in this case. THRUST LEVERS... TOGA Aggressively apply TOGA power. SPEEDBRAKES... RETRACT BANK... WING LEVEL Wings level to increase or adjust rate of climb. Maintain or increase bank if necessary to avoid obstacle. For TERRAIN AHEAD PULL UP only: In addition to climbing, and if the crew concludes that turning is the safest way of action, a turning maneuver can be initiated. FLAPS/GEAR... MAINTAIN Do not change flap / gear position, and do not regain lost IAS. Until GPWS warning has ceased and/or ground contact is no longer a threat. TOGA POWER SET... ANNOUNCE Check that TOGA power is set. SPEEDBRAKES... CHECK Check that speedbrakes are retracted. RA and V/S... C OUT Continuously call out radio altimeter and vertical speed indication. If in alternate or direct law, call out any significant IAS or attitude deviation.

96 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 8 OM-B REV 05 EVACUATION The stopping actions are described in the REJECTED TAKEOFF procedure ( OM-B ). The expanded procedure is described in the ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION procedure ( OM-B ). The BOXED ITEMS ( QRH 7.01) of the EVACUATION procedure must be performed by memory and are repeated below : EVACUATION ( QRH 7.01 BOXED ITEMS by MEMORY) CM1 CM2 AIRCRAFT / PARKING BRK... STOP/ON ATC (VHF)... NOTIFY Set parking brake ON after aircraft stops. Notify ATC of the nature of the emergency, and request assistance. Only VHF1 is available on batteries. ATTENTION CREW ON STATION... ANNOUNCE START PROCEDURE... ANNOUNCE ECAM ACTIONS... INITIATE LOSS OF BRAKING LOSS OF BRAKING PF If AUTOBRAKE is selected: BRAKE PEDALS... PRESS PNF If no braking available: LOSS OF BRAKING... ANNOUNCE REVERSER... MAX BRAKE PEDALS... RELEASE A/SKID & N/W STRG OFF... ORDER BRAKE PEDALS... PRESS MAX BRK PRESS PSI If still no braking: PARKING BRAKE... SHORT AND SUCCESSIVE... APPLICATION BRAKE PEDALS... RELEASE A/SKID & N/W STRG... OFF MAX BRK PRESS... CHECK

97 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 9 OM-B REV 05 EMERGENCY DESCENT EMERGENCY DESCENT (WITH AP) PF PNF If above FL100: CREW OXY MASKS... ON CREW OXY MASKS... ON CREW COMMUNICATION... ESTABLISH CREW COMMUNICATION... ESTABLISH EMERGENCY DESCENT... ANNOUNCE DESCENT... INITIATE If RAPID DECOMPRESSION: EMER DESCENT FL100 / MEA ALT... TURN / PULL SIGNS... ON HDG... AS REQUIRED ENG MODE... IGN SPD... AS REQUIRED ATC... NOTIFY THR LEVERS (if A/THR not engaged)... IDLE FMA... CHECK THR IDLE / OPEN DES SPD BRK... FULL Note: If structural damage is suspected reduce speed as appropriate. ENGINE ST ENGINE ST CM1 CM2 On ground: ENGINE MASTER... OFF Monitored action. PF In flight: ENG ST START PROCEDURE... ANNOUNCE ENG PARAMETERS... CHECK PNF THR LEVER... IDLE Monitored action. ENG PARAMETERS... CHECK Not normal: ENG MASTER... OFF Monitored action. Continue with ENG ST QRH procedure (PNF reads and verify memory items, and continues with ENG SHUTDOWN on ECAM).

98 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 10 OM-B REV 05 UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION PF UNRELIABLE SPEED... ANNOUNCE THRUST / PITCH... ADJUST Failure below THR RED ALT: Use TOGA / 15 Failure above THR RED ALT: Below FL 100 : use CL / 10 Above FL 100 : use CL / 5 PNF AP / FD... OFF A/THR... OFF FLAPS... MAINTAIN CURRENT CONFIG SPEEDBRAKES... CHECK RETRACTED Note: If failure is detected while in CONF FULL and go-around is initiated, select CONF 3. L/G... UP WHEN AIRBORNE FLAPS... CHECK SPEEDBRAKES... CHECK

99 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 11 OM-B REV 01 READ-AND-DO ACTIONS Actions, which must only be performed after being read. All actions of ECAM Procedures and the majority of actions of Non ECAM Procedures are "Read-and-do Actions". Actions, which must be synchronised with flight progress, e.g. change of airplane configuration, must only be initiated after crew co-ordination. MONITORED ACTIONS Actions, which are non-reversible or may Iead to imminent danger when performed incorrectly shall be monitored by the PF, and only be performed when monitoring is confirmed. They shall be memorised by heart by all CMs. "Monitored Actions" contained in the abnormal procedures are activation of: a) Thrust Levers (for the purpose of engine shutdown) b) ENG MASTER Switches c) ENG FIRE PB-Switches d) IDG Disconnect PBs e) IR Mode Selector f) FWD+AFT Cargo Compartment DISCH PBs Example for performing "Monitored Actions": PNF places hand on the related component, and announces action to be performed. e.g.: THRUST LEVER 1... IDLE PF verifies the correct component, and replies, e.g.: NUMBER 1... CONFIRMED PNF performs the action. For Non ECAM Procedures, PNF reports to indicate that action has been performed, e.g. "IDLE". REVIEW ACTIONS Essential actions for such phases of flight, where the read-and-do concept cannot be applied. They must be read in advance, thus enabling FCM's to memorise them when required.

100 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 12 OM-B REV SEQUENCE TO HANDLE A TYPICAL ABNORMAL12 SEQUENCE TO HANDLE A TYPICAL ABNORMAL Only after the crew has confirmed that a system cannot be restored by normal switching, the condition is considered as an "Abnormal", which requires the application of an associated Abnormal Procedure. READING OnIy when the PF is attentive, the PNF reads all applicable text loudly, including "Memory Actions" already performed, if applicable. Understanding should be confirmed by the PF before continuing. Note: Under special circumstances, when loud reading conflicts with other flight deck duties, the commander may decide that the text is read silently. In such case, the PNF shall however inform the PF about essential steps and the progress of the procedure. INTERRUPTION / CONTINUATION OF PROCEDURE If necessary, an Abnormal Procedure may be interrupted by the PF by ordering "HOLD PROCEDURE". Continuation is requested by ordering "CONTINUE PROCEDURE". ABNORMAL PROCEDURE DISPLAYED ON ECAM Flight Phase Inhibit Some ECAM Cautions/ Warnings are inhibited in certain flight phases. For details, refer to FCOM 1 or this chapter for "ECAM Warning Inhibition During Take-off". "LAND ASAP" lf LAND ASAP (red) is indicated on ECAM, the commander should consider landing at the nearest suitable airport. If LAND ASAP (amber) is indicated on ECAM, the commander should consider the selection of a suitable airport for precautionary landing, depending on the seriousness of the situation. Initiation and Reading of ECAM Procedure:

101 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 13 OM-B REV 01 - ECAMPROCEDURE13 ECAM PROCEDURE Before dealing with an (amber) ECAM Caution, the QRH List "Overridden ECAM Procedures" (OEB tab) shall be reviewed. When ready, the PF requests initiation of the procedure by announcing "... (title line) START PROCEDURE". If several Independent Abnormal Procedures have to be performed, the PF should initiate each procedure individually by announcing "... (title line) START PROCEDURE" and repeat all of the prescribed steps above, until all actions have been performed. PNF reads procedure title and required action. PNF acts accordingly, and reports "ACTIONS COMPLETED" when all actions have been performed. Except for "Monitored Actions", monitoring of actions performed by the PNF is not necessary. If no action is required, the PNF reports "NO ACTIONS REQUIRED" PF checks on ECAM display that associated action lines (blue) have disappeared, then commands "CLEAR". Some action lines, e.g. GPWS...OFF, do not disappear. PNF presses CLR. This has to be repeated until the system page, corresponding to the first secondary failure (if applicable) is displayed. PNF reads the "LAND ASAP RED (AMBER)" message, if applicable. When feasible, both pilots should review all affected equipment shown in amber on system page(s), then the PF commands "CLEAR". On PF command, the PNF presses CLR as often as necessary until STATUS is displayed, then announces: "STATUS". PF announces "HOLD PROCEDURE". For (red) Warnings, the QRH list "Overridden ECAM Procedures" (OEB tab) shall be reviewed prior continuing with the ECAM Status. Reset If the abnormal procedure does not contain a reset of digital computer, a reset of the affected system may be decided on discretion of the crew. Such a reset shall be accomplished according Supplementary Procedure "RESETTING OF DIGITAL COMPUTERS" (QRH). Then, continue with the ECAM procedure as applicable. PF initiates reading by announcing "CONTINUE PROCEDURE - READ STATUS". PNF reads STATUS including INOP SYS and announces: "STATUS COMPLETED". PF commands "CLEAR". PNF presses CLR, and reports "PROCEDURE COMPLETED". Note: Some ECAM procedures additionally require application of a NON ECAM procedure.

102 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 14 OM-B REV 01 ABNORMAL PROCEDURE NOT DISPLAYED ON ECAM Identification of Applicable Procedure After co-ordinated analysis, the commander shall identify and call out the applicable procedure (e.g. SMOKE REMOVAL). Integration of Normal Checklist Normal checklist items are only integrated within abnormal procedures, when a substantial deviation from normal procedures is required. Initiation and Reading of QRH/Non ECAM Procedure: - QRH/ NONECAM PROCEDURE14 QRH / NON ECAM PROCEDURE When ready, the PF requests initiation of the procedure by announcing: "... (title line) START PROCEDURE". "Memory Actions", if included, are then performed by the assigned CM (generally PNF, unless indicated otherwise). Other actions are performed as "Read and Do" actions: PNF reads procedure title and memory actions if included, which have to be verbally confirmed by the assigned CM. PNF continues reading required actions. Designated CM acts accordingly (generally PNF, unless indicated otherwise) and then reports to indicate that prescribed action has been performed. The other CM shall crosscheck when feasible. When options for several choices are indicated by black squares ( ), PNF shall read the available choices sequentially until a definite decision can be made. When black dots ( ) are presented all must be read, because more than one option may apply. At the end of the procedure, the PNF shall announce: "... (title line) PROCEDURE COMPLETED". Reset If the abnormal procedure does not contain a reset of digital computer, a reset of the affected system may be decided on discretion of the crew. Such a reset shall only be made after the Non ECAM Procedure has been read, and shall be accomplished according Supplementary Procedure "RESETTING OF DIGITAL COMPUTERS" (QRH).

103 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 15 OM-B REV 01 PREMATURE TERMINATION / DISREGARDING ABNORMAL PROCEDURES If, in a specific situation, individual termination results in a higher degree of safety, the commander may decide to do so. However, restrictive application of individual termination is recommended, since all operational and safety relevant factors, restrictions and possible influence on other systems have to be considered. Under certain circumstances, the commander may decide to disregard a specific Abnormal Procedure, e.g. in case of nuisance ECAM Cautions/Warnings or if considered impracticable for actual phase of flight. Examples are: Nuisance ECAM cautions triggered during emergency descent or "L/G Doors not closed" message during final approach with HYD G LO PR. Note: Use of the EMER CANC PB should be restricted to such cases. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The expanded version of an abnormal procedure should be reviewed by the crew, if the malfunction is not clearly understood, or if additional background information is required and time is available. OPERATIONAL DECISION Unless the situation dictates, an operational decision should only be made after STATUS has been read, or after the Non ECAM Procedure has been completed. In order to optimise the operational decision, the MEL may be consulted. APPROACH PREPARATION For approach preparation, STATUS shall be reviewed and all remaining actions shall be performed as appropriate. If applicable, it is recommended to use flight pattern ( OM-B ) for the approach preparation. If system malfunctions result in specific approach, landing or go around characteristics, this must be reviewed during the approach/landing briefing.

104 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 16 OM-B REV 01 - ECAM WARNING INHIBITION DURING TAKE-OFF16 ECAM WARNING INHIBITION DURING TAKE-OFF Most ECAM cautions and warnings will be available during low energy regime until reaching 80 kt. Thereafter, the majority of messages is inhibited until reaching 1500 ft. This means only local warning may appear, but not the corresponding ECAM caution or warning. Refer to FCOM 1 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION for the complete list, per system, of flight phase inhibition.

