CHAPTER 15 ARRAS. April April 9 th st Battalion See sketch 27

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1 CHAPTER 15 ARRAS The change in the Allied plan of campaign which had postponed the opening of Sir Douglas Haig s offensive had allowed the Germans to retire according to plan on the defences of the Hindenburg Line, more formidable by the middle of April than they would have been a month earlier. But on the greater part of the Third Army s front the Germans had not withdrawn, and the plans originally arranged did not have to be seriously modified to meet the new situation. The 15 mile frontage to be attacked extended from Croisilles, S.E. of Arras, to the Northern end of the Vimy Ridge. Twelve divisions of the Third Army, among them the Twelfth, were detailed for the attack together with the Canadian Corps of General Home s First Army, which, with the assistance of the 13th Brigade from the Fifth Division, was to tackle the Vimy Ridge. Thus the 1st R.W.K. as well as the 6th took part in the attack, while the 8th who were on the fringe of it North of the Souchez River stood ready to join in should the success of the operations lead to an extension of the front. The defences to be assaulted were fully as formidable as those which had confronted the British forces on the Somme. The defensive belt organized in depth extended in places as far as five miles back and included three separate trench systems. But the British heavy guns and ammunition available exceeded even the preparations for the Somme, and for nearly three weeks before the day fixed for the assault a most systematic bombardment had been carried on, in which the new fuse 106, which burst the shell the instant it touched the ground, proved most effective in cutting wire. As zero day drew nearer the bombardment increased in volume and intensity, while gas was discharged on an 242 April 1917 extensive scale wherever conditions favoured it; by April 9th, when the assault was delivered, the defences had been so effectually battered and the garrisons so shaken and demoralized that the front system was carried over almost the whole line. The advance to the second objective met rather more resistance, but soon after mid-day this, too, was captured. After the attackers passed on beyond the positions which had been within the reach of their preliminary bombardment their fortunes were more chequered, but as a whole the day fully fulfilled the high hopes that had been formed and dealt a really severe blow to the Germans. In this day of general success two battalions of The Queen s Own had their share of victory. The 13th Brigade s task was to pass through the Second Canadian Division after it had captured its second objective and to carry on the advance to where the Eastern edge of the Vimy Ridge dips steeply to the low ground beyond. The 1 st Battalion had moved up into assembly trenches at Neuville St. Vaast on the evening of April 8th, but did not advance till 7.30 a.m., two hours after zero. As it started snow was falling heavily, which added considerably to the difficulty of crossing ground already devastated by the bombardment and pitted with craters and shell holes. The tanks told off to assist the attack were found stuck in the mud at the first objective, but this had not prevented the Canadians from securing both their objectives, and the battalion reached its appointed position of deployment along the Lille road practically without loss. A short halt here allowed the ground ahead to be reconnoitred, and at 9.30 the battalion advanced, passing through the Canadians who were consolidating their second objective. So effective was the barrage that Thelus Trench was reached and April 9 th st Battalion See sketch 27

2 rushed with great ease; little effective opposition was offered, though some 30 prisoners were secured. C and D Companies (Captains Bellman and Wilberforce), who were leading, promptly pushed parties up the communi- 243 cation trench leading to Telegraphen Weg and into the shattered remains of Count s Wood, while No. 14 Platoon, led by Lieut. Hyde and 2nd Lieut. Lewis Barned, secured a crossroads on the right, despite fire over open sights from some German guns in the Bois du Goulot, which were silenced by the accurate shooting of a covering party. Then, while C and D consolidated Thelus Trench, having established touch with the First Canadian Division on the right and the K.O.S.B. s on the left, A and B took up the advance. B, well led by 2nd Lieut. Jenkinson, worked forward round the Northern edge of Count s Wood and, entering the Bois du Goulot from the North, pushed through it, meeting rather more opposition which, however, was speedily overcome, the Germans affording good targets to our Lewis gunners as they made off to the N.E. By 11 a.m. the Blue Line had been secured and then A (2nd Lieut. Press) came up on B s right to complete the clearing of the Bois du Goulot and carry the advance on to the Brown Line, the final objective on its Eastern edge. It, too, was completely successful; a large party of Germans retired hastily in front of it, nine guns of various calibres were captured and many casualties inflicted on the retiring enemy, again mainly by the Lewis gunners, among whom L/Cpls. Bott and Dimmock, Corpl. Ackland and Ptes. Gould and Peachey were conspicuous. By noon the battalion had secured the final objective and had started consolidating it, Lieut. Monypenny and his platoon pushing forward 350 yards ahead of the outpost line and forming an advanced post under heavy fire from machine-guns. From the Bois de Goulot a magnificent view could be obtained over the country at the foot of the ridge on fine days the colour of Douai Cathedral could even be made out and with this advantage in observation it was easy to detect and report to the artillery any German movement in the plain below. The success of the April 9 th st Battalion 244 attack had apparently altogether upset the arrangements of the Germans, for nothing like the vigorous counterattacks of Loos and the Somme was attempted. A and B reported one or two advances to the artillery and assisted to break them up with longrange rifle and Lewis-gun fire, but all that day and the next consolidation proceeded almost unimpeded by the enemy s shell-fire, though rather more effectively hampered by the difficulty of getting up stores and rations over the desolation between the advanced positions and the old British front line, a task in which Lieut. Thorne, the Quarter Master, displayed quite exceptional zeal and ability. On one occasion, moreover, a convoy of pack animals bringing up rations to the front line came under shellfire and was thrown into confusion, several horses being hit, but Corpl. Cutter and Pte. Miles did splendid work and brought the rations through nevertheless. On the evening of the 10th a Canadian battalion arrived to relieve the battalion, which went back to Gouy Servins, not so much to rest as to find some of the large working parties required for the bringing forward of the communications and rearward establishments April 9 th st Battalion April 10 th

3 to meet the new situation. As the weather was peculiarly bad a series of blizzards following in quick succession and the troops were for the moment on reduced rations, this work proved particularly trying; but the battalion had good reason to congratulate itself, not only on a very fine achievement, but on the lightness of its casualty list. Twenty officers and 655 other ranks had gone into action; (1) only 138 figured in the list, Lieut. Hyde and 13 men being killed, 12 men missing, 2nd Lieut. Lewis Barned and the remaining 111 men wounded. (2) While the 1st Battalion had been achieving notable success at this very low cost the 6th, though encounter- April 9 th (1) The battle surplus, on which the battalion might be reconstructed in case of heavy losses, had included 12 officers with N.C.O. s and specialists. (2) Captains Wilberforce and Bellman received the M.C. 245 ing more serious opposition, had been equally successful and scarcely less fortunate as regards losses. The Twelfth Division was in the right centre of the battlefront, starting from the suburb of St. Sauveur and advancing between the Arras Cambria road and the Arras-Douai railway. Its immediate objective was the high ground known as Observation Ridge which runs Northward from Tilloy-lez-Mofflaines towards the Scarpe. The 37th Brigade took the right of the line with the 6th Queen s on the right and 7th East Surreys on the left, the battalion following the East Surreys. On their left came the 36th Brigade, which, with the 37 th, was to carry the attack as far as the Division s second objective the Blue Line after which the 35th was to come through and attack yet a third objective, the Brown Line. Here also the artillery had done its work with extraordinary effectiveness, and The Queen s and East Surreys secured the Black Line in very quick time, while the supporting battalions got forward almost without any casualties. They had had the great advantage of starting the attack unusually fit and fresh owing to the splendid accommodation afforded close up to the front line by the extensive caves and cellars with which Arras abounded, and bad as the going was in the sleet and snow, the troops advanced confidently. The main obstacle before the battalion was Hangest Trench, which was situated on the Western slopes of Observation Ridge and was flanked on the North by Holt and Heron Works, the latter being on the front of the 36th Brigade; while two main communication trenches running back from the front system to the second, Henley Lane on the North and Havant Lane on the South, had to be cleared to prevent the enemy using them for flanking fire. Considerable opposition was offered, the position was strong and bristled with machine-guns, the tanks which should have cooperated never arrived, and the battalion had to fight hard. It passed through the April 9 th 1917 See sketch East Surreys at 7.30 a.m., and by 8.50 reports reached the Brigade that our troops were in Hangest Trench. A little later, however, another message described them as held up in front of that trench, and it soon became dear that as the state of the ground had prevented the troops from keeping quite close up to the barrage some parties of the enemy had managed to put up an effective opposition and had held the attack up in places. The 6th, indeed, had outstripped the troops on their flanks, and at a April 9 th 1917

4 message came back from Colonel Dawson that he had two companies in Henley Lane and Hamel Work, (1) somewhat to the left of and outside his objective, that another company was held up in front of Hangest Trench and that the remaining one had got into Hotte Work on his right. These lodgements on the flanks proved most useful in overcoming the resistance in the centre. Lieut. Thomas distinguished himself by pushing on ahead with a small party, and by forcing his way into the enemy s trench he helped greatly to let the rest of his company, B, get forward, and gradually ground was gained. The detachments which had got in on the left worked down from Henley Lane against Holt Work and Hangest Trench, overcoming a stubborn opposition, while that in Hotte Work also made ground inwards, simultaneously getting touch with the Buffs in Houlette Work further to the right. Under this pressure from the flanks the defence of Hangest Trench and Holt Work collapsed, many Germans put up their hands and a substantial haul of prisoners was collected while the battalion pushed forward and secured its final objective without much further trouble. Here, about 1 p.m., the 35th Brigade passed through it on its way to the Brown Line, on which the battalion set to work to consolidate the position gained; at 3 p.m. it was reported as occupying Hotte Work and part of Holt (1) It seems possible that it was not Hamel Work, but Heron Work, which the left companies had taken. 247 as its main line, with advanced posts on the higher ground in front. Despite its hard fighting the 6th had got off relatively lightly. Only 30 men had fallen with one officer, 2nd Lieut. Proctor; Captain L. C. R. Smith, 2nd Lieuts. Waterhouse, Duffield, Fuller, Apperley and Kneafsey were wounded with 124 men, another 10 men were missing, a total of 172 out of the 20 officers and 655 other ranks in action. (1) This loss could not be reckoned severe in comparison with the exceptionally heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy and the importance of the gains secured; indeed, the Division s 1200 prisoners came to more than half its 2,000 casualties, and the day was certainly the most successful that the Twelfth had yet known. Included in the 6th s captures on this day were one gun, which Colonel Dawson endeavoured to secure as a trophy for The Queen s Own, though he was not successful in rescuing it from the clutches of the Division, and a box containing half -a-dozen Iron Crosses which had obviously been sent up with the rations for distribution. These were eagerly annexed by their finders, and it was with some difficulty and for a large price that one corporal was induced to part with his trophy in order that it might be presented to the Brigadier, General Cator, when he next reviewed the battalion. Meanwhile the 35 th Brigade had secured the Brown Line after heavy fighting, and in the course of April 10th and 11th the Thirty-Seventh Division, which had come up from behind and passed through, carried the advance further and reached Monchy le Preux. This village stood on higher ground than the country round it and was in consequence a tactical position of some importance, so its retention was a matter of urgency. But the Thirty-Seventh Division had lost heavily and was so exhausted that on April 11 th the April 1917 (1) The battalion s effective strength on April 1st had been 32 officers and 833 other ranks th Brigade had to relieve it. The Brigade had had a hard time since the 9th. It had April 1917

5 been unable to shelter in the German dug-outs as many of them had proved to be fitted with delayed-action mines and had blown up with many casualties to their occupants, and the men were exhausted by the work of consolidating trenches in the extremely wintry weather which had set in with the attack and had continued ever since. But they rose to this new demand, and on the evening of April 11 th took over the line East of Monchy, the 6th Battalion being on the left. It was an extremely awkward position; the line here formed a pronounced salient as neither of the Divisions on the flanks had yet got up level. The troops on the left of the battalion were hard to locate, no satisfactory defensive line had as yet been taken up and the position was under heavy and steady shellfire and intermittent sniping. Moreover, the conditions in the village were indescribably ghastly. One officer writes that the streets were literally flowing with the blood of horses and men. A brigade of cavalry had been caught in Monchy by German machine-guns, and the place was strewn with dead and dying horses. It was remnants of this brigade whom the 6th had to relieve among others, and the general confusion added greatly to the difficulties of the relief. For tired men it was a severe trial, but Colonel Dawson set his battalion a splendid example of energy and devotion to duty. He was indefatigable, putting the position into a satisfactory state, re-adjusting the line and re-organizing the defence generally; all this, too, was done under heavy shelling with characteristic coolness and disregard for danger. He inspired confidence everywhere and in everybody, and the men responded splendidly to his calls upon them. Finally, after an arduous and exhausting times the 1st Essex, of the Twenty-Ninth Division, (1) arrived to take over, and the battalion could (1) This was the same battalion which had relieved the 6th at Gueudecourt in October, 1916 (cf. p. 220). 249 withdraw to Arras and thence to Montenescourt for a week s well-deserved rest. Meanwhile the extension of the battle-zone Northward had brought the Twenty-Fourth Division into the fighting, and on April 12th it co-operated with the Fourth Canadians in a successful advance astride the Souchez River. The 8th R.W. K., being at the opposite end of the Division s line, was not engaged in this, but next day there were indications that the enemy were beginning to withdraw from the trenches opposite and the battalion promptly pushed forward strong patrols. These, led by 2nd Lieuts. Hayward and Tanner, penetrated over half-a-mile into the German positions, driving back the parties left to cover the withdrawal and taking some prisoners. Next day the 8th Queen s pushed on ahead, the battalion consolidating a line through Cite St. Pierre, one of the suburbs of Lens. On the 15th it again took up the advance, but this time encountered much more opposition; and though it made good Cowden Trench just beyond Cite St. Pierre, could progress no further without more artillery support than was available. It had therefore merely to consolidate the ground gained, but while doing this had three officers (2nd Lieuts. Vaughan, Johnson and Woolley) and one warrant officer (C.S.M. Verrall) killed and two more officers wounded by one unlucky shell, a bad blow to the battalion, which had altogether nine officers and 60 men hit in these operations, losing in five days more than twice as many as the previous five weeks in the Calonne sector had cost it. Between April 12th and the end of the month the fighting on the Arras front continued April th Battalion See sketch 52 April 13 th April 14 th

6 almost without intermission, though without the brilliant success which had attended the first attack. This was largely because the continuation of the British attack did not form part of Sir Douglas Haig s original scheme. By April 15th he had achieved his purpose. All the tactical features he had desired to secure were in his hands, heavy losses 250 had been inflicted on the enemy, many prisoners and -guns had been taken, reserves had been attracted to the Arras front, and the British plans would not be served by pressing further at this point, particularly as the advance had already largely out-run the artillery support immediately available, so that each step further would only increase the difficulties of getting guns forward to assist it and of keeping the advanced troops supplied. But it was necessary to go on attacking at Arras to divert the German attention from the great French effort on the Aisne from which so much was hoped; and after the virtual failure of General Nivelle s short cut to victory had thrown the whole Allied plan of campaign utterly out of gear, the British had at all costs to keep the Germans fully occupied lest they should profit by their opportunity and fall in force upon the French when they were suffering from the inevitable reaction consequent on their bitter disillusionment. In the renewed British attack of April 23 rd 24 th, when Guemappe and Gavrelle and some other positions were secured, The Queen s Own was not represented; the 1st Battalion, who had moved up to the front again on the 22nd, was held in reserve and spent April 23rd in readiness to move forward, receiving various contradictory orders and reports. The Fifth Division s attack against the Vimy-Lens line between the Vimy- Avion railway and the Souchez River, though gallantly pressed, led to no substantial gains, and when the battalion moved up in the evening to take over the front trenches from the shattered Norfolks it was only an old British line that they occupied. But the enemy attempted no counter-attack, contenting himself with barraging the front line heavily, and the battalion got off without any losses. This was largely because Colonel Dunlop had dug in a little in advance of the old British line, which came in for a very severe but to the battalion quite innocuous shelling. Next night it was relieved by Canadians and was not 251 April 1917 April 23 rd 1 st Battalion again actively employed for another ten days, in which interval various small reinforcements arrived which did not quite balance its losses of April 9th, but enabled it to take over 600 men into action when on May 2nd it moved up to Roclincourt for the Fifth Division s next attack. Before that the 6th had also returned to the battle-zone, for the Twelfth Division had gone into line between Monchy and the Scarpe on April 25th. The tactical position just N.E. of Monchy was complicated and unsatisfactory. The British front line at this point ran from Rifle Farm, a point due N.E. of Monchy, N.W. along Rifle Trench, but the Northern end of the trench was held by the Germans to its junction with Bayonet Trench. This last trench, part of which also was in German hands, ran North and South parallel with the Western end of Monchy. From April 25th to the end of the month there was sharp fighting for the German portions of Rifle and Bayonet Trenches. Some ground was gained on April 28th by the 35th, Brigade, the 6th Battalion being in reserve and employed mainly as carrying parties. Bayonet Trench was then secured and April st Battalion See sketch 29

7 during the next two days all but a small fragment of Rifle Trench was taken. But this left Monchy still in a distinct salient, liable to enfilade fire from the North and North- East, and this very much complicated the task of the Twelfth Division in the big attack arranged for May 3rd. This attack was the biggest effort which the British Armies had made since the opening of the Arras offensive. The front extended from Fresnoy to Fontaine lez Croisilles, while further South the Fifth Army attacked the Hindenburg Line near Bullecourt. Of The Queen s Own only the 6th and 7th Battalions were actively engaged; for the 1st, though in readiness to advance, had the attacks of the Seventeenth Corps met with substantial success, was not called upon to do so. May 3 rd 252 To the 6th and 7th, however, May 3rd brought desperate fighting and heavy losses. The Twelfth Division s task was to swing up its left flank level with its right, so as to reduce the salient at Monchy. It put two brigades into its attack, the 37th being on the right with the Buffs and E. Surreys in front, the R.W.K. in support, and The Queen s in reserve. The leading battalions had first to capture the line formed by Scabbard Trench on their left and Devil s Trench on their right, and then to push on to Gun Trench. This was the Brown Line, beyond it Cartridge and Grenade Trenches formed the Yellow Line, where the 6th were to pass through and go on to the Red Dotted Line, half a mile further East. The ground to be crossed was a maze of trenches old and new. But even more troublesome obstacles were presented by sunken roads and shell-holes, organized for defence and far more difficult for the artillery to locate and to register than definite trench-lines. Somewhat similar conditions prevailed at the point where the Eighteenth Division was to attack. This was some way further to the right, the actual first objective of the 55th Brigade being the village of Cherisy on the left bank of the Sensée, which river had to be crossed and a Red Line consolidated on the slopes beyond. The 7th, like the 6th, were in support, the Buffs and East Surreys being the attacking battalions. Both the Twelfth and Eighteenth Divisions began by securing considerable gains. Scabbard Trench and Devil s Trench were crossed and the leading battalions of the Twelfth reached Gun Trench and even penetrated some way further. But at zero (3.45 a.m.) it was still dark and it seems that the parties detailed to mop up the enemy s front line were not completely successful, for when daylight came parts of Scabbard and Devil s Trenches were still in German hands and machine-gun fire from these points swept No Man s Land and effectually severed communication between May 3 rd the supports and the advanced troops. The Third Division, too, on the right of the Twelfth had been unsuccessful against the Southern end of Devil s Trench, and all through the morning the Germans were pushing reinforcements into Devil s Trench from which they extended Northwards. When these came forward in strength they were caught by the British guns and pretty severely punished, but they dribbled enough men forward to re-occupy their old front line nearly as far as Harness Lane. Further to the left the 36th Brigade not only secured their portion of Scabbard Trench but reached the Brown Line, here a continuation of Gun Trench. But on the 37th Brigade s front, the May 3 rd 1917

8 situation remained very obscure. The great difficulty about ordering a fresh bombardment was that it was uncertain whether the troops who had reached the Brown Line were holding out or not, and without a fresh bombardment it would have been madness to send the 6th over the top in the face of the German machine guns. (1) As the day wore on the German artillery fire increased in volume; it was, however, decided to make a fresh attempt on Devil s Trench under cover of darkness, and after over an hour s artillery preparation, the 6th assaulted about p.m., A and B Companies in front line. (2) Intense machine-gun fire swept through them from both flanks: some of the front wave won through to the German trenches, the majority were shot down and the survivors crept back as best they could. Of those who actually reached the German trenches, about 60, headed by 2nd Lieut. Pyrke, pushed on to Gun Trench and established themselves there. Unluckily Colonel Dawson had been hit just before the (1) Later on some few of the Buffs and East Surreys did make their way back, working round to their left towards the frontage of the 36th Brigade, whose advanced troops had finally to fall back to and consolidate Scabbard Trench. (2) What made Devil s Trench specially hard to capture was that being on the back slope of a ridge it was hard to shell accurately, while the defenders got good targets when the attacking troops came over the crest. 254 attack started and was not available to organize an effort to get through to the help of this detachment. It shows what confidence the battalion had in its young commander that everybody was convinced that had he been present he would have found some way of reaching the little party who were making so fine a stand. Though cut off from help and surrounded by the Germans, they maintained themselves stubbornly for 48 hours, beating off all attacks, till eventually sheer lack of food and water compelled them to surrender. Less fortunate than the 7th in Trones Wood, they had put up a fight which deserved a better fate. But the attack, though gallantly pushed, had failed completely and had cost the 6th over 250 rank and file and eleven officers. Of these Captain E. T. Williams and 2nd Lieut. M. J. Walker were killed, the wounded included, besides Colonel Dawson, Captain Friend, Lieut. G. W. Hill. and 2nd Lieut. Thurburn, while 2nd Lieuts. Antill, Allen, Browning, Ely, Hibbett and Pyrke were taken prisoners. The loss of Captain Williams was much felt; he had served with the battalion since the end of 1914, and had impressed his personality on his brother officers and men as a real leader. The sadly reduced battalion was relieved before dawn by The Queen s, and after a day in support retired to the reserve line to re-organize, Major Alderman, who had been left behind with various details at Arras, and had been kept out of the fight, succeeding to the command in Colonel Dawson s absence. May 3rd had been a disastrous day for the 6th Battalion; it had gone no better with the 7th. The 55th Brigade started well; Cherisy was rushed and cleared and its leading battalions reached the first objective, the Blue Line, well up to time, though the right flank had to be flung back as touch with the 54th Brigade could not be secured; that brigade had come up against broad belts of uncut wire, sited on a reverse slope where the British guns had been unable to reach them, and had May 3 rd th Battalion See sketch in consequence been held up and had suffered terrible losses. D Company of the May 3 rd th Battalion

9 battalion, under Captain Latter, had been detailed as moppers up, and, moving forward behind the leaders, reached the Blue Line about 6.15 and began to consolidate a position on the left flank on the road leading North-East from Cherisy to Vis en Artois. (1) Here also the 55th Brigade s flank was in the air, the Fourteenth Division having apparently failed to get as far forward. The company did not, however, remain here long, being ordered across to the right in order to establish touch between the Buffs and the 54th Brigade. This move Captain Latter carried out with much skill and gallantry, though he was wounded in doing so, but no touch could be obtained, and this flank was quite in the air. Meanwhile some of the leading battalions had forged ahead and gained a precarious foothold on the final objective, but the insecurity of the left flank caused the East Surreys to ask for reinforcements, upon which 2nd Lieut. F. H. F. Smith went up about 7.30 with half A Company and took post on the left of the Blue Line, while the rest of A and half B moved across to Cable Trench, the German front line West of Cherisy; the rest of B had now (8.30 a.m.) come up to the old British front line and C was acting as a carrying party. By this time the enemy were bombarding Cherisy and the British trenches freely, and were attacking the exposed right of the 55th Brigade in force, giving Captain Latter and his men good targets in plenty. The troops who had reached the Red Line were soon driven back, and by 11 a.m. the Germans were also pressing hard on the East Surreys in front and from the left flank. Before long the Blue Line also became untenable, but the troops put up a fine fight and for some time held the enemy at bay. 2nd Lieut. Smith and his platoons of A made a determined stand in a (1) Approximately at the point marked A on the plan. 256 sunken road North-West of the village; D, splendidly led by Captain Latter, who was last seen setting a fine example of gallantry and devotion, offered a stout resistance until overwhelmed by numbers, while the detachments of A and B in Cable Trench, though at one time the retreating British masked their fire, held on for some time and inflicted many casualties on the enemy, until at last sheer weight of numbers forced them back to the British line which C was now manning. Captain Warren did splendid work in covering this retirement; he maintained his position most tenaciously, kept the enemy at bay and was only dislodged from Cable Trench by their getting round both his flanks. It looked as if the Germans might push on further, but they failed to do so, and upon C the retreating troops rallied and were reorganized. Lieut. Woodhouse was conspicuous in this work, exposing himself fearlessly and setting a fine example. Later on the 7 th Queen s were brought up for a fresh attempt on Cherisy, during which the line was held by B and C with A and the 15 survivors who alone remained of D in support. But The Queen s could achieve nothing in face of the machine-guns without much more artillery support than was available, and they lost heavily to no result. All through the next day the 7th continued to hold the line; the Germans kept up a steady shelling but attempted nothing more, and next night the battalion was relieved by the 6th Royal Berkshires and taken back to Beaurains. Its casualties came to 173, Captain Latter and 2nd Lieut. Grist and 22 men were killed, 50 men missing, Colonel Hickson, Captain Warren, six subalterns and 91 men wounded. But the battalion had started the attack much below strength and the losses represented a substantial portion of its effectives. May 3 rd th Battalion May 4 th 5 th

10 But the Regiment was not yet clear of the Arras offensive. The ill-success of May 3rd notwithstand- 257 ing, it was still necessary to maintain the pressure to distract the German attention from the French front. The main interest of the next few days centred at Bullecourt, away to the right on the Fifth Army s front, and upon Fresnoy and Oppy on the left, where the Fifth Division was still in action; though round Monchy also activity was desirable, partly in order to improve the local tactical situation. To this end the 6th Battalion, after a short rest, was called back to the front on May 7th and went into line on the extreme left of the Divisional front which now extended to the Scarpe. The battalion was so much reduced that it had to be re-organized in two companies under Captains Thomas and Hodgson-Smith, but even so, these companies were under 150 strong in the trenches, so that the strain on the men was heavy. It was a disturbed corner, the enemy seemed apprehensive of attack and was constantly putting down barrages without any provocation, so the work on the trenches, of which there was much to be done, was carried on under heavy shell-fire. As often happened the company in the front line got off better than the supports, on whom the majority of the German barrages descended. There were no dugouts, the trenches gave but little protection, and relatively to the numbers available, the casualties, over 40 in all, including 2nd Lieut. Keats killed, were not very light; most of them occurred on the 12th when the enemy retaliated by a severe bombardment of Bayonet and Scabbard Trenches for a renewed attack on Devil s Trench. Another day of heavy shelling was May 16th, when the enemy were making a big but unsuccessful attack on the Fifty-First Division just across the Scarpe, near Roeux, but on this occasion the battalion, though in the front line, escaped without casualties. On the 17th it was relieved after ten very hard days and went back to Montenescourt and then to Ivergny, where it was to get a real spell of rest. Even its paper strength was now well below 258 May , for no drafts had been received to replace the casualties of May 3rd. While the 6th and 7th Battalions were making their gallant but unsuccessful efforts of May 3rd, the 1st had again come within the area of active operations, but the 13th Brigade was in Corps reserve on that day, moving up in the evening and taking over trenches North-West of Oppy. Even then the battalion was in Brigade reserve and did not descend the Eastern slopes of the Vimy Ridge, occupying trenches south of Farbus Wood from which a splendid view could be obtained. Here it remained several days, being occasionally shelled and constantly worried by the hostile aircraft, at this time unpleasantly active and successful. After the German counter-attack of May 8th, which recovered Fresnoy, the battalion went up into the front line just West of Oppy, but had no part in the effort of May 9th to recover Fresnoy. This was practically the last important episode in the Arras offensive on that part of the front. Indeed, the policy adopted at this moment indicated the end of the offensive: the Division was to consolidate its position, to do its utmost to harass the enemy and prevent him from strengthening his line, to make all possible use of machine-gun and rifle-fire, to organize its snipers carefully and harass the enemy with its artillery, but no further advance was to be attempted, though further South a more active policy was maintained for some time longer. May st Battalion

11 Actually the battalion remained in this part of the line till May 23rd, being assiduously shelled, for the enemy, who evidently expected another attack, constantly put down barrages; it was also a good deal bothered by the attentions of the German aeroplanes, who were decidedly in the ascendant at the moment in this quarter, but it escaped with light casualties, having less than 60 for the whole month of May. Early in the month Major Waring had left the battalion to 259 command a Territorial battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment, upon which Captain Wilberforce became Adjutant. On May 26th Lieut.-Col. Buchanan-Dunlop had to go sick and return to England; he had commanded the battalion for the better part of two years and had led it through some stern experiences on the Somme and in its day of triumph on the Vimy Ridge, while his careful training and judicious planning had been largely responsible for the conspicuous success of the great Givenchy raid. All were sorry to lose him and, unfortunately for The Queen s Own, on recovering his health he was posted not to one of its battalions, but to one of the Machine-Gun Corps. Major Lynch White had meanwhile taken over command of the 1st Battalion. May st Battalion 260

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