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1 TO Task Force TEMJAM INDUSTRIES INC SALAMEA AVE. WOODLAND HILLS. CA BBB-1423 FOLD... Following is a proposed Appendix C to the ICS OSD dealing with the management of very large incidents. As mentioned its basically patterned after what is in the NIIMS OSD. I deleted the part that deals with separating into two incidents. Please review and provide suggestions for additions or changes. FORM NO. PK 111-U-2 AVAILABLE FROM BUSINESS ENVELOPE MANUFACTURERS. INC. PEARL RIVER. N.Y DEER PARK. N.Y. ANAHEIM, CALIF. PRINTED IN U.S.A. SIGNED LOT t\ \ "' ( ' " '... "I B

2 ?/"Lo.,- LARGE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE ICS The ICS, using a maximum 5 branch 25 division S&R structure can 1 supply in excess of 6000 personnel to an incident. Very few incidents take place which would require personnel and resources beyond the stated levels. However, it is possible that certain incidents because of geographical size, or the numbers of resources required may require an expansion of the organization beyond that as previously described. This chapter is a brief explanation of a modified expanded res structure which may be employed in these cases. It is emphasized that not all situations ere alike, and that other forms of organization than those described here may be equally as suitable. A large wildland fire incident is depicted in Figure 1. This incident has grown from 8 single command (County A) to 8 Joint Command organization (Counties A, B & C). The standard ICS functional Sections of Planning, S&R, Logistics and Finance have applied to this point. 1 This assumes personnel for two operational periods: a span of control of 5-l; a single division resource mix of 3 engine strike teams; 2 crew strike teams and 1 dozer strike team. Obviously a change in resource mix one way or another could change the totals. 1

3 A PLANNING S&R LOGISTICS FINANCE Figure 1 Large Wildland Incident Covering Several Political Subdivisions The following situations could require a change in the structure of the ICS for an incident of this size: 1. The S&R Section is not large enough to accommodate the resources needed to meet incident action plan requirements. In the ICS, the overall size of the S&R Section is primarily governed by the numbers of resources within each Division. For example, using a Division consisting of: 3 Crew Strike Teams; 1 Dozer Strike Team; end 1 Engine Strike Team, a "typical" Division could consist of a minimum of 131 personnel. Expanding this to a 25-Division, 5-Branch incident, the personnel complement would be in excess of 3200 personnel for each operational period (shift). In order to provide additional needed S&R personnel, ~nd still stay within recommended 5-l span of control guidelines, another 2

4 S&R Section could be added to the existing incident organization. To accomplish this, the Command structure of the incident would be modified to include a Deputy Incident Commander for S&R. The Deputy IC for S&R would be responsible to ensure that ell activities of the two S&R Sections were fully coordinated (between each other as well as with other Sections). The Deputy IC for S&R would normally be co-located with the Incident Command and may have additional support steff if necessary. See Figure 2. A J B I c I DEPUTY IC S&R JOINT COMMAND I ' l I W..t!;b'l' EAST PLANNING LOGISTICS FINANCE S&R S&R ~- Figure 2 Two S&R Sections 2. Logistical Support can no longer be maintained adequately. If the incident were geographically so large that it would not be possible for the Incident Base to support the required 3

5 number of camps end the other Logistics needs, it may be necessary to establish another Logistics Section to support a defined part of the incident. In this situation, another Logistics Section including another Base and necessary camps serviced by that Base could be established. A Deputy IC for Logistics would be added to the Command structure to ensure full coordination of the two Logistics efforts. See Figure 3. " A JOINT OMMAND DEPUTY IC LOGISTICS S&R FINANCE WEST LOGISTICS EAST LOGISTICS Figure 3 Two Logistics Sections 3. Incident becomes too large for a single Action Plan. If the incident becomes so large that there is no logical set of objectives that pertain to the entire incident; or if the preparation and/or distribution of the plan could not be 4

6 feasibly accomplished within the required time frame: then a modified planning structure could be adopted. In this case, the addition of another Planning Section to the ICS structure is not recommended.. One solution would be to have some or ~ll of the detailed operational period action planning done at the '1 This could be accomplished by the Planning Section providing each Branch with general objectives to be met in planning, which must include inter branch coordination where required, end with a firm indication of resources which could be made available to support Branch operations. Individual Branches could then perform detailed action planning. A modification to this could be accomplished by designating only certain Branches (e.g., those in a mop-up mode) as Branches which would perform action planning at Branch level. Other Branches would continue under a centralized planning structure. In either case, the Planning Section should provide each Branch which is doing individual Branch planning with the required capability in terms of personnel end other support to get the planning accomplished. 5

7 ,.,...,;jf.,!.t, ~ :'"\.~r"""'... _-.,.,r...-:!1 -\c.. ".. ~.... _...,, ~ Figure IV-FCC-1.--Fire suppression interpretations of flame length and fireline intensity. 1 Flame length (feet} < 4 Fireline intensity (Btu/ft/sec} < }.00 Interpretation Fires can gen ~rally be attacked ac the head or flanks by persons using 'hand tools. - Handline should hold the fjre Fires are too intense for direct attack on the head by persons using hand tool! - Handline cannot be relied on to hold fire. Equipment such as dozers, pumpers, and retardant air craft can be effective Fires may present seriou~ control problems--torching out, crowning, and spottin~ Control efforts at the fin head will probably be ineffective. > 11 > Crowning, spotting, and major fire runs are probabl Control efforts at head of fire are ineffective. -15'3-