105 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 17 OM-B REV 01 - HANDLING OF ECAM WARNINGS17 HANDLING OF ECAM WARNINGS OVERRIDEN ECAM WARNINGS If amber caution: Check before ECAM procedure. If red warning: Check before Resetting Digital Computers

106 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 18 OM-B REV ABNORMALWORKMETHODAFTER PROCEDURE COMPLETED 18 ABNORMAL WORKMETHOD AFTER PROCEDURE COMPLETED CONSULT EXPANDED ABNORMAL and SUMMARY Time permitting. Pay special attention to Inop systems not displayed on ECAM. Consult SUMMARY if applicable and deemed necessary. CONSULT MEL Time permitting. Verify consequences for the next flight. FORDEC FACTS : Wx, NOTAMs, fuel. What did change due to the abnormal : STS, redundancy, time, operational,.... OPTIONS : Continue. Divert. Return. RISKS and BENEFITS : Evaluate risks and benefits for all options. DECISION : Final decision by commander. EXECUTION and INFORMATION : Announce to SCCM, ask required clearances to ATC, inform PAX, contact company. CHECK FOR CHANGES : Continuously check for changes that affect the decision. CABIN PREPARATION When required, start Cabin Preparation. FCM check if following items are applicable : FLIGHT PATTERNS? OVERWEIGHT LANDING CHECKLIST? FORCED LANDING CHECKLIST? GRAVITY GEAR EXTENSION CHECKLIST? DITCHING CHECKLIST? EVACUATION? DESC / APPROACH FMGS LOADING DESC/APPROACH BRIEFINGS RECEIVE CABIN CLEAR REPORT START APPROACH

107 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 19 OM-B REV EXPLANATION OF LAYOUT19 EXPLANATION OF LAYOUT PRESENTATION In the expanded Abnormal Procedures, the contents of the basic procedure is shown, whenever deemed necessary with the addition of explanatory information (giving the reason or the result of the single steps). The sequence of these procedures is identical to the one used in the QRH. The presentation of procedures is, as far as practicable, identical to the presentation on ECAM. The abbreviations are identical to those used on the cockpit panels. All actions and information displayed on ECAM are printed in large letters. Other information, not on ECAM, is printed in small letters. Expanded information, when inserted in the procedure, appears in italics. This information: identifies the particular failure explains actions for which the reason is not self-evident furnishes additional background. When several procedures appear under the same title, a black square marks the starting point of each procedure. Only one procedure is applicable at a time. For example : Black squares also indicate parts of a procedure among which only one is applicable. For example :

108 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 20 OM-B REV The ECAM does not display black squares. If an action depends on a precondition, a black dot identifies the precondition. If the precondition appears on ECAM, it appears in large letters. If not, it appears in small letters. For example : Titles of the procedures appear in the following ways : ECAM COLOUR CODE RED : for configuration or failure needing corrective action as soon as situation permits AMBER : for configuration or failure needing awareness and possible subsequent action GREEN : for normal long term operation WHITE : for titles and remarks used to guide during procedures BLUE : for actions to be carried out or limitations VIOLET : for particular messages (e.g. for inhibition messages)

109 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 21 OM-B REV 01 STATUS PRESENTATION The operational summary of the airplane after a failure is displayed on the STATUS page. It includes: a) Limitations (speed, flight level) Blue b) Approach procedures White/Red or Amber c) Procedures (corrections to apply for landing) Blue d) Information Green e) Inoperative system Amber f) INOP SYS White

110 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY INTRODUCTION P 22 OM-B REV USE OF SUMMARIES22 USE OF SUMMARIES GENERAL The summaries consist of QRH procedures. They have been created to help the crew handle the actions to be carried out, in the event of an electrical emergency configuration or dual hydraulic failure. In any case, the ECAM should be applied first. This includes both the procedure and the STATUS review. Only after announcing PROCEDURE COMPLETED, should the PNF refer to the corresponding QRH summary. However, the use of the SUMMARIES is optional. Note: The only exception is that the summaries may be used during the LDG DIST PROC... APPLY procedural step of the STATUS analysis : to determine the landing distance coefficient, to compute VAPP and LDG DIST. Since normal landing distances are given on this page, the PNF will be able to compute the landing distance taking failure(s) into account, in order for the pilot to decide whether to divert or not. APPROACH PREPARATION As always, approach preparation includes a review of the ECAM STATUS. After reviewing the STATUS, the PNF should refer to the CRUISE portion of the summary to determine the VREF correction, and compute the VAPP. The pilot is presumed to know the computation method, and use the VREF given on the MCDU (the destination having been previously updated). A VREF table is provided in the summary, for failure cases leading to the loss of the MCDU. The LANDING and GO-AROUND portions of the summary should be used for the approach briefing. APPROACH The APPR PROC actions should be performed by reading the APPROACH portion of the summary. This portion has primarily been added due to the flap extension procedure, which is not fully addressed on the ECAM. After referring to the APPROACH portion of the summary, the PNF should then review the ECAM STATUS, and check that all APPR PROC actions have been completed.

111 OPERATING TECHNIQUES ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 1 OM-B REV 05 - SCOPE1 SCOPE The FCOM section is completely replaced by the procedures provided here ( OM-B ). - REJECTEDTAKEOFF 1 REJECTED TAKEOFF GENERAL The decision to reject the takeoff and the stop action is made by the CM1. Therefore, the CM1 should keep his hand on the thrust levers until V1 is reached whether he is PF or PNF. As soon as he decides to abort, he calls STOP, takes over, and performs the stop actions. It is impossible to list all the factors that could lead to the decision to abort the takeoff, but in order to help in the decision process, the ECAM inhibits the warnings that are not paramount from 80 knots to 1500 feet (or 2 minutes after lift-off, whichever occurs first). Rejected takeoffs have sometimes been hazardous, even though the performance was correctly calculated, based on flight tests. This may be due to the following : delay in initiating the stopping procedure, tires damaged, brakes worn or not working correctly, initial temperature higher than normal, brakes not fully applied, runway friction coefficient lower than expected, error in gross weight determination, runway line-up not considered. The aircraft is certificated according to FAR amendment 25-42, which allows 2 seconds between decision and action, thus improving the safety margin. Above 100 knots, rejecting the takeoff becomes a serious action that may lead to a hazardous situation. Therefore, as speed approaches V1, the pilot should be go-minded if none of the main failures cited below ( Above 100 knots and below V1 ) have occurred.

112 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES REJECTED TAKEOFF (CONT D) P 2 OM-B REV 03 DECISION MANAGEMENT Below 100 knots : The decision to reject the takeoff may be taken at the CM1 s discretion, depending on the circumstances. Although we cannot list all the causes, the CM1 should seriously consider discontinuing the takeoff, if any ECAM warning is activated. The speed of 100 knots is not critical : It was chosen in order to help the CM1 make his decision, and to avoid unnecessary stops from high speed. The low energy regime ends at 100 knots. This value results from the worst case study, calculating brakes-on-speed that prevents damage to the brakes/tires system with possibly severe operational consequences. Examples : System failures. Tire failure. Unusual noise or vibration. If during T/O run a warning/caution occurs and CM1 decides to continue the take-off he shall announce CONTINUE. Above 100 knots and below V1 : Rejecting the takeoff at these speeds is a more serious matter, particularly on slippery runways. It could lead to a hazardous situation, if the speed is approaching V1. Very few situations should lead to the decision to reject the takeoff. The main ones are: 1. Fire warning or severe damage. 2. Sudden loss of engine thrust. 3. Malfunctions or conditions that give unambiguous indications that the aircraft will not fly safely. 4. ECAM warnings such as :. ENG or APU FIRE. ENG FAIL. CONFIG. (MAIN WARNINGS ONLY). ENG OIL LO PR. ENG REV UNLOCKED. L + R ELEV FAULT Nose gear vibration should not lead to an RTO above 100 knots. In case of tire failure between V1 minus 20 knots and V1 : Unless debris from the tires has caused serious engine anomalies, it is far better to get airborne, reduce the fuel load, and land with a full runway length available. The V1 call has precedence over any other call. Above V1 Takeoff must be continued, because it may not be possible to stop the aircraft on the remaining runway.

113 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES REJECTED TAKEOFF (CONT D) P 3 OM-B REV 05 PROCEDURE DURING A REJECTED TAKEOFF CM1 CM2 C... "STOP" Simultaneously : THRUST LEVERS... IDLE REVERSE THRUST... MAX AVAILABLE BRAKE RESPONSE... MONITOR REVERSE... CONFIRM ANY AUDIO... CANCEL Aircraft stopped : Consider positioning the aircraft to keep any possible fire away from the fuselage. REVERSERS... STOWED PARKING BRAKE... APPLY Set parking brake ON after aircraft stops. PA call... ATTENTION CREW ON STATION (2X) C... START PROCEDURE ATC... INFORM EMER EVAC checklist... LOCATE ECAM ACTIONS... INITIATE The aircraft should remain stationary while the crew evaluates the situation. Evacuation phase : If required, refer to the EMERGENCY EVACUATION Checklist Inform ATC of intention and required assistance. for evacuation. REVERSERS : Full reverse may be used until coming to a complete stop. But, if there is enough runway available at the end of the deceleration, it is preferable to reduce reverse thrust when passing 70 knots. For V2500 engines, the use of full reverse until complete stop must be reported in the logbook for maintenance action.

114 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES REJECTED TAKEOFF (CONT D) P 4 OM-B REV 00 Note : 1. If the brake response does not seem appropriate for the runway condition, FULL manual braking should be applied and maintained. If IN DOUBT, TAKE OVER MANUY. Do not attempt to clear the runway, until it is absolutely clear that an evacuation is not necessary and that it is safe to do so. 2. If the autobrake is unserviceable, the CM1 simultaneously reduces thrust and applies maximum pressure on both pedals. The aircraft will stop in the minimum distance, only if the brake pedals are maintained fully pressed until the aircraft comes to a stop. 3. If normal braking is inoperative, immediately switch the A/SKID & NOSE WHEEL switch OFF and modulate brake pressure, as required, at or below 1000 PSI. If the brake pedals were fully pressed when switching the A/SKID & NOSE WHEEL switch OFF, full pressure would be applied to the brakes. 4. After a rejected takeoff, if the aircraft comes to a complete stop using autobrake MAX, release brakes prior to taxi by disarming spoilers.

115 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 5 OM-B REV ENG FAILURE AFTER V1 CONTINUEDTAKEOFF5 ENG FAILURE AFTER V1 CONTINUED TAKEOFF If an engine fails after the aircraft passes V1, the takeoff must be continued. Use rudder conventionally to stay on the runway centerline. At VR, rotate the aircraft smoothly using a continuous pitch rate to a pitch attitude of 12.5 degrees. After lift-off, follow the Speed Reference System (SRS). When airborne with a positive rate of climb, select the landing gear up. Use rudder to prevent yaw. Shortly after lift-off, β target will appear. Adjust rudder position to zero the β target. Control heading conventionally with bank, keeping the β target at zero with rudder. Consider the use of TOGA thrust. Consider the use of autopilot. At 400 feet minimum, apply the ECAM procedure At acceleration height, level off and allow the speed to increase. At F speed select CONF 1. At S speed select CONF 0. When the flap handle is at zero, β target reverts to side-slip indication. Center the sideslip indication conventionally. At green dot speed (engine-out operating speed in clean configuration) resume the climb using maximum continuous thrust and maintain green dot speed. (If already in the FLX/MCT gate, move to CL and back to MCT). MAXIMUM TAKEOFF THRUST IS ONLY OWED FOR 10 MINUTES. ENGINE FAILURE DURING INITIAL CLIMB-OUT Proceed as above. However, if the failure occurs above V2 maintain the SRS commanded attitude (or the speed reached after recovery). In any case, the minimum speed must be equal to V2. ENGINE OPERATION AT MAX T.O. THRUST IS LIMITED TO 10 MINUTES

116 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 6 OM-B REV 05 ENG FAILURE AFTER V1 CONTINUED TAKEOFF (CONT D)

117 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 7 OM-B REV 05 - IMMEDIATE VMC LDGFOLLOWING ENGFAILURE ON TO7 IMMEDIATE VMC LDG FOLLOWING ENG FAILURE ON TO

118 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 8 OM-B REV 01 - STRAIGHT-INAPPROACHWITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE8 STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE For performance reasons, do not extend flaps full until established on a final descent to landing. If a level off is expected during the final approach, perform the approach and landing in CONF 3. Note: Landing CONF 3, performance permitting, is recommended. - CIRCLING APPROACHWITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE8 CIRCLING APPROACH WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE LANDING WEIGHT... CHECK If the aircraft weight is above the maximum weight for circling in CONF 3 (given in the table below) : The aircraft cannot maintain level flight with CONF 3 and the landing gear down. FOR LDG... USE FLAP 3 Conf 3 is preferred, to minimize a configuration change in short final. GPWS LDG FLAP 3... ON Delay gear extension. Note : If the approach is flown at less than 750 feet RA, the L/G NOT DOWN warning will be triggered. The pilot can cancel the aural warning by pressing the EMER CANC pushbutton, located on the ECAM control panel. A TOO LOW GEAR warning is to be expected, if the landing gear is not downlocked at 500 feet RA. MAXIMUM WEIGHT FOR CIRCLING IN CONF 3 (1000 KG) OAT AIRPORT ELEVATION (feet) ( C)

119 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 9 OM-B REV 05 - GO AROUNDONE ENGINE OUT9 GO AROUND ONE ENGINE OUT

120 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 10 OM-B REV 01 - LANDING WITHSLATS ORFLAPS JAMMED10 LANDING WITH SLATS OR FLAPS JAMMED LANDING CONF... CONF 3 Repeat the following until landing configuration is reached : SPEED SEL... VFE NEXT 5 KT Decelerate towards VFE NEXT 5 KT but not below VLS. In case of turbulence, to avoid VFE exceedance, the pilot may decide to decelerate to a lower speed, but not below VLS. Note : The autopilot may be used down to 500 feet AGL. As it is not tuned for abnormal configurations, its behavior can be less than optimum and must be monitored. Approach with selected speed is recommended. A/THR is recommended, except in the case of a G+B SYS LO PR warning. OVERSPEED warning and VLS, displayed on the PFD, are computed according to the actual flaps/slats position. VFE and VFE NEXT are displayed on the PFD according to the FLAPS' lever position. If not displayed, use the placard speeds. If VLS is greater than VFE NEXT (overweight landing case), the FLAPS lever can be set in the required next position, while the speed is reduced to follow VLS reduction as surfaces extend. The VFE warning threshold should not be triggered. In this case, disconnect the A/THR. A/THR can be re-engaged when the landing configuration is established. As speed reduces through VFE NEXT : FLAPS LEVER... ONE STEP DOWN When landing configuration is established : DECELERATE TO CALCULATED APPROACH SPEED IN FINAL APPROACH FOR GO AROUND The table at the end of this checklist provides the MAX SPEEDS for the abnormal configurations. IF SLATS FAULT : FOR CIRCUIT : MAINTAIN SLATS/FLAPS CONFIGURATION Recommended speed : MAX SPEED 10 KT FOR DIVERSION SELECT CLEAN CONFIGURATION Recommended flaps retraction speed is between MAX SPEED 10 knots and MAX SPEED. Recommended diversion speed : MAX SPEED 10 KT.

121 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES LANDING WITH SLATS OR FLAPS JAMMED (CONT D) P 11 OM-B REV 05 IF FLAPS FAULT : FOR CIRCUIT : MAINTAIN SLATS/FLAPS CONFIGURATION Recommended speed : MAX SPEED 10 KT FOR DIVERSION : If FLAPS jammed at 0 SELECT CLEAN CONFIGURATION Note : Recommended speed for slats retraction is between MAX SPEED 10 KT and MAX SPEED of actual slat/flap position. Normal operating speeds If FLAPS jammed > 0 MAINTAIN SLAT/FLAP CONFIGURATION Recommended speed for diversion : MAX SPEED 10 KT Note : In the majority of cases, VFE on PFD is equal to the MAX SPEED. In this case, VFE can be used as MAX SPEED. In case the SPD LIM flag is displayed on the PFD, use the MAX SPEED displayed on the ECAM status page. In some cases, MAX SPEED 10 knots may be a few knots higher than the VFE. In this situation, pilot may follow the VFE. In case of a go-around with CONF FULL selected, the L/G NOT DOWN warning is triggered at landing gear retraction. MAX SPEED Flaps Slats F= 0 0< F 1 1< F 2 2< F 3 F> 3 S= 0 NO LIMITATION Not allowed ( knots 200 knots 185 knots 0< S knots knots) 1< S 3 200knots 200knots 185 knots 177 knots S> knots 177 knots 177 knots 177 knots CAUTION For flight with SLATS or FLAPS extended, fuel consumption is increased. Refer to the fuel flow indication. As a guideline, determine the fuel consumption in clean configuration at the same altitude without airspeed limitation (e.g. From ALTERNATE FLIGHT PLANNING tables, refer to ) and multiply this result by 1.6 (SLATS EXTENDED), or 1.8 (FLAPS EXTENDED, or 2 (SLATS and FLAPS EXTENDED), to obtain the fuel consumption required to reach the destination in the current configuration.

122 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 12 OM-B REV 02 - APPROACHWITH FLAPS LOCKED OR HYD G+Y LOPR12 APPROACH WITH FLAPS LOCKED OR HYD G+Y LO PR

123 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 13 OM-B REV 02 - APPROACHWITH SLATS LOCKED13 APPROACH WITH SLATS LOCKED

124 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 14 OM-B REV 02 - APPROACHWITH HYD G+B LO PR14 APPROACH WITH HYD G+B LO PR

125 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 15 OM-B REV 02 - NO FLAPS + NO SLATS LANDING15 NO FLAPS + NO SLATS LANDING

126 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY OPERATING TECHNIQUES P 16 OM-B REV 01 - EMERGENCY DESCENT WITHAUTOPILOT16 EMERGENCY DESCENT WITH AUTO PILOT

127 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY DETAILED CABIN/COCKPIT EVAC PROC P 1 OM-B REV DETAILEDCABIN/COCKPIT EVACPROC - SCOPE1 SCOPE The FCOM section is completely replaced by the information provided here ( OM-B ) and by the SEP (land and water evacuation). - ONGROUND EMER/EVACUATION1 ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION All announcements in this procedure shall be given twice. The decision to evacuate shall be made in a restrictive manner. An actual evacuation should only be initiated after available means have been applied to verify the warning and to cope with the triggering abnormal condition. The procedure assumes that a pending abnormal state (e.g. wheel/wheel well fire, collapsed gear, any kind of structural damage, overrun, bomb scare, engine/apu fire, cabin fire or smoke, etc) develops to such a serious level that a passenger evacuation may be required. Considering a variety of situations the procedure lists all actions which may be necessary to prepare and conduct an orderly progress. In a well defined situation some of the actions listed may not be necessary or helpfull. If so decided by CM1 they may be omitted. Note : When airplane occupants are in grave imminent danger, which would for instance be the case when the cabin is on fire or the airplane is partially disintegrated, the EVACUATION checklist should be limited to executing only : PARKING BRAKE... SET ENGINE MASTERS... OFF before ordering PASSENGER EVACUATION. Due to the variety of possible conditions it is not feasible to have one procedure that perfectly satisfies all situations. In such serious cases, when the need for immediate evacuation is obvious, the crew must use best professional knowledge and emergency authority to perform whatever suits the situation best to save lives. PASSENGER EVACUATION must not be announced before the airplane is at rest (parking brake set) and the engines have been shut down. The EVAC COMMAND is not used by Belgium. This procedure may be discontinued at any time when the situation does no longer require an evacuation. In such case CM1 shall announce CANCEL ALERT and the crew shall return to and complete the procedure relevant to the initial abnormal condition. A critical situation can demand cabin to cockpit communication. Cabin attendants are instructed to alert cockpit crew via call system.

128 ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY DETAILED CABIN/COCKPIT EVAC PROC ON GROUND EMER/EVACUATION (CONT D) P 2 OM-B REV 01 AIRCRAFT/PARKING BRK... STOP/ON 1 ATTENTION CREW ON STATION... ANNOUNCED 1 ATC (VHF)... NOTIFY 2 Notify ATC of the nature of the emergency, and request assistance. Only VHF 1 is available on batteries. GROUND CREW... INFORMED 1 ΔP (only if MAN CAB PR has been used)... CHECK ZERO 1 If ΔP is not at zero, select manual mode and V/S CTL-FULL UP in order to fully open the outflow valve. ENG MASTER 1 and 2... OFF 2 Monitored action. Engines must be shutdown before slides are deployed and to avoid endangering assisting ground crew by blast. HP and LP fuel valves are closed. This prevents fuel spillage from ruptured fuel lines. FIRE pushbuttons (ENG and APU)...PUSH 2 ENG FIRE PBs: monitored action. AGENTS (ENG and APU)... DISCH 2 One bottle per engine and the APU bottle shall be discharged as a preventive measure against inflammation of liquids spilling from ruptured lines and casings. EVACUATION REQUIRED : Warning : Experience shows that evacuation is dangerous in itself and may lead to serious injuries. To avoid passenger evacuation due to false fire warnings a fire condition shall be confirmed by all means available (e.g. ATC, ground crew, lookout) whenever feasible. PASSENGER EVACUATION... ANNOUNCE 1 CM1 commands PASSENGER EVACUATION via PA to start slide deployment and passenger evacuation. If in CM1 opinion exit(s) shall not be used due to risk of fire or other hazard he will announce additionally KEEP CLOSED.... EVACUATION NOT REQUIRED : CANCEL ALERT... ANNOUNCE 1 CM1 cancels cabin crew alertness and informs ground crew accordingly.

129 GENERAL STANDARD 103 OPERATINGPROCEDURES INFORMATION STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 1 OM-B REV 03 - SCOPE1 SCOPE The FCOM chapter is completely replaced by the informations provided here ( OM- B ). - GENERAL1 GENERAL PRINCIPLE applies the Airbus SOPs as described in the FCOM Some differences and precisions are introduced by, and are listed in the OMB Basic Procedures describe actions which are necessary for the routine operation. While the sequence of procedures follows the natural phases of flight, the sequence of actions in a procedure follows a standardized scan of panels or equipment, except when required by the logic of actions priority. For all actions, relevant expanded information is given, if necessary. All actions of a procedure are either required to operate the aircraft safely in the related phase of flight, or to prepare the aircraft for the following phase of flight. Each action is assigned to a specific crew member, to ensure coordinated operation. Basic principle during preparation is the "Dark Cockpit" (All White Lights Out) concept. After scan and during normal operation, all the white lights are extinguished. The use of lights to indicate operation is limited to a minimum (i.e. anti-ice) after engine start. In addition, ECAM Memo Page shall be used to visually confirm normal configurations and temporarily used systems. Scanning or monitoring panels out of normal field of view is therefore not required during normal operation. Similar to the technical concept of the aircraft (dark and quiet during normal operation), verbal crew communication will be limited to commands, requests, announcements and callouts. If a wrong or incompatible command is given, or a desired configuration is not achieved, verbal feedback is required. Basic procedures are presented with the assumption that all systems are operating normally. Some basic procedures, which either are not related to a specific phase of flight, or which describe optional operation of complex systems (i.e. flight management and guidance systems as mentioned below), are to be found in the FMGS Pilot's Guide.

130 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 2 OM-B REV PF / PNF2 PF / PNF 1. On GROUND CM1 is PF and CM2 is PNF, The taxi is performed by CM1. 2. In FLIGHT During TO briefing, CM1 confirms who is the PF/PNF, CM1 may change PF/PNF designation whenever necessary. - FLIGHT CONTROLS TAKE-OVER2 FLIGHT CONTROLS TAKE-OVER 1. If the PNF must take over controls, he must call I HAVE CONTROLS (according to the standard calls) and push the side stick priority button and keep it depressed until the transfer of controls is clearly established. 2. If at any time, in MANUAL flight, the aircraft does not respond correctly to the PF inputs, he will call YOU HAVE CONTROLS (according to the standard calls), and the PNF will take the controls. - COMMUNICATIONS2 COMMUNICATIONS 1. When flying manually, the PNF shall pay attention not moving the side stick when using the pushto-talk button, 2. The use of interphone is mandatory when the aircraft is moving (on ground), during climb up to the first cruising level and during descent from Top of Descent point. - FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS CHECK2 FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS CHECK During COCKPIT PREPARATION: check STBY COMPASS (surrounding equipment may interfere with STBY COMPASS indication). During COCKPIT PREPARATION and TAXI, each pilot silently checks his flight instruments for : correct indication, correct FMA indications, absence of flags. - EXTERIORLIGHTS USE2 EXTERIOR LIGHTS USE Select NAV lights ON before performing the EXT. WALKAROUND, then AS RQRD. The landing light should be ON below feet.

131 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 3 OM-B REV SEAT BELTS USE3 SEAT BELTS USE During CLIMB : At feet at the earliest and with BA < 7, PNF sets SEAT BELTS OFF on request of PF. At feet at the earliest and with BA < 7, if SEAT BELTS remains ON, the cabin crew may be released for duties in cabin using the call CABIN CREW RELEASE on PA (call made by PNF on request of PF). During DESCENT : At TOD, PNF sets SEAT BELTS ON on request of PF. The seat belts may remain OFF till feet at the latest. Prior coordination with the purser is necessary in that case. All phases of flight : During turbulent or anticipated turbulent conditions, PNF sets SEAT BELTS ON on request of PF. - PRINCIPLES OF BASIC PROCEDURES APPLICATION3 PRINCIPLES OF BASIC PROCEDURES APPLICATION Basic Procedures are performed by memory. Some procedures are presented in two versions of different volume, the "Complete Procedure" and the "Reduced Procedure". The "Complete Procedure" lists all actions required to: perform system tests and functional checks, ensure correct positions and indications of all controls and instruments for a safe and economic aircraft operation. The "Reduced Procedure" follows the same scan as the "Complete Procedure", omitting, however, system tests and functional checks. Items marked by (*) in the concerned procedures are the only steps to be completed in that case. The "Complete Procedure" must always be performed: after any non-routine maintenance action, or after the aircraft was left unattended by qualified personnel, or after the "SECURING THE AIRCRAFT" procedure was performed by the previous crew, or if there is any doubt about the aircraft status.

132 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 4 OM-B REV CHECKLIST4 NORMAL CHECKLIST General The normal checklist is used to make sure that the aircraft is safely prepared for the next phase of flight. It serves to verify actions already performed, and must not be used as a do-list. Checklists are kept as short as possible, including, however, all safety items and other items seriously affecting economy. Presentation of NORMAL CHECKLISTS ECAM checklist Normal checklist placard (In flight, the normal C/L are replaced by the ECAM scanning. ECAM memo and STATUS shall be checked). Requesting a Checklist Prior to requesting a checklist, PF (on ground always CM1) shall ensure: that all active FCM's are at their station, that all required actions have been performed. Then, he shall request the appropriate checklist by announcing "...CHECKLIST" Reading a Checklist All checklists are read by PNF (on ground always CM2). Reading shall start with the checklist title. Only the left side of the printed line is read. The reader shall verify that the answer complies with the checklist before proceeding. A checklist is terminated by announcing: "...CHECKLIST COMPLETE". The only exception is the LANDING C/L which is performed on the ECAM using the STANDARD C as stated in the -OMB Note: During the BEFORE TAKEOFF C/L, before responding for the FLAPS SETTING, the PF must check : 1. CONF indicated on TO data sheet, 2. CONF indicated on MCDU PERF TO page, 3. CONF indicated on EWD. The correct answers are CONF 1+F, CONF 2 or CONF 3. During the BEFORE TAKEOFF C/L, before responding for the V1, VR, V2 / FLEX TEMP, the pilots must check : 1. V1, VR, V2 and FLEX TEMP indicated on TO data sheet, 2. V1, VR, V2 and FLEX TEMP indicated on MCDU PERF TO page, 3. V1, V2 indicated on the PFD. The correct answers are, f.e. 147, 148, 150, FLEX 57 or 147, 148, 150, TOGA.

133 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 5 OM-B REV Responding to a Checklist For each item, one or both CM's are assigned to answer. Assignment depends on role (PF/PNF) or seat location (CM1/2), and is printed behind each checklist line. If more than one CM is assigned, the sequence to respond is PF - PNF. The assigned CM shall only respond after having checked the existing configuration condition. The other CM shall, whenever feasible, cross-check the validity of the response to provide redundancy. The only checklists which are not of the CHENGE-RESPONSE type are the AFTER LANDING C/L and the SECURING THE AIRCRAFT C/L which are verified by CM2. Deviation from Standard If the actual configuration/condition is inadvertently not in accordance with the checklist standard, corrective action shall be initiated before proceeding. If the actual configuration/condition is purposely not in accordance with the checklist standard (special / abnormal operation, MEL procedure), the response must be modified to reflect the actual situation (specific answer). This deviation from standard must be realized by all CM's. - TAKE OFF BRIEFING5 TAKE OFF BRIEFING During COCKPIT PREPARATION : Perform the TO briefing as described in OMA. During TAXI : If no changes, only confirm first turn and cleared altitude. - DESC / APPR BRIEFING5 DESC / APPR BRIEFING The DESC and APPR briefings are performed in two steps : Before Descent : Perform the DESC briefing as described in OMA. Prior to the commencement of the approach : Perform the APPR briefing as described in OMA. AUTOBRAKE selection for landing is decided during the APPR briefing. For short flights (when the approach is expected to be started shortly after TOD) or when there is no doubt about the runway in use, both DESC and APPR briefings may be performed before Descent. In those latter cases, a short review of : Final Altitude, MINIMUM altitude & MAPt (for non-precision approaches), Missed Approach Procedure. should be performed before commencing the approach.

134 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 6 OM-B REV FLIGHT MANAGEMENT AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM6 FLIGHT MANAGEMENT AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM The FMGC has 3 functions : The two FG (Flight Guidance) functions : Autopilot (AP) and Flight Director (FD) Autothrust (A/THR) The FM (Flight Management) function. During normal operation, the flight is controlled through the FMGS in managed guidance modes, unless operational conditions necessitate use of selected guidance modes or manual flight (with or without FD). Due to the multitude of possible choices, detailed FMGS operation will be described in the FMGS Pilot's Guide. Task sharing for flight plan revisions or selections of FMGS modes or references: PILOT FLYING PILOT NOT FLYING Revisions/selections with immediate influence on flight path and/or speed ( short term revisions ) Perform all selections on FCU. Revisions on MCDU only : DIR TO ACTIVATE APPR PHASE AUTOMATIC FLIGHT Revisions/selections without immediate influence on flight path and/or speed ( long term revisions ) Crosscheck on PFD/FMA/ND/MCDU Request revision/selection on MCDU Perform all revisions on MCDU except : DIR TO ACTIVATE APPR PHASE Crosscheck on PFD/FMA/ND/MCDU MANUAL FLIGHT Request revision/selection Crosscheck on PFD/FMA/ND/MCDU Perform revision/selection on FCU/MCDU Note: ALT selection : Select altitude targets on FCU in 100ft increments only (outer selector knob in 100 position).

135 General rules for monitoring the FMGS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 7 OM-B REV 03 Monitor the AP/FD/ATHR modes and engagement status on the FMA Monitor the result of any target selection performed on the FCU, on the related scales of the PFD (e.g. SPD target on SPD scale...) Monitor the AP/FD/ATHR resulting guidance on the basic flight instrument scales of the PFD (HDG, SPD, ALT, attitude...) - FMGS - PRINCIPLES OF TASK SHARING7 FMGS - PRINCIPLES OF TASK SHARING Manual Flight The PF controls the aircraft through inputs on sidestick and rudder pedals, and by moving the thrust levers. All inputs and selections on FCU/MCDU affecting "flight guidance" are performed by the PNF, according to ATC instructions and/or on request of the PF. Autoflight The primary task of the PF is to control the aircraft, while the PNF assists by doing all insertions and revisions on the MCDU, on request of the PF. If the PF is not satisfied with the guidance, he must: REVERT TO BASIC MANUAL FLYING FLY THE AIRCRAFT where he wants to go. It is vitally important to understand that the aircraft is controlled by the PF solely through inputs on the FCU. The MCDU is no control interface (with the exception of DIR TO and ACTIVATE APPROACH PHASE), but a keyboard for inserting data for the FMGS, thus pre-programming certain autoflight functions. Monitoring and Check Normally, all actions performed on FCU/MCDU have to be cross-checked by both pilots on FMA, PFD and ND. Only those inputs which are not indicated on these CRT's are crosschecked on the MCDU screen itself. Entries on the MCDU done by the PNF are checked by the PF when the PNF has completed this task, and not while he is performing the entry. MCDU Page Call up The call-up of MCDU pages for getting information on flight data or the progress of flight is out of the scope of this task-sharing philosophy. For this purpose any pilot may call up any appropriate page, depending on prevailling workload. Communication Silent cockpit remains the basic principle. However, whenever a crew member makes any altitude adjustment on the FCU, he must advise the other crew member (f.ex. "3000 BLUE", "240 BLUE") and obtain an acknowledgement ("CHECKED").

136 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 8 OM-B REV 03 - FLOWPATTERNS8 FLOW PATTERNS AFTER START

137 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 9 OM-B REV 03 TAXI

138 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 10 OM-B REV 03 CLIMB FEET

139 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 11 OM-B REV 03 DESCENT FEET

140 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 12 OM-B REV 03 AFTER LANDING

141 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 13 OM-B REV 03 - FUEL CHECK13 FUEL CHECK During COCKPIT PREPARATION, perform a FUEL QTY check as follows : Check that ECAM fuel on board corresponds to the F-PLN. Check that fuel imbalance is within limits. Sign the fuel supply sheet after checking correctness of the fuelling : 1. Compare FOB after refuelling with fuel requested. 2. Compare fuel delivered according to the aircraft gauges with fuel delivered according to the fuel truck gauges. To do this, make a computation on the OFP (see example below):. a) Take the density of the uplifted fuel (or 0.8 if no data) and convert the litres uplifted (marked on fuel supply sheet ) into the equivalent in kilograms using this value. b) Compare this with the kilograms uplifted according to the gauges (FOB - fuel remaining before fuelling). 3. A difference of +/- 5% of the uplift or +/- 400 kg, whichever is higher, is tolerated (due to tolerance on density and gauges). The tolerances given above are conservative values. Maintenance should be contacted in the exceptional case these values are exceeded. The tolerance values described in the maintenance documents are more precise and take preceedence on the above mentioned conservative values. Technical intervention is due if the maintenance values are exceeded. Conservative values were established for daily operations because obtaining the precise tolerances requires lengthy computations, which are impracticable in daily operation. Example: FOB before refuelling: kg FOB after refuelling: kg Difference: kg Litres uplifted: l => x 600 = 4800 kg Difference: kg (5% of 4800 = 240 kg):...use 400 kg instead of 5% because 400 > kg > 200 kg:...check is SATISFACTORY

142 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 14 OM-B REV 03 - PACKS OFF TAKEOFF 14 PACKS OFF TAKEOFF All takeoff are performed with packs OFF. This will improve performance when using TOGA thrust. In case of a FLEX takeoff, selecting packs OFF will reduce takeoff EGT and thus reduce maintenance costs. The effect is particularly significant with the first degrees of FLEX. - FUEL SAVINGPOLICY14 FUEL SAVING POLICY Before Departure APU start should be delayed until aircraft ready for start, when EXT PWR is available, for noise, fuel saving and environmental considerations. After Arrival APU should be switched OFF as soon as possible when EXT PWR is available, for noise, fuel saving and environmental considerations.

143 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 15 OM-B REV PERFORMANCE FACTOR15 PERFORMANCE FACTOR To trigger a change in fuel factor(s) and provide the relevant figures to OCC (flight planning) and crew (flight preparation and FMGS update), the following procedure will be used: OCC, in charge of the flight planning system update, will receive monthly the latest PERF FACTOR for each aircraft. They will update the OFP computation. They will also introduce a company NOTAM with the per-aircraft values. Crew is in charge of updating/checking the FMS PERF FACTOR on board of the aircraft (see below) and will cross-check the PERF FACTOR used for the OFP computation using the NOTAM values. Due to synchronisation schedule of this chain of information, it is possible, the first day of PERF FACTOR change, that the OFP received by the crew is still computed with the preceeding month values. To avoid unecessary recomputation of the OFP and due to the fact that the monthly variation is low, it is requested to correct the fuel values manually on the OFP to adapt to the most current PERF FACTOR. The PERF FACTOR can only be modified on ground. Note: The PERF FACTOR is displayed in CYAN when on ground (modifiable) and in GREEN when airborne or when no change code was entered (not modifiable). It is displayed in large blue font, following a modification. Aircraft fitted with FMS1 (legacy) 1. Select the MCDU A/C STATUS page 2. Type the new value 3. Press LSK 6R. The new value is displayed in large fonts (CYAN on the ground, GREEN in-flight) Aircraft fitted with FMS2 (pegasus) If no PERF FACTOR was entered, the Airline Modifiable Information (AMI) values are taken into account and are displayed in small font (0.0/0.0 for ). Changing the PERF FACTOR value thanks to the below procedure will over-ride the PERF FACTOR value that is defined in the AMI. Following steps describe how to change the PERF FACTOR value: 1. Enter ARM in the CHG CODE line [5L] brackets (or appropriate password), 2. Write the new IDLE/PERF factor in the scratchpad, 3. Enter this new factor in line [6L ]. The entered factor is displayed in large CYAN font.

144 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 16 OM-B REV RVSM16 RVSM During CLIMB, above FL250, prior entering RVSM airspace (FL290-FL410) : ALTIMETER CHECK...PERFORM The two primary altitude indications (PFDs) shall be in accordance with the instrument tolerance ( ). If only two ADRs are operative, the altimeter indication on the PFD and standby altimeter shall be recorded. PF request ALTIMETERS. PNF announces STANDARD PASSING FLIGHT LEVEL NOW (as read from his PFD). PF announces CHECKED. If Standby Altimeter check is necessary : PNF announces STANDARD PASSING FLIGHT LEVEL NOW (as read from the standby altimeter). - EXPEDITE CLB / DES16 EXPEDITE CLB / DES Use of EXPEDITE ( ) CLB/DES is not recommended. - P-RNAV16 P-RNAV Whenever a P-RNAV procedure (departure or arrival) will be used, both pilots must compare with the charts (PF reads from MCDU and PNF verifies on chart): 1. correct waypoint sequencing, 2. correct tracks, 3. correct distances, 4. correct altitudes. P-RNAV STAR s, TRANSITION s or SID s must be extracted from the FMS Navigation Database to be inserted in the FMGS F-PLN. The construction or modification of a RNAV terminal procedure, by inserting pilot s defined waypoints or altitude constraints, is NOT authorized. - RAWDATA APPROACHES16 RAW DATA APPROACHES Raw data approaches (without AP and/or FD) are authorized. The use of MAN THR is authorized.

145 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 17 OM-B REV 04 - NONPRECISIONAPPROACHSPEED TECHNIQUE17 NON PRECISION APPROACH SPEED TECHNIQUE The Decelerate Approach Technique is the preferred approach technique.

146 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES GENERAL INFORMATION P 18 OM-B REV 04 - NORMAL CHECKLIST PLACARD18 NORMAL CHECKLIST PLACARD