8 ('.j.. c. CALIFORNIA FUEL MOISTURE CONDITIONS 7/25/81 WEATHER SUMMARY NORMAL WEATHER PATTERNS WHERE SUB-TROPICAL MOISTURE SURGES NORTHWARD AND RESULTS IN THUNDERSTORMS HAVE BEEN BLOCKED FIRST BY A PERSISTANT LOW PRESSURE AREA OVER THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST AND NOW BY THE PACIFIC HIGH. SOME MOISTURE DID REACH SO. CALIF. ON ABOUT THE 15TH BUT MOST WENT EAST INTO NEVADA. ALL IN ALL IT HAS BEEN DRYER AND WINDIER THAN NORMAL. E:Y OR THE NEXT 5-7 DAYS HIGH PRESSURE OFF THE COAST WILL RESULT IN INCREASING SW WINDS IN NO. CALIF. WITH LITTLE CHANGE IN THE SOUTH. BY THE WEEKEND, NO. CALIF. CAN EXPECT DRY NORTHEASTERLY WINDFLOWS. LITTLE CHANGE EXPECTED FOR SO. CALIF. FUEL MOISTURES LIVING FUEL MOISTURE VALUES IN CHAPARRAL FUELS ARE AT OR RAPIDLY APPROACHING CRITICAL LEVELS IN MANY AREAS OF THE STATE.( CRITICAL LEVELS ARE 60% FOR CHA~ISE AND 80% FOR MANZANITA ) AS OF THE LAST REPORTING DATE NINE OF THE 15 SAMPLE STATIONS WERE SLIGHTLY ABOVE CRITICAL LEVELS, TWO WERE BELOW AND THE REST WERE BELOW NORMAL FOR THE 'DATE.ALL IN ALL WE ARE ABOUT 6 WEEKS AHEAD OF NORMAL DRYING. THESE FUEL MOISTURE VALUES ARE IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY HAVE SUCH A DRAMATIC EFFECT ON FIRE BEHAVIOR. A FIRE BURNING IN CHAPARRAL FUELS WHERE ABOUT 20% OF THE FUELBED IS DEAD FUEL AND WHERE LIVING FUEL MOISTURES ARE BELOW CRITICAL LEVELS WILL EXHIBIT ABOUT THE SAME FIRE BEHAVIOR AS A FIRE BURNING IN COMPLETELY DEAD BRUSH. THE DRYING OF LARGE DEAD FUELS ( 1000 HOUR TIMELAG ) CONTINUES AND MOST VALUES ARE ABOUT 2% BELOW NORMAL FOR THE DATE. THE THOUSAND HOUR FUEL MOISTURE VALUE HAS PROVEN TO BE A GOOD INDICATOR of FIRE POTENTIAL. WE SELDOM HAVE LARGE FIRE~ WHEN THE 1000 HR FUEL MOISTURE EXCEEDS 15%. THE INCIDENCE OF LARGE FIRES PICKS E:

9 y UP DRAMATICALLY AT ABOUT 12% AND MAJOR CONFLAGRATIONS HISTORICALLY COINCIDS WITH VALUES BELOW 10%. AS OF JULY 22, 1000 HR. VALUES RANGED FROM 7% TO 10% THROUGHOUT THE STATE. THE NORTH COASTAL MOUNTAINS, SO. CALIF. COASTAL AND INTERMEDIATE VALLEYSAND AREAS ABOVE ABOUT 5000 FT. ARE SOMEWHAT HIGHER WHILE THE EASTERN SIERRA IS SOMEWHAT LOWER. STATEWIDE, WHILE WE ARE NOT YET AT THE 1977 DROUTH YEAR VALUES, DRYING HAS PROCEEDED MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN USUAL AND EARLY SEPTEMBER VALUES BEST DESCRIBE THE CURRENT SITUATION. FIRE BEHAVIOR. GRASS AND FLASHY HERBACEOUS FUELS STILL ACCOUNT FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE FIRE ACTIVITY SINCE OUR LAST REPORT.FIRES ARE, HOWEVER, BEGINNING TO RESPOND TO THE LOW FUEL MOISTURE CONDITIONS IN BOTH TIMBER AND BRUSH TYPE FUELBEDS. LOOK FOR CONTINUED DRYING IN LARGE FUELS AND CONTINUED MOISTURE LOSS IN CHAPARRAL.FIRES IN CHAPARRAL WILL BEGIN TO SUSTAIN THEMSELVES ON SOUTHERLY ASPECTS. STRONG UPHILL RUNS CAN BE EXPECTED ON STEEP SLOPESAND WINDS OVER ABOUT 20 MPH WILL PUSH FIRE THROUGH BRUSH FUELS. EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR IS NOT ANTICIPATED BUT STRONG, FAST RUNS CAN BE EXPECTED ON STEEP GROUND OR UNDER HIGH WIND CONDITIONS ESPECIALLY IN THE AFTERNOON TIMBER TYPE FUELS WILL BURN WITH HIGH INTENSITIES BUT IT WILL TAKE WINDY CONDITIONS TO GENERATE HIGH RATES OF SPREAD UNLESS FINE FUELS ARE PRESENT AT HIGH LOADINGS. ANOTHER WARNING IS IN ORDER REGARDING THE FLAMMABILITY OF SAGE, BUCK\rHEAT AND SIMILAR HERBACEOUS FUELS.COMPOSED AS THEY ARE OF PRIMARILY ONE HOUR TIMELAG FUEL COMPONENTS AND HAVING HIGH QUANTITIES OF VOLITILE OILS IN THEIR FOLIAGE THEY CAN BE ALMOST EXPLOSIVE UNDER HOT, DRY AND WINDY CONDITIONS. DICK HARRELL KEEP YOUR MAIL? Y FUEL MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST.